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THE  HISTORY 

OP  THB 

EOMAN  BEPTTBLIC. 


\ 


h 


THE  HISTOKY 

OF     THE 

ROMAN    REPUBLIC 


ABRIDGED   FEOM  THE   HISTORY  BY 
PROFESSOR   MOMMSEN 

// 


BY 

C.  BRYANS, 

ABSISTANT-MASTER   IN   DULWICH   COLLEGE, 

F.  J.  R.  HENDY, 

ABSISTANT-MASTEB  IN  FETTES  COLLEGE. 


NEW  YORK  : 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S   SONS. 

1911 


NORTH  CAH.tHiJ.wn 


PREFACE. 


Probably  few  whose  duty  it  is  to  teach  Roman  history  in 
schools  will  deny  that  some  such  work  as  the  present  has 
too  long  been  needed.  It  is  for  men  thus  engaged  to  judge 
whether  this  book  meets  their  need.  It  would  be  alike 
impertinent  and  superfluous  to  dilate  on  the  merits  of 
Professor  Mommsen's  history :  those  merits  have  won 
recognition  from  all  qualified  judges,  and  have  long  estab- 
lished his  position  as  the  prince  of  Roman  historians.  Un- 
fortunately the  size  of  his  history  is  beyond  the  compass 
of  ordinary  schoolboys;  nay,  possibly,  others  besides  school- 
boys have  shrunk  from  attempting  so  formidable  a  task. 
Our  abridgment  of  his  history  must  of  necessity  give  but 
a  feeble  and  inadequate  idea  of  the  original ;  but  something 
will  have  been  accomplished  if  we  have  given  some  con- 
ception, however  faint,  of  that  original,  and  have  induced 
fresh  inquirers  to  read  for  themselves  those  pages  so 
bright  with  wisdom  and  imagination.  There  has  been  no 
attempt  to  hold  the  balance  between  Professor  Mommsen 
'  and  his  rival  Ihne,  nor  to  answer  the  criticisms  of  Pro- 
fessor Freeman.  Such  efforts,  even  if  we  had  the  ability 
to  make  them,  wonld  be  manifestly  out  of  place  in  such 
a  work  as  this.  Occasionally,  indeed,  conflicting  views 
have  been  indicated  in  a  note;  and  the  authorities  have 
been  studied,  but  our  text  contains  the  views  of  Professor 
Mommsen.  Whatever  merits  may  belong  to  this  work 
should  be  ascribed  to  another;  we  must  be  held  responsible 
for  its  defects.  Our  object  has  been  to  present  the  salient 
points  clearly,  and  as  far  as  possible  to  escape  dulness, 
the  Nemesis  of  the  abridger.  Consequently  we  have  tried 
to  avoid  writing  down  to  a  boy's  level,  a  process  invariably 

b 


vi  PREFACE. 

resented  by  the  boy  himself.  Inverted  commas  indicate 
that  the  passage  is  directly  taken  from  the  original.  The 
requirements  of  space  have  necessitated  the  omission  of 
a  special  chapter  on  Literature,  Art,  Religion,  Economy, 
etc. ;  nor  have  we  thought  it  wise  to  insert  a  few  maps  or 
illustrations  of  coins,  works  of  art,  etc.  An  atlas  is  really 
indispensable,  and  one  is,  we  believe,  shortly  to  be  pub- 
lished specially  designed  to  illustrate  this  period.  We  have 
to  express  our  great  indebtedness  to  Professor  Dickson  for 
allowing  us  to  make  free  use  of  his  translation,  the  merits 
of  which  it  would  be  difficult  to  overpraise.  Our  gratitude 
is  also  due  to  Mr.  Fowler,  of  Lincoln  College,  Oxford,  and 
to  Mr.  Matheson,  of  New  College,  Oxford.  The  former 
kindly  revised  the  proof  sheets  of  the  chapter  on  Autho- 
rities, and  gave  valuable  suggestions.  The  latter  was 
good  enough  to  revise  all  the  proof  sheets  of  the  history, 
in  the  preparation  of  which  we  often  found  much  assist- 
ance from  his  very  useful  "  Outline  of  Roman  History." 
We  have  also  to  thank  Mr.  H.  E.  Goldschmidt,  of 
Fettes  College,  Edinburgh,  for  a  careful  revision  of  a 
large  portion  of  the  proofs. 

While  our  history  was  in  the  press  the  third  volume  of 
Professor  Mommsen's  "  Romisches  Staatsrecht"  appeared. 
Where  possible,  we  have  added  references  to  it  m  our 
lists  of  authorities. 


THE  SOURCES  OF  ROMAN  HISTORY. 


At  the  close  of  each  chapter  we  have  subjoined,  where 
possible,  a  list  of  the  chief  authorities  for  the  statements 
therein  contained,  but  a  few  remarks  on  the  character 
of  such  authorities  will  not  be  out  of  place. 

Modern  criticism  has  rudely  shattered  the  romantic 
legends  of  the  origin  and  regal  period  of  Rome,  legends 
given  us  in  one  form  or  another  by  all  the  ancient  writers 
whose  works  are  still  preserved.  Any  reconstruction  of 
the  ruined  fabric  must  necessarily  rest  in  the  main  upon 
conjecture,  and,  however  great  be  the  probability  of  such 
conjecture,  absolute  certainty  is  impossible.  Not  only 
does'  darkness  envelop  the  regal  period  of  Rome,  but  we 
have  to  move  with  great  caution  through  the  confused 
accounts  of  the  triumphs  abroad  and  conflicts  at  home 
which  marked  Rome's  career  during  the  first  centuries 
of  the  republic.  The  reason  of  this  is  plain  :  no  records 
except  of  the  most  meagre  kind  were  at  first  preserved 
by  the  Romans,  and  the  earliest  writer  of  Roman  history 
did  not  live  until  the  time  of  the  second  Punic  war,  or 
five  hundred  years  after  the  foundation  of  the  city. 

Our  inquiry  into  the  sources  of  Roman  history  naturally 
falls  into  two  divisions  :  firstly,  as  to  what  were  the 
authorities  of  the  Roman  writers  themselves  ;  secondly, 
as  to  what  weight  must  be  attached  to  the  writers  whose 
works  have  come  down  to  us. 

Among  the  earliest  records  preserved  at  Rome  were 
(1)  the  annales  pontificii  and  the  annales  pontificum 
maximi.  The  first-mentioned,  although  mainly  devoted 
to  the  various  religious  forms  and  ceremonies,  doubtless 
contained  mention  of  historical  events,  while  the  annales 


via  THE  SOURCES  OF  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

maximi  contained  a  bare  statement,  by  the  pontifex 
maximus,  of  the  chief  events  of  the  year  and  the  names  of 
the  chief  magistrates;  and  this  statement  was  pu'blicly 
exhibited  every  year. 

(2)  In  imitation  of  the  records  kept  by  the  priest- 
colleges,  arose  at  a  later  time  commentarii,  or  notes,  kept 
by  the  chief  officers  of  the  state,  e.g  by  the  consuls  and 
quaestors,  and  also  the  tabulae  eensoriae  or  lists  of  the 
censors.  These  were  known  under  the  wider  term  of 
libri  magistratuum,  a  special  division  of  which  is  men- 
tioned by  Livy  (iv.  13,  etc.),  under  the  name  of  libri 
lintei,  or  books  written  on  linen. 

(3)  The  pontifices  also  arranged  calendars  or  fasti  con- 
taining the  days  set  apart  for  the  transaction  of  business 
(dies  fasti),  in  which  were  also  enumerated  the  feasts, 
games,  markets,  sacrifices,  etc.,  and  to  which  were  gradu- 
ally added  the  anniversaries  of  disasters  and  other  brief 
notices  of  historical  events. 

(4)  The  name  of  fasti  was  subsequently  given  to  lists 
of  years  containing  (a)  the  names  of  the  chief  magis- 
trates (fasti  consulares),  (b)  the  triumphs  held  in  each 
year  (fasti  triumphales),  and  (c)  the  names  of  the  priests 
(fasti  sacerdotales).  Of  these,  the  first-named,  called 
Fasti  Capitolini  from  the  fact  that  they  are  now  pre- 
served in  the  Capitol,  are  the  most  important,  and  con- 
tain the  names  of  the  successive  consuls,  censors,  dic- 
tators, and  magistri  equitum. 

(5)  In  addition  to  the  above-mentioned  state  documents, 
which  were  in  the  keeping  of  the  magistrates,  there 
existed  private  memorials  and  family  chronicles  of  various 
kinds.  Some  were  in  writing,  and  no  doubt  contained 
gross  exaggerations  in  glorification  of  particular  houses. 
To  these  belong  the  imagines  or  ancestral  busts  with  the 
attached  inscriptions  (elogia),the  funeral  eulogies  (lauda- 
tiones  funebres),  the  songs  (neniae)  sung  during  funeral 
processions  or  at  funeral  banquets,  and  the  inscriptions 
on  votive  presents,  pillars,  and  tombs. 

(6)  The  most  important  legal  monument  is  that  of  the 
Twelve  Tables,  which  were  graven  on  iron  and  set  up 
in  the  Forum,  and  were,  in  Livy's  words,  "fons  omnis 
publici  privatique  iuris."  The  original  probably  perished 
in  the  burning  of   Rome  by  the  Gauls,  but  was  either 


THE  SOURCES  OF  BOM  AN  HISTORY.  ix 

replaced  by  copies  preserved  by  the  pontifices  or  was 
restored  from  memory.  We  may  add  to  this  section  the 
so-called  leges  regiae,  which,  though  purporting  to  give 
decrees  and  decisions  of  the  kings  chiefly  on  religious 
matters,  were  really  a  collection  of  old  laws,  set  down 
in.  writing  at  a  period  later  than  the  Twelve  Tables. 

(7)  Another  source  of  information  consisted  of  various 
treaties  of  alliance.  Dionysius  mentions  (a)  an  apocryphal 
treaty  between  Romulus  and  the  Veientines  (ii.  55),  (b) 
one  between  Tullus  Hostilius  and  the  Sabines  (hi.  33), 

(c)  one  between  Servius  Tullius  and  the  Latins  (iv.  26), 

(d)  one  between  Tarquinius  (?  Superbus)  and  Gabii  (iv. 
58).  Polybius  (iii.  22—26)  gives  an  account  of  three 
ancient  treaties  between  Rome  and  Carthage,  Pliny 
(N.  H.  xxxiv.  14)  mentions  the  treaty  with  Porsena, 
Cicero  (pro  Balbo,  23)  mentions  the  treaty  of  alliance 
with  the  Latins  in  493  B.C.,  and  Livy  (iv.  7)  mentions  the 
treaty  made  with  Ardea,  410  B.C.  To  these  may  be  added 
mention  by  Festus  *  (p.  318)  of  the  first  tribunician  law, 
493  B.C.,  and  the  mention  by  Livy  (iii.  31)  and  by  Dio- 
nysius (x.  32)  of  the  Italian  law  De  Aventino  Publicando 
in  456  B.C. 

Such,  then,  were  the  sources  open  to  the  earliest 
Roman  annalists.  We  may  now  turn  to  them.  Our  first 
list  will  give  those  writers  whose  works  embraced  the 
early  history  of  Rome  but  which  have  perished,  with  the 
exception  of  a  few  fragments. t  (1)  Q-  Fabius  Pictor, 
born  about  254  B.C.,  served  in  the  Celtic  war  of  22o  B.C., 
and  wrote  probably  in  Greek.  (2)  L.  Cincius  Aliraentus, 
praetor  210  B.C.,  and  taken  prisoner  by  Hannibal,  wrote 

*  Festus'  work  is  merely  an  abridgment  of  the  lost  work  of 
M.  Verrius  Flaccus,  a  freedman  of  the  Augustine  age 

t  For  the  student  of  Roman  history,  Hermann  Peter's  "  Histori- 
corum  Romanorum  Fragmenta "  is  invaluable.  On  the  general 
question  of  the  sources  of  Roman  history  we  may  refer  to  Teuffel's 
"  History  of  Roman  Literature,"  Professor  Seeley's  "  Introduction  to 
the  First  Book  of  Livy,"  and  more  especially  to  the  "  Quellenkunde 
der  Romischen  Geschichte,"  by  M.  Schmitz,  and  the  instructive 
criticism  by  C.  Peter,  in  his  "  Zur  Kritik  der  Quellen  der  Aelteren 
Romischen  Geschichte."  Cf.  also  Schwegler,  R.  G.  i.,  c.  1,  2,  19,  of 
whose  work  Mr.  Fowler  writes,  "  T  have  always  thought  it  the 
greatest  masterpiece  of  detailed,  clear,  and  rational  criticism  I  have 
ever  read." 


x  TEE  SOUBCES  OF  ROMAN  EISTORY. 

in  Greek.  (3)  Gaius  Acilius,  flourished  about  155  B.C., 
a  senator,  wrote  in  Greek.  (4)  Aulus  Postumius  Albinus, 
consul  151  B.C.,  one  of  the  commissioners  sent  to  settle  the 
province  of  Greece,  wrote  in  Greek.  (5)  Omitting  the 
poetical  description  by  Gaius  Naevius  (264-194  B.C.)  of 
the  first  Punic  war,  and  by  Quintus  Ennius  (239-169  B.C.) 
of  the  history  of  Rome  from  the  earliest  times  down  to 
172  B.C.),  we  now  come  to  the  first  historians  who  wrote 
in  Latin  prose.  Marcus  Porcius  Cato  (234-149  B.c),  author 
of  the  Origines,  is  the  first.  (6)  Lucius  Cassius  Hemina, 
flourished  146  B.C.  (7)  Lucius  Calpurnius  Piso,  consul 
in  133  B.C.  (8)  Gaius  Sempronius  Tuditanus,  consul  in 
129  B.C.  (9)  Cneius  Gellius,  flourished  about  100  B.C. 
(10)  Quintus  Claud  as  Quadrigarius,  flourished  about 
90  B.c  ;  his  history  began  at  the  capture  of  Rome  by  the 
Gauls.  (11)  Valerius  Antias,  about  70  b.c.  (12)  Gaius 
Licinius  Macer,  tribune  in  73  B.C.  All  these  writers 
preceded  Livy,  and  in  most  cases  are  cited  by  him  as 
authorities.  The  other  historians  previous  to  Livy,  such 
as  Gaius  Fannius  (consul  in  122  B.C.),  Lucius  Coelius 
Antipater,  born  in  170  B.C.,  Lucius  Cornelius  Sisenna 
(120-67  B.C.),  wrote  on  special  and  later  periods  ;  while 
statesmen,  such  as  M.  Aemilius  Seaurus  (consul,  115-107 
B.C.),  Q.  Lutatius  Catulus  (consul  102  B.C.),  and  Sulla  the 
dictator,  did  not  disdain  to  write  memoirs  in  self-defence. 
We  may  now  give  a  second  list  of  those  writers  on  the 
early  period  of  Rome,  whose  works  are  in  part  still  extant. 
Dionysius  of  Halicarnassus  (70-8  B.C.),  of  whose  "  Roman 
Antiquities"  we  possess  nine  complete  books,  and  Titus 
Livius  (59-17  B.C.)  stand  practically  alone.  Other  writers, 
e.g.  M.  Velleius  Paterculus  (born  about  19  B.C.),  Plutarch 
(a.d.  46-120),  Julius  Florus  (about  a.d.  70-150),  Aulus 
Gellius  (a.d.  125-175),  Diodorus  Siculus,  Appian  (about 
a.d.  130),  and  Dio  Cassius  (a.d.  155-230),  all  throw  more 
or  less  light  on  the  early  history ;  but  practically  our  in- 
formation is  drawn  from  the  works  of  Livy  and  Dionysius.* 
Unfortunately,  the  latter's  history,  written  as  it  was  for 
Greeks,  and  avowedly  written  to  please  the  reader  rather 
than  inform  posterity,  is  disfigured  by  contradictions  and 

*  On  the  relation  of  Livy  (a)  to  the  Roman  annalists,  (b)  to 
Dionysius,  the  student  is  referred  to  the  remarkably  instructive 
analysis  by  C.  Peter,  in  his  above-mentioned  work,  pp.  55-82. 


THE  SOURCES  OF  ROMAN  HISTORY.  xi 

rhetorical  exaggeration.  Difficulties  are  left  unsolved, 
and  the  superficial  knowledge  displayed  throughout  shows 
that  Dionysius  was  content  with  setting  down  the  varying 
statements  of  Roman  annalists  without  attempting  to 
reconcile  their  contradictions.  Livy,  on  the  other  hand, 
has  the  great  advantage  of  being  well  acquainted  with 
Roman  traditions,  and  is  thus  able  to  blend  with  pictur- 
esque language  the  colour  of  the  Roman  life  and  thought. 
Nor  was  he  wanting  in  judgment,  although  incapable  of 
scientific  criticism.  Yet  the  narrative  of  Rome  as  pre- 
sented by  him  in  the  first  decade,  cannot  be  regarded  as 
serious  history,  built  up  as  it  is  of  the  jejune  records 
preserved  by  the  magistrates  and  of  the  absurd  exaggera- 
tions and  pure  fictions  preserved  in  family  documents  and 
embellished  by  family  annalists.  We  do  not,  in  truth, 
reach  real  historical  ground  until  the  first  Punic  war,  and 
that  we  owe  to  the  great  work  of  Polybius.  Our  know- 
ledge of  the  interval  between  the  end  of  the  first  decade 
of  Livy  and  the  beginning  of  the  history  of  Polybius  (i.e. 
293-264  B.C.)  is  due  to  passages  in  Dionysius,  Appian, 
Plutarch,  and  Dio  Cassius,  but  these  extracts  are  either 
confused  and  bare  notices,  or  fabulous  anecdotes  in  illus- 
tration of  the  Roman  virtues.  Polybius  (208-127  B.C.) 
covers  the  ground  extending  from  264—146  B.C.  Unfortu- 
nately, we  only  possess  in  completeness  his  books  down  to 
216  B.C.,  but  the  fragments  of  the  remaining  books  are 
many  and  precious,  and  the  influence  he  exerted  on  all  suc- 
ceeding historians  was  specially  valuable  in  the  interests 
of  truth.  To  quote  Professor  Mommsen,  "  Polybius  is  not 
an  attractive  author  ;  but  as  truth  and  truthfulness  are 
of  more  value  tban  all  ornament  and  elegance,  no  other 
author  of  antiquity  perhaps  can  be  named  to  whom  we 
are  indebted  for  so  much  real  instruction.  His  books  are 
like  the  sun  in  the  field  of  Roman  history ;  at  the  point 
where  they  begin  the  veil  of  mist  which  still  envelops 
the  Samnite  and  Pyrrhic  war  is  raised,  and  at  the  point 
where  they  end  a  new  and,  if  possible,  still  more  vexatious 
twilight  begins."  A  comparison  of  passages  describing 
the  same  events  shows  that  Livy  made  free  use  of  the 
writings  of  Polybius,*  but  even  where  the  resemblance  is 

*  On   this    point,  vide   C.  Peter,  in  his  above-mentioned   work, 
pp.  82-99. 


xii  TEE  SOURCES  OF  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

closest  we  can  detect  signs  of  other  sources  used  by  Livy, 
and  unfortunately  his  love  of  rhetorical  embellishment 
and  his  carelessness  as  to  historical  connection  often 
obscured  and  perverted  the  more  straightforward  accounts 
of  Polybius.  To  Livy  we  have  to  turn  for  a  detailed 
account  of  Roman  history  for  the  years  216-167  B.C., 
although  we  can  often  correct  his  statement  by  the  copious 
fragments  of  Polybius. 

From  167  B.C.  onwards  we  depend  upon  Appian, 
Plutarch,  and  Sallust's  Jugurthine  war.  The  books  of 
Appian  which  have  come  down  to  us  contain  notices  of 
the  regal  period,  a  history  of  Spain  and  of  the  second 
Punic  war,  a  history  of  Libya  down  to  the  destruction  of 
Carthage,  a  history  of  Syria  and  Parthia,  the  war  with 
Mithradates,  and  a  history  of  the  civil  strife  from  the 
Gracchi  down  to  the  death  of  Sextus  Pompeius  in  35  B.C. 
His  carelessness  and  inaccuracy,  his  tendency  to  sacrifice 
truth  to  petty  jealousy  and  party  spirit,  lessen  the  value 
of  his  work.*  Sallust,  however,  had  the  great  advantage 
over  Appian  and  similar  writers  of  being  a  Roman  and 
well  versed  in  the  politics  of  his  time.  He  shows  a 
freedom  from  party  prejudice  and  a  sense  of  historical 
truth,  and  his  work  is  not  merely  instructive  with  regard 
to  the  Jugurthine  war,  but  throws  valuable  light  On  the 
inner  circumstances  of  that  period. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  Social  War  (91-88  B.C.),  the 
mass  of  contemporary  material  which  in  one  form  or 
another  must  have  been  available  for  later  writers  is  con- 
tinually increasing.  For  the  Sullan  period,  from  the  Social 
War  to  the  death  of  the  dictator  (91-78  B.C.),  we  rely 
chiefly  on  Plutarch's  Lives  of  the  chief  actors  on  the 
political  stage ;  but  there  are  other  works  of  various 
worth.  Of  the  writers  already  mentioned,  Claudius 
Quadrigarius  treated  of  Sulla's  campaign  in  Greece; 
the  work  of  Valerius  Antias  extended  as  far  as  the  time 
of  Sulla;  that  of  Sisenna  embraced  the  Social  War.  They 
appear  to  have  written  at  great  length,  and  to  have  incor- 
porated speeches  and  letters  in  their  works.  In  addition 
to  the  sources  mentioned  above,  there  were  (1)  published 
speeches,  political  and  forensic,  such  as  those  of  L.  Licinius 
Crassus  (consul  95  B.C.),  of  Q.  Scaevola  (consul  95  B.C.), 

*  Cf .  C.  Peter,  pp.  127-138. 


THE  SOURCES  OF  ROMAN  HISTORY.  xiii 

of  C.  Julius  Caesar  Strabo  (killed  87  B.C.)  ;  (2)  Memoirs. 
Sulla  (ob.  78  B.C.)  wrote  an  autobiography  which  was 
completed  after  his  death  by  his  freedman  Epicadus,  and 
which  was  largely  used  by  Plutarch.  Lucius  Lucullus 
(ob.  57  B.C.)  wrote  a  history  of  the  Social  War  in  Greek. 
C.  Piso  narrated  the  war  between  Sulla  and  Marius.  L. 
Voltacilius  Pilutus,  a  freedman,  wrote  an  account  of  the 
doings  of  Cn.  Pompeius,  the  triumvir,  and  of  the  father  of 
Pompeius,  probably  during  the  lifetime  of  the  former. 

Of  still  extant  authorities  the  following  are  the  most 
important.  (1)  Plutarch  (lived  probably  from  the  reign 
of  Claudius  to  Trajan  or  Hadrian).  Twenty-three  lives 
of  Romans  survive,  few  of  which,  those  of  Marius,  Sulla, 
Lucullus,  and  Sertorius,  fall  under  this  period.  For  later 
times  we  have  the  lives  of  Crassus,  Pompeius,  Caesar, 
Cato  minor,  Cicero,  Antonius,  and  Brutus.  Plutarch 
writes  with  good  sense  and  wide  knowledge,  but  his  aim 
is  biography,  not  history :  hence  important  events  are 
often  lightly  touched,  while  trivialities  characteristic  of 
the  men  are  dwelt  upon  ;  and  as  a  Greek  he  is  often 
defective  in  acquaintance  with  Roman  institutions.  He 
used  contemporary  authorities  largely,  though  his  own 
knowledge  of  Latin  was  slight,  and  he  often  reveals  his 
sources ;  of  250  writers  quoted  by  him  80  are  wholly 
or  partially  lost.  (2)  Appian.  (3)  The  epitomes  of  Livy, 
attributed  to  Florus,  which  survive  of  all  the  lost  books 
except  136  and  137,  and  are  valuable  for  the  main  points. 
(4)  The  compendia  of  several  epitomists  of  late  date  have 
come  down  to  us,  based  largely,  sometimes  exclusively, 
upon  Livy.  They  are  careful  and  accurate,  and  often 
contain  useful  information  not  found  elsewhere,  but  are 
marked  by  a  strong  Roman  bias.  Such  are  the  works  of 
(Annaeus  ?)  Florus  (flor.  2nd  cent.  A.D.),  Eutropius  and 
Rufus  Festus  (4th  cent.  a.d.).  (5)  Justinus  (date  uncer- 
tain) who  made  a  collection  of  extracts  from  the  Historiae 
Philippicae  of  Trogus  Pompeius  (flor.  20  B.C.),  apparently 
a  sound  and  solid  work,  based  upon  Greek  sources ; 
Justinus  is  the  chief  authority  for  the  earlier  years  of 
Mithradates. 

For  the  next  eight  years  (78-70  B.C.),  to  the  overthrow 
of  the  Sullan  constitution,  we  rely  chiefly  upon  Plutarch, 
Appian,   the   epitomes   of   Livy,   Justinus,    Dio    Cassius, 


xiv  TEE  SOURCES  OF  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

some  valuable  fragments  of  the  histories  of  Sallust  dealing 
with  the  Sertorian  war  and  the  outbreak  of  Lepidus,  and 
the  recently  discovered  fragments  of  Granius  Licinianus. 

When  we  come  to  what  may  conveniently  be  called  the 
Ciceronian  period  (70-40  B.C.)  the  conditions  are  changed 
A,  mass  of  contemporary  material — letters,  speeches, 
memoirs  —  is  still  extant,  though  much  has  perished, 
and  the  modern  historian  is  in  a  position,  if  not  to  write 
history  from  the  original  sources,  at  least  to  criticise  with 
effect  the  compositions  of  ancient  writers.  At  the  same 
time,  the  spread  of  culture  in  Rome  and  Italy  brought 
with  it  a  facility  in  composition  which  resulted  in  a 
multitude  of  historical  works ;  and  if  all  this  mass  of 
literature  is  the  work  of  partisans,  on  the  other  hand  we 
have  the  advantage  of  possessing  the  views  of  both  sides. 

We  will  now  give  some  account,  first  of  the  contempo- 
rary records  whether  lost  or  extant,  secondly  of  the  later 
histories  treating  of  this  period,  wThich  survive.  (1) 
Marcus  Tullius  Cicero  (106-43  B  c  )  is  the  most  voluminous 
and  on  the  whole  the  most  valuable  writer  of  the  period. 
Advocate  and  partisan  as  he  was,  the  naivete  and  volubility 
of  his  character  make  him  peculiarly  useful  as  a  historical 
witness.  Of  his  speeches,  private  and  public,  fifty-seven 
survive,  besides  fragments  of  twenty  more,  and  throw  light, 
not  only  on  the  political  situation  in  all  its  constant  varia- 
tions, but  on  many  other  points,  such  as  the  working  of 
the  Sullan  laws,  and  of  the  numerous  changes  which  fol- 
lowed rapidly  on  the  death  of  Sulla,  on  the  social  condition 
of  Italy,  and  the  provincial  administration.  Incomparably 
more  valuable  than  even  the  speeches  are  the  letters,  864 
in  number,  including  ninety  addressed  to  Cicero,  and  ex- 
tending from  68  to  43  B.C.  It  is  hardly  too  much  to  say 
that  they  are  an  inexhaustible  storehouse  of  contemporary 
history,  such  as  exists  for  no  other  period  ancient  or  modern. 
A  memoir  of  the  year  of  his  consulship  is  unfortunately 
lost.  His  voluminous  philosophical  and  rhetorical  writings 
contain  valuable  information  on  a  great  variety  of  sub- 
jects, especially  on  the  Roman  law  and  constitution,  for 
which  the  De  Republica  and  De  Legibus  are  peculiarly 
valuable.  With  Cicero  should  be  mentioned  his  faithful 
freedman,  friend,  and  editor,  M.  Tullius  Tiro,  who  edited 
the  speeches  and  letters,  and  wrote  a  life  of   his  patron, 


TEE  SOURCES  OF  ROMAN  E1ST0RT.  xv 

and  also  developed  a  system  of  stenography  (notae 
Tironianae) .  (2)  There  were  also  published  speeches  by 
Q.  Hortensius  Hortalus  (114-50  B.C.),  Pompeius  Magnus, 
C.  Scribonius  Curio  (killed  49  B.C.),  M.  Coelius  Eufus 
(killed  48  B.C.),  M.  Junius  Brutus  (ob.  42  B.C.),  C.  Licinius 
Calvus  (ob.  ante  47  B.C.),  and  others.  (3)  Of  historical  com- 
positions the  most  important  in  the  earlier  portion  of  this 
period,  down  to  63  B.C.,  were  the  annals  of  T.  Pomponius 
Atticus  (109-32  B.C.),  a  compendium  of  Boman  history 
from  the  earliest  time,  giving  special  attention  to  the 
history  of  the  great  Boman  families ;  he  also  wrote  an 
account  of  Cicero's  consulship,  and  a  large  number  of 
letters.  There  were  also  historical  compositions  by 
Hortensius  the  orator,  by  Lucius  Lucceius,  a  corre- 
spondent of  Cicero's,  and  by  Lucius  Tubero,  a  friend  and 
brother-in-law  of  Cicero,  of  which  almost  nothing  is 
known.  (4)  In  the  later  half  of  the  Ciceronian  period, 
from  63  B.C.  to  the  outbreak  of  the  civil  war,  the  most 
important  author  is  C.  Julius  Caesar  (102-44  B.C.).  His 
speeches,  letters,  and  the  "  Anticato  "  (a  political  pamphlet 
in  answer  to  Cicero's  panegyric  on  Cato  Uticensis)  are  all 
lost  ;  but  there  are  extant  (a)  Commentarii  de  Bello 
Gallico  in  seven  books,  which  is  at  once  a  military  report,  a 
history,  and  an  apologia.  "  It  is,"  says  Mommsen,*  "  evi- 
dently designed  to  justify  as  well  as  possible  before  the 
public  the  formally  unconstitutional  enterprise  of  Caesar 
in  conquering  a  great  country,  and  constantly  increasing 
his  army  for  that  object,  without  instructions  from  the 
competent  authority."  It  was  published  in  51  B.C.,  when 
the  storm  was  imminent.  The  work  is  very  valuable  for 
the  condition  of  Gaul,  Germany,  and  Britain,  and  also  for 
the  Boman  military  system  and  camp  life.  (b)  The 
Bellum  Civile,  in  three  books,  is  a  much  less  careful  work; 
it  extends  to  the  beginning  of  the  Alexandrine  war  in  47 
B.C.,  and  has  equally  a  political  purpose.  (5)  After 
Caesar's  death  the  histories  of  the  Gallic  and  of  the  civil 
war  were  continued  by  his  friends.  The  eighth  book  of 
the  Gallic  war  and  the  Bellum  Alexandrinum  are  generally 
ascribed  to  Aulus  Hirtius  (killed  43  B.C.);  the  Bellum 
Africanum  and  Bellum  Hispanicum  are  by  other  and  un- 
known hands.     (6)   Other  friends  of  Caesar  who  treated 

*  Vol.  iv.,  p.  605. 


xvi  TEE  SOURCES  OF  ROMAN  E1ST0RT. 

of  his  life  were  C.  Oppius  (to  whom  the  continuations  of 
Caesar's  Bellum  Civile  are  by  some  ascribed,  and  who  also 
wrote  lives  of  Scipio  Af  rieanus  the  elder  and  other  famous 
Romans),  and  L.  Cornelius  Balbus  of  Gades.  (7)  Cornelius 
Nepos  (circ.  94-24  B.C.),  besides  other  works,  wrote  lives 
of  Cato  the  elder  and  of  Cicero,  both  lost. 

Some  of  the  works  already  mentioned  were  written 
under  the  influence  of  the  mighty  struggle  which  preceded 
the  extinction  of  the  republic :  those  which  still  remain 
are  nearly  all  directed  to  political  objects,  and  are  strongly 
affected  by  the  passion  and  turmoil  of  the  time.  (8) 
Gaius  Sallustius  Crispus  (87-34  B.C.),  who  has  been 
mentioned  above,  wrote,  besides  his  Jugui'thine  war,  an 
account  of  the  conspiracy  of  Catiline,  to  justify  the  demo- 
cratic party,  "  on  which  in  fact  the  Roman  monarchy  was 
based,  and  to  clear  Caesar's  memory  from  the  blackest 
stain  that  rested  on  it."  *  His  Historiae  were  written  as 
a  continuation  of  Sisenna,  and  extended  over  the  twelve 
years  from  78  B.C.  onwards:  only  fragments,  together  with 
some  letters  and  speeches  extracted  from  the  history, 
survive.  (9)  Q.  Aelius  Tubero  (flor.  circ.  46  B.C.)  wrote 
a  histoi'y  of  Rome  extending  to  his  own  time.  (10)  As 
evidence  of  the  feeling  about  Caesar  in  some  literary 
circles  at  Rome,  and  as  an  example  of  the  warfare  of 
literature  which  raged  alongside  of  the  political  struggle, 
the  attacks  of  the  poet  Catullus  (87-54  B.C.)  on  Caesar 
and  his  friend  Mamurra  are  worth  mention.  (11)  Pam- 
phlets in  prose  and  verse  were  continually  published  on 
either  side  ;  M.  Varro,  C.  Scribonius  Curio,  and  Aulus 
Caecina  wrote  against  Caesar.  Funeral  orations  (lauda- 
tiones)  were  used  for  the  same  purpose.  The  death  of 
Cato,  and  even  of  his  daughter,  called  forth  a  regular 
literature  of  its  own  ;  Cicero  and  Marcus  Brutus  were  the 
most  famous  of  his  champions,  while  on  the  other  side 
Aulus  Hirtius,  Metellus  Scipio,  even  Caesar  himself  and, 
later,  Augustus  deigned  to  enter  the  lists.  (12)  From 
59  B.C.  onwards  the  minutes  of  the  senate  (acta  senatus) 
and  the  chief  events  of  the  day  (acta  populi  or  acta 
diurna)  were  regularly  published  as  a  sort  of  official 
gazette:  none  of  the  latter  survive.  (13)  Inscriptions. 
Only  two  of  great  importance  belong  to  this  period,  con- 

*  Mommsen,  iv.  184,  note# 


THE  SOURCES  OF  BOM  AN  HISTORY.  xvii 

taining  fragments  of  the  Lex  Rubria  (Corp.  Inscrr.  Lat. 
I.  205)  and  of  the  Lex  Julia  Municipalis  (C.  I.  L.  I.  206). 
For  others,  on  private  or  local  matters,  see  Corp.  Inscrr., 
especially  No.  I.  573-626 ;  and  for  one  containing  a  frag- 
ment of  Sulla's  law  De  XX  Q  (uaestoribus),  ib.  I.  202.* 
There  are  also  bullets  used  in  sieges  with  rude  inscrip- 
tions (ib.  I.  644-705),  tesserae  (ib.  I.  717-827),  bricks 
(ib.  I.  p.  202),  epitaphs  (ib.  1. 1256). 

Where  contemporary  material  is  so  abundant  later 
historians  are  less  important,  and  may  be  merely  enumer- 
ated. (1)  The  most  valuable  is  Dio  Cassius  Cocceianus 
(circ.  a.d.  155-229),  whose  history  extended  from  Aeneas 
to  a.d.  229,  and  is  extant  from  the  wars  of  Lucullus  to 
a.d.  10.  It  is  written  with  great  knowledge  and  judgment ; 
fragments  of  the  earlier  and  a  compendium  of  the  later 
portions  are  extant.  (2)  C.  Suetonius  Tranquillus  (a.d. 
75-160)  wrote  Lives  of  the  Caesars  from  C.  Julius  Caesar 
to  Domitian.  The  work  is  intelligent,  honest,  and  rich  in 
information,  and  is  based  upon  valuable  contemporary 
records  of  all  kinds.  (3)  Tacitus  is  continually  useful  for 
the  history  of  the  last  generation  of  the  republic,  especially 
on  constitutional  and  legal  points.  (4)  Velleius  Pater- 
culus  (19  B.C.  to  A.D.  31)  wrote  a  compendium  of  universal 
history  ,  Memnon  (not  later  than  the  Antonines),  a 
history  of  Heraclea  in  Pontus,  which  survives  in  copious 
extracts  by  Photius,  and  is  useful  for  Pontic  affairs ; 
Granius  Licinianus  (temp,  the  Antonines),  annals,  of 
which  fragments  relating  to  163  B.C.  and  to  78  B.C.  have 
recently  been  discovered.  (5)  Orosius  (flor.  first  half 
5th  cent.),  Historiarum  adversus  Paganos,  libb.  vii., — a 
religious  polemic  of  no  value  when  unsupported. 

The  following  works  upon  special  subjects  often  throw 
light  incidentally  upon  history,  and  may  be  consulted 
passim  as  occasion  requires.  The  order  is  approximately 
chronological. 

(1)  M.  Terentius  Varro  (116-28  B.C.),  De  Re  Rustica 
and  De  Lingua  Latina  ;  unfortunately,  all  that  remain, 
besides  fragments,  of  the  works  of  the  most  learned  of  the 
Romans  ;  but  his  writings,  especially  the  Antiquitatum 
Libri,  were  very  largely  drawn  upon  by  later  antiquarians 

*  For  legal  fragments  Bruns'  Fontes  Juris  Romani  Antiqui 
may  be  consulted,  as  more  convenient  and  accessible  than  the 
Coipus  iDScriptionum. 


xviii  THE  SOURCES  OF  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

and  grammarians,  such  as  those  mentioned  (12)  to  (15). 
In  the  reign  of  Augustus,  Fenestella,  Sinnius  Capito,  and 
Verrius  Flaccus  should  be  mentioned  as  antiquarians  who 
wrote  under  Varro's  influence  and  on  similar  topics,  and 
who  furnished  a  vast  amount  of  information  upon  which 
later  writings  are  based.  Flaccus  survives  in  an  abridg- 
ment by  Festus.  (2)  With  Varro  may  be  conveniently 
mentioned  two  other  writers  on  agriculture ;  M.  Poreius 
Cato  (234-149  B.C.),  the  most  valuable  of  the  three,  and 
Lucius  Junius  Moderatus  Columella  (1st  cent.  A.D.), 
De  Re  Rustica — a  work  much  less  valuable  than  Varro's. 
(3)  Strabo  (temp.  Augustus  and  Tiberius),  a  voluminous 
work  on  Universal  Geography.  (4)  Gaius  Plinius 
Secundus  (major)  (a.d.  23-79),  Naturalis  Historia — an 
encyclopedia  of  the  scientific  knowledge  of  his  time.  (5) 
Vitruvius  Pollio  (temp.  Augustus),  De  Architectura.  (6) 
Q.  Asconius  Pedianus  (2  B.C.  to  a.d.  83),  commentaries  on 
some  speeches  of  Cicero — valuable  especially  for  consti- 
tutional points.  (7)  Valerius  Maximus  (temp,  the  early 
Caesars),  De  Factis  Dictisque  Memorabilibus — contains 
much  unique  information.  (8)  Sex.  Julius  Frontinus 
(praetor  a.d.  70),  Strategematica  Libb.  iv.,  on  military 
science  with  many  anecdotes  of  great  commanders  ;  and  De 
Aqueductibus  Urbis  Romanae.  (9)  M.  Fabius  Quintili- 
anus  (a.d.  40-118),  De  Institutione  Oratoria  Libb.  xii., 
including  a  brief  history  of  Roman  literature  in  book  x. 
(10)  Gaius  (circ.  the  Antonines),  Institutes,  in  four  books; 
probably  the  earliest  systematic  work  on  Roman  juris- 
prudence. (11)  With  Gaius  should  be  mentioned  the 
works  executed  under  the  auspices  of  the  Emperor  Justi- 
nian (a.d.  527-565)  :  (a)  the  New  Code,  superseding  all 
previous  codes  ;  (b)  Pandecta  or  Digesta,  a  compilation  of 
all  the  valuable  matter  of  preceding  jurists ;  (c)  the 
Institutes,  based  chiefly  upon  Gaius.  (12)  Aulus  Gellius 
(temp,  the  Antonines),  Noctes  Atticae,  a  miscellany,  con- 
taining information  on  all  manner  of  subjects  and  numerous 
extracts  from  Roman  writers.  (13)  Nonius  Marcellus 
(between  2nd  cent,  and  6th,  a.d.),  a  voluminous  work  on 
grammar,  valuable  as  a  repertory  of  quotations  from  lost 
writers.  (14)  Servius  (5th  cent.  A.D.),  Commentary  on 
Vergil.  (15)  Macrobius  (5th  cent,  a.d.),  Saturnaliorum 
Conviviorum  Libb.  vii.  —  dissertations  on  mythology, 
history,  etc. 


CONTENTS. 


BOOK  FIRST. 

The  Period  anterior  to  the  Abolition  of  the  Monarchy, 
Ch.  I.-V. 

BOOK  SECOND. 

From  the  Abolition  of  the  Monarchy  in  Rome  to  the  Union 
of  Italy,  Ch.  VI.-XI. 

BOOK   THIRD. 

From  the  Union  of  Italy  to  the  Subjugation  of  Carthage 
and  the  Greek  States,  Ch.  XII.-XVIII. 

BOOK  FOURTH. 
The  Revolution,  Ch.  XIX.-XXVII. 

BOOK   FIFTH. 

The     Establishment     of     the    Military    Monarchy,    Ch. 
XXVIII.-XXXVIII. 


HISTORY   OF    ROME. 


CHAPTER  I. 

INTRODUCTION. 

Ancient  history — Geography  of  Italy — Italian  history — Primitive 
races — Relation  of  Latins  to  Umbro-Samnites — Resemblance 
and  distinction  between  Greeks  and  Italians. 

The  division  between  ancient  and  modern  history  is  not 
one  of  mere  convenience ;  it  has  a  reality,  in  that  it  marks 
the  distinction  in  point  of  time,  place,  and  character 
between  the  civilization  of  the  old  and  new  worlds. 

Ancient  history  is  in  the  main  an  account  of  the  rise 
and  fall  of  those  peoples  whose  civilization  had  a  common 
origin,  and  presented  similar  features.  In  each  case,  how- 
ever, the  individuality  of  each  nation  impressed  its  own 
peculiar  stamp  on  the  character  of  that  civilization. 

The  Mediterranean  Sea  was  the  theatre  of  the  growth 
and  decay  of  the  great  nations  who  may  be  included  in 
the  same  cycle  of  civilization,  and  whose  culture  found  its 
highest  point  in  Thebes  in  Egypt,  Carthage  in  Africa, 
Athens  in  Greece,  Rome  in  Italy.  When  their  work  was 
finished,  new  peoples  arose,  a  new  cycle  of  civilization  was 
begun,  a  new  centre  was  found  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean  in 
place  of  the  Mediterranean.  The  province  of  the  Roman 
historian  is  to  record  the  closing  scene  of  the  great  drama 
of  ancient  history  as  enacted  in  Italy. 

Geographically,  this  peninsula  is  formed  by  the  mountain 
chain  of  the  Apennines  breaking  off  in  a  southerly  direction 
from  the  Western  Alps.    The  Apennines  at  first  run  south- 

1 


2  HISTORY  OF  HOME. 

east,  and  reach  their  highest  point  in  the  Abruzzi.  From 
the  Abruzzi  the  chain  runs  south,  at  first  unbroken  and 
of  considerable  height ;  but  later  it  splits  south-east  and 
south,  forming  narrow  and  mountainous  peninsulas.  It 
must  be  specially  remembered  that  the  ancient  boundary 
of  Italy  on  the  north  was  not  the  Alps,  but  the  Apennines  ; 
therefore,  the  flat  country  on  the  north,  extending  between 
the  Alps  and  the  Apennines  as  far  down  as  the  Abruzzi, 
does  not  belong  geographically  nor  historically  to  the 
Italy  of  our  history.  As  the  Apennines  nowhere  rise 
precipitously,  but  enclose  many  valleys  and  table-lands 
connected  by  easy  passes,  the  country  is  well  adapted 
for  human  habitation.  This  is  specially  the  case  with 
the  adjacent  slopes  and  coast-districts.  On  the  east  coast 
stretches  the  plain  of  Apulia,  only  broken  by  the  isolated 
steep  of  Garganus ;  again,  on  the  south  coast,  well- 
watered  and  fertile  lowlands  adjoin  the  hill  country  of 
the  interior ;  and  on  the  west  coast  we  find,  not  merely 
the  extraordinarily  rich  and  irrigated  lands  of  Etruria, 
Latium,  and  Campania,  but,  owing  to  the  action  of  the 
sea  and  of  volcanoes,  the  country  is  varied  with  hill  and 
valley,  harbour  and  island.  As  the  Peloponnese  is  at- 
tached to  Greece,  so  the  island  of  Sicily  is  attached  to 
Italy,  the  Sicilian  mountains  being  but  a  continuation 
of  the  Apennines,  interrupted  by  the  narrow  "rent" 
(Pr/ytov)  of  the  straits.  Although  Italy  lacks  the  island- 
studded  sea  which  gave  the  Greeks  their  seafaring 
character,  and  is  deficient  in  bays  and  harbours,  except 
on  the  south-west  coast,  yet  it  resembles  Greece  in  its 
temperate  climate  and  wholesome  mountain  air,  while 
it  excels  it  in  rich  alluvial  plains  and  grassy  mountain 
slopes.  All  Italian  interests  centre  in  the  west ;  the 
reverse  is  the  case  with  Greece.  Thus,  the  Apulian  and 
Messapian  coasts  play  a  subordinate  part  in  Italian,  as 
Epirus  and  Acarnania  did  in  Greek  history.  The  two 
peninsulas  lie  side  by  side,  but  turn  their  backs  on  each 
other,  and  the  Italians  and  Greeks  rarely  came  into 
contact  in  the  Adriatic  Sea. 

The  history  of  Italy  falls  into  two  main  sections :  (1) 
Its  internal  history  down  to  its  union  under  the  leadership 
of  the  Latin  stock;  (2)  The  history  of  its  sovereignty 
over  the  world.     It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  what  has 


INTRODUCTION.  3 

been  called  the  conquest  of  Italy  by  the  Romans  is  really 
the  consolidation  and  union  of  the  whole  Italian  stock — 
a  stock  of  which  the  Romans  were  the  most  powerful 
branch,  but  still  only  a  branch.  Our  attention  must  now 
be  fixed  on  the  first  of  the  two  sections — on  the  settlement 
of  the  Italian  stock ;  on  its  external  struggles  for  exist- 
ence against  Greek  and  Etruscan  intruders;  on  its 
conquest  of  these  enemies ;  finally,  on  its  internal  strife ; 
on  the  contest  between  the  Latms  and  Samnites  for  the 
leadership  of  Italy,  resulting  in  the  victory  of  the  Latins, 
at  the  end  of  the  fourth  century  before  Christ. 

With  regard  to  the  earliest  migrations  into  Italy  we 
have  no  evidence  to  guide  us,  not  even  the  uncertain  voice 
of  tradition.  No  monuments  of  a  savage  primitive  race 
have  ever  been  unearthed,  such  as  exist  in  France,  Ger- 
many, and  England.  But  the  remains  of  the  Italian 
languages  show  that  the  three  primitive  stocks  were 
(1)  Iapygian,  (2)  Etruscan,  (3)  Italian.  The  last  is 
divided  into  two  main  branches  :  (a)  Latin  ;  (6)  TJmbro- 
Samnite,  or  more  fully  that  branch  to  which  the  dialects 
of  the  Umbri,  Marsi,  Volsci,  and  Samnites  belong. 

As  to  the  Iapygians,  owing  to  the  fact  that  no  one  has  at 
present  been  able  to  decipher  the  inscriptions  in  their 
language,  very  little  is  known.  Their  dialect  points  to  a 
closer  connection  with  Greek  than  that  of  other  Italians ; 
and  this  supposition  is  supported  by  the  ease  with  which 
they  became  Hellenized.  From  the  feeble  resistance  they 
made  to  foreign  influences,  and  from  their  geographical 
position,  it  is  concluded  that  they  were  the  oldest  immi- 
grants or  historical  autochthones  of  Italy.  In  the  earliest 
times  immigrants  came  by  land,  not  by  sea,  and  the  races 
pushed  furthest  south  were  the  oldest  inhabitants. 

The  centre  of  Italy  was  inhabited,  from  a  remote  period, 
by  the  two  divisions  of  the  Italian  people.  Philological 
analysis  of  the  Italian  tongue  shows  that  they  belong 
to  the  Indo-Germanic  family,  and  that  the  Italians  are 
brothers  of  the  Greeks,  and  cousins  of  the  Celts,  Germans, 
and  Slavonians.  The  same  analysis  further  shows  us 
that  the  relation  of  the  Latin  dialect  in  the  Italian 
language  to  the  Umbro-Samnite  dialect  is  somewhat 
similar  to  the  relation  of  Ionic  to  Doric  Greek  ;  and  the 
differences  between  the  Oscan  (i.e.  Samnite)  and  Umbrian 


4  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

dialects  may  be  compared  to  the  differences  between  the 
Dorism  of  Sicily  and  that  of  Sparta.  Language  thus 
proves  to  us  that,  at  some  unknown  period,  from  the 
same  cradle  there  issued  a  stock  which  included  the 
ancestors  of  the  Greeks  and  Italians  ;  that  subsequently 
the  Italians  branched  off ;  that  the  Italians  divided  into 
Latin  and  Umbro-Samnite  stocks,  and  that  later  the 
Umbrians  parted  from  the  Samnites,  or  Oscans. 

Language  again  shows  to  us  what  state  of  civilization 
had  been  reached  by  the  Greeks  and  Italians  before  they 
separated.  Their  words  for  plough,  field,  garden,  barley, 
wine,  are  identical  in  both  languages  ;  their  choice  of 
grain  agrees,  as  also  their  methods  of  preparing  it.  The 
name  of  "  Wine-land  "  (OivwTpta)  given  by  Greek  voyagers 
to  Italy  shows  that  vine-culture  was  not  introduced 
by  the  Greeks.  Thus,  the  two  peoples  had  passed  from 
the  pastoral  to  the  agricultural  stage,  and  both  nations 
closely  associated  agriculture  with  their  religion,  laws, 
and  customs.  Again,  the  Greek  house,  as  described  by 
Homer,  differs  but  slightly  from  the  model  followed  in 
Italy.  In  dress,  also,  the  tunica  corresponds  to  the  chiton 
of  the  Greeks,  and  the  toga  is  only  a  fuller  himation. 
In  fine,  in  language,  manners,  and  all  the  material  things 
of  primitive  life,  the  same  origin  is  apparent  in  both  races. 

When  we  turn  to  the  graver  problems  of  life,  to  the 
moral,  social,  political,  and  religious  development  of  the 
Greeks  and  Italians,  the  distinction  is  far  more  marked ; 
nay,  it  is  almost  difficult  to  believe  that  here  too  there  is 
a  common  basis.  In  the  Greek  world  we  see  the  full  and 
free  play  of  individual  life,  and  individual  thought, 
whether  in  the  political  arena  or  that  of  literature, 
whether  in  the  games  at  Olympia  or  in  religious  festivals. 
The  whole  was  sacrificed  to  its  parts,  the  nation  to  the 
township,  the  township  to  the  citizen.  Thus,  solemn  awe 
of  the  gods  was  lessened  and  at  last  extinguished  by  that 
freedom  of  thought,  which  invested  them  with  human 
attributes  and  then  denied  their  existence.  The  Romans, 
on  the  contrary,  merged  the  individual  in  the  state,  and 
regarded  the  progress  and  prosperity  of  the  latter  as  the 
ideal  for  which  all  were  bound  to  labour  unceasingly. 
With  them  the  son  was  bound  to  reverence  the  father, 
the  citizen  to   reverence  the  ruler,  all  to  reverence  the 


INTRODUCTION.  3 

gods.  This  distinction  becomes  more  evident,  when  we 
consider  the  length  to  which  paternal  and  marital  au- 
thority was  carried  by  the  Romans,  and  the  merciless 
rigour  with  which  a  slave  was  treated  by  them.  The 
meagre  and  meaningless  character  of  individual  names 
among  the  Romans,  when  contrasted  with  the  luxuriant 
and  poetic  fulness  of  those  among  the  Greeks,  points  to 
the  wish  of  the  Romans  to  reduce  all  to  one  uniform  level, 
instead  of  promoting  the  development  of  distinctive 
personality.  But  we  must  not  forget  that  the  basis  was 
the  same  with  both  nations.  In  both,  the  clan  arose  from 
the  family  and  the  state  from  the  clan  ;  but,  as  the  rela- 
tions in  a  Roman  household  differed  widely  from  those  in 
a  Greek,  so  the  position  of  a  clan,  as  a  separate  power,  in 
a  Greek,  was  far  higher  than  in  a  Roman  state.  Again, 
although  the  fundamental  ideas  of  the  Roman  constitution 
— a  king,  a  senate,  and  an  assembly  authorized  merely  to 
accept  or  reject  proposals  submitted  to  it — are  also  found 
in  Greek  states,  as  in  the  earlier  constitution  of  Crete,  yet 
widely  different  was  the  development  which  these  ideas 
received  in  each  nation.  So,  too,  in  religion,  both  nations 
founded  their  faith  on  the  same  common  store  of  symbolic 
and  allegorical  views  of  nature.  But  the  Greek  lost  sight 
of  the  spiritual  abstractions,  and  gave  all  the  phenomena 
of  nature  a  concrete  and  corporeal  shape,  clothing  all 
with  the  riches  of  his  poetic  fancy.  The  Roman,  casting 
aside  all  mythical  legends  of  the  gods,  sanctified  every 
action  of  life  by  assigning  a  spirit  to  everything  existing — 
a  spirit  which  came  into  being  with  it,  and  perished  with 
it;  and  thus  the  very  word  Religio,  "that  which  binds," 
shows  what  a  hold  this  faith  in  the  unseen  and  this  power 
of  spiritual  abstraction  had  upon  the  Roman  mind. 
Finally,  even  in  art,  where  the  greatest  contrast  was 
developed,  the  original  simple  elements  are  identical. 
The  decorous  armed  dance,  the  "  leap  "  (triumpus  6pia.fji.fios 
St,-dvpa.(ifio<;),  the  masquerade  of  the  "  full  people  "  (crarvpot, 
satura)  who  in  their  sheep  or  goat-skins  wound  up  the 
festival  with  jests ;  the  pipe,  which  regulated  the  solemn 
or  merry  dance,  were  common  to  both  nations.  But  the 
Greeks  alone  felt  the  power  of  beauty,  and  evolved  a 
system  of  education  calculated  to  train  mind  and  body 
alike   in   conformity   with    that   ideal.     "  Thus    the    two 


6  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

nations,  in  which  the  civilization  of  antiquity  culminated, 
stand  side  by  side,  as  different  in  development  as  they 
were  in  origin  identical.  The  points  in  which  the 
Hellenes  excel  the  Italians  are  more  universally  intelli- 
gible, and  reflect  a  more  brilliant  lustre;  but  the  deep 
feeling  in  each  individual,  that  he  was  only  a  part  of  the 
community,  a  rare  devotedness  and  power  of  self-sacrifice 
for  the  common  weal,  an  earnest  faith  in  its  own  gods, 
form  the  rich  treasure  of  the  Italian  nation.  Wherever 
in  Hellas  a  tendency  towards  national  union  appeared, 
it  was  based  not  on  elements  directly  political,  but  on 
games  and  art;  the  contests  at  Olympia,  the  poems  of 
Homer,  the  tragedies  of  Euripides,  were  the  only  bonds 
that  held  Hellas  together.  Resolutely,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  Italian  surrendered  his  own  personal  will  for  the  sake 
of  freedom,  and  learned  to  obey  his  father  that  he  might 
know  how  to  obey  the  state.  Amidst  this  subjection 
individual  development  might  be  marred,  and  the  germs 
of  fairest  promise  might  be  arrested  in  the  bud ;  the 
Italian  gained  in  their  stead  a  feeling  of  fatherland  and 
of  patriotism  such  as  the  Greek  never  knew,  and,  alone 
among  all  civilized  nations  of  antiquity,  succeeded  in 
working  out  national  unity  in  connection  with  a  consti- 
tution based  on  self-government — a  national  unity  which 
at  last  placed  in  his  hands  the  mastery,  not  only  over  the 
divided  Hellenic  stock,  but  over  the  whole  known  world." 


AUTHORITIES. 

[N.B. — Reference  is  made  to  Mommsen's  "  Romisches  Staatsrecht  " 
as  Momms.  R.  St.,  and  to  Marquardt's  "  Rbmische  Staatsver- 
waltung  "  as  Marq.  Stv.,  and  to  his  "  Das  Privatleben  der  Romer" 
as  Marq.  P.l.  Ramsay's  "  Manual  of  Roman  Antiquities''  is  also  of 
great  value  to  the  student,  as  also  the  article  by  Mr.  Pelham  on 
Rome,  in  the  "Encyclopaedia  Britannica."] 

Geography  of  Italy.—  Strab.  210-288.     Polyb.  ii.  14-24. 
lapygians.— Dionys.  i.  11,  12,  22,  51.     Strab.  279,  282. 


CHAPTER  II. 

LATIN    SETTLEMENTS,    AND   ORIGIN   OF   ROME. 

Latin  settlements — Latium — Primitive  society — Latin  league- 
Origin  of  Rome — Geographical  position — The  Palatine  city; 
Hill,  or  Quirinal  Romans. 

We  have  no  data  enabling  us  to  accurately  determine  the 
migration  of  the  Italians  into  Italy,  but  that  it  took  place 
from  the  north  and  by  land  may  be  considered  certain. 
The  fact  that  the  Umbro-Sabellian  stock  had  to  content 
themselves  with  the  rough  mountain  districts,  proves  that 
the  Latins  went  first  and  settled  on  the  west  coast,  in  the 
plains  of  Latium  and  Campania.  The  Italian  names 
Novla  or  Nola  (new  town),  Campani,  Capua,  Volturnus, 
Opsci  (labourers),  show  that  an  Italian  and  probably 
Latin  stock,  the  Ausones,  were  in  possession  of  Campania 
before  the  Samnite  and  Greek  immigrations.  The  Itali 
proper,  who  were  the  primitive  inhabitants  of  the  country 
subsequently  occupied  by  the  Lucani  and  Bruttii,  were 
probably  connected  with  the  Italian,  not  the  Iapygian 
stock,  and  possibly  with  the  Latin  branch  of  the  Italian ; 
but  Greek  influence  and  Samnite  invasions  completely 
obliterated  all  trace  of  the  Itali.  So,  too,  ancient  legends 
connect  the  extinct  stock  of  the  Siculi  with  Rome.  What- 
ever the  truth  of  this  may  be  it  is  not  improbable  that  the 
Latins  in  primitive  times  spread  over  Latium,  Campania, 
Lucania,  and  the  eastern  half  of  Sicily.  But  those  settled 
in  Sicily,  Magna  Graecia,  and  Campania  came  into  con- 
tact with  the  Greeks  at  a  time  when  they  were  unable 
to  resist  so  superior  a  civilization,  and  were  consequently, 
as  in  Sicily,  completely  Helleniaed,  or  so  weakened  that 


8  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

they  fell  an  easy  prey  to  Sabine  hordes.     Thus,  the  Siculi, 
Itali,  and  Ausonians  play  no  part  in  the  history  of  Italy. 
Ou   the  other  hand,  those  settled  in   Latiuui,  where  no 
Greek  colony  was  founded,  succeeded  in  maintaining  their 
ground   against   the    Sabines   and    more    northern    foes. 
Latium  itself  is  a  plain  ti%aversed  by  the  Tiber  and  Anio, 
bounded   on  the  east  by  the  mountains  of  the  Sabines 
and  Aequi,  which  form  part  of  the  Apennines ;  on  the 
south,  by  the  Volscian  range,  which   is   separated  from 
the  main  chain  of  the  Apennines  by  the  ancient  territory 
of  the  Hernici ;  on  the  west,  by  the  sea,  whose  harbours 
on  this  part  of  the  coast  are  few  and  poor ;  on  the  north, 
by  the  broad  highlands  of  Etruria,  into  which   it  imper- 
ceptibly merges.     This  plain  is  dotted  with  isolated  hills, 
such  as  Soracte  in  the  north-east,  the  Circeian  promontory 
on  the  south-west,  the  lower  height  of  Janiculum ;    and 
the  Alban  range,  free  on  every  side,  stands  between    the 
Volscian  chain  and  the  Tiber.     Here  were  settled  the  old 
Latins   (Prisci   Latini),  as  they  were  later  on    called,  to 
distinguish  them  from  the  Latins  settled  outside    Latium. 
Bat  in  early  times  the  Tiber  formed  the  northern  boundary, 
and  only  the  centre  of  the  region  between  the  Tiber,  the 
spurs  of  the  Apennines,  the  Alban  mount,   and  the  sea, 
consisting  of  some  seven  hundred   square    miles,  formed 
Latium  proper — the  real  plain  land    (7rAarus,   flat),  as  it 
seems  from  the  height  of  the  Alban    mount.     This  plain 
is  broken  by  hills  of  tufa  of  moderate  height,  and  by  deep 
fissures  in  the  ground.     Owing  to   this  uneven  character 
lakes  are  formed  in  winter,  and   as  there  is  no  natural 
outlet   for   the   water,   malaria    arises   from    the   noxious 
'  exhalations  in  summer   heat.     This   malaria  the  ancient 
inhabitants  avoided  by   wearing  heavy  woollen  clothing, 
and  by  keeping  a  constant  blazing  fire,  and  thus  a  dense 
population   existed    where   now   no   one   can    support   a 
healthy  life. 

The  conditions  of  early  society  among  the  settlers  in 
Latium  must  be  a  matter  of  conjecture.  The  clan,*  or 
gens,  served  as  the  link  between  house,  village,  and  canton. 
Probably  each  canton  was  an  aggregate  of  clan-villages, 
which   villages  were  an  aggregate  of  clan-houses,  united 

*  Ihne,  i.  113,  notes  that  "clan"  does  not  adequately  represent 
gens,  and  prefers  "  house  "  or  "  family." 


LATIN  SETTLEMENTS.  9 

together  by  locality  and  clanship ;  and  every  political 
community  (civitas,  populus)  consisted  of  an  aggregate 
of  cantons.  No  doubt  each  canton  had  its  local  centre, 
which  served  alike  as  a  place  of  meeting  and  of  refuge  : 
these  were  called,  from  their  position,  mountain-tops 
(capitolia)  or  strongholds  (arces).  In  time  houses  began 
to  cluster  round  the  stronghold,  and  were  surrounded 
with  the  "  ring  "  (urbs)  ;  thus  the  nucleus  of  a  town  was 
formed.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  Alban  range, 
from  its  natural  strength  and  advantages  of  air  and  water, 
was  occupied  by  the  first  comers.  Here,  among  other 
ancient  canton-centres,  stood  pre-eminent  Alba,  the 
mother-city  of  all  the  old  Latin  settlements.  Therefore, 
when  the  various  cantons,  though  each  independent  and 
governed  by  its  own  constitution  of  prince,  elders,  and 
general  assembly  of  warriors,  expressed  their  sense  of 
the  ties  of  blood  and  language  by  forming  what  is  known 
as  the  Latin  League,  it  was  but  natural  that  Alba  should 
be  the  centre  of  that  league,  and  therefore  president 
of  the  thirty  cantons  which  composed  it.  We  have  no 
certain  knowledge  as  to  the  powers  or  legal  rights  this 
confederacy  exercised  over  the  various  members.  Probably 
disputes  between  cantons  were  settled  by  the  league,  wars 
against  foreign  foes  decided,  and  a  federal  commander- 
in-chief  appointed  What  we  do  know  is  that  on  the 
annual  day  of  assembly  the  Latin  festival  (Latinae  feriae) 
was  kept,  and  an  ox  sacrificed  to  the  Latin  god  (Jupiter 
Latiaris).  Each  community  had  to  contribute  to  the 
sacrificial  feast  its  fixed  proportion  of  cattle,  milk,  and 
cheese,  and  to  receive  in  return  a  part  of  the  roasted 
victim.  During  this  festival  "  a  truce  of  God "  was 
observed  throughout  all  Latium,  and  safe-conducts  were 
probably  granted,  even  by  tribes  at  feud  with  one  another. 
It  is  impossible  to  define  the  privileges  of  Alba,  as  pre- 
siding canton.  Probably  it  was  a  purely  honorary  position, 
and  had  no  political  signification,  certainly  none  as  de- 
noting any  sort  of  leadership  or  command  of  the  rest  of 
the  Latin  cantons.  But,  vague  as  the  outlines  of  this 
early  canton  life  must  necessarily  be,  they  show  us  the 
one  great  fact  of  a  common  centre,  which,  while  it  did 
not  destroy  the  individual  independence  of  the  cantons, 
kept  alive  the  feeling  of  national  kinship,  and  thus  paved 


10  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

the   way  for   that   national   union  which  is   the  goal   of 
every  free  people's  progress. 

In  tracing  the  beginnings  of  Rome,  her  original  consti- 
tution, and  the  first  changes  it  underwent,  we  are  on 
ground  which  the  uncertain  light  of  ancient  tradition 
and  modern  theory  has  made  most  difficult,  if  not  im- 
possible to  traverse  with  any  certainty.  The  very  name 
of  Romans,  with  which  the  settlement  on  the  low  hills 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tiber  has  so  long  been  associated, 
was  originally  not  Romans,  but  Ramnes  (possibly  "  bush- 
men").  Side  by  side  with  this  Latin  settlement  of 
Ramnians  two  other  cantons  settled,  and  from  the  combi- 
nation, or  synoikismos,  of  these  three  arose  Rome.  It 
must  be  specially  noted  that  one  of  these  other  two 
cantons,  viz.  the  Tities,  has  been  unanimously  ascribed 
to  a  Sabellian,  not  Latin,  stock ;  the  third  canton,  viz. 
the  Luceres,  was  probably,  like  the  Ramnes,  a  Latin 
community.  From  the  fact  that  this  Sabellian  mixture 
and  absorption  in  a  Latin  canton-union  has  left  scarce 
any  trace  of  Sabellian  elements  in  Roman  institutions, 
we  may  conclude  that,  at  the  remote  period  at  which  it 
occurred,  the  Sabellian  and  Latin  stocks  were  far  less 
sharply  contrasted  in  language,  manners,  and  customs 
than  was  the  case  in  a  later  age.  A  proof  of  the  great 
antiquity  of  this  triple  division  is  the  fact  that  the 
Romans  regularly  used  tribuere  and  tribus  in  the  simple 
sense  of  "divide"  and  "a  part."  The  unfavourable 
character  of  the  site  renders  it  hard  to  understand  how 
Rome  could  so  early  attain  its  prominent  position  in 
Latium.  The  soil  is  unfavourable  to  the  growth  of  fig 
or  vine,  and  in  addition  to  the  want  of  good  water- 
springs,  swamps  are  caused  by  the  frequent  inundations 
of  the  Tiber.  Moreover,  it  was  confined  in  all  land 
directions  by  powerful  cities  :  on  the  east,  by  Antemnae, 
Fidenae,  Caenina,  Collatia,  and  Gabii;  on  the  south,  by  - 
Tusculum  and  Alba ;  and  on  the  south-west  by  Lavinium. 
But  all  these  disadvantages  were  more  than  compensated 
by  the  unfettered  command  it  had  of  both  banks  of  the 
Tiber  down  to  the  month  of  the  river.  The  fact  that 
the  clan  of  the  Romilii  was  settled  on  the  right  bank 
from  time  immemorial,  and  that  there  lay  the  grove  of 
the  creative  goddess  (Dea  Dia),  the  primitive  seat  of  the 


ORIGIN  OF  ROME.  11 

Arval  festival  and  Arval  brotherhood,  proves  that  the 
original  territory  of  Rome  comprehended  Janiculnm  and 
Ostia,  which  afterwards  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Etrus- 
cans. Not  only  did  this  position  on  both  banks  of  the 
Tiber  place  in  Rome's  hands  all  the  traffic  of  Latium, 
but,  as  the  Tiber  was  the  natural  barrier  against  northern 
invaders,  Rome  became  the  maritime  frontier  fortress  of 
Latium.  Again,  this  situation  acted  in  two  ways. 
Firstly,  it  brought  Rome  into  commercial  relations  with 
the  outer  world,  cemented  her  alliance  with  Caere,  and 
taught  her  the  importance  of  building  bridges.  Secondly, 
it  caused  the  Roman  canton  to  become  united  in  the  city 
itself  far  earlier  than  was  the  case  with  other  Latin 
communities.  And  thus,  though  Latium  was  a  strictly 
agricultural  country,  Rome  was  a  centre  of  commerce ; 
and  this  commercial  position  stamped  its  peculiar  mark 
on  the  Roman  character,  distinguishing  them  from  the 
rest  of  the  Latins  and  Italians,  as  the  citizen  is  dis- 
tinguished from  the  rustic.  Not,  indeed,  that  the  Roman 
neglected  his  farm,  or  ceased  to  regard  it  as  his  home ; 
but  the  unwholesome  air  of  the  Campagna  tended  to  make 
him  withdraw  to  the  more  healthy  city  hills ;  and  from 
early  times  by  the  side  of  the  Roman  farmer  arose  a 
non-agricultural  population,  composed  partly  of  foreigners 
and  partly  of  natives,  which  tended  to  develop  urban 
bfe.  The  town  originally  embraced  only  the  Palatine, 
or  what  was  later  known  as  "  Square  Rome "  (Roma 
quadrata),  so  called  from  the  quadrangular  form  of  the 
Palatine  Hill.  The  "Festival  of  the  Seven  Mounts" 
(Septimontium)  was  a  memorial  of  the  growth  of  suburbs 
and  of  the  gradual  extension  of  the  city.  Each  suburb 
was  surrounded  with  its  own  ring-wall,  and  connected 
with  the  original  ring-wall  of  the  Palatine.  This  ancient 
Palatine  city  with  its  seven  rings  embraced  the  Palatine, 
the  Palatine  slope  called  Cermalus,  the  Velia,  or  ridge 
connecting  the  Palatine  and  the  Esquiline,  the  three 
peaks  of  the  Esquiline,  and  the  fortress  of  Subura,  which 
protected  the  new  town. on  the  Carinae,  in  the  low  ground 
between  the  Esquiline  and  the  Quirinal.  This  ancient 
city  of  the  seven  mounts  has  left  no  tradition  of  its 
history,  being  completely  absorbed  in  the  mightier  Rome. 
That  other  ground  was  very  early  occupied,  we  may  well 


12  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

believe,  such  as  the  Capitol  and  Aventine,  and  the  height 
of  the  Janiculum  ;  but  as  to  the  distribution  of  the  three 
component  elements,  the  Ramnes,  Tities,  and  Luceres, 
we  have  no  knowledge.  There  is,  however,  strong  evi- 
dence in  favour  of  the  view  that,  coexistent  with  the 
Palatine  Romans,  was  another  settlement  on  the  Quirinal, 
facing  the  city  on  the  Palatine,  and  independent  of  it. 
The  twofold  worship  of  Mars  on  the  Palatine  and  Quirinal, 
the  duplicate  existence  in  later  Rome  of  his  two  priest- 
colleges  of  Salii  and  Luperci,  representing  the  original 
colleges  of  each  priesthood  on  the  two  hills,  and  the  fact 
that  the  Romans  on  the  Palatine  called  themselves 
Montani  and  those  on  the  Quirinal  Collini,  all  point  to 
the  coexistence  of  two  separate  and  independent  commu- 
nities. That  a  distinction  of  race  caused  the  founding 
of  these  two  cities  is  unproved.  The  Palatine  Romans 
soon  overshadowed  those  on  the  hill,  but  it  was  the  work 
of  Servius  Tullius  to  comprehend  both  these  small  cities, 
and  also  the  heights  of  the  Aventine  and  Capitoiine, 
within  a  single  ring-wall,  and  thus  create  the  greater 
Rome  of  history. 


AUTHORITIES. 

Alba  Longa  and  Latins.—  Dionys.  i.  66-67 ;  iii.  1-34  ;  iv.  49. 
Early  society. — Vide  Marq.  Stv.  i.  1-20. 

Triple  settlement  of  Rome. — Liv.  i.  13.  '  Varro  L.  L.  v.  51,  55,  74. 
Early  city. — Livy  i.  44.     Dionys.  i.  88.     Cic.  de  Rep.  ii.  6.    Anl.  Gell. 

xiii.  14.     VaiTo  L.  L.  v.  48,  50,  143.     Festus  258,  348.    Tac. 

Ann.  xii.  24. 
On  all  topographical  and  archaeological  questions,  ride  Middleton'a 

"Ancient  Rome  "  and  his  article  in  "  Encyclopaedia  Britannica." 
On  early  Latium  and  Rome's  position,  cf.  Momms.  R.  St.  iii.  607, 

sqq. 


CHAPTER  III. 

rome's  original  constitution. 

Father — Slave — Client — King — Community — Rights  and  burdens  of 
burgesses — Senate. 

The  basis  of  the  Roman  constitution  was  the  family, 
and  the  constitution  of  the  state  was  but  an  expansion  of 
that  of  the  family.  The  head  of  the  household  was  of 
necessity  a  man,  and  his  authority  alike  as  father  or 
husband  was  supreme,  and  in  the  eye  of  the  law  as 
absolute  over  wife  and  child  as  over  slave.  Though  a 
woman  could  acquire  property,  she  was  under  the  absolute 
dominion  of  her  father,  or,  if  married,  under  that  of  her 
husband,  or,  if  he  died,  under  the  guardianship  (tutela)  of 
her  nearest  male  relations.  This  authority  of  the  pater 
familias  was  alike  irresponsible  and  unchangeable ;  nor 
could  it  be  dissolved  except  by  death.  Although  a  grown- 
uvp  son  might  establish  a  separate  household  of  his  own, 
all  his  property,  however  acquired,  belonged  legally  to  his 
father ;  and  it  was  easier  for  a  slave  to  obtain  release  from 
his  master  than  for  a  son  to  free  himself  from  the  control 
of  his  father.  A  daughter,  if  married,  passed  out  of  her 
father's  hand  into  that  of  her  husband,  to  whose  clan  or 
gens  she  henceforth  belonged.  On  the  father's  death  the 
sons  still  preserved  the  unity  of  the  family,  nor  did  it 
become  broken  till  the  male  stock  died  out ,  but,  as  the 
connecting  links  became  gradually  weaker  in  succeeding 
generations,  there  arose  the  distinction  between  members 
of  a  family  (agnati)  and  members  of  a  clan  (gentiles). 
The  former  denoted  those  male  members  of  a  family  who 
could  show  the  successive  steps  of  their  descent  from  a 


14  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

common  progenitor,  the  latter,  those  who  could  do  longer 
prove  their  degree  of  relationship  by  pointing  out  the 
intermediate  links  of  connection  with  a  common  ancestor. 
Slaves  belonging  to  a  household  were  regarded  by  the  law, 
not  as  living  beings,  but  as  chattels,  whose  position  was 
not  affected  by  the  death  of  the  head  of  the  house. 
Attached  to  the  Roman  household  was  an  intermediate 
class  of  person,  called  clientes  ("  listeners  "),  or  dependants. 
These  consisted  partly  of  refugees  from  foreign  states; 
partly  of  slaves  living  in  a  state  of  practical  freedom  ; 
partly  of  persons  who,  though  not  free  citizens  of  any 
community,  lived  in  a  condition  of  protected  freedom. 
Although  these  formed  with  the  slaves  the  familia,  or 
"  body  of  servants,"  and  were  dependent  on  the  will  of 
the  head  of  the  house  or  patron  (patronus),  their  position 
was  practically  one  of  considerable  freedom ;  and  in  the 
course  of  several  generations  the  clients  of  a  household 
acquired  more  and  more  liberty.  Every  one  who  was  a 
member  of  a  Roman  family,  and  therefore  of  one  of  the 
gentes,  or  clanships,  whose  union  formed  the  state,  was  a 
true  citizen  or  burgess  of  Rome.  Every  one  born  of 
parents  united  by  the  ceremony  of  the  sacred  salted  cake 
(confarreatio)  was  also  a  full  citizen  ;  and  therefore  the 
Roman  burgesses  called  themselves  "fathers'  children" 
(patricii),  as  in  the  eye  of  the  law  they  alone  had  a 
father.  Thus  the  state  consisted  of  gentes,  or  clans,  and 
the  clans  of  families,  and  although  the  relations  of  the 
various  members  of  the  household  were  not  altered  by 
their  incorporation  with  the  state,  yet  a  son  outside  the 
household  was  on  a  footing  of  equality  with  the  father  in 
respect  of  political  rights  and  duties.  So,  too,  the  various 
clients,  though  not  admitted  to  the  rights  and  duties 
proper  to  true  burgesses,  were  not  wholly  excluded  from 
participation  in  state  festivals  and  state  worship ;  and 
this  would  be  specially  true  of  those  who  were  not  clients 
of  special  families,  but  of  the  community  at  large. 

Since  the  family  served  as  the  model  for  the  constitution 
of  the  state,  it  was  necessary  to  choose  some  one  who 
should  stand  in  the  same  relation  to  the  body-politic  as 
the  head  of  the  family  did  to  the  household.  He  who  was 
so  chosen  rex,  or  leader,  possessed  the  same  absolute  power 
over  the  state  as  the  house-father  had  over  his  household, 


ROME'S  ORIGINAL  CONSTITUTION.  15 

and,  like  him,  ruled  for  life  :  there  was  no  other  holder  of 
power  beside  him.  His  "  command  "  (imperium)  was  all- 
powerful  in  peace  and  war,  and  he  was  preceded  by 
lictores,  or  "  summoners,"  armed  with  axes  and  rods  on  all 
public  occasions.  He  nominated  priests  and  priestesses, 
and  acted  as  the  nation's  intercessor  with  the  gods.  He 
held  the  keys  of  the  public  treasury,  and  alone  had  the 
right  of  publicly  addressing  the  burgesses.  He  was 
supreme  judge  in  all  private  and  criminal  trials,  and  had 
the  power  of  life  and  death  :  he  called  out  the  people  for 
military  service,  and  commanded  the  army.  Any  magis- 
trates, any  religious  colleges,  any  military  officers,  that  he 
might  appoint,  derived  all  their  power  from  him,  and  only 
existed  during  his  pleasure.  His  power  only  ended  with 
death,  and  he  appointed  his  successor,  thus  imparting  a 
sense  of  permanence  to  the  kingship,  despite  the  personal 
change  of  the  holders  of  the  sovereign  power.  But, 
although  the  king's  authority  was  so  absolute,  he  never 
came  to  be  regarded  by  the  Romans  as  other  than  mortal, 
nor,  as  by  divine  right,  higher  and  better  than  his  fellow- 
citizens.  This  view  of  the  kingship  was  at  once  the 
moral  and  practical  limitation  of  its  power.  The  king  was 
the  people's  representative,  and  derived  his  power  from 
them,  and  was  accountable  to  them  for  its  use  and  abuse. 
Moreover,  the  legal  limitation  to  his  power  lay  in  the 
principle  that  he  was  entitled  only  to  execute  the  law, 
not  to  alter  it.  Any  deviation  from  the  law  had  to 
receive  the  previous  sanction  of  the  assembly  of  the 
people  and  the  council  of  eldei'S.  There  is  no  parallel 
in  modern  life  to  the  Roman  family  or  Roman  state  or 
Roman  sovereign. 

The  principle  on  which  the  division  of  the  burgesses 
rested  was  that  ten  houses  formed  a  clan,  ten  clans  a 
wardship  (curia),  ten  wardships  the  community.  Each 
householder  furnished  a  foot-soldier  (mil-es,  thousand- 
walker),  and  each  clan  a  horseman  and  senator.  If  com- 
munities combined,  each  was  a  part  or  tribe  (tribus)  of 
the  whole  community.  Originally  each  household  had  its 
own  portion  of  land  ;  but  when  households  combined  into 
a  gens,  each  clan  had  its  lands,  and  this  system  naturally 
extended  to  curies  and  communities,  whether  single  or 
combined.     Thus  clan-lands  formed  in  primitive  times  the 


16  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

smallest  unit  in  the  division  of  land.  Although  this 
division  into  ten  curies  early  disappeared  in  Rome,  we 
find  it  in  later  Latin  communities,  which  always  had 
one  hundred  acting  councillors  (centumviri),  each  of 
whom  was  "head  of  ten  households"  (decurio).  This 
constitutional  scheme  did  not  originate  in  Rome,  but  was 
a  primitive  institution,  common  to  all  Latins.  What  the 
precise  object  and  value  of  this  division  was  we  cannot 
now  determine ;  and  it  is  clear  that  any  attempt  to 
rigidly  fix  the  number  of  households  and  clans  must, 
through  ordinary  human  accidents,  have  failed.  The  really 
important  unit  in  the  division  was  the  curia,  the  members 
of  which  were  bound  by  religious  ties,  and  had  a  priest 
of  their  own  (flamen  curialis).  Military  levies  and  money 
valuations  were  made  according  to  curial  divisions,  and 
the  burgesses  met  and  voted  by  curies.  Although  all  full 
citizens  or  burgesses  were  on  a  footing  of  absolute  equality 
as  regarded  one  another,  the  distinction  between  those 
who  were  burgesses  and  those  who  were  not  was  most 
sharply  and  rigidly  defined.  If  a  stranger  were  adopted 
into  the  burgess-body  (patronum  cooptari  or  in  patricios 
cooptari,  as  patronus  like  patricius  merely  denoted  the 
"full  citizen"),  he  could  not  retain  his  rights  as  citizen 
elsewhere.  If  he  did,  he  merely  possessed  honorary  citizen- 
ship at  Rome,  and  was  entitled  to  the  privileges  and 
protection  of  a  guest  (ius  hospitii),  not  to  the  exercise  of 
full  citizen  rights.  There  were  no  class  privileges  at 
Rome.  All  wore  the  simple  woollen  toga  in  public, 
although  certain  officers  by  virtue  of  their  office  were 
distinguished  by  dress.  As  the  Latin  immigrants  had  no 
conquered  race  to  deal  with,  the  nobility  of  Greece  and 
the  caste  of  India  were,  unknown  to  them.  The  most 
important  duty  of  the  burgesses  was  military  service,  as 
they  alone  had  the  right  of  bearing  arms.  Hence  the 
name  populus  ("  body  of  warriors,"  connected  with  popular -i, 
"to  lay  waste  "),  called  in  old  litanies  pilumnus  populus, 
"  spear-armed  host ; "  hence,  too,  the  name  of  quirites  * 
("  lance-men  "),  given  them  by  the  king.  Other  duties  in- 
cumbent on  the  burgesses  were  such  as  the  king  laid  upon 
them ;  among  these  was  the  all-important  task  of  building 
walls,  to  which  the  name  of  moenia  ("tasks")  was  given. 
*  On  this  word,  cf.  Momms.  R.  St.  iii.  p.  5,  note. 


ROME'S  ORIGINAL   CONSTITUTION.  17 

As  there  was  no  state  pay  for  services  so  rendered,  there 
was  no  direct  state  expenditure  or  state  taxation.  The 
very  victims  for  sacrifice  were  provided  by  the  deposit,  or 
cattle-fine  (sacramentum),  which  the  defeated  party  in  a 
law-suit  was  bound  to  pay.  In  cases  of  urgent  need  a 
direct  contribution  (tributum)  was  levied ;  but  this  was 
regarded  as  a  loan,  and  repaid  when  times  improved. 
Although  the  king  managed  the  state  exchequer,  the 
state  property,  e.g.  the  land  won  in  war,  was  not  identified 
with  the  private  property  of  the  king.  His  exchequer 
was  filled  partly  by  the  land-taxes,  i.e.  the  scriptura,  or 
pasture  tribute,  paid  by  those  wTho  fed  cattle  on  the 
common  pasture,  and  the  vectigalia,  or  payment  in  kind  in 
place  of  rent,  by  those  who  were  lessees  of  the  state 
lands;  partly  by  gains  in  war;  partly  by  harbour-dues 
levied  on  the  exports  and  imports  of  Ostia;  partly, 
perhaps,  by  the  tax  which  the  non-burgesses  settled  al 
Rome  (aerarii)  paid  him  for  protection.  In  addition 
to  these  duties  the  burgesses  had  also  rights.  They 
were  convoked  by  the  king  (1)  in  formal  assemblies 
(comitia  curiata)  twice  a  year,  or  (2)  in  such  meetings 
(contiones)  as  the  king  thought  fit  to  hold.  They  had  no 
power  of  speech  on  such  occasions,  unless  the  king  saw 
fit  to  grant  it ;  their  duty  was  merely  to  listen  and  return 
simple  answers  without  discussion  to  the  king's  questions. 
As  long  as  the  king  was  executor  of  existing  laws,  no 
intervention  was  necessary  on  the  part  of  the  citizens ; 
but  where  abnormal  events  arose  which  necessitated  any 
change  of  or  deviation  from  existing  laws,  the  co-operation 
and  assent  of  the  burgess  body  was  essential.  The  king 
put  the  question  (rogatio),  and  the  people  returned 
answer ;  and  the  lex,  or  law,  which  was  the  outcome  of 
this  process,  was  not  in  its  origin  a  command  of  a  king 
but  a  contract  proposed  by  the  king  and  accepted  or 
refused  by  his  hearers.  The  citizens  alone  could  allow  a 
man  to  make  such  a  will  as  transferred  his  property  on 
his  death  to  another ;  they  alone  could  sanction  the 
adoption  of  a  man  into  the  burgess  body,  or  allow  a 
burgess  to  surrender  his  rights  as  citizen  ;  they  alone 
could  pardon  a  condemned  criminal,  whence  arose  the 
right  of  appeal  (provocatio),  which  was  only  allowed  to 
those  who  pleaded  guilty.      "  Thus  far  the  assembly  of 

2 


18  B1ST0HY  OF  ROME. 

the  community,  restricted  and  hampered  as  it  first  appears, 
was  yet  from  antiquity  a  constituent  element  of  the 
Roman  commonwealth,  and  was  in  law  superior  to,  rather 
than  co-ordinate  with,  the  king." 

The  origin  of  the  senate  can  with  probability  be  asci'ibed 
to  that  remote  period  w'len  each  clan  in  Latium  was 
under  the  rule  of  its  own  elder.  As  the  clans  became 
amalgamated,  the  position  of  such  an  elder  was  necessarily 
subordinated  to  that  of  the  head  or  king  of  the  community  ; 
but  that  the  senate  was  not  a  mere  conclave  of  trusty  coun- 
cillors called  into  being  by  the  king,  but  an  institution  as 
old  as  that  of  king  and  burgess-assembly,  admits  of  little 
doubt.  It  x'esembled  the  assembly  of  pi'inces  and  rulers, 
gathered  in  a  circle  round  the  king  as  described  by 
Homer.  The  number  was  fixed  at  three  hundred,  corre- 
sponding to  the  three  hundred  clans  of  which  the  three 
primitive  communities,  forming  the  whole  state,  were 
composed.  All  senators  sat  for  life  ;  they  were  chosen  by 
the  king,  and  it  is  only  natural  to  suppose  that,  if  originally 
the  senate  consisted  of  the  ancient  body  of  clan  elders,  the 
king  always  chose,  when  a  senator  died,  a  man  of  the  same 
clan  to  fill  his  place.  The  senators  were,  therefore,  so 
many  kings  of  the  whole  community,  although  the  chief 
power,  as  in  the  household,  was  vested  in  one  of  their  body, 
namely  the  king  :  their  insignia,  though  inferior  to  those 
of  the  king,  were  of  the  same  character ;  the  purple  border 
(latus  clavus)  being  substituted  for  the  purple  robe  of  the 
king,  and  the  red  shoes  of  the  senator  being  lower  and  less 
striking  than  those  which  the  king  wore.  Should  the  king 
die  without  appointing  a  successor,  one  of  the  senators, 
chosen  by  lot  as  interrex,  exercised  his  authority  for  fire 
days,  and  this  interrex  appointed  the  next,  thus  passing 
on  the  five  days'  sovereign  power  to  one  of  his  own  body. 
Finally,  one  of  these  interreges,  but  never  the  one  first 
chosen,  nominated  the  king,  and  his  choice  was  ratified 
by  the  whole  assembly  of  the  citizens.  Thus  the  senate 
was  the  ultimate  holder  of  the  ruling  power,  and  was  a 
guarantee  of  the  permanence  of  the  monarchy.  Further, 
it  was  the  guardian  of  the  constitution,  examining  every 
new  resolution  which  the  king  suggested  and  the  burgesses 
adopted,  and  having  the  right  of  vetoing  these  resolutions, 
should  they  appear  to  violate  existing  rights.    The  senate's 


ROME'S  ORIGINAL   CONSTITUTION.  19 

consent  (patrum  auctoritas)  had  also  to  be  obtained  before 
war  could  be  declared.  And  thus  the  senate's  duty  was  to 
guard  against  any  innovation  or  violation  of  the  constitu- 
tion, whether  coming  from  king  or  burgess-assembly.  In 
consequence  of,  or,  at  least,  in  close  connection  with,  this 
power  of  the  senate,  arose  the  very  ancient  custom  of  the 
king's  convoking  the  senate,  and  submitting  to  it  the  pro- 
posals he  intended  to  bring  before  the  citizens.  By  thus 
ascertaining  the  opinions  of  the  individual  members,  the 
king  avoided  the  possibility  of  any  subsequent  opposition 
from  that  body.  On  most  questions,  involving  no  breach 
of  the  constitution,  the  senate's  part  Mas  doubtless  merely 
that  of  compliance  with  the  king's  wishes.  The  senate  could 
not  meet  unless  convoked  by  the  king,  and  no  one  might 
declare  his  opinion  unasked  :  nor  was  the  consultation  of 
the  senate  on  ordinary  matters  of  state  business  legally 
incumbent  on  the  king  ;  but  this  consultation  soon  became 
usual,  and  from  this  usage  the  subsequent  extensive  powers 
of  the  senate  were  in  great  measure  developed.  To  sum 
up,  "the  oldest  constitution  of  Rome  was  in  some  measure 
constitutional  monarchy  inverted.  In  the  Roman  con- 
stitution the  community  of  the  people  exercised  very  much 
the  same  functions  as  belong  to  the  king  in  England.  The 
right  of  pardon,  which  in  England  is  the  prerogative  of 
the  crown,  was  in  Rome  the  prerogative  of  the  community ; 
while  all  government  was  vested  in  the  president  of  the 
state,"  whose  royal  power  was  at  once  absolute  and  limited 
by  the  laws  (imperium  legitimum).  Further,  in  the  rela- 
tions of  the  state  to  the  individual,  we  find  that  the  family 
was  not  sacrificed  to  the  community,  but  that,  though 
power  of  imprisonment  or  death  was  vested  in  the  statp, 
no  burgess  could  have  his  son  or  his  field  taken  from  him, 
or  even  taxation  imposed  on  him.  In  no  other  community 
could  a  citizen  live  so  absolutely  secure  from  encroach- 
ment, either  on  the  part  of  his  fellows  or  of  the  state  itself. 
This  constitution  was  neither  manufactured  nor  borrowed  ; 
it  grew  and  developed  with  the  growth  and  development 
of  the  Roman  people,  and  "as  long  as  there  existed  a 
Roman  community,  in  spite  of  changes  of  form,  it  was 
always  held  that  the  magistrate  had  absolute  command, 
that  the  council  of  elders  was  the  highest  authority  in  the 
state,  and  that  every  exceptional  resolution  required  the 


20  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

sanction  of  the  sovereign,  or,  in  other  words,  of  the  com- 
munity of  the  people." 


AUTHORITIES. 

Roman  household. — Dionys.  ii.  26,  27.     Marq.  Priv.  leb.  1-6. 
King.— Liv.  i.  8,  22,  32,  42  ;  iv.  7.     Cic.  de  Legg.  iii.  3.      Appian 

i.  98.    Dionys.  4,  80.    Momms.  R.  St.  ii.  3-16.    Schwegler  R.  G. 

i.  646,  sq. 
Burgesses. — Comit.  Curiata  Dionys.  ii.  14;  iii.  22.     Liv.  i.  26.     Cic. 

de  Rep.  ii.  13.     A.  Gell.  v.  19 ;  xv.  27.     Gaius,  ii.  101.     Momms. 

R.  St.  iii.  316-321. 
Senate.— Liv.  i.  8,  17-22,  35,  41,  49.      Dionys.  ii.  12,  47 ;    iii.  67. 

Plut.  Rom.  13,  20.     Nam.  2. 
Populus. — Cf.  Momms.  R.  St.  iii.  2-8. 
Gentes  and  adoption. —  Momms.  R.  St.  iii.  9-40. 
Citizen  rights. — Momms.  R.  St.  iii.  40-48. 
Curies.- Momms.  R.  St.  iii.  89-103. 


CHAPTER   IV.    • 

REFORMS  OF  SERVIDS   TDLLIUS — SUPREMACY  OF  ROME  IN  LATIUM. 

Rise  of  the  plebs — Military  reforms  of  Servius  Tullius — Political 
effects — Rise  of  Rome  to  supremacy  in  Latium — Her  relation  to 
Latium — Extension  of  Rome  and  Roman  territory — Treatment 
of  conquered  Latins. 

We  have  already  stated  that  the  earliest  amalgamation 
in  the  history  of  Rome  was  that  which  blended  together 
the  Ramnes,  Tities,  and  Luceres.  This  was  followed  by  the 
union  of  the  settlement  on  the  Quirinal  with  that  on  the 
Palatine.  Traces  of  this  union  existed  in  the  duplicate 
I'eligious  institutions  retained  in  Rome,  but  politically  it 
left  little  mark.  The  town  on  the  Quirinal  counted  as  one 
of  the  four  divisions  of  the  Palatine  city,  the  other  three 
being  the  Suburan,  Palatine,  and  Esquiline.  No  new  tribe, 
however,  was  added  to  the  original  three;  and  the  new  bur- 
gesses were  distributed  among  the  existing  tribes  and  curies. 
Henceforth  each  of  the  three  tribes  contained  two  divisions 
or  ranks,  and  these  ranks  were  denoted  by  the  names  "  first  " 
(priores)  and  "  second  "  (posteriores) .  But  no  increase  was 
made  in  the  number  of  the  senate,  the  primitive  number 
of  three  hundred  remaining  unchanged  down  to  the  seventh 
century  of  the  city's  history.  So  also  the  magistrates  or 
king's  deputies  remained  the  same.  If,  then,  the  Quirinal 
citizens  furnished  the  posterior  or  "  second  "  gentes  of  the 
old  tribes,  this  distinction  must  not  be  confused  with  the 
subsequent  maiores  and  minores  gentes  (greater  and  lesser 
clans)  who  figure  in  history :  these  probably  belonged  to 
those  communities  which,  beginning  with  Alba,  were  sub- 
sequently amalgamated  with  the  Roman  people.     Thus  the 


22  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

incorporation  of  the  Quirinal  or  Hill  Romans  with  the  Pala- 
tine or  Mountain  Romaus  marks  an  intermediate  stage 
between  the  earliest  synoikismos,  which  united  into  one  body 
the  Titles,  Ramnes,  and  Luceres,  and  all  subsequent  incor- 
porations. This  amalgamation,  then,  increased  the  bulk, 
but  did  uot  change  the  character  of  the  Roman  state.  But 
another  process  of  incorporation,  the  first  steps  of  which 
may  be  traced  to  this  period,  and  which  proceeded  very 
gradually,  did  profoundly  affect  the  community.  We 
refer  to  the  development  of  the  plebs — a  problem  most 
intricate  and  elusive.  In  the  previous  chapter  the  posi- 
tion of  "  clients  "  was  described  as  twofold  :  (1)  that  of 
those  dependent  on  and  protected  by  the  master  of  the 
household;  (2)  that  of  those  dependent  on  and  protected 
by  the  state,  i.e.  by  the  king.  Every  fresh  amalgamation 
doubtless  brought  in  an  accession  of  clients,  but  the 
principal  increase  must  have  been  due  (1)  to  the  attraction 
Rome,  as  a  commercial  centre,  possessed  for  foreigners, 
who  became  metoecs  (peToiKoi) ,  or  resident  aliens;  (2)  to 
the  influence  of  war,  which,  while  it  transferred  the  citizens 
of  conquered  towns  to  Rome,  at  the  same  time  thinned 
the  ranks  of  the  Roman  citizens,  who  alone  had  the 
doubtful  privilege  of  bearing  the  brunt  of  such  wars.  In 
truth  this  latter  fact  was  the  chief  cause  in  promoting  the 
amalgamation  of  the  clients  and  the  citizens.  With  the 
increase  of  the  whole  body  of  clients,  and  especially  of 
that  portion  consisting  of  foreigners,  attached  as  clients  to 
the  Roman  state,  but  often  retaining  the  citizenship  of 
other  communities,  the  old  restrictions,  which  were  more 
easily  observed  in  the  case  of  household  clients,  must  have 
broken  down.  Many,  in  fact,  must  have  enjoyed  practical 
freedom,  though,  of  course,  not  the  full  rights  of  Roman 
citizens.  The  immemorial  principle  of  Roman  law  that, 
when  once  a  master  or  owner  had  renounced  his  ownership 
(dominium),  he  could  never  resume  it  over  the  f reed- 
man  or  the  freedm  m's  descendants;  the  liberal  concessions, 
made  by  Roman  law  especially  to  foreignei*s,  as  regarded 
marriage  and  the  acquisition  of  property;  the  increasing 
number  of  manumitted  slaves ;  the  influx  alike  of  traders, 
and  still  more  of  Latins  vanquished  in  war ;  the  corre- 
sponding decrease  of  true  Roman  patricians  ;  the  constant 
vexation  of  the  relations  between  client  and  patron, — these 


REFORMS  OF  SERYIUS  TULLIUS.  23 

and  otber  causes  must  have  all  sufficed  to  threaten  a 
revolution  of  the  direst  consequences  to  the  Roman  state. 
The  new  name  of  plebes,  or  multitude,  (from  pleo,  plenus), 
by  which  the  clients  were  now  called,  was  ominous,  signi- 
fying, as  it  did,  that  the  majority  no  longer  felt  so  much 
their  special  dependence  as  their  want  of  political  rights. 
The  danger  was  averted  by  the  reform  associated  with 
the  name  of  Servius  Tullius,  although  the  new  consti- 
tution assigned  the  plebeians  primarily  only  duties,  not 
rights  Military  service  was  now  changed  from  a  burden 
upon  birth  to  a  burden  on  property.  All  freeholders, 
from  seventeen  to  sixty  years  of  age,  whether  burgesses, 
metoecs,  or  manumitted  slaves,  provided  only  they  held 
land,  were  bound  to  serve ;  and  they  were  distributed, 
according  to  the  size  of  their  property,  into  five  classes  (lit. 
"  summonings  " — classis,  from  calare).  The  first  class,  who 
were  obliged  to  appear  in  complete  armour,  consisted  of  the 
possessors  of  an  entire  hide  of  land,  and  were  called  classici. 
The  remaining  four  classes  consisted  of  the  respective  pos- 
sessors of  three-quarters,  half,  a  quarter,  or  an  eighth  of  a 
nominal  farm,  i.e.  of  a  farm  whose  size  served  as  the 
standard  by  which  such  divisions  were  regulated  (probably 
such  a  farm  contained  at  least  twenty  jugera).  The 
cavalry  was  dealt  with  in  the  same  way  :  its  existing  six 
divisions,  which  retained  their  old  names,  were  tripled ; 
only  the  richest  landholders,  whether  burgesses  or  non- 
burgesses,  served  as  horsemen.  All  those  who  held  land 
and  were  incapable  of  service,  either  from  sex  or  age,  were 
bound  to  provide  horses  and  fodder  for  special  troopers. 
To  facilitate  the  levying  of  the  infantry,  the  city  was 
divided  into  four  parts  (tribus),  (1)  the  Palatine,  com- 
prising also  the  Velia ;  (2)  the  Suburan,  comprising  also 
the  Carinae  and  Coelian;  (3)  the  Esquiline;  (4)  the  Colline, 
i.e.  the  Quirinal  and  Viminal,  Each  of  these  four  divi- 
sions contributed  a  fourth  part,  not  merely  of  the  force 
as  a  whole,  but  of  each  of  its  military  subdivisions ;  and 
this  arrangement  tended  to  merge  all  distinctions  of  clan 
and  place,  and  also  to  blend,  by  its  levelling  spirit,  bur- 
gesses and  metoecs  into  one  people.  The  army  was  divided 
into  two  levies :  the  first  comprised  the  juniors,  who 
served  in  the  field  from  their  seventeenth  to  their  forty- 
sixth  year;  the  second,  the  seniors,  who  guarded  the  walls 


24  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

at  home.  The  whole  force  of  infantry  consisted  of  four 
legions  ("musters,"  legiones),  each  of  4200  men,  or  42 
centuries,  3000  of  whom  were  heavy  armed,  and  1200 
light  armed  (velites)  ;  two  of  these  legions  were  juniors 
and  two  seniors.  Added  to  these  were  1800  cavalry,  thus 
bringing  the  whole  force  to  about  20,000  men.  The 
century,  or  body  of  one  hundred,  formed  the  unit  of  this 
military  scheme,  and  by  the  arrangement  above  indicated 
there  would  be  18  centuries  of  cavalry  and  168  of  infantry. 
To  these,  other  centuries  of  supernumeraries  (adcensi) 
must  be  added,  who  marched  with  the  army  unarmed 
(velati),  and  took  the  place  of  those  who  fell  ill  or  died  in 
battle.  The  whole  number  of  centuries  amounted  to  193 
or  194;  nor  was  it  increased  as  the  population  rose.  Out 
of  this  military  organization  arose  the  census  or  register 
of  landed  property,  including  the  slaves,  cattle,  etc.,  that 
each  man  possessed,  and  this  was  strictly  revised  every 
fourth  year.  This  reform,  though  instituted  on  purely 
military  lines  and  for  military  purposes,  had  important 
political  results.  In  the  first  place,  every  soldier,  whether 
a  full  citizen  or  not,  would  be  certain  to  have  it  in  his 
power  to  become  a  centurion  and,  further,  a  military 
tribune.  In  the  second,  those  rights  which  the  burgesses 
had  formerly  possessed,  not  as  an  assembly  of  citizens  in 
curies,  but  as  a  levy  of  armed  burgesses,  would  now  be 
shared  by  the  whole  army  of  centuries.  These  rights 
conferred  the  power  on  the  military  centuries  of  authoriz- 
ing soldiers  to  make  wills  before  battle,  and  of  granting 
permission  to  the  king  to  make  an  aggressive  war.  In 
the  third  place,  although  the  rights  of  the  old  burgess 
assembly  were  in  no  way  restricted,  there  thus  arose  three 
classes  :  (1)  the  full  burgesses  or  citizens  ;  (2)  the  clients 
possessing  freeholds,  called  later,  "  burgesses  without  the 
right  of  voting  "  (cives  sine  suffragio),  who  shared  in  the 
public  burdens,  i.e.  military  service,  tribute,  and  task- 
work, and  were,  therefore,  called  municipals  (municipes)  ; 
(3)  those  metoecs  who  were  not  included  in  the  tribes, 
and  who  paid  protection-money,  and  were  non-freeholders 
(aerarii).  The  period  at  which  this  reform  took  place  must 
be  a  matter  of  conjecture,  but  it  presupposes  the  existence 
of  the  Servian  wall,  embracing  the  four  regions  of  the 
city :  and  the  smallest  extent  to  which  the  city  must  have 


SUPREMACY  OF  ROME  IN  LATIUM.  25 

spread  is  420  square  miles  ;  and  we  must  assume  that 
not  only  the  district  between  the  Tiber  and  the  Anio 
had  been  acquired,  but  also  the  Alban  territory.  Analogy 
from  Greek  states  inclines  to  the  view  that  this  reform 
was  modelled  on  Greek  lines,  and  produced  by  Greek 
influence.  The  adoption  of  the  armour  and  arrangements 
of  the  Greek  hoplite  system  in  the  legion,  the  supply 
of  cavalry  horses  by  widows  and  orphans,  point  in  this 
direction ;  moreover,  about  this  time  the  Greek  states  in 
Lower  Italy  adopted  a  modification  of  the  pure  clan 
constitution,  and  gave  the  preponderance  of  power  to  the 
landholders. 

The  steps  by  which  Rome  rose  to  the  proud  position 
of  head  state  iu  Latium,  the  union  of  the  Latin  com- 
munities under  her  headship,  the  extension  alike  of  Latin 
territory  and  of  the  city  of  Rome,  the  splendour  of  that 
regal  period  which  shed  a  special  lustre  on  the  royal 
house  of  Tarquin,  cannot  now  be  described,  save  in  faint 
outline.  We  may,  however,  briefly  summarize  the  results, 
the  details  of  which  have  either  been  buried  in  oblivion  or 
falsified  by  mythical  legend.  Firstly,  those  Latin  com- 
munities situated  on  the  Upper  Tiber,  and  between  the 
Tiber  and  the  Anio — Antemnae,  Crustumerium,  Ficulnea, 
Medullia,  Caenina,  Corniculum,  Cameria,  Collatia,  which 
on  the  east  side  sorely  hampered  Rome — were  very  early 
subjugated  ;  the  only  one  which  retained  its  independence 
was  Nomentum,  probably  by  alliance  with  Rome.  Con- 
stant war  was  waged  between  the  Romans  and  the 
Etruscan  people  of  Veii  for  the  possession  of  Fidenae, 
situate  on  the  left  (Latin)  bank  of  the  Tiber,  about  five 
miles  from  Rome,  but  apparently  without  the  Romans 
becoming  permanent  masters  of  this  important  outpost. 
Secondly,  Alba  was  conquered  and  destroyed ;  to  her 
position  as  the  recognized  political  head  and  sacred 
metropolis  of  Latium,  Rome  succeeded.  Rome  thus 
became  presideut  of  the  Latin  league  of  thirty  cantons, 
and  the  seat  of  the  religious  ceremonial  observed  at  the 
Latin  festival.  An  alliance  was  concluded  on  equal  terms 
between  Rome  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Latin  confederacy 
on  the  other,  establishing  lasting  peace  throughout  Latium, 
and  a  perpetual  league  for  offence  and  defence.  Equality 
of  rights  was  established  between  the  members   of  this 


26  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

federation,  alike  as  to  commerce  and  intermarriage.  No 
member  of  the  league  could  exist  as  a  slave  within  the 
league's  territory,  and,  though  every  member  only- 
exercised  political  rights,  as  member  of  the  community 
to  which  he  belonged,  he  had  the  private  right  of  living 
anywhere  he  liked  within  the  Latin  territory ;  and, 
further,  although  Latin  law  was  not  of  necessity  identical 
with  Roman,  the  league  naturally  brought  the  two  into 
more  complete  harmony  with  one  another.  The  difference 
between  the  position  occupied  by  Rome  and  that  formerly 
held  by  Alba,  was  that  the  honorary  presidency  of  the 
latter  was  replaced  by  the  real  supremacy  of  the  former, 
Rome  was  not,  as  Alba,  a  mere  member  of  the  league,  and 
included  within  it,  but  rather  existed  alongside  it ;  this 
is  shown  by  the  composition  of  the  federal  army,  the 
Roman  and  Latin  force  being  of  equal  strength,  and  the 
supreme  command  being  held  by  Rome  and  Latium 
alternately.  In  accordance  with  this  principle,  aTl  land 
and  other  property  acquired  in  war  by  the  league  was 
divided  equally  between  Rome  and  Latium.  Each  Latin 
community  retained  its  own  independent  constitution  and 
administration,  so  far  as  its  obligations  to  the  league  were 
not  concerned ;  and  the  league  of  the  thirty  Latin  com- 
munities retained  its  independence,  and  had  its  own 
federal  council,  in  contradistinction  to  the  self-government 
and  council  of  Rone.  Thirdly,  although  Rome  failed  to 
master  Fidenae,  it  kept  its  hold  upon  Janiculum,  and  upon 
both  banks  at  the  mouth  of  the  Tiber  In  the  direction 
of  the  Sabines  and  Aequi,  Rome  advanced  her  position, 
and,  by  the  help  of  an  alliance  with  the  Hernici,  held  in 
check  her  eastern  neighbours.  On  the  south,  constant 
wars,  not  without  success,  were  waged  against  the 
Volscians  and  Rutulians ;  and  in  this  quarter  we  first 
meet  with  Latin  colonies,  i.e.  communities  founded  by 
Rome  and  Latium  on  the  enemy's  soil,  which  shows  that 
the  earliest  extension  of  Latin  territory  took  place  in  this 
direction.  Lastly,  in  addition  to  this  enlargement  of  the 
Latin  borders  towards  the  east  and  south,  the  city  of 
Rome,  owing  to  its  increase  of  inhabitants,  and  com- 
mercial and  political  prominence,  needed  new  defences. 
In  consequence  the  Servian  wall  was  constructed :  this, 
beginning   at   the   river   below   the   Aventine,  embraced 


SUPREMACY  OF  ROME  IN  LATIUM.  27 

that  hill,  the  Coelian,  the  whole  of  the  Esquiline,  Viminal, 
and  Quirinal ;  thence  it  ran  to  the  Capitoline.  and  abutted 
on  the  river  above  the  island  in  the  Tiber.*  The  Palatine, 
which  had  hitherto  been  the  stronghold,  was  now  left 
open  to  be  built  upon,  and  the  stronghold  (arx,  or  capi- 
tolium)  was  constructed  on  the  Capitoline,  which  was 
free  on  every  side  and  easily  defensible ;  it  was  sometimes 
called  Mons  Tarpeius  ("  the  Tarpeian  hill"),  and  its  lower 
summit  facing  the  Tiber  was  the  famous  Tarpeian  rock, 
a  precipice,  in  ancient  days,  of  some  eighty  feet.  Here, 
too,  was  the  enclosed  "well-house"  (tullianum),  the 
treasury  (aerarium),  the  prison,  and  the  most  ancient 
place  of  assembling  for  the  burgesses  (Area  Capitolina). 
No  stone  dwelling-houses  were  allowed  to  be  built  on 
the  hill;  and  trees  or  shrubs  covered  the  space  between 
the  two  hill  summits,  which  was  afterwards  called  the 
Asylum.  Thus  the  Capitol  was  the  true  Acropolis  of 
Rome,  a  castle  of  refuge  when  the  city  itself  had  fallen. 
Janiculum,  though  outside  the  city  limits,  was  fortified, 
and  embraced  by  the  Servian  wall,  and  connected  with 
the  city  by  the  bridge  of  piles  (Pons  Sublicins)  which  ran 
across  to  the  Tiber  island.  The  great  work  of  draining 
the  marshy  valley  between  the  Capitol  and  the  Palatine 
was  undertaken  in  this  regal  period,  and  the  assembly- 
place  of  the  community  was  transferred  from  the  Area 
Capitolina  to  the  flat  space  (comitium)  between  the 
Palatine  and  the  Carinae.  Not  far  from  here  was  built 
the  senate-house  (Curia  Hostilia)  ;  here  stood  the  tribunal, 
or  judgment-seat  platform,  and  the  stage,  whence  the 
burgesses  were  addressed  (afterwards  called  rostra).  In 
the  direction  of  the  Velia  arose  the  new  market  (Forum 
Romanorum).  To  the  west  of  the  forum,  beneath  the 
Palatine,  was  the  temple  of  Vesta,  the  common  hearth 
of  the  city ;  and  in  the  valley  between  the  Palatine  and 
Aventine  was  marked  off  a  racecourse,  the  circus  of  later 
times.     Among  the  numerous  temples  and  sanctuaries  on 

*  It  is  necessary  to  remark  that  this  enlarged  Rome  was  never 
looked  upon  as  the  "  city  of  seven  hills,"  which  title  was  exclusively 
reserved  for  the  narrower  old  Rome  of  the  Palatine,  described  at  the 
end  of  Chapter  II  The  modern  list  of  the  seven  hills,  as  comprising 
those  embraced  by  the  Servian  wall,  viz.  Palatine,  Aventine,  Coelian, 
Esquiline,  Viminal,  Quirinal,  Capitoline,  is  unknown  to  any  ancient 
author. 


28  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

all  the  summits,  were  conspicuous  the  federal  sanctuary  of 
Diana  ou  the  Aventine,  and  the  far-seen  temple  of  Jupiter 
Diovis  on  the  Capitoline.  That  Greek  influences,  as  in 
the  Servian  military  organization,  can  be  traced  in  this 
remodelling  of  the  Roman  state  cannot  well  be  doubted  ; 
but  how  far  and  in  what  way  they  did  so  cannot  now  be 
shown.  There  may  be  some  truth  in  the  traditions  which 
ascribe  to  different  kings  the  various  improvements  and 
new  buildings  of  Rome,  but  it  is  clear  that  in  any  case 
they  are  to  be  assigned  to  the  period  when  Rome  re- 
modelled her  army  and  rose  to  the  hegemony  of  Latium. 

Reverting  for  a  moment  to  the  first  two  sections  above 
enumerated,  we  may  briefly  touch  on  the  .treatment  of 
the  conquered  Latins  by  Rome.  The  circumstances  of 
each  particular  case  doubtless  decided  the  question,  as  to 
whether  the  inhabitants  of  a  conquered  town  were  forced 
to  migrate  to  Rome,  or  allowed  to  remain  in  the  open 
villages  of  their  old  district.  Strongholds  in  all  cases 
were  razed,  and  the  conquered  country  was  included  in 
the  Roman  territory,  and  the  vanquished  farmers  were 
taught  to  regard  Rome  as  their  market-centre  and  seat  of 
justice.  Legally  they  occupied  the  position  of  clients, 
though  in  some  cases  of  individuals  and  clans  full  burgess- 
rights  were  granted ;  this  was  specially  the  case  with 
Alban  clans.  The  jealousy  with  which  the  Latin  cantons, 
and  especially  the  Roman,  guarded  against  the  rise  of 
colonies  as  rival  political  centres,  is  well  shown  in  Rome's 
treatment  of  Ostia ;  the  latter  city  had  no  political  in- 
dependence, and  its  citizens  were  only  allowed  to  retain, 
if  they  already  possessed,  the  general  burgess-rights  of 
Rome.  Thus  this  centralizing  process,  which  caused  the 
absorption  of  a  number  of  smaller  states  in  a  larger  one, 
though  not  essentially  a  Roman  nor  even  Italian  idea,  was 
carried  out  more  consistently  and  perseveringly  by  the 
Roman  than  by  any  other  Italian  canton ;  and  the  success 
of  Rome,  as  of  Athens,  is  doubtless  due  to  the  thorough 
application  of  this  system  of  centralization. 


SUPREMACY  OF  ROME  IN  LATIUM.  29 


AUTHORITIES. 

Plebs  distinct  from  clients  and  populus. — Liv.  ii.  35,  56,  64;  ill.  14, 

16;  vii.  18;  xxv.  12.    Dionys.  vi.  45-47;  ix.  41 ;  x.  27.    Momms. 

R.  St.  iii.  71-75. 
Clients. — Liv.  ii.  16.     Dionys.  ii.  10,  46;  v.  40 ;  ix.  5;  x.  14.     Marq. 

P.l.  i.  196,  sq.     Momnis.  R.  St.  iii.  54-88. 
Servian  reforms. — Liv.  i.  42-43.      Dionys.  iv.  16,  18.      Cio.  de  Rep. 

ii.  22.     Varro  L.  L.  46-54.     Momms.  R.  St.  iii.  240-267,  281- 

288. 
Rome's  extension  and  relation  to  Latium. — Liv.  i.  35-38,  45,  50-55. 

Dionys.  iii.    54.     Plinv    N.  H.   36,    15.     Marq.   Stv.  i.  21,  eq. 

Momms.  R.  St.  iii.  609-617. 
On  the  tribes,  cf.  Momms.  R.  St.  iii.  161,  sq. 


80  HISTORY  OF  POME. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE    ETRUSCANS — THE    GREEKS    IN    ITALY. 

The  Etrnscans — Origin — Settlements  in  Italy — Etruria — Relations 
with  Rome — Constitution — Maritime  power — Religion — Art — 
The  Greeks  in  Italy — Date  of  immigration — League  of  Achaean 
cities — Tarentum — Cumae  — Relations  of  Greeks  with  Latins, 
Etruscans,  and  Phoenicians. 

Before  proceeding  to  describe  the  changes  of  Republican 
Rome,  it  will  be  well  to  direct  our  attention  to  the  other 
races  inhabiting  Italy.  For  convenience,  we  will  omit  the 
movements  of  the  Umbro-Sabellian  stocks  for  the  present, 
and  only  include  in  this  chapter  the  two  foreign  races, 
whose  history  is  interwoven  with  our  subject  :  (1)  the 
Etruscans ;  (2)  the  Italian  Greeks.  A  mystery  shrouds 
the  first  people  as  to  their  origin,  language,  race-classifica- 
tion, and  original  home.  Their  heavy  bodily  structure, 
gloomy  and  fantastic  religion,  strange  manners  and  customs, 
and  harsh  language,  point  to  their  original  distinctness 
from  all  Italian  and  Greek  races.  No  one  has  been  able 
either  to  decipher  the  numerous  remains  of  their  language 
or  to  classify  with  precision  the  language  itself.  Its 
original  soft  and  melodious  character  was  by  the  weaken- 
ing of  vowels  and  loss  of  soft  terminations,  completely 
changed.  Tarquinius  became  Tarchnaf  ;  Minerva,  Menrva; 
Menelaos,  Menle  ;  indistinct  pronunciation  confused  owith 
v,  b  with  p,  c  with  g,  d  with  t,  and  the  termination  al 
signified  "  son  of"  {e.g.  Canial  =  Cainia  natus)  ;  sa  denoted 
"wife  of  "  (e.g.  Lecnesa  =  "  wife  of  Licinius  ")  ;  Hermes 
became  Turms  ;  Aphrodite,  Turan  ;  Bacchus,  Fufluns.  All 
fchijse  present  not  the  remotest  analogy  to  the  tongues  of 


TEE  ETRUSCANS.  31 

Greece  or  Italy.  But  the  clan  termination  enas  or  cna  (e.g. 
Porsena,  Maecenas,  Spurinna)  corresponds  closely  to  that 
found  in  Italian,  especially  Sabellian,  names  (compare  Vi~ 
bius,  or  Vibienus,and  Spurius  with  Vivenna  and  Spurinna). 
The  Etruscan  names  of  divinities,  which  at  first  sight  would 
point  to  a  close  connection  with  the  Latin  language  (e.g. 
Usil,  sun  and  dawn,  connected  with  ausum,  aurum,  aurora, 
sol,  Menrva,  and  Minerva,  etc.),  probably  arose  from  the 
subsequent  political  and  religious  relations  between  the 
Etruscans  and  Latins.  Still,  in  default  of  anything  more 
certain,  we  may  conclude  that  the  Etruscans  belonged  to 
the  Indo-Germanic  family,  although  standing  strangely 
isolated.  Many  conjectures  have  been  hazarded  as  to  their 
original  home  before  migrating  into  Italy — all  equally  in 
vain.  The  fact  that  their  o'dest  and  most  important 
towns  (with  the  exception  of  Populonia,  which  was  not  one 
of  the  old  twelve  cities)  lay  far  inland,  and  never  on  the 
coast,  makes  it  probable  that  they  migrated  by  land  from 
the  north  or  west  of  Italy ;  possibly  they  came  over  the 
Raetian  Alps,  for  the  Raeti  spoke  Etruscan  down  to  his- 
torical times,  and  their  name  sounds  similar  to  that  of  Ras, 
by  which  the  Etruscans  called  themselves.  The  old  tradition 
that  they  were  Lydian  emigrants  from  Asia  has  nothing 
to  support  it,  except  the  accidental  resemblance  of  Tui*s- 
ennae  (which  in  Greek  became  Tvpcr-rjvot,  Tvpprjvoi ;  in 
Umbrian,  Tursci ;  and  in  Latin,  Tusci,  Etrusci)  to  the 
Lydian  Topprj/3oi  of  the  town  Tvppa.  These  Torrhebi  were 
sometimes  denoted  by  the  word  Tyrrhenians  ;  and,  as  the 
Lydian s,  and  especially  the  Torrhebians,  were  noted  for 
piracy,  and  the  Etruscans  for  commerce  by  sea,  this  un- 
fortunate error  easily  arose.  Whatever,  then,  was  their 
original  home,  the  fact  of  the  Etruscan  dialect  being  still 
spoken  in  Livy's  time  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  Raetian  Alps, 
and  of  Mantua  remaining  Tuscan  to  a  late  period,  proves 
that  Etruscans  dwelt  in  the  district  north  of  thePo,  bounded 
on  the  east  by  the  Veneti,  and  on  the  west  by  the  Ligu- 
rians.  To  the  south  of  the  Po,  and  at  its  mouths,  the  Um- 
brians,  who  were  the  older  settlers,  were  mingled  with  and 
under  the  supremacy  of  the  Etruscan  immigrants  ;  and 
the  towns  of  Hatria  and  Spina,  founded  by  the  Umbrians, 
and  Felsina  (Bologna)  and  Ravenna,  founded  by  the 
Etruscans,  point  to  this  joint  settlement;   but  the  irrup- 


32  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

tions  of  the  Celts  forced  the  Etruscans  early  to  abandon 
their  position  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Po,  and  later  that  on 
the  right  bank  of  that  river. 

The  great  settlement  of  the  Tuscans  in  the  land  that 
still  bears  their  name  completely  effaced  all  traces  of 
Ligurian  or  Umbrian  predecessors  in  that  country,  and 
maintained  its  position  with  great  tenacity  down  to  the 
time  of  the  empire.  Etruria  proper  was  bounded  on  the 
east  by  the  Apennines,  on  the  north  by  the  Arnus,  on 
the  south  at  first  by  the  Ciminian  forest,  and  later  by  the 
Tiber.  The  land  north  of  the  Arnus,  as  far  as  the  mouth 
of  the  Macra  and  the  Apennines,  was  debatable  border 
territory,  held  now  by  Ligurians,  now  by  Etruscans. 
The  land  between  the  Ciminian  range  and  the  Tiber,  with 
the  towns  of  Sutrium,  Nepete,  Falerii,  Veii,  and  Caere, 
was  occupied  at  a  later  date,  possibly  in  the  second  century 
of  Rome;  and  the  Italian  population  there  held  its  ground, 
especially  in  Falerii,  though  in  a  state  of  dependence. 
When  the  Tiber  became  the  boundary,  the  relations 
between  Rome  and  the  Etruscan  invader  were  on  the 
whole  peaceful  and  friendly,  especially  with  the  town  of 
Caere.  But  where  an  Etruscan  town  threatened  Rome's 
commercial  position  on  the  Tiber,  as  was  the  case  with 
Veii,  constant  war  naturally  resulted.  Any  trace  of 
Etruscans  to  the  south  of  the  Tiber  must  be  ascribed 
to  plundering  expeditions  by  sea,  never  to  regular  land 
invasions ;  nor  is  there  any  reliable  evidence  of  any 
Etruscan  settlement  south  of  the  Tiber  being  planted  by 
settlers  who  came  by  land.*  The  name  of  "  Tuscan  quarter  " 
(Tuscus  vicus)  at  the  foot  of  the  Palatine,  and  the  un- 
doubted fact  that  the  last  royal  house  of  Rome,  the 
Tarquin,  was  of  Etruscan  origin  (whether  sprung  from 
Tarquinii  or  Caere),  coupled  with  minor  and  similar  tra- 
ditions, prove  that  Tuscan  settlements  took  place  in 
Rome ;  but  the  fact  that  a  house  of  Etruscan  origin  held 
the  royal  sceptre  does  not  warrant  the  conclusion  that  the 
Etruscans  ever  were  dominant  in  Rome.  There  is  no 
evidence  that  Etruria  exercised  any  essential  influence  on 

*  Others — e.g.  O.  Miiller  and  Pelham  ("  Encyclopaedia  Britan- 
nica") — hold  the  contrary  view,  and  base  it  on  the  evidence  for 
Etruscan  rule  over  Rome  and  Latium  found  in  Dionys.  i.  29,  64,  65; 
Plut.  Q.  R.  18 ;  Liv.  i.  2. 


THE  ETRUSCANS.  33 

tbe  language  or  customs  or  political  development  of  Rome. 
The  passive  attitude  of  Etruria  towards  Rome  was  prob- 
ably due  to  two  causes  :  (1)  to  their  struggles  with  the 
Celtic  hordes  from  the  North  ;  (2)  to  their  sea-faring 
tendency,  which  is  especially  shown  in  their  Campanian 
settlements. 

The  commercial  instincts  of  the  Etruscans  caused  them 
to  form  cities  earlier  than  any  other  Italian  race.  Hence 
Caere  is  the  first  Italian  town  mentioned  in  Greek  records. 
This  same  instinct  disposed  them  less  to  war,  and  led 
them  to  employ  mercenaries  at  a  very  early  period.  They 
were  governed  by  kings,  or  lucumones,  with  powers  prob- 
ably similar  to  those  of  Roman  kings.  They  probably  had 
a  system  of  clans  not  dissimilar  from  that  of  the  Romans ; 
the  nobles  were  marked  off  strictly  from  the  common 
people.  They  were  formed  into  loose  confederacies,  each 
consisting  of  twelve  communities,  with  a  metropolis  and 
federal  head,  or  high  priest  of  the  league.  The  whole 
nation  was  not  embraced  in  one  confederation,  as  the 
Etruscans  in  the  north  and  those  in  Campania  had 
leagues  of  their  own.  Volsinii  was  the  metropolis  of  the 
league  in  Etruria  proper.  Of  the  rest  of  the  twelve  towns 
we  only  know  for  certain  Perusia,  Vetulonium,  Volci,  and 
Tarquinii.  The  laxity  of  the  league  allowed,  or  rather 
preferred,  that  separate  communities  should  carry  on 
ordinary  wars  ;  nor  did  all  the  towns  join,  when,  in  ex- 
ceptional cases,  a  war  was  resolved  on  by  the  confederacy. 
"  The  Etruscan  confederations  appear  to  have  been  from 
the  first  deficient  in  a  firm  and  paramount  central 
authority." 

When  the  tide  of  Greek  invasion  swept  over  Italy,  it  met 
a  firm  but  not  bitter  resistance  from  the  Latins  and  the 
inhabitants  of  the  southern  part  of  Etruria.  Caere,  in  fact, 
attained  its  early  prosperity  by  its  tolerance  of,  and  benefit 
from,  commercial  intercourse  with  the  Greeks.  But  the 
"  wild  Tyrrhenians,"  alike  on  the  banks  of  the  Po  and  on 
the  west  coast,  proved  a  deadly  foe  to  the  Greek  intruders  ; 
they  dislodged  them  from  Aethalia  (Ilva,  Elba)  and  Popu- 
lonia.  The  depredations  of  Etruscan  privateers  were  the 
dread  of  all  Greek  merchants,  and  caused  the  Greeks  to 
call  the  western  sea  of  Italy  by  their  name  (Tyrrhenum 
mare).     Although  the  Etruscans  failed  to  effect  a  settle- 

3 


34  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

ment  in  Latium,  or  to  dislodge  the  Greeks  at  Vesuvius, 
they  held  sway  in  Antinm  and  Surrentum.  The  Volscians 
became  their  clients,  and  they  founded  a  league  of  twelve 
cities  in  Campania.  Their  very  piracy  helped  them  to 
develop  their  commercial  instincts;  and,  though  at  war 
with  Italian  Greeks,  they  were  often  on  peaceful  and 
intimate  relations  with  Greece  proper  and  Asia  Minor1. 
Their  position  as  inhabitants  of  Northern  Italy  from  sea 
to  sea,  and  thus  commanding  the  mouths  of  the  Po  on  the 
Adriatic  and  the  great  free  ports  on  the  western  sea,  as 
holding  the  land  route  from  Pisae  on  the  western  coast  to 
Spina  on  the  eastern,  and  as  masters  in  the  south  of  the 
rich  plains  of  Capua  and  Nola,  gave  them  exceptional 
advantages;  and  the  luxury  thus  speedily  introduced  was 
doubtless  no  small  factor  in  their  rapid  decline.  The  part 
they  played,  as  allies  of  the  Phoenicians,  and  specially  of 
the  Carthaginians,  in  opposing  Hellenic  influence,  belongs 
to  another  chapter  ;  but  the  main  result  at  first  was  to 
increase  their  trade  and  establish  their  naval  power. 
Corsica,  with  the  towns  of  Alalia  and  Nicaea,  became 
subject  to  them,  while  Carthage  seized  the  sister  island  of 
Sardinia. 

The  subsequent  decay  of  the  Etruscan  power  must  be 
treated  of  elsewhere ;  but  we  may  conclude  this  account 
with  a  brief  estimate  of  their  religious  and  artistic  de- 
velopment. Livy's  statement  that  Etruscan  culture  was 
in  early  times  the  basis  of  Roman  education,  as  Greek 
culture  was  in  later  days,  is  due  to  a  false  notion  preva- 
lent among  ancient  and  modern  scholars  touching  the 
intellectual  eminence  of  the  Etruscans.  The  chief  cha- 
racteristics of  Etruscan  religion  were  a  gloomy  mysticism, 
an  insipid  play  on  numbers,  a  system  of  fortune-telling, 
by  interpretation  of  all  portents,  especially  lightning, 
and  by  entrail-inspection,  and  a  horrible  conception  of 
a  future  world  of  torment,  ruled  over  by  malignant 
deities,  whose  favour  was  to  be  appeased  by  the  most 
cruel  worship.  Etruscan  art  exercised  very  little  influence 
on  the  development  of  that  of  the  Italians ;  and  indeed 
the  Etruscans,  except  in  tomb-painting,  mirror- design- 
ing, and  graving  on  stone,  showed  but  little  genius ;  and 
even  in  these  three  branches  it  is  probable  that  the  best 
works  of  Italian  artists  were  superior.     Barbaric  extra- 


TEE  ETBUSCANS.  35 

vasance  alike  in  material  and  design,  an  ostentatious  love 
of  size  and  costly  eccentricity,  and  an  absence  of  all  origi- 
nality characterize  Etruscan  art.  The  fact  that  no  pro- 
gress was  made  by  the  Etruscans  after  an  early  peril  id 
caused  people  to  regard  Etruscan  art  as  the  mother 
instead  of  the  stunted  daughter  of  Greek  art.  A  close 
connection  is  visible  between  the  Etruscan  and  oldest 
Attic  art,  which  arose  doubtless  from  their  commercial 
relations ;  and  the  bronze  candlesticks  and  gold  cups 
decorated  by  tlie  great  technical  skill  of  the  Tyrrhenian 
workmen  found  a  market  in  Attica  at  an  early  time. 
Fresco-painting,  copper  mirrors,  bronze  statues  of  colossal 
size,  and  painted  vases  were  also  produced  in  great 
numbei'S  by  Etruscan  artists.  But  it  is  specially  to  be 
noticed  that  it  is  in  South  Etruria,  in  the  districts  of 
Caere,  Tarquinii,  and  Volci,  where  Greek  influence  was 
strongly  prevalent,  and  where  the  population  was  not 
purely  Etruscan,  that  the  great  treasures  of  so-called 
Tuscan  art  have  been  preserved.  What  northern  Etruria, 
unassisted  by  Greek  or  Latin  influence,  was  able  to  pro- 
duce is  shown  by  the  copper  coins  which  chiefly  belong 
to  it.  "Etruscan  art  is  a  remarkable  evidence  of  dex- 
terity mechanically  acquired  and  mechanically  retained  j 
but  it  is  as  little  as  the  Chinese  an  evidence  even  of 
genial  receptivity.  As  scholars  have  long  since  desisted 
from  the  attempt  to  derive  Greek  art  from  that  of  the 
Etruscans,  so  they  must,  with  whatever  reluctance,  make 
up  their  minds  to  transfer  the  Etruscans  from  the  first  to 
the  lowest  place  in  the  history  of  Italian  art." 

We  now  turn  to  the  subject  of  the  second  and  con- 
cluding portion  of  this  chapter — the  position  of  the 
Greeks  in  Italy.  All  civilizing  influences  reached  Italy 
by  sea,  and  not  by  land;  but  it  is  remarkable  that  the 
Phoenicians,  who  established  trading  stations  on  almost 
every  coast  of  the  Mediterranean,  have  left  only  one  trace 
in  Italy.  Their  factory  at  Caere,  however,  was  probably 
no  older  than  the  stations  established  by  the  Greeks  on 
the  same  coast ;  and  the  name  Poeni,  which  the  Latins 
gave  to  the  Phoenicians,  was  borrowed  from  the  Greeks, 
and  points  to  the  probability  that  the  Greeks  introduced 
the  Phoenicians  to  Italian  knowledge.  The  name  of  the 
Ionian  sea  applied    to  the  waters    between    Epirus    and 


36  HISTORY   OF  ROME. 

Sicily,  and  that  of  Ionian  gu*f,  applied  by  early  Greeks 
to  the  Adriatic,  prove  that  seafarers  from  Ionia  first  dis- 
covered the  southern  and  eastern  coasts  of  Italy.  Kyme 
(Cumae),  the  oldest  Greek  settlement  in  Italy,  was  founded 
by  the  town  of  the  same  name  on  the  Anatolian  coast. 
The  Phocaeans  are  said  to  have  been  the  first  to  explore 
the  western  sea  ;  and  doubtless  they  were  soon  followed  by 
other  Greeks,  not  only  from  Asia  Minor,  but  from  Greece 
itself  and  the  larger  islands  of  the  Aegean.  These,  in 
their  new  homes  in  southern  Italy  or  Magna  Graecia, 
as  it  was  called,  and  in  Sicily,  recognizing  their  com- 
munity of  character  and  interests,  became  blended  to- 
gether, as  in  our  own  time  different  settlers  from  the  old 
world  have  combined  in  their  new  home  of  Northern 
America.  These  Greek  colonies  may  be  grouped  in  three 
divisions :  (1)  The  original  Ionian  group  included  in 
Italy  Cumae  with  the  other  Greek  settlements  at  Vesuvius 
and  Rhegium,  and  in  Sicily  Zankle  (later  Messana), 
Naxos,  Catana,  Leontini,  and  Himera.  (2)  The  Achaean 
group  embraced  Sybaris  and  most  of  the  cities  of  Magna 
Graecia.  (3)  The  Dorian  group  comprehended  Syracuse, 
Gela,  Agrigentum,  and  most  of  the  Sicilian  colonies  ;  but 
in  Italy  it  only  possessed  Tarentum  and  Heraclea.  As  to 
the  period  at  which  these  several  settlements  took  place, 
we  rely  on  the  fact  that,  while  in  Homer's  time  Sicily 
and  Italy  were  practically  unknown,  in  Hesiod's  poems 
the  outlines  of  these  two  lands  are  more  clearly  defined ; 
and  in  the  literature  subsequent  to  Hesiod  a  general  and 
fairly  accurate  knowledge  appears  to  have  been  possessed 
by  the  Greeks.  That  Cumae  was  the  oldest  Greek  settle- 
ment in  Italy  is  generally  allowed;  that  between  that 
settlement  and  the  main  Greek  immigration  into  Sicily 
and  lower  Italy  a  considerable  period  elapsed  is  also 
probable  :  but  the  two  first  dates  in  Italian  history  which 
can  be  regarded  as  fairly  accurate  are  (1)  the  founding 
of  Sybaris  by  the  Achaeans  in  721  B.C.,  and  (2)  that  of 
the  Dorian  Tarentum  in  708  B.C. 

It  is  important  to  remember  that  the  Italian  and  Sicilian 
Greeks  always  retained  the  closest  connection  with  their 
old  homes,  and  that  therefore  their  history  is  always  a 
history  of  Greeks,  never  of  true  Italians  or  Sicilians. 
This  is  most  clearly  shown  by  the  league  of  the  Achaean 


THE  GREEKS  IN  ITALY.  37 

cities,  comprising  Siris,  Pandosia,  Metapontum,  Sybaris 
with  its  offshoots  Posidonia  and  Laus,  Croton,  Caulouia, 
Temesa,  Terina,  and  Pyxus ;  which,  like  the  Achaean 
league  in  the  Peloponnese,  preserved  its  own  nationality, 
distinct  alike  from  the  barbarians  of  Italy  and  the  other 
Greek  colonies.  These  Achaean  Greeks  attained  a  very 
rapid  prosperity,  especially  in  the  case  of  Sybaris,  Croton, 
and  Metapontum  ;  but  they  did  so  more  from  the  fertility 
of  their  soil,  which  they  compelled  the  natives  to  cultivate 
for  them,  than  from  their  own  efforts  in  commerce  or 
agriculture.  This  rapid  bloom  bore  no  fruit.  Demora- 
lized by  a  life  of  luxury  and  indolence,  these  Italian  Greeks 
produced  no  famous  names  in  Greek  art  or  literature  ;  and 
their  political  constitution,  sapped  in  the  first  place  by 
the  attempt  of  a  few  families  under  the  guise  of  Pytha- 
gorean philosophy  to  seize  absolute  power,  and  later  torn 
by  party  feuds,  slave  insurrections,  and  the  grossest  social 
abuses,  completely  broke  down  Thus  the  Achaeans  exer- 
cised but  little  influence  on  the  civilization  of  Italy;  and 
"  the  bilingual  mongrel  people,  that  arose  out  of  the 
remains  of  the  native  Italians  and  Achaeans  and  the  more 
recent  immigrants  of  Sabellian  descent,  never  attained 
any  real  prosperity." 

The  other  Greeks  settled  in  Italy  had  a  very  different 
effect  on  that  country.  Although,  unlike  the  Achaeans, 
they  founded  their  cities  by  the  best  harbours,  and  mainly 
for  trading  purposes,  they  did  not  despise  agriculture  and 
the  acquisition  of  territory.  The  two  cities  of  greatest  in- 
fluence on  Italy  were  the  Doric  Tarentum  and  the  Ionic 
Cumae.  The  first  named,  from  its  possession  of  the  only 
good  harbour  on  the  southern  coast,  from  the  rich  fisheries 
on  its  gulf,  from  the  excellence  of  its  wool,  and  the  dyeing 
of  it  with  the  purple  juice  of  the  Tarentine  murex,  rapidly 
acquired  an  unrivalled  commercial  position  in  the  south 
of  Italy.  The  fact,  moreover,  that  the  Greeks  planted 
no  colony  on  the  Italian  shore  of  the  Adriatic,  and  only 
two  of  importance  on  the  Illyrian  coast,  viz.  Epidamnus 
and  Apollonia,  caused  Tarentum  to  have  no  small  share  in 
the  Adriatic  commerce,  carried  on  by  Corinth  and  Corcyra ; 
and,  as  Ancona  and  Brundisium  rose  at  a  far  later  period, 
the  ports  at  the  mouths  of  the  Po  were  the  only  rivals  of 
Tarentum  along  the  whole  ea«t  coast.      Her  intercourse 


38  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

by  land  with  Apulia  sowed  the  seeds  of  civilization  in 
the  south-east  of  Italy  ;  but  it  is  noteworthy  that,  as  a  rule, 
the  eastern  provinces  of  Italy  acquired  the  elements  of 
civilization,  not  from  the  scanty  Greek  settlements  on  the 
Illyrian  and  Italian  coasts  of  the  Adriatic,  but  from  the 
more  numerous  colonies  on  the  west  coast  of  Italy.  The 
people  of  Cumae,  and  of  the  other  Greek  stations  near 
Vesuvius,  attained  a  more  moderate  prosperity  than  either 
the  Achaeans  or  Tarentines.  The  district  they  occupied 
was  small,  and  they  contented  themselves  with  spreading 
Greek  civilization  by  peaceful  commercial  intercourse 
rather  than  by  a  policy  of  conquest  and  oppression.  The 
sea-port  of  Dicaearchia  (later  Puteoli),  and  the  cities  of 
Parthenope  and  Neapolis  were  founded  by  the  settlers  at 
Cumae.  There  is  no  doubt  that  in  very  early  times  the 
western  coast  north  of  Vesuvius  was  visited  by  Greek 
voyagers ;  the  adventures  of  Ulysses  himself  have  been 
localized  in  this  region.  The  name  and  architecture  of 
Pyrgi  near  Caere,  the  names  of  Aethalia  ("  the  fire 
island,"  Elba),  Telamon  in  Etruria,  and  Alsium  near 
Pyrgi,  all  point  to  early  Greek  settlements  ;  but,  as  we 
have  already  observed,  the  Latins  and  Etruscans  success- 
fully resisted  the  intruders,  and  north  of  Vesuvius  no 
independent  Greek  community  existed  in  historical  times. 
Nay,  we  may  conclude  that  the  danger  from  Greek  depre- 
dations first  turned  the  attention  of  the  Italians  in  central 
Italy  to  navigation  and  the  founding  of  towns ;  Spina 
and  Hatria  at  the  mouth  of  the  Po,  and  Ariminum  further 
south,  were  Italian,  not  Greek  foundations.  Although 
this  firm  resistance  was  offered  to  the  Greeks,  yet,  as  far 
as  Latium  and  southern  Etruria  were  concerned,  com- 
mercial intercourse  was  welcomed  and  fostered.  Caere, 
Rome,  and  the  cities  at  the  mouth  of  the  Po,  not  only 
prospered  commercially  by  this  friendly  connection,  but, 
as  their  earliest  traditions  show,  enjoyed  religious  inter- 
course with  the  Greek  oracles  of  Delphi  and  Cumae. 
The  different  treatment  that  Greek  voyagers  met  with  from 
the  Etruscans  proper  has  been  already  set  forth :  how  the 
Etruscans  wrested,  from  their  grasp  the  iron  trade  of 
Aethalia,  and  the  silver  mines  of  Populonia,  and  did 
not  even  allow  individual  traders  to  enter  their  waters. 
This   union   of  the  Etruscans  with  the  Phoenicians,  and 


THE  GREEKS  IN  ITALY.  29 

the  sndden  rise  of  Carthage  itself,  arrested  that  Greek 
colonization  which  had,  up  to  the  middle  of  the  second 
century  of  Rome,  threatened  to  sweep  the  Phoenicians 
out  of  the  Mediterranean.  The  establishment  of  Massilia, 
in  600  B.C.,  on  the  Celtic  coast  marks  the  limit  of  Greek 
enterprise ;  an  attempt  in  579  B.C.  to  settle  at  Liljbaeum 
was  frustrated  by  the  natives  and  the  Phoenicians,  and  a 
similar  fate  befell  the  Phocaeans  at  Alalia  in  Corsica, 
which  they  evacuated  after  a  naval  battle  with  the  com- 
bined Etruscans  and  Carthaginians  in  537  B.C.,  pre- 
ferring to  settle  at  Hyele  (Velia)  in  Lncania.  In  this 
struggle  between  the  Greeks  and  the  combined  Etruscans 
and  Phoenicians,  Latium  observed  a  strict  neutrality, 
being  on  friendly  and  commercial  relations  with  Caere 
and  Carthage  on  the  one  hand,  and  Velia  and  Massilia  on 
the  other.  Although  the  Greeks  did  not  give  up  the 
struggle,  and  even  founded  fresh  stations,  they  no  longer 
gained  ground ;  and,  after  the  foundation  of  Agrigentum 
in  580  B.C.,  they  gained  no  important  additions  of  terri- 
tory on  the  Adriatic  or  on  the  western  sea,  and  they 
remained  excluded  from  the  Spanish  waters  as  well  as  the 
Atlantic  ocean. 

The  part  played  by  the  Greeks,  and  in  particular  the 
Sicilian  Greeks,  in  revenging  themselves  at  Himera  in 
480  B.C.  upon  the  Etruscans  and  Carthaginians,  must  be 
described  when  we  reach  the  fall  of  the  Etruscan  power; 
and  the  decline  of  the  Greek  colonies  in  Italy,  and  speci- 
ally the  oppression  of  the  Greeks  in  Campania  and 
southern  Italy  by  the  Samnites,  must  belong  to  our 
account  of  that  race. 


AUTHORITIES. 

Etruscans.— Dionys.  i.  28-30;  iii.  45-66;  iv.  27.      Liv.  i.  2;  v.  33. 

For  fresh  evidence  of  Etruscan  supremacy  in  Rome,  cf.  Mod- 

dleton's  "  Rome,"  pp.  42,  43. 
Greeks.— Dionys.  ii.  21 ;  viii.  22;  xix.  1,  6,  14.     Polyb.  i.  6;  ii.  39. 

Liv.  vii  25-26.     Herod,  i.  166. 


40  HISTORY  OF  BOMB. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

CHANGE    OF   THE    CONSTITUTION. 

Triple  cause  of  political  agitation — Expulsion  of  the  Tarquins— 
Powers  of  the  consuls — The  dictator — Comitia  centuriata — The 
senate — Chief  results  of  the  revolution. 

The  close  of  the  regal  period,  and  the  causes  which  led  to 
the  subsequent  changes  in  the  Roman  constitution,  render 
it  necessary  for  us  to  revert  to  the  internal  state  of  Rome 
itself.  Three  distinct  movements  agitated  the  community. 
The  first  proceeded  from  the  body  of  full  citizens,  and 
was  confined  to  it :  its  object  was  to  limit  and  lessen  the 
life-power  of  the  single  president  or  king ;  in  all  such 
movements  at  Rome,  from  the  time  of  the  Tarquins  to  that 
of  the  Gracchi,  there  was  no  attempt  to  assert  the  rights 
of  the  individual  at  the  expense  of  the  state,  nor  to  limit 
the  power  of  the  state,  but  only  that  of  its  magistrates. 
The  second  was  the  demand  for  equality  of  political  privi- 
leges, and  was  the  cause  of  bitter  struggles  between  the 
full  burgesses  and  those,  whether  plebeians,  freedmen, 
Latins,  or  Italians,  who  keenly  resented  their  political 
inequality.  The  third  movement  was  an  equally  prolific 
source  of  trouble  in  Roman  history ;  it  arose  from  the 
embittered  relations  between  landholders  and  those  who 
had  either  lost  possession  of  their  farms,  or,  as  was  the 
case  with  many  small  farmers,  held  possession  at  the 
mercy  of  the  capitalist  or  landlord.  These  three  move- 
ments must  be  clearly  grasped,  as  upon  them  hinges  the 
internal  history  of  Rome.  Although  often  intertwined  and 
confused  with  one  another,  they  were,  nevertheless,  essen- 
tially and  fundamentally  distinct.     The  natural  outcome 


CHANGE  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION.  41 

of  the  first  was  the  abolition  of  the  monarchy — a  result 
which  we  find  everywhere,  alike  in  Greek  and  Italian 
states,  and  which  seems  to  have  been  a  certain  evolution  of 
the  form  of  constitution  peculiar  to  both  peoples.  What  is 
remarkable  in  the  change  at  Rome,  is  that  violent  measures 
had  to  be  adopted,  and  that  the  Tarquins,  both  the  king 
and  all  the  members  of  his  clan,  had  to  be  forcibly  expelled. 
The  romantic  details  colouring  this  event  do  not  affect 
the  fact  itself,  nor  are  the  reasons  assigned  by  tradition 
undeserving  of  belief.  Tarquin  "  the  proud  "  is  said  to 
have  neglected  to  consult  the  senate,  and  fill  up  the 
vacancies  in  it ;  to  have  pronounced  sentences  of  death 
and  confiscation  without  consulting  his  counsellors  ;  to 
have  stored  his  own  granaries,  and  exacted  undue  military 
service  and  other  duties  from  the  citizens.  The  formal 
vow  registered  by  each  citizen  that  no  king  should  ever 
again  be  tolerated,  the  blind  hatred  felt  at  Rome  ever 
afterwards  for  the  name  of  king,  the  enactment  that  the 
"  king  of  sacrifice  "  (rex  sacrorum)  should  never  hold  any 
other  office, —  all  these  sufficiently  testify  to  the  exaspera- 
tion of  the  people.  There  is  no  proof  that  foreign  nations 
took  part  in  the  struggle  which  ensued  between  the  royal 
house  and  its  expel lers,  nor  can  we  regard  the  great  war 
with  Etruria  in  that  light,  since,  although  successful,  the 
Etruscans  neither  restored  the  monarchy,  nor  even  brought 
back  the  family  of  the  Tarquins.  The  change,  violently 
accomplished  as  it  was,  did  not  abolish  the  royal  power ; 
the  one  life-king  was  simply  replaced  by  two  year-kings, 
called  either  generals  (praetores)  or  judges  (iudices)  or, 
more  commonly,  colleagues  (consules).  Although,  probably 
from  the  first,  the  consuls  divided  their  functions — the  one, 
for  instance,  taking  charge  of  the  army,  the  other  of  the 
administration  of  justice — such  a  partition  was  not  binding, 
and  each  possessed  and  exercised  the  supreme  power  as 
completely  as  the  king  had  done.  In  consequence  of  this 
each  consul  could  forbid  what  the  other  enjoined,  and 
thus  the  consular  commands,  being  both  absolute,  would, 
if  they  clashed,  neutralize  one  another.  It  is  hard  to 
parallel  this  system  of  co-ordinate  supreme  authorities, 
which,  if  not  peculiarly  Roman,  was  a  peculiarly  Latin 
institution.  The  object  clearly  was  to  preserve  the  regal 
power  undiminished,  but,  by  doubling  the  holder  of  this 


42  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

power,  to  neutralize  its  effects.  The  limit  of  a  year,  fixed 
for  the  duration  of  the  consular  office,  was  reckoned  from 
the  day  of  entry  upon  office  to  the  day  of  the  solemn 
laying  down  of  power  by  the  consuls  ;  and,  as  the  consuls 
to  a  certain  extent  laid  down  their  power  of  their  own 
free  will,  and  as,  even  if  they  overstepped  the  year's  limit, 
their  consular  acts  were  still  valid,  they  were  not  so  much 
restricted  directly  by  the  law,  as  induced  by  it  to  restrict 
themselves.  Still,  the  effect  of  this  tenure  of  office  for 
a  set  term  was  to  abolish  the  irresponsibility  of  the  king, 
who,  as  supreme  judge,  had  been  accountable  to  no  tribunal 
and  liable  to  no  punishment.  The  consul,  on  the  other 
hand,  when  his  term  had  expired,  and  the  protection 
given  by  his  office  had  been  removed,  was  liable  to  be 
called  to  account  just  like  any  other  burgess.  Together 
with  the  abolition  of  the  monarchy,  the  ancient  privilege 
of  the  king  to  have  his  fields  tilled  by  the  burgesses,  and 
the  position  which  the  metoecs  held  as  special  clients  of 
the  king,  naturally  came  to  an  end.  The  contrast  between 
the  old  royal  power  and  the  new  consular  office  was  brought 
out  more  clearly  by  the  following  restrictions.  (1)  The  old 
right  of  appeal,  which  the  king  had  granted  or  not  at  his 
pleasure  in  all  criminal  procedure,  was  now  established 
by  the  Valerian  law  in  509  B.C. ;  the  consul  was  now 
bound  to  grant  this  right  to  every  criminal  who  was 
condemned  to  suffer  capital  or  corporal  punishment; 
unless,  indeed,  the  sentence  was  pronounced  under  martial 
law.  In  token  of  this  right,  which  before  451  B.C.  was 
extended  to  cases  of  heavy  fines,  the  consular  lintors  laid 
aside  the  axes,  which  had  been  the  sign  of  the  king's 
penal  jurisdiction.  (2)  The  need  of  deputies,  which  had 
caused,  but  not  compelled,  the  king  to  appoint  a  city- 
warden  (urbi  praefectus)  to  act  in  his  absence,  ceased  with 
the  substitution  of  two  consuls  for  one  king.  If  the 
consul  in  time  of  war  did  entrust  the  supreme  command 
to  a  deputy,  such  a  deputy  was  only  adjutant  or  lieutenant 
(legatus)  of  the  consul.  It  is  true  that,  in  times  of  special 
emergency,  the  consuls  could  nominate  a  third  colleague, 
who,  under  the  name  of  dictator,  revived  the  old  single 
supremacy  of  the  king,  and  who  for  the  time  was  obeyed 
by  the  consuls  and  the  whole  state ;  but  such  an  office 
was  a   special  creation  to   meet    an  exceptional   state  of 


CHANGE  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION.  43 

things.  (3)  Although  in  the  field  a  consul  could  delegate 
his  functions  to  a  deputy,  at  home  he  had  no  free  will  in 
the  matter.  The  two  quaestors  ("  trackers  of  murder"), 
whose  appointment  by  the  king  to  deal  with  criminal  cases 
had  not  been  obligatory  although  usual,  became  now 
regular  state  officers.  The  consul  was  obliged  to  nominate 
them,  and  their  province  was  enlarged,  so  as  to  include 
the  charge  of  the  state  treasure  and  state  archives ;  their 
tenure  of  office,  like  that  of  the  consuls,  lasted  for  one 
year.  On  the  other  hand,  the  chief  magistrate  in  the  city 
had  to  act  in  person,  or  not  at  all,  in  those  cases  in  which 
a  delegation  of  his  authority  was  not  expressly  incumbent 
on  him.  Thus  in  the  home  government  no  deputy  acting 
for  a  city  magistrate  (pro  magistratu)  was  possible,  while 
military  deputies  (pro  consule,  pro  praetore,  pro  quaestore) 
were  only  possible  in  the  field,  and  had  no  power  to  act 
within  the  community  itself.  (4)  The  consul  retained 
the  right,  which  the  king  had  exercised  absolutely,  of 
nominating  his  successor,  but  he  was  bound  to  follow  the 
expressed  wishes  of  the  community  in  his  nomination. 
He  might  reject  particular  candidates,  and  at  first  even 
limit  the  choice  to  a  list  of  'candidates  proposed  by  him- 
self ;  and,  what  was  more  important,  the  candidate,  once 
appointed,  could  never  be  deposed  by  the  community.  (5) 
The  consuls  had  not  the  right,  which  had  belonged  to  the 
kings,  of  appointing  the  priests ;  the  colleges  of  priests 
now  filled  up  the  vacancies  in  their  own  body,  and  the 
appointment  of  the  vestals  and  single  priests  passed  into 
the  hands  of  the  president,  or  Pontifex  Maximus,  now 
nominated  for  the  first  time  by  the  pontifical  college. 
Thus  the  supreme  authority  in  religion  was  separated 
from  the  civil  power,  and  the  semi-magisterial  position 
of  the  Pontifex  Maximus  is  a  further  proof  of  the  wish  to 
impose  limits  on  the  consular  power.  (6)  The  insignia 
of  the  consul  were  markedly  inferior  to  those  which  had 
distinguished  the  king  The  lictor's  axe  was  taken  away, 
the  purple  robe  of  the  king  was  replaced  by  the  purple 
border  of  the  consul's  toga,  the  royal  chariot  was  abolished, 
and  the  consul  was  obliged,  like  every  other  citizen,  to  go 
on  foot  within  the  city. 

We  have  above  alluded  to  the  revival  of  the  royal  power 
in  the  person  of  the  dictator.     His  other  title,  "  master 


44  HISTORY  OF  SOME. 

of  the  army  "  (magister  populi),  as  also  that  of  his  chief 
assistant  (magister  equitum,  "master  of  the  horse"), 
coupled  with  what  we  know  about  the  circumstances  and 
causes  of  his  appointment,  prove  that  the  dictatorship  was 
an  essentially  military  institution.  No  doubt  it  was 
designed  to  obviate  the  disadvantage  of  divided  power  in 
the  field,  and  its  restriction  to  a  maximum  limit  of  six 
months  indicates  that  the  office  was  not  to  last  longer 
than  the  duration  of  a  summer  campaign.  The  dictator 
was  nominated  by  one  of  the  consuls ;  and,  as  their  col- 
league, he  was  obliged  to  lay  down  his  office  when  they  did. 
All  magistrates  were  subject  to  him,  and  no  appeal  was 
allowed  from  his  sentence ;  the  community  had  no  part 
in  his  election.  The  consuls,  then,  were,  with  certain 
restrictions,  what  the  kings  had  been,  the  supreme  adminis- 
trators, judges,  and  generals ;  in  matters  of  religion,  too, 
they  offered  prayers  and  sacrifices  for  the  community,  and 
with  the  aid  of  skilled  interpreters  ascertained  the  will 
of  the  gods.  The  very  restrictions  which  hampered  the 
consuls  could,  in  time  of  need,  be  broken  through  by  the 
dictatorship,  and  Rome  could  see  again,  under  a  new  name, 
the  absolute  authority  of  the  king.  "  In  this  way  the 
problem  of  legally  retaining  and  practically  restricting  the 
regal  authority  was  solved  in  genuine  Roman  fashion, 
with  equal  acuteness  and  simplicity,  by  the  nameless 
statesmen  who  worked  out  this  revolution." 

A  further  change  of  great  importance  followed  the  new 
powers  given  to  the  community  as  a  whole.  The  right  of 
annually  electing  the  consuls,  and  of  deciding,  upon  appeal 
from  a  criminal,  the  life  or  death  of  a  citizen,  gave  the 
public  assembly  something  more  than  the  passive  formal 
part  in  state-administration  which  it  had  played  under  the 
kings.  The  growth,  wealth,  and  importance  of  the  plebs, 
and  the  necessity  of  their  help  in  making  the  reform, 
rendered  it  impossible  for  all  power  to  remain  in  the  hands 
of  the  smaller  body  of  the  patriciate,  which  by  this  time 
had  practically  become  an  order  of  nobility.  Therefore 
the  new  community  was  extended,  so  as  to  embrace  the 
whole  body  of  plebeians ;  all  the  non-burgesses,  who  were 
neither  slaves  nor  citizens  of  foreign  states,  living  at  Rome 
under  the  ius  hospitii,  were  admitted  into  the  curies,  and 
the   old  burgesses,  who  had  hitherto  formed  the   curies, 


CHANGE  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION.  45 

Joet  the  right  of  meeting  and  passing  resolutions.  Further, 
the  curiate  assembly  (comitia  curiata)  had  thus  lost  its 
fundamental  character  of  burgesses  belonging  to  different 
clans,  and  included  many  plebeians,  who  belonged  to  no 
clan,  but  were  legally  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  most 
aristocratic  citizens.  To  obviate  the  results  of  such  a 
democratic  levelling,  all  political  power  was  taken  away 
from  the  comitia  curiata,  and  was  transferred  to  the 
assembly  of  the  centuries  (comitia  centuriata)  ;  that  is,  to 
the  assembled  levy  of  those  bound  to  military  service,  who 
now  received  the  rights,  as  they  had  previously  borne  the 
burdens,  of  citizens.  This  body,  originally  constituted  for 
pui-ely  military  purposes,  now  decided  cases  of  appeal, 
nominated  magistrates,  adopted  or  rejected  laws.  There 
was  no  debate  in  this  assembly,  any  more  than  in  that  of 
the  curies  ;  but  the  constitution  of  the  assembly  gave  the 
preponderance  of  power  to  the  possessors  of  property  ;  and 
the  peculiar  system,  by  which  the  decision  of  an  election 
was  often  determined  by  the  voting  of  the  first  centuries, 
gave  a  manifest  advantage  to  the  possessors  of  property, 
whose  centuries  had  the  privilege  of  giving  their  votes  first. 
The  prerogatives  of  the  senate  were  increased  by  the 
reform  of  the  constitution.  In  addition  to  its  old  rights 
of  appointing  the  interrex,  and  of  confirming  or  rejecting 
the  resolutions  passed  by  the  community,  the  senate  could 
now  either  reject  or  confirm  the  appointment  of  the  magis- 
trates elected  by  the  pub.1  c  assembly.  The  senate  was 
still  composed  exclusively  of  patricians,  but  on  occasions 
when  its  advice  was  asked,  side  by  side  with  the  patres, 
or  true  patrician  senators,  a  number  of  non-patricians 
were  admitted  and  "  added  to  the  senate-roll "  (con- 
script!). These  plebeians  were  not  by  this  admission 
placed  on  a  footing  of  equality ;  they  did  not  become  true 
senators,  and  were  not  invested  with  the  senatorial  in- 
signia ;  they  had  no  share  in  the  magisterial  prerogatives 
of  the  senate  (rmctoritas),  nor  were  they  allowed  to  express 
their  opinion  on  those  occasions  when  the  senate  met  in 
the  chnracter  of  a  state-council,  and  discussed  what  advice 
(consilium)  should  be  tendered  the  community  :  they 
were  simply  silent  voters  in  the  divisions  of  the  house, 
and  called  "  foot-members  "  (pedarii)  by  the  proud  nobility, 
or  "  men  who   voted  with   their   feet  "   (pedibus   ire   in 


46  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

sententiam).  Still,  this  admission  of  plebeians  into  the 
senate-house  was  a  most  important  step,  and  one  fraught 
with  no  slight  consequences.  Among  the  patres  them- 
selves distinctions  of  rank  arose  :  those  who  had  been 
consuls,  or  were  already  designated  as  successors  to  the 
outgoing  consuls,  occupied  the  first  place  on  the  senate- 
roll,  and  voted  first ;  the  position  of  the  first  of  these,  or 
foremost  man  of  the  senate  (princeps  senatus),  naturally 
was  much  coveted.  The  consuls  in  office  did  not  vote,  but 
they  selected  the  new  members  of  the  senate,  alike  the 
patres  and  the  plebeian  conscripti,  although  they  were  no 
doubt  more  restricted  by  the  opinions  of  the  nobility  in 
their  selection  than  the  king  had  been.  Two  rules  early 
obtained — (1)  that  the  consulship  entailed  upon  the  holder 
of  it  admission  to  the  senate  for  life ;  (2)  that  vacancies 
in  the  senate  were  not  filled  up  at  once,  but  on  the  oc- 
casion of  the  census,  taken  every  fourth  year,  when  the 
roll  of  senators  was  revised  and  completed.  The  number 
of  senators  remained  unchanged,  and,  from  the  fact  that 
the  conscripti  were  included  in  the  number,  we  may  infer 
the  diminution  of  the  number  of  patriciate  clans.  It  is 
easy  to  see  what  an  immense  preponderance  of  power 
the  revolution  gave  the  senate.  Its  right  of  rejecting  the 
proposals  of  the  comitia  centuriata,  its  position  as  adviser 
of  the  chief  magistrate,  its  tenure  of  office  for  life,  as 
contrasted  with  the  annual  duration  of  magistracies, — all 
tended  to  place  the  government  in  its  hands.  But  what 
chiefly  did  so,  was  the  fact  that  the  consul  ruled  for  but  a 
brief  space,  and  was,  on  the  expiry  of  his  office,  merely  one 
of  the  nobility  ;  and  thus,  even  if  a  consul  were  inclined  to 
question  the  senate's  influence,  he  lacked  the  first  element 
of  political  power,  viz.  time ;  while  his  authority  was 
paralyzed  alike  by  the  priestly  colleges  and  his  own  col- 
leagues, and,  if  need  be,  could  be  suspended  by  the  dic- 
tatorship. The  result  was  that  the  senate  became  the  real 
governing  power,  and  the  consul  subsided  into  a  president, 
acting  as  its  chairman  and  executing  its  decrees.  The 
senate  also  drew  into  its  own  hands  the  management  of 
the  state  finances,  by  causing  the  consul  to  commit  the 
administration  of  the  public  chest  to  two  quaestors,  who 
naturally  became  dependent  on  the  senate. 

The  revolution  thus  accomplished  at  Rome  was,  as  we 


CHANGE  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION.  47 

have  seen,  conservative  in  its  character,  in  that  the  funda- 
mental elements  of  the  old  constitution  were  retained.  It 
was,  in  fact,  a  compromise  between  the  two  state  parties — 
the  old  burgesses  and  the  plebeians — who,  fur  the  time 
being  sank  their  party  quarrels,  and  united,  under  the 
pressure  of  the  common  danger  of  a  despotism.  The 
necessity  of  their  co-operation  caused  those  mutual  con- 
cessions we  have  described  above,  and  the  importance  of 
the  revolution  lay  far  more  in  the  indirect  effects  of  those 
concessions  than  in  the  limit  of  time  imposed  on  the 
supreme  magistracy.  The  chief  of  these  indirect  effects 
were  (1)  the  rise  of  the  Roman  citizens  in  the  later  sense 
of  the  term.  The  plebeians  had  hitherto  been  little  better 
than  aliens  or  metoecs  in  the  eye  of  the  law.  Now  they 
were  enrolled  in  the  curies  as  citizens,  they  voted  in  the 
common  assembly  and  in  the  senate,  and  they  were  pro- 
tected by  the  right  of  appeal.  (2)  The  elevation  of  the  old 
burgess-body,  or  patriciate,  into  an  exclusive  aristocracy. 
The  very  incorporation  of  the  plebeians  into  the  burgess- 
body  caused  the  patres  to  close  up  their  ranks,  and  hold 
stubbornly  to  the  privileges  that  remained  to  them  :  the 
admission  of  new  clans  into  their  body,  which  had  not  been 
very  rare  under  the  kings,  now  ceased.  Although  the 
plebeians  might  become  military  officers  and  senators,  they 
could  hold  no  public  magistracy  or  priesthood  :  and  the 
patres  still  maintained  the  legal  impossibility  of  marriage 
between  their  order  and  the  plebeians.  ('6)  It  further 
became  necessary  to  define  the  distinction  between  the 
enlarged  burgess-body  and  those  who  were  now  the  non- 
burgesses.  "  To  this  epoch,  therefore,  we  may  trace  back 
— in  the  views  and  feelings  of  the  people — both  the  in- 
vidiousness  of  the  distinction  between  the  patricians  and 
plebeians,  and  the  strict  and  haughty  line  of  demarcation 
between  cives  Romani  and  aliens." 

(4)  Further,  at  this  period  arose  the  separation  between 
law  and  edict.  The  principle  of  Roman  law  that  every 
command  of  a  magistrate,  even  if  illegal,  was  valid  during 
his  tenure  of  office,  must,  owing  to  the  official  life-tenure 
of  a  king,  have  caused  the  distinction  between  law  and 
edict  to  have  been  lost  sight  of.  But  it  is  obvious  that 
the  annual  change  of  consuls  led  to  the  two  being  clearly 
separated. 


48  EISTOBY  OF  HOME. 

(5)  The  provinces  of  civil  and  military  authority  were 
now  finally  separated.  The  power  of  the  consul  within 
the  city  limits  was  restricted  by  law,  as  shown  above  ; 
his  power  as  general  was  absolute.  Therefore  the  general 
and  the  army  could  not  in  their  military  capacity  enter 
the  city  proper,  unless  allowed  to  do  so.  Thus  the  dis- 
tinction between  quirites  and  soldiers  became  deeply  rooted 
in  the  minds  of  the  people. 

Viewing  the  revolution  as  a  whole,  its  immediate  effect 
was  to  establish  an  aristocratic  government,  by  making 
the  senate  practically  supreme.  But  the  germs  of  a  more 
representative  constitution  were  visible.  The  enrolment 
of  the  plebeians  among  the  burgesses,  the  admission  of 
certain  of  them  to  the  senate,  were  victories  of  happy 
augury  for  the  future.  Those  plebeian  families  admitted 
on  account  of  their  wealth  or  position  into  the  senate 
naturally  held  aloof  from  the  mass  of  the  plebs.  In 
addition  to  this  distinction  in  the  plebeian  body,  there 
arose  another  oat  of  the  system  of  voting  in  the  comitia 
centuriata,  which  placed  the  chief  power  in  that  class  of 
fanners  whose  property  was  in  excess  of  that  of  the  small 
freeholders,  but  inferior  to  that  of  the  great  proprietors ; 
and  this  arrangement  further  enabled  the  seniors,  although 
less  numerous,  to  have  as  many  voting  divisions  as  the 
juniors.  "  While  in  this  way  the  axe  was  laid  to  the  root 
of  the  old  burgess-body  and  their  clan-nobility,  and  the 
basis  of  a  new  burgess-body  was  laid,  the  preponderance 
in  the  latter  rested  on  the  possession  of  land  and  on  age, 
and  the  first  beginnings  were  already  visible  of  a  new 
aristocracy,  based  primarily  on  the  consideration  in  which 
the  families  were  held — the  future  nobility." 


AUTHORITIES. 

Expulsion  of  Tar  quins. — Liv.  i.  58-60.     Dionys.  i.  75;  iv.  41-end  ;  v. 

1-7,  13-15,  20-23,  31-34,  51-55. 
Lex  Valeria. — Liv.  ii.  8 ;  iii.  20.     Cic.  de  Rep.  ii.  31. 
Consuls.—  Liv.  ii.  1, 18,  27 ;  iii.  34,  36.    Cic.  de  Rep.  ii.  32.    Momma.  R. 

St.  ii.  71-132,  249-279. 
Quaestors. — Momms.  R.  St.  ii.  511  sq. 
Pontifex  Maximus. — Liv.  iii.  32;  xxxiii.  44;    xl.  42.      Dionys.  ii.  73, 

Momms.  R.  St.  ii.  17-47. 


CHANGE  OF  TEE  CONSTITUTION.  49 

Dictator.— Liv.  ii.  18 ;  iii.  29 ;  viii.  32.      Cic.  cle  Rep.  i.  40.      Polyb. 

iii.  87.     Momms,  R.  St.  ii.  133,  sq. 
Comitia  Centuriata. — Dionys.  iv.  20.     Cic.  de  Leg.  Agr.  ii.  2.     Prof. 

Seeley,  Introd.  to  Liv.  bk.  i.     Momtns.  R.  St.  iii.  301-368. 

Conscripti  Senatores. — Aul.  Gell.  iii.  18. 
Senate's  power. — Polyb.  vi.  13,  16,  sqq. 


SO  HISTORY  OF  HOME. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE   TRIBUNATE   OF   THE    PLEBS,    AND    THE    DECEMVIRATE. 

Land-tenure  and  agriculture  —  Public  land  —  Evil  influence  of 
capitalists — Ruin  of  small  farmers — Secession  to  the  "  Sacred 
Mount" — The  tribunes  and  aediles — Powers  of  the  tribunes — 
Political  value  of  the  tribunate — Further  dissensions — Agrarian 
law  of  Spurius  Cassius — The  Decemvirs — Twelve  Tables — Fall 
of  the  Decemvirs — The  Valerio-Horatian  laws. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  last  chapter  we  noted  the  im- 
portance of  the  struggle  which  was  intimately  connected 
with  land-occupation.  Before  proceeding  to  describe  the 
constitutional  changes  which  arose  from  this  struggle,  we 
must  revert  for  a  time  to  the  original  laud-tenure  among 
the  Romans,  and,  as  far  as  possible,  strive  to  clearly  pre- 
sent the  main  features  of  this  most  difficult  and  important 
question.  From  the  first,  agriculture  was  felt  to  he  the 
main  support  and  fundamental  basis  of  every  Italian 
commonwealth.  The  Roman  state  in  particular  secured 
by  the  plough  what  it  won  by  the  sword;  it  felt  that  the 
strength  of  man  and  of  the  state  lay  in  their  hold  over 
the  soil;  and  this  feeling  caused  the  state  to  avoid,  if 
possible,  the  cession  of  Roman  soil,  and  caused  the  fai'mers 
to  cling  tenaciously  to  their  fields  and  homesteads.  The 
main  object  of  war  was  to  increase  the  number  of  free- 
holders ;  this  object  was  also  evident  in  the  Servian  con- 
stitution, which  showed  the  original  preponderance  of  the 
agricultural  class  in  the  state;  and  which,  by  its  division 
of  the  community  into  "  freeholders  "  (adsidui)  and  "  pro- 
ducers of  children"  (proletarii),  without  reference  to  their 
political  position,  proved  that  a  large  portion  of  the  landed 


THE  TBIBVNATE  OF  THE    PLEBS.  51 

property  had  passed  into  the  hands  of  non-burgesses. 
This  division,  by  imposing  upon  the  freeholders  the  duties 
of  citizens,  paved  the  way,  as  we  have  seen,  to  conceding 
them  political  rights.  In  the  earliest  times  no  burgess 
had  any  special  property  in  land  :  all  arable  land  was  the 
common  possession  of  the  several  clans ;  each  clan  tilled 
its  own  portion  and  divided  the  produce  among  its  con- 
stituent households.  When  and  how  the  distribution  of 
laud  among  the  individual  burgesses  was  made,  we  cannot 
tell — at  any  rate  it  was  previous  to  the  Servian  constitu- 
tion ;  and  that  same  constitution  leads  us  to  conclude  that 
the  mass  of  the  land  was  divided  into  medium-sized  farms 
of  not  less  than  20  jugera,  or  12|  acres.  Landed  estates 
were  successfully  guarded  against  excessive  subdivision 
by  custom  and  the  sound  sense  of  the  population.  Evi- 
dence is  also  furnished  by  the  Servian  constitution  that 
even  in  the  regal  period  of  Rome  there  were  small 
cottagers  and  garden  proprietors,  with  whom  the  mattock 
took  the  place  of  the  plough.  In  addition  to  the  ordinary 
farmers,  it  is  clear  from  the  same  constitution  that  large 
landed  proprietors  had  also  come  into  existence — partlr 
perhaps  from  the  numerical  inequality  of  the  members  of 
the  various  clans,  when  the  clan-lands  were  divided 
among  the  members ;  partly,  too,  from  the  great  influx  of 
mercantile  capital  into  Rome.  But,  as  we  cannot  suppose 
that  there  were  many  slaves  at  this  time,  by  whose  labour 
such  large  estates  were  afterwards  worked,  we  must  con- 
clude that  a  landowner  assigned  lots  to  tenants  of  such 
portion  of  his  estate  as  he  could  not  farm  in  person. 
Such  tenants  were  composed  of  decayed  farmers,  clients, 
and  freedmen,  and  formed  the  bulk  of  the  agricultural 
proletariate.  They  were  often  free  men,  and  were  then 
called  "tenants  on  sufferance"  (precarii),  as  their  pos- 
session was  only  held  at  the  pleasure  of  the  owner.  For 
this  usufruct  of  the  soil  the  tenant  did  not  necessarily  pay 
rent  m  kind,  and,  when  he  did,  his  position  was  not  quite 
the  same  as  that  of  the  lessee  of  later  times.  The  relation 
between  the  landlord  and  his  tenants  was  all  the  closer, 
because  the  landlords  did  not  employ  middlemen,  but  lived 
themselves  on  their  estates,  and  took  the  greatest  interest 
in  the  welfare  of  those  dependent  on  them;  their  lodging 
in  the  city  was  only  for  business  purposes,  and  for  avoid- 


52  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

ing,  at  certain  seasons,  the  unhealthy  atmosphere  of  the 
country  Such  slaves  as  were  employed  were,  as  a  rule, 
of  Italian  race,  and  must  have  occupied  very  different 
relations  towards  their  masters  from  those  held  by  Syrians 
and  Celts  in  later  days.  It  was  from  these  large  land- 
owners, and  the  system  above  described,  that  there  sprang 
up  in  Rome  a  landed,  and  not  an  urban,  nobility;  and 
further,  these  tenants-on- sufferance  were  of  the  greatest 
service  to  the  state,  in  furnishing  trained  and  intelligent 
farmers  to  carry  out  the  Roman  policy  of  colonization. 
A  sharp  line  divided  arable  from  pasture  land.  The 
latter  belonged  to  the  state  and  not  to  the  clan,  and  was 
consequently  not  subjected  to  the  distribution,  which  has 
been  described  above.  The  state  used  such  land  for  its 
own  flocks  and  herds,  which  were  intended  for  sacrifices 
and  other  purposes,  and  which  were  kept  up  by  cattle 
fines :  and  such  land  was  also  used  by  individuals  who 
paid  a  certain  tax  (scriptura)  for  the  right  to  graze  their 
cattle  on  the  common  pasture.  This  right  was  a  special 
privilege  of  the  burgess,  and  never  granted  to  a  plebeian, 
except  under  extraordinary  circumstances.  In  the  regal 
period  such  common  pasture  land  was  probably  not  ex- 
tensive, and,  as  a  rule,  any  conquered  territory  was  par- 
celled out  as  arable  land,  originally  among  the  clans,  and 
then  among  individuals.  This  description  of  land-tenure 
in  the  earliest  period  now  allows  us  to  resume  our  history 
at  the  point  of  our  digression. 

Although  the  new  government  at  Rome  passed  certain 
measures — such  as  the  reduction  of  port-dues  ;  the  state- 
purchase  of  corn  and  salt,  so  as  to  supply  the  citizens  at 
reasonable  prices ;  the  addition  of  a  day  to  the  national 
festival ;  the  limitation  of  the  magisterial  power  of  fining, — 
which  seemed  intended  for  the  good  of  the  more  numerous 
and  less  wealthy  classes,  unfortunately  such  regulations 
were  exceptional  The  object  of  the  kings  had  probably 
been  to  check  the  power  of  capital,  and  increase  the 
number  of  farmers.  The  object  of  the  new  aristocratic 
government  was  to  destroy  the  middle  classes,  and  espe- 
cially the  smaller  independent  farmers ;  and  thus  to 
develop  the  power  of  the  capitalists,  and  of  large  land- 
owners, and  to  increase  the  number  of  the  agricultural 
proletariate.     Out  of  this  action  on  the  part  of  those  in 


THE  TRIBUNATE  OF   TEE  PLEBS.  53 

power  arose  the  evil  influence  of  the  capitalists.  The 
extension  of  the  financial  province  of  the  state  treasury  to 
such  matters  as  the  purchase  of  grain  and  salt,  caused  the 
state  to  employ  agents,  or  middlemen,  to  collect  its  indirect 
revenues  and  more  complicated  payments.  These  men 
pa-id  the  state  a  set  sum,  and  farmed  the  revenues  for  their 
own  benefit.  "  Thus  there  grew  up  a  class  of  tax-farmers 
and  contractors,  who,  in  the  rapid  growth  of  their  wealth, 
in  their  power  over  the  state,  to  which  they  appeared  to 
be  servants,  and  in  the  absurd  and  sterile  basis  of  their 
moneyed  dominion,  are  completely  on  a  parallel  with  the 
speculators  on  the  stock-exchange  of  the  present  day." 

The  mismanagement  of  the  public  land  (ager  publicus) 
brought  out  these  evils  most  clearly.  The  patricians  now 
claimed  the  sole  right  of  the  use  of  the  public  pasture  and 
state  lands  :  a  right  which,  as  shown  above,  belonged  by 
law  to  every  burgess.  Although  the  senate  made  excep- 
tions in  favour  of  the  wealthy  plebeian  houses,  the  small 
farmers  and  ten  ants- on- sufferance,  who  needed  it  most, 
were  excluded  from  the  common  pasture.  Moreover,  to 
oblige  men  of  their  own  order,  the  patrician  quaestors 
gradually  omitted  to  collect  the  pasture-tax  (scriptura), 
and  thus  diminished  the  state  revenues.  And  further,  in- 
stead of  making  fresh  assignations  of  land,  acquired  by 
conquest,  to  the  poorer  citizens,  the  ruling  class  introduced 
a  pernicious  system  of  what  was  practically  permanent 
occupation,  on  the  condition  of  the  state  receiving  from 
the  occupier  one  tenth  of  corn,  or  one  fifth  of  oil  and  wine. 
Thus  the  system  of  "  precarium,"  or  tenure-on-sufferance, 
above  described,  was  now  applied  to  the  state  lands  ;  and 
not  only  did  this  tenure  become  permanent,  but  it  was 
only  allowed  to  the  privileged  patricians  and  their 
favourites  ;  nor  was  the  collection  of  the  fifths  or  tenths 
enforced  with  more  rigour  than  that  of  the  pasture-tax. 
Thus  the  smaller  landholders  (1)  were  deprived  of  the 
usufructs  which  were  their  right  as  burgesses  ;  (2)  were 
more  heavily  taxed  in  consequence  of  the  lax  collection  of 
the  revenues  from  the  use  of  the  pnblic  land ;  (3)  and  lost 
the  old  outlet  for  their  energies,  which  had  been  provided 
by  the  assignations  of  land.  Added  to  these  evils  was  the 
system  of  working  large  estates  by  slaves,  which  at  this 
time  was  introduced,  and  dispossessed  the  small  agrarian 


54  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

clients,  or  free  labourers.    Moreover,  owing  to  the  enforced 
absence  from  his  farm  in  time  of  war,  and  the  exorbitant 
taxation  and   other  state-imposed  works   which  war  en- 
tailed, the  farmer  often  lost  possession   of  his  farm,  and 
was  reduced  to  the  position  of  bondsman,  if  not  slave,  of 
his  creditor.     His  creditor  was  often  a  capitalist,  to  whom 
speculation  in  land  offered  a  new  and   lucrative  field ;  if 
left  by  his  creditor  as  nominal  proprietor,  and  actual  pos- 
sessor of  the  farm,  he  was  perhaps  saved  from  utter  ruin, 
but  was  demoralized  by  the  consciousness  that  his  person 
and   estate  really  belonged   to  another,  and    that  he  was 
entirely  dependent  on  his  creditor's  mercy.      The  misery 
and  distress  caused  by  these  evils  thx-eatened  to  annihilate 
the  middle  class  of  smaller  farmers,  and  matters  were  not 
long  in  coming  to  a  crisis.     In  495  B.C.  (but  this  date  is 
probably  too  early),  a  levy  was  called  for:   owing  to  the 
exasperation  produced  by  the  strict  enforcement   of  the 
law  of  debt,  the  farmers  refused  to  obey.     One  of  the  con- 
suls,   Publius  Servilius,   induced  them  to  do   so,  by  sus- 
pending the  law  and  liberating  the  imprisoned  debtors. 
On  their  return  from  the  field  of  victory,  the  other  consul, 
Appius  Claudius,  enforced  the  debtor-laws  with  merciless 
rigour.     The  war  was  renewed  in  the  following  year ;  and 
this  time  the  authority,  attaching  to  the  dictatorship,  and 
the  personal  popularity  of  the  dictator,  Manius  Valerius, 
were  found  necessary  to  win  over  the  reluctant  farmers. 
Victory   again   was  with  the    Roman   army ;  but,  on  its 
return,  the  senate  refused  to  agree  to  the  reforms  proposed 
by  the  dictator.     On  the  news  of  this  refusal  reaching  the 
army,  arrayed  outside  the  city  gates,  the  whole  force  left 
its  general  and  encampment,  and  marched  to  a  hill  between 
the  Tiber  and  the  Anio,  in  the  district  of   Crustumeria. 
This  celebrated  secession,  to  what  was  afterwards  called 
"  the  sacred  mount "    (Mons  Sacer),  was  terminated  by 
the  mediation  of  the  dictator  and  the  submission  of  the 
senate.     The   consequences  of  this  secession,  undertaken 
by  the  multitude  without  a  settled  leader,  and  accom- 
plished without  bloodshed,  were  felt  for  many  centuries. 
It  was  the  origin  of   the  tribunate  of  the  plebs.     The  law 
which  created  this  new  office  was  deposited  in  a  temple, 
under  the  charge  of  two  plebeian  magistrates  specially 
appointed  for  the  purpose,  and  called  aediles,  or  "  house- 


THE  TRIBUNATE  OF  THE  PLEBS.  55 

masters."  These  aedilcs  were  attached  to  the  tribunes  as 
assistants,  and  their  jurisdiction  chiefly  concerned  such 
minor  cases  as  were  settled  by  fines. 

The  following  were  the  chief  characteristics  rf  the 
tribunate.  (1)  The  two  tribunes  were  of  plebeian  rank,  and 
elected  by  the  plebeians  assembled  in  curies.  (2)  Their 
power  was  confined  to  the  city's  limits,  and  thus  could  not 
oppose  the  military  imperium  of  the  consul,  which  was  all- 
powerful  outside  those  limits,  nor  the  authority  of  the 
dictator,  whether  exercised  inside  or  outside  the  city. 
(3)  Within  these  limits  the  tribunes  stood  on  an  equal 
and  independent  footing  with  the  consuls,  and  had  the 
right  to  cancel  any  command,  issued  by  a  magistrate,  upon 
a  formal  protest  from  the  burgess  aggrieved  by  such  a 
command.  This  power  of  intercession  made  it  possible 
for  the  tribunes  to  bring  the  ordinary  administration  and 
execution  of  the  law  to  a  dead-lock  while  an  appeal 
against  the  sentence  of  a  judge  or  decree  of  the  senate 
was  being  investigated.  (4)  Their  judicial  powers,  owing 
to  the  vague  and  ill-defined  laws  touching  offences  against 
order,  and  crime  against  the  community,  were  alike  exten- 
sive and  arbitrary.  They  could  by  their  messengers 
(viatores)  summon  before  them  any  burgess,  even  the 
consul,  arrest  him  on  refusal,  imprison  him,  or  allow  him 
bail  during  investigation,  and  finally  sentence  him  to  death 
or  the  payment  of  a  fine.  An  appeal  from  their  sentence 
was  heard,  not  by  the  whole  body  of  burgesses,  but  by 
the  whole  plebeian  body,  and  the  tribunes  defended  them- 
selves before  this  assembly  in  case  of  such  an  appeal. 
(5)  Out  of  this  risrht  of  defence  sprang  the  right  of 
holding  assemblies  of  the  people,  and  addressing  them  on 
other  matters  •  a  right  expressly  guaranteed  to  the  tri- 
bunes by  the  Icilian  law  (b  c.  492),  which  rendered 
liable  to  severe  punishment  any  one  who  interrupted  a 
tribune  while  speaking,  or  who  bade  the  assembly  dis- 
perse. They  could  take  the  vote  of  the  people  at  such 
meetings,  and  the  "plebiscites"  (plebi  scita),  or  resolu- 
tions thus  passed,  soon  came  to  have  a  force  and  validity 
which  did  not  properly  belong  to  them.  (6)  Lastly,  the 
persons  of  the  tribunes  were  declared  inviolable  (sacro- 
sancti),  and  the  man  who  laid  hands  on  them  was  counted 
accursed  in  the  sight  of  gods  and  men 


56  HISTORY  OF  HOME. 

This  outline  of  the  tribunician  power  serves  to  show  that 
it  was  really  a  copy  of  the  consular  power.  In  both  cases 
the  Roman  check  of  intercession,  or  veto,  plays  a  prominent 
part;  as  one  consul  could  veto  his  colleague,  so  one  tribune 
could  thwart  the  other.  The  special  power  of  vetoing 
the  consul,  or  any  other  state  magistrate,  belonged  to  the 
tribune,  in  virtue  of  his  position  as  protector  and  counsel 
of  the  plebs.  Again,  the  duration  of  office  was  limited  to 
a  year  in  both  cases,  and  in  both  cases  the  holder  of  the 
office  could  not  be  deposed.  Further,  in  their  criminal 
jurisdiction,  two  aediles  were  associated  with  the  tribunes, 
just  as  two  quaestors  had  been  attached  to  the  consuls ; 
but  the  consul  submitted  to  the  prohibition  of  the  tribune, 
while  the  tribune  was  unrestricted  by  any  such  prohibi- 
tion from  the  consul.  Still,  although  a  copy,  tho  tribuni- 
cian power  presente  1  a  contrast  to  the  consular.  It  was 
essentially  negative,  while  that  of  the  consuls  was  essen- 
tially positive.  The  consuls  alone  were  magistrates  of  the 
Roman  people,  as  being  elected  by  the  whole  burgess- 
body,  and  not  merely  by  the  plebeians.  Therefore  the 
consul  alone  had  the  outward  insignia  of  office  ;  the  tribune 
lacked  official  attendants,  the  purple  border,  and  had  no 
seat  in  the  senate.  "  Thus  in  this  remarkable  institution 
absolute  prohibition  was  in  the  most  stern  and  abrupt 
fashion  opposed  to  absolute  command  ;  the  quarx^el  was 
settled  by  legally  recognizing  and  regulating  the  discord 
between  rich  and  poor." 

It  remains  for  us  to  consider  what  was  the  political 
value  of  the  tribunate.  Springing  as  it  did  from  the 
miseries  caused  by  over-taxation,  the  baleful  system  of 
credit,  and  the  pernicious  occupation  of  the  state  lands, 
it  yet  pat  no  stop  to  these  evils.  The  reason  of  this  is 
simply  that  the  wealthy  plebeians  had  as  much  interest 
in  these  abuses  as  the  patricians.  The  good  that  the  office 
might  do  in  individual  cases  of  hardship,  and  in  helping 
plebeians  to  gain  admission  to  state  offices,  was  more 
than  counterbalanced  by  the  evil  of  rendering  the  ad- 
ministration of  criminal  law  subject  to  the  party  passion 
of  politics.  For  party  purposes,  too,  the  tribunes  could 
employ  their  power  of  veto,  and  throw  out  of  gear  the 
machine  of  state,  and  thus  pave  the  way  for  that  very 
tyranny  which  they  were  created  to  render  impossible. 


TEE  TRIBUNATE  OF  TEE  PLEBS.  57 

In  the  later  days  of  the  Republic  we  shall  find  that  this 
was  the  very  course  they  pursued  ;  and  the  odium  thus 
incurred  found  expression  in  the  contemptuous  definition 
of  the  tribunate  as  a  "  pestiferous  power,  the  offspring  of 
sedition,  with  sedition  for  its  end  and  aim."  The  events 
which  followed  the  institution  of  the  tribunes  indicate  a 
state  of  organized  civil  war  between  the  two  parties  of  the 
state.  Among  minor  conflicts  stands  out  the  story  of 
Gaius  Marcius,  surnamed  Coriolanus,  from  the  storming 
of  Corioli.  Romance  has  doubtless  coloured  his  bitter 
opposition  to  the  tribunes  in  491  B.C.,  his  expulsion  by 
them  from  Rome,  his  return  at  the  head  of  the  Volscian 
army,  his  withdrawal  on  the  appeal  of  his  mother,  bis 
death  at  the  hands  of  the  exasperated  Yolscians  ;  but  the 
truth  of  these  disgraceful  conflicts  between  the  Roman 
orders  remains  unshaken.  The  surprise  of  the  Capitol  by 
a  band  of  political  refugees,  led  by  a  Sabine  chief,  Appius 
Herdonius,  in  460  B.C.,  the  extirpation  of  the  Fabii  by  the 
Etruscans  at  Cremera  in  477  B.C.,  and  other  events  of 
this  period  were  connected  with  the  same  fanatical  violence. 
But  the  murder  of  the  tribune,  Gnaeus  Genucius,  who  had 
dared  to  impeach  two  men  of  consular  rank  in  473  B.C., 
had  a  more  lasting  result,  giving  rise  two  years  later  to 
the  Publilian  law.  The  proposer  of  this  law,  Volero 
Publilius,  who  was  tribune  in  471  B.C.,  established  in  the 
first  place  the  comitia  tributa,*  or  plebeian  assembly  of 
tribes.  Hitherto  the  plebeians  had  voted  by  curies,  and 
numbers  alone  had  determined  their  decision.  The  clients 
of  patrician  families  voted  in  these  assemblies,  and  thus 
enabled  the  nobility  to  exercise  no  small  influence  on  the 
result.  The  new  plebeian  assembly  was  composed  solely 
of  those  who  were  freeholders,  and  thus  excluded  the 
great  majority  of  freedmen  and  clients,  as  well  as  all 
the  patricians.  Owing  to  this  the  comitia  tributa  was 
practically  an  assembly  of  the  independent  middle  class, 
and  was,  owing  to  its  exclusion  alike  of  patricians  and 
non-freeholder  plebeians,  less  representative  of  the  bur- 
gesses  than  the    assembly   of   curies   had  been.     In  the 

*  The  view  here  taken  is  the  simplest  one  held  by  Schwegler, 
Pelham,  etc.,  that  the  comitia  tributa  was  a  development  of  the 
concilium  plebis  tributum.  Mommsen  holds  that  the  Publilian  law 
refers  only  to  the  latter. 


53  BISTORT   OF  ROME. 

second  place  we  must  ascribe,  if  not  directly  to  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Publilian  law,  at  least  indirectly  to  its 
effects,  the  fact  that  the  resolutions  of  theplebs  (plebiscita) 
were  recognized  as  legally  binding  on  the  whole  commu- 
nity, and  had  the  same  validity  as  the  decrees  of  the 
comitia  centuriata.  Probably,  also,  the  increase  of  the 
number  of  tribunes  from  two  to  five  was  due  to  this  law,  and 
their  election  was  now  transferred  to  the  comitia  tributa. 
Previous  to  this  outcome  of  party  triumph  and  parry 
legislation,  a  far  wiser  and  far  more  serious  attempt  to 
deal  with  the  real  source  of  evil  was  made  by  Spurius 
Cassius,  a  patrician  of  the  patricians,  and  personally  illus- 
trious by  two  triumphs.  In  his  third  consulate  (486  B.C.) 
he  brought  forward  an  agrarian  bill,  in  which  lie  proposed 
to  have  the  state  land  measured,  and  to  lease  part  of  it  for 
the  benefit  of  the  public  treasury,  and  to  distribute  a 
larger  part  among  the  needy  citizens.  With  an  unwise 
generosity  he  wished  to  give  the  Latin  confederates  a 
share  in  this  distribution  of  public  land.  This  proposa.l, 
aimed  as  it  was  at  the  control  of  the  state  lands  by  the 
senate,  and  the  selfish  system  of  occupation,  drew  down  on 
its  author  the  wrath  of  the  nobles  and  the  rich  plebeians. 
The  cry  of  "  king  "  was  raised,  and  the  commons,  irritated 
by  the  proposed  association  of  the  Latins  in  the  distribu- 
tion, and  ever  ready  to  believe  that  royal  power  was  being 
aimed  at,  refused  to  save  their  champion.  Cassius  fell, 
and  "  his  law  was  buried  along  with  him  ;  but  its  spectre 
thenceforsvard  incessantly  haunted  the  eves  of  the  rich, 
and  again  and  again  it  rose  from  the  tomb  against  them, 
until,  amidst  the  conflicts  to  which  it  led,  the  common- 
wealth perished." 

Later,  in  462  B.C.,  a  further  attempt  to  abolish  the 
tribunate  came  from  one  holding  that  office.  Gaius 
Terentilius  Arsa  proposed  to  nominate  a  commission  of 
five  men  for  the  purpose  of  preparing  a  legal  code  which 
should  bind  the  consuls  in  the  exercise  of  their  judicial 
powers.  Ten  years  of  party  strife  elapsed  before  this 
proposal  was  carried  into  effect,  and  during  that  strife 
two  concessions  were  made  to  induce  the  plebeians  to  give 
up  this  legal  code.  (1)  In  457  B.C.  the  tribunes  were  in- 
creased from  five  to  ten;  (2)  in  456  B.C.  the  Aventine, 
which  had  hitherto  been  sacred  ground  and  uninhabited, 


THE  DECEMYIRATE.  59 

was  distributed  among  the  poorer  burgesses,  for  them  to 
bnild  on  and  occupy.  But  these  concessions  did  not  turn 
aside  the  plebs.  The  legal  code  was  agreed  to,  and  in 
451  B.C.  ten  men  were  elected  by  the  centuries,  for  the 
purpose  of  drawing  it  up  (decemviri  consulari  imperio 
legibus  scribundis).  These  decemvirs  had  frill  powers  as 
supreme  magistrates  in  the  place  of  the  consuls  ;  no  appeal 
was  allowed  in  their  case  ;  the  tribunate  was  suspended  ; 
and,  what  was  more  important,  plebeians,  as  well  as 
patricians,  were  eligible  for  the  new  office.  The  first 
plebeians  were  elected  at  the  second  electiou  in  450  B.C., 
and  these  were  the  first  non-patrician  magistrates  of  the 
Roman  community.  Although  the  proposal  for  the  insti- 
tution of  the  decemvirate  was  made  in  454  B.C.,  no  de- 
cemvirs were  elected  for  three  years  ;  during  that  interval 
an  embassy  was  sent  to  Greece  to  collect  the  more  famous 
Greek  laws,  and  especially  those  of  Solon  ;  this  embassy 
did  not  return  till  451  B.C.  The  object  of  this  new  creation 
was  to  substitute  a  limitation  of  the  consular  powers  by 
written  law  for  the  more  turbulent  veto  of  the  tribunes. 
The  pledge  given  by  the  decemvirs  not  to  infringe  the 
liberties  of  the  plebs  did  not,  perhaps,  imply  the  abolition 
of  the  tribunate  ;  but  a  wise  compromise  would  doubtless 
have  brought  this  about,  had  the  decemvirs  retired  when 
their  task  was  done.  In  451  B.C.  the  law,  engraven  on 
ten  tables  of  copper,  was  affixed  in  the  Forum  to  the  rostra 
in  front  of  the  senate-house.  Two  more  tables  were  added 
in  the  following  year,  and  thus  originated  the  first  and 
only  legal  code  of  Rome — the  Twelve  Tables.  The  chanees 
introduced  by  this  code  were  of  a  comparatively  slight 
character;  the  maximum  of  interest  was  fixed  at  ten  per 
cent.,  and  the  usurer  was  rendered  liable  to  heavy  penalties. 
The  legal  distinction  between  freeholders  and  non-free- 
holders was  retained,  as  also  the  invalidity  of  marriage 
between  patricians  and  plebeians.  The  chief  feature  was 
the  denial  of  appeal  to  the  comitia  tributa  in  capital  cases, 
and  the  confirmation  of  it  in  the  case  of  the  comitia 
centuriata.  The  political  significance  of  this  code  lay  not 
so  much  in  the  particulars  of  its  legislation,  as  in  the  fact 
that  the  consuls  were  now  bound  to  administer  justice 
according  to  set  forms  and  rules  ;  while  the  exhibition  of 
the  code  in  public  subjected    the    administrator   to    the 


60  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

control  of  the  public  eye.  The  downfall  of  the  decemvirs, 
who  under  various  pretexts  refused  to  abdicate  their 
office,  has  been  ascribed  by  legend  to  the  tyranny  of  their 
chief,  Appius  Claudius.  The  murder  of  Lucius  Siccius 
Dentatus,  the  bravest  soldier  in  Rome,  and  a  former  tri- 
bune, was  laid  at  the  door  of  the  decemvirs  ;  and  the  act 
of  the  centurion  Lucius  Verginius,  who  slew  his  own 
daughter  to  save  her  from  the  brutal  lust  of  Appius, 
caused  the  storm  of  popular  indignation  to  break  forth. 
The  two  armies,  which  a  double  war  against  the  Sabines 
and  Volscians  had  called  into  the  field,  on  hearing  the 
story  from  Verginius  and  Lucius  Icilius,  the  betrothed 
lover  of  the  dead  maiden,  straightway  left  their  camps, 
and  once  more  seceded  to  the  Sacred  Mount.  They  there 
nominated  their  tribunes,  and,  as  the  decemvirs  still  re- 
mained obstinate,  returned  to  the  city,  and  encamped  on 
the  Aventine.  The  decemvirs  now  gave  way,  and  Appius 
Claudius  and  Spurius  Oppius  put  an  end  to  their  lives, 
while  the  remaining  eight  went  into  exile.  It  is  hard  to 
believe  that  the  decemvirate,  one  of  the  triumphs  of  the 
plebs,  was  abolished  by  that  body.  Possibly  the  whole 
story  is  a  myth  of  the  aristocrats.  The  overthrow  of 
the  decemvirate  would  more  naturally  have  come  from  the 
patricians.  A  subsequent  contest  may  possibly  have 
ensued  to  force  the  patricians  to  restore  the  tribunate, 
resulting  in  the  victory  of  the  plebs,  and  in  the  com- 
promise which  was  confirmed  by  the  Valerio-Horatian 
laws,  the  so-called  Magna  Charta  of  Rome. 

At  any  rate  the  tribunate  was  restored,  and,  under 
the  Valerio-Horatian  laws,  gained  the  following  new 
powers  in  449  B.C. :  (1)  The  consuls  were  forced  to 
administer  justice  in  accordance  with  the  twelve  tables 
of  the  decemvirs.  (2)  To  compensate  for  the  loss  of 
right  of  appeal  in  capital  cases  to  the  comitia  tri- 
buta,*  every  magistrate,  the  dictator  among  the  rest,  was 
obliged  to  allovv  the  right  of  appeal.  (3)  The  tribunes 
could,  as  before,  inflict  fines  without  limitation,  and 
submit  their  sentences  to  the  comitia  tribnta.  (4)  The 
management  of  the  military  chest  was  taken  from   the 

*  According  to  Mommsen  it  would  be  better  to  read  in  (2)  and 
(3)  "'the  assembly  of  the  plebs"  for  "comitia  tributa,"  and  to 
reserve  that  name  for  (4). 


THE  DECEMVIR  ATE.  61 

consuls,  and  entrusted  to  two  quaestors,  who  were  chosen 
by  the  whole  body  of  freeholders,  both  patrician  and 
plebeian  ;  the  votes  of  this  assembly  were  taken  by  dis- 
tricts, which  gave  the  plebeian  farmers  far  more  weight 
than  they  possessed  in  the  comitia  centuriata.  (5)  The 
tribunes  were  allowed  to  sit  on  a  bench  at  the  door  of  the 
senate-house,  and  thus  have  a  share  in  the  proceedings  of 
that  body.  And  from  this  important  concession  gradually 
arose  the  principle,  that  the  tribune  could  by  his  veto 
stop  any  resolution  of  the  senate  or  of  the  public  assembly. 
(6)  The  persons  of  the  tribunes  were  pronounced  in- 
violable (sacrosancti),  and  the  most  hallowed  ordinances 
of  religion  were  employed  to  impart  sacredness  to  their 
office.  "  No  attempt  to  abolish  this  magistracy  was  ever 
from  this  time  forward  made  in  Rome." 


AUTHORITIES. 

Land.— Appian  B.  C.  1,  7.      Plut.  Tib.  Gracch.  8.      Dionys.  ii.  7,  35, 

50,  53.     Liv.  x.  1 ;  xxxvi.  39.     Varro  de  R.  R.  i.  10.     Marq.  Stv. 

i.  96-99;  ii.  149-159. 
Publicani.— Cic.  ad   Q.  F.  i.  1,  12,   35.      Plut.  de  curios,  viii.  60. 

Marq.  Stv.  ii.  299-301. 
First  secession. — Liv.  ii.  23-33      Dionys.  vi.  22-96. 
Tribunate. — Liv.  ii.  33,  58;  iii.  55  ;  iv.  6.     Dionys.  vii.  17.     Varro  de 

L.  L.  5,  81.     Cic.  in  Corn.  p.  75  ;  pro  Sest.  35,  79.     Momms.  R. 

St.  ii.  261-318. 
Aediles. — Dionys.  vi.  90.     Zonar.  7,  15.     Valer.  Max.  22,  7-     Momms. 

R.  St.  ii.  462,  sqq. 
Struggles  between  plebs  and  patres. — Liv.  ii.  34—40.       Dionys.  vii. 

19-47;  viii.  1-84      Plutarch  G.  Marcius  (Coriol.). 
Fabii.—  Dionys.  ix.  15-27.     Liv.  ii.  48-50. 
Appius  Herdonius. — Liv.  iii.  15-18.     Dionys.  x.  14,  16,  37. 
Spurius  Cassius. — Liv.  ii.  41.      Dionys.  vi.  95 ;  viii.  68-87.      Festus. 

p.  241. 
Lex  Publilia. — Liv.  ii.  56-60.     Dionys.  ix.  39-43. 
Lex  Terentilia. — Liv.  iii.  9,  32. 
Decemvirate  and  Valerio-Horatian  laws. —  Liv.  iii.  33-58.      Dionys.  x. 

54-60 ;  xi.  1-49. 
Twelve  Tables,  cf.  Schwegler  R.  G.  iii.  1-47  ;    Bruns   fontes,  147 ; 

Dirksen's  Review  of  the  Explanations  of  XII.  Tables,  Schmitz 

Qnellen-Kunde,  p.  12-14. 
Comitia  Tributa — Mommsen  (R.  St.  iii.  322,  sq. ;  Romische  Forsch- 

ungen,  i.  165)   holds  that  Roman  writers  confused  the  comitia 

populi   tributa  with  the  concilium  plebis  tributum.     Strachan- 

Davidson  (Historical  Revieiv,  p.  209,  sq.)  suggests  a  third  view, 


HISTORY  OF  flO.lfF. 


CHAPTER  Vni. 

EQUALIZATION   OF   THE    ORDERS,   AND   THE    NEW   ARISTOCRACY. 

Union  of  the  plebeians — Lex  Canuleia,  445  B.C. — Military  tribunes 
with  consular  powers — Censorship,  435  B.C. — Quaestorship, 
421  B.C. — Bitter  resistance  of  the  nobility — Social  distress — 
Attempted  remedies — Licinio-Sextian  laws — Death-blows  of  the 
old  aristocracy — Utility  of  the  Licinio-Sextian  laws — New 
aristocracy  and  new  opposition — Increase  of  the  powers  of 
burgesses — Decreasing  importance  of  the  comitia — Subdivision 
and  diminution  of  the  consular  power — Changed  character  of  the 
tribunate — The  senate  all-powerful. 

The  contest  between  the  patricians  and  plebeians  was  not 
yet  ended.  For  two  hundred  years  the  bitter  strife  con- 
tinued ;  each  successive  struggle  wrested  from  the  old 
aristocracy  one  or  more  of  their  deai'ly  loved  privileges, 
until  at  last  not  one  remained,  save  that  which  birth  alone 
gives  and  nought  can  take  away,  the  exclusive  pride  of 
caste.  To  present  a  continuous  history  of  the  internal 
strife  of  parties,  it  will  be  necessary  to  confine  this  chapter 
to  a  narrative  of  the  inner  life  of  Rome,  and  to  summarize 
as  briefly  as  possible  the  events  of  each  blow  to  the 
patrician  power,  and  the  results  of  the  conflict  as  a  whole. 
The  history  of  Rome's  foreign  relations,  although  they 
exercised  no  slight  influence  on  her  internal  discord,  must 
be  reserved  for  another  place. 

Social  discontent,  rather  than  political,  had  given  rise 
to  the  tribunician  movement,  a  movement  viewed  with 
suspicion  by  wealthy  plebeians  as  well  as  by  patricians. 
Doubtless  some  of  the  leading  plebeians  had  supported 
their  less  powerful  brethren  in  the  struggle,  whether  from 
motives  of  justice  or  self-interest.      But,  now  that  the 


EQUALIZATION   OF  THE  ORDERS.  63 

office  of  tribune  was  firmly  established,  the  whole  ple- 
beian body,  comprising  both  those  wealthier  families  who 
had  already  become  members  of  the  senate,  and  the 
general  mass  of  the  citizens,  became  firmly  united  together, 
and  used  the  tribunate  as  a  lever  to  remove  the  political 
disabilities  of  their  order.  The  first  blow  was  dealt  by 
the  Canuleian  law  in  445  B.C.  This  law  (1)  legalized  the 
validity  of  marriage  between  a  patrician  and  plebeian, 
giving  the  children  of  such  a  marriage  the  rank  of  their 
father.  (2)  It  further  created  six  military  tribunes  in 
the  place  of  consuls,  with  consular  powers  and  consular 
duration  of  office,  whose  election  was  intrusted  to  the 
centuries.  This  office  was  open  alike  to  plebeians  and 
patricians.  As  the  creation  of  this  magistracy  was  doubt- 
less a  compromise  between  the  claim  of  the  plebeians  to 
be  admitted  to  the  consulship  and  the  opposition  of  the 
patricians,  we  must  seek  for  some  reason  why  the  patri- 
cians practically  conceded  the  claim  of  the  plebeians,  but 
changed  the  form  of  the  consulate  to  that  of  a  military 
tribunate.  Certain  honorary  distinctions  were  associated 
with  the  holding  of  the  consular  power,  such  as  the  honour 
of  a  triumph,  and  the  ius  imaginum,  or  right  which 
allowed  a  consul's  descendants  to  set  up  their  ancestor's 
image  in  the  family  hall,  and  to  exhibit  it  on  certain 
occasions  in  public.  These  honours  were  not  allowed  to 
the  military  tribunes.  Further,  a  plebeian  military  tribune 
did  not  have  the  right  of  speech  in  the  senate,  which 
would  of  necessity  have  belonged  to  plebeian  consuls ; 
since  the  opinion  of  all  chosen  to  fill  the  office  of  consul, 
and  of  all  who  had  filled  it,  had  to  be  asked  before  that  of 
the  other  senators.  It  must  be  specially  noted  that  the 
old  patrician  consuls  were  not  abolished  by  this  new  office ; 
indeed,  every  year  the  struggle  was  renewed  as  to  whether 
military  tribunes  or  patrician  consuls  should  be  elected. 
During  the  period  of  nearly  eighty  years,  i.e.  from  444  B.C. 
to  the  throwing  open  of  the  consulship  to  the  plebeians  by 
the  Licinian  law  in  367  B.C.,  we  find  that  the  military 
tribunes  were  elected  fifty  times,  and  the  patrician  consuls 
twenty-three  times.  The  miserable  shifts  by  which  the 
patricians  thus  sought  to  baffle  their  opponents  found 
further  expression  in  the  creation  of  the  censorship  in 
435  B.C.     The  two  officers,  or  "valuers"  (censores),  thus 


64  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

created,  were  chosen  from  the  patricians,  and  held  office 
for  a  period  of  not  more  than  eighteen  months.  They  had 
charge  of  the  registration  of  the  whole  body  of  citizens  for 
the  purposes  of  taxation,  and  the  duty  of  ascertaining  the  age 
and  property  of  each  man,  and  of  assigning  him  his  proper 
position  on  the  burgess-roll.  This  task  had  hitherto  been 
managed  by  the  consuls  every  fourth  year.  The  censor- 
ship, although  at  this  period  lacking  its  rubsequent  im- 
portance and  moral  supremacy,  from  its  influence  in  filling 
up  the  vacancies  in  the  senate  and  the  equites,  and  from 
its  power  to  remove  persons  from  the  lists  of  senators, 
equites,  and  burgesses,  came  to  be  regarded  as  the  palla- 
dium of  the  aristocracy.  The  second  great  victory  over 
the  patricians  was  gained  in  421  B.C.,  when  the  quaestor- 
ship  was  thrown  open  to  the  plebeians.  Hitherto  the 
consuls  had  nominated  the  two  city  quaestors,  who  had 
charge  of  the  public  money :  their  election  was  now  trans- 
ferred to  the  same  body  which  elected  their  two  colleagues 
who  had  charge  of  the  military  chest  (cf.  p.  60).  Thus 
the  plebeians  became  eligible  for  the  first  time  to  one  of 
the  ordinary  magistracies,  although  we  do  not  find  that 
they  were  able  to  avail  themselves  of  this  privilege  until 
409  B.C.,  when  they  secured  three  places  out  of  the  four. 
In  their  bitter  resistance  to  the  plebs  the  aristocracy  had 
resort  to  every  artifice  which  could  influence  elections; 
the  aristocratic  colleges  of  priests,  under  the  guise  of 
religion,  seconded  the  bribery  and  intimidation  freely 
practised  on  the  electorate.  Laws  could  be  arrested, 
elections  made  null  and  void,  by  the  convenient  discovery 
of  portentous  omens,  whether  from  the  flight  of  birds  or 
other  phenomena.  The  blood  of  Rome's  best  and  bravest 
citizens  was  shed  in  the  vain  hope  of  stemming  the  tide 
of  plebeian  victory.  We  have  already  (p.  58)  narrated 
the  fall  of  Cassius ;  to  the  same  list  of  judicial  murders 
must  be  added  the  names  of  Spurius  Maelius  and  Marcus 
Manlius.  The  first  of  these,  in  a  time  of  great  distress 
(b.c.  439)  sold  corn  at  greatly  reduced  prices  for  the 
benefit  of  the  sufferers.  This  roused  the  ire  of  the  patri- 
cian "  store-president  "  (praefectus  annonae),  Gaius  Minu- 
fius.  The  old  cry  of  "  king"  was  raised,  and  Maelius  fell 
by  the  hand  of  the  master  of  the  hnrse,  Gaius  Servilius 
Ahala,  because  he  refused  to  obey  the  summons  of  the 


EQUALIZATION  OF  THE  ORDERS.  65 

dictator  Lucius  Quinctius  Cineinnatus.  The  house  of 
Maelius  was  pulled  down,  and  the  corn  from  his  granaries 
distributed  among  the  people.  The  second  victim  was 
Marcus  Manlius,  whose  name,  as  the  saviour  of  the  Capitol 
during  the  Gallic  siege,  was  specially  dear  to  the  Roman 
people.  The  same  evils  which  had  roused  Spurius  Cassius 
now  wrung  the  heart  of  his  ill-fated  successor.  The 
mismanagement  of  the  state  lands,  the  evil  system  of 
credit,  and  the  misery  of  the  decaying  farmers  still  called 
loudly  for  reform.  Assignations  of  conquered  territory 
had,  indeed,  been  made,  notably  in  the  case  of  lands  taken 
from  Ardea  in  412  B.C.,  from  Labici  in  418  B.C.,  and  from 
Veii  in  393  B.C.,  but  the  relief  thus  afforded  was  by  no 
means  adequate.  Attempts  had  been  made,  moreover,  to 
revive  the  law  of  Cassius — as,  for  instance,  the  proposal  of 
Spurius  Maecilius  and  Spurius  Metilius  in  417  B.C.  to 
distribute  all  the  state  land ;  but  all  such  efforts  had  met 
with  the  same  success  as  that  of  Spurius  Cassius.  No 
better  fate  befell  the  patrician  Marcus  Manlius.  His  noble 
generosity  in  freeing  with  his  own  money  a  brave  officer, 
who  was  about  to  be  led  away  to  a  debtor's  prison,  and 
his  bold  utterance  that  such  iniquities  should  not  occur 
as  long  as  he  had  a  foot  of  land  to  sell,  roused  against 
him  the  hatred  of  the  aristocrats  and  the  blind  credulity 
and  fanaticism  of  the  multitude.  The  brave  champion  of 
the  oppressed  was  tried  for  high  treason,  and  condemned 
to  death  by  those  whom  he  had  vainly  tried  to  free,  in 
384  B.C. ;  and  thus  once  more  the  charge  of  aiming  at 
royal  power  exercised  its  deadly  charm.  Despite  the 
constant  acquisition  of  fresh  territory  by  successful  wars, 
the  social  distress  among  the  farmers  only  deepened ;  and 
the  severe  war  with  Veii  from  406-396  B.C.,  when  the 
soldiers  remained  under  arms  both  summer  and  winter, 
coupled  with  the  burning  of  Rome  by  the  Gauls  in  390 
B.C.,  added  fresh  horrors  to  the  widespread  misery. 

At  last  a  solution  of  the  troubles  arising  from  political 
discontent  and  social  wretchedness  sprang  out  of  the 
combination  of  the  chief  plebeians  with  the  farmers. 
This  solution  was  found  in  the  famous  proposals  brought 
forward  in  377  B.C.  by  the  tribunes  Gaius  Licinius  and 
Lucius  Sextius.  Their  proposals  were,  (1)  that  the 
military  tribunes  should  be  abolished,  and  that  at  least 


66  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

one  of  the  consuls  should  be  a  plebeian  ;  (2)  that  plebeians 
should  be  admitted  to  one  of  the  three  great  priest-colleges, 
viz.  that  of  the  decemviri  (hitherto  duoviri)  sacris  faci- 
undis,  or  custodians  of  the  oracles ;  (3)  that  no  one  should 
keep  on  the  common  pasture-land  more  than  a  hundred 
oxen  and  five  hundred  sheep,  or  hold  more  than  five 
hundred  jugera  (about  three  hundred  acres)  of  the  state 
lands  left  free  for  occupation  ;  (4)  that  every  landlord 
should  be  obliged  to  employ  in  land  cultivation  a  certain 
number  of  frue  labourers,  in  proportion  to  that  of  his 
rural  slaves ;  (5)  that  debtors  should  be  relieved  by  the 
deduction  of  the  intei'est  already  paid  from  the  capital, 
and  by  arranging  set  terms  for  the  payment  of  arrears. 

The  three  watch- words  of  this  great  movement  were 
clearly  the  abolition  of  privilege,  social  reform,  civil 
equality.  The  hereditary  distinctions  associated  with  the 
curule  magistracy,  the  right  to  speak  in  the  senate-house, 
(cf.  p.  45),  the  possession  of  spiritual  dignities,  were  no 
longer  to  be  the  exclusive  property  of  the  nobles.  Social 
distress  was  to  be  relieved,  and  the  poorest  burgess  was 
to  have  his  rightful  share  in  those  lands  from  which  the 
selfishness  of  the  rich  had  so  long  excluded  him.  That 
the  patricians  struggled  hard  to  prevent  these  proposals 
becoming  law  is  not  surprising ;  but  that  they  were 
passed,  after  a  struggle  of  eleven  years,  in  367  B.C.,  proves 
the  strength  of  the  united  forces  of  the  farmers  and  rich 
plebeians.  The  passing  of  these  laws  was  marked  by  the 
founding  of  a  temple  of  concord  at  the  foot  of  the  Capitol  % 
— the  last  act  of  the  aged  warrior  and  statesman  Marcus 
Furius  Camillus,  who  perhaps  trusted  that  the  struggle, 
too  long  continued,  was  now  at  an  end.  But  the  patrician 
spirit  still  showed  itself  in  the  creation  of  a  third  consul, 
or,  as  he  was  usually  called,  a  praetor.  However,  this 
office  among  others  was  thrown  open  to  the  plebeians  in 
337  B.C.,  having  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  aristocracy 
only  twenty-nine  years.  The  last  blows  which  destroyed 
aristocratic  exclusiveness  were  (1)  that  by  which  the 
dictatorship  was  thrown  open  to  the  plebeians  in  356  B.C. ; 
(2)  that  which  gave  the  plebeians  access  to  the  censorship 
in  351  B.C.;  (3)  that  dealt  by  the  Publilian  law  in  339  B.C., 
which  ordained  that  at  least  one  of  the  censors  must  be  a 
plebeian,  and  which  rendered  it  impossible  for  the  senate 


EQUALIZATION  OF  TEE  OBDERS.  67 

to  reject  a  decree  of  the  community.  The  result  of  this 
■was  that  the  senate  had  to  give  their  consent  before- 
hand to  any  measures  which  might  be  passed  by  the 
comitia  tributa.  (4)  The  next  blow,  aimed  at  the  religious 
privileges  of  the  patricians,  fell  later.  In  300  B.C.,  the 
Ogulnian  law  increased  the  number  of  pontifices  from  five 
to  eight,  and  that  of  the  augurs  from  six  to  nine,  and 
distributed  the  stalls  in  the  two  colleges  between  the 
patricians  and  plebeians.  (5)  Lastly,  owing  to  another 
secession  of  the  plebs,  the  final  blow  was  given  by  the  law 
of  the  dictator  Quintus  Hortensius,  in  287  B.C.  This  law 
declared  that  the  decrees  of  the  plebs,  passed  in  their 
tribal  assembly,  should  have  equal  force  with  the  decrees 
of  the  whole  populus,  or  community.  Thus  it  was  brought 
about  that  those  very  burgesses,  who  had  once  exclusively 
possessed  the  right  of  voting,  no  longer  had  even  a  vote 
in  that  assembly  whose  resolutions  were  binding  on  the 
whole  state. 

The  end  had  at  last  come  to  a  strife  of  two  hundred 
years.  The  clan  nobility, as  such,  was  no  longer  apolitical 
factor  in  the  Roman  Republic;  but,  although  its  power  and 
privileges  were  gone,  its  exclusive  patrician  spirit  was 
ever  a  disturbing  element  of  discontent  in  the  public  and 
private  life  of  Rome.  "  To  understand  rightly  the  history 
of  Rome  in  the  fifth  and  sixth  centuries,  we  must  never 
overlook  this  sulking  patricianism ;  it  could,  indeed,  do 
little  more  than  irritate  itself  and  others,  but  this  it  did 
to  the  best  of  its  ability." 

It  remains  for  us  to  estimate  the  result  of  these  changes, 
as  to  whether  they  checked  social  distress  and  established 
political  equality. 

With  regard  to  the  first  point,  we  should  first  consider 
what  relief  was  really  given  by  the  Licinio-Sextian  laws, 
passed  in  367  B.C.  No  doubt  a  substantial  benefit  was 
conferred  upon  the  small  farmer  and  free  labourer  by  the 
provisions  of  these  laws,  and  this  benefit  was  the  more 
felt  as  long  as  the  regulations  touching  the  maximum  of 
public  land  held  by  individuals,  and  the  number  of  cattle 
grazing  on  the  public  pasture,  were  strictly  enforced.  But 
it  is  obvious  that  no  legislation  could  really  check  the 
system  of  large  estates,  or  the  employment  of  slave-labour, 
without  at  the  same  time  shaking  the  foundations  of  the 


68  HISTORY  OF  HOME. 

civil  organization  of  that  time,  in  a  way  that  would  entail 
far-reaching  consequences.  Again,  the  maximum  fixed 
as  to  occupation  of  domain-land  and  the  grazing  of  flocks 
and  herds  was  a  high  one,  and  in  effect  was  a  concession 
to  the  wealthy,  whose  tenure,  although  liable  to  certain 
restrictions,  acquired  a  certain  legal  sanction.  Moreover, 
these  laws  provided  no  better  means  than  had  previously 
existed  for  the  collection  of  the  pasture-tax  and  the  tenths 
or  6fths.  No  officer  was  appointed  to  revise  the  list  of 
those  already  holding  such  land,  nor  to  ensure  that,  in 
case  of  fresh  territorial  acquisitions,  a  distribution  should 
at  once  be  made,  nor  to  secure  to  those  who  already  were 
in  possession,  or  should  be  so  in  future,  full  ownership. 
The  absence  of  these  provisions,  which  the  necessities  of 
the  case  demanded,  is  in  itself  suspicious.  It  seems  only 
too  probable  that  the  plebeian  aristocracy,  at  whose  in- 
stance these  laws  were  proposed,  regarded  their  own  selfish 
interests  rather  than  those  of  the  poorer  citizens.  Indeed, 
Gaius  Licinius  Stolo,  one  of  the  authors  of  these  laws, 
was  among  the  first  to  be  condemned  for  having  exceeded 
the  maximum  of  land.  Still  some  real  good  was  done, 
and  other  measures  followed,  of  a  beneBcial  character.  In 
357  B.C.,  a  tax  was  imposed  by  the  Manlian  law  on  the 
manumissions  of  slaves  ;  this  was  the  first  direct  tax  upon 
the  rich,  and  its  object  was  to  check  the  undesirable 
multiplication  of  freedmen.  Moreover,  the  usury  laws 
established  by  the  Twelve  Tables  (p.  59)  were  rendered 
more  stringent,  and  the  maximum  of  interest,  which  the 
law  of  Duilius  Maenius  had  fixed  at  ten  per  cent,  in  357 
B.C.,  was  lowered  to  five  percent,  ten  years  later;  and  later 
on,  the  Genucian  law  in  342  B.C.  forbade  the  taking  of 
interest  altogether.  This  foolish  law,  though  it  remained 
formally  in  force,  was  practically  inoperative ;  but  the 
maximum  of  interest  at  a  rate  of  five  or  six  per  cent, 
would,  at  this  period,  represent  the  usual  rate  of  twelve 
per  cent.,  which  obtained  in  later  times.  More  important 
were  the  restrictions  introduced  by  the  Paetelian  and 
Papirian  law  of  326  B.C. :  by  this  law,  no  citizen  of  Rome 
could  be  led  away  to  prison  for  debt  until  he  had  been 
sentenced  by  jurymen ;  and  the  debtor  could,  after  declar- 
ing on  oath  that  he  was  solvent,  save  his  personal  freedom 
by  giving  up  his  property.   Notwithstanding  these  measures 


THE  NEW  ARISTOCRACY.  69 

we  have  clear  proof  that  the  distress  of  the  middle  class 
still  continued.  The  appointment  of  a  board  to  advance 
money  (quinqueviri  mensarii)  in  352  B.C.,  the  violent  in- 
surrection and  secession  of  the  plebs  to  the  Janiculum  in 
287  B.C.,  and  the  concessions  thereby  obtained,  all  point 
to  the  same  fact.  The  real  relief  came  not  from  legisla- 
tion, but  from  the  successes  of  Rome,  and  the  necessity 
of  sending  out  large  colonies  to  consolidate  tie  Roman 
rale  in  Italy.  Added  to  this,  the  general  increase  of 
prosperity  from  successful  war  and  commerce,  and  the 
flourishing  condition  of  the  state  finances,  must  have 
lightened  the  burdens,  of  the  farmers,  and  diffused  material 
well-being  among  the  whole  community. 

Again,  as  to  the  second  point,  political  equality  was  now 
practically  attained.  In  the  eye  of  the  law,  atr  least,  all 
arbitrary  distinctions  were  abolished.  The  different  gra- 
dations, which  age,  wisdom,  and  wealth  always  produce 
in  society,  were  lessened  by  the  system  that  pervaded 
Roman  life.  That  system  aimed  rather  at  a  uniform  level 
of  ability,  than  at  bringing  into  prominence  those  more 
highly  gifted.  Rich  and  poor  alike  lived  frugal  lives, 
avoiding  even  the  luxury  of  silver  plate.  From  the  last 
war  with  Veii  down  to  that  against  Pyrrhus,  the  farmers 
played  a  more  important  part  than  the  old  patriciate:  the 
exploits  of  a  plebeian,  like  Decins,  and  of  a  poor  farmer, 
like  Manius  Curius,  now  began  to  take  equal  rank  with, 
and  even  eclipse,  those  of  the  noblest  aristocrat.  But, 
great  as  the  strides  to  this  republican  equality  were,  the 
government  still  remained  aristocratic.  The  mere  opening 
of  state  magistracies  to  the  humblest  and  poorest  burgess 
does  not  remove  the  difficulties  which  always  hinder  the 
rise  of  a  man  from  the  ranks.  Moreover,  a  new  aristocracy, 
consisting  of  the  wealthy  plebeians,  had  existed  from  the 
first,  and  now  developed  fresh  powers.  Their  policy  had 
always  followed  lines  distinct  from,  and  often  oppos<  d  to, 
that  of  the  plebs.  This  new  aristocracy  coalesced  with 
the  old  patriciate,  and  largely  adopted  its  views,  and  soon 
practically  took  its  place.  A  natural  result  of  this  develop- 
ment was  the  rise  of  a  new  opposition.  This  new  demo- 
cratic party  was  formed  no  longer  of  plebeians,  as  such, 
but  of  the  lower  classes  and  the  small  farmers.  But, 
fortunately  for   Rome,  her  struggles  with   foreign    foes 


70  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

caused  the  leaders  of  the  two  new  state  parties  to  forego 
their  quarrels  in  the  face  of  a  common  danger;  and  thus 
we  find  the  patrician  Appius  Claudius  uniting  with  his 
personal  foe,  the  farmer  Manius  Curius,  for  the  purpose 
of  crushing  Pyrrhus.  "  The  breach  was  already  formed  ; 
but  the  adversaries  still  shook  hands  across  it." 

Finally,  let  us  consider  what  effect  the  political  abo- 
lition of  the  old  nobility  had  upon  the  relations  between 
the  burgesses,  the  magistrates,  and  the  senate.  It  has  been 
already  pointed  out  that  the  Hortensian  law  in  287  B.C. 
had  given  great  powers  to  the  comitia  tributa ;  and 
that  in  this  assembly  all  voted  ou  a  footing  of  equality, 
without  reference  to  their  means,  thus  differing  from 
the  practice  in  the  comitia  centuriata.  The  censor, 
Appius  Claudius,  in  312  B.C.,  even  struck  a  blow  at  the 
old  freehold  basis  of  suffrage,  and  allowed  landless 
citizens  to  be  enrolled  in  the  tribes.  His  action  was, 
however,  greatly  limited  by  Quintus  Fabius  Rullianus, 
the  conqueror  of  the  Samnites,  in  304  B.C.  He  incor- 
porated all  free  men  who  had  no  land,  and  also  all 
freedmen  whose  landed  property  was  under  thirty  thou- 
sand sesterces  (£300),  in  the  four  city  tribes.  But  he 
reserved  the  rural  tribes,  whose  number  gradually  increased 
from  seventeen  to  thirty-one,  for  all  freeborn  freeholders, 
and  for  those  freedmen  whose  estate  exceeded  thirty 
thousand  sesterces  in  value.  Thus  he  gave  a  great  pre- 
ponderance of  power  in  the  two  assemblies  of  the  citizens 
to  the  holders  of  land  and  wealth,  and  he  placed  a  check 
upon  the  increasing  importance  of  the  freedmen.  Although 
the  powers  of  the  burgess  assemblies  were  increased  in 
certain  directions,  chiefly  with  respect  to  the  number  of 
magistrates  nominated  by  them,  they  did  not  as  a  rule 
interfere  with  the  administration  of  government.  They 
kept  a  firm  hold  on  their  right  to  declare  war,  and  oc- 
casionally settled  disputes  between  the  governing  powers, 
when  appealed  to  by  the  disputants,  and  in  390  B.C.  they 
even  annulled  a  decree  of  the  senate.  The  Hortensian 
law  probably  marks  the  extension  of  the  powers  of  the 
comitia  tributa,  w7hich  came  to  be  consulted  as  to  the 
conclusion  of  peace  and  alliances.  Still,  the  influence  of 
these  assemblies  on  public  affairs  towards  the  close  of  this 
period  began  to  wane.     This  was  mainly  due  to  the  ex- 


THE  NEW  ARISTOCRACY.  71 

tension  of  the  bounds  of  Rome,  whose  burgess-body  no 
longer  composed  a  city,  but  a  state.  Thus  the  interest 
felt  in  their  proceedings  on  ordinary  occasions  was  com- 
paratively slight,  inasmuch  as  only  those  residing  in  the 
capital  as  a  rule  attended.  Moreover,  the  magistrate 
who  convoked  the  assembly  could  prevent  all  discussion ; 
hence  the  assemblies  became  mere  instruments  in  his 
hands,  and  played  a  passive  part,  neither  helping  nor 
hindering  the  administration  of  the  government. 

With  regard  to  the  Roman  magistrates,  a  great  loss  of 
power  was  the  outcome  of  party  contests.  The  close  of 
the  struggle  left  the  consular  power  subdivided  and 
weakened.  Jurisdiction,  city  police,  election  of  senators 
and  equites,  the  census  and  financial  administration,  were 
all  transferred  to  magistrates  elected  by  the  community, 
and  occupying  a  position  co-ordinate  with,  rather  than 
subordinate  to,  the  consuls.  Further,  although  the  consul- 
ship ranked  higher  than  the  praetorship,  aedileship,  and 
quaestorship,  it  ranked  below  the  censorship,  which  office 
now  exercised  a  wholly  arbitrary  control  over  the  entire 
community  and  every  individual  burgess.  In  addition 
to  this  creation  of  collateral  standing  offices  fuch  as 
the  praetorship,  the  senate  now  annually  defined,  though 
it  did  not  directly  assign,  the  different  departments  (pro- 
vinciae)  of  the  consuls  ;  and  the  senate  no  longer  allowed 
the  consuls  to  conclude  peace,  without  first  receiving  in- 
structions from  the  assembled  senators.  Lastly,  the  senate 
could  in  emergencies  suspend  a  consul  by  creating  a 
dictator ;  and,  although  nominally  designated  by  the 
consul,  the  consul  elect  was,  as  a  rule,  really  chosen  by 
the  senate.  Even  the  dictator's  power  was  no  longer 
regarded  as  absolute  and  unlimited.  The  definition  of  the 
functions  of  the  dictator,  as  of  that  of  the  consul  and  other 
magistrates,  came  to  be  regarded  as  a  constitutional 
necessity.  Thus  we  find  in  363  B.C.,  and  again  in  351 
B.C.,  a  dictator  appointed  for  a  special  and  limited  duty, 
such  as  the  performance  of  a  religious  ceremony.  More- 
over, restrictions  were  imposed  in  342  B.C.  by  plebis- 
cites, enacting  that  no  one  should  hold  two  magistracies 
in  the  same  year,  and  that  the  same  man  should  not 
hold  the  same  office  twice  within  a  period  of  ten  years. 
Later,  again,  in  265  b.c,  the  Marcian  law  forbade  any  one 


72  EISTOTiY  OF  HOME. 

holding  the  censorship  twice.  Although  the  rule  forbid- 
ing  pluralism,  i.e.  the  holding  of  two  offices  at  the  same 
time,  was  strictly  observed,  we  frequently  find  instances 
of  a  relaxation  of  the  other  restriction.  Thus  Quintus 
Fabius  Rullianus  was  five  times  consul  in  eight  and  twenty 
years,  and  Marcns  Valerius  Corvus  (370-271  B.C.)  held 
the  consulship  six  times — the  first  in  his  twenty-third, 
and  the  last  in  his  seventy-second  year.  The  change, 
which  thus  transformed  the  supreme  power  of  the  state 
into  a  limited  magistracy  with  definite  functions,  also 
affected  the  tribunate.  Now  that  this  office  had  accom- 
plished the  purpose  for  which  it  had  been  used,  by  securing 
the  abolition  of  the  legal  disabilities  of  the  commons  and 
of  the  privileges  of  the  old  nobility,  the  original  object  of 
the  tribunate  as  counsel  and  protector  of  the  humblest 
and  weakest  was  as  odious  to  the  new  plebeian  aristocracy 
as  it  had  been  to  the  patrician.  Therefore,  under  the  new 
organization  the  office  lost  its  old  character  of  a  weapon  of 
opposition,  and  became  an  instrument  of  government. 
The  tribunes  no  longer  sat  on  a  bench  at  the  door  of  the 
senate-house,  but  took  their  seats  by  the  side  of  the  other 
magistrates,  and  took  part  in  the  discussions.  Like  the 
other  acting  magistrates,  they  did  not  during  their  year  of 
office  vote  in  the  senate,  but  they  had  the  right  of  con- 
voking it,  of  consulting  it,  and  of  procuring  decrees  from 
it.  Thus,  by  becoming  magistrates  of  the  state,  the  tribunes 
for  the  time  lost  their  old  revolutionary  and  obstructive 
character,  and  paved  the  way  for  the  steady  growth  of  the 
power  of  the  new  aristocracy  ;  indeed,  the  tribunes  were, 
as  a  rule,  members  of  that  body.  Yet  the  preservation 
and  the  associations  of  the  name  of  tribunate,  might 
well  forbode  danger  in  the  future.  "  For  the  moment, 
however,  and  for  a  long  time  to  come,  the  aristocracy 
was  so  absolutely  powerful,  and  so  completely  possessed 
control  over  the  tribunate,  that  no  trace  is  to  be  met 
with  of  a  collegiate  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  tribunes 
to  the  senate."  What  opposition  did  arise  came  from 
single  independent  tribunes,  and  was  easily  crushed,  often 
by  the  aid  of  the  tribune-college  itself. 

The  real  governing  power  became  vested  in  the  senate. 
The  Ovinian  law,  probably  passed  soon  after  the  Sexto- 
Licinian  laws,  regulated  the  composition  of  that  body.    All 


THE  NEW  ARISTOCRACY.  73 

who  had  been  curule  aediles,  praetors,  or  consuls  became 
members.  The  action  of  the  censors  was  in  this  way 
greatly  restricted,  although  it  was  still  their  duty  to  fill 
up  all  the  vacancies  which  remained  after  the  above- 
mentioned  officers  had  been  placed  on  the  senatorial  roll. 
Even  in  making  this  selection  the  censors  were  bound  by 
oath  to  choose  all  the  best  citizens.  Moreover,  usage,  if 
not  law,  seemed  to  have  ordained  that  burgesses,  who  had 
filled  a  non-curule  office,  or  who  were  eminent  for  personal 
valour,  or  who  had  saved  the  life  of  a  fellow-citizen,  should 
be  selected  for  the  honour.  Those  thus  chosen  by  the 
censor  voted,  but  took  no  part  in  debate,  and  thus  were 
senatores  pedarii  (cf.  p.  45).  The  main  part  of  the  senate, 
whose  election  was  determined  by  the  Ovinian  law,  and 
not  by  the  selection  of  the  censors,  and  who  held  the  reins 
of  government,  were  in  this  way  indirectly  elected  by  the 
people.  "  The  Roman  government  in  this  way  made  some 
approach  to,  although  it  did  not  reach,  the  great  institu- 
tion of  modern  times,  representative  popular  government, 
while  the  aggregate  of  the  non-debating  senators  furnished 
— what  it  is  so  necessary,  and  yet  so  difficult  to  get  in 
governing  corporations — a  compact  mass  of  members, 
capable  of  forming  and  entitled  to  pronounce  an  opinion, 
but  voting  in  silence."  No  magistrate  submitted  a  pro- 
posal to  the  people  without,  or  in  opposition  to,  the  senate's 
opinion  ;  if  he  did  so,  the  senate,  by  means  of  the  vetoing 
power  of  the  magistrates  and  the  annulling  powers  of  the 
priests,  easily  thwarted  him  ;  and  in  extreme  cases  the 
senate  could  refuse  to  execute  the  decrees  of  the  people. 
Through  the  presiding  magistrate  the  senate  practically 
exerted  a  paramount  influence  on  the  elections,  and,  as 
was  shown  above  in  the  case  of  the  consuls,  bore  no  small 
part  in  settling  what  was  to  be  the  special  sphere  of  the 
elected  magistrates.  Further,  the  senate  acquired  the 
right,  which  by  law  belonged  only  to  the  community,  of 
extending  the  term  of  office  to  the  consul  or  praetor,  acting 
outside  the  city's  limits ;  and  the  consul  or  praetor,  whose 
term  was  thus  prolonged,  was  said  to  be  acting  "  in  a 
consul's  or  praetor's  stead  "  (pro  consule,  pro  praetore). 
From  the  year  307  B.C.  the  term  of  the  commander-in- 
chief  was  regularly  prolonged  by  a  mere  decree  of  the 
eenate.      Finally,  as   regards  administration,   war,   peace, 


74  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

and  alliances,  the  founding  of  colonies,  the  assignation  of 
lands,  and  the  whole  system  of  finance,  the  senate  became 
practically  supreme.  Great  as  the  powers  entrusted  to 
the  senate  were,  the  senate  proved  fully  worthy  of  the 
trust.  Although  it  is  clear  that  the  steps  above  described 
arrested  the  free  action  of  the  burgesses,  and  reduced  the 
magistrates  to  mere  executors  of  the  senate  s  will,  the 
assembly,  by  its  ability  to  govern,  justified  its  usurpation 
of  power.  Its  members  owed  their  position  to  merit  and 
the  people's  choice,  not  to  birth  ;  those  unworthy  of  their 
high  position  were  liable  to  removal  by  the  censors  every 
fifth  year.  Their  life-tenure  of  office  freed  them  from  the 
necessity  of  trimming  their  sails  to  the  shifting  breeze  of 
public  opinion,  and  gave  them  a  complete  control  over  the 
executive  magistrates,  whose  office  annually  changed 
hands.  This  continuity  of  existence  rendered  possible  a 
firm,  unwavering,  and  patriotic  foreign  policy;  and  never 
was  a  state  more  firmly  and  worthily  represented  in  its 
external  relations  than  Rome  in  its  best  times  by  its 
senate.  We  cannot  deny  that,  in  matters  of  internal  ad- 
ministration, the  senate  too  often  favoured  the  selfish 
interests  of  the  moneyed  and  landed  aristocracy,  which 
was  largely  represented  in  that  body.  But,  when  we 
consider  its  conduct  as  a  whole,  we  mnst  allow  that  "  the 
Roman  senate  was  the  noblest  organ  of  the  nation,  and  in 
consistency  and  political  sagacity,  in  unanimity  and  pa- 
triotism, in  grasp  of  power,  and  unwavering  courage,  the 
foremost  political  corporation  of  all  times — still  even  now 
"an  assembly  of  kings,"  which  knew  well  how  to  combine 
despotic  energy  with  republican  self-devotion. 


AUTHORITIES. 

Lex  Canuleia.  — Liv.  iv.  1-6. 

Military  tribunes  cons.  pot. — Liv.  iv.  7,  12,  55.     Dionys.  ii.  60-63. 

Momms.  R.  St.  ii.  173-184. 
Censorship. —  Liv.  iv.  8.     Momms.  R.  St.  ii.  319,  sqq. 
Quaestorship  thrown  open. — Liv.  iv.  43. 
Spurius  Maelius. — Liv.  iv.  13,  15. 
Spurius  Maecilius. — Liv.  iv.  48. 
Marcus  Manlius. — Liv.  vi.  11-20. 
Veientine  war. — Liv.  iv.  60-v.  22. 


THE  NEW  ARISTOCRACY.  75 

Licinio-Sextian  laws. — Liv.  vi.  35-42.     Appian  B.  C.  i.  8.     Marq.  Stv. 

i.  101-104. 
Praetor. — Liv.  vi.  42  ;  vii.  1. 

Victories  ofplebs.—Liv.  vii.  17,  22;  viii.  12,  15;  ix.  6.     Epit.  59. 
Publilian  laiu. — Liv.  viii.  12. 
Ogulnian  law. — Liv.  x.  6-9. 
Law  of  Quintus  Hortensius. —  Pliny  N.  H.  xvi.   10.      Gell.   xv.   27. 

Gaius  i.  3. 
Laws  of  Appius  Claudius  and  Quintus  Rullianus. — Liv.  ix.  46. 
Genucian  law. — Liv.  vii.  42. 
Papirian  laws. — Liv.  viii.  28. 
Quinqueviri  mensarii. — Liv.  vii.  21. 
Secession  of  plebs. — Liv.  Epit.  11. 
Com.  tributa. — Liv.  ii.  56.     Dionys.  vii.  59 ;  ix.  41.     Momms.  E.  St. 

iii.  340,  sqq. 
Plebiscites  limiting  number  of  magistracies. — Liv.  vii.  42. 
Marcian  law. — Pint.  Coriol.  i.     Valer.  Max.  4,  1.     Liv.  xxiii.  23. 
Ovinian  law. — Liv.  xxiii.  23.     Festus,  246. 

Proconsul.— Liv.  viii.  23  ;  ix.  42  ;  x.  22.     Momms.  R.  St.  i.  615-622. 
On  the  difficulties  connected  with  the  Publilian  and  Hortensian  laws, 

cf.  Strachan  Davidson,  Historical  Review,  p.  210,  etc. 


7f  BISTORT  OF  HOME. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

FALL   OF   THE    ETRUSCAN    POWER — THE    CELTS. 

Maritime  supremacy  of  the  allied  Etruscans  and  Carthaginians  — 
Etruscan  subjugation  of  and  expulsion  from  Latium.  Effects  of 
victories  at  Salamis  and  Himera — Rise  of  maritime  power  of 
Tarentum  and  Syracuse — Wars  between  Rome  and  Veii ; 
between  Samnites  and  Campanian  Etruscans — Character  of  the 
Celts — Celtic  migrations — Fall  of  Veii,  396  B.C. — Celtic  attack 
and  capture  of  Rome — Effects  of  Celtic  victory — Conquest  of 
South  Etruria  by  Rome — Pacification  of  North  Italy — Decline  of 
Etruria  proper. 

The  last  three  chapters  have  been  devoted  to  the  internal 
struggles  of  Rome,  and  their  political  results  :  we  can 
now  turn  to  the  external  history  both  of  Rome  and  of 
Italy.  Two  notable  events  meet  our  eyes — firstly,  the 
collapse  of  the  Etruscan  power ;  secondly,  the  incursions 
of  the  Celts.  The  history  of  the  rise  of  the  Etruscans  has 
been  given  in  the  fifth  chapter  ;  it  is  here  resnmed.  About 
500  B.C.  they  had  reached  their  zenith  of  prosperity.  Allied 
with  the  Carthaginians,  who  were  absolute  masters  of 
Sardinia,  and  had  a  firm  foothold  in  Sicily,  they  ruled  the 
Etruscan  and  Adriatic  seas.  Although  Massilia  retained 
her  independence,  the  seaports  of  Campania  and  of  the 
Volscian  land,  and  the  island  of  Corsica,  were  in  the 
hands  of  the  Etruscans.  The  possession  of  Latium,  which 
interposed  a  firm  barrier  between  Etruria  proper  and  the 
Tuscan  settlements  in  Campania,  was  naturally  of  the 
ntmost  importance  ;  and,  for  a  short  time,  the  conquest  of 
Rome  by  Lars  Porsena  in  507  B.C.  seemed  to  open  out  a 
prospect  of  the  realization  of  Tuscan  supremacy  in  Italy. 
But  the  advance  of  the  victorious  Etruscans  into  Latium 


FALL  OF  THE  ETRUSCAN  POWER.  77 

received  a  check  beneath  the  walls  of  Aricia,  from  the 
timely  succour  of  the  people  of  Cuma3  in  506  B.C.  The 
end  of  this  war  is  unknown ;  possibly  the  disgraceful 
terms  of  the  peace,  which  Rome  had  concluded  with  Lars 
Porsena  the  previous  year,  were  somewhat  modified  ;  but, 
for  a  time  at  least,  Latium  was  in  imminent  danger  of  being 
reduced  to  subjection  by  Etruscan  arms.  Fortunately, 
however,  for  Rome,  the  main  strength  of  the  Etruscan 
nation  was  diverted  from  Latium,  and  called  to  do  battle 
elsewhere ;  while  Veii  and  the  neighbouring  towns  grappled 
with  Rome,  the  rest  of  the  Etruscans  were  engaged  in 
another  cause. 

The  arrest  of  Greek  colonization  by  the  combined 
Etruscans  and  Carthaginians  has  been  already  described ; 
a  more  deadly  blow,  on  a  far  grander  scale,  if  we  may 
believe  tradition,  threatened  the  whole  Greek  world. 
The  simultaneous  defeat  of  the  Persians  at  Salamis 
and  the  Carthaginians  at  Himera  by  the  rulers  of  Syra- 
cuse and  Agrigentum,  Gelon  and  Theron,  in  480  B.C., 
utterly  crushed  the  great  combination  of  Persians,  Cartha- 
ginians, and  Etruscans  against  liberty  and  civilization. 
Six  years  later,  the  Cumaeans  and  Hiero  of  Syracuse 
vanquished  the  Etruscan  fleet  off  Cumae ;  and  the  rise  of 
Syracuse  to  the  chief  power  in  Sicily,  and  of  Tarentum  to 
the  leading  position  in  the  south  of  Italy,  put  an  end  to 
the  maritime  supremacy  of  both  Etruscans  and  Cartha- 
ginians. Syracuse  in  453  B.C.  ravaged  the  island  of  Corsica 
and  the  Etrurian  coast,  and  occupied  Aethalia ;  and  later, 
in  415  to  413  B.C.,  the  Athenian  expedition  against  Syracuse. 
which  received  support  from  Etruscan  galleys,  ended  in 
ignominious  failure,  and  left  Syracuse  free  to  turn  on  her 
old  enemy  with  redoubled  vigour.  Dionysius,  who  reigned 
from  406  to  367  B.C.,  founded  Syracusan  colonies  on  the 
Illyrian  coast  at  Lissus  and  the  island  of  Issa,  and  on 
the  eastern  coast  of  Italy  at  the  ports  of  Ancona,  Numana, 
and  Hatria ;  thus  ousting  the  Etruscans  from  the  Adriatic. 
In  addition  to  this,  he  captured,  in  358  B.C.,  Pyrgi,  the  rich 
seaport  of  Caere,  a  blow  from  which  the  Etruscans  never 
recovered.  Later,  too,  when  the  death  of  Dionysius  and 
the  ensuing  political  troubles  of  Syracuse  opened  the  way 
to  Carthaginian  arms,  we  find  that  the  revival  of  maritime 
supremacy  by  Carthage  brought  no  similar  revival  to  their 


78  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

old  allies  the  Etruscans.  On  the  contrary,  the  relations 
between  the  two  powers  had  become  so  strained,  that  in 
310  B.C.  Tuscan  men-of-war  assisted  Agathocles  of  Syracuse 
in  his  war  against  Carthage,  and  the  old  alliance  was  thus 
severed.  This  rapid  collapse  of  the  naval  power  of  the 
Etruscans  was  due  in  great  measure  to  the  fact  that,  at 
the  same  time  that  they  were  struggling  with  the  Sicilian 
Greeks  by  sea,  they  were  assailed  on  all  sides  by  foes  on 
land.  During  the  period  of  the  combination  of  Persians, 
Carthaginians,  and  Etruscans,  above  alluded  to,  a  bitter 
war  raged  between  Rome  and  Veii  from  483  to  474  B.C. 
This  war  is  memorable  for  the  extermination  of  the  Fabian 
clan  at  Cremera  in  477  B.C.,  which  clan,  doubtless  owing 
to  the  party  struggles,  had  voluntarily  banished  itself  from 
Rome,  and  undertaken  the  defence  of  the  frontier.  The 
result  of  this  war  was  so  far  favourable  to  Rome  that 
the  Etruscans  gave  up  Fidenae,  and  the  district  they  had 
won  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Tiber  Moreover,  the 
Samnites  attacked  the  Etruscan  settlements  in  Campania ; 
Capua  fell  in  424  B.C.,  and  the  Etruscan  population  was 
extirpated  or  expelled.  But  in  northern  Italy  a  new 
nation  was  knocking  at  the  gates  of  the  Alps  .  it  was  the 
Celts ;  and  the  brunt  of  their  inroad  fell  first  upon  the 
Etruscans. 

The  character  of  the  Celtic  nation,  their  origin,  and  the 
part  they  played  in  Italian  history  at  this  period,  now 
claim  our  attention.  Nature,  though  she  lavished  upon 
the  Celts  her  most  brilliant  gifts,  had  denied  them  those 
more  solid  and  enduring  qualities  which  lead  to  the 
highest  human  development,  alike  in  morality  and  politics. 
The  mainspring  of  their  life  and  action  was  a  boundless 
vanity.  Whether  we  regard  their  chivalrous  feats  of 
bravery,  their  impetuous  generosity,  and  ready  acceptance 
of  new  impressions,  or  their  want  of  perseverance,  hatred 
of  discipline  and  order,  constant  discord,  love  of  ostenta- 
tion, and  extreme  instability, — to  all  these  many-sided 
manifestations  of  the  Celtic  temperament  egotism  supplies 
the  key.  They  preferred  a  pastoral  life  to  an  agricultural, 
and  had  none  of  that  attachment  to  their  native  soil 
which  characterized  the  Italians  and  the  Germans.  Their 
fondness  for  congregating  in  towns  and  villages  did  not 
lead  them  to  develop  political  constitutions.     As  a  nation 


TEE  CELTS.  79 

they  had  little  sense  of  unity  ;  their  individual  communities 
were  equally  deficient  in  sincere  patriotism,  consistent 
purpose,  and  united  effort.  Ever  ready  to  rove,  they  were 
the  true  soldiers-of -fortune  of  antiquity,  and  possessed 
all  the  qualities  of  good  soldiers,  hut  of  bad  citizens, — 
qualities  which  explain  the  historical  fact  that  the  Celts 
have  shaken  all  states  and  founded  none.  "All  their 
enterprises  melted  away  like  snow  in  spring;  and  nowhere 
did  they  create  a  great  state,  or  develop  a  distinctive 
culture  of  their  own."  Sprung  from  the  same  cradle  as 
the  Hellenic,  Italian,  and  Germanic  peoples,  the  Celts  at 
a  very  early  period  settled  in  modern  France  ;  from  there 
they  crossed  over  to  Britain  in  the  north,  and  in  the  south 
passed  the  Pyrenees,  and  contested  the  possession  of  Spain 
with  the  Iberian  tribes.  Our  history  is  immediately 
concerned  with  their  movements  in  the  opposite  direction, 
when,  leaving  their  homes  in  the  West,  they  retraced  their 
steps  and  poured  over  the  Alps  in  ceaseless  streams. 
Their  hordes,  on  passing  the  Graian  Alps  (the  little  St. 
Bernard),  first  formed  the  Celtic  canton  of  the  Insubres, 
with  Mediolanum  (Milan)  as  its  capital.  The  canton  of 
the  Cenomani,  with  the  towns  of  Brixia  (Brescia)  and 
Verona,  soon  followed.  The  Ligurians  were  dislodged,  and 
the  possessions  of  the  Etruscans  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Po  were  soon  wrested  from  their  grasp ;  Melpum  fell,  and 
soon  the  invaders  crossed  the  Po,  and  assailed  the  Etruscans 
and  Umbrians  in  their  original  home.  The  Boii,  and  later 
the  Senones,  were  the  chief  assailants  in  this  quarter: 
the  former  took  the  Etruscan  town  Felsina,  and  changed 
its  name  to  Bononia ;  the  latter  settled  along  the  Adriatic 
coast  from  Rimini  to  Ancona.  Isolated  roving  bands  no 
doubt  reached  the  borders  of  Etruria  proper,  and  about 
the  middle  of  the  fourth  century  the  Tuscan  nation  were 
practically  restricted  to  that  land,  which  still  bears  their 
name.  About  the  year  426  B.C.,  the  Etruscans  were  thus 
engaged  in  war  with  three  enemies  :  in  the  north  with  the 
encroaching  Celts  ;  in  the  south  with  the  Samnites,  who 
had  invaded  Campania  ;  and  with  the  Romans.  A  fresh 
outbreak  of  hostilities  between  Rome  and  Veii  was  due  to 
the  revolt  of  the  people  of  Fidenae,  who  had  murdered 
the  Roman  envoys  and  called  in  the  help  of  Lars  Tolum- 
nius,  king  of  Veii.      This  king  was  slain  by  the  corsul 


80  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Aulus  Cornelius  Cossus,  and  the  war  ended  favourably  to 
the  Romans.  After  a  truce,  daring  which  the  position  of 
Etruria  grew  moi'e  and  more  critical,  war  broke  out  again 
in  406  B.C.  between  Rome  and  Veii :  the  latter  received 
support  from  Capena  and  Falerii,  but,  owing  to  their 
struggles  with  the  Celts,  and  their  dislike  for  the  regal 
form  of  government  in  Veii,  the  Etruscan  nation  as  a 
whole  gave  no  aid  to  the  hard-pressed  Veientines.  The 
city  fell  in  396  B.C.,  and  was  destroyed  by  the  triumphant 
Romans,  to  whom  the  heroism  of  Marcus  Furius  Camillus 
had  first  opened  up  the  brilliant  and  perilous  career  of 
foreign  conquest.  Tradition  tells  us  that  Melpum  and 
Veii  fell  on  the  same  day  ;  whether  this  be  so  or  not, 
"  the  double  assault  from  the  north  and  the  south,  and 
the  fall  of  the  two  frontier  strongholds,  were  the  beginning 
of  the  end  of  the  great  Etruscan  nation."  For  a  momeut, 
however,  it  seemed  as  if  the  folly  of  Rome  was  destined 
to  turn  aside  from  the  head  of  the  Etruscans  the  sword  of 
the  foreign  barbarian.  In  391  B.C.,  Clusium,  situated  in 
the  heart  of  Etruria,  was  hard  pressed  by  the  Celtic 
Senones ;  so  low  was  Tuscan  pride,  that  Clusium  begged 
aid  from  the  destroyers  of  Veii.  Rome,  however,  in  place 
of  substantial  help,  despatched  envoys,  who  attempted  to 
impose  on  the  Celts  by  haughty  language  ;  when  this 
failed,  the  envoys  violated  the  law  of  nations  by  fighting 
in  the  ranks  of  the  men  of  Clusium.  To  the  demand  of 
the  barbarians  for  the  surrender  of  these  envoys  the 
Romans  refused  to  listen.  Then  the  Brennus,  or  king  of 
the  Gallic  host,  abandoned  the  siege  of  Clusium,  and  turned 
against  Rome.  The  battle  of  the  Allia  in  390  B.C.,  and 
the  capture  and  destruction  of  Rome,  taught  the  Romans 
a  bitter  lesson.  The  horrors  of  this  catastrophe,  the 
burning  of  the  city,  the  saving  of  the  Capitol  by  the 
sacred  geese  and  the  brave  Marcus  Manlius,  the  scornful 
throwing  down  into  the  scale  of  the  Gallic  sword,  have 
left  a  lasting  impression  on  the  imagination  of  posterity  ; 
but  the  victory  of  the  Gauls  had  no  permanent  conse- 
quences— nay,  it  only  served  to  knit  more  closely  the  ties 
of  union  between  Latium  and  rebuilt  Rome.  The  Gauls 
often  returned  to  Latium  during  this  century.  Camillus, 
indeed,  crowned  his  great  career  by  defeating  them  at 
Alba  in  367  B.C. ;  the  dictator  Gaius   Sulpicius  Peticus 


THE  CELTS.  81 

routed  a  Gallic  host  in  358  B.C.,  and,  eight  years  later, 
Lucius  Furius  Camillus,  the  son  of  the  celebrated  general, 
dislodged  the  Gauls  from  the  Alban  mount,  where  they 
had  encamped  during  the  winter.  But  these  plundering 
incursions  only  served  to  make  all  Italy  regard  Rome  as 
the  bulwark  against  the  barbarians,  and  thus  to  further 
her  claim,  not  only  to  supremacy  in  Italy,  but  also  to 
universal  empire.  The  Etruscans  had  attempted  to  recover 
what  they  had  lost  in  the  Veientine  war,  while  the  Celts 
were  assailing  Rome.  When  the  barbarians  had  departed, 
Rome  turned  once  more  on  her  old  enemy.  The  whole  of 
southern  Etruria,  as  far  as  the  Ciminian  range,  passed 
into  Roman  hands,  and  the  advanced  frontier  line  was 
secured  by  the  fortresses  of  Sutrium  and  Nepete,  estab- 
lished respectively  in  383  and  373  B.C.  Moreover,  four 
new  tribes  were  formed  in  the  territories  of  Veii,  Capena, 
and  Falerii,  in  387  B.C.,  and  the  whole  country  became 
rapidly  Romanized.  A  revolt  of  Tarquinii,  Falerii,  and 
Caere,  about  358  B.C.,  against  Roman  aggression  was  soon 
crushed;  and  Caere  had  to  cede  half  its  territory,  and 
withdraw  from  the  Etruscan  league.  The  relation  of 
political  subjection  in  which  Caere  stood  to  Rome  was 
called  "  citizenship  without  the  power  of  voting"  (civitas 
sine  suffragio)  ;  thus  the  state  lost  its  freedom,  but  could 
still  administer  its  own  affairs.  This  occurred  in  351  B.C.; 
and  eight  years  later  Falerii  withdrew  from  the  Etruscan 
league,  and  became  a  perpetual  ally  of  Rome.  Thus  the 
whole  of  southern  Etruria  became  subject  to  Roman 
supremacy. 

Gradually  the  conflicts  in  northern  Italy  ceased,  and 
the  various  nations  settled  side  by  side  within  more 
defined  limits.  The  stream  of  Celtic  immigrations  over 
the  Alps  flowed  back  ;  whether  from  the  desperate  efforts 
of  the  Etruscans,  and  the  strong  barrier  of  the  Romans, 
or  from  some  causes  operating  On  the  other  side  of 
the  Alps,  we  cannot  determine.  In  a  general  way  the 
Celts  now  rulel  between  the  Alps  and  the  Apennines, 
and  as  far  south  as  the  Abruzzi  :  but  their  dominion  did 
not  sink  deep  into  the  land,  nor  had  it  the  character  of 
exclusive  possession.  It  is  certain  that  the  Etruscans 
still  remained  in  the  modern  Grisons  and  Tyrol,  the 
Umbrians   in   the  Apennine  valleys,   the  Veneti   in    the 

6 


82  HISTORY  OF  BOMS. 

north-eastern  valley  of  the  Po,  and  the  Ligurian  tribes  in 
the  western  mountains,  dividing  Celt-land  proper  from 
Etruria.  Even  in  the  flat  country  occupied  by  the  Celts 
Etruscan  settlements  still  existed.  Mantua  was  a  Tuscan 
city  even  in  the  days  of  the  empire,  as  also  was  Hatria 
on  the  Po  ,  and  Etruscan  corsairs  still  rendered  the 
Adriatic  unsafe  far  on  into  the  fifth  century.  Further, 
although  mere  fragments  of  the  former  supremacy  of  the 
Etruscans  were  now  left  in  these  districts,  such  civilization 
as  we  find  among  the  Celts  and  Alpine  peoples  was  due  to 
Tuscan  influence.  To  this  we  must  ascribe  the  fact  that 
the  Celts  in  the  plains  of  Lombardy  abandoned  their 
roving  warrior-life,  and  permanently  settled  in  that  district. 
But  the  Etruscan  nation  was  now  hemmed  in  on  all  sides. 
Its  possessions  in  Campania,  and  in  the  district  north  of 
the  Apennines  and  south  of  the  Ciminian  forest,  were  lost 
for  ever — its  day  of  power  had  passed  away.  Socially 
and  politically  the  whole  nation  had  completely  degene- 
rated. Unbounded  luxury  and  gross  immorality  had  eaten 
out  the  heart  of  the  people.  Gladiatorial  combats  first 
came  into  vogue  among  the  Etruscans  ;  sensual  indulgence 
of  every  sort  sapped  the  nation's  vigour.  The  abolition 
of  royalty,  which  had  been  carried  out  in  every  city  about 
the  time  of  the  siege  of  Veii,  introduced  the  worst  form 
of  aristocratic  government.  The  federal  bond  had  always 
exercised  but  little  restraint ;  now  the  abuse  of  power  by 
the  nobles  caused  social  revolution  and  bitter  distress. 
When  the  aristocrats  of  Arretium  in  301  B.C.,  and  of 
Volsinii  in  266  B.C.,  called  in  the  Romans  to  put  an  end 
to  the  disorder,  the  Romans  answered  the  call-in  such  a 
way  as  to  extinguish  the  lingering  sparks  of  independence. 
"  The  energies  of  the  nation  were  broken  from  the  day  of 
Veii  and  of  Melpum.  Earnest  attempts  were  still  once  or 
twice  made  to  escape  from  the  Roman  supremacy,  but  in 
these  instances  tbe  stimulus  was  communicated  to  the 
Etruscans  from  without — from  another  Italian  stock,  the 
Samnites." 


THE  CELTS. 


AUTHORITIES. 

Himera.— Plut.  Camill.  138.     Timol.  23. 

Dionysius  and  Agathocles. — Polyb.  i.  6,  7,  82 ;  ii.  39 ;  viii.  12 ;  ix.  23 ; 

xii.  4,  10,  15 ;  xv.  35. 
Capua  taken  by  Samnites. — Liv.  iv.  37. 
Celts.— Polyb.  "ii.  17-22,  32-35;  iii.  70,  79.     Liv.  v.  33-55.     Dionys. 

xiii.  6-12. 
Defeats  of  Celts.— Liv.  vi.  42 ;  vii.  12-15,  25-26. 
Conquest  of  South  Etruria. — Liv.  vi.  3-10.     Dionys.  xii.  10-15. 
Revolt  of  Caere. — Liv.  vii.  17-20,  38. 
Arretiwm. — Liv.  viii.  3-5. 
MeVpum.— Pbn.  N.  H.  iii.  V, 


84  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 


CHAPTER  X. 

ADVANCE    OF    ROME    TO    THE    SUPREME    POWER    IN    ITALY. 

Encroachment  on  the  rights  of  the  Latins  by  Rome — Extension  of 
Roman  and  Latin  territory  by  wars  with  the  Sabines,  Aequi,  and 
Volsci — League  with  the  Heinici — Revolt  of  Latin  towns  against 
Rome — Closing  of  the  Latin  confederation — Practical  subjection 
ofLatium — Early  history  of  the  Umbro-Sabellian  migrations— 
The  Samnites — Their  political  development  and  conquests  in 
southern  Italy — Their  relations  with  the  Greeks — The  Cam- 
panian  Samnites — Samnium  proper — First  collision  with  Rome 
— Revolt  of  the  Latins  and  Campanians  against  Rome — Battle  of 
Trifanum,  340  B.C. — Its  effects — Outbreak  of  thirty-seven  years' 
war  between  Samnium  and  Rome — Part  played  by  Tarentum, 
the  Etruscans,  central  Italy,  and  the  Gauls — Battles  of  Sentinum 
and  Aquilonia — Complete  triumph  of  Rome. 

We  have  now  reached  a  turning-point  in  the  fortunes 
of  Rome.  In  the  last  chapter  it  was  shown  that  she  had 
abandoned  her  old  defensive  attitude  towards  Etruria, 
and  had  succeeded  in  annexing  the  southern  portion  of 
that  country,  and  in  repelling  the  restless  Celtic  hordes. 
Her  next  foes  are  no  longer  foreign  intruders,  but  men 
of  her  own  stock,  or  of  Italian  race. 

We  may  briefly  summarize  the  steps  by  which  Rome 
became  mistress  of  Italy  as  follows :  (1)  The  subjuga- 
tion of  the  Latins  and  Campanians.  (2)  The  gallant 
struggles  of  the  Samnites,  both  on  their  own  behalf  and 
on  behalf  of  the  rest  of  the  still  independent  Italians.  (3) 
The  invasion  and  defeat  of  Pyrrhus.  With  regard  to  the 
first  point,  we  must  for  a  moment  revert  to  the  old  posi- 
tion of  Rome  in  Latium,  as  exercising  a  hegemony,  based 
upon  complete  equality  between  the  Roman  state  on  the 


ROMAN  ADVANCE  IN  ITALY.  85 

one  hand  and  the  Latin  confederacy  on  the  other.  That 
these  relations  were  violently  shaken  by  the  abolition  of 
the  monarchy  at  Rome  we  know  from  tradition,  which 
has  painted  in  glowing  colours  the  victory  at  Lake 
Regillus,  gained  by  the  Romans  about  499  B.C.  More 
certain  proof  is  afforded  by  the  renewal  of  the  perpetual 
league  between  Rome  and  Latium  by  Spurius  Cassius 
six  years  later.  At  what  time  the  rest  of  Latium  fol- 
lowed Rome's  lead  and  abolished  the  regal  power  we  do 
not  know,  but  probably  this  took  place  at  an  early  period. 
Although  we  are  without  definite  information  on  each 
point,  it  is  easy  to  understand  how  the  basis  of  equal 
rights  soon  became  impracticable ;  how  Rome  not  only 
bore  the  brunt  of  most  of  the  wars,  but  also  naturally 
appropriated  the  substantial  fruits  of  the  victories ;  how 
she  not  only  decided  the  question  of  war  or  peace,  but 
practically  appointed  from  her  own  body  the  federal 
generals  and  chief  officers,  and  assumed  the  direction  of 
every  campaign,  and  how  in  founding  colonies  she  supplied 
most  of  the  colonists.  Although  the  public  rights  of  the 
federal  Latins  were  thus  encroached  upon,  their  private 
rights  remained  the  same.  To  whatever  federal  town  a 
Latin  migrated,  he  was  a  passive  burgess  (municeps), 
could  hold  property,  marry,  make  wills ;  and,  though  not 
eligible  for  office,  he  shared  in  all  other  political  rights 
and  duties,  and  could  vote  in  the  comitia  tributa,  if  not 
in  the  other  assemblies.  Long  before  the  allied  Latins 
dared  to  penetrate  Etruria,  they  successfully  extended 
their  power  towards  the  east  and  south.  The  Sabines 
between  the  Tiber  and  Anio  offered  but  a  feeble  resistance 
to  the  confederate  arms,  possibly  owing  to  the  fact  that 
the  Sabine  hordes  were  pouring  into  lower  Italy.  It  was 
not  even  found  necessary  to  plant  colonies  in  this  Sabine 
land  to  keep  it  in  subjection.  Their  neighbours,  the 
Aequi,  on  the  upper  Anio,  and  the  Volscians  on  the  coast, 
proved  far  tougher  foes.  In  their  constant  struggles  with 
these  two  peoples,  the  Romans  and  Latins  made  it  their 
chief  aim  to  sever  the  Aequi  from  the  Volsci.  This  object 
they  partly  obtained  by  planting  Latin  colonies  at  Cora, 
Norba,  and  Signia,  about  495  B.C.,  and  still  more  by  form- 
ing a  league  with  the  Hernici  in  486  B.C. ;  the  accession 
of  this  state  isolated  the  Volscians,  and  formed  a  bulwark 


86  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

against  the  Sabellian  tribes  on  the  south  and  east.  The 
power  of  the  Aequi  was  thus  broken,  but  it  was  not  till 
the  system  uf  fortresses  or  colonies  had  been  extended 
throughout  the  Volscian  land  that  the  Volsci  ceased  to 
resist.  Chief  among  these  colonies  were  Velitrae,  founded 
in  49  i  B.C.,  Suessa  Pometia  and  Ardea  in  442  B.C.,  Circeii  in 
393  B.C. ;  and  Bnally,  after  two  great  victories,  won  by  the 
dictator  Camillus  in  389  B.C.,  and  the  dictator  Aulus  Cor- 
nelius Cossus  in  385  B.C.,  the  Pomptine  territory  was  secured 
by  the  founding  of  the  fortresses  Satricum  in  385  B.C.,  and 
Setia  in  382  B.C.,  and  the  territory  itself  was  distributed 
into  farm  allotments  and  tribes  about  383  B.C.  These  suc- 
cesses of  the  league,  which  now  embraced  Rome,  Latium, 
and  the  Hernici,  only  rendered  it  more  liable  to  disunion. 
The  allies  felt  all  the  more  acutely  the  overshadowing 
burden  of  Rome's  inci'eased  power,  and  were  naturally 
indignant  at  her  overbearing  acts  of  injustice.  A  glaring 
instance  of  wrong  was  the  appropriation  by  Rome  of  a 
border  territory  between  the  lands  of  the  people  of  Aricia 
and  Ardea,  to  which  both  cities  laid  claim,  and  had  called 
in  Rome  to  act  as  arbiter  in  446  B.C.  Dissensions,  owing 
to  this,  arose  in  Ardea  between  the  aristocratic  party, 
which  held  to  Rome,  and  the  popular  party,  which  sided 
with  the  Volscians.  The  chief  cause  of  the  disruption 
of  the  league  was  the  absence  of  a  common  foe.  The 
capture  of  Rome  by  the  Celts,  and  the  appropriation  by 
Rome  of  the  Pomptine  territory  caused  the  most  famous 
Latin  towns  to  break  off  from  their  alliance.  Separate 
wars,  in  consequence,  occurred  with  the  revolted  towns — 
with  Lanuvium,  383  B.C. ;  Praeneste,  382-380  B.C. ;  and 
Tusculum,  381  B.C.  The  latter  was  reduced  to  the  posi- 
tion of  a  municipality  (municipium),  and  was  incor- 
porated in  the  Roman  state  with  the  full  rights  of  Roman 
citizenship,  retaining  certain  powers  of  self-government. 
This  was  the  first  instance  of  a  municipium  in  its  later 
sense.  In  addition  to  these  towns,  Tibur,  in  360  B.C.,  and 
some  of  the  colonies  planted  in  Volscian  land,  such  as 
Velitrae  and  Circeii  and  Satricum,  all  revolted  from 
Rome  ;  and  Tibur  even  made  common  cause  with  the  again 
advancing  Celtic  hordes,  whom  the  dictator  Ahala  de- 
feated in  360  B.C.  But,  owing  to  the  want  of  concert 
between  the  various   Latin   cities,   Rome   subdued  each 


ROMAN  ADVANCE  IN  ITALY.  87 

separately,  and  also  proved  victorious  in  the  later  and 
severer  struggle  with  her  allies,  the  Hernicans,  from  362- 
358  B.C.  In  the  latter  year,  the  treaty  between  Rome  and 
the  Latins  and  Hernicans  was  renewed,  but  the  terms  were 
doubtless  greatly  to  Rome's  advantage. 

To  this  period  must  be  referred  the  closing  of  the  Latin 
confederation,  which  took  place  about  384  B.C.  Probably 
this  was  in  no  small  degree  the  cause  of  the  revolt  of 
Latium  above  described.  The  league,  as  now  constituted, 
included  thirty  towns  with  full  Latin  rights,  some  of 
which  were  old  Latin  towns,  viz.  Nomentum,  between  the 
Tiber  and  Anio ;  Tibur,  Gabii,  Scaptia,  Labici,  Pedum 
and  Praeneste,  between  the  Anio  and  the  Alban  hills ; 
Corbio,  Tusculum,  Bovillae,  Aricia,  Corioli,  and  Lanuvium, 
on  the  Alban  range ;  and  lastly,  Laurentum  and  Lavinium 
in  the  plain  by  the  coast.  In  addition,  there  were  the 
colonies  founded  by  Rome  and  the  Latin  league,  viz. 
Ardea  in  the  territory  of  the  Rutuli,  and  Velitrae,  Satri- 
cum,  Cora,  Norba,  Setia,  and  Circeii  in  what  had  been 
Volscian  territory.  A  second  class  of  seventeen  towns, 
whose  names  are  not  known,  had  no  right  of  voting,  but 
shared  in  the  Latin  festival.  Such  communities  as  were 
subsequently  founded,  e.g.  Sutrium,  Nepete,  Cales,  and 
Tarracina,  were  not  incorporated  in  the  league ;  nor  were 
those  communities  whose  independence  was  afterwards 
taken  away,  such  as  Tusculum  and  Satricum,  erased  from 
the  list.  The  geographical  limits  of  Latium  were  fixed 
by  the  closing  o'"  the  league.  Moreover,  in  the  case  of  all 
Latin  communities  subsequently  founded,  right  of  com- 
merce and  marriage  was  granted  to  them  only  in  relation 
to  Rome ;  they  could  not  enjoy  the  interchange  of  these 
privileges  with  any  other  Latin  community.  Further,  all 
special  leagues  between  Latin  communities,  irrespective 
of  Rome,  were  for  the  future  prevented,  as  being  dan- 
gerous to  Rome's  pre-eminence.  Owing  also  to  Rome's 
influence,  aediles  were  created  in  the  Latin  communities, 
and  their  constitutions  were  remodelled  on  the  Roman 
pattern.  After  the  fall  of  Veii  and  the  conquest  of  the 
Pomptine  land,  Rome  tightened  the  reins  of  government 
over  the  practically  subject  Latins  ;  and  the  exasperation 
arising  therefrom  caused  Latin  volunteers  to  join  foreign 
foes  in  their  conflicts  with  Rome;  and,  in  349  B.C.,  the 


88  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Latin  league  refused  the  Romans  its  regular  contingent* 
The  defeat  of  the  Aurunci  and  the  capture  of  Sora 
in  345  B.C.  had  advanced  Roman  arms  to  the  Liris. 
Thus  Rome  was  brought  into  contact  with  the  Samnites, 
and  the  struggle  with  this  brave  people  now  claims  our 
attention.  Before,  however,  we  give  the  details  of  this 
conflict,  we  must  revert  to  the  early  movements  of  the 
Umbro-Sabellian  stocks. 

With  regard  to  the  Umbrians  and  their  movements 
our  information  is  of  the  most  meagre  kind.  They 
probably  migrated  into  Italy  at  a  later  period  than 
the  Latins,  and,  while  moving  south,  kept  in  the  centre 
of  the  peninsula  and  along  the  east  coast.  At  a  remote 
period  they  occupied  the  greater  part  of  northern  Italy; 
and  the  Italian  names  of  towns  in  the  valley  of  the  Po, 
e.g.  Hatria  and  Spina,  and  of  other  places  in  southern 
Etruria,  e.g.  Camars,  the  old  name  of  Clusium,  the  river 
Umbro,  etc.,  point  to  the  fact  that  an  Italian  population 
preceded  the  Etruscan  alike  in  the  valleys  of  the  Po 
and  in  southern  Etruria  (cf.  p.  31).  Inscriptions  found 
in  the  district  of  Falerii  indicate  that  an  Italian  lan- 
guage long  kept  its  hold  in  that  town — an  inference 
which  is  supported  by  the  statement  of  Strabo,  and 
the  religious  ceremonies  of  Falerii  point  in  the  same 
direction.  The  probability  that  an  Umbrian  population 
existed  in  southern  Etruria  after  the  Tuscan  conquest  is 
supported  by  the  remarkable  rapidity  with  which  that 
part  of  Etruria  became  Latinized  (cf.  pp.  32  and  81). 
The  pressure  exerted  on  the  Umbrians  by  the  victorious 
Etruscans  confined  them  in  the  narrow  mountainous 
country  between  the  two  arms  of  the  Apennines,  which 
was  called  by  their  name,  and  also  drove  them  south 
along  the  mountainous  ridges,  as  the  plains  were  already 
occupied  by  the  Latins.  The  absorption  of  a  Sabellian 
element  in  the  Roman  community  at  an  early  period 
(p.  10)  marks  the  fact  that  during  the  progress  south- 
ward of  the  Umbro-Sabellian  stocks  such  mixtnres  often 
took  place ;  and  we  infer  from  this  circumstance,  and 
from  the  ease  with  which  Sabina  became  Latinized,  and 
from  the  numerous  relations  between  the  Volscians  and 
Latins,  that  in  remote  times  the  Latins  and  Umbro-Sabel- 
lians  wrere  not  markedly  distinct  in  language  and  customs. 


ROMAN  ADVANCE  IN  ITALY.  89 

But  the  chief  branch  of  the  Umhrian  stcck  turned  east- 
ward from  Sabina  into  the  mountains  of  the  Abruzzi  and 
the  adjacent  hill-country  to  the  south.  Owing  to  external 
pressure  the  Sabines  are  said  to  have  vowed  a  ver  sacrum, 
which  oath  bound  all  the  children  born  in  a  particular 
year  of  war  to  emigrate  as  soon  as  they  reached  maturity. 
Owing  to  this  the  Safini,  or  Samnites,  went  forth  from 
the  Sabine  land,  and  settled  first  on  the  mountains  near 
the  river  Sagrus,  and  later  in  the  plain  on  the  east  of  the 
Matese  chain,  near  the  sources  of  the  Tifernus.  The  sign 
that  led  them  was  the  Ox  of  Mars,  and  in  consequence 
they  named  both  the  places  of  their  public  assembly 
Bovianum.  The  Samnites  were  followed  by  other  tribes : 
the  Picentes,  who  occupied  the  district  near  Ancona,  and 
the  Hirpini,  who  settled  near  Beneventum.  Smaller  tribes 
also  branched  off,  among  wdiom  were  the  Frentani  on  the 
Apulian  frontier,  the  Paeligni  near  the  Majella  mountains, 
and  the  Marsi  about  lake  Fucinus.  Their  secluded  and 
isolated  position  in  mountain  valleys  and  steep  table-lands 
not  only  protected  these  settlers  from  external  assaults, 
but  also  rendered  all  internal  intercourse,  whether  com- 
mercial or  political,  very  difficult.  Thus  their  communi- 
ties never  formed  a  single  state,  nor  were  their  leagues 
ever  closely  knit  together.  Cut  off  from  the  rest  of  Italy 
and  communicating  but  little  with  one  another,  despite 
their  bravery,  "  they  exercised  less  influence  than  any 
other  portion  of  the  Italian  nation  on  the  development  of 
the  history  of  the  peninsula."  But  the  Samnites  were  an 
exception  to  the  other  Sabellian  tribes  in  their  genius  for 
political  development.  The  subsequent  strength  of  the 
Samnite  nation  proves  that  their  league  was  of  long 
standing,  though  as  to  its  formation  we  have  no  know- 
ledge. No  one  community  preponderated  as  Rome  did  in 
Latium,  and  no  one  town  served  as  a  centre.  The  healthy 
life  of  the  Samnite  nation  of  husbandmen  was  its  strength  ; 
their  assembly  of  representatives  appointed  in  time  of  need 
a  federal  commander-in-chief.  The  policy  they  pursued 
was  the  exact  opposite  of  that  of  Rome.  They  were  con- 
tent with  the  defence  of  their  territory,  and  rarely  sought 
to  enlarge  it ;  any  new  lands  gained  were  the  result  of 
adventurous  bands  who  left  their  homes  in  search  of 
plunder,  and  were  left  to  their  own  resources  by  their 


90  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

native  state.  Thus  their  gains  were  not  direct  gains  to 
the  Samnite  nation,  while  Rome  secured  every  success  by 
a  system  of  colonization.  The  movements  of  the  Samnites 
had  hitherto  been  pai'tly  checked  by  the  Dannians,  whose 
town  of  Arpi  had  attained  no  small  degree  of  prosperity 
and  power,  but  still  more  by  the  Greeks  and  Etruscms. 
The  rapid  collapse  of  the  Etruscans,  and  the  decline  of 
the  Greek  colonies  from  450-350  B.C.,  left  them  free  to 
march  west  and  south.  We  have  already  narrated  their 
capture  of  Capua  in  424  B.C.  (cf.  p.  78)  ;  four  years  later 
they  dealt  a  fatal  blow  to  the  Campanian  Greeks  by  taking 
Cumae.  It  is  about  this  time  that  another  Samnite  stock, 
called  Lucanians,  made  its  appearance  in  southern  Italy. 
The  Lucanians  proved  too  powerful  for  the  demoralized 
Greeks  ;  and,  despite  the  united  efforts  of  the  chief  Achaean 
cities,  who  reconstructed  their  league  in  393  B.C.,  in  a  very 
short  time  but  few  Greek  towns  remained.  Their  speedy 
downfall  was  due  in  great  measure  to  the  fact  that 
Dionysius  the  elder,  of  Syracuse.,  sided  with  the  Lucanians 
against  his  countrymen.  Even  Tarentum,  powerful  and 
warlike  as  she  was,  was  forced  to  turn  for  aid  to  her 
mother  country.  Thus,  at  the  period  when  Rome  began 
to  advance  southward,  the  Samnites  and  their  kinsfolk 
the  Lucanians  and  Bruttians  had  practically  swept  over 
the  whole  of  southern  Italy.  Isolated  Greek  towns  con- 
tinued to  exist,  such  as  Tarentum,  Thurii,  Croton,  Meta- 
pontum,  Heraclea,  Rhegium,  and  Neapolis ;  some  of  these 
retained  their  independence.  Other  Greek  cities,  such  as 
Cumae,  Posidonia,  Laus,  and  Hipponium,  were  under 
Samnite  rule.  In  this  way  mixed  populations  arose  ;  this 
was  specially  the  case  with  the  bilingual  Bruttii,  and  in  a 
lesser  degree  with  the  Samnites  in  Lucaniaand  Campania. 
The  very  extent  of  the  Samnite  conquests,  owing  to  the 
want  of  a  settled  policy,  and  of  some  bond  by  which  the 
Lucanians,  Bruttians,  and  Samnites  proper  might  be 
closely  united,  proved  a  source  of  weakness  rather  than 
strength.  The  space  they  occupied  was  out  of  proportion 
to  their  numbers,  and  the  hold  they  exercised  over  their 
possessions  was  loose  and  insecure.  Moreover,  Greek 
culture  exercised  a  fatal  influence  on  the  Samnite  nation. 
Thus  in  Campania  the  Samnite  population  of  Capua,  Nola, 
Nuceria,   and    Teanum   adopted    Greek   manners,  and  a 


ROMAN  ADVANCE  IN  ITALY.  91 

Greek  form  (if  constitution.  Capua  became  notorious  for 
its  wealth  and  luxury,  for  its  gladiatorial  combats,  and  its 
warlike,  if  dissolute,  youth ;  whose  plundering  excursions 
to  Sicily  and  other  places  had  no  small  effect  on  the 
history  of  Italy.  The  Campanian  Samnites — especially  in 
Capua,  where  Etruscan  influences  still  lingered — thus  com- 
pletely changed  their  old  habits  of  life ;  and,  though  they 
did  not  lose  their  love  of  enterprise  and  bravery,  they  were 
nnable  to  resist  the  demoralizing  influences  with  which 
they  were  there  sm»rounded.  The  same  result  in  a  lesser 
degree  is  ebservable  in  the  Lucanians  and  Bruttians. 
Treasures  of  Greek  art  have  been  discovered  in  their 
tombs,  and  they  abandoned  their  old  national  mode  of 
writing  for  that  of  the  Greeks.  The  stock  inhabiting 
Samnium  proper  alone  retained  its  old  character,  and  was 
free  from  all  the  debasing  effects  of  a  superior  but  immoral 
civilization.  The  Hellenized  Samnites  of  Campania  soon 
learned  to  fear  their  hardier  and  purer  kinsmen  in  Sam- 
nium, who,  pouring  down  from  their  mountain  strong- 
holds, ravaged  the  rich  plains  of  their  weaker  brethren. 
Roman  interference  sprung  from  this  very  cause.  The 
Sidicini  in  Teanum,  and  the  Campanians  in  Capua,  called 
in  Rome  to  protect  them  against  the  Samnites  in  343  B.C. 
When  Rome  at  first  refused,  the  Campanians  offered  to 
submit  to  Roman  supremacy  ;  this  offer  was  too  tempting 
to  be  rejected.  Rome  and  Samnium,  whether  after  a 
campaign  or  not  is  doubtful,  came  to  terms ;  Capua  was 
left  under  Roman,  and  Teanum  under  Samnite  sway,  and 
the  upper  Liris  was  left  in  Volscian  hands.  Both  sides 
were  glad  to  lay  down  arms — the  Samnites,  because 
Tarentum  was  threatening  her  Sabellian  neighbours  ;  the 
Romans,  because  a  fresh  storm  was  brewing  in  Latium. 
The  old  grievances  of  the  Latin  towns  were  aggravated 
by  the  prospect  of  Roman  rule  extending  to  the  south  of 
them,  and  once  more  they  broke  into  open  revolt.  All 
the  original  Latin  communities,  except  the  Laurentes, 
took  up  arms  against  Rome  ;  but  all  the  Roman  colonies 
in  Latium,  except  Velitrae,  remained  firm  to  the  Roman 
side.  Capua  seized  the  opportunity  to  get  rid  of  Roman 
rule,  and  other  Campanian  cities  joined  the  revolted 
Latins.  The  Volscians  also  felt  that  still  another  chance 
was   given   them   of   recovering   their   liberty ;    but   the 


92  EISTOET  OF  ROME. 

Hernici  and  the  Campanian  aristocracy  did  not  unite  with 
the  insurgents.  The  battle  of  Trifanum  in  340  B.C.,  gained 
by  Titus  Manilas  Torquatus  over  the  joint  forces  of  the 
Latins  and  Campanians,  broke  the  neck  of  the  rebellion. 
The  old  Latin  league  was  dissolved  in  338  B.C.,  and  was 
changed  from  a  political  federation  into  a  mere  association 
for  religious  purposes.  The  Latin  communities  were 
isolated  from  one  another  by  the  application  to  the  whole 
of  Latium  of  the  principle  which  was  introduced  in  the 
case  of  those  colonies  founded  after  the  closing  of  the 
Latin  league  in  384  B.C.  (cf.  p.  87).  Moreover,  each  com- 
munity had  to  form  a  separate  alliance  with  Rome,  as  the 
old  confederacy  no  longer  existed.  In  certain  cases  harsh 
measures  were  adopted.  Tibur  and  Praeneste  had  to  give 
up  part  of  their  territory  to  Rome.  Colonists  Avere  sent 
to  Antium,  the  most  important  and  strongest  town  of  the 
Volscians  ;  and  the  town  was  treated  as  Tusculum  had 
been  in  381  B.C.  (cf.  p.  86).  Lanuvium,  Pedum,  Aricia, 
and  Nomentum  also  lost  their  independence  and  became 
Roman  municipia.  Velitrae  lost  its  walls,  and  its  senate 
was  deported  to  the  interior  of  South  Etruria,  while  the 
town  was  probably  treated  as  Caere  had  been  in  351  B.C. 
(cf.  p.  81).  The  land  thus  acquired  by  Rome  was  partly 
distributed  among  Roman  citizens,  and  two  new  tribes 
were  instituted  in  332  B.C.,  thus  bringing  the  total  up  to 
twenty-nine.  The  decoration  of  the  orators'  platform  in 
the  Forum  with  the  beaks  of  the  galleys  of  Antium  by  the 
dictator  Gaius  Maenius,  in  338  B.C.,  and  the  erection  of  a 
column  in  the  Forum  to  his  honour,  attested  the  Roman 
sense  of  the  great  results  achieved  by  this  war.  Roman 
rule  was  secured  in  similar  fashion  in  the  Volscian  and 
Campanian  provinces.  A  number  of  towns,  among  which 
were  Capua,  Fundi,  Formiae,and  Cumae,  became  dependent 
on  Rome  in  the  same  way  that  Caere  was.  Privernum, 
under  Vitruvius  Vaccus,  struck  the  last  blow  for  Latin 
freedom ;  but  in  329  B.C.  the  town  was  stormed,  and  its 
leader  executed.  About  ten  years  later,  two  new  tribes 
were  formed  out  of  the  numerous  settlers  planted  in  the 
Falernian  and  Privernate  territories.  The  two  strong 
colonies  of  Cales,  in  the  middle  of  the  Campanian  plain, 
and  Fregellae,  commanding  the  passage  of  the  Liris,  finally 
secured   the  newly  won  land.      These  were  founded   in 


ROMAN  ADVANCE  IN  ITALY.  93 

334  and  328  B.C.  respectively.  The  Romans  even  estab- 
lished a  garrison  in  Sora,  which  properly  belonged  to 
Samnite  territory.  This  steady  pursuit  of  a  far-reaching 
policy  of  colonization  secured  to  Rome  what  she  won  on 
the  field  of  battle,  and  contrasts  strongly  with  the  un- 
steady violence  and  loose  grasp  of  the  Samnite  nation. 
It  is  clear  that  the  Samnites  must  have  been  alarmed  at 
the  advance  of  the  Romans,  but  with  the  exception  of 
garrisoning  Teanum  they  did  little  to  prevent  it.  "  The 
Samnite  confederacy  allowed  the  Roman  conquest  of 
Campania  to  be  completed,  before  they  in  earnest  opposed 
it ;  and  the  reason  for  their  doing  so  is  to  be  sought  partly 
in  the  contemporary  hostilities  between  the  Samnite  nation 
and  the  Italian  Hellenes,  but  principally  in  the  remiss  and 
distracted  policy  which  the  confederacy  pursued." 

While  Rome  had  been  securing  her  hold  in  the  centre 
of  Italy,  the  Samnite  tribes  of  the  Lucanians  and  Bruttians 
had  been  engaged  in  constant  struggles  with  the  Italian 
Greeks  in  the  south,  and  especially  with  Tarentum.  So 
hard  pressed  was  the  latter  city  that  she  called  in  the  aid 
of  the  Spartan  king,  Archidamus,  who  was  defeated  by 
the  Lucanians  on  the  same  day  as  Philip  conquered  at 
Chaeronea,  in  338  B.C.  Alexander,  the  Molossian,  uncle 
of  Alexander  the  Great,  proved  far  more  successful  in  his 
championship  of  the  Greek  cause  in  southern  Italy.  Not 
only  did  he  capture  Consentia,  the  centre  of  the  Lucanians 
and  their  confederates,  but  he  defeated  the  Samnites  who 
brought  aid  to  the  Lucanians,  and  subdued  the  Daunians 
and  Messapians  who  had  made  common  cause  with  the 
Sabellian  tribes  against  the  Greeks.  His  successes,  how- 
ever, alarmed  the  Tarentines,  who  turned  against  their 
commander ;  and  his  scheme  of  founding  a  new  Hellenic 
empire  in  the  West  was  cut  short  by  the  hand  of  an 
assassin  in  332  B.C.  His  death  left  the  Lucanians  and 
other  Sabellian  tribes  again  paramount  in  the  south  of 
Italy,  and  destroyed  all  hopes  of  a  combined  resistance 
from  the  Greek  cities. 

We  have  already  shown  that  war  was  sooner  or  later 
unavoidable  between  Rome  and  the  Samnites,  as  the  latter 
were  the  only  power  capable  of  disputing  with  Rome  the 
supremacy  of  Italy.  Had  the  Samnites  been  able  to  count 
on  the  active  co-operation  of  all  Sabellian  tribes,  of  the 


94  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Lucanians  and  Bruttians,  as  well  as  of  the  smaller  cantons, 
such  as  the  Vestini,  Frentani  and  Marrucini, — had  they, 
further,  been  able  to  persuade  the  Greeks  of  Campania  and 
of  southern  Italy  to  sink  minor  differences  in  the  face  of  a 
common  danger, — had  they  been  able  to  rouse  at  once  the 
Etruscans  in  the  north,  and  the  still  chafing  and  indignant 
Latins,  Volscians,  and  Hernicans,  Rome  might  no  doubt 
have  succumbed.  But  such  combinations  belong  rather 
to  the  imagination  of  the  historian  than  to  the  facts  of 
history.  The  immediate  cause  of  the  outbreak  of  war  lay 
in  the  two  independent  Greek  cities  of  Campania,  Palaeo- 
polis  and  Neapolis.  Rome  was  scheming  to  obtain  posses- 
sion of  these  towns,  and  the  Samnites  combined  with 
the  Tarentines  to  prevent  them.  A  strong  garrison  was 
placed  in  Palaeopolis  by  the  Samnites.  The  Romans  laid 
siege  to  the  town  ;  and  thus  war  began,  nominally  against 
the  people  of  Palaeopolis,  really  against  the  Samnites,  in 
327  B.C.  Palaeopolis,  weary  alike  of  the  foes  without  and 
the  Samnite  garrison  within,  got  rid  of  the  latter  by 
stratagem,  and  concluded  peace  with  Rome  on  the  most 
favourable  conditions  in  the  following  year.  The  Cara- 
panian  Greeks  generally  followed  the  example  of  Palaeo- 
polis, and  held  to  the  Roman  side  ;  and  Rome  still  further 
attained  her  object  of  isolating  Samnium,  by  detaching 
the  Sabellian  towns  to  the  south  of  the  Volturnus — Nola, 
Nuceria,  Herculaneum,  and  Pompeii — through  the  influence 
of  the  aristocratic  party  in  those  cities.  By  the  same  means 
Rome  secured  an  alliance  with  the  Lucanians,  who  were 
the  natural  allies  of  the  Samnites.  This  alliance  was  of 
great  importance,  as  it  left  Rome  free  to  turn  all  her 
attention  to  Samnium,  while  the  Samnite  ally,  Tarentum, 
was  occupied  with  guarding  herself  against  Lucanian 
inroads. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  recount  in  detail  all  the  events  of 
this  war,  which  lasted  seven  and  thirty  years.  The  isolated 
position  of  the  Samnites,  the  disasters  that  befell  them 
in  quick  succession,  the  humble  request  they  made  for 
peace  in  322  B.C.,  the  rejection  of  the  same  by  the  Romans; 
the  desperate  resistance  and  brief  success  of  Samnite 
arms  at  the  Caudine  Pass,  under  the  brave  Gavius  Pontius, 
in  321  B.C. ;  the  refusal  of  the  senate  to  recognize  the  agree- 
ment made  by  the  defeated  generals,  mark  the  first  period 


ROMAN  ADVANCE  IN  ITALY.  95 

of  the  war.  When  it  was  renewed,  the  Samnites  occupied 
Luceria  in  Apulia,  the  attempt  to  relieve  which  town  had 
caused  the  Romans  the  disaster  in  the  pass  of  Candium ; 
and  they  captured  Fregellae,  aud  gained  over  the  Satricans. 
Lucius  Papirius  Cursor  now  was  placed  in  command  of 
the  Roman  forces,  which  divided,  part  marching  by  Sabina 
and  the  Adriatic  coast,  part  proceeding  through  Samnium. 
They  united  again  before  the  walls  of  Luceria,  and  took 
the  town  in  319  B.C.,  having  received  no  small  assistance 
from  the  people  of  Arpi  and  other  Apulians.  Roman 
successes  followed  this  important  capture,  and  Satricum 
was  recovered  and  severely  punished.  For  a  moment, 
indeed,  fortune  deluded  the  Samnites  with  hopes  of 
victory.  The  frontier  towns  of  Nuceria  and  Nola  sided 
with  them.  Sora,  on  the  upper  Liris,  expelled  the  Roman 
garrison.  The  Ausonians  on  the  coast  and  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Liris  threatened  to  rise,  and  the  Samnite  party  in 
Capua  began  to  bestir  itself.  But  the  recapture  of  Sora 
in  314  B.C.,  the  cruel  suppression  of  the  Ausonian  revolt, 
the  execution  or  voluntary  death  of  the  leaders  of  the 
Saranite  party  in  Capua,  the  defeat  of  the  Samnite  army 
before  the  walls  of  that  city,  the  treaty  with  Nola  which 
detached  that  city  for  ever  from  the  Samnites  in  313  B.C., 
and  the  fall  of  Fregellae  in  the  same  year,  turned  the  tide 
of  war  once  more  in  Rome's  favour,  and  placed  Apulia 
and  Campania  in  her  hands.  Her  position  was  secured 
by  the  usual  process  of  founding  new  fortresses ;  e.g. 
Luceria  in  Apulia,  Saticula  on  the  frontier  of  Campania 
and  Samnium,  Interamna  and  Suessa  Aurunca  on  the  road 
from  Rome  to  Capua.  Appius  Claudius,  the  censor,  com- 
pleted in  313  B.C.  the  great  military  road  from  Rome  to 
Capua,  across  the  Pomptine  marshes.  Thus  by  roads  and 
fortresses  Samnium  was  now  cut  off,  and  the  ultimate 
object  of  the  subjugation  of  Italy  was  within  Rome's 
grasp.  The  close  of  the  second  period  of  the  war  ex- 
hibits to  us  an  attempt  at  that  coalition  which  at  the 
outset  might  have  rescued  Italy.  Tarentum,  indeed, 
practically  continued  an  inactive  spectator  of  the  con- 
test ;  with  childish  arrogance  its  rulers  had.  in  320  B.C., 
ordered  the  Roman  and  Samnite  armies  in  Apulia  to  lay 
down  their  arms ;  but,  when  Rome  refused,  Tarentum 
lacked  the  courage  and  sense  of  honour  to  declare  war. 


96  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

Towards  the  close  of  the  war  she  once  more  invoked 
Greek  aid  against  the  Lucanians,  and  the  Spartan  prince 
Cleonymus  succeeded  in  compelling  the  latter  to  make 
peace  with  Tarentum ;  but  he  did  not  dare  to  enter 
on  the  more  perilous  course  of  actively  siding  with  the 
Samnites  against  Rome.  But  in  the  north  and  centre  of 
Italy  the  ignoble  example  of  Tarentum  found  no  imitators. 
The  Etruscans  in  311  B.C.  made  one  more  fiery  effort  for 
freedom,  and  for  two  years  the  Roman  frontier-fortress  of 
Sutrinm  was  hotly  besieged.  But  all  was  in  vain ;  in 
310  B.C.  Quintus  Fabius  Rullianus  penetrated  for  the  first 
time  Etruria  proper,  marching  through  the  Ciminian 
forest,  and  at  the  Vadimonian  lake  crushed  the  roused 
Etruscans.  The  three  most  powerful  towns,  Perusia, 
Cortona,  and  Arretium,  made  peace  with  Rome ;  and  two 
years  later,  after  another  defe  it,  Tarquinii  followed  their 
example;  and  the  Etruscans  laid  down  their  arms.  Mean- 
while the  Samnites  abated  not  their  exertions  ;  but  their 
hopes,  based  on  Etruscan  aid,  were  rudely  dashed  to  the 
ground  by  the  terrible  battle  in  309  B.C.,  in  which  the 
very  flower  of  their  army — the  wearers  of  striped  tunics 
and  golden  shields,  and  the  wearers  of  white  tunics  and 
silver  shields — was  extirpated  by  Lucius  Papirius  Cursor. 
Too  late  to  save  them  came  the  allied  forces  of  the  Urn- 
brians,  the  Marsi,  and  Paeligni,  and,  later,  the  Hernicans, 
who  all  rose  against  Rome, — too  late,  for  the  Etruscans 
had  already  cowered  back  into  inaction.  The  first  three 
peoples  were  soon  mastered  by  Roman  arms  ;  but  for  a 
moment  the  rising  of  the  Hernicans  in  the  rear  of  the 
Roman  army  threatened  destruction.  But  Anagnia,  the 
chief  Hernican  city,  fell ;  and  two  consular  armies  pene- 
trated the  fastnesses  of  Samnium,  and  took  the  Samnian 
capital,  Bovianum,  by  storm  in  305  B.C.  A  brief  peace, 
on  moderate  terms,  ensued,  not  only  with  Samnium,  but 
with  all  the  Sa,bellian  tribes ;  and  about  the  same  time, 
owing  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  Spartan  Cleonymus  to 
Corcyra,  Tarentum,  whose  part  in  the  contest  we  have 
already  described,  came  to  formal  terms  with  Rome. 

Rome  lost  no  time  in  turning  her  victory  to  good 
account.  In  the  first  place,  she  dissolved  the  Hernican 
league,  and  punished  those  communities  which  had  re- 
volted, by  taking  away  their  autonomy  and  giving  them 


ROMAIC  ADVANCE  IN  ITALY.  97 

citizenship  without  voting  power.  Those  Hernican  com- 
munities which  had  not  joined  in  the  revolt,  viz.  Aletrium, 
Verulae,  and  Ferentinum,  remained  with  their  old  rights. 
In  carrying  out  her  wise  policy  of  subjugating  central 
Italy,  Rome  severed  the  north  of  Italy  from  the  south, 
and  prevented  the  inhabitants  from  being  in  direct  touch 
■with  one  another  The  old  Volscian  land  was  completely 
subdued  and  soon  Romanized,  by  planting  a  legion  of 
four  thousand  men  in  Sora  on  the  upper  Liris,  by  making 
Arpinum  subject,  and  taking  away  a  third  of  its  terri- 
tory from  Frusino.  Two  military  roads  ran  through  the 
country  separating  Samnium  from  Etruria ,  the  northern 
one,  which  was  afterwards  the  Flaminian,  covered  the  line 
of  the  Tiber,  passing  through  Ocriculum  to  Nequinum, 
which  was  later  called  Narnia,  when  the  Romans  colonized 
it  in  299  B.C.  The  southern  road,  afterwards  called  the 
Valerian,  commanded  the  Marsian  and  Aequian  land,  run- 
ning along  the  Fucine  lake  by  way  of  Carsioli  and  Alba, 
in  both  of  which  towns  colonies  were  planted.  Thus, 
when  we  remember  the  roads  and  fortresses  which  already 
commanded  Apulia  and  Campania,  it  is  easy  to  see  that 
Samnium  was  enclosed  by  a  net  of  Roman  strongholds. 
Such  a  peace  was  more  ruinous  than  war,  and  the  proud 
and  heroic  Samnites  viewed  it  in  that  light.  We  have 
now  reached  the  third  and  final  period  of  their  brave 
but  ill-fated  struggle.  This  time  the  Samnites,  taught 
by  former  experience,  brought  pressure  to  bear  on  the 
Lucanians,  and  secured  their  alliance ;  strong  hopes  were 
entertained,  not  only  of  a  rising  in  central  Italy,  but 
of  active  aid  from  the  Etruscans  and  from  mercenary 
Gauls.  War  broke  out  afresh  in  298  B.C.,  and  the  first 
move  was  the  suppression  of  the  Lucanians  by  Roman 
arms,  and  two  Samnite  defeats  in  the  following  year. 
The  superhuman  efforts  of  the  Samnite  nation  put  three 
fresh  armies  into  the  field,  and  their  general,  Gellius 
Egnatius,  who  led  an  army  into  Etruria,  caused  the 
Etruscans  to  rise  once  more  and  take  into  their  pay 
numerous  Celtic  bands.  The  Romans  strained  every 
nerve  to  meet  the  threatened  danger ;  and,  by  sending 
part  of  their  forces  into  Etruria,  drew  off  a  large  portion 
of  the  Etruscan  forces  which  were  encamped  with  the 
Samnites  and  Cauls  near  Sentinum,  in  Umbria,  on  the 

7 


98  HISTORY  OF  HOME. 

eastern  slope  of  the  Apennines,  in  295  B.C.  It  was  here 
that  the  two  consuls  Publius  Decius  Mus  and  the  aged 
Quintus  Fabius  Rullianus  encountered  the  confederate 
army ;  and  it  was  here  that  the  heroic  death  of  Publius 
Decius  rallied  the  Roman  legions  when  wavering  before 
the  Gallic  hordes,  and  at  the  cost  of  nine  thousand  Roman 
lives  gained  a  victory,  which  broke  the  coalition  and  made 
Etruria  sue  for  peace.  The  Samnites,  however,  met  their 
fate  with  a  spirit  unbroken  by  disaster,  and  in  the  follow- 
ing year  gained  some  successes  over  the  Roman  consul, 
Marcus  Atilias;  but  m  293  B  c.  the  battle  of  Aquilonia  dealt 
a  blow  to  the  Samnites  from  which  they  never  recovered , 
and,  though  in  their  mountain  strongholds  they  continued 
the  struggle  till  230  B.C.,  deserted  by  all  to  whom  they 
looked  for  aid,  decimated  and  exhausted  by  a  war  which 
had  lasted  thirty-seven  years,  they  at  last  concluded  an 
honourable  peace  with  their  great  antagonist.  Rome  was 
too  wise  to  impose  disgraceful  or  ruinous  conditions.  Her 
object  was  to  secure  for  ever  what  she  had  already  sub- 
jugated. With  this  end  in  view,  two  fortresses,  Minturnae 
and  Sinuessa,  were  established  on  the  Campanian  coast  in 
295  B.C.  All  the  Sabines  were  forced  to  become  subjects 
in  290,  and  the  strong  fortress  of  Hatria  was  established 
in  the  Abruzzi,  not  far  from  the  coast,  in  289  B.C.  Still 
more  important  was  the  colony  of  Venusia,  founded  with 
twenty  thousand  colonists  in  291  B.C.,  which,  standing  on 
the  great  road  between  Tarentum  and  Samnium,  at  the 
borders  of  Samnium,  Apulia,  and  Lucania,  kept  in  check 
the  neighbouring  tribes,  and  interrupted  the  communi- 
cations between  Rome's  two  most  powerful  enemies  in 
southern  Italy.  "  Thus  the  compact  Roman  domain  at 
the  close  of  the  Samnite  wars  extended  on  the  north  to 
the  Ciminian  forest,  on  the  east  to  the  Abruzzi,  on  the 
south  to  Capua,  while  the  two  advanced  posts,  Luceria 
and  Venusia,  established  towards  the  east  and  south  on 
the  lines  of  communication  of  their  opponents,  isolated 
them  on  every  side.  Rome  was  no  longer  merely  the 
first,  but  was  already  the  ruling  power  in  the  peninsula 
when,  towards  the  end  of  the  fifth  century  of  the  city, 
those  nations  which  had  been  raised  to  supremacy  by  the 
favour  of  the  gods  and  by  their  own  capacity,  began  to 
come  into  contact  in  council  and  on  the  battle-field  ;  and 


ROMAN  ADVANCE  IN  ITALY.  99 

as  at  Olympia  the  preliminary  victors  girt  themselves  for 
a  gecond  and  more  serious  struggle,  so  on  the  larger  arena 
of  the  nations,  Carthage,  Macedonia,  and  Rome  now  pre- 
pared for  the  final  and  decisive  contest." 


AUTHORITIES. 

Rome  and  Latium. — Liv.  ii.  19-20.     Dionys.  vi.  3-14.      Marq.  Sfcv. 

i.  21-35.     Momnts.  R.  St.  iii.  619,  sq. 
Wars  u-itli  Aequi  and  Volsci.  —  Liv.  bks.  ii.  and  iii. 
League  ivith  Hernici. — Liv.  ii.  41. 
Ardea  and  Aricia. — Liv.  iii.  71-iv.  11. 
Wars  with  Lanuvium,  etc. — Liv.  vi.  21-29. 
War  with  Hernici  and  closing  of  league. — Liv.  vii.  6-19,  28;  viii.  14; 

Dionys.  v.  61. 
Municipia. — Marq.  Stv.  i.  28.     Momms.  R.  St.  iii.  231,  sq. 
Umbrians.— Strab.  214-219,  227,  235,  240,  250,  376. 
Lucanians,  etc. — Strab.  249-251. 

Teanum  and  Capua,  Latin  revolt. — Liv.  vii.  29-viii.  16. 
First  Samnite  war. — Liv.  viii.  17,  23-ix.  15. 
Second  war. — Liv.  x.  11-end. 


100  HISTORY  <OF  POME. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

WAR   WITH    PYRRHUS — UNION    WITH    ITALY. 

Rising  of  Italians  against  Rome — Annihilation  of  the  Senones — ■ 
Outrage  of  the  Tarentines,  who  invoke  aid  of  Pyrrhus  —Early 
history  and  character  of  Pyrrhus — He  lands,  280  B.C.— Battle  of 
Heraclea — Negotiations  with  Rome — Battle  of  Ausculum,  279  B.C. 
—  League  between  Rome  and  Carthage  —  Pyrrhus  master  of 
Sicily  —  Returns  to  Italy  —  Battle  of  Beneventum,  275  B.C. — 
Capture  of  Tarentum — Naval  power  of  Rome — Treatment  of  the 
Italians. — New  position  of  Rome. 

The  preceding  chapter  presented  the  chief  features  of 
that  career  of  conquest  which  left  Rome  without  a  rival 
in  Italy.  But  before  her  position  was  firmly  and  per- 
manently established,  and  before  the  various  Italian  races 
were  united  under  her  rule,  one  more  step  remained,  and 
one  more  struggle  had  to  be  decided.  The  interest  of 
this  final  phase  in  the  subjugation  of  Italy  is  chiefly  due 
to  the  romantic  charm  of  the  name  of  Pyrrhus.  The 
personal  qualities  and  adventurous  enterprises  of  Pyrrhus 
himself  cannot  but  excite  our  imagination  and  kindle  our 
sympathies.  Of  still  greater  moment  is  the  fact  that 
this  was  the  first  occasion  on  which  Roman  and  Greek 
influences  met  in  conflict ;  that  from  Pyrrhus  date  Rome's 
direct  relations  with  Greece ;  that  "  the  struggle  between 
phalanxes  and  cohorts,  between  a  mercenary  army  and  a 
militia.,  between  military  monarchy  and  senatorial  govern- 
ment, between  individual  talent  and  national  vigour,  was 
first  fought  out  in  the  battles  between  Pyrrhus  and  the 
Roman  generals."  The  victory  on  this  occasion,  as  on 
all  others,  rested  with  Roman  arms,  but  the  victory  was 


WAR   WITH  PYRRHUS— UNION  WITH  ITALY.     101 

of  a  different  character  from  that  over  Gauls  and  Phoeni- 
cians ;  for  in  the  end  the  subtle  charm  of  Hellenic  ideas 
and  Hellenic  life  amply  avenged  the  physical  and  political 
inferiority  of  the  Greek  to  the  Roman. 

For  the  sake  of  chronological  sequence  it  will  be  well 
to  reach  the  causes  which  brought  Pyrrhus  to  Italy  before 
we  narrate  his  previous  career  or  estimate  his  position  in 
history. 

The  peace  with  Samnium  had  scarce  been  concluded 
when  the  storm  broke  out  afresh,  and  this  time  from  a 
new  quarter.  The  Romans  had  granted  the  Lucanians, 
in  consideration  of  their  services  in  the  Samnite  war, 
the  Greek  cities  in  their  territory.  In  consequence  of 
this,  Thurii,  among  other  cities,  was  attacked  by  the 
Lncanians  and  Bruttians,  and  reduced  to  great  extremities. 
Thurii  appealed  for  protection  to  Rome ;  and  Rome,  feel- 
ing that  the  fortress  of  Venusia  enabled  her  to  dispense 
with  the  Lucanian  alliance,  granted  the  appeal.  The  Luca- 
nians and  Bruttians,  thus  foiled  by  the  Romans,  proceeded 
to  form  a  new  coalition  against  their  old  allies,  and  at 
the  same  time  opened  the  campaign  by  a  fresh  attack 
on  Thurii  about  285  B.C.  This  coalition  was  at  once 
joined  by  the  Etruscans,  Gauls,  Umbrians,  and  Sam- 
nites.  The  last-named,  exhausted  and  hemmed  in  on  all 
sides  as  they  were,  could  render  but  little  assistance. 
But  in  the  north,  under  the  walls  of  Arretium,  the  Roman 
army,  led  by  the  praetor  Lucius  C^ecilius,  was  annihi- 
lated by  the  Celtic  Senones,  who  were  in  the  pay  of  the 
Etruscans.  A  terrible  revenge  was  executed  on  the 
Senones  in  283  B.C.,  by  the  consul  Publius  Cornelius 
Dolabella,  who  carried  fire  and  sword  through  their  terri- 
tory, and  completely  expelled  the  whole  Celtic  tribe  from 
Italy.  Their  Celtic  kinsmen  and  neighbours,  the  Boii. 
at  once  joined  the  Etruscans,  and  a  mighty  combined 
army  marched  to  wreak  vengeance  on  Rome ;  but  two 
battles,  one  near  Lake  "Vadimo  in  283  B.C.,  and  another 
near  Populonia  in  the  following  year,  crushed  this  com- 
bination, and  caused  the  Boii  to  conclude  a  separate  peace 
with  Rome.  The  Romans  were  now  free  to  prosecute 
with  vigour  the  war  in  southern  Italy.  Thurii  was 
relieved  and  the  Lucanians  utterly  defeated  in  282  B.C.  •, 
the  most   important   places — Locri,  Croton,  Thurii,  and 


102  EISTOHY  OF  ROME. 

Rhegium — were  garrisoned.  That  part  of  the  Adriatic 
coast  which  had  been  occupied  by  the  Senones  was  secured 
by  a  colony  planted  in  the  seaport  of  Sena,  the  former 
Senonian  capital.  A  Roman  fleet  sailed  from  the  Tyrrhene 
sea  to  take  up  its  station  in  the  Adriatic,  and,  on  its  way, 
anchored  in  the  harbour  of  Tarentum.  The  time  had  at 
last  arrived  for  the  supine  people  of  Tarentum  to  shake 
off  their  lethargy ;  but  their  awakening  came  too  late. 
Old  treaties  had  forbidden  Roman  men-of-war  from  sailing 
beyond  the  promontory  of  Lacinium.  Fiery  appeals  by 
mob-orators  excited  the  Tarentine  multitude  to  sucb  a 
degree  of  senseless  passion  that  it  rushed  down  to  the 
harbour,  fell  upon  the  unsuspecting  Romans,  and  seized 
their  ships  and  crews  after  a  sharp  struggle  This  wanton 
outrage  was  followed  up  by  the  surprise  of  Thurii  and  the 
severe  punishment  of  its  inhabitants.  Notwithstanding 
this  violent  breach  of  all  civilized  law,  the  Romans  dis- 
played great  moderation  and  forbearance  in  the  terms  they 
offered  Tarentum.  But  all  negotiations  failed,  and  the 
Roman  consul,  Lucius  Aemilius,  entered  Tarentine  territory 
in  281  B.C.  It  was  clear  that  Tarentum  could  not  resist 
Rome  single-handed,  and  the  fear  of  the  demagogues  as 
to  the  vengeanee  which  Rome  would  exact  drove  them  to 
urge  the  completion  of  the  alliance  with  Pyrrhus  on  the 
terms  proposed  by  the  Epirot  king. 

At  this  point  we  must  revert  to  the  previous  history 
of  the  man  whose  name  has  cast  a  halo  of  romance  upon 
this  war.  Born  in  320  B.C.,  Pyrrhus,  when  but  six  years 
old,  was  by  his  father's  downfall  deprived  of  his  hereditary 
,  throne  among  the  Molossians  of  Epirus,  and  subjected  to 
the  many  vicissitudes  that  befell  all  those  engaged  in 
Macedonian  polities.  Trained  in  the  campaigns  of  the 
veteran  Antigonus,  one  of  Alexander's  chief  generals, 
universally  admired  by  the  Alexandrian  court  of  Ptolemy, 
whither  the  battle  of  Ipsus  brought  him  as  a  host- 
age, he  was  restored  to  his  native  land  and  kingdom 
of  Epirus  in  296  B.C.,  through  the  influence  of  Ptolemy, 
who  wished  to  counteract  the  growing  power  of  the 
Macedonian  ruler,  Demetrius  Poliorcetes.  Aided  by  the 
brave  Epirots,  whose  loyalty  and  enthusiasm  were  fired 
by  their  young  ruler,  "  the  eagle  of  Epirus,"  as  they  styled 
him,    extended   his    dominions.      Wh.n    Demetrius   was 


WAR    WITH  PYRRHUS— VMON   WITH  ITALY.       103 

driven  from  his  throne  in  287  B.C.,  Pyrrhus  was  sum- 
moned to  wear  the  royal  diadem  of  Philip  and  of 
Alexander.  No  worthier  successor  could  have  been  found. 
But  Macedonian  jealousy,  and  that  national  feeling  which 
could  not  brook  a  foreign  leader,  caused  him  to  resign 
the  kingdom  after  a  short  reign  of  seven  months.  The 
colourless  life  of  an  Epirot  king  could  not  satisfy  the 
ambition  of  such  a  man  as  Pyrrhus.  Conscious  of  his 
great  powers  as  a  general,  fired  with  a  desire  to  imitate 
the  great  Alexander,  Pyrrhus  eagerly  embraced  the  oppor- 
tunity that  now  offered  itself  of  founding  an  Hellenic 
empire  in  the  West.  In  estimating  the  possibilities  of 
success,  and  the  historical  position  of  Pyrrhus  himself, 
we  cannot  but  feel  that  the  attempt  to  draw  a  comparison 
between  him  and  Alexander  completely  fails.  Alexander 
was  at  the  head  of  a  powerful  and  well-officered  Mace- 
donian army ;  he  was  the  foremost  general  and  most 
gifted  statesman  of  his  time ;  his  own  dominions  were 
secured  by  the  powerful  army  he  left  behind  him ;  the 
foes  he  went  to  encounter  were  such  as,  long  inured  to 
despotism,  knew  nothing  of  national  independence  and 
national  vigour,  and  regarded  with  indifference  a  change 
of  despots.  In  the  case  of  Pyrrhus  none  of  these  advan- 
tages existed.  Despite  his  noble  descent,  his  strategic 
ability,  his  pure  and  chivalrous  nature,  he  was  but  a 
soldier  of  fortune,  a  king  of  mountain-tribes,  a  man  whose 
chances  of  success  depended  on  mercenaries  and  foreign 
alliances,  and  on  his  ability  to  keep  together  a  coalition  of 
secondary  states.  Wide-reaching  as  was  his  scheme  of 
founding  a  great  Hellenic  empire  in  the  West,  it  was 
the  unreal  dream  of  a  romantic  adventurer,  not  the 
possible  and  practicable  aim  of  a  powerful  conqueror  and 
statesman. 

When  once  Tarentum  had  signed  the  treaty  with 
Pyrrhus,  the  arrival  of  Cineas,  the  confidential  adviser  of 
Pyrrhus,  and  of  his  general,  Milo,  in  281  B.C.,  with  three 
thousand  Epirots,  put  an  end  to  all  further  vacillation. 
Pyrrhus  himself  landed  early  in  the  following  year,  with 
a  mixed  force  of  various  Greek  tribes,  amounting  in  all  to 
about  twenty  thousand  infantry,  two  thousand  archers, 
five  hundred  slingers,  three  thousand  cavalry,  and  twenty 
elephants.     The  boasts  which  the  Tarentine  envoys  had 


104  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

made,  of  the  huge  confederate  army  ready  to  take  the  field 
in  Italy,  were  soon  proved  to  be  utterly  fallacious.  In  the 
north,  the  Etruscans  alone  were  still  in  arms,  but  misfor- 
tune attended  every  effort  they  made.  The  Tarentines, 
who  had  hoped  that  Pyrrhus  would  take  all  the  blows 
while  they  shared  the  spoil,  found  their  master  in  the 
eagle  of  Epirus.  They  were  called  upon  to  serve  ;  and 
the  foreign  soldiers  were  quartered  in  their  houses,  and 
foreign  guards  set  over  their  gates.  The  strictest  military 
government  everywhere  prevailed ;  and  all  the  clubs, 
theatres,  and  amusements  of  the  pleasure-loving  Taren- 
tines were  ruthlessly  suspended. 

Special  exertions  were  made  by  Rome  to  meet  the  new 
danger.  In  280  B.C.,  on  the  banks  of  the  Siris,  near 
Heraclea,  the  Roman  consul,  Publius  Laevinus,  first 
measured  swords  with  a  Greek  army  under  the  greatest 
general  of  the  day.  After  a  stubborn  contest,  varied  by 
many  vicissitudes  of  fortune,  the  elephants  of  Pyrrhus 
decided  the  issue.  The  losses  of  the  Romans,  estimated 
from  fifteen  to  twenty  thousand,  were  almost  equalled  by 
those  of  Pyrrhus.  But  the  value  of  winning  the  first 
battle  was  at  once  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  Lucanians, 
Bruttians,  Samnites,  and  all  the  Greek  cities  joined 
Pyrrhus.  The  Latins,  however,  remained  firm  ,  and  the 
frontier  fortress,  Venusia,  although  completely  hemmed  in 
by  enemies,  refused  to  desert  Rome.  Pyrrhus  saw  that 
his  hopes  lay  iu  securing  favourable  terms  from  the 
Romans,  while  the  impressions  of  the  battle  of  Heraclea 
were  still  vivid.  He  commissioned  Cineas,  whose  rhetori- 
cal powers  were  famous,  to  go  to  Rome  and  demand  the 
freedom  of  all  Greek  towns,  and  the  restitution  of  the 
territory  taken  from  the  Samnites,  Daunians,  Lucanians, 
and  Bruttians.  The  leniency  and  respect  shown  by 
Pyrrhus  towards  his  Roman  prisoners,  and  the  persuasive 
arts  of  Cineas,  made  the  senate  waver ,  but  the  undaunted 
energy  of  the  blind  and  aged  Appius  Claudius,  who  had 
been  censor  in  312,  and  consul  in  307  and  296  B.C.,  and 
who  had  caused  himself  to  be  carried  into  the  senate- 
house  at  this  critical  moment,  revived  the  true  Roman 
spirit  in  the  hearts  of  his  audience.  The  proud  answer 
was  given  that  Rome  could  not  negotiate  with  foreign 
troops  as  long  as  they  were  on  Italian  soil.     This  answer, 


WAR   WITH  PYRRHUS-UNION  WITH  ITALY,      105 

then  heard  for  the  first  time,  passed  thenceforth  into  a 
maxim  of  state. 

Pyrrhus  now  marched  upon  Rome,  hoping  by  this  step 
to  shake  the  allegiance  of  her  allies  and  to  terrify  the 
capital.  Roman  courage,  however,  was  proof  alike  against 
the  flatteries  of  Cineas,  and  the  armed  threats  of  Pyrrhus. 
No  Latin  ally,  no  Campanian  Greek  state  joined  him ; 
moreover,  the  Etruscans  at  this  time  concluded  peace  with 
Rome,  and  thus  set  free  the  army  of  the  consul  Tiberius 
Coruncanius.  Three  armies,  one  in  his  rear  under  Laevinus, 
and  two  in  the  vicinity  of  the  capital,  barred  his  progress. 
After  surprising  Fregellae  and  reaching  Anagnia,  the  king 
was  forced  to  retrace  his  steps  without  striking  a  decisive 
blow.  At  the  approach  of  winter  he  returned  to  his  old 
quarters  in  Tarentum.  In  the  spring  of  279  B.C.,  Pyrrhus 
resumed  the  offensive,  and  met  the  Roman  army  in  Apulia 
near  Ausculum.  The  allied  forces  of  Pyrrhus  amounted 
to  about  seventy  thousand  infantry,  eight  thousand  cavalry, 
and  nineteen  elephants.  The  Romans  with  their  con- 
federates were  not  inferior  in  number ;  and  as  a  protection 
against  the  elephants  they  had  invented  a  sort  of  war- 
chariot,  armed  with  projecting  iron  poles  and  movable 
masts,  capable  of  being  lowered,  and  fitted  with  an  iron 
spike  Pyrrhus  also  had  copied  the  Roman  system  of 
maniples,  and  placed  companies  on  the  wings  of  the 
phalanx,  with  spaces  between  them,  in  imitation  of  the 
cohorts.  For  two  days  the  battle  raged ;  at  last  the  ele- 
phants, as  at  Heraclea,  forced  back  the  Roman  line,  and 
Pyrrhus  remained  in  possession  of  the  field.  This  defeat 
cost  the  Roman  forces  some  six  thousand  lives ;  but 
Pyrrhus  himself  was  wounded.  Nor  was  the  victory 
decisive  enough  to  break  up  the  Roman  confederacy,  and 
thus  further  the  political  designs  of  the  Epirot  king. 
Forced  by  his  wound  to  renounce  the  campaign  and 
remain  inactive  in  Tarentum,  Pyrrhus  soon  perceived  that 
the  losses  he  had  sustained,  and  the  petty  quarrels  and 
hatred  of  discipline  which  characterized  his  allies,  rendered 
all  chance  of  ultimate  success  with  his  present  resources 
out  of  the  question.  The  condition  of  the  Sicilian  Greeks 
gave  him  an  opportunity  of  leaving  Italy,  and  of  this  he 
gladly  availed  himself. 

After  the  death  of  Agathocles  of  Syracuse,  in  289  B.C.. 


106  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Carthage  had  made  great  strides  in  the  subjugation  of 
Sicily.  No  resistance  could  be  offered  by  the  smaller 
Greek  cities,  whose  government,  whether  under  dema- 
gogues or  despots,  was  always  equally  incapable.  Agri- 
gentum  had  fallen,  and  Syracuse  was  now  hard  pressed 
by  the  victorious  Carthaginians.  In  the  hour  of  her  peril 
Syracuse  acted  as  Tarentum  had  done  ;  she  offered  the 
supreme  power  to  Pyrrhus.  Thus  fortune,  by  placing  in 
his  hands  at  the  same  moment  Tarentum  and  Syracuse, 
seemed  to  give  to  Pyrrhus  a  great  opportunity  of  realizing 
his  mighty  schemes.  One  effect  of  this  union  of  Italian 
and  Sicilian  Greeks  under  one  head  was  to  bring  into 
closer  relations  Carthage  and  Rome.  An  offensive  and 
defensive  treaty  was  concluded  between  them,  in  279  B.C., 
against  Pyrrhus,  binding  each  party  to  assist  the  other  in 
case  of  attack,  and  binding  both  states  not  to  conclude  a 
separate  peace  with  Pyrrhus.  Messana,  which  had  pre- 
viously been  seized  by  the  Manertines,  who  were  the 
Campanian  mercenaries  of  Agathocles  (cf.  p.  78),  in  fear 
of  the  vengeance  of  Pyrrhus  joined  the  Romans  and 
Carthaginians,  and  thus  secured  for  them  the  Sicilian  side 
of  the  straits.  But  Rhegium,  on  the  Italian  side,  which 
had  been  wrested  from  the  Romans  by  a  mutiny  of  the 
Campanian  troops  stationed  there  in  281  B.C.,  could  not 
be  allowed  by  Rome  to  follow  the  example  of  their 
Mamertine  kinsmen  ;  and  a  combined  attack  of  Cartha- 
ginians and  Romans  failed  to  capture  the  city.  A  strong 
Carthaginian  fleet  proceeded  to  blockade  Syracuse,  while 
at  the  same  time  a  land  army  laid  siege  to  it,  in  278  B.C. 
Pyrrhus  was  therefore  forced  to  desert  the  Lucanians  and 
Samnites,  and  content  himself  with  occupying  Tarentum 
by  a  garrison  under  Milo,  and  Locri  with  a  force  under 
his  son  Alexander.  He  himself  set  sail  with  the  rest  of 
his  troops  for  Syracuse  in  the  spring  of  278  B.C.  During 
his  absence  from  Italy  the  Romans,  exhausted  by  their 
previous  struggles,  allowed  the  war  to  drag  on,  without 
being  able  to  completely  expel  the  troops  left  behind  by 
Pyrrhus.  Heraclea,  indeed,  made  peace  with  Rome  in  278, 
and  Locri  slaughtered  its  Epirot  garrison  in  277  B.C. ; 
but  Milo  retained  his  hold  of  Tarentum,  and  made  success- 
ful sorties  against  the  Romans.  Ignorance  of  the  art  of 
besieging  towns,  and  the  want  of  a  fleet,  made  the  capture 


WAR    WITH  PYRRHUS—  UNION    WITH  ITALY.      107 

of  Tarentum  almost  impossible  ;  and  the  Carthaginians, 
owing  to  their  disasters  in  Sicily,  were  unable  to  render 
any  real  assistance.  Pyrrhus,  on  landing  at  Syracuse, 
met  with  complete  success.  At  the  hend  of  the  Greek 
cities  he  wrested  from  the  Carthaginians  almost  all  that 
tbey  had  won.  To  cope  with  their  powerful  fleet  and 
capture  the  all-important  position  of  Lilybaeum,  Pyrrhus 
built  himself  a  fleet,  and  in  276  B.C.  seemed  to  have  within 
his  grasp  the  realization  of  his  aims.  But  his  methods  of 
governing  Sicily  were  those  which  he  had  seen  Ptolemy 
practise  in  Egypt:  personal  favourites,  not  native  Greeks, 
exercised  absolute  authority  as  magistrates  and  judges  in 
the  various  cities;  his  own  troeos  acted  as  garrisons,  and  his 
own  acts  were  arbitrary  and  despotic  to  the  last  degree. 
His  reign  thus  became  more  detested  than  even  the 
threatened  Carthaginian  yoke  had  been,  and  negotiations 
were  entered  into  by  the  principal  Greek  cities  with  the 
Carthaginians.  To  this  error  Pyrrhus  added  a  second. 
Instead  of  securing  his  s  ule  in  Sicily,  expelling  the  Cartha- 
ginians and  capturing  Lilybaeum,  he  turned  his  thoughts 
once  more  to  Italy.  Possibly  a  sense  of  honour  and  the 
cry  of  his  old  allies,  the  Lucanians  and  Samnites,  moved 
him  to  do  so ;  but  the  folly  of  the  step  was  at  once 
apparent.  When  once  it  was  known  that  he  had  set  sail 
for  Italy,  towards  the  close  of  276  B.C.,  all  the  Sicilian 
cities  revolted,  and  refused  to  grant  him  money  or  troops ; 
and  "  thus  the  enterprise  of  Pyrrhus  was  wrecked,  and 
the  plan  of  his  life  irretrievably  ruined,  he  was  thence- 
forth an  adventurer  who  felt  that  he  had  been  great,  and 
was  so  no  longer."  Foiled  in  an  attack  on  Rhegium,  he 
surprised  Locri,  and  avenged  himself  on  the  treacherous 
inhabitants.  In  the  spring  of  275  B.C.  he  marched  to  the 
aid  of  the  hard-pressed  Samnites,  and  near  Beneventum, 
on  the  Campus  Arusinus,  he  fought  his  final  battle  on 
Italian  soil.  The  very  elephants,  which  had  won  his 
previous  victories,  proved  the  cause  of  his  defeat  by 
attacking  their  own  side.  Unable  any  longer  to  keep  the 
field,  or  to  get  reinforcements  from  abroad,  Pyrrhus  left 
Italy,  and  once  more  took  part  in  Greek  politics.  He 
even  succeeded  in  recovering  the  whole  of  his  former 
kingdom,  and  in  paving  the  way  for  a  return  to  the  throne 
of  Macedonia.     But  his  successes  bore  no  lasting  fruit, 


108  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

and  he  perished  ingloriously  in  a  street  fight  at  Argos,  in 
272  B.C. 

With  the  battle  of  Beneventum  and  the  departure  of 
Pyrrhus  the  war  in  Italy  came  to  an  end.  Milo,  who  had 
been  left  behind  in  Tarentum,  made  over  that  city  to  the 
Roman  consul  Lucius  Papirius  in  272  B.C.,  on  hearing  of 
his  master's  death.  He  thus  prevented  the  citizens  from 
surrendering  the  town  to  the  Carthaginians,  who  had 
entered  the  harbour  with  a  fleet,  and  secured  for  himself 
and  his  troops  a  free  departure.  The  Carthaginians,  thus 
frustrated  in  their  attempt  to  gain  a  foothold  in  Italy, 
pretended  that  their  presence  was  merely  due  to  their 
wish  to  help  the  Romans.  The  gain  to  Rome  from  the 
act  of  Milo  can  scarcely  be  overestimated.  In  the  same 
year,  the  Samnites,  Lucanians,  and  Bruttians  laid  down 
their  arms.  Rhegium  was  at  last  stormed  in  270  B.C.,  and 
the  remnant  of  the  mutineers  who  had  so  long  held  the 
town  were  scourged  and  executed.  Rome  was  now  mis- 
tress of  all  Italy.  New  colonies  and  new  roads  held  in  a 
firm  grip  the  cunquered  territories.  Paestum  and  Cosa 
in  Lucania,  Beneventum  and  Aesernia  to  command  Sam- 
nium,  Ariminum,  Firmum  in  Picenum,  and  Castrum 
Novum  to  hold  in  check  the  Gauls,  were  all  established 
in  the  ten  years  from  273-264  B.C.  Preparations  were 
made  to  continue  the  southern  highway  to  the  seaports  of 
Tarentum  and  Brundisium,  to  colonize  the  latter  seaport 
and  make  it  the  rival  of  Tarentum.  Wars  with  small 
tribes,  whose  territory  was  encroached  upon,  were  caused 
by  the  construction  of  these  fortresses  and  roads :  writh 
the  Picentes  in  269-268  B.C.,  with  the  Sallentines  and  the 
Umbrian  Sassinates  in  267-266  B.C.  Rome's  dominion 
was  thus  extended  from  the  Apennines  to  the  Ionian  sea. 
Nor  did  she  solely  confine  her  attention  to  the  development 
of  her  power  by  land.  At  this  time  Carthage  was  pirati- 
cally paramount  in  the  western  waters  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean. Even  Syracuse  gradually  ceased  to  compete 
with  her ;  Tarentum,  owing  to  the  Roman  occupation,  was 
no  longer  formidable ;  the  naval  power  of  Etruria  had 
long  been  broken,  and  the  Etruscan  island  of  Corsica  lay 
open  to  the  ships  of  Carthage.  The  constant  struggles 
by  land  had  caused  the  Roman  fleet  to  dwindle  in  neglect, 
until  about  350  B.C.  it  reached  its  lowest  point  of  ineffi- 


WAR   WITH  PYRRHUS— UNION   WITH  ITALY.      109 

ciency.  A  treaty  with  Carthage  in  348  B.C.  bound  Roman 
ships  not  to  sail  beyond  the  Fair  Promontory  (Cape  Bon) 
on  the  Libyan  coast ;  a  like  stipulation  with  Tarentum 
excluded  Roman  ships  from  the  eastern  basin  of  the 
Mediterranean.  As  soon  as  she  was  able,  Rome  made 
efforts  to  free  herself  fro- 1  this  humiliating  position. 
The  chief  towns  along  the  Tyrrhene  and  Adriatic  seas 
were  colonized,  and  thus  protected  the  coasts  from  in- 
vasion and  pillage.  The  Roman  navy  was  in  part  revived, 
and  the  war-ships  taken  from  Antium  in  338  B.C.  served 
as  a  nucleus  for  this  purpose.  Such  Greek  cities  as  were 
admitted  into  a  state  of  dependence  on  Rome  furnished  a 
certain  number  of  vessels  as  a  war  contribution.  In  311 
B.C.,  two  masters  of  the  fleet  (dnoviri  navales)  were  created 
by  a  special  resolution  of  the  burgesses,  and  the  Roman 
fleet  lent  assistance  in  the  Samnite  war  at  the  siege  of 
Nuceria.  But  the  renewal  of  the  treaty  with  Carthage  in 
306  B.C.  shows  how  little  Rome  really  accomplished. 
Carthage  only  allowed  the  Romans  to  trade  with  Sicily  and 
Carthage,  but  prohibited  their  navigation  of  the  Atlantic, 
and  thus  restricted  them  to  the  narrow  space  of  the 
western  Mediterranean.  Although  obliged  to  acquiesce  in 
the  conditions  imposed  by  Carthage,  the  Romans  continued 
to  improve  the  state  of  their  navy.  Four  quaestors  of 
the  fleet  (quaestores  classici)  were  appointed  in  267  B.C., 
for  the  purpose  of  jointly  guarding  the  coasts  and  creating 
a  navy  for  their  protection.  The  first  was  stationed  at 
Ostia,  the  Roman  port ;  the  second  at  Cales,  the  capital 
of  Roman  Campania ;  the  third  at  Ariminum,  to  w-atch 
over  the  ports  on  the  Adriatic ;  the  province  of  the  fourth 
is  not  known. 

The  lukewarm  alliance  formed  with  Carthage  against 
Pyrrhus  did  not  lessen  the  wish  of  Rome  to  free  herself 
from  the  fetters  imposed  by  Carthage  on  the  growth  of 
her  maritime  power.  To  further  this  object  she  attached 
herself  closely  to  such  Greek  maritime  states  as  could 
counterbalance  the  Carthaginian  ascendency  by  sea :  to 
Massilia,  whose  citizens  held  a  position  of  honour  at  the 
Roman  games ;  to  Rhodes,  and  Apollonia  on  the  Epirot 
coast ;  above  all  to  Syracuse,  after  the  Pyrrhic  war  was 
ended.  Nature  herself  favoured  the  growth  of  her  naval 
power.     Latium  supplied  the  finest  timber  for  ships,  and 


110  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

the  commercial  and  geographical  position  of  Rome  was 
specially  adapted  for  the  development  of  a  war  marine. 
Although,  indeed,  so  far  Rome  had  not  availed  herself  of 
these  advantages,  yet  at  this  period  signs  were  not  wanting 
that  the  old  indifference  to  naval  matters  was  a  thing  of 
the  past ;  "  and,  considering  the  great  resources  of  Italy, 
the  Phoenicians  might  well  follow  her  efforts  with  anxious 
eyes." 

It  remains  for  us  to  consider  the  political  effect  of  the 
mighty  changes  consequent  upon  the  establishment  of 
Roman  supremacy  in  Italy.  We  do  not  know  with 
exactness  what  privileges  Rome  reserved  for  herself  as 
sovereign  state.  It  is  certain  that  she  alone  could  make 
war,  conclude  treaties,  and  coin  money  ;  and  that,  further, 
any  war  or  treaty  resolved  upon  by  the  Roman  people 
was  legally  binding  on  all  Italian  communities,  and  that 
the  silver  money  of  Rome  was  current  everywhere  in 
Italy. 

The  relations  of  the  Italians  to  Rome  cannot  in  all 
cases  be  precisely  defined,  but  the  main  features  are  as 
follows.  In  the  first  place,  the  full  Roman  franchise  was 
extended  as  far  as  was  compatible  with  the  preservation 
of  the  urban  character  of  the  Roman  community.  Those 
who  received  this  franchise  may  be  divided  into  three 
classes  :  (1)  All  the  occupants  of  the  various  allotments 
of  state  lands,  which  now  embraced  a  considerable  portion 
of  Etruria  and  Campania.  (2)  All  the  communities 
which,  after  the  method  first  adopted  in  the  case  of 
Tusculum,  were  incorporated  and  completely  merged  in 
the  Roman  state.  As  above  mentioned  (p.  92),  this 
course  had  been  followed  in  the  case  of  many  of  the 
original  members  of  the  Latin  league  :  it  was  now,  in 
268  B.C.,  pursued  with  regard  to  all  the  Sabine  com- 
munities and  many  of  the  Volscian.  (3)  Further,  full 
Roman  citizenship  was  possessed  by  the  maritime  or 
burgess  colonies  which  had  been  instituted  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  coast ;  the  names  of  these  were  Pyrgi.  Ostia, 
Antium,  Tarracina,  Minturnae,  Sinuessa,  Sena  Gallica, 
and  Castrum  Novum.  In  these  towns  the  young  men 
were  exempted  from  service  in  the  legions,  and  devoted 
all  their  attention  to  guarding  the  coasts. 

Thus  the  title  of  Roman  citizen  in  its  fullest  sense  was 


WAR   WITH  PYRRHUS— UNION   WITH  IT  ALT.      Ill 

possessed  by  men  dwelling  as  far  north  as  Caere,*  as  far 
east  as  the  Apennines,  and  as  far  south  as  Formiae.  But 
within  these  limits  isolated  communities,  such  as  Tibur, 
Praeneste,  Signia,  and  Norba,  were  without  the  Roman 
franchise  ;  while  beyond  them  other  communities,  such  as 
Sena,  possessed  it. 

In  the  next  place,  we  must  distinguish  the  various 
grades  of  subjection  which  marked  all  the  communities 
not  honoured  with  the  full  Roman  franchise.  As  in 
the  case  of  the  recipients  of  full  citizenship,  so  here  we 
may  make  a  threefold  division.  To  the  first  division 
belong  the  Latin  towns  :  these  retained  their  Latin  rights  ; 
that  is,  they  were  self-governing  and  stood  on  an  equal 
footing  with  Roman  citizens  as  regards  the  right  of  trad- 
ing and  inheritance.  But  it  is  important  to  observe  that 
the  Latins  of  the  later  times  of  the  Republic  were  no  longer 
for  the  most  part  members  of  the  old  Latin  towns,  which 
had  participated  in  the  Alban  festival,  but  were  colonists 
planted  in  Latium  by  Rome,  who  honoured  Rome  as  their 
capital  and  parent  city,  and  formed  the  main  supports  of 
Roman  rule  in  Latium.  Indeed,  the  old  Latin  communities, 
with  the  exception  of  Tibur  and  Praeneste,  had  sunk  into 
insignificance.  It  was  but  natural  that  the  Latin  colonies, 
issuing  as  they  did  from  the  burgess-body  of  Rome,  should 
not  rest  content  with  mere  Latin  rights,  but  should  aim 
at  the  full  rights  of  Roman  citizens.  Rome,  on  the  other 
hand,  new  that  Italy  was  subjugated,  no  longer  felt  her 
former  need  of  these  colonies  ;  nor  did  she  deem  it  prudent 
to  extend  the  full  franchise  with  the  same  freedom  as  she 
hitherto  had  done.  A  lin~  was  now  strictly  drawn,  and 
all  members  of  autonomous  communities  founded  after 
268  B.C.  could  no  longer  by  settling  in  Rome  become 
municipes  or  passive  burgesses  with  the  power  of  voting 
in  the  comitia  tributa  (cf.  p.  85).  Men  of  eminence,  e.g. 
public  magistrates,  in  such  communities  were  alone  in 
future  eligible  to  the  Roman  franchise.  By  these  means 
the  old  power  of  migration  to  Rome  was  somewhat 
restricted,  and  a  jealous  guard  was  set  upon  the  privilege 
of  becoming  a  full  Roman  citizen. 

To  the   second  division  belong  those  towns  wrhose  in- 

*  Of  course  Caere  is  not  meant  to  be  included,  but  men  living 
uear  it  had  full  citizen  rights. 


112  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

habitants  were  passive  citizens  of  Rome  (cives  sine  suf- 
fragio).  They  were  liable  to  service  in  the  Roman  legions, 
and  to  taxation,  and  were  included  in  the  Roman  census. 
A  deputy  or  praefect  appointed  annually  by  the  Roman 
praetor  administered  justice  according  to  laws  which 
were  subjected  to  Roman  revision.  In  other  respects  they 
retained  their  old  form  of  government  and  appointed  their 
own  magistrates.  Caere  (cf.  p.  81)  was  the  first  town  to 
be  placed  on  this  footing;  afterwards  Capua  and  other 
more  remote  towns  were  treated  in  the  same  way. 

In  the  third  and  last  division  we  may  include  all  allied 
communities  which  were  not  Latin  states  ;  the  relation  of 
these  towns  to  Rome  was  defined  by  separate  treaties,  and 
therefore  varied  in  accordance  with  the  terms  imposed  by 
such  agreements. 

No  doubt  all  national  leagues,  such  as  the  Samnite  and 
Lucanian,  shared  the  fate  which  had  earlier  befallen  the 
Latin  and  Hernican  confederations  ;  and  any  movements 
which  might  tend  to  hind  one  community  with  another, 
whether  by  rights  of  intermarriage  or  of  acquisition  of 
property  or  by  common  council-chambers,  were  doubtless 
suppressed  by  the  vigilance  of  Rome.  Further,  all  the 
Italian  communities  were  obliged  to  equip  and  furnish  at 
their  own  expense  contingents  in  time  of  war.  Those 
Latin  towns  classified  above  in  the  first  division  furnished 
a  definitely  fixed  number  of  infantry  and  cavalry  which 
acted  on  the  wings  of  the  Roman  legion  and  were  there- 
fore named  "wings"  (alae)  and  "  winged  cohorts"  (cohortes 
alariae).  The  same  duty  was  imposed  on  most  of  the 
allied  communities  classified  in  the  third  division,  such  as 
Apulians,  Sabellians,  and  Etruscans.  Further,  the  passive 
citizens  defined  in  the  second  division  were,  as  above 
stated,  bound  to  serve  in  the  ranks  of  the  Roman  legions, 
while  the  duty  of  supplying  ships  of  war  fell  almost 
entirely  on  the  Greek  cities.  Such  w^ere  the  leading 
features  of  the  Roman  government  of  Italy,  the  details  of 
which  can  no  longer  be  ascertained.  In  addition  to  break- 
ing up  all  existing  confederacies,  and  thus  splitting  up  the 
subject  states  into  a  number  of  smaller  communities,  Rome 
fostered  schisms  and  factions  among  them.  In  pursuance 
of  the  same  object  the  government  of  all  dependent  com- 


WAR    WITH  PYIiRHVS— UNION   WITH  ITALY.      113 

munities  was  now  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  wealthy  and 
leading  families,  whose  interests  were  naturally  opposed 
to  those  of  the  multitude,  and  who  were  inclined  to  favour 
Roman  views.  Capua,  whose  nobles  had  sided  with  Rome 
throughout  the  war  against  the  revolted  Latins  and  Cam- 
panians,  furnished  a  notorious  instance  of  this  policy. 
Special  privileges  and  pensions  were  granted  by  Rome  to 
the  Campanian  aristocracy.  But  the  great  wisdom  and 
moderation  of  Rome  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  she  either 
extended  to  these  dependent  states  the  Roman  franchise, 
or  allowed  them  to  retain  a  certain  amount  of  self-govern- 
ment, and  gave  them  a  share  in  the  successes  of  Rome. 
Thus  in  Italy,  at  least,  no  community  of  Helots  existed, 
nor,  which  was  equally  important,  was  there  any  tributary 
state  ;  for  Rome  with  a  wise  magnanimity  never  assumed 
that  most  dangerous  of  rights,  the  right  of  taxing  any  of 
her  Italian  subjects.  Rome  exercised  control  and  super- 
vision over  the  various  Italian  communities  by  means  of 
the  four  quaestors  of  the  fleet,  who  had  a  district  and  resi- 
dence outside  Rome  assigned  them  by  law.  In  addition,  the 
chief  magistrate  of  every  community  had  to  take  a  census 
of  his  state  every  fourth  or  fifth  year ;  by  this  means  the 
Roman  senate  was  kept  informed  of  the  resources  in  men 
and  money  of  the  whole  of  Italy. 

Politically  united  under  the  leadership  of  Rome,  the 
various  tribes  inhabiting  Italy  now  began  to  realize  more 
completely  and  feel  more  intensely  their  unity  as  a  nation. 
This  feeling  must  have  first  sprung  into  existence  from 
the  contrast  presented  by  the  Greeks,  and  must  have  been 
heightened  by  the  danger  with  which  the  Celts  threatened 
all  Italians  equally.  It  found  expression  in  two  names, 
which  now  began  to  be  applied  to  all  the  peoples  inhabit- 
ing Italy.  The  name  of  Italians,  which  was  originally 
a  Greek  term,  became  current  everywhere,  and  Italia, 
originally  limited  to  the  modern  Calabria,  was  now  used 
of  the  whole  land.  The  name  of  Togati,  or  "men  of  the 
toga,"  was  now  for  the  first  time  used  to  designate  all  the 
Italians,  and  thus  sharply  contrasted  them  with  the  Celtic 
"men  of  the  hose"  (Braccati).  The  common  use  by  all 
of  the  Latin  toga  seemed  to  point  to  the  day  when  the 
Latin  language  would  be  regarded  as  the  mother-tongue 
of  every  Italian  :  the  germs  of  the  Latinization  of  the  whole 

8 


114  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

peninsula  were  already  planted  ;  time  alone  was  needed 
for  their  development. 

The  recognition  of  Rome's  new  position  as  one  of  the 
great  powers  in  the  political  world  was  first  marked  by 
an  embassy  sent  from  Alexandria  to  Rome  in  273  B.C., 
primarily  with  a  view  to  settling  commercial  relations. 
Egypt  was  at  that  time  at  variance  with  Carthage  touch- 
ing Cyrene,  and  with  Macedonia  touching  the  predominat- 
ing influence  in  Greece ;  the  complications  that  were 
eventually  to  arise  between  Rome  and  Carthage  for  the 
possession  of  Sicily,  and  between  Rome  and  Macedonia 
for  the  sovereignty  of  the  Adriatic  coasts,  were  doubtless 
foreshadowed  even  then,  and  may  well  have  suggested 
an  alliance  with  Es:ypt.  "  The  new  struggles,  which  were 
preparing  on  all  sides,  could  not  but  influence  each  other; 
and  Rome,  as  mistress  of  Italy,  could  not  fail  to  be  drawn 
into  the  wide  arena,  which  the  victories  and  projects  of 
Alexander  the  Great  had  marked  out  as  the  field  of  conflict 
to  his  successors." 

AUTHORITIES. 

Thurii  and  Celtic  war. — Dionys.  xix.  13.      Polyb.  ii.  19-20.     Appian 

Sp.  6;  G.  1,  11.     Strab.  212,  216. 
Tarentine  mob. — Dionys.  xix.  3-10. 
Pyrrhus. — Dionys.   xix.   8-13,    17  ;     xx.    1-12.      Plut.    Pyrrh.    and 

Alexand.     Appian  Sp.  7-12. 
Tarentum  captured. — Zonar.  8,  2. 
Rhegiwm  — Dio.  Cass.  Fr.  39-40. 
Picentine  war. — Dio.  Cas.  Fr.  98,  3. 
Neiv  colonies. — Liv.  Epit.  xi.  14,  16.     Veil.  i.  14.     Marq.  Stv.  i.  39, 

50-51. 
Roman  fleet. — Liv.  viii.  14;  ix.  30. 
Treaty  with  Carthage.—  Polyb.  iii.  22-25. 

Quaestores  class. — Lydns  de  Magistr.  i.  27.     Momms.  R.  St.  ii.  556. 
Relation  of  Italians  to  Rome.—  Marq.  Stv.  i.  21-103.     Momms.  R.  St. 

iii.  645,  sq. 
Cives  sine  suffragio. — Momms.  R.  St.  iii.  570,  8q. 
Praefecti. — Momms.  R.  St.  iii.  581. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

CARTHAGE. 

The  Phoenicians — Position  of  Carthage — Opposition  to  the  Greeks- 
Empire — Constitution — Financial  position — Comparison  between 
Rome  and  Carthage. 

We  now  turn  our  eyes  to  a  race  of  people  widely  differing 
from  any  in  Italy  in  nature  and  origin,  viz.  the  Cartha- 
ginians. Belonging  to  the  great  Semitic  race,  which  has 
ever,  as  though  from  some  instinctive  sense  of  its  wide 
diversity,  kept  itself  severed  from  the  Indo-Germanic 
nations,  Carthage  was  one  of  the  numerous  settlements 
of  the  enterprising  Phoenicians.  This  particular  branch 
of  the  Semitic  stock  issued  forth  from  its  native  land  of 
Canaan  or  "  the  plain,"  and  spread  further  west  than  any 
other  people  of  the  same  race.  Utilizing  to  the  full  the 
excellent  harbours,  and  the  bountiful  supply  of  timber  and 
metals  of  their  own  country,  the  Phoenicians  early  attained 
an  unrivalled  position  in  the  ancient  world  as  the  pioneers 
of  commerce,  navigation,  manufacture,  and  colonization. 
In  the  most  remote  times  we  find  them  in  Cyprus  and 
Egypt,  Greece  and  Sicily,  Africa  and  Spain,  and  even  on 
the  Atlantic  Ocean  and  the  North  Sea.  "  The  field  of 
their  commerce  reached  from  Sierra  Leone  and  Cornwall 
in  the  west,  eastward  to  the  coast  of  Malabar." 

But  the  one-sided  character  that  marks  the  develop- 
ment of  the  great  nations  of  antiquity  is  specially  visible 
in  the  case  of  the  Phoenicians.  We  cannot  ascribe  to 
them  the  credit  of  having  originated  any  of  the  intellectual 
or  scientific  discoveries  which  have  been  the  glory  of 
other  members  of  the  Semitic  family.     Their   religious 


116  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

conceptions  were  gross  and  barbarous  ;  their  art  was  not 
comparable  to  that  of  Italy,  still  less  to  that  of  Greece , 
their  knowledge  of  astronomy  and  chronology,  of  the 
alphabet,  of  weights  and  measures,  was  derived  from 
Babylon.  No  doubt,  in  their  commercial  dealings,  the 
Phoenicians  spread  valuable  germs  of  civilization,  but 
rather  as  a  bird  dropping  grain  than  a  husbandman 
sowing  seed.  They  never  civilized  and  assimilated  to 
themselves  the  nations  with  which  they  came  into  con- 
tact. 

Moreover,  politically,  the  Phoenicians  were,  like  the 
rest  of  the  Aramaean  nations,  without  the  ennobling  idea 
of  self-governed  freedom.  A  policy  of  conquest  was  never 
in  their  eyes  to  be  compared  with  a  policy  of  commerce. 
Their  colonies  were  factories.  The  power  to  trade  with 
natives  was  bought  too  dear  if  it  entailed  constant  war 
and  the  interruption  of  peaceful  barter.  Thus  they 
allowed  themselves  to  be  supplanted  in  Egypt,  Greece, 
Italy,  and  the  east  of  Sicily,  almost  without  resistance  , 
and  in  the  great  naval  battles  at  Alalia  in  537  B.C.,  and 
at  Cumae  in  474  B.C.,  for  the  supremacy  of  the  western 
Mediterranean,  the  brunt  of  the  struggle  with  the  Greeks 
fell  upon  the  Etruscans,  and  not  on  the  Phoenicians.  In 
the  great  Sicilian  expedition,  which  ended  in  their  defeat 
at  Himera  by  Gelo  of  Syracuse  in  480  B.C.,  the  African 
Phoenicians  only  took  the  field  as  subjects  of  the  Great 
King,  and  to  avoid  being  obliged  to  aid  him  in  the  East 
instead  of  the  West.  This  was  not  from  want  of  courage 
or  national  spirit ;  indeed,  the  tenacity  and  obstinacy  writh 
which  the  Aramaeans  have  ever  held  to  their  feelings  and 
prejudices  as  a  nation  far  exceeds  the  pertinacity  of  any 
I  n  do -Germanic  race:  it  was  rather  due  to  their  want  of 
political  instinct  and  of  the  love  of  liberty.  No  Phoenician 
settlements  attained  a  more  rapid  and  secure  prosperity 
than  those  established  by  the  cities  of  Tyre  and  Sidon  on 
the  south  coast  of  Spain  and  the  north  coast  of  Africa. 
Here  they  were  out  of  the  reach  of  the  great  king  and  of 
Greek  rivals,  and  held  the  same  l'elation  to  the  natives  as 
the  Europeans  held  to  the  American  Indians.  Although 
not  the  earliest  settlement,  by  far  the  most  prominent  was 
Karthada,  "  the  new  town,"  or  Carthage.  Situated  near 
the  mouth  of  the  river  Bagradas,  which  flows  through  the 


CARTHAGE.  117 

richest  corn  district  in  North  Africa,  on  rising  ground 
which  slopes  gently  towards  the  plain  and  ends  in  a  sea- 
girt promontory,  commanding  the  great  roadstead  of 
North  Africa,  the  Gnlf  of  Tunis,  Carthage  owed  its 
sudden  rise  to  pre-eminence  even  more  to  the  natural 
advantages  of  its  situation  than  to  the  character  of  its 
inhabitants  Even  when  restored,  Carthage  at  once  became 
the  third  city  in  the  Roman  empire  ;  and  in  our  day,  on 
a  far  worse  site,  and  under  far  less  favourable  conditions, 
a  city  exists  in  that  district,  whose  inhabitants  number 
one  hundred  thousand.  We  need  no  explanation,  then,  of 
the  commercial  prosperity  of  ancient  Carthage ;  but  we 
must  answer  the  question  raised  by  its  development  of 
political  power,  a  development  never  attained  by  any 
other  Phoenician  city. 

At  the  outset  Carthage  pursued  the  usual  passive  policy 
of  Phoenician  cities.  She  paid  a  ground-rent  for  the 
space  occupied  by  the  city  to  the  native  Berbers,  the  tribe 
of  Maxitani  or  Maxyes ;  and  she  recognized  the  nominal 
supremacy  of  the  great  king  by  paying  tribute  to  him  on 
different  occasions.  It  gradually,  however,  became  clear 
to  the  Carthaginians  that,  unless  they  undertook  the  task 
of  repelling  Greek  influences  and  Greek  migrations,  the 
Phoenicians  would  be  supplanted  in  Africa,  as  they  had 
already  been  in  Greece,  Italy,  and  Sicily.  The  colony  of 
Cyrene  threatened  their  very  stronghold  and  imperilled 
their  existence.  The  Carthaginians,  therefore,  undertook 
the  task ,  and  by  about  500  B.C.,  after  a  long  and  obstinate 
struggle,  they  had  to  a  great  extent  effected  their  purpose, 
and  set  bounds  to  Greek  invasion.  These  successes  changed 
the  character  of  the  city  itself ;  it  no  longer  aimed  at 
being  merely  pre-eminent  in  commerce,  but  at  establishing 
an  empire  as  mistress  of  Libya  and  of  part  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean. 

About  the  year  450  B.C.  the  Carthaginians  refused 
any  longer  to  pay  rent  for  the  soil  they  occupied  to 
the  natives,  and  were  thus  enabled  to  prosecute  agri- 
culture on  a  greatly  extended  scale.  Capital  thus  found 
a  new  outlet,  and  the  rich  soil  of  Libya  was  cultivated  on 
a  system  similar  to  that  employed  by  modern  planters. 
Single  landowners  appear  to  have  employed  on  their 
estates  no  fewer  than  twenty  thousand  slaves.     Moreover, 


118  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

the  native  Libyan  farmers  were  subdued,  and  reduced  to 
the  position  of  fellahs,  who  paid  a  fourth  of  the  produce 
of  their  soil  as  tribute  to  their  new  masters,  and  served  as 
a  recruiting'  ground  for  the  Carthaginian  armies.  The 
Nomades,  or  roving  pastoral  tribes,  were  driven  back  into 
the  deserts  and  mountains,  or  were  compelled  to  pay- 
tribute  and  supply  soldiers.  The  capture  of  their  great 
town  Theveste  took  place  about  the  time  of  the  first 
Punic  war.  These  two  classes  of  subjects  gave  rise  to  the 
expression  found  in  Carthaginian  state  treaties  of  "  towns 
and  tribes  of  subjects;  "  the  first  refers  to  the  dependent 
Libyan  villages,  the  second  to  the  subject  Nomades. 
Thirdly,  the  Carthaginian  rule  embraced  the  other 
Phoenician  settlements  in  Africa,  or  the  so-called  Liby- 
Phoenicians.  These  consisted  partly  of  the  older  Phoenician 
colonies,  such  as  Hippo,  Hadrumetum,  Thapsus,  and  the 
Little  and  Great  Leptis ;  partly  of  colonies  sent  from 
Carthage  itself.  These  states,  with  the  exception  of 
Utica,  the  ancient  protectress  of  Carthage,  lost  their 
independence,  and  had  to  pull  down  their  walls  and  to 
contribute  a  fixed  sum  of  money  and  a  definite  number  of 
soldiers.  But  they  did  not  pay  a  land-tax,  nor  were  they 
subject  to  the  recruiting  system  like  the  subject  Libyans  ; 
and  they  enjoyed  equal  legal  privileges  and  right  of 
intermarriage  with  the  Carthaginians. 

Thus  Carthage  became  the  capital  of  a  great  North 
African  empire,  extending  from  the  desert  of  Tripoli  to 
the  Atlantic  ocean  ;  on  the  west  (Morocco  and  Algiers), 
indeed,  she  merely  held  a  belt  along  the  coast,  but  on  the 
east  (Constantine  and  Tunis)  she  extended  her  sway  far 
into  the  interior.  In  the  words  of  an  ancient  writer,  the 
Carthaginians  were  changed  from  Tyrians  into  Libyans. 
The  Phoenician  tongue  and  civilization  were,  at  any  rate 
among  the  more  advanced  natives,  adopted  in  Libya. 
These  changes  have  been  associated  with  the  name  of 
Hanno ;  but  they  were  no  doubt  gradual,  and  cannot, 
therefore,  be  assigned  to  any  period  with  precision.  The 
rise  of  Carthage  was  synchronous  with  a  decline  of  the 
great  cities  in  the  mother-country  of  Tyre  and  Sidon  ; 
and  from  the  first-named  most  of  the  powerful  families 
emigrated  to  their  prosperous  daughter  city. 

In  addition  to  the  empire  in  Libya  we  must  bear  in 


CARTHAGE.  119 

mind  tlie  parallel  growth  of  the  maritime  and  colonial 
dominion  of  Carthage.  The  early  Tyrian  settlement  at 
Gades  (Cadiz)  was  the  chief  Phoenician  colony  in  Spain. 
By  a  chain  of  factories  on  the  west  and  east  of  Gades,  and 
by  the  possession  of  the  silver  mines  in  the  interior,  the 
Phoenicians  occupied  nearly  all  the  modern  Andalusia 
and  Granada.  Although  not  strictly  under  the  rule  of 
Carthage,  no  doubt  Gades  and  the  other  stations  in  Spain 
fell  under  her  hegemony.  The  island  of  Ebusus  and  the 
Baleares  were  early  occupied  by  the  Carthaginians,  partly 
as  fishing-stations,  partly  as  outposts  against  the  Greek 
colony  of  Massilia,  with  which  Carthage  was  ever  at  war. 
Moreover,  about  500  B.C.,  the  Carthaginians  established 
themselves  in  Sardinia,  the  natives  of  which  island  retired 
before  them  into  the  mountainous  interior,  just  as  the 
Numidians  withdrew  to  the  borders  of  the  African  desert. 
The  fertile  districts  of  the  Sardinian  coast  were  cultivated 
by  imported  Libyans,  and  colonies  were  planted  at  Cavalis 
(Cagliari)  and  other  points.  They  also  held  the  west  and 
north-west  coast  of  Sicily,  together  with  the  smaller 
adjacent  islands  of  the  Aegates,  Melita,  Gaulos,  Cossyra ; 
the  station  at  Motya,  and  later  at  Liljbaeum,  preserved 
their  communication  with  Africa,  as  those  at  Panormus 
and  Soluntum  did  with  Sardinia.  For  a  long  period, 
down  to  the  Athenian  expedition  to  Sicily  (415—413 
B.C.),  the  Greeks  and  Carthaginians  seem  to  have  agreed 
to  tolerate  one  another  in  Sicily.  All  these  posses- 
sions served  not  only  as  commercial  centres,  but  as 
pillars  of  the  Carthaginian  supremacy  by  sea.  The 
western  straits  of  the  Mediterranean  were  practically 
closed  to  other  nations,  and  in  the  Tyrrhene  and  Gallic 
seas  alone  the  Phoenicians  had  to  endure  the  rivalry  of 
foreign  fleets.  As  long,  indeed,  as  the  Etruscan  power 
counterbalanced  the  Greek  in  those  waters,  Carthage 
could  afford  to  remain  passive ;  but  on  the  fall  of  the 
Etruscans  and  the  rise  of  the  naval  power  of  Syracuse, 
a  great  contest  ensued  between  Dionysius  of  Syracuse 
(406-865  B.C.)  and  Carthage,  in  the  course  of  which  all 
the  smaller  Greek  cities  in  Sicily  were  either  totally 
destroyed,  e.g.  Selinus,  Himera,  Agrigentum,  Gela,  and 
Messana,  or  reduced  to  a  state  of  utter  prostration.  The 
island    was    partitioned    between    the    Syracusans    and 


120  EISTOBY  OF  HOME. 

Carthaginians,  and  on  several  occasions  eauli  side  in  turn 
was  on  the  point  of  completely  expelling  its  rival  from 
the  island.  But  gradually  the  balauce  inclined  iu  favour 
of  the  Carthaginians,  and,  after  the  failure  of  the  attempt 
of  Pyrrhus  to  restore  the  Syracusau  fleet,  the  Carthagi- 
nians commanded  Avithont  a  rival  the  whole  western 
Mediterranean ;  and  their  efforts  to  occupy  Syracuse, 
Rhegium,  and  Tarentum,  show  the  extent  of  their  power, 
and  the  objects  they  had  in  view.  They  shrank  from  no 
violence  in  their  attempt  to  monopolize  the  whole  trade 
of  the  West ;  any  foreigner  sailing  towards  Sardinia  and 
Gades,  if  apprehended,  was  thrown  into  the  sea ,  and  the 
treaty  of  306  B.C.  closed  every  Phoenician  port  except  that 
of  Carthage  against  Roman  vessels,  which  forty-two  years 
before  had  been  allowed  to  trade  with  the  ports  in  Spain, 
Sardinia,  and  Libya. 

The  constitution  of  Carthage  was  described  by  Aristotle 
as  having  chauged  from  a  monarchy  to  an  aristocracy,  or 
as  a  democracy  inclining  towards  oligarchy.  The  conduct 
of  affairs  was  directly  vested  in  the  hands  of  a  council  of 
elders,  which  consisted,  like  the  Spartan  gerusia,  of  two 
kings,  annually  nominated  by  the  citizens,  and  of  twenty- 
eight  elders  also  annually  chosen  by  the  same  body.  All 
the  chief  business  of  state  was  transacted  by  this  council, 
and  the  general  and  his  chief  officers,  who  were  always 
"  elders,"  were  appointed  by  it.  The  kings  seem  to  have 
had  compai'atively  little  power,  and  acted  as  supreme 
judges.  The  general  was  much  more  of  an  autocrat,  and 
is  described  by  Roman  writers  as  a  dictator ;  the  term  of 
his  office  was  not  fixed,  but  the  gerusiasts  attached  to  him 
as  sub-commanders  must  have  restricted  his  power,  and 
on  laying  down  his  office  he  had  to  give  an  official  account 
of  his  actions. 

But  over  the  gerusia  and  the  magistrates  was  the  body 
of  the  Hundred  and  Four,  or  the  judges,  the  bulwark  of 
the  Carthaginian  oligarchy.  Its  origin  was  due  to  the 
danger  that  threatened  Carthage  of  all  the  power  being 
concentrated  in  the  hands  of  a  single  family.  Public 
offices  could  be  bought,  and,  as  the  supreme  board  con- 
sisted originally  of  only  a  few  members,  this  result  was 
not  only  possible,  but  did  actually  occur  in  the  case  of  the 
Mago  family.     The  aristocratic  opposition  brought  about 


CARTHAGE.  121 

a  reform  and  created  this  body  of  the  judges.  Although, 
there  is  considerable  obscurity  as  to  the  mode  of  their 
election  and  the  length  of  their  tenure  of  office,  we  may 
infer  from  the  name  of  senators,  given  them  by  the 
Greeks  and  Romans,  that  they  practically  held  office  for 
life,  and  that  they  were  elected  by  some  method  of 
co-optation.  At  first  intended  to  act  as  political  jurymen 
and  hear  the  accounts  of,  and,  if  necessary,  punish  the 
general,  or  any  of  the  gerusiasts,  the  judges  gradually 
came  to  interfere  in  all  legislation  and  thus  usurp  the 
functions  of  those  gerusiasts  whom  they  controlled.  We 
can  thus  easily  understand  how  the  generals  and  states- 
men of  Carthage  were  perpetually  hampered  in  council 
and  action  by  the  fear  of  this  control. 

The  body  of  citizens  seems  to  have  exercised  very  little 
influence  in  Carthage.  Open  corruption  prevailed  in  the 
election  of  gerusiasts ;  and,  although  the  people  were 
consulted  in  the  election  of  a  general,  their  opinion  was 
only  taken  after  the  general  had  been  nominated  by  the 
gerusia.  On  other  questions  the  people  were  only  con- 
sulted if  the  gerusia  thought  fit  to  do  so.  The  citizens 
possessed  no  assemblies  with  judicial  functions ;  they 
were  split  up  into  political  coteries  or  mess  associations, 
like  the  Spartan  pheiditia,  and  these  were  probably  guilds 
under  oligarchical  management. 

Viewing  the  Carthaginian  constitution  as  a  whole,  we 
may  conclude  that  the  government  was  one  of  capitalists, 
such  as  would  arise  in  a  city  where  there  was  no  rich 
middle  class,  but  merely  a  city  rabble  on  the  one  hand 
and  a  class  of  great  merchants,  planters,  and  noble 
governors  on  the  other.  Beguiled  by  the  bribes  of  the 
rich  governing  class,  the  needy  nobles  did  not,  for  a  long 
time  at  least,  play  the  part  of  leaders  of  a  democratic 
revolution,  and  thus,  up  to  the  time  of  the  first  Punic 
war,  no  influential  party  representing  a  democratic 
opposition  had  arisen.  At  a  later  time,  due  in  some 
measure  to  the  defeats  sustained  by  the  Carthaginian 
arms,  such  a  party  arose  to  prominence,  and  by  its 
rapidly  increasing  influence  broke  down  the  power  of  the 
Carthaginian  oligarchy.  At  the  close  of  the  second  Punic 
war  Hannibal  carried  a  proposal  that  no  member  of  the 
Council  of  a  Hundred  should  hold  office  for  two  consecutive 


122  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

years ;  and  thus  a  complete  democracy  was  introduced ; 
but,  owing  to  the  corruption  prevalent  at  Carthage,  and 
the  ungovernable  nature  of  the  body  of  citizens,  such 
revolutions  were  powerless  to  effect  the  good  they  brought 
about  in  other  states. 

Regarded  from  a  financial  point  of  view,  Carthage 
stands  pre-eminent  among  the  states  of  antiquity.  Poly- 
bius  calls  it  the  wealthiest  city  in  the  world,  and  indeed 
it  rivalled  the  London  of  our  own  times.  The  high  pitch 
reached  by  the  Carthaginians  in  the  art  of  husbandry  is 
attested  by  the  agricultural  treatise  of  Mago,  the  text- 
book not  only  of  Carthage  but  of  Rome,  which  was 
translated  into  Greek  and  edited  in  Latin  by  the  express 
order  of  the  Roman  senate,  for  the  benefit  of  Italian 
landholders.  The  close  connection  between  agriculture 
and  the  management  of  capital  was  a  special  feature  of 
their  enlightened  system  ;  no  one  held  more' land  than  he 
could  thoroughly  manage.  Thus  enriched  at  home  by  the 
well-nigh  inexhaustible  resources  of  fertile  Libya,  whose 
horses,  oxen,  sheep,  and  goats  excelled  those  of  all  other 
lands,  and  drawing  a  huge  rental  from  her  subjects,  while 
abroad  she  held  in  her  hands  the  trade  and  manufactures 
of  the  interior  as  well  as  of  the  coasts  of  the  western 
Mediterranean,  Carthage  occupied  a  commercial  position 
up  to  that  time  unrivalled  in  the  ancient  world;  and  the 
whole  carrying  trade  between  east  and  west  became 
more  and  more  concentrated  in  her  single  harbour.  For 
science  and  art  Carthage  was  chiefly  indebted  to  Hellenic 
influences,  and  rich  treasures  were  carried  off  to  Carthage 
from  Sicilian  temples.  Native  intellect  was  subservient 
to  the  interests  of  capital :  and  therefore  her  literature 
bore  chiefly  upon  agriculture  and  geography,  and  such 
subjects  as  advanced  commerce.  The  same  utilitarian 
view  of  education  caused  the  Carthaginians  to  pay  special 
attention  to  the  knowledge  of  foreign  languages.  In 
consequence  of  the  huge  accumulation  of  wealth  in  the 
city  no  direct  taxation  was  found  necessary  ;  and  after 
the  second  Punic  war,  when  the  power  of  Carthage  was 
broken,  it  was  found  possible,  by  a  stricter  administration 
of  the  finances,  to  meet  the  current  expenses  and  pay  the 
yearly  instalment  of  £48,000  to  Rome  without  levying 
any  tax.     Carthage  anticipated  the  economical  principles 


CARTHAGE.  123 

of  a  later  epoch  in  her  financial  management  of  loans  and 
currency.  "  In  fact,  if  government  had  resolved  itself 
into  a  mere  mercantile  speculation,  never  would  any  state 
have  solved  the  problem  more  brilliantly  than  Cartliage." 
Some  comparison  between  the  resources  of  Rome  and 
Carthage  will  be  a  fitting  close  to  this  chapter.  Both 
cities  were  purely  agricultural  and  mercantile,  art  and 
science  in  both  playing  a  subordinate  and  wholly  practical 
part.  In  Rome  the  landed  interest  still  preponderated 
over  the  moneyed :  in  Carthage  the  reverse  was  the  case. 
In  the  former  the  great  mass  of  citizens  tilled  their  own 
fields,  in  the  latter  the  agricultural  interest  was  centred 
in  the  hands  of  large  landholders  and  slave-owners.  Thus 
at  Rome,  owring  to  the  fact  that  most  of  the  citizens  held 
property,  the  tone  was  conservative ;  in  Carthage  the 
majority  held  no  property,  and  were  therefore  moved 
alike  by  the  bribes  of  the  rich  and  the  reform-cries  of  the 
democrats.  Rome  still  prescribed  pristine  frugal  sim- 
plicity in  her  mode  of  life ;  Carthage  was  the  victim  of 
opulence  and  luxury. 

Politically,  the  constitution  of  both  was  aristocratic. 
The  judges  of  Carthage  and  the  senate  of  Rome  governed 
on  the  same  system  of  police-control.  In  both  cities  the 
individual  magistrate  was  subject  to  the  control  of  the 
governing  board,  but  the  cruel  severity  and  absurd 
restrictions  visible  in  the  Carthaginian  system  contrast 
very  unfavourably  with  the  milder  and  more  reasonable 
powers  of  the  Roman  council.  Moreover,  the  Roman 
senate  was  open  to  and  filled  by  men  of  eminent  ability, 
representatives  of  the  nation  in  the  truest  and  best  sense, 
while  the  Carthaginian  senate  exercised  a  jealous  control 
on  the  executive,  and  represented  only  a  few  leading 
families,  and  was  inspired  by  a  sense  of  mistrust  of  all 
above  and  below  it.  Hence  the  steady  unwavering  policy 
of  Rome,  and  the  confidence  and  good  understanding 
generally  existing  between  the  senate  and  its  magistrates  ; 
while  at  Carthage  a  wavering  half-hearted  policy  was 
pursued,  and  the  best  officers  were  generally  at  feud  with 
the  governing  body  at  home,  and  were  thus  forced  to  join 
the  reform  or  opposition  party.  Again,  as  to  their  treat- 
ment of  subject  states,  Rome  threw  open  her  citizenship  to 
one  district  after  another,  and  made  it  even  legally  attain- 


12A  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

able  by  the  Latin  communities :  Carthage  never  allowed 
such  a  hope  to  be  entertained,  still  less  to  be  realized 
Rome  granted  a  share  in  the  fruits  of  victory,  and  sought 
to  create  a  party  in  each  state  favourable  to  her  own 
interests  ;  Carthage  reserved  to  herself  all  the  spoils  of 
victory,  and  took  away  from  all  cities  the  freedom  of 
trade.  Rome  allowed  a  shadow  of  independence  even  to 
the  lowest  grade  of  her  subject  states,  and  imposed  a 
fixed  tribute  on  none  ;  Carthage  enforced  a  heavy  tribute 
on  even  the  old  Phoenician  cities  (with  the  exception  of 
Utica),  and  treated  subject  tribes  as  state  slaves.  Thus 
every  African  community  (with  the  above  exception) 
would  have  profited  by  the  fall  of  Carthage,  whereas 
every  state  in  Italy  would  have  lost  rather  than  gained 
by  a  rebellion  against  Rome.  The  strength  of  the  Roman 
alliance  was  shown  in  the  war  against  Pyrrhus;  the 
landing  of  Agathocles  and  Regulns  in  Africa,  and  the 
mercenary  war,  proved  the  hollow  and  rotten  nature  of 
the  Carthaginian  confederacy.  In  Sicily  alone  Carthage 
pursued  a  wiser  and  milder  policy,  owing  to  her  inability 
to  take  Syracuse,  and  thus  there  was  always  a  party 
there  favourable  to  her  interests. 

The  state  revenues  of  Carthage  were  far  superior  to 
those  of  Rome,  but  the  sources  of  that  revenue — tribute 
and  customs — were  exhausted  far  sooner  than  those  of 
Rome,  and  the  Carthaginian  mode  of  conducting  war  was 
far  costlier  than  the  Roman. 

Though  very  different,  the  military  resources  of  the  two 
rivals  were  not  unequally  balanced.  Carthage,  at  the 
time  of  her  conquest,  still  numbered  700,000  citizens,  and 
at  the  close  of  the  fifth  century  she  could  put  into  the 
field  an  army  of  40,000  hoplites.  Rome's  advantage  lay 
not  so  much  in  the  superiority  of  numbers,  as  in  the 
superior  physique  and  character  of  the  Roman  husband- 
man. Neither  the  Carthaginians  nor  the  Libj-Phoenicians 
were  naturally  soldiei's ;  the  flower  of  the  Carthaginian 
armies  consisted  of  the  Libyans,  who  made  good  infantry, 
and  were  unsurpassed  as  light  cavalry.  Aided  by  the 
forces  of  the  dependent  tribes  of  Libya  and  Spain,  and  by 
the  famous  slingers  of  the  Baleares,  as  well  as  by  merce- 
nary foreigners,  the  Carthaginians  could  raise  their  armies 
to  almost  any  strength ;  but  a  long  and  dangerous  interval 


CARTHAGE.  125 

must  elapse  before  such  hosts  could  be  collected,  and, 
when  assembled,  they  lacked  that  unity  of  interests  and 
ties  of  fatherland  which  made  the  Roman  army  so  formid- 
able. Moreover,  the  relations  between  the  Carthaginian 
officers  and  the  mercenary  and  Libyan  troops  were 
marked  by  a  callous  indifference  on  the  one  hand,  and 
a  dangerous  and  mutinous  dissatisfaction  on  the  other. 
Officers  broke  their  word  to  the  troops,  and  even  betrayed 
them, — wrongs  which  were  bitterly  avenged  by  Libyan 
insurrections.  Great  efforts  were  always  made  by  the 
Carthaginian  government  to  remedy  the  defects  of  their 
military  system.  Not  only  were  the  army  chests  and 
magazines  kept  fully  stored,  but  special  attention  was 
paid  to  all  machines  of  war,  aud  to  the  use  of  elephants. 
As  the  Carthaginians  did  not  dare  to  fortify  their  de- 
pendent cities,  owing  to  their  fear  of  their  subject  states, 
they  spared  no  pains  in  making  Carthage  impregnable. 
Rome,  on  the  other  hand,  allowed  most  of  the  subject 
towns  to  retain  their  walls,  and  secured  her  power  by  a 
chain  of  frontier  fortresses  throughout  Italy.  The  great 
strength  of  Carthage  lay  in  her  war-marine,  composed  of 
ships  and  sailors  unrivalled  in  the  world.  Ships  with 
more  than  three  banks  of  oars  were  first  built  at  Carthage, 
and  her  quinqueremes  were  better  sailers  than  the  Creek 
ships  of  war.  In  this  point  Rome  was  no  match,  and 
could  not  at  this  period  venture  into  the  open  sea  against 
her  rivals. 

To  sum  up,  the  resources  of  the  two  great  powers  were 
at  the  outset  very  equally  matched ;  but  the  danger  of 
Carthage  lay  in  the  want  of  a  land  army  of  her  own, 
and  of  a  confederacy  of  states  resting  on  a  secure  and 
self-supporting  basis.  It  was  plain  that  neither  Rome 
nor  Carthage  could  be  seriously  attacked  except  in  the 
home  of  her  power :    but,  in  the  one  case,  almost  insu- 

Eerable  obstacles  met  the  invader;  while,  in  the  other,  half 
is  task  was  accomplished  as  soon  as   he  had  set  foot 
on  African  soil. 


126 


HISTORY  OF  ROME. 


AUTHORITIES. 


Phoenicians.— Strab.  756-760.     Thuc.  i.  8,  13,  16,  100 ;  viii.  81,  87. 
Carthage  ;  position,  etc. — Strab.  832,  sqq.     Polyb.  i.  73-75.     Appian, 

Lib.  i.  sqq.     Plat.  Timol.  8. 
Colonies. — Appian  Sp.  2-3. 

Constitution. — Polyb.  vi.  51,  sqq.     Aristot.  Pol.  ii.  11. 
Resources.— Strab.  833,  sqq.     Polyb.  iii.  39,  vi.  52. 


CHAPTER   XIII. 

THE    FIRST   PUNIC   WAB,    264-241    B.C. — EXTENSION   OF 
ROMAN   DOMINION. 

State  of  Sicily — Cause  of  rupture  between  Rome  and  Carthage- 
Roman  fleet — Naval  victories  of  Mylae,  260  B.C.,  and  Ecnomus, 
256  B.c. — Regulus  in  Africa — Siege  of  Lilybaeum,  and  Roman 
defeat  off  Drepana,  249  B.C. — Despondency  at  Rome — Victory  at 
Aegusa,  2-A1  B.C. — Terms  of  peace — Roman  administration  of  the 
new  provinces — Suppression  of  Illyrian  piracy — Conquest  of  the 
Italian  Celts. 

As  was  but  natural,  the  first  conflict  between  Rome  and 
Carthage  had  its  origin  in  the  island  which  lay  between 
Italy  and  Africa.  After  Pyrrhus  had  been  driven  from 
Sicily  and  Italy  in  275  B.C.,  the  Carthaginians  were  left 
masters  of  more  than  half  the  island,  and  were  in  pos- 
session of  the  important  town  of  Agrigentum.  Syracuse 
retained  nothing  but  Taui*omenium  and  the  south-east  of 
the  island.  We  have  above  (p.  91)  alluded  to  the  roving 
and  mercenary  character  of  the  Catnpanian  youth,  who, 
feeling  no  strong  attachment  to  their  native  land,  had 
ever  been  willing  to  join  the  forces  of  Greek  adventurers. 
On  the  death  of  Agathocles  a  band  of  these  mercenaries 
had,  by  an  act  of  odious  treachery,  seized  Messana  (cf. 
p.  106),  and  in  a  short  time  these  Mamertines,  or  men  of 
Mars,  as  they  styled  themselves,  became  the  third  power 
in  Sicilv.  Their  increasing  strength  was  not  unwelcome 
to  the  Carthaginians,  who  gladly  saw  a  new  and  hostile 
power  established  close  to  Syracuse.  Hiero,  the  new 
ruler  and  able  general  of  Syracuse,  made  great  efforts 
to  rest-ore  the  city  to  its  former  eminence,  and  to  unite 


128  HISTORY  OF  R03IE. 

• 
the  Sicilian  Greeks.  Being  at  peace  for  the  time  with 
the  Carthaginians,  he  turned  his  arms  against  Messana, 
at  the  very  time  that  Rome  was  taking  vigorous  measures 
against  the  Campanian  kinsmen  of  the  Mamertines,  who 
had  established  themselves  in  Rhegium.  Hiero  succeeded 
in  shutting  up  the  Mamertines  in  their  city,  and  was  on 
the  point  of  successfully  terminating  a  siege  which  had 
lasted  some  years,  when  the  Mamertines  in  their  dire 
strait  turned  for  help  to  Rome,  and  offered  to  deliver 
their  city  into  her  hands.  "  It  was  a  moment  of  the 
deepest  significance  in  the  history  of  the  world,  when 
the  envoys  of  the  Mamertines  appeared  in  the  Roman 
senate."  If  the  Romans  acceded  to  their  request,  they 
would  not  only  do  violence  to  their  own  feelings  of  right 
and  wrong,  by  receiving  into  alliance  a  band  of  adven- 
turers stained  with  the  worst  crimes,  whose  very  kinsmen 
in  Rhegium  they  had  just  punished  for  the  same  offence, 
but  they  would  throw  aside  their  views  of  establishing 
a  mere  sovereignty  in  Italy  for  the  wider  and  more 
dangerous  policy  of  interference  with  the  outside  world — 
a  policy  which  could  not  fail  to  bring  them  into  compli- 
cated relations  with  powers  strictly  outside  their  own 
land.  A  war  with  Carthage,  serious  as  it  might  prove, 
was  not  the  only  result  that  might  follow  such  a  step; 
no  one  could  calculate  the  consequences  of  so  bold  a  leap 
in  the  dark.  After  long  deliberation  the  senate  referred 
the  matter  to  the  citizens;  and  they,  fired  by  a  con- 
sciousness of  what  they  had  already  achieved,  and  by  a 
belief  in  their  future  destiny,  authorized  the  senate  to 
receive  the  Mamertines  into  the  Italian  confederacy,  and 
to  send  them  aid  at  once — 265  B.C. 

The  question  now  was,  what  would  be  the  action  of  Car- 
thage and  of  Hiero,  both  nominally  allies  of  Rome,  when 
the  news  came  that  the  Mamertines  were  under  Roman 
protection,  and  that  therefore  Hiero  must  desist  from 
his  siege  of  Messana.  We  have  already  pointed  out  (p. 
10S)  that  the  relations  between  Carthage  and  Rome  had 
been  somewhat  strained  by  the  Carthaginian  attempt  to 
occupy  Tarentum  in  272  B.C.  Envoys  were  now  sent 
to  Carthage  to  demand  explanations  of  this  act;  but  the 
Carthaginians  avoided  an  open  rupture,  and  did  not 
threaten  to  regard  the  meditated  Roman  invasion  of  Sicily 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC   WAR.  129 

as  a  casus  belli.  When,  however,  the  Roman  fleet,  to- 
gether with  the  vanguard  of  the  land  army  under  Gaius 
Claudius,  appeared  at  Rhegiura  in  the  spring  of  274  B.C., 
news  came  that  Hiero  and  the  Mamertines  had  accepted 
the  mediation  of  Carthage,  that  the  siege  of  Messaua  was 
raised,  and  the  town  in  the  hands  of  Hanno,  the  Cartha- 
ginian admiral.  The  Mamertines,  while  thanking  Rome 
for  her  speedy  aid,  said  that  they  no  longer  required  it. 
The  Roman  general,  however,  refused  to  acquiesce  in  this 
arrangement,  and,  despite  the  warnings  of  the  Cartha- 
ginians, set  sail.  Although  at  first  foiled  by  the  Car- 
thaginian fleet,  he  succeeded  in  crossing  on  the  second 
attempt,  and  seized  the  town  of  Messana,  which  the 
cowardly  Carthaginian  admiral  evacuated.  Carthage 
declared  war  264  B.C.,  and  a  strong  fleet  under  Hanno, 
the  son  of  Hannibal,  blockaded  Messana.  At  the  same 
time  a  Carthaginian  land  army  laid  siege  to  the  town 
on  the  north  side,  and  Hiero  undertook  the  attack  on 
the  south  side  of  the  city.  But  the  Roman  consul,  Appius 
Claudius  Caudex,  crossed  over  from  Rhegium,  and,  uniting 
his  forces  with  those  of  Claudius,  surprised  the  enemy,  and 
succeeded  in  raising  the  siege.  In  the  following  year 
(263  B.C.)  Marcus  Valerius  Maximus,  afterwards  called 
Messalla,  "the  hero  of  Messana,"  defeated  the  allied 
armies  of  Carthage  and  Syracuse.  Upon  this  Hiero  went 
over  to  the  Roman  side,  and  continued  to  be  the  most  im- 
portant and  the  firmest  ally  the  Romans  bad  in  the  island. 
The  desertion  of  Hiero  and  the  success  of  Roman  arms 
forced  the  Carthaginians  to  take  refuge  in  their  fortresses; 
and  the  succeeding  year  (262  B.C.)  practically  saw  the 
close,  for  the  time  being,  of  the  war  in  Sicily.  The  siege 
of  Agrigentum,  which  was  held  by  Hannibal,  son  of  Gisgo, 
and  the  flower  of  the  Carthaginian  army,  was  the  main 
episode  in  this  year.  Unable  to  storm  so  strong  a  city, 
the  Romans  strove  to  reduce  it  by  famine,  but  were 
themselves  cut  off  from  provisions  by  the  arrival  of  a 
Carthaginian  fleet  under  Hanno.  At  last  a  severe  battle, 
in  which  both  sides  suffered  heavily,  gave  Rome  the 
coveted  town;  although  the  besieged  Carthaginians, 
during  the  confusion  and  exhaustion  of  their  conquerors, 
managed  to  escape  to  their  fleet  at  Heraclea.  This  victory 
placed  the  whole  island  in  the  hands  of  the  Romans,  with 

9 


130  ITISTORY  OF  ROME. 

the  exception  of  the  maritime  fortresses,  held  by  the  firm 
grip  of  Hamilcar,  and  the  coast  towns,  which  were  awed 
into  obedience  by  the  all-powerful  Carthaginian  fleet. 
The  real  difficulties  of  the  war  were  at  last  beginning 
to  be  realized  by  the  Romans,  and  the  necessity  of  a  fleet 
was  clearly  recognized.  Not  only  was  it  impossible  for 
them  completely  to  subdue  Sicily  while  Carthage  ruled 
the  sea,  but  their  own  coast  was  continually  ravaged  by 
Carthaginian  privateers,  and  their  commerce  was  well- 
nigh  ruined.  Therefore  they  resolved  to  build  a  fleet 
of  one  hundred  quinqueremes  and  twenty  triremes.  A 
stranded  Carthaginian  man-of-war  served  as  a  model  to 
the  Roman  shipbuilders,  and  in  the  spring:  of  260  B.C. 
the  great  task  was  accomplished,  and  the  fleet  launched. 
We  have  above  shown  in  what  poor  estimation  the  Romans 
held  naval  matters  (cf.  p.  108),  and,  even  now,  not  only 
the  sailors  but  also  the  naval  officers  were  almost  ex- 
clusively drawn  from  their  Italian  allies.  To  compensate 
for  their  ignorance  of  nautical  tactics  and  manoeuvres, 
the  Romans  made  great  use  of  soldiers  ;  and  by  lowering 
flying-bridges  on  to  the  Carthaginian  ships,  and  fastening 
them  with  grappling-irons,  they  reduced  the  fight  to  a 
land  conflict,  making  it  possible  to  board  and  capture 
the  enemy's  ships  by  assault.  The  first  great  trial  of 
strength  took  place  at  Mylae,  a  promontory  to  the  north- 
west of  Messana,  where  the  Roman  fleet  under  Gaius 
Duilius  encountered  the  Carthaginian  fleet  under  the 
command  of  Hannibal.  The  Carthaginians,  despising 
their  awkward-looking  opponents,  fell  upon  them  in 
irregular  order;  but  the  boarding-bridges  gave  the 
Romans  a  complete  victory,  the  moral  effect  of  which  was 
far  greater  than  the  victory  itself.  "  Rome  had  suddenly 
become  a  naval  power,  and  held  in  her  hand  the  means 
of  energetically  terminating  a  war,  which  threatened  to 
be  endlessly  prolonged,  and  to  involve  the  commerce  of 
Italy  in  ruin."  In  the  following  year  (259  B.C.)  the 
consul  Lucius  Scipio  captured  the  port  of  Aleria  in 
Corsica ;  but  no  permanent  hold  was  gained  in  Sardinia, 
although  the  coast  was  plundered.  In  Sicily,  Hamilcar 
showed  great  skill  and  energy  in  his  conduct  of  the  war, 
and  by  political  proselytism,  as  well  as  by  force  of  arms, 
baffled  the  Romans  in  their  attempts  to  completely  oust 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC   WAR.  131 

the  Carthaginiaus.  The  small  towns  inland  continually 
returned  to  their  Carthaginian  allegiance,  while  the 
fortresses  on  the  coast,  of  which  Panormus  and  Drepana 
were  the  chief,  were  practically  impregnable.  The  war 
dragged  on  without  any  decisive  action.  At  last,  weary 
of  this  unsatisfactory  state  of  things,  the  Romans  deter- 
mined to  strike  at  Carthage  in  her  native  land.  In  the 
spring  of  256  B.C.  a  powerful  fleet  of  330  ships  set  sail  for 
Africa ;  on  the  way,  it  received  on  board  at  Himera,  on  the 
south  coast  of  Sicily,  four  legions  under  the  command  of 
the  two  consuls,  Marcus  Atilius  Regulus  and  Lucius 
Manlius  Volso.  The  Carthaginian  fleet,  consisting  of 
some  350  ships,  had  taken  up  its  station  at  Ecnomus  to 
protect  its  native  shores ;  thus,  when  the  two  fleets  met, 
each  side  must  have  numbered  little  less  than  one  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  men.  After  an  obstinate  struggle,  in 
which  both  sides  suffered  heavily,  the  Romans  gained  the 
day ;  and  the  consuls,  having  deceived  the  Carthaginians 
as  to  their  place  of  landing,  disembarked,  without  any 
hindrance  from  the  enemy,  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  gulf 
of  Carthage,  at  the  bay  of  Clupea.  An  entrenched  camp 
was  formed  on  a  hill  above  the  harbour ;  and  so  confident 
were  the  Romans  rendered  by  the  success  of  their  plan, 
that  half  the  army  and  most  of  the  fleet  were  recalled 
home  by  the  senate.  Regulus  remained  in  Africa  with 
40  ships,  15,000  infantry,  and  500  cavalry.  The  terror- 
stricken  Carthaginians  did  not  dare  to  face  the  Romans 
in  the  field;  the  towns  everywhere  surrendered,  and  the 
Numidians  rose  in  revolt  against  Carthage.  Cowed  by 
this  accumulation  of  disasters,  the  proud  Phoenician  city 
sued  for  peace,  but  the  exorbitant  terms  proposed  by 
Regulus  were  little  calculated  to  render  such  a  solution 
possible.  Under  the  spur  of  dire  necessity,  Carthage 
evinced  that  energy  and  enthusiasm  which  on  such 
occasions  often  marks  Oriental  nations.  Hamilcar,  the 
hero  of  the  guerilla  war  in  Sicily,  appeared  on  the  scene 
with  the  flower  of  his  Sicilian  troops ;  gold  purchased 
the  support  both  of  Numidian  cavalry  and  of  Greek 
mercenaries,  among  whom  was  the  Spartan  Xanthippus, 
famous  for  his  knowledge  and  skill  in  the  art  of  war. 
During  the  energetic  preparations  of  Carthage,  Regulus 
remained  idle   at    Tunes ;    he   still  pretended   to    besiege 


132  IUSTORT  OF  ROME. 

Carthage,  and  did  not  even  take  measures  to  secure  his 
retreat  to  the  naval  camp  at  Clupea.  His  folly  cost  him 
dear.  In  the  spring  of  255  B.C.  the  Carthaginians  wen 
in  a  position  to  take  the  field ;  and  Regulus  accepted 
battle  without  waiting  for  reinforcements.  Roman  cour- 
age availed  not  against  the  superior  tactics  of  Xanthippus. 
Outflanked  and  surrounded  by  the  Numidian  horse,  crushed 
and  completely  broken  up  by  the  elephants,  the  Romans 
were  almost  annihilated.  The  consul  was  one  of  the  few 
prisoners ;  about  two  thousand  fugitives  reached  Clupea 
in  safety.  On  the  news  of  this  disaster  reaching  Rome, 
a  large  fleet  at  once  started  to  save  the  remnant  shut  up 
in  Clupea.  After  defeating  the  Carthaginians  off  the.  Her- 
maean  promontory,  the  Roman  ships  arrived  at  Clupea,  and 
carried  off  what  remained  of  the  army  of  Regulus.  Content 
with  accomplishing  this,  they  sailed  horaewanls,  and  thus 
evacuated  a  most  important  position,  and  left  their  African 
allies  to  Carthaginian  vengeance.  To  crown  the  misfor- 
tunes of  Rome,  a  terrible  storm  destroyed  three-fourths  of 
their  fleet,  and  only  eighty  ships  reached  home  iu  safety 

Carthage  took  a  stern  vengeance  on  the  revolted  Nu- 
midians,  and  filled  her  exhausted  treasury  with  the 
heavy  fines  in  money  and  cattle  Avhich  she  exacted  from 
her  rebellious  subjects.  Able  now  to  assum3  the  offen- 
sive, she  despatched  Hasdrubal,  so.i  of  Hanno,  to  Sicily, 
with  a  force  especially  strong  in  elephants.  He  landed 
at  Lilybaeum,  and  Sicily  once  more  became  the  theatre  of 
the  war.  A  new  Roman  fleet  of  three  hundred  ships  was 
despatched  thither  in  the  incredibly  short  space  of  three 
months ;  and  the  Carthaginian  stronghold  of  Panormus, 
with  many  other  places  of  minor  importance,  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Romans.  But  by  land  no  progress  was 
made,  and  the  Romans  did  not  dare  to  risk  a  battle  in 
the  face  of  the  overwhelming  numbers  of  Carthaginian 
elephants.  The  year  254  B.C.  passed  by  ;  and  the  next 
year,  while  returning  from  a  plundering  expedition  to  the 
coast  of  Africa,  the  Romans  lost  150  vessels  in  another 
storm,  owing  to  their  obstinate  refusal  to  allow  the  pilots 
to  take  their  own  course.  The  senate,  utterly  downcast 
by  this  disaster,  reduced  their  fleet  to  sixty  sail,  and 
limited  themselves  to  the  defence  of  the  coast  and  the 
convoy  of  transports.     The  land  war  in  Sicily  was  more 


THE  FIRST  FUNIC   WAR.  133 

successful.  In  252  B.C.,  Thermae,  the  last  Carthaginian 
position  on  the  north  coast,  and  the  island  of  Lipara, 
yielded  to  Roman  arms  ;  and  in  the  following  year  the 
consul  Gaius  Caecilius  Metellus  gained  a  great  victory 
over  the  Carthaginian  army  under  the  walls  of  Panormus, 
owing  to  the  disorder  of  the  elephants,  which  charged 
their  own  side.  The  Carthaginians  could  no  longer  take 
the  field,  and  in  a  short  time  they  only  retained  their 
hold  on  Drepana  and  Lilybaeum.  The  Romans  refused 
the  Carthaginian  proposals  for  peace  in  249  B.C.,  and  con- 
centrated all  their  efforts  on  the  capture  of  Lilybaeum. 
This  was  the  first  great  siege  undertaken  by  Rome;  but 
the  greater  adroitness  of  the  Carthaginian  sailors  and  the 
ability  of  Himilco,  the  commander  of  Lilybaeum,  parried 
all  the  efforts  of  the  Romans  both  by  sea  and  land.  Foiled 
in  their  efforts  to  take  the  city  by  assault,  they  were 
forced  to  attempt  to  reduce  it  by  blockade ;  but  they 
were  unable  to  completely  prevent  Carthaginian  ships 
from  running  into  the  harbour  with  supplies  from  Drepana, 
while  the  light  Numidian  cavalry  made  all  foraging  both 
difficult  and  dangerous  on  land.  In  addition,  disease, 
arising  from  the  malaria  of  the  district,  thinned  the  ranks 
of  the  Roman  land  army.  Weary  of  the  tedious  blockade, 
the  new  consul,  Publius  Claudius,  attempted  to  surprise 
the  Carthaginian  fleet  as  it  lay  at  anchor  before  Drepana. 
Completely  outmanoeuvred  by  the  Phoenician  admiral, 
Atarbas,  the  Roman  consul  fell  into  the  trap  set  for  him, 
and  only  escaped  by  prompt  flight  himself.  Ninety-three 
Roman  vessels,  with  the  legions  on  board,  were  captured; 
and  the  Carthaginians  won  their  first  and  only  great  naval 
victory  over  the  Romans.  Lilybaeum  was  thus  set  free 
from  the  blockade  by  sea ;  in  fact,  the  remains  of  the 
Roman  fleet  were  in  their  turn  blockaded  by  the  Car- 
thaginian vice-admiral,  Carthalo.  The  latter  also  took 
advantage  of  the  folly  of  the  second  consul,  Lucius  Junius 
Pullns,  who  was  in  charge  of  a  second  Roman  fleet,  in- 
tended to  convey  supplies  to  the  army  at  Lilybaeum. 
Carthalo  met  this  fleet  off  the  south  coast,  sailing  in  two 
squadrons  at  some  distance  from  each  other;  interposing 
his  own  ships  between  the  squadrons,  he  forced  both  to 
run  on  shore.  A  violent  storm  completed  the  work  begun 
by  Carthaginian  assaults,  and  both  squadrons  were  com- 


134  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

pletely  wrecked,  while  the  Carthaginians  easily  weathered 
the  storm  out  on  the  open  sea. 

Now,  if  ever,  was  the  time  for  Carthage  to  humble 
her  great  antagonist.  During  a  war  of  fifteen  years  the 
Romans  had  lost  four  fleets,  three  with  armies  on  board; 
and  one  land  army  had  been  destroyed  in  Libya.  This, 
added  to  the  many  minor  losses  by  disease,  guerilla  war- 
fare, battles  by  sea  and  land,  had  reduced  the  burgess- 
roll,  from  the  years  252-247  B.C.  alone,  by  about  forty 
thousand  men,  without  reckoning  the  losses  of  the  allies, 
who  bore  the  whole  brunt  of  the  war  by  sea.  The  loss  of 
ships  and  war-material,  and  the  utter  paralysis  of  trade, 
had  inflicted  incalculable  damage.  Moreover,  every  method 
and  every  plan  had  been  tried,  and  Rome  was  no  nearer 
the  end  than  she  was  at  the  outset  of  the  war.  In  utter 
despondency  the  senate  no  longer  felt  equal  to  the  task  of 
subduing  Sicily  ;  the  fleet  was  discarded,  and  the  state 
ships  were  placed  at  the  disposal  of  privateer  captains, 
whose  unaided  valour  might  perhaps  compensate  in  some 
degree  for  the  feebleness  of  the  senate.  The  miserable 
indolence  and  weakness  of  the  Carthaginian  government 
alone  saved  Rome  :  relieved  of  the  necessity  of  self- 
defence,  the  Carthaginians  imitated  the  example  of  their 
enemy,  and  confined  their  operations  by  land  and  sea  to 
the  petty  warfare  in  and  around  Sicily 

The  next  six  years  of  uneventful  warfare,  from  248-243 
B.C.,  reflect  little  credit  on  Carthage,  and  still  less  on  Rome. 
Hamilcar,  named  Barak  or  Barca  (i.e.  lightning),  the 
Carthaginian  commander  in  Sicily,  alone  showed  proper 
energy  and  spirit.  Aware  that  the  infantry  of  Car- 
thage were  no  match  for  the  Roman  legions,  and  aware 
that  his  mercenaries  cared  as  little  for  Carthage  as  for 
Rome,  he  proved  that  personal  attachment  to  a  general 
could  compensate  in  the  minds  of  his  soldiers  for  the 
want  of  ties  of  nation  and  country.  He  established 
himself  on  mount  Ercte  (Monte  Pellegrino),  and  later 
captured  the  town  of  Eryx,  and  from  these  strong  posi- 
tions he  carried  on  a  plundering  warfare,  and  levied  con- 
tributions from  the  plains,  while  Phoenician  privateers 
ravaged  the  Italian  coast.  The  Romans  were  unable  to 
dislodge  him  from  either  of  his  positions,  and  every  day 
threatened   to   bring  fresh   defeat   and   disgrace  to   the 


TEE  FIRST  PUNIC   WAR.  135 

Roman  arms.  No  Roman  general  was  a  match  for  Hamil- 
car,  and  the  Carthaginian  mercenary  had  learnt  to  look 
the  Roman  legionary  in  the  face.  This  gloomy  aspect 
of  affairs  was  completely  changed,  not  by  the  energy  of 
the  Roman  government,  but  by  the  noble  patriotism  of 
individuals.  By  private  subscription  a  fleet  of  two  hundred 
ships,  manned  by  sixty  thousand  sailors,  and  fitted  out 
with  the  greatest  care,  was  raised  and  presented  to  the 
state.  This  fleet,  under  the  consul  Gaius  Lutatius  Ca- 
tulus,  had  no  difficulty  in  occupying  the  harbours  of 
Drepana  and  Lilybaeum,  and  prosecuted  the  siege  of  both 
places  with  great  vigour.  Carthage,  taken  by  surprise, 
despatched  a  weak  fleet  with  supplies  to  the  beleaguered 
towns,  and  hoped  to  effect  a  landing  without  interference 
from  the  Romans.  They  were,  however,  intercepted  and 
forced  to  accept  battle  off  the  small  island  of  Aegusa,  in 
the  spring  of  241  B.C.  The  result  was  never  doubtful, 
and  the  Romans  gained  a  complete  and  decisive  victory. 
"  The  last  effort  of  the  Roman  patriots  had  borne  fruit ; 
it  brought  victory,  and  with  victory  peace." 

Peace  was  concluded  at  last  on  terms  not  wholly  un- 
favourable to  Carthage.  Sicily,  however,  had  to  Le 
abandoned,  and  Hamilcar  was  forced  by  the  incapacity  of 
others  to  descend  from  the  positions  he  had  occupied  for 
seven  years  with  such  conspicuous  success.  In  addition 
to  Sicily,  Carthage  ceded  all  the  islands  between  Sicily 
and  Italy.  She  was  also  condemned  to  pay  a  war  in- 
demnity of  £790,000,  a  third  of  which  was  to  be  paid 
down  at  once,  and  the  remainder  in  ten  annual  instal- 
ments. But  Hamilcar  refused  to  accede  to  certain  de- 
mands of  the  Roman  consul ;  and  the  independence  and 
integrity  of  the  Carthaginian  state  and  territory  were 
expressly  guaranteed.  Both  Rome  and  Carthage  bound 
themselves  not  to  enter  into  a  separate  alliance  with  any 
dependency  of  the  other,  nor  in  any  way  to  encroach  on 
the  rights  which  each  exercised  in  her  own  dominions. 
The  dissatisfaction  of  the  patriotic  party  at  Rome  was  so 
great,  that  at  first  the  public  assembly  refused  to  sanction 
the  proposed  terms  of  peace.  But  a  commission  was 
appointed  to  settle  the  question  on  the  spot  in  Sicily ; 
and  practically  the  proposals  of  Catulus  were  adopted, 
and  Hamilcar,  the  unconquered  general  of  a  vanquished 


136  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

nation,  delivered  up  to  the  new  masters  of  Sicily  the 
fortresses  which  had  been  in  the  possession  of  the  Phoeni- 
cians for  at  least  four  hundred  years  ;  and  in  241  B.C.  the 
West  had  peace. 

The  severe  struggle,  which  thus  ended  in  the  extension 
of  Roman  dominion  beyond  Italy,  throws  a  strong  and  by 
no  means  favourable  light  on  the  Roman  military  and 
political  system.  Notwithstanding  the  noble  patriotism 
and  heroic  energy  often  exhibited  by  the  citizens,  we 
cannot  fail  to  mark  the  miserable  vacillation  shown  by 
Rome  in  the  conduct  of  this  war.  The  fact  is  that  the 
organization  of  the  Roman  senate  and  of  the  military 
system  were  only  adapted  for  a  purely  Italian  policy,  and 
a  purely  continental  war.  The  wide  area  of  the  battle- 
field, the  necessity  of  a  fleet,  the  siege  of  maritime 
fortresses,  were  all  hitherto  unknown  to  the  Romans. 
For  the  solution  of  such  problems  the  senate,  from  its 
composition  and  ignorance,  was  quite  unfitted  :  moreover, 
the  system  of  choosing  a  new  commander  every  year, 
often  to  reverse  the  plans  of  his  predecessor,  was  mani- 
festly absurd.  The  noble  creation  of  this  war — a  Roman 
fleet — was  never  truly  Roman ;  Italian  Greeks  com- 
manded, and  subjects,  nay  even  slaves  and  outcasts, 
composed  the  crews ;  naval  service  was  always  held  in 
slight  esteem  when  compared  with  the  honour  of  the 
legionary.  The  general,  again,  as  we  see  in  the  case  of 
Regulus,  could  not  change  his  tactics  to  suit  the  exigen- 
cies of  the  moment.  The  old  idea  that  any  citizen  was 
fit  to  be  a  general  wa3  true  only  in  rustic  warfare,  while 
the  notion  that  the  chief  command  of  the  fleet  should  be 
regarded  as  a  mere  adjunct  of  the  chief  command  of  the 
land  army  excites  our  wonder  and  ridicule.  To  the 
energy  of  her  citizens,  and  still  more  to  the  terrible 
blunders  of  her  adversaries,  Rome  owed  her  victorious 
issue  from  the  first  Punic  war. 

In  the  years  that  followed  this  peace  Rome  gradually 
extended  her  dominion  to  what  we  may  term  the  natural 
boundaries  of  Italy,  to  the  Alps  in  the  north  and  to  Sicily 
in  the  south.  On  the  expulsion  of  the  Phoenicians,  Rome 
contented  herself  with  allowing  her  steadfast  ally,  Hiero, 
to  retain  his  independence  as  ruler  of  Syracuse,  and  of  the 
neighbouring  districts  of  Elorus,  Neetum,  Acrae,  Leontini, 


EXTENSION  OF  SOMAN  DOMINION.  137 

Megara,  and  Tauromenium  ;  the  rest  of  Sicily  she  per- 
manently appropriated.  Meanwhile  Carthage,  in  con- 
sequence of  her  cowardly  and  miserly  attempt  to  dock 
the  pay  of  the  mercenaries  of  Hamilcar,  was  engaged  in 
a  deadly  conflict  with  her  revolted  soldiers  and  her  Libyan 
dependencies,  among  whom  the  revolution  spread  far  and 
wide.  The  city  of  Carthage  itself  was  besieged,  and  not 
only  in  Libya  but  even  in  Sardinia  the  insurgents  looked 
to  Rome  for  aid.  Some,  although  she  refused  to  succour 
the  revolted  Libyans,  availed  herself  of  the  treachery 
of  the  Sardinian  garrisons,  and  seized  possession  of  that 
island  in  23S  B.C.  ;  shortly  afterwards  she  added  Corsica 
to  her  new  possessions.  Carthage,  restored  by  the  genius 
of  Hamilcar  to  her  full  sovereignty  in  Africa,  demanded 
in  237  B.C.  the  restitution  of  Sardinia;  but  she  did  not 
dare  to  take  up  the  gage  of  battle  which  was  promptly 
thrown  down  by  Rome;  and  therefore  she  had  to  submit 
to  the  cession  of  Sardinia,  and,  in  addition,  to  pay  1200 
talents  (£292,000). 

The  acquisition  of  Sicily  and  Sardinia  caused  an  im- 
portant change  in  the  Roman  method  of  administration, 
and  one  which  marked  the  difference  between  Italy  and 
the  provinces,  between  the  conquests  of  Rome  in  her  own 
proper  land  of  Italy  and  those  she  made  across  the  sea.  The 
necessity  of  some  special  magistrate  for  these  transmarine 
regions  caused  the  appointment  of  two  provincial  praetors, 
one  for  Sicily,  and  one  for  Sardinia  and  Corsica  ;  the  coasts 
of  these  latter  islands  alone  were  occupied,  and  with  the 
natives  of  the  wild  interior  perpetual  war  was  waged. 
The  two  praetors  exercised  powers  very  similar  to  those  of 
the  consuls  in  early  times  ;  the  praetor  was  commander-in- 
chief,  chief  magistrate,  and  supreme  judge.  One  or  more 
quaestors  were  assigned  to  each  praetor,  to  look  after 
the  finance-administration.  With  the  exception  of  this 
difference  in  the  chief  power,  the  same  principles  were 
adhered  to  as  those  which  Rome  had  observed  in  organiz- 
ing her  dependencies  in  Italy.  All  independence  in 
external  relations  was  taken  away  from  the  provincial 
communities;  every  provincial  was  restricted,  as  regards 
the  acquisition  of  property,  and,  perhaps,  the  right  of 
marriage,  to  his  own  community.  But  in  Sicily,  at  least, 
the    cities   retained    their   old  federal    organization,  and 


138  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

their  harmless  federal  diets  :  the  power  of  coining  money 
was  probably  withdrawn.  The  land,  however,  was  left 
untouched,  and  each  Sardinian  and  Sicilian  community 
retained  self-administration  and  some  sort  of  autonomy. 
A  general  valuation  corresponding  to  the  Roman  census 
was  instituted  every  fifth  year,  and  all  democratic  con- 
stitutions were  set  aside  in  favour  of  aristocratic  councils. 

Another  de  facto  distinction,  of  great  importance,  between 
the  Italian  and  transmarine  communities,  was  that  the 
latter  furnished  no  fixed  contingent  to  the  army  or  fleet 
of  Rome ;  they  lost  the  right  of  bearing  arms,  and  could 
only  use  them  in  self-defence  when  called  upon  by  the 
praetor.  In  lieu  of  a  contingent  they  paid  a  tithe  of 
their  produce  and  a  tax  of  five  per  cent,  on  all  articles  of 
commerce  exported  or  imported  ;  these  taxes  were  not 
new  to  the  Sicilian  Greeks,  who  had  paid  them  to  the 
ruling  power,  whether  the  Persian  king,  Carthage,  or 
Syracuse.  Certain  communities  were  no  doubt  exempted 
from  these  imposts ;  Messana,  for  instance,  was  enrolled 
in  the  Roman  alliance,  and  furnished  its  contingent  of 
ships ;  other  towns,  such  as  Segesta  and  Halicyae,  Centu- 
ripa  and  Alaesa,  and  Panormus,  the  future  capital  of 
Roman  Sicily,  though  not  admitted  as  confederates  of 
Rome,  were  exempted  from  taxation.  But  on  the  whole 
the  position  of  Sicilian  and  Sardinian  communities  was 
one  of  tributary  subjection,  not  of  dependent  alliance. 

By  the  possession  of  Sicily,  Sardinia,  and  Corsica, 
Rome  might  now  call  the  Tyrrhene  sea  her  own.  On  the 
east  coast,  the  founding  of  Brundisium  in  244  B.C.  had 
from  the  first  established  Roman  supremacy  ;  the  quarrels 
of  the  Greek  states  prevented  any  rival  power  arising  in 
Greece  itself.  But  the  Adriatic  Sea  was  a  prey  to  Illyrian 
pirates,  and  hordes  of  these  tribes,  in  their  dreaded  Libnr- 
nian  galleys,  defied  all  authority  and  ravaged  every  coast. 
They  established  themselves  in  Phoenice,  the  most  flourish- 
ing town  in  Epirus,  and  at  length  took  possession  of  the 
rich  island  of  Corcyra.  Urgent  appeals  from  hard-pressed 
Greek  settlements  on  the  Adriatic  coast,  and  constant 
complaints  from  Italian  mariners,  at  last  caused  Rome 
to  interfere,  and  to  send  an  embassy  to  Agron,  king  of 
Scodra  and  Illyria,  with  demands  that  he  should  put  the 
evil  down.     His  refusal  was  met  with  an  insulting  threat 


EXTENSION   OF  ROMAN  DOMINION.  139 

from  one  of  the  Roman  envoys,  for  which  all  the  ambas- 
sadors paid  with  their  lives.  A  Roman  fleet,  with  an 
army  on  board,  appeared  to  succour  the  hard-pressed 
town  of  Apollonia  in  229  B.C.,  and  the  corsairs  were 
completely  vanquished  and  their  strongholds  razed  to  the 
ground.  The  territory  of  the  sovereigns  of  Scodra  was 
greatly  restricted  by  the  terms  imposed  by  Rome  ;  and 
much  of  the  Illyrian  and  Dalmatian  coasts,  together  with 
several  Greek  cities  in  that  quarter,  was  practically 
reduced  under  Roman  sway,  or  attached  to  Rome  under 
forms  of  alliance.  The  Greeks  submitted  with  a  good 
grace  to  the  humility  of  seeing  their  countrymen  delivered 
from  the  scourge  of  piracy  by  barbarians  from  across  the 
sea,  and  admitted  the  Romans  to  the  Isthmian  games  and  the 
Eleusinian  mysteries.  Macedonia  was  too  weak  to  protest 
by  aught  but  words,  and  that  part  she  disdained  to  play. 

With  the  exception  of  a  six-days'  war  with  Falerii  in 
241  B.C.,  nothing  broke  the  peace  of  Italy  proper.  But 
matters  were  not  so  settled  in  the  northern  district 
between  the  Alps  and  the  Apennines,  where  strong  Celtic 
races  still  held  their  ground.  South  of  the  Po  were  the 
Boii  and  Lingones,  and  other  minor  tribes  ;  the  Ligurians, 
mingled  with  isolated  Celtic  tribes,  occupied  the  Apen- 
nines to  the  west,  near  the  sources  of  the  Po ;  while  the 
eastern  part  of  the  plain  to  the  north  of  that  river,  from 
Verona  to  the  coast,  was  held  by  the  Veneti,  an  Illyrian 
race.  Besides  these,  were  the  Cenomani,  settled  near 
Cremona  and  Brescia,  and  the  most  important  of  all  the 
Celtic  tribes  in  Italy,  the  Insubres,  who  were  established 
around  Milan.  It  was  but  natural  that  Rome  should  now 
wrest  the  gates  of  the  Alps  from  the  grasp  of  the  bar- 
barian, and  make  herself  mistress,  not  only  of  the  mighty 
river,  navigable  for  230  miles,  but  of  the  largest  and 
most  fertile  plain  in  the  then  civilized  Europe.  The 
Celts,  indeed,  had  begun  to  stir  in  238  B.C.,  and  two  years 
later  the  army  of  the  Boii,  united  with  the  Transalpine 
Gauls,  encamped  before  the  walls  of  Ariminum.  Fortu- 
nately for  Rome,  exhausted  as  she  then  was  by  her 
struggle  with  Carthage,  the  two  Celtic  hosts  turned  on 
one  another,  and  thus  freed  Rome  from  the  threatened 
danger.  In  232  B.C.,  the  Celts,  weary  of  waiting  for  the 
outbreak  of  that  contest  for  Lombardy,  which  they  per- 


140  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

ceived  was  inevitable,  resolved  to  strike  the  first  blow. 
All  the  Italian  Celts,  except  the  Cenomani  and  Veneti, 
took  part  in  the  war  against  Rome ;  advancing  to  the 
Apennines  in  225  B.C.,  from  which  quarter  the  Romans 
did  not  expect  an  attack,  they  ravaged  Etruria  up  to  the 
walls  of  Clusium ;  and  by  a  clever  strategy  almost 
succeeded  in  cutting  off  one  Roman  army  before  the 
other  could  relieve  it.  Failing  in  this  attempt,  the  Celts 
retreated,  bat  were  intercepted  at  Telamon  by  some 
legions  which  had  crossed  from  Sardinia  and  landed  at 
Pisae.  The  consul  Gaius  Atilius  Regulus  commanded 
this  force,  and  at  once  made  a  flank  attack  with  his 
cavalry ;  he  fell  in  the  engagement,  but  his  colleague, 
Papus,  at  the  head  of  the  Italian  army,  now  came  into 
action.  Despite  their  desperate  resistance  against  the 
double  attack,  the  Celts  were  utterly  defeated;  and  all 
the  tribes  south  of  the  Po  submitted  in  the  following 
year  (224;  B.C.).  The  next  year  saw  the  struggle  renewed 
on  the  northern  side  of  the  river.  The  valour  of  the 
Roman  soldiers  redeemed  the  blunder  of  their  general, 
Gaius  Flaminius,  and  turned  what  nearly  proved  a  defeat 
into  a  glorious  victory  over  the  Insubres.  Many  conflicts 
took  place  in  222  B.C.,  but  the  capture  of  the  Insubrian 
capital,  Mediolanum,  by  Gnaeus  Scipio,  put  an  end  to 
their  resistance.  Thus  the  Celts  of  Italy  were  completely 
vanquished ;  and,  though  in  the  most  northern  and  remote 
districts  Celtic  cantons  were  allowed  to  remain,  in  all  the 
country  south  of  the  Po  the  Celtic  race  gradually  dis- 
appeared. By  extensive  assignations  of  land  in  the 
country  between  Picenum  and  Ariminum;  by  carrying 
the  great  northern  highway,  or  "  Flaminian  road,"  on 
from  Narnia  across  the  Apennines  to  Ariminum  on  the 
Adriatic  coast;  by  planting  fortresses  and  Roman  town- 
ships, e.g.  Placentia  and  Cremona  on  the  Po  itself,  in  the 
newly  acquired  territory,  the  Romans  showed  their 
determination  to  reap  the  fruits  of  their  late  conquests ; 
but  a  sudden  event  checked  them  while  in  the  full  tide 
of  their  prosperity. 

AUTHORITIES. 

First  Punic  loar. — Polyb.  i.  5-end  ;  ii.  22-35.     Appian.  Sic.  2,  sq.; 

Lib.  3-5.     Dio.  Cass.  Fr.  43,  sq. 
Provincial  government. — Marq.  Stv.  i.  242,  sqq. 


CHAPTER   XIV. 

THE   SECOND   PUNIC,   OR  HANNIBALIAN,   WAR,    218-202   B.C. 

Hamilcar  Barca — Founds  kingdom  in  Spain — Hannibal — Capture  of 
Saguntum — Rome  declares  war — Hannibal  reaches  Gaul — 
Passage  of  the  Alps — Rise  of  the  Italian  Celts — Battles  on  the 
Ticinus  and  Trebia— Crossing  of  the  Apennines — Battle  at  Lake 
Trasimene — War  in  Apulia — Battle  of  Cannae — Its  results — 
State  of  things  in  Spain,  Africa,  Macedonia,  and  Sicily — Attitude 
of  Rome. 

The  most  shallow -minded  Carthaginian  can  scarcely 
have  regarded  the  peace  with  Rome  in  241  B.C.  as  likely 
to  prove  lasting.  Carthage  had,  no  doubt,  long  been 
divided  into  two  parties,  the  one  eager  for  political  reform, 
the  other  striving  to  retain  the  close  oligarchical  con 
stitution.  These  two  parties  were  now  further  rent 
asunder  by  the  cry  for  war  and  the  demand  for  peace. 
To  the  latter,  or  peace-party,  belonged  the  gerusia  and 
Council  of  a  Hundred,  under  the  leadership  of  Hanno;  to 
this  party  the  timorous  and  indolent,  the  worshippers  of 
money  and  place,  naturally  attached  themselves.  The 
war-party  found  its  chief  support  in  the  democratic  leaders 
and  military  officers,  among  whom  Hasdrubal  and  Hamil- 
car were  pre-eminent ;  the  wisest,  most  far-seeing,  and 
most  patriotic  Carthaginians  lent  their  aid  to  this  section 
of  the  state.  The  successful  conclusion  of  the  war  against 
the  revolted  Numidians,  while  it  made  clear  to  all  the 
genius  of  Hamilcar  Barca,  brought  out  in  odious  contrast 
the  miserable  incapacity  of  Hanno,  and  the  utterly  corrupt 
and  pernicious  character  of  the  ruling  oligarchy.  Great 
prominence  was  thus  given  to  the  patriotic  party ;  and, 
although  political  reform  was  impracticable,  while  Rome 


142  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

was  all-povvenul  and  gave  her  countenance  to  the 
treacherous  oligarchs,  important  changes  were  effected 
in  the  military  system  of  Carthage.  Hanno  was  deposed 
from  his  command,  and  Hamilcar  was  nominated  com- 
mander-in-chief of  all  Africa  for  an  indefinite  period.  He 
could  only  be  recalled  by  the  vote  of  the  popular  assembly, 
and  the  choice  of  a  successor  was  made  to  depend,  not  on 
the  magisterial  board  at  home,  but  on  the  decision  of  the 
officers  serving  in  the  army.  Apparently  Hamilcar  wa9 
invested  with  these  dictatorial  powers  for  the  purpose  of 
superintending  the  border- warfare  with  the  Numidians  ; 
but  we  shall  see  what  a  different  view  he  took  of  the 
charge  committed  to  him. 

The  task  set  Hamilcar  of  saving  the  state  by  means 
of  the  army  was  calculated  to  try  to  the  uttermost  the 
abilities  of  that  great  man.  Not  only  had  he  to  con- 
struct an  army  out  of  poor  material,  and  to  pay  his 
mercenaries  out  of  an  ill-supplied  chest,  but  he  had  also, 
as  leader  of  a  party,  to  please  and  delude  in  turn  the 
venal  multitude  at  home,  whose  fickle  devotion  he  knew 
but  too  well  how  to  appraise.  Although  still  a  young 
man,  Hamilcar  possibly  foreboded  his  premature  fate; 
and,  ere  he  left  Carthage,  he  bound  his  son  Hannibal, 
then  nine  years  of  age,  by  the  most  solemn  oath  to  swear 
eternal  enmity  to  Rome,  and  thus  he  transmitted  to  his 
children  his  schemes,  his  genius,  and  his  hatred.  At  the 
head  of  a  strong  army,  and  accompanied  by  a  fleet  under 
his  son-in-law,  Hasdrubal,  Hamilcar  marched  westwards, 
apparently  against  the  Libyans  in  that  quarter ;  suddenly, 
without  any  authority  from  the  government,  he  crossed 
over  into  Spain,  and  there  laid  the  foundations  of  the 
Spanish  kingdom  of  the  Barcides.  Of  his  personal  achieve- 
ments we  have  no  details,  save  that  Cato  the  elder,  on 
seeing  the  still  fresh  traces  of  his  work,  exclaimed  that  no 
king  was  worthy  to  be  named  by  the  side  of  Hamilcar 
Barca.  After  nine  years  of  constant  war  with  the  Spanish 
native  tribes,  when  he  was  beginning  to  see  the  result  of 
all  his  labours,  he  fell  fighting,  in  228  B.C. 

For  the  next  eight  years,  his  son-in-law,  Hasdrubal, 
carried  on  his  plans  in  the  same  spirit.  The  adroit 
statemanship  of  Hasdrubal  consolidated  the  Carthaginian 
kingdom  in  Spain,  which  the  generalship  of  Hamilcar  had 


TEE  SECOND  PUNIC.  OR  HANNIBALIAN,  WAR.       143 

founded.  The  fairest  regions  of  Spain,  the  southern  and 
eastern  coasts,  became  Carthaginian  provinces ;  towns 
were  founded,  chief  of  which  was  Cartagena  on  the  only- 
good  harbour  on  the  south  coast,  whose  silver  mines,  then 
first  discovered,  a  century  later  produced  a  yearly  yield  of 
more  than  £360,000.  The  revenues  of  the  province  not 
only  paid  for  the  maintenance  of  the  army,  but  enabled 
Hasdrubal  to  remit  a  large  sum  to  Carthage  every  year. 
The  native  chiefs  were  by  every  means  attached  to  Car- 
thage, and  all  the  subject  communities  served  as  an 
excellent  recruiting-ground  for  the  Carthaginian  army. 
Constant  conflicts  with  the  Iberians  and  Celtic  tribes  in 
Spain  greatly  improved  the  character  of  the  Carthaginian 
infantry.  The  revival  of  commerce,  which  thus  recouped 
in  Spain  what  it  had  lost  in  Sicily  and  Sardinia,  wras  in 
itself  a  sufficient  reason  for  the  non-interference  of  the 
home  government  with  the  plans  of  Hamilcar  and  Has- 
drubal. 

We  must  ascribe  the  inaction  of  Rome  during  such  a  long 
period  of  brilliant  Carthaginian  successes  to  the  ignorance  of 
the  Romans,  who  knew  very  little  of  so  remote  a  country  as 
Spain,  and  who,  no  doubt,  at  first  regarded  with  contempt 
the  reports  furnished  them  by  their  spies  in  Carthage. 
In  226  B.C.,  however,  the  senate  warned  Hasdrubal  not  to 
pass  the  Ehro,  and  received  into  alliance  the  two  Greek 
towns  on  the  east  coast  of  Spain.  Saguntum  and  Emporiae  ; 
by  fixing  this  limit  to  the  Carthaginian  advance,  the 
Romans  intended  to  secure  a  basis  of  operations  in  the 
country  between  the  Ebro  and  the  Pyrenees,  should 
occasion  arise  for  their  active  interference  in  Spain.  The 
delay  of  the  Romans  in  beginning  the  second  Punic  war 
was  due  to  many  causes,  but  chiefly  to  their  inability  to 
form  a  true  conception  of  the  great  scheme  which  the 
family  of  Barca  was  pursuing  with  such  success.  "  The 
policy  of  the  Romans  was  always  more  remarkable  for 
tenacity,  cunning,  and  consistency,  than  for  grandeur  of 
conception  or  power  of  rapid  organization." 

So  far  fortune  had  smiled  on  the  Carthaginians.  It  was 
not  fated  that  Hasdrubal  should  attempt  to  realize  the 
dream  of  his  great  predecessor.  In  220  B.C.,  he  fell  by  an 
assassin's  hand,  and  his  place  was  filled  by  Hannibal,  the 
eldest  son  of  Hamilcar,  then  in   his  twenty-ninth  year. 


144  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Despite  his  youth,  the  man  thus  chosen  by  his  comrades, 
in-arms,  was  fully  worthy  of  their  confidence.  Nature 
had  bestowed  upon  him  gifts  both  mental  and  physical, 
which  were  no  mean  qualifications  for  his  mighty  task ; 
education  and  association  had  completed  nature's  work. 
Brought  up  from  his  infancy  to  cherish  thoughts  of 
vengeance  on  Rome,  trained  as  a  soldier  in  early  youth 
under  his  father's  eye,  already  highly  distinguished,  as 
the  commander  of  the  Spanish  cavalry,  alike  for  personal 
bravery  and  for  the  higher  qualities  of  a  leader,  Hannibal 
was  specially  fitted  to  carry  out  the  great  projects  of  his 
father.  Anger,  envy,  and  meanness  have  written  his 
history,  but  have  not  been  able  to  mar  the  pure  and  noble 
image  which  it  presents.  Combining  in  rare  perfection 
discretion  and  enthusiasm,  caution  and  energy,  Hannibal 
was  marked  in  a  peculiar  degree  by  the  Phoenician  cha- 
racteristic of  inventive  craftiness.  "  Every  page  of  the 
history  of  the  period  attests  his  genius  as  a  general ;  and 
his  gifts  as  a  statesman  were,  after  the  peace  with  Rome, 
no  less  conspicuously  displayed  in  the  reform  of  the 
Carthaginian  constitution,  and  in  the  unparalleled  in- 
fluence which,  as  a  foreign  exile,  he  exercised  in  the 
cabinets  of  the  eastern  potentates.  The  power  which  he 
wielded  over  men  is  shown  by  his  incomparable  control 
over  an  army  of  various  nations  and  many  tongues — an 
army  which  never,  in  the  worst  times,  mutinied  against 
him.  He  was  a  great  man  ;  wherever  he  went,  he  riveted 
the  eyes  of  all." 

Hannibal  resolved  at  once  to  begin  the  war,  while  the 
Celts  in  Italy  were  still  unsubdued,  and  while  a  war 
between  Rome  and  Antigonus  Doson,  the  far-seeing  ruler 
of  Macedonia,  seemed  imminent.  Unfortunately  the  death 
of  the  latter  reduced  Macedonia  to  silence ;  while  the  death 
of  Hasdrubal  had  again  brought  the  peace-party  in  Car- 
thage to  the  helm  of  the  state.  But  Hannibal  was  not 
to  be  deterred  by  the  opposition  of  the  miserable  politicians 
at  home.  Having  in  vain  tried  to  provoke  the  people  of 
Saguntum  to  break  the  peace,  he  attacked  the  town  in 
219  B.C.  on  the  pretext  that  the  Saguntines  were  oppress- 
ing the  Torboletes,  a  native  tribe  subject  to  Carthage. 
The  authorities  at  home,  whose  sanction  Hannibal  had 
purposely  refused  to  wait  for,  did  not  dare  to  oppose  the 


TEE  SECOND  PUNIC,  OR  HANNIBALIAN,  WAR.      145 

war  thus  begun.  Owing  to  the  supineness  of  the  Romans, 
who  were  engaged  in  war  with  the  Illyrian  brigands, 
Sascuntum  fell  after  a  siege  of  eight  months ;  and  the  rich 
spoils  sent  home  to  Carthage  roused  the  people  to  such  a 
pitch  of  enthusiasm  that  they  accepted  the  challenge  of 
war  from  the  Roman  envoys,  who  had  been  sent  to  demand 
the  surrender  of  Hannibal,  in  the  spring  of  218  B.C. 

Hannibal  entrusted  the  safety  of  Spain  to  his  younger 
brother,  Hasdrubal,  and  sent  home  about  20,000  men  to 
defend  Africa.  The  fleet  remained  in  Spain  to  secure  the 
communications  between  that  country  and  Africa.  Two 
smaller  fleets  were  despatched,  the  one  to  ravage  the  coast 
of  Italy,  the  other  to  attempt  to  surprise  Lilybaeum,  and 
to  renew  the  war  in  Sicily.  Hannibal  himself,  relying  on 
the  enmity  of  the  Celts  and  Ligurians  to  Rome,  determined 
to  make  northern  Italy  the  meeting-place,  where  all  foes 
of  Rome  might  unite  and  aid  him  in  the  achievement 
of  his  great  enterprise.  It  is  not  clear  why  he  chose 
the  land-route,  the  old  pathway  of  Celtic  hordes,  in  pre- 
ference to  that  by  sea ;  for  neither  the  maritime  supre- 
macy of  the  Romans,  nor  their  league  with  Massilia, 
could  have  prevented  a  landing  at  Genoa. 

In  the  spring  of  218  B.C.,  with  a  force  of  90,000  infantry, 
12,000  cavalry,  and  37  elephants,  he  set  out  from  Cartagena 
to  cross  the  Ebro ;  and  he  inspired  all  his  soldiers  with 
enthusiasm  by  pointing  out  the  main  plan  and  object  of 
his  undertaking.  Distracted  by  the  unexpected  nature 
of  the  danger  which  threatened  them,  the  Romans  seem 
to  have  been  but  little  prepared  with  a  settled  plan  of 
war,  and  to  have  fatally  delayed  both  in  aiding  Saguntum 
and  in  meeting  Hannibal  on  the  Ebro  ;  the  losses  inflicted 
on  Hannibal  by  the  native  tribes,  when  he  forced  the 
passage  of  that  river,  show  clearly  where  the  Romans 
ought  to  have  first  opposed  him.  Part  of  his  troops  he 
left  behind  to  secure  the  newly  won  country  between  the 
Ebro  and  the  Pyrenees,  part  he  sent  home  on  reaching 
that  chain  of  mountains  ;  with  the  rest,  amounting  to 
50,000  infantry  and  9000  cavalry,  all  veterans,  he  crossed 
the  Pyrenees,  nor  did  he  meet  with  any  serious  resistance 
until  he  reached  the  Rhone,  opposite  Avignon  ;  there  a 
levy  of  Celts,  raised  by  the  consul  Publius  Cornelius 
Scipio,  but  not  yet  united  to  the  consular  army,  threatened 

10 


146  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

opposition.  Hannibal,  however,  by  buying  up  all  the 
available  boats,  and  constructing  rafts  with  great  speed, 
crossed  the  Rhone  at  the  same  moment  that  the  Celts 
were  taken  in  the  rear  by  a  detachment  under  Hanno, 
which  had  three  days  previously  crossed  the  Rhone  much 
higher  up.  Scipio,  although  warned  by  the  Celts  of 
Hannibal's  arrival,  had  delayed  fatally  at  Massilia  ;  when 
at  last  he  did  move  to  Avignon,  he  found  that  the  Cartha- 
ginians had  passed  on  into  the  Celtic  territory  on  the 
Roman  side  of  the  Rhone,  and  could  not  now  be  prevented 
from  reaching  the  Alps.  Hannibal  had  the  choice  of 
three  routes  in  crossing  the  Alps.  The  coast-route  was, 
however,  out  of  the  question,  as  it  was  not  only  barred  by 
the  Romans,  but  would  also  have  taken  him  away  from, 
his  destination.  The  remaining  two  routes  at  that  time 
consisted  of  the  pass  of  the  Cottian  Alps  (Mont  Genevre), 
which  route,  though  shorter,  passes  through  a  difficult 
and  poor  mountain  country,  and  of  the  pass  of  the  Graian 
Alps  (the  little  St.  Bernard).  This,  though  longer,  is  far 
the  easiest  to  traverse  ;  and  the  route  by  this  pass  leads 
through  the  broadest  and  most  fertile  of  the  Alpine 
valleys ;  moreover,  the  Celts  favourable  to  Hannibal  in- 
habited the  country  on  the  Italian  side  of  the  little 
St.  Bernard,  while  the  Cottian  pass  led  directly  into 
the  territory  of  the  Taurini,  a  Celtic  tribe  at  feud  with  the 
Insubres,  who  were  Hannibal's  allies.  Thus  every  cir- 
cumstance tended  to  make  Hannibal  choose  the  pass  of 
the  Graian  Alps.* 

The  march  along  the  Rhone  towards  the  valley  of  the 
upper  Isere,  through  the  rich  country  of  the  Allobroges, 
brought  the  Carthaginian  army,  after  sixteen  uneventful 
days,  to  the  foot  of  the  Alps,  and  there  the  first  dangers 
were  encountered  from  some  cantons  of  the  Allobroges, 
who  made  constant  assaults  on  the  army  during  its  ascent 
of  the  first  Alpine  chain,  and  during  the  descent  of  the 
precipitous  path  that  trends  sheer  down  to  the  lake  of 
Bourget.      A  welcome  rest  in  the  fertile  valley  of  Cham- 

*  The  question  as  to  the  Alpine  route  of  Hannibal  is  still  open. 
For  an  able  summary  of  the  various  views,  see  pp.  362-372  of  Mr. 
W.  T.  Arnold's  edition  of  the  third  volume  of  his  grandfather's  history. 
Strong  arguments  are  there  advanced  in  favour  of  the  Mont  Genevre 
and  of  the  Col  d'Argentiere  passes. 


TEE  SECOND  PUNIC,  OR  EANNIBAL1AN,  WAR.      147 

bery  gave  Hannibal  time  to  repair  his  losses  in  beasts 
of  burthen  and  horses.  Marching  up  the  Isere,  the  army 
now  entered  the  territory  of  the  Ceutrones,  whose  cour- 
teous hospitality  did  but  mask  their  coming  treachery. 
On  reaching  the  narrow  track  that  led  to  the  summit  of 
the  St.  Bernard,  Hannibal  found  the  pass  occupied  on  both 
sides,  and  in  the  rear,  by  the  perfidious  Ceutrones.  His 
forethought  in  sending  forward  the  baggage  and  cavalry 
saved  him  from  the  intended  robbery  of  his  supplies  ;  but 
all  along  the  line  of  his  ascent  constant  conflicts  caused 
not  only  loss  of  men  and  beasts,  but  confusion  and  utter 
despondency  in  his  soldiers'  hearts.  At  last,  however,  the 
summit  was  reached,  and,  after  a  brief  rest,  the  perilous 
descent  began  ;  here  the  late  season,  "with  its  fresh  mantle 
of  September  snows,  proved  more  terrible  than  the 
treacherous  attacks  of  barbarians.  But  all  difficulties 
gave  way  hefore  the  iron  will  and  unshaken  confidence  of 
the  great  general  ;  and  at  last  the  shattered  army  enjoyed  a 
nobly  earned  repose  in  the  plain  of  Ivrea,  quartered  in  the 
villages  of  the  friendly  Salassi,  clients  of  the  Insubres. 
Fortunately  for  Hannibal,  no  Roman  troops  were  stationed 
so  far  north  to  await  his  arrival.  The  Alps  were  crossed, 
and  Hannibal  had  attained  his  object;  but  to  this  end 
he  had  sacrificed  more  than  half  his  infantry  and  three 
thousand  cavalry.  The  military  value  of  this  wonderful 
achievement  may  well  be  called  in  question, but  the  courage, 
skill,  and  masterly  execution  of  the  plan  by  Hannibal 
himself  admit  of  no  doubt.  "  The  grand  idea  of  Hamilcar, 
that  of  taking  up  the  conflict  with  Rome  in  Italy,  was 
now  realized.  It  was  his  genius  that  projected  this  ex- 
pedition ;  and  the  unerring  tact  of  historical  tradition  has 
always  dwelt  on  the  last  link  in  the  great  chain  of  pre- 
paratory steps,  the  passage  of  the  Alps,  with  a  greater 
admiration  than  on  the  battles  of  the  Trasimene  lake 
and  of  the  plain  of  Cannae." 

Hannibal's  airrival  in  Italy  disconcerted  the  Roman 
plans.  The  army  of  Publius  Scipio  had  already  landed 
in  Spain,  under  the  command  of  Gnaeus,  the  brother  of 
Publius.  The  latter,  on  being  foiled  by  Hannibal  at  the 
passage  of  the  Rhone,  had  himself  returned  to  Pisae  with 
a  few  troops,  and  was  now  in  command  of  the  Roman 
force  in  the  valley  of  the  Po.     A  fortunate  delay  had 


148  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

prevented  the  army  of  the  other  consul,  Tiberius  Semprc- 
nius,  from  reaching  its  destination  in  Africa.  Owing  to 
the  futile  attempt  of  the  Carthaginian  squadron  to  surprise 
Lilybaeum,  and  the  threatened  attack  on  the  Italian  coast, 
Sempronius  had  passed  the  summer  in  securing  the 
Sicilian  and  Italian  coasts  against  the  possibility  of  sur- 
prise by  Carthaginian  fleets.  Urgent  orders  from  the 
senate  now  recalled  him  to  the  defence  of  Italy.  The 
Boii  and  Insubres,  who  had  been  driven  to  revolt  before 
the  time  agreed  upon  with  Hannibal,  by  the  erection  of 
the  Roman  fortresses  in  their  country,  fully  occupied  the 
attention  of  the  hard-pressed  colonists  and  of  the  two 
legions  sent  to  their  aid.  Thus  Hannibal  bad  time  both 
to  rest  his  troops,  capture  the  capital  of  the  Taurini,  and 
bring  over  to  his  side  all  the  Ligurian  and  Celtic  commu- 
nities in  the  upper  basin  of  the  Po,  before  Publius  Scipio 
encountered  him. 

The  two  armies  met  in  the  plain  between  the  Ticino 
and  the  Sesia,  not  far  from  Vercellae,  and  Scipio  was 
decisively  beaten,  owing  to  the  overpowering  force  of  the 
light  Numidian  cavalry.  Scipio  himself  was  severely 
wounded,  and  only  saved  by  the  spirited  devotion  of  his 
son,  then  a  youth  of  seventeen.  Scipio  at  once  wisely 
recrossed  the  Po,  and  broke  down  the  bridge  over  it. 
But  despite  his  able  precautions  Hannibal  easily  crossed 
the  river  higher  up  on  a  bridge  of  boats,  and  again 
confronted  the  Roman  army,  which  had  withdrawn  from 
its  previous  position  in  the  plain  before  Placentia  to 
a  very  strong  position  on  the  hills  behind  the  Trebia. 
Scipio,  although  unable  to  save  Clastidium  from  being 
plundered,  or  to  extinguish  the  torch  of  insurrection  now 
passed  on  from  Celtic  canton  to  Celtic  canton,  had  by  this 
move  completely  checked  the  advance  of  Hannibal ;  more- 
over, he  had  thus  given  an  opportunity  to  the  second 
army,  which,  under  Sempronius,  had  marched  by  land 
from  Messana  to  Ariminum,  to  unite  with  his  own  force 
at  Placentia.  The  Roman  army,  thus  strengthened  and 
occupying  a  highly  advantageous  position,  might  await 
with  confidence  the  next  move  of  Hannibal.  Fortunately 
for  the  latter,  Scipio's  wound  caused  the  sole  command  to 
devolve  on  Tiberius  Sempronius,  who  was  fired  with  im- 
patience to  avenge  the  previous  defeat  on  the  Ticinus, 


TEE  SECOND  PUNIC,  OB  HANNIBALIAN,  WAR.       149 

and  the  desolation  of  the  villages  of  such  Celts  as  still 
remained  loyal  to  Rome.  Drawn  on  by  the  simulated 
flight  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  the  Romans  crossed  the 
Trebia*  in  hot  pursuit,  and  suddenly  found  themselves 
face  to  face  with  the  whole  army  of  Hannibal  drawn  up 
for  battle.  The  Roman  cavalry  proved  no  match  for  their 
opponents ;  but  the  stubborn  courage  of  the  infantry 
resisted  every  attack  both  of  foot  and  horse,  until  a  picked 
force  of  two  thousand  Carthaginians  under  Mago  by  an 
attack  in  the  rear  decided  the  day.  Even  then  the  first 
division  of  the  Roman  infantry,  ten  thousand  strong,  cut 
their  way  through  the  midst  of  the  enemy  and  succeeded 
in  reaching  the  fortress  of  Placentia.  The  losses  of 
Hannibal  in  battle  fell  chiefly  on  the  Celts ;  but  many  of 
his  veterans  and  all  his  elephants,  except  one,  perished 
afterwards  of  fatal  diseases  caused  by  the  cold  and  wet  of 
that  bitter  December  day.  This  victory  made  Hannibal 
master  of  northern  Italy,  and  the  Celtic  insurrection 
spread  far  and  wide  without  let  or  hindrance  from  Roman 
arms.  Hannibal  bivouacked  for  the  winter  where  he 
was,  and  organized  the  Celtic  accessions  to  his  army, 
which  are  said  to  have  numbered  more  than  sixty  thou- 
sand infantry  and  four  thousand  cavalry. 

Despite  this  brilliant  success  Hannibal  was  probably 
well  aware  of  his  true  position  in  Italy.  He  knew  that 
his  chance  of  ultimate  victory  depended  rather  on  political 
than  military  achievements,  upon  the  gradual  loosening  and 
breaking  up  of  the  Italian  confederation :  as  long  as  that 
confederation  remained  united,  and  confronted  him  with  its 
vaoily  superior  resources,  he  no  doubt  felt  that  with  his 
inferior  infantry,  with  his  precarious  and  irregular  support 
from  home,  with  the  capricious  aid  of  the  fickle  Celts,  he 
had  no  hope  of  humbling  to  the  dust  his  proud  antagonist. 
Owing  to  this  conviction,  Hannibal's  conduct  of  the  war 
in  Italy  is  marked  by  a  constant  change  both  of  the 
theatre  of  war  and  of  the  plan  of  operations,  and  also  by 
an  earnest  endeavour  to  turn  every  success  to  good 
account  by  posing  as  the  liberator  of  Italian  cities  from 

*  On  the  geographical  questions  raised  by  the  battles  of  Trebia, 
Trasimene,  Cannae,  and  by  the  passage  of  the  Apennines  and  the 
escape  from  Fabius,  see  able  notes  by  Mr.  W.  T.  Arnold  in  his  edition 
above  referred  to,  pp.  373-399. 


150  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

the  tyranny  of  Rome.  With  this  object  in  view  he  released 
all  the  Italian  prisoners  without  a  ransom,  and  charged 
them  to  report  that  he  waged  war  against  Rome,  not 
Italy,  whose  saviour  and  restorer  of  ancient  powers  and 
independence  he  professed  himself.  The  Roman  prisoners, 
on  the  other  hand,  he  loaded  with  chains  as  slaves. 

In  the  early  spring  of  2L7  B.C.,  Hannibal  set  out  from 
the  Po  ;  aud  at  a  point  as  far  west  as  possible,  while  the 
new  consul,  Gaius  Flaminius,  lay  idle  at  Arretium,  he 
crossed  the  Apennines.*  His  army  suffered  terrible  hard- 
ships on  the  other  side  of  the  mountains  when  struggling 
through  the  low-lying  and  flooded  country  extending  be- 
tween the  Sere  hi  o  and  Amo,  and  Hannibal  himself  lost 
the  sight  of  one  eye  from  ophthalmia.  However,  at  last 
he  reached  the  rich  laud  at  Faesulae,  where  he  encamped, 
having  thus  completely  baffled  the  consul  Flaminius. 

The  latter,  raised  by  the  popular  party  at  Rome  to  a 
second  consulship,  did  not  wait  for  his  colleague,  Gnaeus 
Servilius,  to  leave  his  useless  post  at  Ariminum,  and  join 
him.  Fired  by  his  ambition  to  justify  the  good  opinion  of 
the  democrats,  and  stung  by  the  sight  of  the  devastation 
which  marked  far  and  wide  the  line  of  Hannibal's  march 
through  Etruria,  Flaminius  hastily  followed,  and  overtook 
Hannibal  in  the  district  of  Cortona.  Here  Hannibal 
had  chosen  his  field  of  battle — a  narrow  defile  between  two 
steep  mountains,  closed  at  its  outlet  by  a  high  hill,  and 
its  entrance  by  the  lake  Trasimene.*  The  outlet  was  barred 
by  the  Libyan  infantry,  and  on  both  sides  the  cavalry  and 
light  troops  of  Hannibal  were  posted  in  concealment. 
The  unsuspecting  Romans  in  the  thick  mist  advanced  into 
the  pass.  When  they  drew  near  the  hill  at  the  outlet,  the 
cavalry  of  Hannibal,  at  a  given  signal,  closed  the  entrance, 
and  the  mist  rolling  away  revealed  the  enemy  on  all  sides. 
There  was  no  battle  ;  it  was  a  mere  rout.  Fifteen  thou- 
sand Romans  fell,  and  among  them  the  consul  ;  and  as 
many  more  were  captured  :  while  Hannibal's  loss  was  but 
fifteen  hundred.  The  vanguard  of  the  Romans,  six  thou- 
sand strong,  proved  once  more  the  irresistible  might  of 
the  legion,  and  cut  its  way  through  the  opposing  infantry; 
but  they  were  next  day  surrounded  and  made  prisoners 
of  war  by  Maharbal,  at  the  head  of  a  squadron  of  cavalry. 
*  See  note  on  preceding  page. 


TEE  SECOND  FUNIC,  OB  HANNIBALIAN,  WAR.      151 

About  the  same  time  the  cavalry  of  the  army  of  Servilius, 
which  had  been  sent  forward  to  support  Flaminius,  fell  in 
with  the  enemy  and  was  cut  to  pieces.  All  Etruria  was 
lost ;  and  the  Romans  broke  down  the  bridges  over  the 
Tiber,  and  nominated  Quintus  Fabius  Maximus  dictator, 
to  make  all  preparations  for  the  defence  of  the  city,  upon 
which  it  was  supposed  Hannibal  would  at  once  march. 

Hannibal,  however,  knew  better;  suddenly  marching 
through  Umbria,  he  carried  fire  and  sword  through  the 
territory  of  Picenum,  and  then  gave  a  much-needed  rest 
to  his  army  on  the  shores  of  the  Adriatic.  More  than  this, 
he  here  adopted  the  marvellously  bold  experiment  of 
reorganizing  his  Libyan  infantry,  after  the  Roman  fashion, 
and  of  equipping  them  with  the  arms  taken  from  the 
Roman  spoils.  From  here,  too,  he  sent  messages  of  his 
victory  by  sea  to  Carthage.  After  a  sufficient  rest  and 
practice  of  the  new  method  of  warfare,  he  marched  slowly 
along  the  coast  into  southern  Italy.  His  hope  that  the 
Italian  confederacy  would  now  break  up  was  not  fulfilled  : 
not  a  single  community  entered  into  alliance  with  the 
Carthaginians. 

A  new  general  of  very  different  tactics  now  confronted 
Hannibal,  in  the  person  of  the  dictator  Quintus  Fabius. 
Elected  to  counteract  the  demagogic  spirit,  which  had 
given  the  consulship  to  Flaminius,  he  was  as  opposed 
in  strategy  as  in  policy  to  his  predecessor.  Determined 
to  avoid  a  pitched  battle,  and  to  wear  out  Hannibal 
by  small  conflicts  and  deprivation  of  provisions,  Fabius 
followed  Hannibal,  as  he  marched  over  the  Apennines 
into  the  heart  of  Italy  and  made  a  futile  attempt  on 
the  loyalty  of  Capua.  Bitter  indeed  must  have  been 
the  feelings  of  the  Roman  soldier  as  from  the  heights 
along  which  Fabius  marched  was  visible  the  flaming  track 
of  ruin  and  desolation  thi'oughout  Samnium  and  Cam- 
pania, beneath  the  devastating  blight  of  the  Numidian 
horsemen.  At  last,  however,  the  patient  policy  of  Fabius 
seemed  to  grasp  its  reward.  When  Hannibal,  foiled  in 
his  attempt  on  Capua,  be<*an  to  retreat,  Fabius  inter- 
cepted his  route  near  Casilinum  by  strongly  garrisoning 
that  town  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Volturnus,  and  occupying 
the  heights  commanding  the  right  bank  with  his  main 
army,  while  a  division  blockaded  the  road  along  that  river. 


152  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

•"% 
All  his  efforts  were,  however,  baffled  by  the  famous  ruse 
of  Hannibal,  who  caused  his  light-armed  troops  to  climb 
the  heights  immediately  above  the  road,  and  drive  before 
them  a  number  of  oxen  with  lighted  faggots  on  their 
horns.  The  Romans,  thinking  that  they  saw  the  whole 
Carthaginian  army  marching  off  during  the  night  by  torch- 
light, abandoned  their  blockade  of  the  road,  and  made  for 
the  heights.  Hannibal  thus  gained  a  free  passage  for  his 
main  army,  and  on  the  morrow  easily  disengaged  his  light 
troops ;  then  marching  north-east,  and  laying  all  the 
country  under  contribution  as  he  marched,  he  proceeded 
to  entrench  himself  for  the  winter  in  the  plains  of  Apulia 
at  Gerunium.  Huge  stores  of  grain  and  supplies  were 
daily  amassed  by  detachments  sent  out  for  that  purpose. 

Marcus  Minucius,  the  master  of  the  horse,  in  the  absence 
of  the  dictator  formed  a  camp  not  far  off,  in  the  territory 
of  the  Larinates ;  and  by  some  successful  engagements 
with  Carthaginian  detachments  he  caused  the  storm,  which 
had  long  been  brewing  at  Rome,  to  break  out  against 
Fabius  and  his  policy.  The  Roman  legions  felt  that  they 
had  borne  long  enough  the  passive  attitude  of  vigilant 
observation,  and  had  too  long  acquiesced  in  the  sight  of 
all  Italy  spoiled  by  the  invader  without  striking  a  blow 
in  her  defence.  Indeed,  the  policy  of  Fabius  not  only  did 
not  save  Rome,  but  never  really  hindered  Hannibal  from 
carrying  into  execution  any  single  operation  he  had 
planned.  The  outcry  at  Rome  gave  rise  to  the  absurd 
resolution  of  the  people,  by  which  Minucius  was  appointed 
co-dictator  with  the  same  powers  as  Fabius,  but  with  a 
diametrically  opposite  policy.  Minucius,  in  his  eagerness 
to  give  effect  to  his  spirited  policy,  was  soon  lured  into 
a  foolish  attack,  and  only  escaped  annihilation  by  the 
timely  rescue  of  Fabius.  Rome,  now  thoroughly  aroused, 
haughtily  declined  the  offers  of  money  from  Hiero  of 
Syracuse,  and  from  the  Greek  cities  in  Italy,  and  deter- 
mined to  send  out  such  a  force  as  had  never  before  been 
seen  :  consisting  of  eight  legions,  each  raised  a  fifth  above 
the  normal  strength,  with  a  corresponding  number  of  allies 
Weary  of  the  dictatorship,  and  bitterly  distrusting  the 
senate,  the  people  elected,  in  216  B.C.,  as  consul,  Marcus 
Terentius  Varro,  whose  sole  recommendation  was  his 
low  origin  and  hot-headed  zeal  for  the  popular  cause.    His 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC,  OR  HANNIBALIAN,  WAR.      153 

colleague  was  the  able  Lucius  Aemilius  Paullus,  whose 
candidature  was  supported,  and  with  great  difficulty 
carried,  by  the  senatorial  party. 

Hannibal  had  already  resumed  the  offensive  in  Apulia, 
and,  marching  south  from  Gerunium,  took  the  citadel 
of  Cannae,  which  commanded  the  plain  of  Canusium. 
Hither  came  the  two  new  consuls  with  a  united  army 
of  eighty  thousand  infantry  and  six  thousand  cavalry, 
as  compared  with  the  forty  thousand  infantry  and  ten 
thousand  cavalry  of  Hannibal.  Paullus  saw  that  the 
wide,  open  plain  was  very  favourable  to  the  superior 
horse  of  his  enemy,  and  therefore  constructed  two  camps 
higher  up  the  river,  the  larger  on  the  right  bank, 
the  smaller  on  the  left  of  the  Aufidus,  hoping  thus  to 
compel  Hannibal  to  retire  from  his  position.  But  the 
soldiers  and  his  hot-headed  colleague  were  impatient  of 
camp-work,  and  longed  to  measure  swords  with  the  hated 
foe.  At  early  dawn,  on  one  of  the  days  on  which  Varro 
held  the  supreme  command,  the  Romans  crossed  over  the 
river,  then  almost  dry,  and  took  up  position  near  their 
smaller  camp  in  the  wide  plain  that  stretches  westward 
from  Cannae.  The  Carthaginians  followed  them,  and 
Hannibal  formed  his  infantry  in  crescent  shape,  with  the 
Celtic  and  Iberian  troops  in  the  centre  to  meet  the  first 
shock  of  the  serried  ranks  of  the  enemy ;  the  light 
Numidian  horse  occupied  the  open  space  in  the  plain 
facing  the  Italian  cavalry  under  Varro  ;  the  heavy  cavalry 
under  Hasdrubal  occupied  the  ground  near  the  river  on 
the  right,  and  faced  the  less  numerous  Roman  horse  under 
Paullus.  The  Roman  legions  easily  overthrew  the  Celts 
and  Iberians,  and  pressed  on  into  the  centre  to  complete 
their  success.  On  the  left  wing  the  cavalry  action  was 
undecided,  but  on  the  right  Hasdrubal  completely  scattered 
and  cut  down  the  Roman  horse.  Meanwhile  the  Roman 
infantry  had  become  wedged  in  by  their  eager  efforts  to 
follow  up  their  first  success,  and  were  unable  to  deploy 
their  ranks  so  as  to  meet  the  attacks  of  the  Libyan 
infantry,  who  closed  in  upon  all  sides.  At  this  crisis, 
Hasdrubal,  who  had  previously  completely  routed  the 
horse  under  Varro  and  left  their  pursuit  to  the  light 
Numidian  horse,  made  a  third  and  final  charge  on  the 
confused  ranks  of  the  Roman  infantry.     All  was  lost,  and 


154  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

the  Romans  merely  stood  to  be  butchered.  The  army 
was  annihilated:  seventy  thousand  Romans  lay  on  the 
field,  while  Hannibal  lost  but  six  thousand,  two-thirds  of 
whom  were  Celts.  Paullus  was  among  the  slain,  as  also 
the  pro-consul  Gnaeus  Servilius,  who  had  led  the  infantry, 
and  eighty  men  of  senatorial  rank.  Varro  was  not 
ashamed  to  survive  the  disaster,  and,  saved  by  his  swift 
steed,  reached  Venusia ;  and  the  senators,  with  a  noble,  if 
to  us  ironical,  generosity,  met  him  at  the  gates  of  Rome, 
and  thanked  him  for  not  having  despaired  of  the  safety 
of  the  state.  In  addition  to  those  slain  on  the  field  of 
battle,  most  of  the  division  guarding  the  Roman  camp 
were  made  prisoners ;  and,  as  if  to  crown  the  disasters  of 
Rome,  a  little  later  a  legion  sent  to  Gaul  fell  into  an 
ambush,  and  was  completely  destroyed,  together  with  its 
general,  Lucius  Postumius,  the  consul-designate  for  the 
coming  year. 

Now  at  last  there  seemed  good  hope  of  realizing  that 
great  political  combination  for  the  sake  of  which  Hannibal 
had  invaded  Italy ;  his  army  had  nobly  performed  its 
task,  and  opened  the  way  for  the  union  of  the  eastern  and 
western  foes  of  the  proud  city.  In  one  essential  quarter, 
indeed,  all  chance  of  succour  had  been  for  the  time 
destroyed.  Gnaeus  Soipio  had  met  with  great  success 
in  Spain,  and  was  not  only  master  of  the  country  north 
of  the  Ebro,  but  with  the  aid  of  his  brother  Publius,  had 
in  217  B.C.  crossed  that  river,  after  inflicting  a  severe 
defeat  on  the  Carthaginian  fleet  it  its  mouth,  and  advanced 
as  far  as  Saguntum.  Further,  in  the  following  year,  almost 
at  the  same  time  as  the  great  victory  of  Cannae,  the  two 
Scipios  totally  defeated  Hasdrubal,  when  attempting  to 
cross  the  Ebro  and  bring  a  fresh  army  across  the  Pyrenees 
to  his  brother's  aid.  As  far  as  Africa  was  concerned, 
Hannibal  had  received  all  the  assistance  he  could  hope  for 
from  home,  though  he  was  continually  pinched  for  want 
of  money  wherewith  to  pay  his  soldiers.  The  news  of  the 
victory  of  Cannae  made  Carthage  resolve  to  send  him 
reinforcements  of  money  and  men,  and  to  prosecute  the 
war  with  energy  both  in  Italy  and  Spain.  Now,  too, 
Philip  of  Macedon  formed  his  long-deferred  alliance  with 
Carthage,  and  undertook  to  land  an  army  on  the  east 
coast  of  Italy,  in  return  for  the  restoration  of  the  lands  in 


TEE  SECOND  FUNIC,  OR  EANNIBALIAN,  WAR.     155 

Epirus,  which  had  been  wrested  from  Macedonia  by  the 
Romans.  Moreover,  Hieronynius,  the  young  and  incapable 
successor  of  the  shrewd  fiiero,  joined  the  side  of  the 
Carthaginians ;  and  the  ivnited  fleet  of  Syracuse  and 
Carthage  at  once  rendered  the  position  of  the  Romans  at 
Lilybaeum  most  critical.  But,  above  all,  signs  were  at 
last  visible  that  the  Italian  confederacy  was  losing  its 
cohesion,  and  throwing  off  its  allegiance  to  Rome.  Arpi 
in  Apulia,  and  Uxeutum  in  Messapia,  all  the  towns  of  the 
Brut-tii,  must  of  the  Lucanians,  the  transplanted  Picentes 
near  Salernum,  the  Birpini,  the  Samnites  with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  Pentri,  and  Capua,  the  second  city  in  Italy, 
with  the  neighbouring  towns  of  Atella  and  Calatia,  passed 
over  to  the  side  of  Hannibal.  The  aristocratic  party  in 
all  these  places  vehemently  opposed  the  change  of  sides, 
and  their  bitter  opposition,  especially  in  Capua,  produced 
internal  conflicts,  which  greatly  lessened  the  advantage 
derived  by  Hannibal  from  these  secessions.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  south  Italian  and  Campanian  Greeks  remained 
firmly  loyal  to  Rome,  despite  their  perilous  position  and 
the  attacks  of  Hannibal ;  naturally,  too,  all  the  Latin 
colonies  in  southern  and  central  Italy  presented  an  un- 
yielding front  to-thc  enemy. 

Such  were  the  direct  consequences  of  the  day  of 
Cannae,  a  cruel  but  just  punishment  for  the  grave  political 
errors  of  the  Roman  people.  The  war  with  Hannibal 
had  revealed,  with  fatal  clearness,  the  absurdity  of  the 
method  of  electing  generals,  and  the  still  greater  danger 
of  such  a  method  when,  as  in  the  case  of  the  two  con- 
suls Flaminius  and  Varro,  it  became  the  tool  of  party 
and  the  two-edged  instrument,  of  deuuagogisin.  It  was 
clear  that,  to  work  the  deliverance  of  the  state,  the 
breach  between  the  senate  and  the  citizens  must  be 
healed,  and  that  the  government  and  the  governed  must 
unite  in  the  great  cause  with  a  trustful  confidence  in  each 
other.  It  was  clear,  too,  that  the  selection  of  generals 
must  depend  upon  the  one  stable  element  in  the  state, 
the  senate  ;  and  that  their  choice,  no  longer  subject  to 
the  suspicion  of  party  favouritism,  but  based  upon  the 
necessary  qualities  of  a  leader,  must  be  heartily  ratified 
by  a  united  people.  The  noble  and  patriotic  manner  in 
which  the  senate  performed  its  task,  and  healed  the  party 


156  HISTORY   OF  ROME. 

quarrels  by  abstaining  from  all  recriminations,  constitutes 
its  glorious  and  imperishable  honour.  Quintus  Fabius 
took  the  lead  in  all  the  defensive  measures,  aud  the  praetor, 
Marcus  Claudius  Marcellus,  whose  destination  previous  to 
the  battle  of  Cannae  had  been  Sicily,  was  appointed  to 
the  chief  command  of  the  hastily  collected  army.  Every 
nerve  was  strained  to  gather  troops  aud  supply  arms. 
All  those  above  boyhood  were  ralWl  out,  debtor-serfa  nnd 
criminals  were  armed,  and  even  eight  thousand  slaves 
were  incorporated  in  the  array.  All  proposals  from 
Hannibal  touching  a  ransom  of  captives  were  contemptu- 
ously rejected  ;  no  word,  no  action,  was  suffered  to  have 
even  the  semblance  of  a  thought  of  peace,  while  Hannibal 
was  still  in  Italy  and  Cannae  unavenged. 


AUTHORITIES. 

Second  Punic  war — Cannae. — Pol  vb.  ii.  1,  36 ;  iii.  8-21,  29-end  ;  vi. 
58.  Liv.  xxi.  xxii.  xxiii.-c.  30.  Plut.  Q.  Fabius.  Appiaa  Sp. 
3,  sqq. ;  Harm.  1-28  ;  Lib.  0,  sqq. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

FROM    CANNAE    TO    ZAMA. 

Harcei^s — War  in  Campania  and  Apulia — Siege  of  Syracuse — End 
of  war  in  Sicily —Philip  of  Macedonia — Spanish  war — Defeat 
and  death  of  the  Scipios — Publius  Scipio— Capture  of  New 
Carthage — Conquest  of  Spain — War  in  Italy — Fall  of  Capua — 
Weariness  of  Roman  allies — Hasdrubal  in  Italy — Battle  of  the 
Metaurus — Scipio  in  Africa — Recall  of  Hannibal — Battle  of 
Zama — Peace — Results  of  the  war  in  and  out  of  Italy. 

The  closing  act  of  the  second  Punic  war  shifts  the  scene 
of  active  operations  once  more  to  Sicily,  where  the  petty- 
jealousy  of  Carthaginian  generals  was  as  potent  a  factor 
in  the  final  triumph  of  Rome  as  the  ability  of  her  com- 
manders and  the  prowess  of  her  soldiers.  From  Sicily  we 
turn  again  to  Spain,  where  the  genius  and  good  fortune 
of  Publius  Scipio  revived  the  drooping  spirits  of  his 
countrymen  by  a  series  of  brilliant  successes  :  finally,  with 
Hannibal,  we  strain  our  anxious  gaze  to  the  mighty  Alpine 
wall,  and  await  the  coming  of  Hasdrubal  to  join  hands 
with  his  great  brother,  and  shake  Rome  to  her  foundations 
in  her  native  land. 

In  Italy  itself  the  war  flagged.  The  gradual  decline 
of  Hannibal's  power  dates  really  from  his  victory  at 
Cannae.  He  had  gained  all  that  he  could  hope  for  by 
mere  force  of  arms,  but  the  Roman  confederation  in 
central  Italy  still  presented  an  unbroken  front  to  his. 
invincible  army.  The  support  of  the  Sabellian  com- 
munities was  not  such  a  gain  to  Hannibal  as  it  would 
have  been  in  earlier  days,  when  the  Sabellian  youtn  was 
trained  to  arms  and  when  their  land  was  not  over-awcd 


158  HISTORY  OF  HOME. 

by  Roman  fortresses.  The  great  difficulty  of  taking 
fortified  towns  prevented  a  single  battle  from  being  so 
decisive  as  it  is  in  our  own  days.  Further,  Rome  had 
grown  wiser,  and  the  selection  of  Marcus  Claudius  Mar- 
cellus  as  commander  of  the  forces  in  Italy  contributed 
in  no  small  degree  to  Rome's  preservation.  Hannibal 
could  no  longer  hope  that  Roman  armies  would  remain 
inactive  spectators  on  mountain  heights,  while  he  laid 
waste  the  valleys  below  ;  nor  that  rash  and  inexperienced 
generals  would  leave  the  protection  of  their  own  fortresses 
and  meet  him  on  battle-fields  specially  chosen  by  himself. 
At  first,  indeed,  Hannibal's  advance  into  Campania  from 
the  field  of  Cannae  met  with  conspicuous  success.  Capua, 
Nuceria,  Acerrae,  joined  him  ;  Casilinum,  the  key  of  the 
Volturnus,  fell  after  an  obstinate  siege  in  215  B.C.  But 
the  important  ports  of  Neapolis,  Cumae,  and  Nuceria 
remained  faithful  to  Rome,  and  Nola  was  secured  in  its 
fidelity  by  the  activity  of  Marcellus,  who  repulsed  Hannibal 
with  considerable  loss  in  216  B.C.  The  winter  of  this  year 
was  passed  by  Hannibal  in  Capua,  and  the  luxury  of  this 
town  had  a  pernicious  effect  on  his  troops,  who  for  three 
years  had  not  been  under  a  roof. 

In  215  B.C.,  the  Romans  took  the  field  with  three  armies  : 
one,  under  Marcellus,  posted  near  Nola ;  a  second,  under 
the  veteran  Qaintus  Fabius  Maximus,  encamped  near 
Cales ;  a  third,  under  Tiberias  Sempronius  Gracchus, 
covering  the  coast  and  the  ports  of  Neapolis  and  Cumae. 
Thus  Hannibal  was  watched  on  all  sides,  and  the  invest- 
ment of  Capua  was  threatened.  An  attempt  by  the  Cam- 
panians  to  surprise  Cumae  was  completely  frustrated  by 
Gracchus,  who  not  only  defeated  the  Campanians,  but 
even  worsted  Hannibal  when  he  appeared  to  avenge  the 
defeat  of  his  allies. 

A  fourth  Roman  army  meanwhile,  under  the  praetor 
Marcus  Valerius,  had  taken  up  its  position  at  Luceria, 
and  in  conjunction  with  the  force  under  Marcellus  caused 
great  annoyance  to  Hannibal's  allies  in  Apulia  and  Lu- 
cania.  To  relieve  these,  Hannibal  again  attacked  Mar- 
cellus, and  again  suffered  defeat  beneath  the  walls  of 
Nola. 

This  succession  of  misfortunes  obliged  Hannibal  to 
evacuate  Campania  and  march  to  Arpi,  where  he  might 


FROM  CANNAE  TO  ZAMA.  159 

in  person  put  a  stop  to  the  further  progress  of  the 
Romans  in  Apulia.  Gracchus  followed  him,  leaving  the 
other  two  Roman  armies  to  arrange  for  the  attack  on 
Capua  in  the  coming  spring. 

It  was  clear  to  Hannibal  that  the  offensive  was  no 
longer  possible,  and  that  the  defensive  became  daily- 
more  difficult.  The  accomplishment  of  his  great  purpose 
depended  on  the  strenous  co-operation  of  the  govern- 
ment at  Carthage,  on  the  success  of  the  Carthaginian 
generals  in  Spain,  and  on  the  long-promised  aid  of 
Philip  of  Macedon.  But  the  peace  party  in  Carthage, 
after  the  first  impressions  of  the  victory  of  Cannae  had 
died  away,  regained  the  ascendancy,  and,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  a  small  force  of  four  thousand  Africans,  no 
adequate  reinforcements  reached  Hannibal  from  Carthage. 
To  this  miserable  short-sightedness  and  indolence  of  the 
Carthaginian  citizens  the  safety  of  Rome  was  in  no  small 
measure  due.  Compelled  to  turn  for  help  from  his 
native  land  to  Spain,  Macedonia,  and  Sicily,  Hannibal 
caused  the  interest  of  the  war,  so  far  as  active  operations 
were  concerned,  to  centre  in  those  countries ;  his  allies 
there  renewed  their  exertions  to  reach  out  to  him  the  help 
his  own  country  refused,  while  the  Romans  strained  every 
nerve  to  confine  Hannibal's  allies  to  their  respective 
countries  and  to  prevent  reinforcements  reaching  him. 
Thus,  although  Italy  plays  a  somewhat  passive  part  in  the 
future  events  of  the  war,  "all  efforts  were  directed  towards, 
as  all  interest  centred  in,  the  removal  or  the  continuance 
of  Hannibal's  isolation  in  southern  Italy."  Had  Hannibal 
been  able  to  bring  into  play  the  united  forces  of  Carthage, 
Spain,  Sicily,  and  Macedonia,  the  overthrow  of  Rome 
would  have  been  well-nigh  certain  ;  but  in  no  quarter  did 
matters  go  well  for  him.  The  activity  and  success  of  the 
two  Scipios  in  Spain  held  Hasdrubal  in  check ;  and  the 
reinforcements  sent  thither  from  Carthage  failed  to  produce 
much  effect.  An  attempt  to  secure  Sardinia  was  baffled 
by  Titus  Manlius  Torquatus,  who  completely  destroyed 
the  Carthaginian  force  in  215  B.C.  The  assassination  of 
Hieronymus  at  the  close  of  the  same  year  left  the  state 
of  Syracuse  in  great  confusion ;  and  Hippocrates  and 
Epicydes,  emissaries  of  Hannibal,  counteracted  a  tendency 
on  the  part  of  the  chief  Syracusans  to  return  to  their  old 


ISO  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

alliance  with  Rome.  Marcellus  himself  was  sent  over  to 
finish  the  war  in  Sicily  in  214  B.C.  Owing  to  the  dread 
of  Roman  vengeance  and  the  passionate  enthusiasm  for 
liberty  which  Hannibal's  emissaries  had  excited  in  the 
Syracusan  multitude,  Marcellus  was  obliged  to  lay  siege 
to  the  city,  and  after  eight  months  to  convert  the  siege 
into  a  blockade. 

The  defence  of  Syracuse  was  notable  alike  for  the 
famous  ingenuity  of  the  great  engineer,  Archimedes, 
and  for  the  efforts  made  by  Carthage  in  its  behalf.  A 
strong  army  landed  under  Himilco,  and  occupied  Asrri- 
gentum  ;  this  army  was  joined  by  a  force  under  Hip- 
pocrates, the  able  commander  of  Syracuse.  A  combined 
attack  on  the  Roman  besieging  army  failed,  and  the 
relieving  armies  were  compelled  to  encamp  on  the  low, 
marshy  grounds  along  the  Anapus.  The  deadly  pestilence 
engendered  in  those  districts  swept  off  the  troops,  while 
the  Romans  remained  unscathed  in  their  quarters,  winch 
they  had  transferred  to  a  part  of  the  suburbs,  surprised  by 
them  not  long  before  during  a  festival  of  the  Syracusans. 
The  survivors  of  the  Carthaginian  and  Syracusan  armies 
dispersed  into  the  neighbouring  towns,  and  Epicydes,  the 
successor  of  Hippocrates  as  commander  of  Syracuse,  aban- 
doned the  city  as  lost.  Shortly  afterwards,  Syracuse 
surrendered,  in  212  B.C.,  and  was  completely  sacked  by 
the  soldiers  of  Marcellus,  Archimedes  being  among  the 
slain.  Syracuse  was  deprived  of  its  freedom  and  was 
classed  among  the  communities  that  paid  tribute  to  Rome. 

All  Sicily  seemed  lost  t  >  the  Carthaginians,  whose  force 
at  Agrigentum,  under  Hanno  and  Epicydes,  dared  not 
make  a  move  against  the  triumphant  Romans.  But 
Hannibal's  influence,  and  the  ability  of  one  of  his  Libyan 
cavalry  officers,  Mutines,  whom  Hannibal  sent  from  Italy, 
carried  on  a  guerilla  warfare  throughout  the  island  with 
great  success.  Mutines,  at  the  head  of  the  Nnmidian 
cavalry,  even  succeeded  in  worsting  Marcellus  himself. 
Hanno,  however,  as  appointed  by  the  Carthaginian  govern- 
ment, was  jealous  of  the  success  of  one  of  Hannibal's 
officers  ;  insisting  upon  giving  battle  to  Marcellus  against 
the  advice  of  Mutines,  he  was  utterly  beaten.  Mutines 
still  gained  brilliant  successes,  which  only  served  to 
aggravate  the  stupid  jealousy  of  Hanno  ;  the  latter  even 


FROM    CANNAE  TO  ZAMA.  161 

deposed  him  from  his  command  of  the  cavalry,  and  gave 
it  to  his  own  son.  In  indignation  at  such  treatment, 
Mn tines  delivered  up  Agi'igentum  to  the  Roman  general 
Marcus  Valerius  Laevinus,  and  thus  put  an  end  to  the 
war  in  Sicily  in  210  B.C.  Carthage  made  no  further  effort 
to  regain  her  former  position  in  that  island,  which  was  gra- 
dually reduced  to  order  and  tranquillity  under  Roman  rule. 
Hannibal  might  with  good  reason  have  looked  for  more 
substantial  aid  from  Macedonia.  In  Greece  generally 
there  was  a  strong  outburst  of  national  patriotism ; 
internal  discord  had  been  healed  and  peace  established 
in  217  B.C.  between  Philip  and  the  Aetolian  league. 
But  in  Greece,  as  in  Carthage,  a  national  leader  was 
wanting  to  give  effect  to  the  national  ardour  of  the 
moment.  Philip  of  Macedon  lacked  that  enthusiasm  and 
faith  in  the  Greek  nation  which  alone  could  have  fitted 
him  for  such  an  enterprise.  "  He  knew  not  how  to  solve 
the  arduous  problem  of  transforming  himself  from  the 
oppressor  into  the  champion  of  Greece."  After  a  futile 
attempt  to  take  Apollonia  in  216  B.C.,  and  after  constantly 
threatening  but  never  daring  to  carry  out  his  promised 
descent  on  the  east  coast  of  Italy,  he  made  a  useless 
attack  on  the  Roman  possessions  in  Epirus  in  214  B.C. 
The  energetic  action  of  the  Romans,  who  crossed  over  from 
Brundisium  and  stormed  his  camp,  cowed  him  back  into 
inaction.  Nor  was  he  roused  out  of  this  inertness  until 
a  coalition,  headed  bv  the  Aetolians,  and  joined  by  the 
old  Greek  enemies  of  Macedonia,  and  supported  by  Rome, 
forced  him  to  bestir  himself.  In  the  long  and  dreary  war 
that  followed,  Philip  repelled  the  attacks  of  his  foes  with 
vigour  and  success,  but  Hannibal  soon  ceased  to  look 
eastward  for  aid.  The  war  itself  bore  no  fruit,  except 
that  it  exhausted  the  Greek  states  and  rendered  them  the 
easier  prey  to  Roman  oppression.  Worn  out  by  useless 
conflicts,  at  last  Philip  made  peace  with  the  Aetolians  in 
205  B.C.,  and  then  with  Rome :  a  peace  favourable,  indeed, 
to  Philip,  in  so  far  as  it  left  matters  in  much  the  same 
position  as  they  were  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  ;  but 
disastrous  to  him  and  to  the  Greek  nation  as  a  whole, 
since  by  it  "the  grand  and  just  combination,  which 
Hannibal  had  projected  and  all  Greece  had  for  a  moment 
joined,  was  shattered  irretrievably." 

11 


162  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

In  Spain  the  struggle  was  sharpest,  and  was  marked  by 
the  vicissitudes  incidental  to  the  character  of  the  country 
and  habits  of  the  people.  Neither  Rome  nor  Carthage  had 
brought  into  Spain  a  force  sufficiently  powerful  to  termi- 
nate the  contest ;  therefore  both  sides  had  to  have  recourse 
to  native  help;  but  the  natives  regarded  neither  side  with 
ardent  partisanship,  and  they  were  never  to  be  depended 
upon  for  persistent  and  united  action.  For  a  time,  indeed, 
the  two  Roman  generals,  Publins  and  Gnaeus  Scipio,  were 
brilliantly  successful.  Not  only  did  they  firmly  secure 
the  barrier  of  the  Pyrenees,  but  they  established  a  new 
Rome,  as  a  rival  to  Nova  Carthago,  in  the  city  of  Tarraco, 
and  penetrated  Andalusia  in  215  and  214  B.C.  In  the 
latter  year  they  almost  reached  the  Pillars  of  Hercules, 
and  extended  the  Roman  protectorate  in  southern  Spain, and 
regained  and  restored  the  important  town  of  Saguntum ; 
at  the  same  time  they  raised  up  a  powerful  enemy  to 
Carthage,  in  the  African  prince  Syphax,  who  ruled  in  the 
modern  provinces  of  Oran  and  Algiers.  A  revolt  was 
excited  by  Syphax  among  the  Libyan  dependencies  of 
Carthage,  to  quell  which  Hasdrubal  Barca  took  the  flower 
of  his  Spanish  troops  in  212  B.C.  Syphax  was  defeated 
by  the  brave  Massinissa,  son  of  Gala,  king  of  the  modern 
Constantine  and  ally  of  Carthage,  and  was  compelled  to 
make  peace  with  Carthage.  The  Libyan  revolt  was  easily 
quelled,  and  Carthage  wreaked  her  usual  vengeance  on  the 
rebels. 

Hasdrubal  proceeded  to  Spain  in  211  B.C.,  followed 
by  Massinissa,  who  commanded  the  Numidian  cavalry, 
and  three  Carthaginian  armies  took  the  field.  The  two 
Scipios  were  thus  surprised  while  plundering  the  Cartha- 
ginian territory  in  Spain.  Instead  of  retreating,  they 
took  into  their  pay  20,000  Celtiberians,  and  divided  their 
forces  so  as  to  face  the  three  armies  of  the  enemy.  Has- 
drubal easily  induced  the  Celtiberians  by  a  sum  of  money 
to  leave  the  Romans  to  their  fate.  Hemmed  in  on  all 
sides,  while  attempting  to  retreat,  the  two  armies,  with  their 
brave  commanders,  were  cut  to  pieces.  The  result  of  this 
twofold  disaster  was  that  Carthage  was  again  paramount 
in  all  Spain  south  of  the  Ebro. 

In  the  following  year,  Rome  was  enabled,  by  the  fall  of 
Capua,  to  despatch  a  force  of  12,000  men,  under  the  pro- 


FROM  CANNAE  TO  ZAMA  163 

praetor  Gaius  Claudius  Nero,  to  check  the  Carthaginian 
advance  in  Spain.  Nero  was  not  unsuccessful  on  the  field, 
but  his  strategic  ability  was  more  than  counterbalanced  by 
his  harshness  and  inability  to  deal  with  the  natives.  The 
senate,  aware  of  the  great  exertions  which  were  being 
made  in  Carthage  to  send  Hasdrubal  and  Massinissa  with 
a  powerful  army  across  the  Pyrenees  to  Italy,  resolved  to 
send  an  extraordinary  general  with  a  numerous  force  to 
Spain.  His  nomination,  if  we  may  credit  the  story,  was  left 
to  the  people.  At  first  no  one  in  Rome  offered  himself  as  a 
candidate  ;  but  at  last  Publius  Scipio,  son  of  the  Publius 
Scipio  who  had  fallen  in  Spain,  although  not  properly 
qualified  for  the  office,  came  forward.  The  youth,  personal 
beauty,  enthusiasm,  military  distinctions  gained  on  the 
fields  of  Trebia  and  Cannae,  and  political  eminence  of 
Publius  Scipio  were  of  themselves  calculated  to  deeply 
impress  the  people  of  Rome  :  the  thought  that  a  youth  of 
twenty-seven,  who  had  merely  held  the  offices  of  aedile 
and  miltary  tribune,  was  thus  suddenly  raised  to  the 
highest  and  proudest  office  in  the  state  at  a  time  of 
great  peril,  and  was  going  forth  to  avenge  a  father's  death, 
rendered  that  impression  indelible,  and  has  coloured  the 
story  with  romantic  details.  Although  lacking  the  energy, 
and  iron  will,  and  statesmanlike  grasp  of  such  men  as 
Caesar  and  Alexander,  Publius  Scipio  was  eminently  cal- 
culated to  inspire  others  with  his  own  enthusiasm.  His 
personal  qualities,  both  of  appearance  and  manner ;  his 
graceful  oratory  ;  his  happy  union  of  Hellenic  culture  and 
Roman  patriotism ;  above  all,  his  intense  belief  in  himself 
as  one  specially  favoured  by  the  gods,  served  to  cast  a 
romantic  glamour  round  his  name,  and  to  kindle  in  men's 
hearts  a  fervent  belief  that  a  true  prophet  and  divinely 
inspired  saviour  had  arisen  to  give  victory  and  peace  to 
his  country. 

On  being  elected  general,  Scipio  proceeded  to  Spain 
in  210  B.C.,  accompanied  by  the  propraetor  Marcus  Si- 
lanus,  and  by  his  friend  Gaius  Laelius  as  admiral,  with 
a  strong  force  and  well-filled  chest.  He  at  once  suc- 
cessfully executed  one  of  the  boldest  coups- de-main  known 
in  history.  All  the  three  Carthaginian  generals  were  at 
least  ten  days'  march  from  Nova  Carthago.  Suddenly, 
early  in  the  spring  of  209  B.C.,  Scipio  appeared  before  the 


164  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

weakly  garrisoned  town  with  his  whole  army  and  fleet.  By 
engaging  the  attention  of  the  garrison  with  an  attack  from 
the  land  side,  Seipio  had  no  difficulty  in  scaling  the  un- 
defended walls  from  the  harbour  side,  where  at  ebb-tide  a 
land  passage  was  left  open  to  his  troops.  The  capture  of 
the  Carthaginian  capital,  apart  from  the  immense  stores 
thus  thrown  into  the  conqueror's  hands,  completely  re- 
stored Roman  prestige  in  Spain.  Scipio's  command  was 
indefinitely  prolonged,  and  not  only  were  the  passes  of 
the  Pyrenees,  and  all  the  country  north  of  the  Ebro, 
secured,  but  incui'sions  were  successfully  made  into  Anda- 
lusia. Rendered  over-confident  by  success,  Seipio  ex- 
tended his  operations  over  too  large  an  area,  and,  when 
in  Andalusia,  he  encountered  Hasdrubal  Barca  at  Baecula, 
in  208  B.C.,  on  his  march  northward  to  his  brother's  aid. 
Seipio  claimed  the  victory,  but  Hasdrubal  attained  his 
object,  and  succeeded  in  crossing  the  Pyrenees,  and  taking 
up  his  quarters  in  Gaul  for  the  winter.  On  Hasdrubal's 
departure,  the  two  other  Carthaginian  generals  retired  to 
positions  of  safety,  and  left  all  active  warfare  to  the  light 
cavalry  of  Massinissa. 

Fresh  armies  were  sent  from  Carthage  in  207  and 
206  B.C.  ;  but  in  both  years  the  Romans  were  successful. 
In  the  latter  year,  Seipio  fought  a  second  battle  at  Baecula 
against  the  enemy,  who  numerically  were  far  superior, 
and  by  this  battle  decided  the  question  as  to  which 
power  should  rule  in  Spain.  Hasdrubal,  the  son  of  Gisgo, 
and  Mago,  the  youngest  of  Hamilcar's  sons,  were  com- 
pletely defeated,  and  escaped  to  Gades.  Mago  held  the 
latter  place,  and  for  a  moment  the  illness  of  Seipio 
and  mutiny  of  one  of  his  corps,  owing  to  arrears  of  pay, 
encouraged  the  hope  that  a  national  insurrection  would 
take  place  in  Spain  against  the  Romans,  and  restore  to 
Carthage  her  lost  supremacy.  Seipio,  however,  speedily 
recovered,  and  quelled  the  tumult ;  and  Mago,  by  order  of 
the  Carthaginian  government,  collected  what  ships  and 
troops  he  could,  and  set  sail  for  Italy.  Gades,  the  first 
and  last  of  Carthaginian  possessions  in  Spain,  submitted 
on  favourable  terms  to  the  Romans ;  and  thus  Spain,  after 
a  struggle  of  thirteen  years,  became  a  Roman  province. 
Seipio  resigned  his  command,  and  returned  to  Rome  in 
206  B.C. 


FROM  CANNAE  TO  ZAMA.  165 

Meanwhile  the  great  conflict  in  Italy  had  been  continued 
without  interruption.  After  Hannibal's  departure,  the 
north  of  Italy  had  been  reoecupied  by  the  Romans, 
whereas  all  lower  Italy,  as  far  as  Mount  Garganus  and 
the  river  Volturnus,  with  the  exception  of  the  fortresses 
and  most  of  the  ports,  was  in  Hannibal's  hands.  His 
main  army  lay  at  Arpi,  and  was  confronted  by  four  legions, 
under  Tiberius  Gracchus ;  further  south,  and  as  yet 
opposed  by  no  Roman  force,  a  second  Cartbaginian  army, 
under  Han  no,  held  possession  of  all  the  Bruttian  land. 
The  main  Roman  army,  under  the  two  consuls  Quintus 
Fabius  and  Marcus  Marcellus,  was  occupied  with  the 
attack  on  Capua.  An  estimate  of  all  the  Roman  forces 
employed  at  this  time  in  Italy,  Sicily.  Spain,  and  Sardinia, 
can  scarcely  fix  the  number  at  less  than  200,000  men. 
The  finances  of  Rone,  especially  those  derived  from  the 
land-tax,  were  terribly  embarrassed  ;  and  the  culture  of 
the  fields,  where  possible,  must  have  been  left  to  slaves, 
old  men,  women,  and  children.  Still,  Rome  gradually  re- 
covered what  she  had  so  rapidly  lost ;  her  forces  increased, 
those  of  Hannibal  diminished  ;  her  commanders  were  no 
longer  mere  citizen -generals,  but  experienced  and  able 
officers  of  the  stern  school  of  Marcellus. 

Hannibal,  unable  even  to  protect  his  Italian  allies,  had 
to  play  the  waiting  game,  until  Philip  of  Macedon  or  his 
brothers  in  Spain  should  come  to  his  aid.  "  We  hardly 
recognize  in  the  obstinate  defensive  system  which  he  now 
began,  the  same  general  who  had  carried  on  the  offensive 
with  almost  unequalled  impetuosity  and  boldness  :  it  is  mar- 
vellous in  a  psychological,  as  well  as  in  a  military  point  of 
view,  that  the  same  man  should  have  accomplished  the  two 
tasks  prescribed  to  him — tasks  so  diametrically  opposite 
in  their  character — with  equal  completeness."  His  efforts 
were  at  first  chiefly  directed  to  preventing  the  investment 
of  Capua,  in  which  for  a  time  he  was  successful.  But  in 
214  B.C.,  among  other  towns,  the  important  position  of 
Casilinum  was  retaken  by  the  consular  army  ;  and  Hanni- 
bal failed  in  an  attempt  to  capture  Tarentum.  In  the 
same  year,  Tiberius  Gracchus  gained  several  successes  over 
Hanno's  Bruttian  army,  and,  after  a  victory  near  Bene- 
ventum,  he  gave  liberty  and  citizenship  to  the  slave- 
soldiers  fighting  in  the  ranks.     The  following  year  was 


160  HISTOllY  OF  ROME. 

equally  favourable  to  Rome.  Arpi  was  recovered,  and 
several  Bruttian  towns  passed  over  to  Rome ;  even  a 
Spanish  division  deserted  the  Carthaginian  army  and 
enlisted  on  the  Roman  side.  In  212  B.C.  Rome  outraged 
Greek  feeling  by  putting  to  death  all  the  hostages  of 
Tarentum  and  Thurii,  who  had  been  induced  by  Hannibal 
to  attempt  to  escape.  As  a  result  of  this  senseless  revenge, 
Tarentum  opened  her  gates  to  Hannibal,  though  her 
citadel  still  remained  in  possession  of  the  Romans ;  and 
Heraclea,  Thurii,  and  Metapontum,  shortly  afterwards 
followed  her  example.  The  same  year  saw  the  death  of 
Tiberius  Gracchus  and  the  dispersion  of  his  army,  which 
had  been  posted  on  the  Appian  Way  to  prevent  Hannibal's 
approach  to  Capua.  Betrayed  by  a  Lucanian,  Gracchus 
fell,  and  Hannibal  raised  the  blockade  of  Capua,  which  the 
other  two  consuls  had  begun.  Various  cavalry  successes 
were  also  gained  by  the  Phoenician  horse,  and  two  Roman 
forces  were  completely  defeated  in  Apulia  and  Lucania. 

Despite  these  successes,  as  soon  as  Hannibal  left  Capua 
for  Apulia,  three  Roman  armies,  under  Appius  Claudius, 
Quintus  Fulvius,  and  Gaius  Claudius  Nero,  gathered  and 
strongly  entrenched  themselves  round  the  doomed  Capua. 
Towards  the  close  of  the  winter  212-211  B.C.  provisions 
were  almost  exhausted,  and  urgent  messages  were  sent  to 
Hannibal  at  Tarentum  requesting  his  immediate  succour. 
Hannibal  at  once  set  out  and  encamped  on  Mount  Tifata, 
close  to  Capua ;  but  the  Romans  refused  to  stir  from  their 
entrenchments,  despite  the  insulting  onset  of  the  Numidian 
and  Campanian  cavalry  as  they  dashed  against  their 
lines.  As  a  last  resource,  Hannibal  tried  to  draw  off  the 
Roman  armies  by  a  rapid  march  towards  Rome.  Passing 
through  Samnium,  and  along  the  Valerian  Way  past 
•Tibur,  he  crossed  the  bridge  over  the  Anio,  and  encamped 
on  the  opposite  bank,  five  miles  from  the  city.  The  two 
legions  in  the  capital  prevented  any  successful  operations 
against  Rome  itself.  In  truth  there  was  no  real  danger. 
Hannibal  had  never  hoped  to  surprise  the  city,  but  merely 
to  draw  off  the  legions  around  Capua,  and  raise  the 
blockade.  But  the  Roman  generals  refused  to  be  lured 
from  their  Capuan  lines. 

The  consul  Publius  Galba  followed  Hannibal  on  his 
retreat  from   Rome ;    suddenly  Hannibal  turned  on  him 


FROM  CANNAE  TO  ZAMA.  167 

and  utterly  defeated  him,  capturing  his  camp  by  storm. 
This  was  but  a  poor  compensation  for  the  inevitable  fall 
of  Capua.  This  city,  after  a  siege  of  two  years,  capitu- 
lated, and  suffered  a  terrible  revenge  at  the  hands  of  the 
exasperated  Romans.  Her  chief  magistrates  were  scourged 
and  executed,  many  citizens  were  sold  into  slavery,  the 
property  of  the  rich  was  confiscated,  and  the  old  consti- 
tution abolished.  The  fall  of  Capua  gave  a  tremendous 
shock  to  the  respect  and  confidence  which  Hannibal  had 
enjoyed  among  the  Italian  allies,  and  Roman  arms  straight- 
way recovered  that  ascendancy  which  the  secession  of 
Capua  had  shown  them  to  have  lost.  The  citadel  of 
Tarentum  still  held  out,  and  an  attempt  of  Hannibal  to 
surprise  Rhegium  had  previously  failed. 

Rome  now  felt  confident  as  to  the  issue  of  the  war  in 
Italy,  and  was  for  the  first  time  able  to  reduce  the 
number  of  her  legions,  and  also  to  despatch  large  rein- 
forcements to  Spain.  The  following  year,  210  B.C., 
saw  Rome  prosecute  the  war  in  Italy  with  less  vigour. 
Marcellus  infused  his  wonted  energy  into  the  struggle  in 
209  B.C.,  and,  after  a  two-days'  battle,  gained  a  costly 
victory  over  Hannibal.  Tarentum  soon  after  was  sur- 
rendered by  the  treachery  of  its  garrison  to  the  veteran 
Quintus  Fabius,  then  consul  for  the  fifth  time.  The  city 
was  pillaged,  and  the  inhabitants  sold  as  slaves.  Hannibal 
arrived  too  late  for  its  relief,  and  retired  to  Metapontum. 
By  the  fall  of  Tarentum,  and  the  loss  of  all  his  most  im- 
portant acquisitions,  he  was  gradually  hemmed  in  to  the 
south-western  point  of  the  peninsula. 

In  the  following  year,  Marcus  Marcellus,  chosen  as 
consul  with  Titus  Quintius  Crispinus,  hoped  to  strike  a 
decisive  blow.  Fortune,  however,  willed  otherwise,  and 
robbed  the  aged  general  of  the  laurels  which  he,  more 
than  any  other  Roman,  deserved.  Surprised  during  a 
reconnaissance  near  Venusia  by  a  strong  force  of  African 
cavalry,  Marcellus  fell  fighting,  and  his  colleague  died 
afterwards  of  his  wounds.  The  war  had  now  reached  its 
eleventh  year.  The  material  distress  of  Rome  was 
terrible :  the  exchequer  was  utterly  impoverished,  the 
lands  lay  fallow,  and  starvation  was  only  averted  by  corn- 
supplies  from  Egypt ;  the  pay  of  the  soldiers  was  greatly 
in  arrear,  and  the  country  villages,  no  longer  smiling 


IG8  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

homes  of  farmers,  were  nests  of  beggars  and  brigands. 
Still  more  ominous  was  the  fact  that  the  allies  of  Rome 
began  to  weary  of  the  struggle,  and  even  Latium  to  waver 
in  her  allegiance.  In  20D  B.c  many  of  the  Latin  com- 
munities announced  that  henceforth  they  would  neither 
send  contingents  nor  contributions,  and  that  Rome  must 
carry  on  the  struggle  single-handed.  Fortunately  the 
colonies  in  Gaul,  Picenum,  and  southern  Italy,  with 
Fregellae  at  their  head,  refused  to  adopt  so  short-sighted 
a  policy.  Arretinm  gave  dangerous  signs  that  the  Etrus- 
cans were  preparing  to  rise  once  more  in   aid  of  Hannibal. 

In  the  midst  of  all  these  difficulties  and  signs  of  coming 
trouble,  the  news  arrived  that  Hasdrubal  had  crossed  the 
Pyrenees  in  the  autumn  of  208  B.C.,  and  that  Rome  would 
have  to  face,  next  year,  both  sons  of  Ilamilcnr  in  Italy. 
Thus,  at  last,  it  seemed  as  if  Hannibal  was  destined  to 
reap  the  reward  of  his  long  and  patient  waiting  Rome 
once  more  called  out  twenty-three  legions.  Hasdrubal, 
however,  was  too  quick  for  them,  and,  ere  the  Romans 
could  occupy  the  outlets  of  the  Alpine  passes,  news  came 
that  he  had  reached  the  Po,  that  the  Gauls  were  flocking 
to  his  standard,  and  that  Placentia  was  invested.  Marcus 
Livius  hastened  to  the  northern  army  :  while  his  colleague 
Gaius  Nero,  with  the  aid  of  the  force  at  Venusia  under 
Gaius  Hostilius  Tubulus,  barred  the  advance  of  Hannibal. 
The  latter  marched  from  the  Bruttian  territory  and  fought 
an  indecisive  engagement  with  Nero  at  Grumentum ;  he 
succeeded,  however,  in  his  object,  and  by  a  flank  march 
reached  Apulia,  and  encamped  at  Canusium.  Nero 
followed,  and  took  up  his  position  opposite  to  him. 

While  the  two  armies  remained  idly  facing  one  another, 
Nero  had  the  good  fortune  to  intercept  the  all-important 
despatch  from  Hasdrubal,  acquainting  Hannibal  with  his 
intention  to  meet  him  at  Narnia.  Nero  thereupon  made 
his  bold  and  famous  march  with  a  picked  force  of  seven 
thousand  men,  and  joined  Marcus  Livius  in  the  north  at 
Sena  Gallica:  he  left  behind  him  the  bulk  of  his  army 
strongly  entrenched  against  attack,  and,  what  was  more 
important,  he  left  Hannibal  unconscious  of  his  departure 
and  ignorant  of  Hasdrubal's  intention.  The  two  consuls 
at  once  marched  against  Hasdrubal,  and  found  him  cross- 
ing the  Metaurus.     Hasdrubal  tried  to  avoid  a  battle,  but, 


FROM   CANNAE   TO  ZAMA.  169 

being  deserted  by  his  guides,  made  the  best  provision  for 
the  inevitable.  A  flank  attack  by  Nero  decided  the  hotly 
contested  day.  Hasdrubal  scorned  to  survive  the  disaster, 
and  his  army  was  destroyed. 

The  defeat  and  death  of  Hasdrubal,  in  207  B.C.,  solved 
the  mighty  question  of  the  triumph  or  humiliation  of  Rome. 
After  fourteen  days'  absence,  Nero  again  reached  his  old 
station  at  Canusium,  and  confronted  the  unconscious  Han- 
nibal in  Apulia.  With  him,  in  ghastly  fashion,  he  brought 
the  news  of  Hasdrubal's  defeat,  and  the  overthrow  of  all 
Hannibal's  plans  and  hopes.  Hannibal  retired  to  the 
Bruttian  territory  ;  while  Rome,  overjoyed  at  the  relief 
from  the  terrible  strain  of  past  years,  and  conscious  that  the 
peril  was  over,  resumed  business  and  even  pleasure  as  in 
time  of  peace,  and  made  no  great  effort  to  finish  the  war. 

Thenceforth  the  wrar  languished  in  Italy,  nor  could  all 
the  superior  force  of  his  opponents  compel  Hannibal  to 
shut  himself  up  in  fortresses  or  to  leave  Italian  soil.  The 
next  few  years  are  marked  by  the  lethargy  of  Rome,  and 
the  gradual  retreat  of  Hannibal  into  the  southernmost 
corner  of  Italy.  The  Carthaginian  government,  alarmed 
at  the  prospect  of  an  African  invasion,  showed  some  vigour 
in  206-205  B.C.,  and  sent  reinforcements  to  Hannibal  and 
an  embassy  to  Philip,  and  commissioned  Mago  to  revive 
the  war  in  the  north  of  Italy.  Philip,  however,  had 
already  made  peace  with  Rome.  Mago,  indeed,  prosecuted 
the  war  with  vigour.  Landing  at  Genoa  with  the  remains 
of  the  Spanish  army,  he  sacktd  the  town,  and  formed  a 
new  army  of  Gauls  and  Ligurians.  But  the  exertions  of 
the  Carthaginian  government  and  its  adoption  of  the 
views  of  Hannibal  came  too  late. 

We  have  now  reached  the  final  scene  of  this  great 
contest.  Publius  Scipio,  who  had  returned  from  Spain 
in  the  previous  year,  was  chosen  consul  in  205  B.C.  His 
popularity  with  the  multitude  made  him  no  favourite 
with  the  senate,  whose  members  viewed  with  suspicion 
his  Greek  refinement  and  modern  culture,  and  not  un- 
justly criticized  his  leniency  and  indulgence  towards  his 
officers  and  his  conduct  of  the  war  in  Spain.  Moreover, 
the  senate  was  averse  from  an  expedition  to  Africa  as  long 
as  Hannibal  was  in  Italy,  and  was  specially  disinclined 
to   intrust   it   to    Scipio,   who    had   shown   too  clearly   a 


170  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

tendency  to  slight  the  constitutional  authority  of  the 
senate  and  to  rely  on  his  fame  and  popularity  with  the 
masses.  At  last,  however,  Scipio  was  intrusted  with 
the  task  of  building  a  fleet  in  Sicily,  and  raising  an  army, 
of  which  the  two  legions  in  Sicily  formed  the  nucleus. 
The  fleet  was  ready  in  forty  days,  and  seven  thousand 
volunteers  responded  to  the  call  of  their  beloved  com- 
mander. 

In  the  spring  of  204  B.C.,  Scipio  set  sail  with  30,000 
men,  40  ships  of  war,  and  400  transports,  and  landed 
unopposed  at  the  Fair  Promontory  near  Utica.  He  was  at 
once  joined  by  his  old  foe  Massinissa,  who  had  been  driven 
from  his  kingdom  by  the  combined  armies  of  Carthage 
and  Syphax.  The  latter  had  embraced  the  side  of 
Carthage,  and,  as  a  reward,  had  caused  Carthage  to 
renounce  her  old  ally  Massinissa.  The  arrival  of  Syphax 
with  a  powerful  army,  and  his  junction  with  the  Car- 
thaginian force  stationed  to  oppose  Scipio,  caused  the 
Roman  general  to  abandon  the  siege  of  Utica,  and  to 
entrench  himself  for  the  winter  on  a  promontory  between 
Utica  and  Carthage.  Fortune,  however,  never  failed  to 
smile  on  Scipio,  and,  under  cover  of  proposals  for  peace, 
Scipio  succeeded  in  surprising  both  camps  on  the  same 
night,  and  in  utterly  routing  the  two  armies.  Reinforce- 
ments at  this  moment  arrived,  consisting  of  a  Macedonian 
corps  under  Sopater,  and  of  Celtiberian  mercenaries.  The 
Carthaginians,  thus  strengthened,  resolved  to  venture  on 
a  pitched  battle  in  the  "  Great  Plains,"  five  days'  march 
from  Utica.  Scipio  was  completely  successful,  and 
Syphax  fell  into  his  hands. 

The  peace  party  at  Carthage  now  tried  to  reverse  the 
Barcid  policy,  and  sued  for  peace.  The  terms  proposed  by 
Scipio  were  so  moderate  that  the  peace  faction  were  for 
accepting  them  at  once.  But  the  patriotic  party  had  not 
lost  hope,  and  during  the  negotiations  recalled  Hannibal 
and  Mago  from  Italy.  The  latter,  however,  after  striving 
for  three  years  to  form  a  coalition  in  northern  Italy 
against  Rome,  h^d  just  been  defeated  near  Milan,  and 
during  his  voyage  home  died  of  a  wound  received  in 
that  battle.  Hannibal  at  once  embarked  at  Croton,  and, 
after  an  absence  of  thirty-six  years,  returned  once  more 
to    his   native   land    in    203    B.C.     "  The   Roman   citizens 


FROM  CANNAE  TO  ZAMA.  171 

breathed  freely,  when  the  mighty  Libyan  lion,  whose 
departure  no  one  even  now  ventured  to  compel,  thus 
voluntarily  turned  his  back  on  Italian  ground."  To 
mark  the  occasion,  a  grass  wreath,  the  highest  distinction 
possible  in  the  Roman  state,  was  presented  to  the  veteran 
Quintus.  Fabius,  then  nearly  ninety, — his  last  honour,  for 
in  the  same  year  he  passed  away. 

Hannibal's  arrival  in  Africa  ignited  the  torch  of  war 
once  more.  The  people  of  Carthage  refused  to  ratify  the 
peace  practically  concluded,  and  the  seizure  of  a  ship  of 
war  with  Roman  envoys  on  board  broke  the  armistice. 
Scipio,  in  just  wrath,  ravaged  the  valley  of  the  Bagradas, 
and  penetrated  the  interior,  when  his  course  was  arrested 
by  Hannibal.  After  fruitless  negotiations  both  armies 
prepared  for  a  decisive  battle  at  Zama,  in  202  B.C.  By 
a  skilful  disposition  Scipio  managed  that  the  elephants 
of  the  enemy  should  pass  through  his  lines  without 
breaking  them :  forcing  their  way  to  the  side,  these 
unwieldy  creatures  threw  the  cavalry  of  Hannibal  into 
disorder,  and  the  far  more  numerous  horse  of  Massi- 
nissa  easily  scattered  the  Carthaginian  squadrons.  ,  The 
infantry  battle  was  most  bloody  and  severe :  nor  did  the 
veterans  of  Hannibal  ever  flinch  until  the  cavalry  of 
Massinissa,  returning  from  pursuit,  surrounded  them  on 
all  sides.  The  Phoenician  army  was  annihilated  and 
Cannae  avenged.  Hannibal  with  a  few  men  escaped  to 
Hadrumetum. 

Peace  was  now  inevitable  if  Carthage  was  to  be  saved 
from  destruction.  The  terms  proposed  by  Scipio,  and  sub- 
sequently ratified  by  the  senate,  were:  (1)  the  cession  of 
the  Spanish  possessions  and  the  islands  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean ;  (2)  the  transference  of  the  kingdom  of  Syphax  to 
Massinissa ;  (3)  the  surrender  of  all  ships  of  war  except 
twenty,  and  an  annual  contribution  of  two  hundred  talents 
(£48,000)  for  the  next  fifty  years  ;  (4)  an  engagement  not 
to  make  war  against  Rome  or  her  allies,  and  not  to  wage 
war  in  Africa  beyond  the  Carthaginian  boundaries  without 
the  permission  of  Rome.  The  practical  effect  of  these  terms 
was  to  render  Carthage  tributary  and  to  deprive  her  of 
her  political  independence.  The  terms  of  this  peace  have 
often  been  considered  too  light,  and  they  served  as  a  handle 
to  the  charge  that  Scipio,  in  his  eagerness  to  secure  for 


172  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

himself  the  glory  of  finishing  the  war,  forgot  what  was 
due  to  Rome.  A  true  estimate  of  the  peace  aud  of  its 
effect  on  the  future  position  of  Carthage  inclines  rather 
to  the  view  that  these  terms  were  the  outcome  of  the 
nobleness  of  the  two  greatest  men  of  the  age,  and  a  recog- 
nition on  the  part  of  Scipio  of  the  crime  of  blotting  out 
one  of  the  main  props  of  civilization  merely  to  gratify 
the  petty  ferocity  of  his  fellow-countrymen.  "  The  noble- 
mindedness  and  statesmanlike  gifts  of  the  great  antagonists 
are  no  less  apparent  in  the  magnanimous  submission  of 
Hannibal  to  what  was  inevitable,  than  in  the  wise 
abstinence  of  Scipio  from  an  extravagant  and  insulting 
use  of  victory." 

It  remains  for  us  to  sum  up  the  results  of  this  terrible 
war,  which  for  seventeen  years  had  devastated  the  lands 
and  islands  from  the  Hellespont  to  the  Pillars  of  Hercules. 
Rome  was  henceforth  compelled  by  the  force  of  circum- 
stances to  assume  a  position  at  which  she  had  not  directly 
aimed,  and  to  exercise  sovereignty  over  all  the  lands  of 
the  Mediterranean.  Outside  Italy,  there  arose  the  two  new 
provinces  in  Spain,  where  the  natives  lived  in  a  state  of 
perpetual  insurrection  :  the  kingdom  of  Syracuse  was  now 
included  in  the  Roman  province  of  Sicily  :  a  Roman  instead 
of  a  Carthaginian  protectorate  was  now  established  over  the 
most  important  Numidian  chiefs  :  Carthage  was  changed 
from  a  powerful  commercial  state  into  a  defenceless 
mercantile  town.  Thus  all  the  western  Mediterranean 
passed  under  the  supremacy  of  Rome.  In  Italy  itself, 
the  destruction  of  the  Celts  became  a  mere  question  of 
time  :  the  ruling  Latin  people  had  been  exalted  by  the 
struggle  to  a  position  of  still  greater  eminence  over  the 
heads  of  the  non-Latin  or  Latinized  Italians,  such  as 
the  Etruscans  and  Sabellians  in  lower  Italy.  A  terrible 
punishment  was  inflicted  on  the  allies  of  Hannibal. 
Capua  was  reduced  from  the  position  of  second  city  to 
that  of  first  village  in  Italy :  the  whole  soil,  with  a  few 
exceptions,  was  declared  to  be  public  domain-land,  and 
was  leased  out  to  small  occupiers.  The  same  fate  befell 
the  Picentes  on  the  Silarus.  The  Bruttians  became  in  a 
manner  bondsmen  to  the  Romans,  and  were  forbidden  to 
carry  arms.  All  the  Greek  cities  which  had  supported 
Hannibal  were  treated  with  great  severity  :   and  in  the 


FROM  CANNAE  TO  ZAMA.  178 

case  of  a  number  of  Apulian,  Lucanian,  and  Samnite 
communities  a  loss  of  territory  was  inflicted,  and  new 
colonies  were  planted.  Throughout  Italy  the  non-Latin 
allies  were  made  to  feel  their  utter  subjection  to  Rome, 
and  the  comedy  of  the  period  testifies  to  the  scorn  of  the 
victorious  Romans. 

It  seems  probable  that  not  less  than  three  hundred 
thousand  Italians  perished  in  this  war,  the  brunt  of  which 
loss  fell  chiefly  on  Rome.  After  the  battle  of  Cannae  it 
was  found  necessary  to  fill  up  the  hideous  gap  in  the 
senate  by  an  extraordinary  nomination  of  177  senators: 
the  ordinary  burgesses  suffered  hardly  less  severely. 
Further,  the  terrible  strain  on  the  resources  of  the  state 
had  shaken  the  national  economy  to  its  very  foundations. 
Four  hundred  flourishing  townships  had  been  utterly 
ruined.  The  blows  inflicted  on  the  simple  morality  of  the 
citizens  and  farmers  by  a  camp-life  worked  no  less  mis- 
chief. Gangs  of  robbers  and  desperadoes  plundered  Italy 
in  dangerous  numbers.  Home  agriculture  saw  its  existence 
endangered  by  the  proof,  first  given  in  this  war,  that  the 
Roman  people  could  be  supported  by  foreign  grain  from 
Sicily  and  Egypt.  Still,  at  the  close  and  happy  issue 
of  so  terrible  a  struggle,  Rome  might  justly  point  with 
pride  to  the  past  and  with  confidence  to  the  future.  In 
spite  of  many  errors  she  had  survived  all  danger,  and  the 
only  question  now  was  whether  she  would  have  the 
wisdom  to  make  a  right  use  of  her  victory,  to  bind  still 
more  closely  to  herself  the  Latin  people,  to  gradually 
Latinize  all  her  Italian  subjects,  and  to  rule  her  foreign 
dependents  as  subjects,  not  as  slaves, — whether  she  would 
reform  her  constitution  and  infuse  new  vigour  into  the 
unsound  and  fast-decaying  portion  of  her  state. 


AUTHORITIES. 

Cannae  to  Zama. — Polyb.  vii.  1-4;  viii.  1,  3-9,  26-end ;  ix.  3-11, 
21-26,  44;  x.  1-20,  32-40;  xi.  1-3,  19-33;  xiv.  1-10;  xv.  1-19. 
Liv.  xxiii.  31-end  of  xxx.  Pint.  Marcell.  P.  Scipio.  Appian 
Sp.  15-38 ;  Hann.  28-end ;  Lib.  7-67. 


174  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

A    REVIEW    OF    THE    WEST   AND    EAST. 

Celtic  wars — Roman  colonization  of  North  Italy — Treatment  of 
Carthage — Flight  of  Hannibal — Massinissa — Wars  with  the 
Spaniards  and  government  of  Spain — Macedonia — Asia — Egypt 
— Powers  of  Asia  Minor — State  of  Greece — Philip  of  Macedon 
— Causes  of  Roman  interference  with  and  declaration  of  war 
against  Philip — Events  of  the  war — Battle  of  Cynoscephalae, 
197  B.C. — Terms  of  the  peace — Settlement  of  Greece  by  Flami- 
ninas. 

The  war  with  Hannibal  had  interrupted  "Rome  in  the 
extension  of  her  dominion  to  the  Alpine  boundary  of 
Italy;  that  task  was  now  resumed.  The  Celts,  aware 
of  the  coming  vengeance,  had  again  taken  up  arms  in 
201  B.C.  The  insurrection  spread  far  and  wide,  and  Celtic 
and  Ligurian  bands,  under  the  leadership  of  the  Boii  and 
Insubres,  sacked  Placentia  and  invested  Cremona  in  the 
following  year.  A  great  battle  before  the  latter  city 
ended  in  the  overthrow  of  the  Celts ;  but  the  struggle 
continued,  nor  was  it  till  the  Boii  and  Insubres  quarrelled, 
and  the  Cenomani  turned  traitors  on  the  field  of  battle 
and  attacked  their  old  allies,  that  the  Insubres  submitted 
in  196  B.C.  The  Romans,  though  they  excluded  them 
from  Roman  citizenship  for  ever,  allowed  the  Cenomani 
and  Insubres  to  retain  their  national  constitution  and 
cantonal  independence,  and  exempted  them  from  tribute. 
They  intended  that  these  Transpadane  Celts  should  serve 
as  a  bulwark  against  the  incursions  of  northern  tribes. 
It  seems  that  the  Celtic  nationality  in  these  districts 
rapidly  became   submerged   in  the   all-absorbing   spread 


A  REVIEW  OF  THE  WEST  AND  EAST  175 

of  Latin  influence.  The  terror  of  the  Roman  name  pene- 
trated even  beyond  the  Alps,  and  by  the  founding  of 
Aquileia,  about  183  B.C.,  the  Romans  showed  their  deter- 
mination to  close  the  gates  of  the  Alps  for  ever  against 
the  Celtic  nation. 

The  resolve  of  the  senate,  in  194  B.C.,  to  incorporate 
the  region  south  of  the  Po  with  Italy  roused  the  Boii 
to  a  last  struggle ;  but  the  bloody  battle  of  Mutina, 
in  the  succeeding  year,  crushed  their  expiring  efforts, 
and  the  war  became  a  slave-hunt.  Even  in  the  terri- 
tory still  allowed  them  by  the  Romans  the  Boii  soon 
disappeared,  and  became  amalgamated  with  their  con- 
querors. The  old  fortresses  of  Placentia  and  Cremona 
wrere  re-established,  and  new  colonies — Potentia  and 
Pisaurum  in  the  old  land  of  the  Senones,  Mutina  and 
Parma  in  the  lately  conquered  soil  of  the  Boii — were 
planted  in  184-183  B.C.  New  means  of  communication 
were  opened  up  by  the  extension  of  the  Flaminian  road, 
under  the  name  of  the  Aemilian,  from  Ariminum  to  Pla- 
centia, and  by  the  reconstruction  of  the  Cassian  Way 
from  Rome  to  Arretium.  The  result  of  these  steps  was 
that  the  Po,  and  not  the  Apennines,  now  divided  Celtic 
from  Italian  land,  and  that  south  of  the  Po  the  old  name 
of  Ager  Celticus,  applied  to  the  district  between  the  Po 
and  the  Apennines,  ceased  to  have  any  meaning. 

The  same  policy  was  pursued  with  the  Ligurian  tribes 
occupying  the  hills  and  valleys  in  the  north-western  high- 
lands of  Italy.  Some  were  extirpated,  others  transplanted, 
and  the  mountainous  country  between  the  valley  of  the 
Po  and  the  Arno  was  practically  cleared.  The  fortress  of 
Luna  was  established  in  177  B.C.,  to  act  as  a  bulwark 
against  the  Ligurians,  and  as  a  port  for  ships  sailing  to 
Massilia  or  Spain. 

With  the  more  western  Ligurian  tribes  in  the  Genoese 
Apennines  and  the  Maritime  Alps  conflicts  were  incessant, 
but  no  permanent  results  were  effected ;  possibly  they 
served  to  keep  the  coast  road  from  Luna  to  Emporiae 
comparatively  clear.  Wars,  too,  of  a  similar  character 
were  waged  in  Corsica  and  Sardinia,  where  the  natives 
in  the  interior  were  continually  hunted  down  by  Roman 
troops. 

With  regard   to  Carthage,  Rome's  great  aim  was  to 


176  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

keep  suspended  over  her  head  the  fear  of  a  declaration 
of  war.     Massinissa  was  established  close   at   her   doors 
as  a  most  powerful  Numidian   chief,  and   Carthaginian 
territory    was    constantly    exposed     to    the     spoliations 
of   the    Libyan    and    Numidian    tribas,    who    exulted    in 
thus  retaliating  ou  their  old  tormentors  for  their  former 
sufferings.     Carthage  bore  every  insult  with  true  Phoe- 
nician patience.     Her  embassies  and  complaints  to  Rome 
had   no   effect,    save  that    of    making    her    victor    more 
resolved  in  this  short-sighted  policv  of  humiliation.     One 
man,  however,  still  remained  at  Carthage,  a  jnst  object 
of   dread  to  his   enemies.     Hannibal    had   already  over- 
thrown   the    rotten    oligarchy   and   instituted   the    most 
beneficial   political  and  financial  reforms.     By    checking 
the  embezzlement  of  the  public  moneys  it  was  soon  found 
that  the  tribute  to  Rome  could   be  paid  without    extra- 
ordinary taxation.     Hannibal  was  doubtless   reorganizing 
Carthage  to  be  ready  for  the  complications  which  he  saw 
must  arise  for  Rome  in  the  East.     We  cannot  wonder  that 
the  Romans  at  last  insisted  on  the  surrender  of  Hannibal, 
in   195  B.C.,  which    demand   he  anticipated    by  a  speedy 
flight  to  the  East,  and  thus  "  left   to   his    ancestral  city 
merely  the  lesser  disgrace  of  banishing  its  greatest  citizen 
for  ever  from  his  native  land,  of  confiscating  his  property, 
and  of  razing  his  house.     The  profound  saying,  that  those 
are   the   favourites   of    the    gods   on    whom   tbey    lavish 
infinite  joys  and  infinite   sorrows,  thus  verified  itself  in 
full  measure  in  the  case   of  Hannibal."     Even  after  his 
withdrawal,  Rome,  still  not  content,  adopted   a  course  of 
perpetual   irritation    against    Carthage.      Jealous    of   her 
financial  prosperity,  which  remained  unshaken  by  the  loss 
of  political  power,  Rome  was  ever  the  credulous  receptacle 
of  every  rumour  of  Carthaginian  perfidy  and  intrigue. 

Unwilling  to  have  any  possessions  of  her  own  in 
Africa,  Rome  established  the  great  Berber  chief  Massi- 
nissa in  his  new  Numidian  kingdom.  This  remarkable 
man  was  in  every  way  fitted  for  the  post.  Thoroughly 
conversant  with  Carthage,  in  which  city  he  had  been 
educated,  and  with  whose  armies  he  had  fought  both 
as  friend  and  foe,  fired  with  bitter  hatred  of  the  Cartha- 
ginian oppressor,  both  as  a  native  African  and  as  a  prince 
personally  wronged,  gifted  with  a  physique  which  knew 


A  REVIEW   OF  THE   WEST  AND  EAST.  177 

no  fatigue,  and  with  a  nature  that  recked  not  of  scruple 
or  honour,  Massinissa  became  the  soul  of  his  nation's 
revival ;  and,  during  ninety  years  of  unimpaired  life  and 
sixty  years  of  vigorous  reign,  was  completely  successful 
in  consolidating  the  vast  kingdom  of  which  he  was  the 
founder.  By  the  addition  of  the  Massaesylian  kingdom 
of  Syphax,  who  died  in  captivity  in  Rome,  Massinissa 
extended  his  sway,  not  only  far  into  the  interior  and  over 
the  upper  valley  of  the  Bagradas,  but,  by  occupying  the 
old  Sidonian  city  of  Great  Leptis  and  other  districts,  he 
held  rule  from  the  Manretanian  to  the  Cyrenaean  frontier, 
and  enclosed  the  Carthaginian  territory  on  all  sides ; 
indeed,  he  fixed  his  eyes  on  Carthage  as  his  future  capital. 
Under  his  example  the  Berber  became  converted  from  a 
nomad  shepherd  into  a  farmer  and  settled  citizen ;  the 
Numidian  hordes  of  plunderers  became  trained  soldiers, 
worthy  to  fight  by  the  side  of  Boman  legions ;  Cirta,  his 
capital,  became  the  seat  of  Phoenician  civilization,  which 
the  king  specially  fostered,  with  a  view,  perhaps,  to  the 
future  extension  of  his  power  over  Carthage.  Thus  the 
Libyan  language,  nationality,  and  manners,  after  so  many 
years  of  degradation,  reasserted  their  position,  and  made 
themselves  felt  even  in  the  old  Phoenician  cities. 

In  Spain  the  Greek  and  Phoenician  towns  along  the 
coastiat  once  submitted  to  the  Romans,  and  were  absorbed 
in  their  civilization.  On  the  other  hand,  the  natives, 
especially  in  the  west  and  north  and  the  interior,  were  a 
perpetual  thorn  in  the  side  of  the  Romans,  nor  was  it 
even  safe  for  a  Roman  governor  to  travel  without  a  strong 
escort.  In  the  southern  and  eastern  districts,  where  the 
natives  were  more  civilized,  Roman  culture  was  more 
readily  adopted  ;  this  was  specially  the  case  with  the 
unwarlike  Turdetani,  situated  round  Seville,  who  are  said 
to  have  evinced  no  small  literary  development,  and  to 
have  practised  agriculture  with  great  success.  But  this 
was  never  true  of  the  mass  of  Spain.  Bound  together  by 
all-powerful  laws  of  chivalry,  proud  of  their  military 
honour,  fired  with  a  love  of  war  and  change,  the  barbaric 
Spaniards  were  utterly  devoid  of  political  instinct,  and 
could  neither  submit  to  military  discipline  nor  political 
combination.  Thus  in  Spain  there  was  no  serious  war 
nor  real  peace. 

12 


178  EISTOBY  OF  ROME. 

The  Romans  divided  the  peninsula  into  two  provinces, 
and  while  the  governor  of  Hither  Spain,  the  modern 
Arragon  and  Catalonia,  was  ever  occupied  with  quelling 
Celtiberian  revolts,  his  colleague  in  Further  Spain, 
which  comprised  the  modern  Andalusia,  Granada,  Murcia, 
and  Valencia,  was  similarly  busy  in  attempts  to  hold 
in  check  the  Lusitanians.  Necessity  thus  compelled  the 
Romans  to  adopt  a  new  policy — to  maintain  a  standing 
army  of  four  legions  in  the  country ;  hence  it  was  in 
Spain  that  the  military  occupation  of  the  land  on  a  large 
scale  first  became  continuous,  and  that  the  military  ser- 
vice first  acquired  a  permanent  character.  The  obvious 
danger  of  withdrawing  or  even  changing  every  year  a 
large  portion  of  the  forces  in  so  remote  and  tui'bulent  a 
country  as  Spain  forced  the  Romans  to  adopt  this  course 
Thus  service  in  Spain  became  very  odious  to  the  Roman 
people,  who  now  learnt  that  dominion  over  a  foreign 
nation  is  a  burden  not  only  to  the  slave  but  also  to  the 
master. 

Wars  in  Spain  lasted  during  the  whole  of  the  second 
Punic  war,  and  in  197  B.C.  a  general  insurrection  broke 
out,  which  was  only  quelled  by  a  complete  victory 
gained  by  the  consul  Marcus  Cato  in  195  B.C.  Owing  to 
a  false  report  of  his  return  to  Italy  the  insurgents  again 
rebelled,  and  this  time  Cato  sold  numbers  into  slavery, 
disarmed  all  the  natives  of  Hither  Spain,  and  ordered  all 
the  towns  in  the  disturbed  districts  to  pull  down  their 
walls.  Two  more  Roman  victories,  in  189  and  185  B.C., 
were  necessary  to  reduce  the  Lusitanians  to  a  state  of 
tranquillity.  Reality  was  first  given  to  the  Roman  rule 
in  Further  Spain  by  the  valour  of  Quintus  Fulvius 
Flaccus  in  181  B.C. ;  and,  two  years  later,  his  successor, 
Tiberius  Gracchus,  achieved  results  of  a  permanent  cha- 
racter, not  merely  by  force  of  arms,  but  by  his  adroit 
comprehension  of  the  Spanish  character.  By  inducing 
Celtiberians  to  serve  in  the  Roman  army,  by  settling  free- 
booting  tribes  in  towns,  by  wise  and  equitable  treaties, 
Gracchus  made  the  Roman  name  not  only  feared  but 
liked,  and  his  own  memory  was  ever  held  dear  by  the 
natives. 

The  Spanish  provinces  were  governed  on  principles 
similar  to  those  which  were  observed  in  Sicily  and  Sar- 


A  REVIEW  OF  THE   WEST  AND  EAST.  179 

dinia;  but  the  Romans  proceeded  with  great  caution, 
and  often  conceded  considerable  privileges  to  Spanish 
towns,  such  as  the  right  of  coining  their  own  money. 
The  old  Carthaginian  imposts  of  fixed  money  payments 
and  other  contributions  were  retained,  instead  of  the 
tithes  and  customs  paid  by  Sicilian  and  Sardinian  com- 
munities. The  grave  fault  of  changing  the  praetors  every 
year  was  still  committed,  and  that  in  spite  of  the  Baebian 
law,  which  in  192  B.C.  specially  prolonged  the  command 
of  Spanish  governors  for  two  years.  On  the  whole,  Spain, 
notwithstanding  its  mines  both  of  iron  and  silver,  was 
a  burden  rather  than  a  gain  to  the  Roman  state ;  but 
probably  the  chief  reason  for  its  retention  as  a  province 
was  the  fear  that,  if  left  unoccupied,  it  might  serve 
another  foe  as  it  had  served  Hannibal,  and  act  as  a  basis 
of  operations  against  the  sovereignty  of  Rome. 

We  must  now  turn  our  eyes  eastward,  and  see  how 
those  complications  arose  which  involved  Rome  in  the 
Macedonian  and  Asiatic  wars.  Macedonia,  alone  of  all 
the  Greek  states,  had  preserved  that  national  vigour 
which  made  the  Greek  race  so  famous  in  earlier  days. 
Philip  V.  ruled  not  only  over  Macedonia  proper,  but  over 
all  Thessaly,  Euboea,  Locris,  Phocis,  and  Doris,  and  held 
many  isolated  and  important  positions  in  Attica  and  the 
Pelopbnnese,  of  which  the  chief  were  Demetrias  in  Mag- 
nesia, Chalcis  in  Euboea,  and  Corinth,  "  the  three  fetters 
of  the  Hellenes."  His  real  strength,  however,  lay  in  his 
hereditary  kingdom  of  Macedonia  proper.  It  is  true  that 
this  land  was  very  sparsely  populated,  but  the  national 
character  of  its  loyal  and  courageous  people,  never  shaken 
in  their  fidelity  to  their  native  land  and  hereditary  form 
of  government,  places  the  Macedonians  almost  on  a  level 
with  the  Romans  themselves  ;  in  particular,  the  regenera- 
tion of  the  state  after  the  storm  of  Celtic  invasion  was  as 
honourable  as  it  was  marvellous. 

The  huge  unwieldy  empire  of  Asia,  pretending  to  stretch 
from  the  Hellespont  to  the  Punjab,  was  in  reality  an 
aggregate  of  states  in  different  stages  of  dependence,  or 
rather  a  conglomeration  of  insubordinate  satrapies  and 
half-free  Greek  cities.  Along  the  coast  the  great  king 
vainly  endeavoured  to  expel  the  Egyptians  ;  on  the  eastern 
frontier  he  was  perpetually  harassed  by  Parthians    and 


180  HI6T0RY  OF  ROME. 

Baetrians  ;  while  in  Asia  Minor  the  Celtic  hordes  had 
settled  on  the  north  coast  and  the  eastern  interior,  and  on 
the  west  the  Greek  cities  were  constantly  trying  to  assert 
and  make  good  their  independence.  Indeed,  in  Asia  Minor 
the  king's  authority  was  little  more  than  nominal  except 
in  Cilicia,  Phrygia,  and  Lydia,  for  the  powerful  kingdom 
of  Pergamus  embraced  a  large  portion  of  the  "west,  and  a 
number  of  cities  aud  native  princes  practically  owned  no 
lord. 

Egypt,  on  the  other  hand,  presented  a  marked  contrast 
to  the  loose  organization  of  Asia.  Under  the  prudent 
Lagidae,  Egypt  had  been  welded  into  a  firmly  united  and 
compact  state,  incapable  of  revolt  or  disruption  under 
the  worst  misrule.  The  objects  of  the  Ptolemies'  policy 
were  not,  like  the  Macedonian  or  Persian,  vague  dreams 
of  universal  empire,  but  definite  and  capable  of  realiza- 
tion. The  whole  traffic  between  India  and  the  Mediter- 
ranean was  in  the  hands  of  the  rulers  of  Egypt,  and 
owing  to  their  excellent  geographical  position,  whether 
for  defence  or  attack,  the  Egyptians  established  them- 
selves not  only  in  Cyrene,  bnt  in  Cyprus  and  the  Cyclades, 
on  the  Phoenician  and  Syrian  coast,  on  the  whole  of  the 
south  and  west  coast  of  Asia  Minor,  and  even  in  the 
Thracian  Chersonese.  The  finances  of  Egypt  were  most 
flourishing,  and  Alexandria,  the  seat  of  the  Ptolemies, 
attracted  all  the  learning,  whether  scientific  or  literary, 
of  the  time.  The  mutual  relation  of  these  three  great 
Eastern  powers  was  naturally  one  of  antagonism  and 
rivalry ;  but  Egypt,  as  a  maritime  power,  and  the  pro- 
tectress of  the  Asiatic  Greek  towns  and  minor  states,  was 
the  foe  of  both  Macedonia  and  Asia,  while  the  two  latter 
powers,  though  rivals,  were  ready  to  combine  against 
Egypt,  their  common  enemy. 

In  addition  to  the  various  states  of  the  second  rank  in 
Asia  Minor,  such  as  Atropatene,  Armenia,  Cappadocia, 
Pontus,  and  Bitbynia,  there  were  the  three  powerful  Celtic 
tribes  of  the  Tolistobogi,  Tectosages,  and  Trocmi,  who 
had  settled  with  their  national  customs  and  constitution 
in  the  interior.  From  their  barbarous  strength  and  free- 
booting  habits  they  were  the  constant  terror  of  the  more 
degenerate  Asiatics.  It  was  due  to  his  successful  oppo- 
sition t<->  these  hordes  that  Attalus  was  raised  from  the 


A  REVIEW  OF  THE   WEST  AND  EAST.  181 

position  of  a  wealthy  citizen  to  that  of  king  of  Pergamus. 
His  court  was  a  miniature  Alexandria,  and,  as  the  patron 
of  art  and  science,  and  from  his  retention,  when  king,  of 
his  simple  citizen  character,  Attalus  may  not  inaptly  be 
styled  the  Lorenzo  de'  Medici  of  antiquity. 

In  Greece  proper  we  find  a  great  decay  of  national  energy. 
The  Aetolian  league,  whose  policy  was  alike  hostile  to  the 
Achaean  confederacy  and  to  Macedonia,  would  have  proved 
of  far  more  service  to  the  Greek  nation  had  not  its 
members  pursued  a  system  of  organized  robbery,  and  by 
their  unfortunate  policy  prevented  any  union  of  the  whole 
Hellenic  race.  In  the  Peloponnese,  the  Achaean  league 
had  knit  together  the  best  elements  of  Greece,  and 
breathed  new  life  and  true  patriotism  into  the  nobler 
portion  of  the  Hellenes.  But,  owing  to  the  selfish  diplo- 
macy of  Aratus  and  the  foolish  invocation  of  Macedonian 
interference  to  settle  its  disputes  with  Sparta,  the  league 
had  become  entirely  subject  to  Macedonian  influence,  and 
had  admitted  Macedonian  garrisons  into  its  chief  for- 
tresses. Sparta  alone  of  the  other  Peloponnesian  states 
showed  any  vigour,  and  under  the  unscrupulous  Nabis 
daily  increased  its  strength.  The  commercial  prosperity 
enjoyed  by  Byzantium,  the  mistress  of  the  Bosporus,  and 
by  Cyzicus,  on  the  Asiatic  side  of  the  Propontis,  was  at 
this  time  very  considerable ;  but  they  were  both  eclipsed 
by  Rhodes,  which  had  secured  the  carrying  trade  of  all 
the  eastern  Mediterranean.  Aided  by  her  fleet  and  the 
courageous  temper  of  her  citizens,  Rhodes  was  the  cham- 
pion of  all  the  Greek  maritime  cities,  and,  though  as  a 
rule  pursuing  a  policy  of  neutrality  and  of  friendly  rela- 
tionship with  the  neighbouring  powers,  she  did  not  shrink, 
if  need  be,  from  adopting  sterner  measures.  The  Rho- 
dians  became  the  leaders  of  a  league  of  the  chief  Greek 
cities  scattered  along  the  coasts  and.  islands  of  Asia  Minor 
and  elsewhere,  such  as  Sinope,  Lampsacus,  Halicarnassus, 
Chios,  Smyrna,  etc.  This  league  upheld  with  success  the 
cause  of  freedom  against  the  attacks  of  neighbouring 
tyrants,  and  securely  fostered  the  arts  of  peace  and  the 
old  Greek  spirit,  uncontaminated  by  the  tyranny  of  a 
dissolute  soldiery  or  the  corrupt  atmosphere  of  an  Eastern 
court. 

Such,  then,  was  the  state  of  things  in  the  East  wheD 


182  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Philip  of  Macedon  was  induced  to  break  down  the  wall 
of  political  separation,  and  to  interfere  in  the  West.  The 
miserable  incompetence  he  had  shown  in  the  first  Mace- 
donian war,  215-205  B.C.,  and  the  contemptible  indolence 
which  caused  him  to  utterly  disappoint  Hannibal  at  a 
critical  period,  have  been  already  pointed  out.  Now, 
however,  though  Philip  was  not  the  man  needed  at  this 
juncture,  he  exhibited  none  of  those  faults  which  had 
marred  his  first  war  with  Rome.  Philip  was  a  true  king 
in  the  worst  and  best  sense  of  the  term.  Inflated  with 
arrogance  and  pride,  incapable  of  taking  advice  or  brook- 
ing opposition,  he  was  utterly  callous  to  the  lives  and 
sufferings  of  those  about  him  ;  bound  by  no  sense  of  moral 
tie  or  obligation,  the  slave  of  passion,  combining  in 
singular  fashion  sagacity  and  resolution  with  supineness 
and  procrastination,  he  was  yet  gifted  with  the  valour  of 
a  soldier  and  the  eye  of  a  general ;  jealous  of  his  honour 
as  a  Macedonian  king,  he  could  rise  to  a  spirited  and 
dignified  public  policy ;  full  of  intelligence  and  wit,  he 
won  the  hearts  of  all  whom  he  wished  to  gain. 

At  the  present  moment  Philip  directed  his  attentions 
to  Egypt.  About  205  B.C.  he  had  formed  an  alliance  with 
Antiochus  of  Asia  to  break  np  the  Egyptian  state,  now 
ruled  over  by  Ptolemy  Epiphanes,  a  child  of  five  years 
old,  and  to  divide  the  spoil.  In  201  B.C.  Philip  had  begun 
his  task  of  plunder.  By  the  aid  of  his  ally  Prusias,  king 
of  Bithynia,  Philip  crossed  to  Asia  and  proceeded  to  make 
war  upon  the  Greek  cities  on  the  coast.  Chalcedon  saved 
itself  by  submission,  but  Cius  and  Thasos  were  stormed 
and  sacked.  Rhodes,  at  the  head  of  her  league,  declared 
war  against  Philip  ;  she  was  joined  by  Byzantium  and 
Attalus  of  Pergamus.  Several  indecisive  battles  were 
fought  at  sea ;  towards  the  close  of  the  year  Philip  with- 
drew to  Macedonia,  where  his  presence  was  urgently 
needed. 

At  this  point  the  Romans  thought  right  to  interfere. 
They  could  not  view  with  indifference  the  possible 
extension  of  Philip's  power,  the  conquest  of  Rhodes 
and  Egypt,  the  fall  of  Cyrene,  and  the  future  peril 
of  all  the  Greek  citie9,  whose  protectors  they  claimed  to 
be,  and  they  could  not  honourably  refuse  aid  to  Attalus 
of  Pergamus,  who  had  been  their  staunch  ally  since  the 


A  REVIEW  OF  THE   WEST  AND  EAST.  183 

first  Macedonian  war.  The  policy  of  interference  in  the 
East  was  not  actuated  by  greed  for  further  conquest,  but 
was  dictated  by  necessity ;  it  redounds  to  the  senate's 
honour  that  it  resolved  to  prepare  for  war  with  Philip  at 
a  time  when  the  Roman  citizens  were  thoroughly  weary 
of  and  exhausted  by  one  transmarine  war,  and  when  such 
a  war  was  sure  to  rouse  a  storm  of  popular  disapprobation. 

At  first,  indeed,  the  Romans  lacked  a  pretext  for  war. 
Their  ambassador,  sent  to  Abydus,  after  the  capture  of 
that  city  by  Philip  in  200  B.C.,  was  politely  reproved  by 
the  Macedonian  king  for  attempting  to  interfere  with  his 
designs.  The  Athenians,  however,  had  at  this  time  put 
to  death  two  Acarnanians  who  strayed  into  their  mysteries. 
The  Acarnanians  at  once  invoked  Philip's  aid,  and  he 
proceeded  to  lay  waste  Attica.  Athens  applied  for  help 
to  Rome,  and  the  popular  assembly  was  at  length  induced 
by  various  concessions  to  ratify  the  declaration  of  war  by 
the  senate,  in  200  B.C.  These  concessions  were  chiefly 
made  at  the  expense  of  the  allies,  who  had  to  supply  the 
garrison  service  in  Gaul,  Lower  Italy,  Sicily,  and  Sar- 
dinia: volunteers  alone,  as  was  alleged,  were  enrolled  for 
the  Macedonian  campaign.  Two  of  the  six  legions,  thus 
called  out,  embarked  at  Brundisium  under  the  leadership 
of  the  consul  Publius  Sulpicius  Galba. 

The  position  of  Philip  was  very  critical.  Antiochus 
stood  aloof ;  Egypt,  despite  its  anxiety  to  keep  a  Roman 
fleet  out  of  Eastern  waters,  was  utterly  estranged  from 
Philip  by  his  recent  scheme  of  partition ;  the  Rhodian 
confederacy  of  Greek  cities  was  also,  owing  to  recent 
events,  a  pronounced  enemy  ;  while  in  Greece  itself  many 
of  the  most  powerful  states  were  ready  to  welcome  the 
Romans  as  deliverers,  and  the  Acarnanians  and  Boeotians 
alone  remained  the  steadfast  allies  of  Macedonia.  The 
Achaean  league,  previously  estranged  by  the  murder  of 
Aratus,  had,  under  the  able  leadership  of  Philopoemen, 
revived  its  military  power  and  freed  itself  from  the 
oppressive  influence  of  Macedonia.  Aware  of  the  danger 
to  Greece  of  invoking  Roman  aid,  this  league  attempted 
in  vain  to  mediate  between  Philip  and  Rhodes,  and  in 
despair  remained  neutral,  awaiting  the  coming  of  the 
Roman  troops  with  undisguised  but  inactive  dread.  Thus 
Philip,  by  his   cruelty  and  arrogance,  had   alienated  all 


184  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

those  Eastern  powers  which  at  this  critical  hour  should 
have  proved  his  staunchest  allies  in  repelling  the  common 
danger  to  Greek  freedom  and  independence. 

The  land  army  under  Galba  at  first  effected  very  little 
of  importance,  though  a  division  of  the  fleet  under  Cento 
surprised  and  captured  Chalcis  in  Euboea,  the  chief 
stronghold  of  Philip  in  Greece,  but  from  want  of  troops 
was  unable  to  retain  it.  Philip,  in  revenge,  made  two 
futile  attempts  on  Athens,  and  laid  waste  Attica. 

In  the  spring  of  109  B.C.  a  joint  invasion  of  Macedonia 
was  concerted  by  Galba  with  the  wild  races  of  the 
Dardani  and  Illyrians  on  the  north,  and  the  Athamanes 
and  Aetoliaus  on  the  south.  Galba  with  his  various  allies 
advanced  from  the  west  into  Macedonia,  and  made  every 
effort  to  draw  Philip  into  a  decisive  engagement.  Aided 
by  his  knowledge  of  the  country  and  his  ease  in  procuring 
supplies,  Philip  for  a  long  time  avoided  an  engagement, 
and  continually  harassed  the  Romans.  Compelled  at  last 
to  withdraw,  by  the  news  that  the  barbarians  from  the 
north  had  entered  his  territory,  and  that  the  Aetolians 
had  joined  the  Athamanes  in  an  incursion  into  Thessaly, 
Philip  easily  evaded  the  pursuit  of  Galba,  and  took  up  his 
position  in  a  narrow  pass  on  ground  favourable,  as  he 
thought,  to  his  troops.  But  in  the  battle  that  followed, 
Galba  was  victorious.  The  result  of  this  victory  was  not 
great,  as  Galba  feared  to  pursue  his  foe  in  a  difficult 
and  unknown  country,  and,  after  laying  waste  the  land 
and  capturing  Celetrum,  he  retreated  to  Apollonia. 

Philip  now  turned  his  arms  with  great  effect  against 
the  Aetolians  and  Athamanes,  while  his  officer  Athena- 
goras  chased  the  Dardani  back  over  the  mountains. 

The  Roman  fleet  was  scarcely  more  successful  than  the 
land  army. 

On  the  whole,  then,  the  result  of  the  first  campaign  was 
favourable  to  Philip.  Elated  by  his  success,  and  by 
hopes,  never  realized,  of  active  assistance  from  Antiochus, 
Philip  next  year  encamped  in  a  narrow  pass  on  the  Aous, 
where  he  was  confronted  by  the  Roman  army  strongly 
reinforced,  and  by  a  much  abler  officer  in  the  person  of 
the  consul  Titus  Quinctius  Flamininus.  After  much 
delay,  caused  both  by  fruitless  negotiations  and  by  the 
strength  of  Philip's  position,  Flamininus  was  enabled,  by 


A  REVIEW  OF  TEE  WEST  AND  EAST.  185 

the  treachery  of  some  Epirot  chiefs,  to  take  the  Mace- 
donians both  in  front  and  rear,  and  rout  them  with 
considerable  loss.  Philip  retreated  to  the  pass  of  Tempe, 
and,  with  the  exception  of  certain  fortresses  in  Thessaly, 
and  of  the  Acarnanian  territory,  all  northern  Greece 
speedily  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Romans.  In  the  south, 
the  strong  fortresses  of  Chalcis  and  Corinth  still  kept  the 
Macedonian  influence  paramount,  but  the  exertions  of  the 
allied  fleet  which  threatened  Corinth,  and  the  action  of 
the  Achaean  league  in  joining  the  victorious  Romans,  soon 
made  Philip  aware  of  the  desperate  nature  of  his  position. 

Negotiations  with  Flamininus,  and  afterwards  with  the 
Roman  senate,  ended  in  the  determination  of  Philip  to 
risk  another  battle  ;  and  in  197  B.C.  he  encountered  the 
enemy  in  the  district  of  Scotussa.  The  battle  takes  its 
name  from  the  steep  height  of  Cynoscephalae,  which, 
lying  between  the  two  camps,  was  the  scene  of  the  first 
encounter  between  the  vanguard  of  both  armies.  Owing 
to  the  success  of  the  Macedonians  at  the  outset,  Philip 
was  encouraged  to  risk  a  battle  with  his  whole  force,  and, 
after  a  fierce  conflict,  in  which  the  phalanx  exhibited  its 
ancient  prowess,  Philip  was  utterly  defeated,  and  escaped 
to  Larissa. 

At  this  defeat,  even  his  most  staunch  allies,  the 
Acarnanians,  submitted  to  Rome ;  resistance  was  no 
longer  possible.  The  terms  imposed  do  honour  to  the 
Romans.  They  gave  no  ear  to  the  malignity  of  the 
Aetolians,  who  demanded  the  annihilation  of  the  Mace- 
donian kingdom  ;  for  they  clearly  saw  that  it  alone  could 
serve  as  a  bulwark  against  the  encroaching  Celts  and 
Thracians.  A  commission  of  ten  was  appointed,  at  the 
head  of  which  was  Flamininus,  to  settle  the  complicated 
affairs  of  Greece.  The  result  of  their  deliberations  was 
the  decision  that  Philip  should  give  up  all  his  possessions 
in  Asia  Minor,  Thrace,  Greece,  and  the  islands  of  the 
Aegean  ;  that  he  should  pay  a  contribution  of  a  thousand 
talents  (£244,000)  ;  that  he  should  conclude  no  foreign 
alliances  without  Rome's  consent,  and  wage  no  foreign 
wars ;  that  he  should  enter  into  the  Roman  alliance,  and 
send  a  contingent  when  required  ;  that  the  Macedonian 
army  should  not  exceed  five  thousand  men,  nor  its  fleet 
five  decked  ships ;  that  the  territory  of  Macedonia  should 


186  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

remain  unimpaired,  with  the  exception  of  some  small 
strips  and  of  the  revolted  province  of  Orestis. 

With  regard  to  the  disposition  of  the  possessions  thus 
ceded  by  Philip,  Rome,  having  learnt  by  experience  in 
Spain  the  doubtful  value  of  transmarine  provinces,  kept 
none  of  the  spoil  for  herself,  and  decreed  freedom  to  the 
Greek  states, — a  freedom  rather  in  name  than  deed,  when 
we  consider  the  value  of  it  to  a  nation  devoid  ot  all 
union  and  unity.  Athens  received  the  three  islands  of 
Paros,  Scyros,  and  Imbros,  as  a  reward  for  the  hardships 
she  had  suffered  and  for  the  many  courtesies  she  had  shown 
to  Rome.  All  Philip's  possessions  in  the  Peloponnese  and 
on  the  Isthmus  were  ceded  to  the  Achaean  league,  which 
was  thus  practically  made  ruler  of  the  Peloponnese :  but 
scant  favour  was  accorded  to  the  boastful  and  greedy 
Aetolians,  who  incorporated  Phocis  and  Locris,  but  were 
not  suffered  to  extend  their  power  to  Acarnania  and 
Thessaly. 

Nabis  of  Sparta  obstinately  refused  to  give  up  Argos  to 
the  Achaean  league,  and  only  yielded  to  a  powerful  display 
of  Roman  arms ;  and,  though  his  banditti  were  dispersed 
and  Sparta  captured,  both  the  city  and  Nabis  himself 
were  left  intact,  the  conquerors  only  requiring  the  cession 
of  his  foreign  possessions  and  his  adherence  to  the  usual 
stipulations  touching  the  right  of  waging  war  and  of 
forming  foreign  alliances. 

Peace  was  thus,  outwardly  at  any  rate,  established 
among  the  petty  Greek  states.  Flamininus  acted  with 
great  fairness  and  patience  throughout,  and  strove  as  far 
as  possible  to  mete  out  justice  to  the  claims  of  each  Greek 
state.  He  showed  an  especially  wise  and  tolerant  mode- 
ration in  his  punishment  of  the  rebellious  Boeotians,  who, 
in  their  eagerness  to  attach  themselves  again  to  Mace- 
donia, did  not  refrain  from  putting  to  death  isolated 
bands  of  Roman  soldiers. 

In  194  B.C.  Flamininus,  after  holding  a  conference  of 
all  the  Greek  states  at  Corinth,  withdrew  his  troops 
from  every  fortress  and  departed  homeward,  thus  giving 
the  lie  to  the  Aetolian  calumny  that  Rome  had  inherited 
from  Philip  "  the  fetters  "  of  Greece. 

We  cannot  doubt  the  nobleness  and  sincerity  of  the 
Roman  endeavour  to  set  Greece  free ;    the  reason  of  its 


A  REVIEW  OF  THE  WEST  AND  EAST.  187 

failure  was  the  complete  demoralization  of  the  Greek 
nation.  In  truth,  the  necessities  of  the  case  demanded 
the  permanent  presence  of  a  superior  power,  not  the 
pernicious  boon  of  a  fictitious  freedom  ;  the  feeble  policy 
of  sentiment,  with  all  its  apparent  humanity,  was  far 
more  cruel  than  the  sternest  occupation.  "  History  has 
a  Nemesis  for  every  sin — for  an  impotent  craving  after 
freedom,  as  well  as  for  an  injudicious  generosity."  The 
Nemesis  in  this  case  was  the  war  with  Antiochus  of  Asia. 


AUTHORITIES. 

Celtic  wars,  etc. — Polyb.  xxxiv.  10,  11.     Liv.  xxxi.  10 ;  xxxii.  29-31 ; 

xxxiii.    22-23,  36-37;    xxxiv.    22,   48-47;    xxxv.   3-5,  11,  40; 

xxxvi.  38-40 ;  xxxix.  1,  21-23,  54-55 ;  xl.  25-28 ;  xli.  16,  18,  20. 
Flight  of  Hannibal. — Liv.  xxxiii.  45-49. 
Massinissa. — Polyb.  xxi.  11,  21;  xxxii.  2;  xxxvii.  10.      Liv.  xxx.  44; 

xxxi.  1,  11,  19  ;  xxxii.  27  ;  xxxiv.  62  ;  xxxvi.  4. 
Spam.— Liv.  xxxi.  40 ;  xxxiii.  21,  25,  44 ;  xxxiv.  10-21 ;  xl.  30-34, 

39-40,  44,  47-LO ;  xli  6-7.     Appian  Sp.  39-43. 
Macedonian  ivars. — Polyb.  viii.  10-16;  ix.  28-41;  xv.  20-24;  xvi. 

1-12,  24-35  ;  xvii.  xviii.  1-28,  33-40,  43-48.     Liv.  xxiii.  33-39 ; 

xxiv.  40 ;  xxvii.  29-32 ;  xxviii.  5-8 ;  xxix.  4,  12  ;  xxx.  42  ;  xxxi. 

5-8,  14-18,  24-44;    xxxii.   4-13,    19-23,   32-38;    xxxiii.  3-25. 

Appian.  Maced.  1-9  ;  Syr.  1. 
Egypt. — Polyb.  iii.  2-3. 
Greece. — Polyb.  iv.  and  v.     Liv.  xxxiv.  22-41,  48-52.     Diod.  xxviii. 

13.     Plut.  Flamininus  and  Aratui. 


188  HISTORY  OF   JtOME. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

WAR   WITH    ANTIOCHUS   OF   ASIA,    AND    THE    THIRD 
MACEDONIAN   WAR. 

Rupture  between  Rome  and  Antiochus — Declaration  of  war,  192  B.C. 
— Antiochus  in  Greece — Scipio  in  Asia — Battle  of  Magnesia, 
190  B.C. — Settlement  of  Asia  and  Greece — Deaths  of  Hannibal 
and  Scipio — Anger  of  Philip — His  successor  Perseus — War  with 
Rome,  172  b.c. — Conduct  of  Perseus  and  of  the  Roman  generals 
—Battle  of  Pydna,  168  B.C. — Roman  treatment  of  Macedonia  and 
the  Eastern  powers — Position  of  Rome. 

Antiochus  had  long  fixed  his  eyes  upon  the  Syrian  coast, 
which  had  been  wrested  from  Asia  bj  the  Egyptians,  and 
had  seized  the  occasion  of  Philopator's  death,  in  205  B.C., 
to  concert  measures  with  Philip  for  the  partition  of  the 
kingdom  of  the  Ptolemies.  But  he  lacked  the  foresight 
to  make  common  cause  with  Philip  in  repelling  Roman 
interference,  and  had  taken  advantage  of  the  second 
Macedonian  war  to  secure  Egypt  for  himself.  At  first  he 
attacked  the  Egyptian  possessions  in  Cilicia,  Syria,  and 
Palestine,  and  by  a  victory  gained  in  198  B.C.,  near  the 
sources  of  the  Jordan,  he  became  absolute  master  of  the  two 
latter  countries.  He  then  proceeded  with  a  strong  fleet 
to  occupy  all  the  districts  on  the  south  and  west  coasts  of 
Asia  Minor,  which  had  formerly  belonged  to  Egypt,  but 
had  virtually  fallen  under  the  dominion  of  Philip.  Rome 
had,  however,  bidden  Philip  to  withdraw  from  these 
possessions,  and  to  leave  them  free  and  untouched,  and 
now  Antiochus  came  forward  to  take  Philip's  place  as  the 
oppressor  of  the  Greek  cities  and  free  kingdoms  in  those 
lands. 


WAR   WITH  ANTIOCHUS.  189 

Already,  in  198  B.C.,  Attalus  of  Pergamus  had  applied 
to  Rome  for  aid  against  Antiochns;  and  in  the  follow- 
ing year  the  Rhodians  openly  protected  the  Carian  cities 
of  Halicarnassus,  Caunus,  Myndus,  and  the  island  of 
Samos  against  the  attacks  of  the  great  king.  Other 
cities,  such  as  Smyrna  and  Lampsacus,  took  heart  to 
resist  Antiochus,  and  they,  one  and  all,  called  upon  Rome 
to  give  effect  to  her  promise  that  they  should  be  free,  and 
to  prove  that  neither  Macedonian  tyrant  nor  Asian  despot 
should  be  suffered  to  endanger  Greek  life  and  liberty. 
Rome,  however,  was  slow  to  answer  such  a  call ;  nor  did 
she  resort  to  other  measures  than  those  of  diplomacy, 
when  Antiochus,  in  196  B.C.,  landed  in  Europe  and  invaded 
the  Thracian  Chersonese,  and  took  active  measures  to 
convert  Thrace  into  a  dependent  satrapy  on  the  plea  that 
he  was  merely  reasserting  his  claim  to  the  land  conquered 
by  his  ancestor  Seleucus. 

The  delay  of  the  Romans  in  forcibly  opposing  Antiochus, 
who  plainly  showed  his  designs  not  only  on  Asia  Minor 
but  also  on  Greece,  may  be  ascribed  partly  to  their  weariness 
of  war,  but  chiefly  to  the  vain  wish  of  Flamininus  to  pose 
as  the  liberator  of  Greece  and  the  extinguisher  of  the  war 
in  the  East.  Flamininus  was  thus  induced  to  withdraw 
all  the  Roman  garrisons  from  Greece  in  194  B.C.,  and  to 
blind  the  Romans  to  the  fact  that  the  embers  of  war  still 
smouldered,  soon  to  be  rekindled  into  a  flame  by  his  own 
vanity  and  by  the  senate's  culpable  negligence. 

In  the  year  previous  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  Roman 
troops  from  Greece,  Antiochus  had  accorded  an  honourable 
reception  to  the  exiled  Hannibal,  which  in  itself  was 
tantamount  to  a  declaration  of  war;  but  Flamininus  re- 
fused to  regard  it  as  such,  and  contented  himself  with 
addressing  mere  verbal  remonstrances  and  demands  to 
Antiochus.  The  latter  did  not  fail  to  profit  by  the  respite 
unexpectedly  granted  him  by  the  Roman  evacuation  of 
Greece.  He  gave  one  daughter  in  marriage  to  the  young 
king  of  Egypt ;  another  to  Ariarathes,  king  of  Cappadocia  ; 
and  offered  a  third  to  Eumenes,  who  had  succeeded  his 
father  Attalus  on  the  throne  of  Pergamus,  on  the  condi- 
tion of  his  abandoning  the  Roman  alliance  :  he  also  adopted 
conciliatory  measures  towards  the  Greek  cities  in  Asia 
Minor.     In  Greece  itself  the  Aetolians  were  eager  to  join 


190  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

him  ;  a  plan  was  even  formed  on  the  suggestion  of  Han- 
nibal by  which  the  Western  world  was  to  unite  with  the 
East,  and  war  to  blaze  anew  throughout  Italy,  Africa, 
and  Spain,  as  well  as  Greece,  Egypt,  and  Asia.  To  the 
vanity  and  impatience  of  the  Aetolians  was  due  the  first 
spark  which  ignited  the  train  of  war.  By  their  attempt 
to  take  Sparta  and  attach  it  to  their  league,  and  by  their 
failure  both  there  and  at  Chalcis,  they  caused  almost  the 
whole  of  the  Peloponnese  to  unite  against  Antiochus — a 
result  diametrically  opposite  to  that  which  they  wished  to 
produce. 

Events  had  now  reached  such  a  pass  that  a  rupture 
between  Rome  and  Antiochus  was  inevitable.  At  length, 
after  some  fruitless  discussion  at  Ephesus  between  the 
Roman  envoys  and  the  great  king,  war  was  declared  in 
192  B.C.,  and  in  the  summer  of  that  year  a  Roman  fleet 
appeared  to  secure  Greece  in  its  allegiance,  while  an  army 
under  Marcus  Baebius  landed  at  Apollonia  in  the  autumn. 
About  the  same  time,  Antiochus  crossed  over  into  Greece 
with  such  troops  as  he  could  at  once  collect,  and  occupied 
Demetrias.  All  hopes  of  success  depended  on  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  coalition  planned  by  Hannibal.  But  a  mean 
jealousy  of  the  latter's  greatness  was  as  fatal  in  the  court 
of  Antiochus  as  it  had  been  in  the  councils  of  Carthage  to 
the  execution  of  his  mighty  schemes ;  and  the  victor  of 
Cannae  was  entrusted  with  subordinate  and  ill-fitting 
commissions. 

The  attitude  of  Philip  of  Macedon,  of  Eumenes,  of  the 
Achaean  league,  Rhodes,  and  Egypt,  who  all  sided  with 
Rome,  showed  at  once  how  futile  would  be  the  attempts  of 
Antiochus  in  Europe.  At  first,  indeed,  Antiochus  antici- 
pated the  Romans  by  occupying  Euboea,  and  by  an  attempt 
to  gain  over  Thessaly  ;  but  he  soon  wearied  of  wrar,  and 
retired  to  Chalcis,  where  he  spent  his  time  in  writing 
letters  to  the  Greek  states  and  in  idle  amusement.  In 
the  spring  of  191  B.C.  the  Roman  general  Manius  Acilius 
Glabrio  arrived,  accompanied  by  several  noted  officers  and 
strong  reinforcements ;  in  all,  the  Roman  force  reached 
about  forty  thousand  men.  Antiochus,  whose  own  forces 
had  suffered  considerably  from  sickness  and  desertion,  and 
who  had  been  grossly  deceived  by  the  Aetolians  as  to 
the  amount  of  their  contingent,  foolishly  resolved  to  en- 


WAR    WITH  ANTIOCHUS.  191 

trench  himself  at  Thermopylae,  and  to  await  there  the 
arrival  of  the  great  army  from  Asia.  Owing  to  the 
remissness  of  the  Aetolians  posted  on  the  heights,  and  to 
their  surprise  by  Marcus  Cato,  Antiochus  was  easily 
routed,  and  escaped  to  Chalcis,  whence  he  took  ship  to 
Ephesus.  At  once  all  the  strong  fortresses,  with  the 
exception  of  Heraclea  and  Naupactus,  where  the  Aeto- 
lians for  a  while  held  out,  surrendered  to  the  Romans,  and 
all  the  Greek  states  tendered  their  submission. 

Thus  ended,  for  the  present,  all  resistance  in  Greece ; 
but  the  coming  war  in  Asia,  owing  to  the  great  distance 
and  difficulty  of  communications,  appeared  to  the  Romans 
far  more  dangerous.  Gaius  Livius,  the  Roman  ndmiral, 
gained  a  signal  victory  over  the  enemy's  fleet  between 
Ionia  and  Chios,  and  cooped  up  their  ships  in  the  harbour 
of  Ephesus ;  but  he  was  obliged,  on  the  approach  of 
winter,  to  retire  to  the  harbour  of  Cane,  near  Pergamus. 
Tn  the  winter,  Smyrna  and  many  Greek  cities  in  Asia 
Minor  welcomed  the  Romans,  and  Antiochus  made  great 
exertions  to  equip  two  fleets  supported  by  a  powerful 
land  army,  and  thus  to  prevent  the  Romans  from  landing 
in  Asia. 

Early  in.  the  following  year,  190  B.C.,  the  Roman 
admiral  proceeded  towards  the  Hellespont,  to  pave  the 
way  for  the  passage  of  the  land  army  by  the  capture  of 
Sestus  and  Abydus.  He  had  almost  effected  his  pur- 
pose when  he  was  recalled  by  the  news  that  the  fleet  of 
the  Rhodians,  his  allies,  had  been  destroyed  by  the 
enemy  ;  the  latter,  however,  on  the  arrival  of  Livius,  shut 
themselves  up  in  the  harbour  of  Ephesus  and  refused 
battle.  The  Roman  fleet  now  took  up  its  station  at 
Samos,  and  Livius  was  replaced  by  the  new  admiral 
Lucius  Aemilius  Regillus,  who  for  a  time  effected  nothing 
of  importance.  The  second  fleet  of  Antiochus,  led  by 
Hannibal,  which  had  long  been  detained  by  unfavourable 
winds,  at  last  threatened  to  join  the  fleet  at  Ephesus ; 
but  at  the  mouth  of  the  Eurymedon,  off  Aspendus  in 
Pamphylia,  it  was  utterly  defeated  by  a  squadron  of 
Rhodian  ships.  It  was  the  first  naval  battle  and  the  last 
battle  fought  by  Hannibal  against  Rome.  This  victory 
was  followed  up  by  another,  at  the  promontory  of  Myon- 
nesus  over  the  Asiatic  fleet  stationed  at  Ephesus,  in  which 


192  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

the  Romans  took  or  sank  forty-two  of  the  enemy's  ships, 
and  swept  the  sea  of  all  opposition  to  the  crossing  of  the 
Romau  land  army. 

The  conduct  of  the  war  on  land  had  been  entrusted  to 
the  conqueror  of  Zama,  who  practically  acted  as  supreme 
commander  in  the  place  of  his  brother  Lucius  Scipio, 
the  nominal  commander-in-chief,  a  man  of  no  ability.  On 
landing  in  Greece  the  Scipios  had  at  first  been  detained 
by  a  renewal  of  hostilities  on  the  part  of  the  Aetohaus, 
which  inconvenient  obstacle  was  only  removed  by  an 
armistice  for  six  months.  As  the  Aegean  was  not  yet 
clear  of  the  enemy's  ships,  Scipio  marched  by  the  coast 
through  Macedonia  and  Thrace,  intending  to  cross  the 
Hellespont.  The  victory  of  Myonnesus  and  the  foolish 
terror  of  Antiochus  proved  that  Scipio's  good  fortune 
had  not  deserted  him.  By  order  of  Antiochus  the  strong 
fortress  of  Lysimachia  on  the  Thracian  Chersonese  was 
evacuated,  and  thus  no  opposition  was  offered  to  the 
crossing  of  the  Hellespont,  nor  was  any  preparation  made 
to  receive  Scipio  on  the  Asiatic  coast.  Scipio  refused  to 
accept  the  terms  of  submission  proposed  by  Antiochus, 
and  the  Romans  met  the  army  of  the  great  king  near 
Magnesia,  at  the  foot  of  mount  Sipylus,  not  far  from 
Smyrna,  in  the  autumn  of  190  B.C.  The  cumbrous  masses 
of  the  Asiatic  troops  proved  their  own  destruction :  the 
flower  of  their  army,  drawn  up  in  Macedonian  phalanx, 
was  foiled  in  its  efforts  to  reach  the  Roman  legions  by  the 
confusion  of  their  own  light  troops,  and  by  the  absence  of 
the  heavy  cavalry  nnder  Antiochus,  which  had  rushed 
off  in  pursuit  of  a  small  Roman  squadron.  At  last  the 
phalanx  was  broken  up  by  its  own  elephants,  and  the 
whole  army  scattered  in  utter  rout. 

The  losses  of  Antiochus  have  been  estimated  at  fifty 
thousand,  those  of  the  Romans  at  three  hundred  foot 
soldiers  and  twenty-four  horsemen.  Peace  was  concluded 
on  the  terms  proposed  by  Scipio  before  the  battle,  by 
which  Antiochus  was  condemned  to  pay  all  the  costs  of 
the  war  and  to  surrender  the  whole  of  Asia  Minor.  Anti- 
ochus himself  was  soon  after  (in  187  B.C.)  slain,  while 
plundering  a  temple  of  Bel  in  Elymais,  at  the  head  of  the 
Persian  Gulf.  "  With  the  day  of  Magnesia  Asia  was 
erased  from  the  list  of  great  states ;    and  never  perhaps 


WAR   WITH  ANTIOCLWS.      "  193 

did  a  great  power  fall  so  rapidly,  so  thoroughly,  and  so 
ignominiously  as  the  kingdom  of  the  Seleucidae  under  this 
Antiochus  the  Great." 

The  Celts  of  Asia  Minor  who  had  supplied  mercenaries 
to  Antiochus  now  met  with  severe  punishment.  The  new 
Roman  commander,  Gnaeus  Manlius  Yolso,  who  had  suc- 
ceeded Lucius  Scipio  in  189  B.C.,  turned  his  arms  against 
the  two  cantons  of  the  Tolistob<  gi  and  the  Tectosages. 
In  both  cases  the  mountain  heights  to  which  the  Celts 
had  retired  were  scaled,  and  both  cantons  were  completely 
broken  up  and  dispersed. 

The  final  settlement  of  Asia  was  determined  by  a  com- 
mission presided  over  by  Volso.  The  sum  to  be  paid  by 
Antiochus  was  fixed  at  fifteen  thousand  Euboic  talents 
(£3,600,000)  ;  all  possessions  in  Europe,  and  all  the 
country  in  Asia  Minor  west  of  the  river  Halys  and  the 
mountain  chain  of  the  Taurus,  were  now  ceded  by 
the  great  king ;  lastly,  certain  restrictions  were  imposed 
upon  his  rights  of  waging  war  and  of  navigating  the  sea. 
Even  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  Roman  protectorate, 
Ariarathes,  king  of  Cappadocia,  though  mulcted  in  a 
light  fine  for  his  alliance  with  Antiochus,  retained  his 
kingdom  and  was  practically  independent  of  Antiochus; 
moreover,  the  two  satrapies  of  Armenia  now  rose  under 
Roman  influence  into  independent  kingdoms.  Prusias, 
king  of  Bithvnia,  was  allowed  to  keep  his  possessions 
intact;  nor  were  the  Celts  ousted  from  their  territory, 
though  bound  to  refrain  in  the  future  from  sending  out 
armed  bands  and  levying  black-mail  from  the  Asiatic 
Greeks.  The  Greek  cities,  which  were  free  and  had 
joined  the  Romans,  were  confirmed  in  their  ancient  free- 
dom and  exempted  from  tribute  to  the  various  dynasts  of 
Asia  Minor ;  this  exemption  was  not,  however,  extended 
to  those  which  paid  tribute  to  Eumenes.  Rhodes  obtained 
Lycia  and  the  greater  part  of  Caria  as  a  reward  for  her 
zealous  assistance.  But  the  largest  share  of  the  spoil  fell 
to  the  king  of  Pergarnus.  Eumenes  received  the  Thracian 
Chersonese  and  the  greater  part  of  Asia  Minor  west  of 
the  Halys,  the  protectorate  over  and  right  of  receiving 
tribute  from  such  Greek  cities  as  were  not  made  absolutely 
free,  and  a  contribution  of  nearly  five  hundred  talents  from 
Antiochus.       Thus    he    was    nobly    recompensed   for   his 


194  WSTUHY  OF  HOME. 

sufferings  and  devotion  to  the  Roman  cause,  and  thus  the 
kingdom  of  the  Attalids  became  in  Asia  what  Numidia 
was  in  Africa — a  powerful  state  dependent  on  Rome, 
capable  of  acting  as  a  check  upon  Macedonia  and  Syria 
without  needing  Roman  support.  Rome  thus  adhered 
strictly  to  its  policy  of  acquiring  no  transmarine  posses 
sions,  and  in  188  B.C.  the  fleet  and  land  army  evacuated 
Asia. 

The  war  with  Antioclms  had  naturally  agitated  the 
ever  quarrelsome  and  excitable  states  in  European  Greece. 
The  Aetolians,  who  had  tried  to  rekindle  tbe  flame  of  war 
by  attacks  on  Philip  of  Macedon,  were  soon  compelled  to 
utter  submission  by  the  combined  arms  of  the  Roman 
consul,  Marcus  Fulvius  Nobilior,  and  the  Macedonians 
and  Achaeans.  The  possessions  taken  from  the  Aetolians 
were  divided  among  tbe  allies  of  Rome,  who  reserved  for 
herself  nothing  but  the  two  islands  of  Cephallenia  aud 
Zacynthus.  Neither  Philip  nor  the  Achaeans  were  satisfied 
with  their  share  of  the  spoil.  The  last-named  were  foolish 
enough  to  attempt  to  display  their  independence  of  Rome, 
and  with  a  quasi- patriotic  zeal  to  desire  an  extension  of 
their  power ;  though  indignant  at  the  advice  of  Flami- 
ninus  to  content  themselves  with  the  Peloponnese,  and  at 
the  refusal  of  Rome  to  enlarge  the  territory  of  their 
league,  they  proved  their  incapacity  to  govern  the  Pelo- 
ponnese by  constant  quarrels  with  Sparta  and  Messene. 
The  senate,  after  vain  attempts  to  arbitrate,  at  last  grew 
weary  of  these  petty  disputes,  and  left  the  Achaeans  and 
the  Greek  states  generally  to  settle  such  trifles  among 
themselves. 

After  the  defeat  of  Antiochus,  Hannibal  had  taken 
refuge  with  Prusias,  the  king  of  Bithynia,  and  had  success- 
fully aided  him  in  his  wars  with  Eumenes.  Now  he,  the 
only  being  on  earth  who  was  still  a  source  of  terror  to 
Rome,  was  hunted  down  by  his  old  enemies  in  a  way 
unworthy  of  so  great  a  nation,  and  compelled  to  take 
poison,  dying  in  183  B.C.,  at  the  age  of  sixty-seven 

About  the  same  time  died  his  great  rival  and  lucky 
victor,  Publius  Scipio.  The  favourite  of  fortune,  he  had 
added  to  the  empire  of  Rome,  Spain,  Africa,  and  Asia;  and 
yet  he,  too,  like  Hannibal,  spent  his  last  years  in  bitter 
trouble  and  disappointment,  a  voluntary  exile  from  the 


TEE  TEIRD  MACEDONIAN   WAR.  195 

city  of  his  fathers,  for  which  lie  had  spent  his  life,  but  in 
which  he  had  forbidden  his  own  remains  to  be  buried. 
We  do  not  exactly  know  A\h;;t  drove  him  from  Rome. 
The  charges  of  peculation  brought  against  him  and  his 
brother  Lucius  were  no  doubt  empty  calumnies,  but  his 
arrogance  and  proud  belief  that  he  was  not  as  other  men 
had  doubtless  raised  many  enemies,  while  his  wish  to 
sacrifice  everything  to  the  promotion  of  his  own  family 
caused  general  distrust  of  his  political  aims.  "It  is, 
moreover,  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  such  natures 
as  that  of  Scipio — strange  mixtures  of  genuine  gold  and 
glittering  tinsel — that  they  need  the  good  fortune  and 
the  brilliance  of  youth  in  order  to  exercise  their  charm, 
and,  when  this  charm  begins  to  fade,  it  is  the  charmer 
himself  that  is  most  painfully  conscious  of  the  change." 

Thus  ended  this  Asiatic  war.  A  significant  indication 
of  the  feeble  and  loose  organization  of  the  kingdom  of  the 
Seleucidae  is  the  fact  that  it,  alone  of  all  the  great  states 
conquered  by  Rome,  never  after  the  first  conquest  made 
a  second  appeal  to  arms.  But  Rome  had  not  yet  done 
with  her  troubles  in  the  East;  and  her  unjust  treatment 
of  Philip  of  Macedon  in  return  for  his  staunch  support 
during  the  war  with  Antiochus  soon  caused  another  out- 
break in  that  quarter.  All  the  states  in  Greece  now 
seized  the  opportunity  of  damaging  their  ancient  oppressor, 
and  of  reviving  the  anti-Macedonian  feeling  by  constant 
complaints  to  the  Roman  senate ;  but  the  irritation  and 
annoyance  thus  caused  to  Philip  was  as  nothing  compared 
with  the  indignation  he  felt  at  the  extension  of  the 
kingdom  of  Eumenes.  The  Attalids  had  ever  been  the 
bitterest  foes  of  Macedonia,  and,  now  that  their  power 
was  revived  and  increased  under  the  protecting  arm  of 
Rome,  Philip's  thirst  for  revenge  went  beyond  all  limits 
of  prudence.  On  hearing  of  some  fresh  invectives  which 
had  been  launched  against  him  in  the  Thessalian  assem- 
blies he  replied  with  the  line  of  Theocritus:  "HSt;  yap 
cf>pdo$ei  iravB  aXiov  a/J-fii  SeSikeiv ;  ("What!  thinkest  thou 
that  all  my  suns  are  set?  ")  ;  a  reply  which  showed  that 
he  had  determined  once  more  to  put  all  to  the  hazard.  In 
these  later  days,  however,  Philip  displayed  a  caution  and 
an  earnest  perseverance  in  his  preparations  which  at  an 
earlier  date  might  have  changed  the  world's  history.     He 


196  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

even  curbed  his  proud  temper  so  as  to  pretend  complete 
submission  to  Rome,  and  delayed  the  breaking  out  of  war 
by  the  agency  of  his  son  Demetrius,  who  during  his 
residence  as  a  hostage  at  Rome  had  won  great  popularity 
with  the  loading  Romans.  Perseus,  the  eldest  son,  fear- 
ing that  Philip  would  disinherit  him  in  favour  of  Deme- 
trius, persuaded  his  father  to  put  the  latter  to  death,  on 
the  false  charge  that  he  was  intriguing  with  Rome  against 
Macedonia.  Philip  learned  too  late  the  plot  of  the  fratri- 
cide, but  died  himself,  in  1  79  B.C.,  before  he  could  punish 
the  crime. 

Thus  Perseus  succeeded  to  the  throne,  a  man  remark- 
able for  his  personal  prowess  and  steady  perseverance, 
and  incapable  of  being  turned  aside,  as  his  father  had 
been,  by  the  vicious  allurements  of  pleasure.  He  entered 
on  all  his  father's  schemes  with  resolute  determination, 
and  to  the  outward  eye  of  his  countrymen  he  seemed  the 
man  needed  for  the  great  work  of  liberation  from  the 
yoke  of  Rome.  But  he  lacked  the  genius  and  elasticity 
of  Philip.  He  could  devise  plans  and  persevere  in  his 
preparations  for  their  execution,  but  when  the  time  came 
for  action  he  was  frightened  at  his  own  handiwork.  As 
is  the  case  with  all  narrow  minds,  the  means  became  to 
him  the  end ,  when  imminent  peril  demanded  the  use  of 
the  treasures  which  he  had  amassed  for  the  war  with 
Rome,  Perseus  could  not  find  the  heart  to  part  with  his 
golden  pieces. 

The  wise  measures  of  Philip,  in  founding  towns,  en- 
couraging marriage,  and  in  developing  the  finances  of  his 
country  during  twenty  years  of  peace,  had  rendered  the 
power  of  Macedonia  at  least  twice  as  strong  as  it  had 
been  at  the  outbreak  of  the  second  Macedonian  war. 
Perseus  now  possessed  an  army  of  thirty  thousand  troops, 
independent  of  auxiliaries,  a  treasury  capable  of  paying 
both  this  army  and  ten  thousand  mercenaries  for  ten 
years,  and,  above  all,  a  devoted  and  loyal  people.  The 
attempts,  however,  to  raise  a  coalition  against  Rome,  and 
thus  carry  out  the  schemes  of  Hannibal,  failed.  In  Greece 
it  is  true  that  the  sentiments  of  every  state  were  gradually 
veering  round  to  the  side  of  Perseus,  whose  name  was  not 
stained,  as  that  of  his  father  had  been,  by  atrocious  and 
bloodthirsty    deeds.       Every    Greek    now    saw    the    true 


THE  THIRD  MACEDONIAN    WAB.  197 

meaning  of  the  freedom  granted  by  Koine,  and  that  the 
restoration  of  Hellenic  nationality  by  a  foreign  power 
involved  a  contradiction  in  terms.  The  efforts  of  Eu- 
menes,  who  tried  by  gifts  and  favours  to  conciliate  the 
Greeks  in  Asia  Minor,  and  to  reconcile  them  to  the 
arrangements  made  by  Rome,  were  received  with  every 
sign  of  scorn  and  contempt. 

But  tl  e  support  from  the  Greek  cities  and  states,  whether 
of  Greece  proper  or  Asia  Minor,  was  but  a  broken  reed 
whereon  to  lean.  More  important  was  the  success  which 
attended  the  efforts  of  Perseus  to  stir  up  the  barbarian 
tribes  living  near  the  Danube  and  in  Illyria,  and  the  close 
alliance  he  formed  with  the  brave  Cotys,  ruler  of  the 
Odrysians  and  of  all  eastern  Thrace.  By  public  proclama- 
tion he  gained  over  to  his  side  all  the  Greeks  who,  owing 
to  political  and  other  offences,  and  still  more  owing  to 
debt,  had  been  exiled.  From  these  and  other  causes  the 
whole  of  Greece  was  once  more  in  a  state  of  ferment. 
Rome  saw  that  she  could  delay  no  longer;  and  the  advent 
of  Eumenes  in  person,  with  a  long  list  of  grievances  and 
a  true  account  of  the  state  of  affairs  in  Greece,  caused  the 
senate  to  resolve  on  war  in  the  autumn  of  172  B.C. 

Perseus,  instead  of  acting  at  once  and  occupying  Greece 
by  the  aid  of  the  Macedonian  party  in  each  state,  frittered 
away  his  time  in  discussions  with  Quintus  Marcius  Philip- 
pus,  whose  aim  was  to  cause  Perseus  to  delay  active 
operations  until  the  Roman  legions  arrived.  This  foolish 
delay  on  the  part  of  Perseus  ruined  his  chance  of  support 
from  the  Greek  states  and  confederacies.  The  Aetolian 
league  chose  Lyciscus  as  its  new  strategus,  a  thorough 
partisan  of  Rome  ;  and  the  Boeotian  confederacy  suddenly 
collapsed  completely  on  the  complaint  of  a  Roman  envoy 
touching  two  of  their  cities,  Haliartus  and  Coronea,  which 
had  entered  into  engagements  with  Perseus. 

In  June,  171  B.C.,  the  Roman  legions  landed,  and  Perseus, 
owing  to  his  utter  remissness,  found  himself  alone.  For- 
tunately for  him,  the  Roman  consul,  Publius  Licinius 
Crassus,  was  grossly  incompetent,  and,  had  Perseus 
followed  up  his  first  success,  gained  near  Larisa,  by 
assuming  the  offensive,  no  doubt  all  Greece  would  have 
at  once  followed  the  example  of  the  Epirots  and  revolted. 
Crassus  signalized  his  shameful  command  by  forcing  the 


198  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

small  Boeotian  town  of  Coronea  to  capitrulate,  and  by 
selling  its  inhabitants  into  slavery.  His  successor,  Aulus 
Hostilius,  was  equally  unsuccessful,  and  was  twice  easily 
repulsed  in  attempting  to  enter  Macedonia ;  while  his 
colleague,  Appius  Claudius,  commanding  the  western 
army,  met  with  nothing  but  reverses.  Moreover,  the 
Roman  name,  hitherto  distinguished  in  the  East  by  the 
honourable  probity  of  its  political  transactions,  was  now 
stained  by  treacherous  and  underhand  dealing  with 
various  Greek  states.  Two  campaigns  had  served  to 
show  the  completely  demoralized  and  disorganized  con- 
dition of  the  Roman  army,  which  was  only  saved  from 
destruction  by  the  inability  of  Perseus  to  change  his  plan 
of  defensive  warfare  to  one  of  a  vigorous  offensive. 

The  third  campaign  was  opened  in  169  B.C.,  by  the  new 
Roman  commander,  Quintus  Marcius  Philippus.  He 
succeeded  in  entering  Macedonia  by  the  pass  of  Tempe,  but 
was  prevented  from  advancing  by  the  entrenched  position 
which  Perseus  occupied  on  the  stream  of  the  Elpius ,  and 
the  Roman  army  remained  idle  in  the  extreme  corner  of 
Thessaly.  Genthins,  king  of  Illyria,  was  bribed  by  Perseus 
to  break  with  Rome,  the  bribe,  however,  the  miserly 
Perseus  never  paid,  nor  would  he  part  with  his  beloved 
gold  to  hire  twenty  thousand  Celts  who  volunteered  to 
serve  in  his  army 

In  168  B  c  a  very  different  Roman  general  appeared  on 
the  scene,  in  the  person  of  Lucius  Aemilius  Paullus,  son 
of  the  consul  who  fell  at  Cannae, — a  man  full  of  vigour 
despite  his  sixty  years,  and  utterly  incorruptible.  He 
soon  turned  the  position  of  the  enemy  and  forced  them  to 
retreat  to  Pydna.  Here  the  decisive  battle  was  fought, 
and  the  Macedonian  phalanx,  after  dispersing  the  Roman 
vanguard  and  endangering  the  whole  army,  lost  its  forma- 
tion on  the  uneven  ground,  and  was  cut  down  to  a  man  ; 
twenty  thousand  Macedonians  fell,  and  eleven  thousand 
were  made  prisoners  Perseus  fled  with  his  cavalry  and 
treasure  to  Samothrace,  and  soon  after  surrendered,  weep- 
ing, to  the  Romans ;  he  died  a  few  years  later,  at  Alba  on 
the  Fucine  lake. 

Thus  perished  the  empire  of  Alexander  the  Great,  144 
years  after  his  death.  Macedonia  was  henceforth  abolished, 
and  the  united  kingdom  was  broken  up  into  four  republi- 


THE  THIRD   MACEDONIAN   WAR.  199 

can  leagues,  which  paid  to  Rome  half  the  former  land-tax  ; 
right  of  intermarriage  between  the  members  of  different 
leagues  was  forbidden,  and  every  measure  was  taken  to 
prevent  a  revival  of  the  ancient  monarchy.  The  Romans 
gained  their  object,  and  from  that  day  to  this  Macedonia 
has  possessed  no  history. 

Illyria,  whose  king  Genthius  was  taken  prisoner,  and 
whose  capital  Scodra  was  captured  by  the  praetor  Lucius 
Anicius,  was  treated  in  the  same  way  as  Macedonia  had 
been.  It  was  split  up  into  three  free  states;  its  piratical 
fleet  was  confiscated,  and  an  end  was  thus  put  to  the 
depredations  of  Illyrian  corsairs. 

In  the  treatment  of  the  rest  of  the  Greek  world, 
Rome  now  discarded  the  sentimental  policy  of  Fla- 
mininus,  and  determined  to  reduce  all  Greek  states  to 
the  same  hnmble  level  of  dependence.  It  was  clear 
that  with  the  abolition  of  Macedonia  the  kingdom  of 
Pergamus,  as  exercising  a  check  on  Macedon,  ceased  to 
be  a  necessity.  The  Romans  therefore  proceeded  to  cir- 
culate strange,  though  utterly  unfounded,  reports  as  to 
the  loyalty  of  Eumenes  ;  they  attempted  to  set  his  brother 
Attalus  against  him  by  granting  Attalus  favours  and 
inciting  him  to  establish  a  rival  throne  ;  they  declared 
Pamphylia  independent,  and,  when  the  Galatians  overran 
Pergamus,  they,  after  a  pretence  of  mediation,  declared 
them  independent  also.  Eumenes  set  sail  for  Italy  to 
remonstrate ;  but  the  senate  suddenly  decreed  that  no 
kings  in  future  were  to  come  to  Rome,  and  sent  a  quaestor 
to  meet  Eumenes  at  Brundisium.  Eumenes,  taking  the 
hint,  declared  that  he  was  satisfied,  and  returned  home ; 
he  clearly  saw  that  all  equality  of  alliance  was  at  an  end, 
and  that  the  time  of  impotent  subjection  to  Rome  had 
now  come  for  himself  as  for  all  other  free  states. 

The  high-spirited  Rhodians  were  the  next  to  suffer. 
Deluded  by  the  consul  Quintus  Marcius,  who  had  pre 
tended  to  wish  for  their  mediation  in  the  war  with  Per- 
seus, they  just  before  the  battle  of  Pydna  sent  envoys 
to  the  Roman  camp  and  the  Roman  senate,  saying  that 
the  Macedonian  war  was  injurious  to  their  commercial 
interests,  and  that  they  would  declare  war  against  the 
side  which  refused  at  once  to  make  peace.  This  miserable 
republican  vanity  soon  changed  to  humble  entreaty,  when 


200  HISTORY  OF  HOME. 

the  .Romans,  after  the  battle  of  Pydna,  threatened  the 
Rhodians  with  war.  The  senate,  glad  of  an  excuse  to 
humiliate  the  haughty  merchant  city,  deprived  Rhodes  of 
all  her  possessions  on  the  maiuland,  and,  by  the  erection 
of  a  free  port  at  Delos,  so  damaged  Rhodian  commerce 
that  the  yearly  receipts  from  customs  sunk  at  once  from 
£41,000,  to  £6000. 

Iu  Greece  itself  severe  measures  were  taken.  Seventy 
towns  in  Epirus  were  plundered,  and  the  inhabitants,  to 
the  number  of  150,000,  were  sold  into  slavery.  Trials  for 
high  treason  took  place  in  all  parts  of  Greece,  owing  to 
the  existence  of  a  Macedonian  party  in  every  city.  A 
very  large  number  of  suspects  from  Achaia,  Aetolia, 
Acarnania,  and  Lesbos  were  deported  to  Italy,  partly, 
perhaps,  to  escape  the  bloodthirsty  zeal  of  such  men  as 
the  Aetolian  strategus  Lyciscus. 

An  opportunity  had,  moreover,  been  given  Rome  to 
interfere  once  more  in  the  East.  During  the  third  Mace- 
donian war,  Antiochus  Epiphanes,  king  of  Asia,  or,  as  it 
was  now  called,  Syria,  seized  the  occasion  to  carry  out 
the  traditional  policy  of  the  Seleucidae  and  to  conquer 
Egypt.  When  he  was  on  the  eve  of  success,  and  was 
lying  encamped  before  Alexandria,  a  Roman  envoy  arrived 
shortly  after  the  battle  of  Pydna,  aud  drawing  a  circle 
round  the  king,  warned  him  at  once  to  restore  all  that  he 
had  conquered  and  to  evacuate  Egypt.  With  this  warn- 
ing Antiochus  was  forced  to  comply ;  and  Egypt  at  once 
submitted  to  the  Roman  protectorate. 

Every  state  in  the  world  now  did  homage  to  Rome,  and 
the  most  obsequious  flattery  met  the  ears  of  the  Roman 
senate.  Nor  was  the  moment  ill-chosen  ;  from  the  battle 
of  Pydna  Polybius  dates  the  full  establishment  of  Rome's 
universal  empire.  All  subsequent  struggles  were  rebel- 
lions, or  wars  with  nations  beyond  the  pale  of  Romano- 
Greek  civilization.  The  whole  civilized  world  recognized 
in  the  Roman  senate  the  supreme  tribunal  for  kings  and 
nations ;  to  acquire  its  language  and  manners  foreign 
princes  and  noble  youths  resided  in  Rome.  Only  once 
was  a  real  attempt  made  to  get  rid  of  Roman  dominion — 
by  Mithradates,  king  of  Pontus. 

The  battle  of  Pydna  marks  the  last  occasion  on  which 
the  senate  still  adhered  to  the  state  ma?im  that  Rome 


THE  TEIED  MACEDONIAN    WAR.  201 

should,  if  possible,  hold  no  possessions  and  maintain  no 
garrisons  beyond  the  Italian  seas,  but  should  keep  in 
check  the  numerous  dependent  states  by  a  mere  political 
supremacy.  The  treatment  of  Macedonia  and  other  states 
after  the  battle  of  Pydna  shows  that  Rome  had  at  last 
recognized  the  impracticable  nature  of  this  protectorate ; 
the  necessity  of  her  constant  intervention  had  proved  to 
Rome  that  the  effort  to  preserve  vanquished  states,  even 
at  the  cost  of  faithful  allies,  was  a  failure  Signs  were 
now  forthcoming  that  by  gradual  steps  these  client-states 
would  be  reduced  to  the  position  of  subjects.  When  we 
review  the  extension  of  Rome's  power  from  the  conquest 
of  Sicily  to  the  battle  of  Pydna,  it  becomes  clear  that  the 
universal  empire  of  Rome  was  a  result  forced  upon  the 
Roman  government,  without,  and  even  in  opposition  to 
its  wish  ; — certainly  it  was  not  a  gigantic  plan  contrived 
and  carried  out  by  a  thirst  for  territorial  aggrandizement. 
All  that  the  Roman  government  wished  for  was  the  sove- 
reignty of  Italy ;  and  they  earnestly  opposed  the  exten- 
sion of  this  sovereignty  to  Africa,  Greece,  and  Asia,  from 
the  sound  view  that  they  ought  not  to  suffer  the  kernel 
of  their  empire  to  be  crushed  by  the  shell.  Their  blind 
hatred  of  Carthage  led  them  into  the  error  of  retaining 
Spam,  and  of  assuming  in  some  measure  the  guardianship 
of  Africa  ;  their  still  blinder  enthusiasm  for  Greek  freedom 
made  them  commit  the  equal  blunder  of  conferring  liberty 
everywhere  on  the  Greeks. 

"  The  policy  of  Rome  was  not  projected  by  a  single 
mighty  intellect  and  bequeathed  by  tradition  from  gene- 
ration to  generation ,  it  was  the  policy  of  a  very  able  but 
somewhat  narrow-minded  deliberative  assembly,  which 
had  far  too  little  power  of  grand  combination,  and  far  too 
much  of  an  instinctive  desire  for  the  preservation  of  its 
own  commonwealth,  to  devise  projects  in  the  spirit  of  a 
Caesar  or  Napoleon  " 

The  universal  empire  of  Rome  was,  in  fact,  based  on  the 
political  development  of  antiquity  in  general.  In  the 
ancient  world,  balance  of  power  was  unknown,  and  every 
nation's  aim  was  to  subdue  his  neighbour  or  to  render 
him  harmless.  Though  we  may  sentimentally  mourn  the 
extinction  of  so  many  richly  gifted  and  highly  developed 
nations  by  the  supremacy  of  Rome,  we  must  bear  in  mind 


202  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

that  that  supremacy  was  not  due  to  a  mere  superiority  of 
arms,  but  was  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  international 
relations  of  antiquity  generally ;  and  therefore  the  issue 
was  not  one  of  mere  chance,  but  the  fulfilment  of  an 
unchangeable  and  therefore  endurable  destiny. 


AUTHORITIES. 

War  with  Antiochus,   Asia,   etc. — Polyb.  xx.  1-12;  xxi. ;  xxii.  1-14, 

17-18  ;  xxiii.  ;  xxiv.-xxxii.     Liv.  xxxiii.  19,  35,  38-44,  40  ;  xxxv. 

13,  15,  23,  43-47,  51 ;  xxxvi.  6-12,  15,  21,  41 ;  xxxvii.  3,  8,  19, 

21,  25,  26,  30-31,  34,  37,  39-45,  55  ;  xxxviii.  15-27,  38.     Appian 

Syr.  2-44. 
Hannibal,  Philip,   and   Scipio. — Liv.    xxxiv.    60-61 ;   xxxv.   14,  19 ; 

xxxvii.  23-24  ;  xxxviii.  50-56  ;  xxxix.  51. 
Third  Macedonian  war. — Appian  Maced.  11-end.     Liv.  xxxvi.  4, 8, 13, 

14,25,33;  xxxvii.  7;  xxxviii.  1-2  ;  xxxix.  23-28,  34-35  ;  xl.3-8; 

21-24,  50-56:  xli.  2,  27-28;  xlii.  5-6,  11-18,  36-42,  46,  50-67; 

xliii.  4-5,  20-21 ;  xliv.  2,  4,  6,  10,  23-27,  40-46  ;  xlv.  6-8,  39,  42. 
jilyria.— Appian  Illyr.  9-10.     Liv.  xlii.  26 ;  xliv  23,  30-32. 
Eumenes  —  Liv.  xliv.  13,  20,  24-25. 

Rhodes.— Liv.  xxxviii.  39;  xliv.  14-15,  35;  xlv.  10,  20-22 
Greece.— Liv.  xxxvi.  35  ;  xliii.  19  ;  xlv.  28,  31,  34. 
Egypt. — Liv.  xlv.  11-13. 
Cf.  also  Plat.  Aem.  Paullus  and  Philopoemen. 


CHAPTER  XVin. 

THE  GOVERNMENT  AND  THE  GOVERNED. 

New  state-parties — Aristocratic  character  of  the  senate  and  equites 
— The  censorship — Usurpation  of  power  by  families — Treatment 
of  the  Latins — The  provinces  and  their  governors — The  comitia 
— Rise  of  a  city  rabble — -Cato  and  his  reforms — Demagogism — 
Management  of  land  and  of  capital — Decline  of  the  population. 

Amid  the  din  of  arms  and  constant  succession  of  victories, 
it  is  difficult  to  trace  the  secret  and  silent  growth  of  those 
changes  which  were  fraught  with  such  momentous  con- 
sequences to  the  Roman  constitution.  The  new  aris- 
tocracy, consisting  of  the  old  patrician  families  and  of 
those  plebeians  who  had  become  united  with  the  old 
patricians,  gradually  gathered  in  its  grasp  the  reins  of 
government  The  leaders  of  the  plebeian  element  of  the 
aristocracy  were  most  zealous  in  maintaining  the  barrier 
of  caste,  and  in  assigning  a  political  significance  to  those 
outward  badges,  such  as  the  ius  imaginum,  the  laticlave, 
the  gold  rings,  and  the  bulla,  which  had  originally  merely 
distinguished  the  higher  from  the  lower  patrician  fami- 
lies. The  senate  and  the  equestrian  order  were  no  longer 
organs  of  the  whole  state,  but  organs  of  the  aristocracy. 
In  each  case  this  change  was  due  to  the  power  of  the 
censorship.  Every  one  who  had  held  a  curule  magistracy 
had  a  legal  claim  to  a  vote  and  seat  in  the  senate ;  but 
the  censor  had  the  power  of  summoning  men  to  become 
members  of  that  body,  and  of  striking  off  the  names  of 
such  as  were  unworthy  of  so  high  a  position.  Inasmuch 
as  the  election  to  a  curule  office  and  the  choice  of  censor 
really  lay  in  the  hands  of  the  senate,  it  was  but  natural 


204  HISTORY  OF  HOME. 

that  curule  magistrates  and  censors  were  chosen  out  of 
the  ranks  of  the  nobility,  and  thus  practically  gave  a 
strong  aristocratic  character  to  the  composition  of  the 
senate.  So,  too,  the  censors  selected  the  members  of  the 
equestrian  centuries,  and  no  doubt,  as  a  rule,  had  regard 
to  the  birth  and  position  of  the  members  they  selected, 
rather  than  to  their  military  capacity.  Thus  the  eques- 
trian order  became  a  stronghold  of  the  aristocracy.  The 
distinction  between  classes  was  further  rendered  more 
marked  by  the  unwise  change  introduced  by  the  great 
Scipio  in  19-1  B.C.  This  change  separated  the  special 
seats  assigned  to  the  senatorial  order  from  those  occupied 
by  the  mass  of  the  people  at  the  national  festivals. 

The  office  of  censor,  owing  to  these  changes,  became 
invested  with  a  peculiar  glory  of  its  own,  as  the  palladium 
of  the  aristocratic  order,  and  great  efforts  were  made  to 
resist  attacks  on  the  censorship  or  judicial  prosecution  of 
unpopular  censors,  and  to  prevent  opponents  of  the  aris- 
tocracy from  holding  this  office.  An  important  check, 
moreover,  was  placed  upon  the  censor  himself  by  the 
usage  which  obliged  him  to  specify  the  grounds  on  which 
he  erased  the  name  of  senator  or  knight.  The  nobility, 
in  order  to  keep  the  government  in  their  own  hands,  was 
naturally  averse  from  appointing  more  magistrates  than 
the  growth  of  Roman  power  rendered  unavoidable.  The 
appointment,  in  243  B.C.,  of  two  praetors  in  the  place  of 
one,  and  the  assignation  of  all  lawsuits  between  Roman 
citizens  to  the  city  praetor  (praetor  urbanus)  and  of  all 
law-suits  between  men  who  were  not  Roman  citizens  to 
his  colleague  (praetor  peregrinus)  was  manifestly  inade- 
quate to  the  growing  needs  of  the  state.  Further,  the 
attempt  to  govern  the  four  transmarine  provinces  bv  the 
appointment  of  four  praetors  in  197  B.C.,  showed  a  desire 
to  limit  the  number  of  magistrates  who  were  outside  the 
immediate  control  of  the  senate,  rather  than  a  real  grasp  of 
the  requirements  of  the  new  empire.  A  more  serious  evil 
was  the  election  of  the  twenty-four  military  tribunes,  i.e. 
of  the  whole  military  staff,  by  the  comitia  tributa  ;  thus 
the  choice  of  officers  became  subject  to  the  evils  of 
popular  election,  and  every  effort  was  made  by  the  aris- 
tocracy to  secure  the  position  for  members  of  their  own 
order,  and  to  make  the  military  tribunate  the  stepping- 


TEE  GOVERNMENT  AND  THE  GOVERNED.         205 

stone  in  the  political  career  of  young  nobles.  In  serious 
wars,  e.g.  in  171  B.C.,  it  was  found  necessary  to  suspend 
this  system,  and  to  restore  to  the  general  the  power  of 
electing  his  own  staff. 

Owing  to  the  aristocratic  spirit  that  pervaded  every 
section  of  the  government,  the  chief  magisterial  offices  of 
consul  and  censor  not  only  centred  in  the  hands  of  a 
limited  number  of  gentes,  but,  what  was  worse,  in  the 
hands  of  particular  families.  This  was  markedly  the  case 
in  the  policy  of  the  Scipios  and  the  Flaminini.  Moreover, 
a  serious  laxity  began  to  prevail  in  the  management  of 
the  public  money ;  and,  although  embezzlement  was  still 
rare  among  Roman  officials,  the  corruption  prevalent  in 
the  provinces  could  not  fail  to  react  with  pernicious  effect 
on  the  praetors  and  their  retinue.  The  relations  of  Rome 
to  her  allies  and  dependents,  both  within  and  outside 
Italy,  gradually  underwent  a  change.  In  the  first  place, 
such  communities  as  had  been  passive  burgesses  of  Rome, 
and  had  sided  with  Hannibal,  e.g.  Capua,  lost  their  Roman 
citizenship,  while  other  communities  which  had  remained 
true  to  Rome  acquired  the  full  franchise  ;  thus,  except  in 
isolated  cases,  the  position  occupied  by  passive  burgesses 
ceased  to  exist.  Admission  to  the  Roman  franchise  be- 
came more  and  more  difficult ;  and  the  tendency  arose  on 
the  part  of  the  Roman  citizens  to  separate  themselves,  not 
only  from  the  mass  of  Italians,  but  even  from  their  old 
Latin  allies,  whose  staunch  support  had  saved  the  state 
in  the  war  with  Hannibal.  The  chief  burdens  of  war,  of 
garrison  duty,  and  of  the  Spanish  service,  now  fell  upon 
the  allies,  while  the  Roman  citizens  appropriated  most  of 
the  spoil  and  of  the  honours  and  advantages  that  accrued 
from  the  successes  won  by  the  arms  of  their  allies. 
Indeed,  the  Latins,  though  of  course  far  removed  from  the 
servile  position  held  by  the  Bruttians  and  other  com- 
munities, felt  that  the  distinction  between  themselves  and 
the  mass  of  the  Italian  confederacy  was  being  abolished, 
and  that  they  were  fast  becoming  the  subjects,  instead  of 
the  privileged  allies,  of  Rome. 

A  far  graver  error  was  the  retention  of  the  old  consti- 
tution, which  Carthage  had  established  in  Sicily,  Sardi- 
nia, and  Spain :  by  retaining  the  tribute  imposed  by  their 
predecessors,  the  Romans  renounced  their  old  policy  of 


206  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

having  no  tributary  subjects ;  and  by  applying  this 
method  to  Hither  Spain,  Macedonia,  and  Illyria,  they 
clearly  adopted  the  dangerous  and  demoralizing  expedient 
of  making  money  out  of  their  new  possessions.  It  is  true 
that  the  governors  were  legally  bound  to  administer  their 
office  with  honesty  and  frugality,  and  it  is  equally  true 
that  many,  like  Cato  in  Sardinia,  scrupulously  observed 
the  legal  injunction.  But  the  temptation  was  too  great; 
the  control  exercised  by  the  senate  over  the  governors  was 
of  necessity  very  lax,  and  the  complaints  of  the  governed, 
unless  the  severity  and  rapacity  of  the  praetor  had  ex- 
ceeded all  ordinary  limits,  met  with  but  scant  attention. 
Moreover,  the  governor  could  not  be  called  to  account 
during  his  term  of  office,  and  the  charges  laid  against  him 
"were,  as  a  rule,  heard  by  a  jury  consisting  of  men  of  his 
own  order,  and  therefore  little  inclined  to  visit  the  offender 
with  severe  punishment.  We  can,  then,  scarcely  doubt 
that,  owing  to  the  feeble  control  exercised  by  the  senate, 
and  the  absolute  nature  of  the  governor's  provincial  office, 
and,  still  more,  owing  to  the  corrupt  servility  of  those 
whom  he  governed,  it  was  a  rare  thing  for  governors  to 
return  home  with  clean  hands. 

A  wholesome  corrective  to  the  abuse  of  the  senatorial 
power,  theoretically  at  least,  still  existed  in  the  assemblies 
of  the  people.  But  this  period  exhibits  to  us  the  growing 
unimportance,  nay  impotence,  of  the  popular  comitia. 
The  reason  is  plain.  With  the  extension  of  the  Roman 
suffrage,  not  only  throughout  Latium,  Sabina,  and  a  part 
of  Campania,  but  to  the  new  colonies  founded  in  Picenum 
and  across  the  Apennines,  the  burgess-body  no  longer  con- 
sisted of  farmers  living  within  easy  distance  of  the  capital. 
Thus  the  decision  of  the  great  questions  of  foreign  policy 
rested  with  men  scattered  over  Italy,  who  met  together 
in  the  capital  by  mere  chance,  and  who  were  unable  by 
previous  consultation  to  arrive  at  some  joint  course  of 
action  and  to  show  an  intelligent  grasp  of  the  weighty 
questions  submitted  to  their  judgment.  As  a  rule,  then, 
the  people  played  a  passive  part  on  such  occasions,  and 
ratified  without  discussion  the  proposals  made  to  them  by 
the  senate. 

Again,  out  of  the  old  clients  of  powerful  houses  now 
arose  a   city   rabble,   whose    votes    in   the   comitia   were 


TEE  GOVERNMENT  AND   TEE  GOVERNED.         207 

becoming  of  even  more  importance  than  those  of  the 
scattered  burgesses,  and  were  employed  by  the  aristocracy 
to  counterbalance  the  independence  of  the  farmers. 
Systematic  corruption  began  to  be  practised  upon  these 
clients  by  the  sale  of  grain  at  low  prices,  by  an  increase 
of  festivals  and  holidays,  and  by  gladiatorial  shows,  in 
order  that  the  aristocratic  candidate  might  secure  his 
election  to  the  offices  of  state  at  the  expense  of  his  poorer 
rival.  The  spoils  of  war  were  even  employed  to  corrupt 
the  soldiers,  and  the  stern  refusal  of  Lucius  Paullus  to 
turn  his  victory  at  Pydna  to  such  base  uses  almost  cost 
him  the  honour  of  a  triumph.  It  was  but  natural  that 
such  corruption  should  work  the  decay  of  the  old  warlike 
spirit,  and  that  cowardice  should  stain  the  honour  of  the 
Koman  officers  and  soldiers. 

Another  sign  of  the  universal  degeneration  was  the 
miserable  love  for  petty  distinctions :  triumphs  were 
granted  to  the  victor  of  Ligurian  or  Corsican  robbers  ; 
statues  and  monuments  became  so  common  that  it  was 
said  to  be  a  distinction  to  have  none ;  men  received 
permanent  surnames  from  the  victories  they  had  won ; 
and  among  the  lower  orders  equal  anxiety  was  manifested 
to  mark  their  social  grade  by  trifling  badges. 

The  party  of  opposition  in  the  state  was  composed  of 
two  elements  of  widely  different  character.  In  the  first 
place,  there  was  the  patriotic  party,  whose  cry  for  reform 
arose  from  a  genuine  distrust  and  hatred  of  the  prevailing 
corruption.  The  moving  spirit  and  typical  representative 
of  this  party  was  Marcus  Porcius  Cato  (234-149  B.C.). 
This  rough  Sabine  farmer  had  been  induced  to  enter 
upon  a  political  career  by  a  noble  of  the  old  stamp, 
Lucius  Valerius  Flaccus.  He  saw  active  service  through- 
out the  whole  of  the  second  Punic  war,  and  in  all 
countries  and  in  every  capacity  had  won  equal  dis- 
tinction. "  He  was  the  same  in  the  Forum  as  in  the 
battlefield.  His  prompt  and  intrepid  address,  his  rough 
but  pungent  rustic  wit,  his  knowledge  of  Roman  law  and 
Roman  affairs,  his  incredible  activity  and  his  iron  frame, 
first  brought  him  into  notice  in  the  neighbouring  towns ; 
and  when  at  length  he  made  his  appearance  on  the 
greater  arena  of  the  Forum  and  the  senatr-house  in  the 
capital,  constituted  him  the  most  influential  pleader  aud 


208  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

public  orator  of  his  time.  Thoroughly  narrow  in  his 
political  and  moral  views,  and  having  the  ideal  of  the  good 
old  times  always  before  his  eyes  and  on  his  lips,  he 
cherished  an  obstinate  contempt  for  everything  new. 
Deeming  himself  entitled,  by  virtue  of  his  own  austere 
life,  to  manifest  an  unrelenting  severity  and  harshness 
towards  everything  and  everybody;  upright  and  honour- 
able, but  without  a  glimpse  of  any  duty  beyond  the  sphere 
of  police  discipline  and  of  mercantile  integrity ;  an  enemy 
to  all  villainy  and  vulgarity  as  well  as  to  all  genius  and 
refinement;  and,  above  all  things,  a  foe  to  those  who  were 
his  foes,  he  never  made  an  attempt  to  stop  evils  at  their 
source,  but  waged  war  throughout  life  against  mere 
symptoms,  and  especially  against  persons."  Not  only  did 
he  attack  the  most  powerful  aristocrats,  such  as  the  Scipios 
and  the  Flaminini,  but  he  never  shrank  from  abusing  his 
own  supporters  did  he  deem  they  deserved  it.  Still,  so 
staunch  were  the  farmers  in  their  support,  that  wheu  Cato 
and  his  friend  and  colleague,  Lucius  Flaccus,  stood  as 
candidates  for  the  censorship  in  184  B.C.,  all  the  exertions 
of  the  aristocrats  were  powerless  to  prevent  their  return. 

The  reforms  introduced  by  Cato  and  his  party  were 
aimed  at  arresting  the  spread  of  decay  and  at  checking 
the  preponderating  influence  of  the  aristocracy  in  politics. 
In  view  of  the  first  object,  police  regulations  were  enacted 
to  restrict  the  luxurious  style  of  living,  and  to  introduce 
a  frugal  economy  into  Roman  households.  More  success- 
ful and  more  practical  were  the  efforts  made  to  revive  the 
farmer  class  by  founding  Latin  colonies  in  the  north,  and 
by  large  and  numerous  assignations  of  the  domain  land. 
Although  Cato  failed  to  carry  his  proposal  to  institute 
four  hundred  new  equestrian  stalls,  and  thus  remedy  the 
decline  of  the  burgess  cavalry,  the  necessities  of  war  had 
long  before  compelled  the  government  to  reduce  the 
rating,  which  allowed  a  man  to  serve  in  the  army,  from 
£43  to  £6,  and  to  abolish  the  other  qualification  of  free 
birth.  The  admission  of  the  poor  and  of  freedmen  into  the 
army  gave  them  a  new  importance  in  the  state,  and  was 
one  of  the  chief  causes  of  the  changes  introduced  into  the 
comitia  centuriata.  These  changes,  accomplished  about 
241  B.C.,  at  the  close  of  the  first  Punic  war,  placed  all  five 
classes  composing   the   comitia  on   an   equal   footing  as 


THE  GOVERNMENT  AND   THE  GOVERNED.       209 

regarded  number  of  votes,  and  took  away  from  the 
equites  their  old  prioi'ity  in  voting,  and  gave  the  f reed- 
men  the  same  power  as  the  freeborn. 

This  reform  was  the  first  victory  won  by  the  new 
democracy  over  the  aristocracy,  but  its  effects  were 
greatly  neutralized  by  the  fact  that,  though  priority  of 
votiug  was  taken  away  from  the  equites  or  aristocratic 
voters,  it  was  still  confined  to  a  division  chosen  by  lot 
from  the  first  or  richest  class ;  and  further,  the  equaliza- 
tion of  the  freedmen  with  the  freeborn  was  set  aside 
twenty  years  later,  in  220  B.C.,  by  the  censor  Gaius  Flami- 
nius,  and  the  freedmen  were  excluded  from  the  centuries. 
A  proof  that  the  reform  did  not  at  any  rate  greatly  affect 
the  power  of  the  aristocracy  is  furnished  by  the  fact  that 
the  second  consulship  and  second  censorship,  although  in 
law  open  to  both  patricians  and  plebeians,  were  almost 
invariably  filled  by  patricians  ;  the  second  consulship 
was  held  by  patricians  down  to  172  B.C.,  and  the  second, 
censorship  down  to  131  B.C. 

Viewed  as  a  whole,  the  reforms  of  Cato  and  his  party, 
distinguished  as  they  were  by  great  energy  and  a  noble 
wish  to  counteract  the  evident  evils  of  the  time,  were 
unfortunately  marred  by  a  want  of  clear  insight  into  the 
source  of  those  evils,  and  by  the  failure  to  devise,  in  a 
large  and  statesmanlike  spirit,  some  comprehensive  plan 
for  their  remedy. 

In  the  second  place,  the  party  of  opposition  contained 
a  far  less  reputable  element,  the  outcome  of  the  city 
rabble.  The  spirit  of  demagogism  was  abroad ;  men, 
cursed  with  a  love  of  empty  speechmaking,  pretended  to 
be  ardent  reformers,  but  in  their  harangues  dwelt  only  on 
the  excessive  powers  of  the  aristocratic  government  and 
on  the  rights  of  the  citizens,  not  on  the  urgent  need  for 
moral  reform  in  every  section  of  the  state.  The  evils 
which  arose  out  of  this  new  spirit  have  already  been 
indicated  in  the  history  of  the  war  with  Hannibal :  the 
appointment  of  mere  party  leaders,  such  as  Flaminius  and 
Varro,  to  the  supreme  command ;  the  absurd  decree  which 
made  Minucius  codictator  with  Fabius  in  217  B.C.,  and 
which  gave  the  deathblow  to  the  dictatorship  ;  the  charge 
of  embezzlement  laid  against  Marcellus  in  219  B.C., — these 
and  other  acts  all  proceeded  from  the  wanton  interference 

14 


210  HISTORY  OF  HOME 

of  the  demagogues.  The  citizens  were  even  tempted  to 
interfere  with  the  administration  of  the  finances,  the 
oldest  and  most  important  prerogative  of  the  government ; 
and,  in  232  B.C.,  Gaius  Flaminius,  owing  to  the  fatal 
obstinacy  of  the  senate,  went  to  the  burgesses  with  his 
proposal  to  distribute  the  domain- lands  in  Picenum.  Nor 
was  this  new  system  of  politics  confined  to  its  author, 
Gaius  Flaminius ;  aristocrats,  such  as  Scipio,  in  their 
efforts  to  place  themselves  and  their  families  in  a  position 
superior  to  that  of  the  rest  of  the  senate,  condescended 
to  vie  with  demagogues  in  their  flattery  of  the  city  rabble. 
We  have  already  pointed  out  the  impotence  of  the  comitia  ; 
as  a  rule,  indeed,  the  burgesses  had  the  good  sense  and 
sufficient  patriotism  to  give  a  hearty  support  to  that 
senate  which  had  weathered  the  storm  of  Hannibal's  in- 
vasion. But  appeals  to  selfishness  and  avarice  could  not 
fail  to  demoralize  the  best  citizens  ;  and  sudden  caprice 
or  violent  outbursts  of  jealousy  or  hatred  from  time  to 
time  showed  that  the  old  foundations  of  the  Republic  were 
being  undermined.  "To  the  later  generations,  who  sur- 
vived the  storms  of  revolution,  the  period  after  the 
Hannibalic  war  appeared  the  golden  age  of  Rome,  and 
Cato  seemed  the  model  of  the  Roman  statesman.  It  was 
in  reality  the  calm  before  the  storm,  and  the  epoch  of 
political  mediocrities."  The  seeming  outward  stability  of 
the  R  >man  constitution,  during  the  years  266-146  B.C.,  was 
a  sign,  not  of  health,  but  of  incipient  sickness  and 
revolution. 

A  review  of  this  period  would  be  incomplete  unless  it 
presented  a  brief  notice  of  the  economic  troubles  produced 
by  the  system  of  farming  on  a  large  scale,  and  by  the  power 
of  capital.  The  importation  of  corn  from  the  provinces, 
and  the  sale  of  it  at  a  merely  nominal  price  for  the  benefit 
of  the  idle  proletariat  of  the  capital,  naturally  ruined  the 
market  for  the  growers  of  Italian  corn.  The  evil  was  all 
the  worse  and  all  the  more  inexcusable  in  a  country  like 
Italy,  where  there  were  hardly  any  manufactures,  and, 
consequently,  no  large  industrial  population  whose  needs, 
as  in  England,  could  not  be  supplied  by  home-grown  grain. 
On  the  contrary,  agriculture  was  the  mainstay  of  the 
Roman  state,  and  the  short-sighted  policy  of  the  govern- 
ment in  this  matter  sacrificed  the  soundest  to  the  most 


THE  GOVERNMENT  AND   THE   GOVERNED       211 

worthless  part  oi;  the  nation.  The  small  farmers  were 
gradually  ruined,  and  their  holdings  became  merged  in  the 
large  estates  of  the  landlords,  who,  by  cultivating  their 
lands  by  means  of  large  gangs  of  slaves,  were  able  to  pro- 
duce at  a  cheaper  rate  than  the  farmer.  But  even  the  large 
landlord  was  unable  to  compete  with  foreign  grain,  and 
devoted  himself  almost  entirely  to  stock-raising  and  the 
production  of  oil  and  wine  :  and  thus  it  was  that  arable  land 
to  a  great  extent  was  converted  into  pasture,  while,  owing 
to  the  increased  use  of  slaves,  free  labour  became  almost 
unknown.  The  power  of  the  capitalist  was  alike  evinced 
in  the  speculative  management  of  land,  in  the  increase  of 
money-lenders,  and  in  the  enormous  extent  of  all  mercantile 
transactions  ;  and,  as  in  the  end  the  gains  from  commercial 
enterprise  flowed  into  Rome,  the  result  was  that  Rome, 
compared  writh  the  rest  of  the  world,  stoed  as  superior  in 
point  of  wealth  as  in  political  and  military  power.  In  fact, 
the  whole  Roman  nation  btcame  possessed  with  the  mer- 
cantile spirit,  and,  while  money  served  to  create  a  new 
social  barrier  between  rich  and  poor,  "that  deep-rooted 
immorality,  which  is  inherent  in  an  economy  of  pure 
capital,  ate  into  the  heart  of  society  and  of  the  common- 
wealth, and  substituted  an  absolute  selfishness  for  humanity 
aud  patriotism." 

Moreover,  the  very  population  of  Italy  began  to  decline, 
and  Cato  and  Polybius  agree  in  stating  that  at  the  end  of 
the  sixth  century  Italy  was  far  weaker  in  population  than 
at  the  end  of  the  fifth  ;  "and  although  it  was,  in  the  fiist 
instance,  the  two  long  wars  with  Carthage  that  decimated 
and  ruined  both  the  burgesses  and  the  allies,  the  Roman 
capitalists  beyond  doubt  contributed  quite  as  much  as 
Hamilcar  and  Hannibal  to  the  decline  in  the  vigour  and 
the  numbers  of  the  Italian  people." 


AUTHORITIES. 

Senate. — Liv.   xxii.   7,  34;  xxvi.  1;  xxxv.  42,  48;  xxxvi.  3 ;  xxxviii. 

42  ;  xlv.  18.     Polyb.  vi.  13  ;  xxvii.  5 ;  xxviii.  45.     Sail.  Jug.  41. 

Momms.  R.  St.  iii.  458,  sqq. 
Equites.— Liv.   xxiii.  48,  49;   xlii.  61.     Polyb.  vi.  20.     Momms.  E. 

St.  iii.  458,  sqq. 
Praetors. — Liv  Epit.  20,  32. 


212  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Military  tribunes. — Liv.  ix.  30;  xxvii.  36;  xliv.  21.      Sail.  Jug.  63. 

Marq.  Stv.  ii.  365,  sqq. 
Exclusiveness  of  Romans. — Liv.  xli.  13;  xlii.  4.     Veil.  2,  15. 
Bribery.— Cic.  in  Verr.  ii.  3,  7  ;  iii.  6, 12.    Gains,  ii.  7.    Liv.  Epit.  43. 
Cato.—  Liv.  xxix.  25;   xxxii.  7,  8,  27;    xxxiii.  43;    xxxiv.  2,  8-20; 

xxxv.  9 ;  xxxvi.  17-21  ;  xxxviii.  54 ;  xxxix.  40-44 ;  xliii.  2  ;  xlv. 

25.     Plut.  Cato.     Cato  M.  36,  40,  42.     Polyb.  xxxi.  24 ;  xxxv.  6. 
Sale  of  imported  corn — arable  land  turned  to  pasture. — Cic.  in  Verr. 

ii.  2,  5.     Liv.  xxvi.  40.    Pliny,  N.  H.  xviii.  29.     Colum.  6,  praef. 

4.     Marq.  Stv.  ii.  112,  sqq. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

THE  SUBJECT  COUNTRIES  DOWN  TO  THE  GRACCHAN  EPOCH. 

Spain — The  Lusitanian  and  Celtiberian  wars — Viriathns — Numantia 
— The  protected  states — Cause  of  the  third  and  last  war  with 
Carthage — Preparations  of  Carthage — Scipio  Aeniiliaims — 
Capture  and  destruction  of  Carthage — Provinces  of  Africa  and 
Macedonia — The  Achaean  war — Destruction  of  Corinth — State 
of  the  East — The  Parthian  empire — Piracy — General  result. 

Before  we  enter  upon  the  period  of  change  which  takes 
its  name  from  the  family  of  the  Gracchi,  it  is  necessary  to 
present  a  picture  of  the  state  of  things  in  the  subject 
countries.  Trivial  and  dreary  as  the  separate  conflicts  in 
these  remote  lands  between  weakness  and  power  may  seem, 
yet  collectively  they  are  of  great  historical  significance  •, 
and  the  reaction  which  the  provinces  exercised  on  the 
mother  country  alone  renders  intelligible  the  condition  of 
Italy  at  this  period. 

At  first  the  only  two  recognized  provinces  of  Rome,  if  we 
except  what  may  be  regarded  as  the  natural  appendages  of 
Italy,  i.e.  Sicily,  Corsica,  and  Sardinia,  were  the  two  Spains  ; 
and  they  were  the  scene  of  many  wars  and  the  cause  of 
much  trouble  to  Rome.  In  154  B.C.  the  peaceful  state  of 
the  Spanish  provinces,  which  had  lasted  for  nearly  thirty 
years,  was  broken  by  the  successful  invasion  of  the  Lusi- 
tanians.  The  complete  defeat  of  the  praetor  Lucius  ilum- 
mius,  governor  of  Further  Spain,  in  153  B.C.,  emboldened 
the  Celtiberians  to  join  against  the  common  foe ;  and  the 
successes  achieved  by  the  powerful  tribe  of  the  Arevacae 
over  the  consul  Quintus  Fulvius  Nobilior  even  eclipsed  the 
previous  victories  of  the  Lusitanians.     But  the  advent  of 


214  HISTORY  OF  HOME. 

Marcus  Claudius  Marcellus,  who  combined  skilful  general* 
ship  with  humane  treatment,  terminated  the  Celtiberian 
war  in  161  B.C.  His  peaceful  and  honourable  arrange- 
ment with  the  Arevacae  did  not,  however,  suit  the  ideas  of 
the  new  consul,  Lucius  Lucullus,  who  made  a  sudden  and 
unprovoked  assault  on  the  friendly  tribe  of  the  Vaccaei, 
and  enslaved  or  massacred  the  inhabitants  of  the  unoffend- 
ing town  of  Cauca.  This  new  method  of  warfare  found  an 
apt  disciple  in  the  praetor  Servius  Sulpicius  Galba,  who 
made  a  treaty  with  three  Lusitanian  tribes  under  the 
promise  of  giving  them  better  settlements,  and,  having 
separated  them  into  three  divisions,  either  put  to  the 
sword  or  carried  off  into  slavery  seven  thousand  men. 
Despite  the  unequalled  perfidy,  cruelty,  and  avarice  with 
which  these  two  generals  waged  war,  they  were  able  to 
purchase  immunity  from  condemnation  on  their  return  to 
Rome. 

The  outbreak  of  the  fourth  Macedonian  and  the  third 
Punic  war,  in  149  B.C.,  caused  the  withdrawal  of  all  special 
Roman  forces  from  Spain.  The  Lusitanians  at  once  renewed 
their  invasions  of  Turdetania,  and,  when  about  to  capitulate 
after  a  defeat  by  the  governor  Gaius  Vetilius,  they  were 
roused  to  fresh  vigour  by  the  eloquence  and  example  of 
the  famous  Viriathus.  It  seemed  as  if  at  last  Spain  had 
found  a  champion  able  to  break  the  fetters  of  Rome  ; 
general  after  general,  army  after  army,  both  in  northern 
and  southern  Spain,  recoiled  in  utter  discomfiture  before 
the  ability  and  enthusiasm  of  the  Spanish  leader.  For 
about  ten  years  (148-139  B.C.)  Viriathus  was  the  acknow- 
ledged king  of  the  Lusitanians,  though  never  distinguished 
by  any  badge  from  the  meanest  soldier ; — a  true  hero, 
remarkable  alike  for  his  physical  and  mental  qualities.  In 
the  end  his  brilliant  and  noble  career  was,  as  often  happened 
in  Spain,  cut  short  by  the  hand  of  the  assassin,  three  of 
his  intimate  friends  having  sold  the  life  of  their  lord  to 
the  Roman  consul,  Quintus  Servilius  Caepio,  in  return  for 
their  own  safety.  With  the  death  of  Viriathus  the  war  in 
Lusitania  came  to  an  end.  But  the  successes  of  Viriathus 
had  once  more  ignited  the  torch  of  war  in  the  North,  and 
the  Celtiberian  Arevacae  again  revolted,  in  144  B.C.  The 
ability  of  the  consul  Quintus  Caecilius  Metellus  reduced 
the  northern  province  to  obedience  in  two  years. 


THE  SUBJECT  COUNTRIES.  215 

Far  more  serious  was  the  struggle  with  the  town  of 
Numantia.  The  incapable  consul,  Quintus  Pompeius, 
after  several  severe  defeats,  agreed  to  come  to  terms  with 
its  invincible  inhabitants  ;  but,  in  fear  of  the  reckoning 
that  awaited  him  at  home  for  thus  concluding  peace,  he  at 
the  last  moment  took  refuge  in  a  base  falsehood,  and  denied 
the  agreement  he  had  made.  The  matter  was  referred  to 
the  senate,  who  supported  their  guilty  consul,  and  ordered 
his  successor  Marcus  Popilius  Laenas  to  continue  the  war. 
The  total  incompetence  of  the  Roman  generals  and  the 
demoralized  condition  of  their  armies  caused  the  war  to 
drag  on,  amid  disgrace  and  disaster,  from  137-134  B.C.  In 
the  latter  year  Scipio  Aemilianus,  the  first  general  in  Rome, 
was  sent  out,  and,  after  reorganizing  the  Roman  army  by 
treatment  alike  severe  and  contemptuous,  he  set  about  the 
task  of  subduing  the  brave  Numantines.  After  a  heroic 
defence,  the  city,  utterly  exhausted  by  famine  and  pesti- 
lence, fell,  in  the  autumn  of  133  B.C.,  and  its  fall  re- 
established the  supremacy  of  Rome  in  Hither  Spain.  A 
senatorial  commission  was  shortly  after  sent  to  Spain,  and 
the  provinces  were  reorganized.  Thanks  to  the  efforts  of 
Scipio  and  other  governors  Spain  gradually  became  ex- 
ceedingly prosperous,  and,  despite  the  guerilla  warfare 
ever  waged  by  the  half-subdued  native  tribes,  it  was  the 
most  nourishing  and  best-organized  country  in  the  Roman 
dominions. 

Par  more  insupportable  was  the  condition — intermediate 
between  formal  sovereignty  and  actual  subjection — of  the 
African,  Greek,  and  Asiatic  states.  These  had  neither 
independence  nor  peace.  In  Africa  there  was  constant  war 
between  Carthage  and  Numidia  ;  in  Egypt  the  rulers  of  that 
country  and  Cyrene  were  ever  disputing  for  the  possession 
of  Cyprus;  in  Asia  almost  every  petty  kingdom  was  torn 
by  intestine  struggles,  and  several  were  at  war  with  one 
another.  The  interference  of  Rome,  constantly  invoked, 
only  made  matters  worse.  Rome  neither  resigned  its 
authority  nor  displayed  sufficient  force  to  bring  the  ruled 
into  subjection.  "  It  was  the  epoch  of  commissions." 
Commissioners  went  to  and  fro,  reporting  and  giving 
orders,  to  which  the  Asiatic  states,  feeling  secure  from 
their  very  remoteness,  as  a  rule  paid  no  attention.  The 
Roman  government  conferred    neither  the    blessings    of 


216  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

freedom  nor  of  order.  It  was  clear  that  this  state  of  things 
must  be  put  an  end  to,  and  that  the  only  way  to  do  so  was 
by  the  conversion  of  the  client  states  into  Roman  provinces. 
The  only  question  was  whether  the  Roman  senate  would 
perceive  the  necessity  of  the  task,  and  would  put  its  hand 
to  the  work  with  the  requisite  energy. 

In  Africa  we  have  to  record  the  last  act  of  the  terrible 
Carthaginian  drama.  The  Romans  saw  with  ill-concealed 
envy  the  increasing  prosperity  of  their  old  rival,  though 
hampered  in  every  way  by  the  encroachments  of  Massi- 
nissa.  At  the  head  of  the  second  commission,  sent  from 
Rome  in  161  B.C.,  to  settle  points  of  dispute  between  the 
Numidian  king  and  Carthage,  was  the  aged  Cato,  whose 
inveterate  hatred  of  Carthage  was  aroused  afresh  by  the 
sight  of  her  great  commercial  prosperity.  Opposed 
though  he  was  by  the  larger-minded  Scipio  Nasica,  Cato 
had  no  difficulty  in  finding  men  at  home  ready  to  support 
his  view  that  Rome  could  know  no  security  until  Car- 
thage was  destroyed ;  and  among  his  most  ardent  sup- 
porters were  the  bankers  and  rich  capitalists  of  Rome, 
who  saw  that  the  wealth  of  Carthage  must  revert  to 
themselves. 

An  opportunity  for  putting  the  policy  of  Cato  into 
effect  soon  arose.  In  154  B.C.  Massinissa  appealed  to 
Rome  to  act  once  more  as  arbiter  between  him  and  Car- 
thage, and  pointed  out  that  the  leaders  of  the  patriotic 
party  in  Carthage,  Hasdrubal  and  Carthalo,  were  amass- 
ing stores  and  collecting  troops  in  violation  of  the  treaty 
with  Rome.  The  Carthaginians  were  ordered  to  destroy 
their  naval  stores  and  dismiss  their  troops  ;  but  the  spirit 
of  the  people  was  roused,  and  the  demand  was  rejected 
and  preparations  made  to  wage  war  against  Massinissa. 
In  152  B.C.  hostilities  began,  and,  owing  to  the  miserable 
incapacity  of  Hasdrubal,  Massinissa  gained  a  complete 
victory. 

The  Romans  now  conceived  that  the  hour  had  come  to 
deal  the  deathblow  to  their  old  antagonist.  By  making 
war  upon  Massinissa,  an  ally  of  Rome,  Carthage  had 
broken  one  of  the  stipulations  of  their  treaty,  and  had 
thus  given  Rome  a  plausible  pretext  for  wTar,  and  from 
the  feeble  display  of  arms  she  had  made  against  Mas- 
sinissa, Carthage  seemed  a  certain  and  easy  victim.     In 


THE  SUBJECT  COUNTRIES.  217 

vain  the  Carthaginians  made  every  submission  to  avert 
the  threatened  blow,  and  war  was  declared  in  149  B.C. 
After  dallying  with  the  wretched  envoys  sent  from  Car- 
thage, and  after  making  the  severest  demands,  the  Roman 
consul  Lucius  Marcius  Censorinus,  who  had  landed  at 
Utica,  at  last  revealed  the  dire  purpose  of  the  senate,  and 
bade  the  envoys  tell  the  Gerusia  that  Carthage  must  be 
evacuated  and  surrendered  to  destruction.  At  this  the 
frenzied  enthusiasm  of  the  Phoenician  race  once  more 
blazed  forth.  The  most  marvellous  efforts  were  made  to 
secure  the  defences  of  the  city,  and  to  repair  the  blunder 
which  had  surrendered  all  the  arms  and  dismantled  the 
battlements  in  obedience  to  the  Roman  demands. 

Meanwhile,  the  Roman  consuls  were  deluded  by  pre- 
tended embassies,  and,  though  but  a  few  miles  distant, 
had  no  idea  what  was  happening  in  the  Phoenician  capital. 
The  precious  respite  was  turned  to  good  account:  day 
and  night  the  work  of  forging  arms  and  catapults  never 
flagged.  Young  and  old,  women  and  children,  were  all 
fired  with  the  same  zeal  and  the  same  hatred.  With  in- 
credible speed  the  work  was  finished,  and  the  city  and 
its  inhabitants  ready  for  the  struggle.  Art  had  rendered 
the  naturally  strong  site  of  Carthage  well-nigh  impreg- 
nable ;  and  the  two  consuls,  Manius  Manilius  and  Lucius 
Censorinus,  on  realizing  their  blunder  and  attempting  to 
prosecute  the  siege,  soon  found  out  how  utterly  incom- 
petent they  were  for  the  task.  After  losses  by  assaults 
and  disease  the  Romans  were  compelled,  by  the  death  of 
Massinissa  in  149  B.C.,  to  suspend  all  offensive  operations. 
The  youthful  Scipio,  who  was  serving  as  a  military  tri- 
bune, alone  retrieved  the  honour  of  the  Roman  name, 
both  by  his  personal  bravery  and  his  politic  dealings  with 
the  native  Numidians ;  and  to  him  the  aged  Cato,  who 
died  the  same  year,  applied  the  Homeric  line,  olos  iriTrvvrat, 
Tol  Se  o-Kiai  aiaa-ovatv  ("  He  only  is  a  living  man,  the 
rest  are  gliding  shades"). 

The  following  year  saw  two  new  commanders,  Lucius 
Piso  at  the  head  of  the  land  army,  and  Lucius  Mancinus 
in  charge  of  the  fleet :  they  achieved  even  less  than  their 
predecessors,  and  neglected  the  siege  of  Carthage  for 
attacks  on  smaller  towns,  which  as  a  rule  were  unsuc- 
cessful.    A  Numidian  sheik  passed  over  to  the  Cartha- 


218  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

ginian  side  with  eight  hundred  horse,  and  negotiations 
were  entered  into  with  the  kings  of  Numidia  and  Maure- 
tania.  At  this  juncture  the  Romans  adopted  the  extra- 
ordinary measure  of  giving  the  command  to  Scipio 
Aemilianus,  and  thus  made  him  consul  without  his  having 
held  the  preliminary  office  of  aedile.  His  arrival,  in 
147  B.C.,  completely  changed  the  aspect  of  affairs.  Man- 
cinns  was  rescued  from  a  position  of  great  danger  on  an 
isolated  cliff,  and  the  siege  of  Carthage  was  once  more 
begun  in  real  earnest.  Scipio  first  constructed  a  large 
camp  across  the  isthmus  which  connected  Carthage  with 
the  mainland,  and  then  blocked  up  the  entrance  to  the 
harbour  by  a  mole  of  stone  ninety-six  feet  in  breadth. 
This  latter  operation  the  Carthaginians  neutralized  by 
cutting  a  new  canal,  thus  gaining  a  new  outlet  into  the 
harbour.  But  Scipio  at  last  succeeded  in  his  object, 
and  completely  blockaded  the  city  by  land  and  sea,  leaving 
famine  and  pestilence  to  complete  what  he  had  be^un. 

In  the  spring  of  146  B.C.  the  city  wall  was  scaled,  and 
for  six  days  the  famished  inhabitants  continued  a  terrible 
but  hopeless  struggle  from  house  to  house  and  street  to 
street.  Even  then  the  steep  citadel-rock,  held  by  Has- 
drubal  and  the  remnant  of  the  garrison,  remained  ;  to 
clear  the  approaches,  Scipio  ordered  the  city  to  be  set  on 
fire  and  the  ruins  to  be  levelled.  The  garrison  at  last 
capitulated,  and  life  was  granted  to  the  survivors,  a  bare 
tenth  part  of  the  former  population.  Hasdrubal,  to  whose 
gluttony  and  bragging  incapacity  the  fall  of  Carthage 
was  in  no  small  measure  due,  gained  the  boon  of  life  for 
which  he  prayed  Scipio  on  his  knees  ;  but  his  wife  scorned 
to  survive  her  city's  destruction,  and  plunged  with  her 
children  into  the  flames  of  a  burning  temple.  Despite 
the  protests  of  Scipio,  the  senate  ordered  the  consul  to 
raze  Carthage  to  the  ground,  to  pass  the  plough  over  its 
site,  and  to  curse  the  ground  for  ever.  "  Where  the 
industrious  Phoenicians  had  bustled  and  trafficked  for  five 
hundred  years,  Roman  slaves  henceforth  pastured  the 
herds  of  their  distant  masters.  Scipio,  however,  whom 
nature  had  destined  for  a  nobler  part  than  that  of  an 
executioner,  gazed  with  horror  on  his  own  work ;  and, 
instead  of  the  joy  of  victory,  the  victor  himself  was 
haunted  by  a  presentiment  of  the  retribution  that  would 


THE  SUBJECT  COUNTRIES.  219 

inevitably  follow  such,  a  misdeed."  The  Carthaginian 
territory,  as  possessed  by  the  city  in  its  last  days,  became 
a  Roman  province  under  the  name  of  Africa,  and  the 
boundaries  of  the  enlarged  Numidian  kingdom  were 
clearly  denned.  Utica  was  the  capital  of  the  new  pro- 
vince, and  thither  Roman  merchants  flocked  to  turn  to 
account  the  new  acquisition. 

About  the  same  time,  Macedonia  also  experienced  the 
common  fate.  The  four  small  confederacies,  into  which 
Roman  wisdom  had  parcelled  out  the  ancient  kingdom, 
soon  showed  how  impracticable  such  an  arrangement  was. 
A  pretender,  calling  himself  Philip  the  son  of  Perseus, 
met  with  support  from  Thrace  and  Byzantium,  and  was 
accepted  as  king  by  the  Macedonian  nation.  He  even 
extended  his  rule  over  Thessaly  by  a  victory  over  the 
Roman  praetor  Juventius  in  149  B.C.,  but  in  the  following 
year  he  was  crushed  by  Quintus  Caecilius  Metellus.  Mace- 
donia was  now  converted  into  a  Roman  province,  and  this 
province,  including  as  it  did  the  Roman  protectorate  over 
Greece  proper,  covered  much  the  same  area  as  had 
formerly  been  subject  to  Macedonian  sway.  One  more 
movement  was  made  by  Alexander,  another  pretended 
son  of  Perseus,  to  break  the  Roman  yoke,  but  it  was 
easily  quelled  in  142  B.C. 

In  Greece  itself  all  Roman  efforts  at  conciliation  failed, 
and  at  last,  despite  the  warnings  of  the  Roman  envoys, 
the  Achaean  league  declared  war  against  Sparta  about 
146  B.C.  This  action,  combined  with  the  insulting  attitude 
of  the  Greeks  towards  Rome,  caused  the  senate  to  send 
Lucius  Mummius  to  crush  the  pretensions  of  Critolaus, 
the  Achaean  strategus.  A  battle  at  Leucopatra  was  utterly 
disastrous  to  the  Achaeans,  and  was  followed  by  the  con- 
version of  Greece  into  the  province  of  Achaia.  On  the 
whole,  Mummius  seems  to  have  acted  with  justice  and 
moderation  in  his  administration  of  Greek  affairs ;  but 
the  Roman  senate  showed  a  hideous  severity  in  the 
destruction  of  Corinth,  the  first  commercial  city  in  Greece, 
and  the  last  precious  ornament  of  a  land  once  so  rich  in 
cities.  Doubtless  this  barbarous  act  was  due  to  the 
political  influence  of  the  Roman  merchants,  who  gladly 
seized  the  opportunity  to  rid  themselves  of  a  commercial 
rival. 


220  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

In  Asia  Minor,  the  bequest  of  Pergamus  to  the  Romans 
by  the  last  of  the  Attalids,  in  133  B.C.,  gave  Rome  a  new 
province,  though  she  had  to  vindicate  her  right  by  the 
sword,  as  Aristonicus,  a  natural  son  of  one  of  the  former 
kings  of  Pergamus,  succet-ded  for  a  time  in  making  good 
his  claim  to  the  throne.  Most  of  the  small  states  and 
cities  in  western  Asia  remained  unchanged,  but  both 
Cappadocia  and  Pontus  received  some  additional  territory 
on  the  dissolution  of  the  Attalid  kingdom.  Roman 
authority  in  Syria  and  Egypt  became  weaker  and  weaker, 
owing  to  the  negligent  and  spasmodic  manner  in  which 
the  senate  attempted  to  settle  the  various  disputes  that 
arose.  Many  causes  had  combined  to  destroy  the  once 
huge  empire  of  Asia :  the  battle  of  Magnesia  had  wrested 
western  Asia  from  the  great  king ;  the  two  Cappadocias 
and  the  two  Armenias  had  become  independent  kingdoms  ; 
lastly,  Antiochus  Epiphanes  (175-164  B.C.)  had  adopted  the 
course,  equally  foolish  and  fatal,  of  introducing  Roman 
and  Greek  ideas  both  in  manners  and  religion  throughout 
his  dominions.  This  step,  enforced  as  it  was  by  religious 
persecution  and  plundering  of  temples,  drove  the  Jews  to 
revolt  in  167  B.C.,  and  the  successful  issue  of  their  rebellion 
was  mainly  due  to  the  brave  and  nrudent  conduct  of  the 
house  of  the  Maccabees. 

A  still  more  important  result  of  the  folly  of  Antiochus 
was  the  founding  of  the  Parthian  kingdom,  the  outcome 
of  a  reaction  on  the  part  of  the  native  religion  and 
manners  against  Hellenism.  Mithradates  I.  (175-133  B.C.) 
laid  the  foundations  of  this  empire  by  his  successes  over 
the  Bactrian  kingdom,  and  in  all  the  countries  west  of  the 
great  desert.  Aided  by  the  internal  dissolution  of  the 
kingdom  of  the  Seleucidae,  from  which  Persia,  Babylonia, 
aud  Media  were  for  ever  severed,  this  new  empire  reached 
from  the  Oxus  and  the  Hindu  Khush  to  the  Tigris  and 
the  desert  of  Arabia.  The  foundations  of  its  strength  rested 
not  merely  on  the  revival  of  the  wild  physical  forces  of  the 
East,  on  the  bow  and  arrow  and  the  whirlwind  rush  of 
the  cavalry  of  the  desert,  but  far  more  on  the  revival  of  the 
national  customs  and  national  religion  ;  on  the  old  Iranian 
language,  the  order  of  the  Magi  and  the  worship  of  Mithra. 
From  the  founding  of  the  Parthian  empire  dates  the  ebb 
of  that  great  Hellenic  movement  which  had  reached  its 


THE  SUBJECT  COUNTRIES.  221 

height  under  Alexander  the  Great.  The  East  once  more 
reasserted  itself,  and  re-entered  the  world  of  politics  :  the 
world  had  again  two  masters.  Thus  "  the  Roman  senate 
sacrificed  the  first  essential  result  of  the  policy  of  Alex- 
ander, and  thereby  paved  the  way  for  that  retrograde 
movement  whose  last  offshoots  ended  in  the  Alhambra  of 
Granada  and  in  the  great  Mosque  of  Constantinople." 

If  we  glance  at  the  maritime  relations  of  this  period, 
we  find  that  practically  no  naval  power  existed.  Rome 
had  no  fleet,  and  her  maritime  police,  once  so  effective, 
ceased  to  control  the  piracy  everywhere  prevalent.  A 
check  no  doubt  was  kept  on  the  buccaneers  of  the  Adriatic 
and  Tyrrhene  seas ;  but  Crete  and  Cilicia  became  the 
recognized  home  of  organized  bands  of  pirates.  The 
Roman  government  merely  looked  on,  and  the  Roman 
merchants  kept  up  a  friendly  traffic  with  the  pirate 
captains,  who  furnished  them  with  that  marketable 
commodi  ty — slaves. 

We  have  now  reviewed  Rome's  position  in  and  dealings 
with  the  outer  world.  The  problem  of  governing  this  new 
empire  was  not  wholly  misunderstood,  though  it  was  by  no 
means  solved.  The  idea  of  Cato's  time  that  the  state 
shonld  not  extend  beyond  Italy,  and  that  outside  that  limit 
a  mere  protectorate  should  be  exercised,  had  proved  unten- 
able ;  the  necessity  of  substituting  a  direct  sovereignty,  that 
should  preserve  the  liberties  of  the  various  communities, 
was  generally  recognized.  But  this  policy  was  not  adopted 
firmly  and  uniformly :  provinces  were  annexed  from  time 
to  time,  according  as  convenience,  caprice,  interest,  or 
chance  suggested ;  but  the  majority  of  dependent  states 
remained  in  the  intolerable  uncertainty  of  their  former 
position,  or,  as  was  the  case  with  Syria,  even  withdrew 
entirely  from  Roman  influence.  Showing  themselves  often 
stern  masters  where  leniency  was  needed,  and  lenient 
where  sternness  was  required,  the  Romans  governed  from 
one  day  to  another  with  feeble  and  selfish  hands,  merely 
transacting  the  current  business  of  the  hour.  Senators 
had  learnt  to  despise  the  old  maxim  that  office  was  its 
own  reward,  and  that  such  office  was  a  burden  and  duty 
rather  than  a  privilege  and  benefit ;  and  we  find  that 
foreign  powers  constantly  bribed  influential  senators  by 
enormous  gifts.     The  Roman  fleet  was  allowed  to  go  to 


222  HISTORY   OF  HOME. 

ruin ;  the  decay  of  the  old  military  spirit  and  prestige 
was  no  less  marked.  The  better  classes  had  begun  to 
disappear  from  the  army,  and  officers  for  the  Spanish 
wars  were  found  with  great  difficulty.  In  truth  the 
Roman  senate  had  solved  the  problem  of  acquiring  the 
sovereignty  of  the  world,  but  had  broken  down  under 
the  more  difficult  task  of  its  government. 


AUTHORITIES. 

Spanish  wars. — Polyb.  xxxv.     Appian  Sp.  44-100.     Liv.  Epit.  53-57, 

59.     Dio  Cass.'Fr.  73,  75-80. 
Third  Punic  war. — Polyb.  xxxvi ;  xxxvii.  1-2 ;    xxxviii.  1-2  ;  xxxix. 

3-o.     Liv.  Epit,  47-51.     Appian  Lib.  67-135.     Strab.  832,  sq. 
Province  of  Africa. — Sail.  Jug.  19.     Marq.  Stv.  i.  464,  sqq. 
Macedonia— Polyb.  lxxxvi.  8-9     Liv.  xlv.  17-18,  29,  30.     Epit.  45,  50. 

Floras,  i.  30,  32.     Marq.  Stv.  i.  316,  sqq. 
Achaean  war. — Polyb.  xxxviii.  7-11;  xxxix.  7-17      Liv.  Epit.  52.    Cic. 

in  Verr.  i.  21.     Marq.  Stv.  i.  321-333. 
Miihradates  (Arsaces).— Polyb.  x.  28-31.     Strab.  515,  669.     Joseph. 

Antiq.  Jew.  xii.  5.     Mommsen  Provinces,  ii.  1,  sqq. 
Fleet. — Marq.  Stv.  ii.  500,  sqq. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

TEE  REFORMS  OP  THE  GRACCHI. 

Spread  of  decay — Attempts  at  reform — Public  elections — Social 
crisis — Slavery  and  slave-wars — Italian  farmers — Scipio  Aemi- 
lianus — Tiberius  Gracchus — Tribune,  134  B.C. — His  agrarian 
law  and  further  plans  —  His  death — Criticism  oi:  his  measures  and 
methods — Suspension  of  the  land  commission— Murder  of  Scipio 
Aemilianus — The  democratic  leaders — War  with  Fregellae — ■ 
Gaius  Gracchus  tribune — His  measures  and  objects — The  Livian 
laws — Overthrow  and  d^athof  Gaius  Gracchus. 

We  have  now  reached  the  epoch  in  Roman  history  for 
ever  rendered  famous  by  the  revolutionary  reforms  of 
Tiberius  and  Gaius  Gracchus.  It  is  our  duty  to  trace  the 
causes  which  called  for  those  reforms,  and  to  form  some 
judgment  both  of  the  measures  and  their  authors.  In  the 
preceding  chapter  we  have  sketched  the  evils  underlying 
the  outward  calm  which  pervaded  the  whole  Roman 
empire  for  a  full  generation  after  the  battle  of  Pydna. 
Cato's  question  as  to  the  future  of  Rome,  when  she  no 
longer  had  a  state  to  fear,  had  a  profound  significance  now. 
The  younger  generation  of  aristocrats  thought  no  more 
of  foreign  foes,  but  of  maintaining  and,  if  possible,  of 
increasing  the  privileges  they  had  usurped.  The  various 
measures  of  the  opposition — e.g.  (a)  the  institution  of  a 
standing  senatorial  commission  by  Lucius  Calpurnius  Piso, 
in  149  B.C.,  to  try  the  complaints  of  provincials  touching 
the  extortion  of  Roman  governors ;  (6)  the  introduction 
of  the  vote  by  ballot  in  the  burgess  assemblies,  primarily 
adopted  for  the  election  of  magistrates  by  the  Gabinian  law 
in  149  B.C.,  then  applied  to  the  law  courts,  in  137  B.C.,  by 


224  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

the  Cassian  law,  and  finally  applied  to  all  'egisjative  pro- 
posals, in  131  B.C.,  by  the  Papirian  law  ;  (c)  the  exclusion,  a 
little  later,  of  the  senators  from  the  equestrian  centuries, — 
failed  entirely  to  emancipate  the  electors  from  aristocratic 
influence,  and  to  restore  to  the  comitia  the  power  and 
independence  they  had  once  possessed.  The  Romans 
lacked  what  alone  compensates  for  the  evils  of  party  life, 
the  free  and  common  movement  of  the  masses  to  some 
definite  aim.  Politics  were,  as  a  rule,  merely  partisanship 
for  individuals,  not  for  great  principles,  and  the  people 
arrayed  itself  now  on  the  side  of  this  aristocratic  coterie, 
now  on  the  side  of  that.  Hence  spr.mg  that  despicable 
canvassing  of  the  mob  by  an  aspirant  for  public  office ; 
hence,  too,  those  demagogic  cries  for  reform  and  attacks 
on  eminent  persons  to  catch  the  popular  ear  ;  hence,  again, 
arose  the  necessity  for  providing  costly  popular  amuse- 
ments, the  long  recognized  duty  of  any  candidate  for  the 
consulship.  A  still  graver  evil  was  the  miserable  position 
which  the  government,  by  thus  cringing  for  the  favour  of 
the  mob,  was  forced  to  occupy  towards  the  governed.  The 
burgesses  became  used  to  the  dangerous  idea  that  they  were 
exempt  from  all  direct  taxation,  and  they  were  no  longer 
forced  to  enter  the  hateful  military  service  across  the  sea. 
The  two  factions,  which  now  became  known  by  the  names 
of  Optimates  and  Populares,  fought  alike  for  shadows, 
being  completely  destitute  of  political  morality  and  politi- 
cal idea?.  It  would  have  been  better  for  Rome  had  the 
Optimates  substituted  hereditary  rotation  for  election  by 
the  burgesses,  or  had  the  Populares  developed  a  real 
democratic  government. 

The  crisis  with  which  the  Roman  revolution  opened 
arose  from  the  old  evil,  the  land  question.  The  warfare 
which  had  for  centuries  been  waged  between  the  small 
farmer  and  the  capitalist  had  at  last  produced  the  most 
disastrous  results  ;  and  as  formerly  the  farmer  had  been 
ruined  by  the  chain  of  debt,  so  now  he  was  crushed  by 
the  competition  with  trans  marine  and  slave-ffrown  corn. 
The  ultimate  result  was  in  both  cases  the  same  :  Italian 
farms  sank  in  value;  small  holdings  became  merged  in 
large  estates  ;  agriculture  gave  place  to  stock-raising  and 
the  growing  of  olives  and  vines  ;  and,  finally,  free  labour 
was  supplanted  in  Italy,  as  in  the  provinces,  by  that  of 


THE  REFORMS  OF  THE  GRACCHI.  225 

slaves.  The  new  and  huge  system  of  slavery  row  intro- 
duced owed  its  rise  to  the  all-powerful  capitalist.  In 
earlier  days  captives  taken  in  war  and  the  hereditary 
transmission  of  slavery  had  sufficed  ;  but  the  demand  now 
exceeded  the  supply,  and,  as  in  America,  man  was  hunted 
down  on  a  regular  system.  The  "negro-lard  "  of  that  period 
was  western  Asia,  and  the  Cretan  and  Cilician  corsairs, 
the  professional  slave-hunters  and  slave-dealers,  robbed 
the  coasts  of  Syria  and  the  Greek  islands.  Their  example 
was  imitated  by  the  Roman  revenue-farmers,  who  insti- 
tuted similar  human  hunts  to  such  an  extent  that  they 
well-nigh  depopulated  certain  provinces.  At  the  great 
slave- market  at  Delos  it  is  said  that  as  many  as  ten 
thousand  slaves  were  disembarked  in  the  morning  and 
sold  before  the  evening  of  the  same  day.  We  have 
previously  shown  that  eveiy  financial  arrangement,  every 
speculation,  and  every  trade,  were  carried  on  by  means 
of  slaves.  Pastoral  husbandry,  now  so  common,  was 
almost  entirelv  performed  by  armed  and  often  mounted 
slaves.  But  far  worse  than  any  previous  form  of  slavery 
was  the  plantation  system  proper — the  cultivation  of 
fields  by  chained  gangs,  who  v\orked  under  overseers 
and  were  locked  up  together  at  night  in  the  common 
labourers'  prison.  This  system,  introduced  from  Ihe 
East  into  Carthage  and  thence  into  Sicily,  was  deve- 
loped in  that  island  earlier  and  more  fully  than  in  any 
other  part  of  the  Roman  dominions.  In  fact,  for  the 
present,  Italy  was  still  substantially  free  from  this  worst 
form  of  slave  husbandry,  though  the  Roman  government 
was  soon  aroused  to  the  danger  which  the  system  deve- 
loped elsewhere. 

It  requires  but  little  imagination  to  picture  the  hideous 
sufferings  of  the  slaves  themselves,  far  exceeding  the  sum 
of  all  negro  misery.  Slave  wars  and  slave  insurrections 
now  became  frequent,  not  only  in  the  provinces  but  in 
Italy  itself,  but,  as  was  natural,  it  was  in  Sicily  that  the 
evil  results  of  slavery  were  most  conspicuous.  At  Enna, 
the  slaves  rose  en  masse,  murdered  their  masters,  and 
crowned  a  Syrian  juggler  as  king.  His  general  Achaeus, 
a  Greek  slave,  traversed  the  island,  and  united  under  his 
standard  both  slaves  and  free  labourers.  Agrieentum 
was  seized  by  another  band,  under  Cleon,  a  Cilician  slave; 

15 


226  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

and  the  united  forces  utterly  defeated  the  praetor  Lucius 
Hypsaeus,  and  reduced  the  whole  island  under  their  sway. 
It  was  not  until  three  successive  consuls  and  armies  had 
been  despatched  from  Rome  (134-132  B.C.)  that  the  servile 
war  was  ended  by  the  capture  of  Tauromenium  and  Euna, 
the  latter  stronghold  being  reduced  by  famine  rather  than 
by  Roman  arms,  after  a  siege  of  two  years.  Such  results 
were  due  partly  to  the  lax  control  of  the  Roman  police- 
system  as  worked  by  the  senate  and  its  officials  in  the 
provinces,  partly  to  the  disinclination  of  the  government 
to  disoblige  Italian  p'anters,  to  whom  revolted  slaves  were 
often  surrendered  for  punishment. 

The  real  remedy  for  these  evils  doubtless  was  to  be  found, 
not  in  the  severe  repression  of  such  revolts,  but  in  the 
elevation,  by  the  government,  of  free  labour,  a  natural  con- 
sequence of  which  would  be  the  restriction  of  the  slave 
proletariate.  But  the  difficulty  of  this  measure  was 
beyond  the  capacity  of  the  senate.  In  the  first  social  crisis 
the  landholder  had  been  forced  by  law  to  employ  a  number 
of  free  labourers  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  his  slaves. 
Now  the  government  caused  a  Punic  treatise  on  agriculture 
to  be  translated  for  the  use  of  Italian  speculators,  the 
solitary  instance  of  a  literary  undertaking  suggested  by 
the  senate!  The  same  wisdom  was  shown  in  the  matter  of 
colonization.  It  was  quite  clear  that  the  only  real  remedy 
against  an  agricultural  proletariate  consisted  in  a  compre- 
hensive and  regular  system  of  emigration.  Hitherto  the 
constant  assignations  of  land  and  the  establishment  of  new 
farm  allotments  had  proved  a  fairly  effective  remedy  for 
the  evil.  But  after  the  founding  of  Luna  in  177  B.C.,  no 
further  assignations  took  place  for  a  long  time,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  no  new  territory  was  acquired  in  Italy, 
with  the  exception  of  the  unattractive  Ligurian  valleys. 
Therefore  there  was  no  other  land  for  distribution  except 
the  leased  or  occupied  domain  land,  with  which  the  aris- 
tocracy was  as  loth  to  part  now  as  it  had  been  three 
hundred  years  before.  For  political  reasons  it  was  deemed 
impossible  to  distribute  the  land  in  the  provinces  :  Italy 
was  to  remain  the  ruling  country,  and  the  wall  of  partition 
between  the  Italian  masters  and  the  provincial  servants 
was  not  to  be  broken  down.  The  result  was  inevitable — 
the  ruin  of  the  farmer-class  in  Italy.     Even  as  early  as 


THE  REFORMS  OF  THE  GRACCHI.  227 

134  B.C.  not  a  free  farmer  existed  in  Etruria,  where  the 
old  native  aristocracy  combined  with  the  Roman  capitalist  ; 
and  in  the  very  capital  one  could  hear  it  said  that  the  beasts 
had  their  lairs  but  the  burgesses  had  nothing  left  but  air 
and  sunshine,  and  that  the  so-called  masters  of  the  world 
had  no  longer  a  clod  they  could  call  tbeir  own.  The 
census  list  supplies  a  sufficient  commentary.  From  the 
close  of  the  war  with  Hannibal  down  to  159  B.C.  the- 
numbers  of  the  burgesses  steadily  rose,  owing  to  the  dis- 
tributions of  the  domain  land;  while  from  159  to  131  B.C. 
they  declined  from  324,000  to  319,000 — an  alarming  result 
for  a  period  of  profound  peace  at  home  and  abroad. 

The  urgent  need  of  reform  was  patent  to  every  eye ;  and 
no  one  seemed  more  directly  called  to  the  task  of  reforma- 
tion than  Publius  Scipio  Aemilianus,  the  adopted  grandson 
of  the  great  Scipio.  He  resembled  his  father  Aemilius 
Paullus  in  his  temperate  and  healthy  mode  of  life. 
Passionately  devoted  to  hunting,  yet  he  did  not  neglect 
to  steep  his  mind  in  the  highest  Greek  culture,  and  his 
thorough  probity  and  noble  simplicity  of  life  contrasted 
with  the  mercantile  spirit  of  so  many  of  those  around 
him.  His  military  ability  had  been  proved  in  his  suc- 
cessful conclusion  of  the  third  Punic  war,  in  which, 
moreover,  as  an  officer  he  had  gained  the  wreath  be- 
stowed upon  those  who  saved  a  fellow-countryman's  life 
at  the  risk  of  their  own.  Though  no  genius,  he  seemed 
from  his  moral  worth  the  man  needed  for  the  work  of 
reform ;  all  the  more  significant  is  the  fact  that  he  did  not 
attempt  it.  Nor  was  this  from  want  of  courage ;  for  he 
supported  Lucius  Cassius  against  the  Optimates  in  carrying 
his  law  for  the  introduction  of  the  ballot  into  the  law- 
courts,  and  he  showed  the  greatest  severity  in  restoring  the 
old  military  discipline  before  the  walls  of  Carthage  and 
Numantia.  But,  as  to  the  land  question,  the  remedy, 
proposed  and  then  withdrawn  by  his  friend  Gains  Laelius, 
of  distributing  the  unallotted  domain  land  in  Italy  among 
the  farmers  was  in  Scipio's  opinion  worse  than  the  disease  ; 
and  so  he  held  a  middle  course  between  the  two  parties  of 
state,  and  on  his  death  was  claimed  as  champion  by  both 
sides. 

When  laying  down  the  censorship  in  142  B.C.,  Scipio 
called  on  the  gods  to  deign  to  preserve  the  state,  whereas 


228  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

ftll  his  predecessors  had  prayed  for  increased  glory  to  flome. 
"  His  whole  confession  of  faith  lies  in  that  painful  excla- 
mation." But,  where  he  despaired,  Tiberius  Sempronius 
Gracchus,  a  youth  unmarked  by  any  achievement,  dared 
to  hope.  His  father  had  been  the  true  model  of  a  Roman 
aristocrat,  and  had  given  proof  of  his  noble  and  generous 
feelings  both  as  consul  and  ceisor,  but,  above  all,  had  by 
his  strict  integrity  and  humane  governorship  of  the  pro- 
vince of  the  Ebro  not  only  rendered  service  to  his  country 
but  also  endeared  himself  to  the  subject  Spaniards.  His 
famous  mother,  Cornelia,  was  the  daughter  of  tli  j  conqueror 
of  Zama,  and  had  been  given  in  marriage  to  Gracchus  in 
return  for  his  generous  intervention  on  behalf  of  his  politi- 
cal opponent,  Scipio,  when  a  petty  and  miserable  charge 
had  been  got  up  against  the  Scipionic  house.  Thus  Tiberius, 
who  had  taken  part  in  the  storming  of  Carthage  under 
his  cousin  and  brother-in-law  Scipio  Aemilianus,  had  been 
brought  up  in  all  the  political  ideas  and  social  and  intel- 
lectual refinement  of  the  Scipionic  circle.  Nor  were  he 
and  his  brother  Gaius  the  only  members  of  that  circle  who 
regarded  the  abandonment  by  Laelius  of  his  scheme  of 
reform  as  weak  rather  than  judicious.  Ap-piu&.JHaudius, 
consul  in  143  B.C.  and  censor  in  136  B.C.,  the  father-in-law 
of  Tiberius,  censured  the  Scipionic  circle  for  their  desertion 
of  the  state  with  bitter  vehemence  ;  the  pontifex  maximus 
Publius  Crassus  Mucianus,  father-in-law  of  Gaius  Gracchus, 
the  revered  warrior  Quintus  Metellus,  and  other  men  of 
note  were  known  to  favour  the  cause  of  reform.  Tiberius 
brooded  over  the  lofty  ideals  of  statesmanship  which  he 
had  imbibed  in  the  atmosphere  around  him,  and  public 
placards  often  summoned  the  grandson  of  Africanus  to 
think  of  the  poor  people  and  of  the  deliverance  of  Italy. 
He  was  elected  tribune  in  134  B.C.,  at  a  time  when  one  of 
the  consuls  had  met  with  disaster  in  his  attempt  to  quell  the 
rebellion  of  the  Sicilian  slaves,  and  when  a  small  Spanish 
town  had  defied  for  months  the  efforts  of  Scipio  Aemilianus. 
Not  only  had  Tiberius  the  support  and  counsel  of  his 
father-in-law,  but  he  also  hoped  for  the  influence  of  the 
new  consul,  Publius  Mucins  Scaevola,  the  founder  of 
scientific  jurisprudence  in  Rome,  and  a  man  whose  absten- 
tion from  party  conflict  gave  his  opinion  the  greater 
weight. 


TEE  REFORMS  OF  TEE  GR ACCEL  229 

At  the  outset  Tiberius  proposed  what  was  in  a  certain 
sense  hut  the  renewal  of  the  Licinio-Sextian  law  of  307 
B.C.  Under  it  all  the  state  lands  held  and  enjoyed  without 
remuneration  were  to  be  resumed  on  behalf  of  the  state, 
with  the  restriction  that  each  occupier  should  reserve  for 
himself  500  jugera  and  for  each  son  250  (so  as,  however, 
not  to  exceed  a  total  of  1000  jugera)  in  peimarent  and 
guaranteed  possession  ;  moreover,  compensation  was  to 
be  given  to  an  ejecteel  occupier  for  any  improvements 
executed  by  him.  The  domain  land  thus  resumed  was  to  be 
broken  up  into  lots  of  o0  jugera,  and  to  be  distributed 
among  burgesses  and  Italian  allies  on  permanent  lease  at  a 
moderate  rent,  and  th  e  new  holders  were  bound  to  use  the 
land  for  agriculture.  A  board  or  "college  "  of  three  men, 
regarded  as  ordinary  state  magistrates  and  annually  elected 
by  the  people,  was  intrustfd  with  the  work  of  confiscation 
and  distribution;  and, later,  the  same  board  had  the  difficult 
and  important  ta.^k  of  detei mining  what  was  domain  land 
and  what   private  property. 

This  permanent  executive,  the  absence  of  v.hioh  had 
chiefly  caused  the  Licinian  rogations  to  remain  in  abeyance, 
was  the  special  point  of  difference  between  the  Sempronian 
and  the  older  proposals.  "War  was  thus  declared  against 
the  great  landholders,  whrse  organ  now,  as  three  centuries 
ago,  was  the  senate.  The  old  plan  was  adopted  of  silencing 
Tiberius.  His  colleague  JVfarens  Octavius  interposed  his 
veto  when  the  measure  was  about  to  be  put  to  the  vote ; 
Gracchus  replied  by  snsperding  all  public  business  and 
administration  of  justice.  Graechus  again  brought  his  law 
to  the  vote,  Octavius  again  vetoed  it.  The  senate  now 
induced  Gracchus  to  discuss  the  matter  further  in  the 
senate-house,  but  no  fruit  came  or  could  come  of  such 
discussions.  Gracchus,  now  feeling  that  all  constitutional 
means  were  exhausted,  began  a  revolution  by  proposing  to 
the  burgesses  that  they  should  vote  whether  be  or  Octavius 
should  retire  from  office.  Such  deposition  v  as  impossible 
according  to  the  Roman  constitution  ;  but  Gracchus  per- 
severed, and  was,  of  course,  backed  up  by  the  almost 
unanimous  vote  of  the  assembled  multitude.  Gracchus 
then  had  his  opponent  removed  from  the  tribunes'  bench, 
and,  amid  great  rejoicing,  the  law  was  carried. 

The  first   three   commissioners    elected    were    Tiberius 


230  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Graccli us,  his  brpyi£ii>_amLhis-iather-in^law-A|4)ius.  Such 
a  family  Selection  only  irritated  the  aristocratic  party  still 
more,  and  the  strife  was  carried  into  every  district  where 
the  commissioners'  task  lay.  Gracchus'  very  life  was  in 
danger,  and  he  appeared  in  public  with  a  retinue  of  3000 
men — a  step  possibly  necessary,  but  the  cause  of  bitter 
words  from  senators  as  well  disposed  to  him  as  Metellus. 
H .;  clearly  saw  that  he  was  a  lost  man  unless  he  continued 
indispensable  to  the  people,  and  that  his  only  course  lay  in 
forming  fresh  plans  and  introducing  still  wider  reforms. 
So  he  proposed  that  the  treasures  ofPergamus,  which  had 
just  been  bequeathed  to  Rome,  slfould.  be^dTvided  among 
the  new  landholders  for  the  purchase  of  the  necessary 
farming  implements  and  stock.  What  his  other  proposals 
were  we  do  not  know,  but  it  is  certain  that  he  was  well 
aware  that  re-election  to  the  tribunate  could  alone  secure 
his  safety.  At  the  meeting  01  the  tribes  to  elect  tribunes, 
the  aristocratic  party  opposed  its  veto  with  the  effect  that 
the  assembly  broke  up  on  the  first  and  second  day  without 
accomplishing  its  object,  though  on  both  occasions  the  first 
divisions  voted  for  Gracchus.  To  attain  his  object  at  the 
second  meeting  of  the  tribes  Gracchus  had  resorted  to 
every  art,  and  even  employed  force  to  expel  his  opponents  : 
they,  in  their  turn,  spread  abroad  that  he  had  deposed  all 
the  other  tribunes  and  was  aiming  at  sole  power.  On  the 
assembling  of  the  senate,  the  consul  Scaevola  refused  the 
urgent  request  for  the  death  of  Tiberius ;  whereupon 
Pnhlina  Spjjno  Nasica,  at  the  head  of  an  aristocratic  follow- 
ing armed  with  legs  of  benches  and  clubs,  began  the  civil 
bloodshed.  Tiberius  wasstruck^  down  on  the  slope  of  the 
/Capitol,  and  his  body,  wrthTKeTcorpses  of  three  hundred 
{adherents,  was  thrown  into  the  Tiber.  Such  a  day  had 
never  before  been  seen  in  Rome.  The  more  moderate 
aristocrats  had  not  only  to  acquiesce  in  but  even  to  defend 
the  deed  of  blood,  as  was  the  case  with  Publius  Scaevola 
and  even  Scipio  Aemilianus  ;  and  official  sanction  was  given 
to  the  assertion    that  Gracchus  had  aimed  at  the  crown. 

It  remains  for  us  to  form  some  judgment  touching 
events  so  momentous.  In  the  first  place,,  the  appointment 
of  an  official  commission,  though  a  sign  of  the  unhealthy 
state  of  things,  was  a  judicious  and  necessary  step.  In  the 
second  place,  the  distribution  of  the  domain  lands  was  not 


TEE  REFORMS  OF  TEE  GR ACCEL  231 

in  itself  a  question  affecting  the  existing  constitution  or  the 
government  of  the  aristocracy  ;  nor,  seeing  that  the  state 
was  admitted  to  be  the  owner  of  the  occupied  land,  was  it 
a  violation  of  rights.  But,  inasmuch  as  many  of  these 
lands  had  been  in  private  hereditary  possession  for  as  long 
as  three  centuries,  the  state's  proprietorship  in  the  soil 
had  virtually  lost  its  character  of  private  right  and  become 
extinct  Therefore,  though  legally  defensible,  the  resump- 
tion of  these  lands  by  the  state  was  regarded  as  an  ejection 
of  the  great  landholders  for  the  benefit  of  the  agricultural 
proletariate.  Still,  strong  as  the  objections  to  such  a 
course  might  be,  the  fact  remains  that  no  other  plan 
seemed  capable  of  checking  the  extinction  of  the  faimer- 
class  in  Italy.  But,  whatever  view  wise  men  took  of  the 
aims  of  Tiberius  Gracchus,  none  could  approve  of  his 
method.  He  practically  began  a  revolution  with  regard 
to  the  spirit  of  the  constitution  when  he  submitted  his 
agrarian  proposals  to  the  people  ;  and  it  was  a  revolution 
with  regard  to  the  letter,  when  he  destroyed  for  all  time 
the  tribunician  veto,  by  which  the  senate  rid  itself  of  inter- 
ference with  its  government,  by  the  unconstitutional  deposi- 
tion of  his  colleague.  Yet  even  this  was  not  the  moral 
and  political  mistake  of  Gracchus;  for  a  revolutionist 
may  be  at  the  same  time  a  sagacious  and  praiseworthy 
statesman.  The  essential  defects  of  the  Graechan  revolu- 
tion lay  in  the  nature  of  the  burgess  assemblies  at  that 
time.  The  sovereign  assembly  of  Rome  was  what  it  would 
be  in  England,  if,  instead  of  sending  representatives,  the 
electors  of  England  were  to  meet  together  in  Parliament. 
Not  only  was  the  assembly  a  chance  conglomeration  of 
men  assembled  in  the  capital,  incapable  of  intelligent 
action  and  agitated  by  every  interest  and  passion,  aud, 
therefore,  as  a  rule,  ready  to  accept  and  ratify  the  decree 
of  the  proposing  magistrate  ;  but  it  was  also,  in  no  small 
degree,  under  the  influence  of  the  opinion  of  the  street. 
Although  the  contiones,  or  meetings  of  the  street  populace, 
had  legally  no  power,  and  consisted  of  the  lowest  rabble,  of 
Egyptians,  Jews,  street  boys,  and  slaves,  yet  the  opinion 
of  the  masses,  evinced  by  the  loud  shouts  of  approval  or 
disapproval,  began  to  be  a  power  in  Rome.  It  was  bad 
enough  that  the  demoralized  and  disorganized  comitia 
should  be  made  use  of  for  the  elections  and  legislation  ; 


232  BISTORT  OF  ROME. 

but  when  they  were  allowed  to  interfere  with  the  govern- 
ment, and  when  the  senate  lost  the  instrument  to  prevent 
such  interferences — when  they  could  decree  themselves 
lands,  and  when  a  single  person  by  his  influence  with  the 
proletariate  could  thus  play  the  part  of  ruler  and  dictate 
to  the  senate — then  Rome  had  reached  the  end  of  popular 
freedom,  and  had  arrived,  not  at  democracy,  but  at  mon- 
archy. For  that  reason,  all  such  Questions  had  hitherto 
been  discussed  in  the  senate  alone  ;  and  even  the  very 
supporters  of  Gracchus,  who  afterwards  carried  out  his 
policy  of  distribution,  abandoned  its  author  to  his  fate. 
The  very  fact  that  Tiberias  Gracchus  never  harboured  the 
thought  of  deposing  the  senate  and  making  himself  sole 
ruler,  but  was  the  victim  of  events  which  irresistibly  urged 
him  into  the  career  of  demagogue  tyrant,  was  only  a  fresh 
ground  of  charge  against  him  rather  than  a  justification. 
The  infamous  butchery  which  slew  him  condemns  the 
aristocratic  party,  and  has  cast  a  halo  of  martyrdom 
round  his  name — a  glory  undeserved  both  in  the  opinion 
of  his  mother  and  of  Scipio  Aemilinnus,  the  latter  of 
whom  uttered  the  words  of  Homei-/fis  ut-oXolto  kcll  aAAos 
otis  ToiauTa  ye  pepoi. 

Though  Tiberius  was  deid,  his  two  works,  the  land  distri- 
bution and  the  revolution,  survived  their  author.  Indeed, 
the  moderate  party  in  the  senate,  headed  by  Metellus 
and  Scaevola,  in  combination  with  the  adherents  of  Scipio, 
gained  the  upper  hand  ;  and,  in  the  place  of  Tiberius 
Gracchus,  Publius  Crassus  Mucianus,  the  father-in-law 
of  Gaius  Gracchus,  was  appointed  on  the  commission. 
In  130  B.C.,  owing  to  the  death  of  Appins  Claudius  and 
the  defeat  and  death  of  Mucianus  by  the  Thracian  bands 
of  Aristonicus,  Gaius  Gracchus  was  left  triumvir,  with 
Marcus  Flaccus  and  Gaius  Carbo  as  coadjutors,  two  of 
the  most  active  leaders  of  the  reform  party.  The  census 
furnishes  the  strongest  evidence  that  the  distribution  of 
the  domain  lands  went  on  very  vigorously,  an  increase  of 
76,000  burgesses  being  noted  in  six  years  (from  131-T25 
B.C.).  No  doubt  in  some  cases  acts  of  injustice  occurred 
and  private  property  wns  confiscated,  but  the  senate  did 
not  interfere,  albeit  loud  complaints  arose  as  to  the  manner 
of  the  distribution.  But  the  commissioners,  in  their 
ardour,  overreached  themselves.     They  attacked  that  part 


TEE  REFORMS  OF  TEE  GR ACCEL  £33 

of  the  lands  which  had  been  assigned  by  decrees  to  Italian 
communities,  or  which  had  been  occupied  with  or  without 
permission  by  Latin  burgesses.  The  senate  could  not  dis- 
regard the  complaints  of  those  communities  who  were 
already  smarting  under  other  wrongs  ;  and  the  Latins 
appealed  for  protection  to  the  most  prominent  man  in 
Rome,  Scipio  Aemilianns.  Through  his  influence  the 
people,  in  129  B.C.,  decreed  that  the  commissioners'  juris- 
diction should  be  suspended,  and  that  the  consuls  should 
decide  what  were  domain  lands  and  what  private  property. 
Thus  practically  the  hind  distribution  ceased,  and  the 
reform  party  were  bitterly  indignant  at  Scipio's  interven- 
tion. Shortly  afterwards  Scipio  was  found  dead  in  his 
bed,  murdered,  no  doubt,  by  some  assassin,  at  the  instiga- 
tion of  the  Gracchan  party.  The  matter  was  hushed  up 
as  far  as  possible,  both  parties  in  the  state  being  glad  to 
let  it  rest ;  but  all  men  of  moderate  views  were  horrified 
at  so  atrocious  a  crime. 

Thus  perished  a  man  to  whose  character  Roman  history 
presents  no  parallel,  in  the  utter  absence  of  political  selfish- 
ness, in  generous  love  of  country,  and  in  the  tragic  part 
assigned  him  by  destiny.  "  Comcious  of  the  best  inten- 
tions and  of  no  common  abilities,  he  was  doomed  to  see 
the  ruin  of  his  country  carried  out  before  his  eyes,  and  to 
repress  within  him  every  serious  attempt  to  save  it,  be- 
cause he  clearly  perceived  that  he  could  only  thereby 
aggravate  the  evil."  Yet  due  to  him,  as  much  as  to 
Tiberius  Gracchus,  was  the  increase  of  nearly  80,000  new 
farm  allotments  ;  and  that  he  put  a  stop  to  the  distribu- 
tion at  the  right  moment  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  Gaius 
Gracchus  never  attempted  to  recur,  after  Scipio's  death, 
to  those  lands  which  might  have  been  but  were  not 
distributed  under  his  brother's  law. 

The  revolution  still  went  on  under  the  leadership  of  the 
orator  Carbo,  Flaccus,  aud  Gaius  Gracchus.  The  first- 
named  nearly  carried  a  proposal  that  the  same  person 
might  hold  the  office  of  tribune  two  years  in  succession  ; 
and  this  was  carried  a  few  years  later.  The  chief  object 
of  the  revolution  party  was  to  revive  the  allotment  com- 
mission, and  to  this  end  they  proposed  to  confer  the  rights 
of  citizenship  on  the  Italian  allies.  Marcus  Pennus, 
tribune  in  12(3  B.C.,  and  member  of  the  aristocratic  party, 


234  BISTORT  OF  ROME. 

carried  his  proposal  that  all  non- burgesses  should  leave 
the  city.  Flaccus,  consul  in  125  B.C.,  made  a  counter- 
proposal that  every  ally  should  take  the  vote  of  the 
comitia  on  the  subject  of  his  request  to  be  entitled  to 
Roman  citizenship.  But  Carbo  had  ratted,  and  joined 
the  aristocratic  party ;  and  Gaius  Gracchus  was  away  as 
quaestor  in  Sardinia ;  so  Flaccus'  proposal  found  no  sup- 
port, and  he  left  Rome  to  take  command  against  the  Celts. 
Still,  his  action  bore  fruit  in  the  revolt  of  Fregellae,  at 
that  time  the  second  city  in  Italy  and  the  mouthpiece  of 
the  Latin  colonies,  situated  on  the  borders  of  Latium 
and  Campania  at  the  chief  passage  of  the  Liris.  This 
was  the  first  instance,  for  one  hundred  and  fifty  years,  of 
a  serious  insurrection  in  Italy  against  Rome,  without  the 
instigation  of  foreign  powers.  But,  before  it  spread, 
Fregellae  was  surprised,  owing  to  the  treachery  of  a 
native,  and  was  seriously  punished  by  the  loss  of  its  walls 
and  all  its  privileges,  in  124  B.C.  The  democratic  party 
was  regarded  as  implicated  in  the  revolt  of  Fregellae,  and 
Gaius  Gracchus,  who  had  returned  from  Sardinia,  was 
tried  but  acquitted.  He  now  threw  down  the  gauntlet, 
and,  by  being  elected  tribune  in  123  B.C.,  declared  open 
war  upon  the  aristocracy. 

Gaius  resembled  his  brother  only  in  his  dislike  for 
vulgar  pleasures  and  pursuits,  in  his  culture  and  personal 
bravery,  but  was  decidedly  his  superior  in  talent,  character, 
and  passion.  His  ability  as  a  statesman  was  evinced  in  his 
clearness  and  self-possession,  in  his  grasp  of  details  and 
practical  powers.  His  lovable  nature  was  proved  by  the 
devotion  of  his  intimate  friends.  Disciplined  by  suffering, 
he  masked  the  terrible  energy  of  his  nature  and  the  bitter 
indignation  he  felt  against  the  aristocracy  by  a  compul- 
sory reserve.  At  times,  indeed,  his  passion  mastered  him, 
and  caused  his  brilliant  oratory  to  become  confused  and 
faltering ;  but  he  was  one  of  the  greatest  speakers  Rome 
ever  saw.  He  had  none  of  the  sentimental  good-nature 
of  his  brother ;  fully  and  firmly  resolved,  he  entered  on 
the  career  of  revolution  with  vengeance  as  his  goal  and 
aim.  To  attain  this  end  he  counted  not  too  great  the 
price  of  his  own  fall  and  the  ruin  of  the  state.  His 
mother's  creed,  that  the  country  should  at  all  cost  be 
saved,    was   nobler ;    but   posterity   has    been    right    in 


THE  REFORMS  OF  THE  GRACCHI.  235 

rather  lamenting  than  blaming  the  course  taken  by  her 
son. 

The  proposals  now  mad©  by  Gracchus  were  nothing  less 
than  a  new  constitution,  the  foundation-stone  of  which 
rested  upon  the  legal  right  of  the  same  man  to  be  elected 
tribune  for  two  or  more  years  in  succession.  This  having 
been  carried,  the  next  object  was  to  attach  the  multitude 
of  the  capital  to  the  holder  of  the  tribunate.  This  was  first 
of  ail  effected  by  distributions  of  corn.  Gaius  enacted 
that  every  burgess,  on  personal  application,  should  re- 
ceive a  monthly  allowance  of  five  ruodii  (1|  bushels) 
at  the  extremely  low  rate  of  three-pence  per  modius  ; 
this  measure  would  both  attract  into  the  capital  the 
whole  mass  of  the  burgess  proletariate,  and  would  make 
them  dependent  on  the  tribune,  and  supply  him  with  a 
body-guard  and  a  firm  majority  in  the  comitia.  He  also 
changed  the  method  of  voting  in  the  comitia  centuriata, 
according  to  which  the  five  property  classes  in  each  tribe 
voted  one  after  the  other,  and  made  the  order  of  voting 
depend  upon  lot.  Tet,  though  thus  securing  his  position 
in  Rome,  he  did  not  neglect  to  legislate  for  the  existing 
social  evils.  His  agrarian  law  only  revived  that  of  his 
brother,  and  he  did  not  proceed  any  further  in  the  distri- 
bution of  domain  land.  But  by  establishing  colonies  at 
Tarentum  and  Capua,  he  rendered  that  land,  which  had 
been  let  on  lease  by  the  state  and  had  been  exempt  from 
distribution,  liable  to  be  divided;  and  no  doubt  he  in- 
tended these  colonies  to  aid  in  defending  the  revolution 
to  which  they  owed  their  existence.  He  also  opened  a 
new  outlet  for  the  Italian  proletariate  by  sending  six  thou- 
sand colonists  to  the  site  of  Carthage — colonists  chosen 
from  Italian  allies  as  well  as  Roman  citizens.  Moreover, 
he  introduced  several  modifications  of  the  military  system, 
by  reviving  the  law  which  enacted  that  no  one  should  be 
enlisted  before  his  seventeenth  year,  and  by  restricting 
the  number  of  campaigns  requisite  for  full  exemption  from 
military  duty  :  the  state  also  supplied  the  soldiers,  for  the 
future,  with  their  clothing  free  of  charge.  Further, 
Gracchus  attempted  to  restrict  capital  punishment  as  far 
as  possible,  by  withdrawing  the  cognizance  of  such  crimes 
as  poisoning  and  murder  from  the  popular  assemblies  and 
intrusting  it  to  permanent  judicial  commissions.     These 


236  HISTORY   OF  ROME. 

tribunals  could  only  sentence  a  man  to  exile,  and  their 
sentence  could  not  be  appealed  from,  nor  could  they,  like 
the  tribunals  of  the  people,  be  broken  up  by  the  interces- 
sion of  a  tribune. 

In  order  to  work  the  ruin  of  the  aristocracy,  Gracchus 
took  advantage  of  the  already  existing  elements  favourable 
to  a  rupture  in  that  body.  The  aristocracy  of  the  rich 
consisted  of  two  classes  :  (1)  of  the  governing  senatorial 
families,  who  bore  some  resemblance  to  our  peers,  and  whose 
capital  was  invested  in  land  ;  (2)  of  the  wealthy  merchants 
and  speculators,  who  conducted  all  the  money  transactions 
of  the  empire,  and  who  had  gradually  risen  to  take  their 
place  by  the  side  of  the  older  aristocracy.  At  the  present 
time  this  class  was  generally  known  as  the  equestrian 
order,  which  title  had  gradually  come  to  be  used  of  all  who 
possessed  an  estate  of  at  least  400,000  sesterces,  aud,  as  such 
were  liable  to  cavalry  service.  Already  senators  had  been 
marked  off  from  this  body  by  a  law  passed  in  129  B.C.  ;  but 
many  members  of  senatorial  families,  not  yet  members  of 
the  senate,  were  included  in  the  equites.  The  natural 
antipathy  between  the  aristocrats  of  blood  and  those  of 
wealth  was  adroitly  increased  by  Gracchus,  until  the 
equestrian  order  ranged  itself  on  his  side.  Partly  by  con- 
ferring on  them  various  insignia,  but  still  more  by  offering 
them  the  revenues  of  Asia  and  the  jui^cjllirts^Gracchus 
won  over  the  clas&~o£_Jpaaterial  interests.  Hitherto  the 
direct  taxes  of  each  province  had  been  farmed  by  the  pro- 
vincials themselves,  and  thus  the  Roman  publicani  had 
been  kept  at  a  distance.  .  Gracchus  now  enacted  that  Asia 
should  be  hardened  with  the  heaviest  taxes,  both  direct 
and  indirect,  and  that  these  taxes  should  be  put  up  for 
auction  in  Rome  ;  he  thus  excluded  the  provincials  from 
participation,  and  gave  the  capitalists  ah  opening  for  the 
farming  gf  these  various  taxes,  of  which  they  did  not  fail 
to  avail  themselves. 

Having  thus  opened  up  a  gold-mine  for  the  merchant 
princes,  Gracchus  gave  them  a  sphere  for  public  action  in 
the  jury  courts.  Most  processes,  alike  civil  and  criminal, 
were  up  to  this  time  decided  by  single  jurymen  or  by  com- 
missioners, whether  permanent  or  extraordinary  ;  and  in 
both  cases  the  members  had  been  exclusively  taken  from 
the   senate.     Gracchus   now  transferred  the  functions  of 


THE  REFORMS  OF  THE  GRACCHI.  237 

jurymen,  both  in  strictly  civil  processes  and  in  the  various 
commissions,  to  the  equestrian  order,  and  directed  a  new- 
list  of  judices  to  be  made  out  annually  from  all  persons  of 
equestrian  rating.  The  result  of  these  measures  was  that 
not  only  was  the  moneyed  class  united  into  a  compact  and 
privileged  order  on  the  solid  basis  of  material  interests, 
but  that  also,  as  a  judicial  and  controlling  power,  it  was 
almost  on  a  footing  of  equality  with  the  ruling- aristocracy. 
All  the  old  antipathies  found  expression  in  the  sentences 
of  the  new  jurymen  ;  and  the  senator,  on  his  return  from 
governing  a  province,  had  no  longer  to  pass  the  scrutiny  of 
his  brother  peers,  but  of  merchants  and  bankers. 

For  the  complete  overthrow  of  the  senate,  Gracchus  not 
only  had  to  deprive  it  of  the  substance  of  its  powers  by 
legislative  changes,  but  also  to  ruin  the  existing  aristocracy 
by  m<;re  personal  and  less  permanent  measures.  He  did 
both.  For  not  only  did  he  deprive  the  senate  of  adminis- 
trative power  by  settling  questions  by  comitial  laws,  dictated 
as  a  rule  by  the  tribune,  but  also  by  taking  the  business  of 
the  state  into  his  own  hands.  He  had  meddled  with  the 
state  finances  by  his  distributions  of  corn ;  with  the  domain 
lands  by  sending  out  colonies,  not  at  the  decree  of  the 
senate,  but  of  the  people  ;  with  the  provincial  administration 
by  overturning  the  provincial  constitution  of  Asia  and  sub- 
stituting his  own  for  that  of  the  senate.  The  marvellous 
activity  Gracchus  showed  in  all  his  new  functions  quite 
threw  into  the  shade  the  lax  administration  of  the  senate, 
and  began  to  make  it  clear  to  the  people  that  one  vigorous 
man  cnuld  control  the  business  of  the  state  better  than  a 
college  of  effete  aristocrats.  Still  more  vigorous  was  his 
interference  with  the  jurisdiction  of  the  senate.  He  forbade 
their  appointing  any  extraordinary  commission  of  high 
treason,  such  as  had  tried  his  brother's  adherents  ;  and  he 
even  planned  to  reinforce  the  senate  by  three  hundred  new 
members,  to  be  elected  by  the  comitia  from  the  equestrian 
order. 

Such  was  the  political-constitution  projected  and  carried 
by  Gaius  Gracchus,  as  tribune,  in  123  and  122  B.C.,  without 
any  serious  resistance  or  recourse  to  force.  It  is  clear  that 
he  did  not  -wish  to  place  the  Roman  Republic  on  a  new 
democratic  basis,  but  that  he  wished  to  abolish  it  and 
introduce  in  its  stead  an  absolute  despotism,  in  the  form  of 


238  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

an  unlimited  tribuneship  for  life.  Nor  can  he  be  blamed 
for  it ;  as,  though  an  absolute  monarchy  is  a  great  mis- 
fortune for  a  nation,  it  is  a  less  misfortune  than  an 
absolute  oligarchy.  Still,  it  is  clear  that  his  whole  legis- 
lation was  marred  by  the  fact  that  it  was  pervaded  by 
conflicting  aims,  now  seeking  the  public  good,  now  minis- 
tering to  the  personal  objects  and  personal  vengeance 
of  its  framer.  "  On  the  very  threshold  of  his  despotism 
he  was  confronted  by  the  fatal  dilemma,  moral  and  po- 
litical, that  the  same  man  had  at  one  and  the  same  time 
to  hold  his  ground  as  a  captain  of  robbers,  and  to  lead 
the  state  as  its  first  citizen — a  dilemma  to  which  Peri- 
cles, Caesar,  and  Napoleon  had  also  to  make  dangerous 
sacrifices."  Besides  this,  he  was  fired  with  the  passion  for 
a  speedy  vengeance,  and  was  in  fact  a  political  incendiary, 
— the  author  not  only  of  the  one  hundred  years'  revolution, 
which  dates  from  him,  but  the  founder  of  that  terrible 
urban  proletariate  which,  utterly  demoralized  by  corn- 
largesses  and  the  flattery  of  the  classes  above  it,  and  at 
the  same  time  conscious  of  its  power,  lay  like  an  incubus 
for  five  hundred  years  on  the  Roman  commonwealth,  and 
only  perished  with  it. 

Many  of  the  fundamental  maxims  of  Roman  monarchy 
may  be  traced  to  Gracchus.  He  first  laid  down  that  all 
the  land  of  subject  communi^es_was_-to  be  regarded  as  the 
private  property  of  the  state— a  maxim  first  applied  to 
vindicate  the  right  of  the  state  to  tax  the  land  and  then  to 
send  out  colonies  to  it,  afterwards  established  as  a  funda- 
mental principle  of  law  under  the  Empire.  He  invented 
the  tactics  by  which  his-SncGesaora  broke  down  the  govern- 
ing aristocracy,  and  substituted  strict  and  judicious  ad- 
ministration for  the  previous  misgovernment.  He  first 
opened  the  way  to  a  reconciliation  between  Rome  and  the 
provinces  ;  and  his  attempt  to  rebuild  Carthage  and  to 
give  an  opportunity  for  Italian  emigration  to  the  provinces 
was  the  first  link  in  the  chain  of  that  beneficial  course  of 
action.  "  Right  and  wrong,  fortune  and  misfortune,  were 
so  inextricably  blended  in  this  singular  man  and  in  this 
marvellous  political  constellation,  that  it  may  well  beseem 
history  in  this  case — though  it  beseems  her  but  seldom — 
to  reserve  her  judgment." 

Having  thus  established  his  new  constitution.  Gracchus 


THE  REFORMS  OF  THE  GRACCHI.  239 

turned  to  the  task  of  enfranchising  the  Italian  allies,  which 
had  been  proposed  and  rejected  in  125  B.C.  But  a  con- 
siderable section  of  the  mob,  thinking  that  their  own 
interests  would  be  seriously  injured  bj  a  new  influx  of  men 
to  share  the  profits  they  were  enjoying,  combined  with  the 
senate  in  rejecting  the  proposal,  made  by  Gracchus  in  122 
B.C.,  that  the  Latins  should  receive  the  full  franchise.  This 
encouraged  the  senate  to  work  his  ruin.  The  method  of 
attack  was  the  clumsy  one  of  offering  the  proletariate  more 
than  Gracchus  had  done.  At  the  instigation  of  the  senate, 
Marcus  Livius  Drusus  proposed  to  release  those  who 
received  land  under  the  law  of  Gracchus  from  their  rent, 
and  to  declare  their  allotments  free  and  inalienable  pro- 
perty, and  to  give  relief  to  the  proletariate  by  planting 
twelve  Italian  colonies,  each  of  three  thousand  men.  Prob- 
ably, owing  to  the  non-existence  elsewhere  in  Italy  of 
domain  land  to  the  extent  required,  this  plan  would  have 
to  be  carried  out  at  the  expense  of  the  Latins  ;  and  Drusus 
passed  several  enactments  coufei'rins;  privileges  on  the 
Latins  with  the  intention  of  indemnifying  them  for  their 
losses.  Drusus  himself  refused  to  be  nominated  as  an 
executor  of  his  own  laws,  perhaps  knowing  well  that  no 
such  extent  of  domain  land  existed,  even  if  those  assigned 
to  the  Latins  were  confiscated.  But  the  clumsy  bait  took. 
Gracchus  was  away  at  the  time  in  Africa,  founding  the  Car- 
thaginian colony,  and  the  incapacity  of  his  lieutenant, 
Marcus  Flaccus,  made  all  easy  for  his  opponents.  The 
people  ratified  the  Livian  laws  as  readily  as  they  had  the 
Sempronian,  and  then  declined  to  re-elect  Gracchus,  when 
he  stood  for  the  third  time  candidate  for  the  tribunate  of 

121  B.C.  Lucius  Opimius,  one  of  the  most  pronounced 
chiefs  of  the  aristocratic  party,  was  also  elected  consul, 
and  the  time  had  now  come  when  a  blow  might  safely  be 
struck  at  the  democratic  despot.  On  the  10th  of  December, 

122  B.C.,  Gracchus  ceased  to  be  tribune  of  the  people ;  on 
the  1st  of  January  of  the  ensuing  year  Opimius  entered  on 
his  consular  office. 

The  first,  attack  was  directed  against  the  most  unpopular 
measure  of  Gracchus,  the  restoration  of  Carthage.  National 
superstition  was  invoked,  and  the  senate  proposed  a  law  to 
prevent  the  planting  of  tho  colony  of  Junonia.  Gracchus, 
attended  by  an  armed  crowd  of  partisans,  appeared  on  the 


240  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

day  of  voting  at  the  Capitol,  to  procure  the  rejection  of 
the  law.  The  sight  of  his  armed  adherents,  and  the  intense 
excitement  which  prevailed,  could  hardly  have  failed  to 
result  in  a  collision  between  the  two  sides.  Quintus  An- 
tullius,  the  attendant  of  Lucius  Opimius  during  the  usual 
ceremony  of  sacrifice,  ordered  all  bad  citizens  to  quit  the 
porch  of  the  Capitoline  temple,  and  seemed  even  to  threaten 
Gracchus  himself  ;  whereupon  a  Gracchan  cut  him  down. 
A  fearful  tumult  arose,  and  Gracchus,  by  addressing  the 
people,  broke  an  old  statute,  which  forbade  any  one  to 
interrupt  a  tribune  while  speaking  to  the  people,  on  pain 
of  the  severest  penalties.  The  consul  Lucius  Opimius 
took  vigorous  measures  to  put  down  the  insurrection  by 
force  of  arms,  and  next  day  was  attended  by  a  large  armed 
force,  including  all  the  aristocracy,  and  commanded  by 
Decimus  Brutus,  an  officer  trained  in  Spanish  warfare. 
The  senate-house  was  crowded  with  senators,  and  outside 
its  doors  lay  the  corpse  of  Antullius  stretched  upon  a  bier. 
The  Gracchan  party,  under  the  command  of  Flaccus,  en- 
trenched itself  upon  the  Aventine.  Gracchus  was  averse  to 
resistance,  but  Flaccus  hoped  to  come  to  a  compromise  with 
his  foes.  But  the  aristocrats  rejected  all  his  proposals, 
and  arrested  his  son  Quintus,  who  was  sent  to  mediate, 
and  ordered  an  attack  on  the  Aventine.  The  defenders  of 
the  mount  were  speedily  dispersed,  and  Flaccus  was  killed 
after  vainly  seeking  concealment.  Gracchus  was  persuaded 
to  fly,  but  sprained  his  foot  in  the  attempt.  The  devotion 
of  two  of  his  attendants,  who  sacrificed  their  lives  to  give 
him  time  to  escape,  enabled  him  and  his  slave  to  cross  the 
Tiber;  here,  in  a  grove,  both  he  and  his  slave  were  found 
dead.  The  Gracchan  party  was  hunted  down  by  prosecu- 
tions, and  three  thousand  are  said  to  have  been  strangled 
in  prison.  The  memory  of  the  Gracchi  was  officially  pro- 
scribed, and  Cornelia  was  forbidden  to  put  on  mourning  for 
the  death  of  her  son  ;  but,  despite  the  precautions  of  the 
police,  the  common  people  continued  to  pay  a  religious 
veneration  to  the  spots  where  the  two  leaders  of  the 
revolution  had  perished. 


THE  REFORMS  OF  THE  GRACCHI.  241 


AUTHORITIES. 

Rome  before  revolution. — Polyb.  iii.  4. 

Calpurnian  law. — Cic.  Brut.  27;    de  Offic.  ii.  21;  in  Verr.  iii.  84; 

iv.  25. 
Gabinian  and  Papirian  laws. — Cic.  de  Legg.  iii.  16  ;  Lael.  16 ;  Brut. 

25,  27  ;  pro  Sest.  48. 
Optimates  and  populares. — Veil.  ii.  3.     Cic.  pro  Sest.  48. 
Slavery.— Appian  B.  0.  i.  7-10.     Cic.  de  Offic.  i.  42.     Strab.  608. 

Marq.  Stv.  i.  164-184. 
Plantation  system. — Colum.  i.  6,  9.    Cato  de  r.  r.  56.    Plin.  N.  H.  xviii. 

21,  36. 
Slave   wars.— Liv.   xxxi.  26 ;    xxxii.    1;    xl.  38.      Epit-  46,    56,   58. 

Diod.  xxxiv.  23.     Strab.  272-273. 
Land,  etc. — Liv.  xlii.  1.     Marq.  Stv.  i.  103,  sqq. 
Publius  Scipio  and   Tiberius  Gracchus. — Liv.    Epit.    54,    58-61,   71. 

Plut.  Lives  of  Gracchi  and  Aem.  Paull.     Dio  Cass.  Fr.  83-85. 
Gaius  Gracchus. — Appian  Lib.  136.     Veil.  ii.  6,  13.     Tac.  Ann.  xii. 

60.     Diod.  xxxiv.  25.    Cic.  in  Verr.  3, 6.     Wordsworth  Lat.  Inscr. 

424,  441. 
Equestrian  jury-courts. — Appian  B.  C.  ii.  22.     Momma.  R.  St.  iii. 

528  sqq. 


242  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 


CHAPTER   XXI. 

THE    RULE    OF   THE    RESTORATION. 

Social  state  of  Italy  and  the  provinces — Second  slave- war  in  Sicily—' 
War  of  the  Numidian  succession — Capture  of  Cirta  by  Jugurtha — 
The  Jugurthinewar — Its  political  results — Trausalpine  relations 
of  Rome — Conquest  of  the  Arverni  and  Allobroges — Province  of 
Narbo — Conflicts  with  tribes  in  the  North- East — The  Cimbri  — 
Their  movements — Battle  of  Arausio — Victories  of  Marius  at 
Aquae  Sextiae  and  Vercellae. 

Gracchus  had  fallen,  and  with  him  the  structure  he  had 
reared ;  nor  was  there  any  one  left  fit  to  take  the  lead  of 
the  Gracchan  party.  But,  though  the  aristocracy  once 
more  ruled,  it  was  the  rule  of  a  restoration,  which  is 
always  in  itself  a  revolution ;  and  in  this  case  it  was  not 
so  much  the  old  government  as  the  old  governor  that  was 
restored.  The  senate  practically  continued  to  govern 
with  the  constitution  of  the  Gracchi,  though  no  doubt 
resolved  to  purge  it  in  due  time  from  the  elements  hostile 
to  its  own  order.  The  distributions  of  grain,  the  taxation 
of  Asia,  and  the  new  arrangements  as  to  jurymen  and 
tribunals  remained  as  before ;  nay,  the  senate  exceeded 
Gracchus  in  the  homage  it  paid  to  the  mercantile  class, 
and,  more  especially,  to  the  proletariate.  But  the  noble 
scheme  of  Gracchus  to  introduce  legal  equality,  first 
between  the  Roman  burgesses  and  Italy,  and  then  between 
Italy  and  the  provinces,  and  also  his  attempt  to  solve  the 
social  question  by  a  comprehensive  system  of  emigration, 
were  alike  disregarded  by  the  aristocrats.  They  still 
held  fast  to  the  principle  that  Italy  ought  to  remain  the 
ruling  land,   and  Rome   the   ruling  city   in    Italy.     The 


THE  RULE  OF  THE  RESTORATION.  243 

colony  of  Narbo,  founded  in  118  B.C.,  was  the  sole  excep- 
tion to  the  success  of  the  government  in  preventing 
assignations  of  land  outside  Italy.  So  also  the  Italian 
colonies  of  Gracchus  were  cancelled,  and,  where  already 
planted,  were  again  broken  up  ;  those  who  had  received 
domain  lands,  not  by  virtue  of  being  members  of  a  colony, 
retained  their  possessions.  With  regard  to  those  domain 
lands,  which  were  still  held  by  the  right  of  occupation, 
and  from  which  to  a  great  extent  the  thirty-six  thousand 
new  allotments  promised  by  Drusus  were  to  have  been 
formed,  it  was  resolved  to  maintain  the  rights  of  the 
present  occupier,  so  as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  future 
distribution. 

The  allotment  commission  was  abolished  in  119  B.C., 
and  a  fixed  rent  imposed  on  the  occupants  of  the  domain 
land,  the  proceeds  of  which  went  to  benefit  the  populace 
of  the  capital. 

The  final  step  was  taken  in  111  B.C.,  when  the  occupied 
domain  land  whs  converted  into  the  rent-free  private 
property  of  the  former  occupants.  It  was  added  that  in 
future  domain  land  was  not  to  be  occupied  at  all,  but  was 
either  to  be  leased  or  lie  open  as  public  pasture  ;  thus  too 
late  the  injurious  character  of  the  occupation  system  was 
officially  recognized,  when  the  state  had  lost  almost  all  its 
domain  lands.  The  aristocracy  thus  converted  all  the 
occupied  land  they  still  held  into  private  property,  and 
pacified  the  Italian  allies  by  preserving  their  rights  with 
resrard  to  the  Latin  domain  land,  though  they  did  not 
actually  confer  it  upon  them. 

But  practically  the  restored  government  was  powerless 
in  the  presence  of  the  dread  forces  evoked  by  Gracchus. 
The  proletariate  of  the  capital  continued  to  have  a  recog- 
nized claim  to  being  kept  by  largesses  of  corn  ;  and  the 
attempt  by  the  consul  Quintus  Caepio  in  106  B.C.,  to 
transfer  the  judicia  back  again  to  the  senatorial  order, 
resulted  in  failure.  The  miserable  condition  of  the  senate 
at  this  period  is  only  too  apparent :  its  rule  rested  on  the 
same  basis  as  that  of  Gracchus,  and  its  strength  lay  only  in 
its  league  with  the  city  rabble  or  with  the  mercantile  order ; 
confronted  with  either,  it  was  powerless.  "  It  sat  on  the 
vacated  throne  with  an  evil  conscience  and  divided  hopes, 
indignant  at  the  institutions  of  the  state  which  it  ruled, 


244  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

and  yet  incapable  of  even  systematically  assailing  the  in, 
vacillating  in  all  its  conduct  except  where  its  own  ma- 
terial advantage  prompted  decision,  a  picture  of  faithless- 
ness towards  its  own  as  well  as  the  opposite  party,  of 
inward  inconsistency,  of  the  most  pitiful  impotence,  of 
the  meanest  selfishness — an  unsurpassed  ideal  of  misrule." 
Moral  and  intellectual  decay  had  fallen  upon  the  whole 
nation,  and  especially  on  the  upper  classes.  The  aris- 
tocracy returned  to  power  with  the  curse  of  restoration 
upon  it,  and  it  returned  neither  wiser  nor  better.  Incom- 
petency marked  alike  its  leaders  in  the  world  of  politics 
and  on  the  field  of  battle.  Social  ruin  spread  apace ; 
small  farm-holders  quickly  disappeared ;  and  in  100  B.C. 
it  was  said  that  among  the  whole  burgesses  there  were 
scarce  two  thousand  wealthy  families.  Slave  insurrec- 
tions became  almost  annual  in  Italy,  the  most  serious  of 
which  was  in  the  territory  of  Thurii,  headed  by  a  Roman 
knight  named  Titus  Vettius,  whom  his  debts  had  driven 
to  take  this  step  in  104  B.C.  Piracy  was  practised  in  the 
Mediterranean  by  the  magisterial  and  mercantile  classes 
of  Rome  as  well  as  by  professional  freebooters.  At  last 
the  government  was  forced  to  despatch  a  fleet,  in  102  B.C., 
and  occupy  stations  on  the  coast  of  Cilicia,  the  main  seat 
of  the  pirates,  and  this  was  the  first  step  to  the  establish- 
ment of  the  province  of  Cilicia ;  but  piracy  flourished  in 
spite  of  these  precautions. 

Throughout  the  provinces  slaves  constantly  rose  in 
insurrection ;  and  the  most  terrible  tumults  occurred,  as 
usual,  in  Sicily,  wdiich  swarmed  with  slaves  brought  from 
Asia  Minor  to  work  on  the  plantations.  Practically, 
too,  the  free  natives  were  little  better  than  slaves,  and 
many  had  become  enrolled  "as  such.  Publius  Nerva,  the 
governor  of  Sicily,  in  104  B.C.  was  ordered  by  the  senate 
to  hold  a  court  at  Syracuse,  and  to  investigate  the  cases  of 
those  who  applied  for  freedom.  Numbers  were  declared 
free,  and,  in  alarm,  the  planters  succeeded  in  causing  Nerva 
to  suspend  the  court  and  to  order  the  rest  of  the  appli- 
cants to  return  to  their  former  masters.  This  set  ablaze 
the  smouldering  embers  of  revolt.  A  band  of  slaves 
defeated  part  of  the  garrison  at  Enna,  and  thus  supplied 
themselves  with  arms ;  they  placed  a  slave  at  their 
head  with  the  title  of  king  Tryphon.     The  open  country 


THE  RULE  OF  THE  RESTORATION.  243 

between  Enna  and  Leontini  was  overruu  by  tlieir  forces, 
and  they  defeated  a  hastily  collected  force  of  militia 
under  the  Eoman  governor  with  ridiculous  ease. 

On  the  west  coast  a  still  more  serious  revolt  arose 
under  the  leadership  of  Athenion,  who  had  been  a  robber 
captain  in  Cilicia,  and  was  alike  versed  in  military  tactics 
and  in  the  superstitious  arts  so  necessary  for  gaining  a 
hold  on  vulgar  minds.  He  avoided  jealous  quarrels  by 
submitting  to  king  Tryphon,  and  the  two  ruled  all  the 
flat  country  in  Sicily  and  laid  siege  to  many  towns,  Mes- 
sana  itself  being  all  but  captured  by  Athenion.  Rome 
was  at  that  time  engaged  with  the  war  against  the  Cimbri, 
but  in  103  B.C.  it  sent  a  large  force  under  Lucullus,  who 
gained  a  victory  but  did  not  follow  it  up.  Nor  was  his 
successor  Servilius  any  more  fortunate  ;  and,  on  the  death 
of  Tryphon,  Athenion,  in  102  B.c  ,  stood  sole  ruler  of  the 
greater  part  of  the  island.  In  lOi  B.C.,  Manius  Aquillius, 
who  had  gained  distinction  in  the  war  with  the  Teutones, 
arrived,  and,  after  two  years  of  hard  struggles,  quelled 
the  revolt  and  killed  Athenion,  thus  terminating  the  war 
after  five  years. 

A  clear  proof  of  the  gross  incompetency  of  the  senate 
is  furnished  by  the  origin  and  conduct  of  this  second 
Sicilian  slave-war.  If  we  turn  our  eyes  to  Africa,  this  is 
still  more  clearly  proved  by  the  fourteen  years'  insurrec- 
tion and  usurpation  successfully  achieved  hy  Jugurtha. 
Numidia  included  the  greatest  poi'tion  of  the  territory 
held  by  Carthage  in  its  days  of  prosperity,  as  well  as 
several  old-Phoenician  cities,  and  thus  embraced  the 
largest  and  best  part  of  the  rich  seaboard  of  northern 
Africa.  The  three  sons  of  Massinissa  had,  by  Scipio's 
arrangement,  divided  the  functions  of  sovereignty  between 
them.  At  this  time  Micipsa,  the  eldest,  reigned  alone,  a 
feeble  and  peaceful  old  man.  As  his  sons  were  not  grown 
up,  Jugurtha,  an  illegitimate  nephew,  practically  ruled. 
Naturally  gifted,  Jugurtha  was,  both  on  the  field  of  battle 
and  in  the  council  chamber,  no  unworthy  grandson  of 
Massinissa.  Micipsa  arranged  that  he  with  his  own  two 
sons  should  govern  the  kingdom.  On  Micipsa's  death, 
in  118  B.C.,  a  quarrel  arose  as  to  the  division.  Hiempsal 
was  assassinated  by  Jngurtha's  orders,  and  a  civil  war 
arose    between    Adherbal,    the    remaining    brother,    and 


246  HISTORY  OF  HOME. 

Jugurtha,  in  which  all  Numidia  took  part.  Jugurtha 
was  victorious,  and  seized  the  whole  kingdom,  while 
Adherbal  escaped  and  made  his  complaints  in  person  at 
Rome.  Jugurtha's  envoys,  however,  bribed  the  senators, 
and,  notwithstanding  the  disgust  of  the  leading  men  in 
Rome,  the  senate  divided  the  kingdom  equally  between 
the  two,  and  sent  Ijftciua_Qpimius  to  arrange  the  division. 
An  unfair  distribution  gave  Jugurtha  far  the  best  half  of 
the  kingdom.  But  Jugurtha,  not  content,  tried  to  pro- 
voke Adherbal  to  war,  and,  finding  this  impossible,  made 
war  upon  him,  and  laid  siege  to  Cirta,  which  was  defended 
more  vigorously  by  the  resident  Italians  than  by  Adher- 
bal's  troops.  In  answer  to  Adherbal's  complaints,  the 
senate  sent  a  commission  of  inexperienced  youths,  whose 
demands  Jugurtha  contemptuously  rejected.  At  last, 
when  matters  were  getting  desperate  at  Cirta,  Rome  sent 
another  commission,  headed  by  the  chief  man  of  the  aris- 
tocracy, Marcus  Aemilius  Scaurus ;  but  the  conference 
at  Utica  en"cted  without  any  result.  In  the  end,  Cirta 
capitulated,  and  Jugurtha  put  air  the  males,  whether 
Italian  or  African,  to  the  sword,  in  112  B.C.  This  was  too 
much  for  the  people  in  Italy  ;  a  storm  broke  out  against 
the  government,  headed  by  Gaius  Memmius,  tribune 
designate  for  the  next  year,  and  war  was  declared  against 
Jugurtha.  A  Roman  army  was  sent  to  Africa,  and 
Bocchus,  the  father-in-law  of  Jugurtha  and  king  of  Mau- 
retania,  took  the  R  >man  side,  but  he  neglected  to  bribe 
the  Roman  commanders,  and  so  his  alliance  fell  through. 
Jugurtha,  on  the  other  hand,  more  wisely  made  free  use 
of  the  treasures  left  by  Massinissa,  and  gained  a  peace 
on  most  favourable  terms,  being  merely  condemned  to 
pay  a  moderate  fine  and  give  up  his  war  elephants.  On 
this  the  storm  again  broke  out  in  Rome ;  all  men  now 
knew  that  even  Scaurus,  who  was  serving  in  Africa, 
was  amenable  to  bribes,  and  Gaius  Memmius  pressed  for 
the  appearance  of  Jugurtha  to  answer  the  charges  made 
against  him.  The  senate  yielded,  and  granted  a  safe-con- 
duct to  Jugurtha ;  but  his  gold  was  as  powerful  as  ever, 
and  the  colleague  of  Memmius  interposed  his  veto,  when 
the  latter  addressed  his  first  question  to  the  king.  End- 
less discussions  took  place  in  the  senate  as  to  the  validity 
of  the  peace,  and   Massiva,   a   grandson  of  Massinissa, 


THE  RULE  OF   TEE  RESTORATION.  247 

living  in  Rome,  was  induced  to  claim  the  throne  of  Nu- 
midia.  He  was  at  once  assassinated  by  Bomilcar,  one 
of  Jugurtha's  confidants.  This  new  outrage  caused  the 
senate  to  cancel  the  peace  and  dismiss  Jugurtha  from  the 
city,  at  the  beginning  of  110  B.C.  War  was  resumed 
under  the  command  of  the  consul  Spurius  Albinus  ;  but, 
owing  to  the  utterly  demoralized  state  of  the  African 
army,  and,  possibly,  to  the  gold  of  Jugurtha,  Albinus 
could  effect  nothing.  His  brother,  however,  rashly  con- 
ceived the  plan  of  storming  the  town  of  Suthul,  where 
Jugurtha  kept  his  treasures.  The  attack  failed,  and  the 
Roman  general  pursued  the  troops  of  Jugurtha,  who  pur- 
posely decoyed  him  into  the  desert.  In  a  night  attack 
the  Roman  army  v\as  utterly  routed,  and  the  terms  dic- 
tated by  Jugurtha  were  accepted,  109  B.C.,  which  involved 
the  passing  of  the  Romans  under  the  yoke,  the  evacuation 
of  Numidia,  and  the  renewal  of  the  cnncelled  peace. 

On  news  of  this  peace,  the  fury  of  the  popular  party, 
allied  for  the  time  with  the  mercantile  classes  at  Rome, 
swept  away  by  public  prosecutions  many  of  the  highest 
aristocrats.  But  the  chief  of  sinners,  Scaurus,  was  too 
powerful  and  too  prudent  to  be  attacked,  and  was  both 
elected  censor  and  cliosen  as  one  of  the  presidents  of  the 
extraoidinary  commission  of  treason,  instituted  to  try 
those  who  were  guilty  of  the  disgraceful  conduct  of  the 
African  war.  The  second  treaty  of  peace  was  cancelled, 
and  Quintus  Metellus,  an  aristocrat  inaccessible  to  bribes 
and  experienced  in  war,  had  the  conduct  of  the  campaign 
in  Africa.  Gaius  Marius  accompanied  him  as  one  of  his 
lieutenants. 

Metellus  speedily  reorganized  the  army  in  Africa,  and 
in  108  B.C.,  led  it  over  the  Numidian  frontier.  He  returned 
an  evasive  answer  to  Jugurtha's  proposals  for  peace,  and 
tried  to  end  the  war  by  having  Jugurtha  assassinated. 
The  latter  prepared  to  await  the  Romans  on  a  ridge  of 
hills,  which  intersected  a  plain  eighteen  miles  in  breadth 
extending  to  the  river  Muthul.  Despite  the  skilful 
dispositions  of  Jugurtha,  the  Roman  infantry  utterly 
scattered  the  Numidians,  and  Jugurtha  restricted  himself 
to  a  guerilla  warfare.  Numidia  was  occupied  by  Metellus, 
but  his  object  was  not  gained,  and  the  Roman  army  had 
to  retire  into  winter  quarters.     Proposals  of  peace  were 


248  HISTOBY  OF  ROME. 

made  and  almost  agreed  to,  had  it  not  been  for  the 
treachery  of  Bomilcar,  the  chief  adviser  of  Jugurtha,  who 
promised  to  deliver  up  his  king,  alive  or  dead,  into  the 
hands  of  the  Romans .  this  plot  and  others  were  dis- 
covered by  Jugurtha,  and  only  leave  a  stain  on  the  name 
of  Metellus.  The  capture  of  Jugurtha  was  all-important. 
Vaga,  one  of  the  Numidian  cities  occupied  by  the  Romans, 
revolted  early  in  107  B.C.,  and  put  to  death  the  whole 
Roman  .garrison ;  and,  although  Metellus  surprised  the 
town  and  gave  it  over  to  martial  law,  such  a  revolt 
sufficiently  indicated  the  difficulty  of  the  Roman  enter- 
prise. 

In  107  B.C.  the  war  in  the  desert  went  on,  but  Jugurtha 
nowhere  withstood  the  Romans  ;  now  here,  now  there,  he 
was  perpetually  appearing  and  then  vanishing  from  the 
scene.  Metellus  took  Thala,  a  city  situated  on  the  edge 
of  the  great  desert  and  only  to  be  reached  with  great 
difficulty,  where  Jugurtha  had  placed  his  treasures, 
children,  and  the  flower  of  his  troops.  But  Jugurtha 
escaped  with  his  chest,  and,  though  Numidia  was  virtually 
in  the  hands  of  the  Romans,  the  war  only  seemed  to 
extend  over  a  wider  area. 

Bocchus  seemed  again  disposed  to  aid  his  son-in-law. 
He  received  him  at  his  court,  and,  by  his  power  over 
Jugurtha's  person,  held  the  key  of  the  position.  Probably 
he  was  undecided  whether  to  play  the  traitor  or  side 
against  Rome,  but  his  ambiguous  position  had  its  advan- 
tages. 

Metellus  had  now  to  resign  the  command  to  his  lieu- 
tenant Marius.  The  Litter  had  gained  his  consulship,  in 
spite  of  the  sneers  of  Metellus  and  the  whole  aristo- 
cratic party,  by  appealing  to  the  credulity  of  the  Roman 
mob  and  by  misleading  them  with  the  most  unfair  and 
absurd  misrepresentations  of  the  conduct  by  Metellus  of 
the  African  war.  He  succeeded  Metellus  in  106  B.C.  In 
spite  of  his  boast  that  he  would  deliver  Jugurtha  bound 
hand  and  foot,  he  spemed  to  abandon  all  hope  of  his 
capture,  and  turned  his  attention  to  storming  towns  and 
strongholds.  Still  more  aimless  was  his  expedition  to  the 
river  Molochath,  by  which,  as  he  almost  entered  Maure- 
tanian  territory,  king  Bocchus  was  roused  to  give  active 
aid  to  his  son-in-law.     Indeed,  on  his  return   from  that 


THE  RULE  OF  TEE  RESTORATION.  249 

river,  Marius  found  his  army  surrounded  by  immense 
swarms  of  cavalry,  and,  had  it  not  been  for  the  skill  and 
bravery  of  Lucius  Sulla,  he  might  never  have  reached  his 
winter  quarters  at  Cirta  in  105  B.C.  Sulla  manifested  his 
bravery  and  adroitness  still  more  conspicuously  in  the 
negotiations  which  followed  between  Marius  and  Bocchus, 
and  at  last  induced  the  latter  to  make  his  choice  between 
the  Romans  and  his  son-in-law.  By  an  act  of  treachery 
the  traitor  fell,  and  Jugurtha  was  given  up  to  Sulla ;  and 
thus  the  war  which  had  lasted  for  seven  years  came  to  an 
end.  Jugurtha  was  brought  to  Rome  on  the  first  of 
January,  104  B.C.,  and  perished  in  the  old  tullianum  in  the 
Capitol,  which  the  Numidian  king  grimly  termed  the 
bath  of  ice. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  Marius  cuts  but  a  sorry 
figure,  when  contrasted  with  either  his  predecessor, 
Metellus,  or  his  still  more  brilliant  officer,  Sulla.  The 
fatal  consequences  produced  by  the  praise  lavished  on 
both  these  men  at  the  expense  of  Marius  bore  bitter  fruit 
in  succeeding  history. 

Contrary  to  the  usual  policy,  Numidia  was  not  converted 
into  a  province,  probably  because  a  standing  army  would 
have  been  necessary  to  protect  its  frontier.  The  most 
westerly  district  was  annexed,  and  the  kingdom  of 
Numidia  was  handed  over  to  the  last  surviving  grandson 
of  Massinissa,  a  man  feeble  alike  in  mind  and  body.  But 
politically  the  results  of  the  Jugurthine  war  were  more 
important.  It  had  made  clear  to  all,  not  only  the  utter 
baseness  and  venality  of  the  restored  senatorial  govern- 
ment, but  also  the  complete  nullity  of  the  opposition. 
"  It  was  not  possible  to  govern  worse  than  the  restoration 
governed  in  117-109  B.C.  ;  it  was  not  possible  to  be  more 
defenceless  and  forlorn  than  was  the  senate  in  109  B.C. : 
had  there  been  in  Rome  a  real  opposition,  that  is  to  say, 
a  party  which  wished  and  urged  a  fundamental  alteration 
of  the  constitution,  it  must  at  least  have  made  an  attempt 
to  overturn  the  restored  senate ;  but  no  such  attempt 
took  place."  The  so-cilled  popular  party,  as  such,  neither 
could  nor  would  govern,  and  the  only  two  possible  forms 
of  government  were  a  despotism  or  an  oligarchy.  The 
appearance  of  Marius  on  the  scene  indicated  clearly  the 
danger  which  threatened  the  oligarchy.     Probably  he  was 


2.^0  EISTOEY  OF  ROME. 

unaware  of  the  real  significance  of  his  action  when  he 
canvassed  the  people  for  the  supreme  command  in  Africa  ; 
but  there  was  evidently  an  end  of  the  restored  aristocratic 
government  when  the  comitia  began  to  make  generals,  or 
when  every  popular  officer  could  legally  nominate  himself 
as  general.  As  might  be  expected,  the  new  element 
introduced  into  politics  was  the  part  played  by  military 
men.  It  could  now  be  foreseen  that  the  new  despot  would 
not  be  a  stateman  like  O-^'is  Gracchus,  hut  a  soldier  like 
Gaius  Marius.  "  The  contemporary  reorganization  of  the 
military  system — which  Marius  introduced  when,  in  form- 
ing his  army  destined  for  Africa.,  he  disregarded  the 
property  qualification  and  allowed  even  the  poorest 
bm'gess  to  enter  the  legion  as  a  volunteer — may  have 
been  projected  by  its  author  on  purely  military  grounds; 
but  it  was  none  the  less  a  momentous  political  event,  that 
the  army  was  no  longer,  as  formerly,  composed  of  those 
who  had  much,  no  longer  even,  as  in  the  most  recent 
times,  composed  of  those  who  had  something,  to  lose,  but 
became  gradually  converted  into  a  host  of  people  who 
had  nothing  but  their  arms  and  what  the  general  bestowe  I 
on  them.  The  aristocracy  ruled  in  104-  B.C.  as  absolutely 
as  in  134  B.C.  ;  but  the  signs  of  the  impending  catastrophe 
had  multiplied,  and  on  the  political  horizon  the  sword  had 
besfnn  to  appear  by  the  side  of  the  crown." 

Let  us  now  for  a  while  turn  our  attention  outside 
Rome  and  its  political  crises,  and  consider  what  was 
taking  place  to  the  north  of  Italy.  Behind  the  mighty 
mountain  screen,  nations  were  moving  uneasily  to  and  fro, 
and  reminding  the  Graeco-Roman  world  that  it  was  not 
the  sole  possessor  of  the  earth.  In  the  country  between 
the  Alps  and  Pyrenees  Rome  found  her  chief  mainstay  in 
the  powerful  city  of  Massilia,  whose  mercantile  and 
political  connections  extended  in  all  directions.  Ligurian 
tribes  were  defeated  and  placed  under  tribute  by  the 
Massiliots  in  154  B.C. ;  and  again  a  tribe,  named  the  Salassi, 
was  conquered  by  Appius  Claudius  in  143  B.C.,  and  forced 
to  surrender  the  gold  mines  of  Victimulae.  But  Marcus 
Fulvius  Flaccus,  consul  in  125  B.C.,  was  the  first  to 
systematically  and  seriously  enter  on  a  career  of  Trans- 
alpine conquest.  At  that  time  the  Arverni,  under  their 
brilliant  and  almost  civilized  ruler,  Luerius,  had  reached 


THE  RULV  OF  THE  RESTORATION.  251 

a  high  state  of  military  power  and  wealth,  and  between 
them  and  the  Aedui  lay  the  hegemony  of  the  various 
Celtic  races.  At  first  Flaccus  subdued  minor  Celtic  tribes  ; 
and  then  the  Allobroges,  who  came  from  the  Isere  valley 
to  aid  these  tribes,  were  drawn  into  the  struggle  in  122  B.C. 
The  Arverni  at  the  outset,  under  Betuitus,  son  of  Luerius, 
remained  spectators  of  the  conflict,  but  at  last  sided  with 
the  Allobroges,  while  their  rivals,  the  Aedui,  embraced 
the  cause  of  Rome.  Near  the  confluence  of  the  Isere  with 
the  Rhone,  in  121  B.C.  the  Arvernian  king  was  utterly 
defeated  by  the  consul  Quintus  Fabius  Maximus  :  and  the 
Allobroges  at  once  submitted.  The  Arverni  once  more 
met  the  Roman  troops  under  Gnaeus  Domitius  Ahenobar- 
bus,  and  were  again  discomfited. 

The  result  of  these  wars  was  the  creation  of  the 
province  of  Narbo  between  the  Alps  and  the  Pyrenees, 
Narbo  being  the  seat  of  the  governor  of  this  province,  in 
which  several  Roman  settlements  were  formed  at  Aquae 
Sextiae  and  elsewhere.  The  policy  which  gave  rise  to 
this  new  field  for  colonization  was  checked  by  the  death 
of  Gaius  Gracchus,  but  the  mercantile  class  at  Rome 
proved  strong  enough  to  protect  the  colony  of  Narbo  from 
the  narrower  policy  of  the  restored  optimates. 

A  similar  problem  had  to  be  solved  in  the  north-east  of 
Italy,  but  there  Rome  contented  herself  with  taking  the 
strong  town  of  Delmium,  and  subduing  the  Dalmatians, 
in  155  B.C.  The  conversion  of  Macedonia  into  a  province 
in  146  B.C.,  and  the  acquisition  of  the  Thracian  Cherso- 
nese in  133  B.C.,  brought  Rome  into  close  relations  with 
the  various  tribes  of  the  north-east,  but  also  gave  her  the 
double  basis  of  the  Po  valley  and  the  province  of  Mace- 
donia, from  which  she  could  now  advance  in  earnest 
towards  the  Rhine  and  Danube.  Of  the  various  Celtic 
tribes  in  these  regions,  the  Helvetii,  who  occupied  both 
banks  of  the  Upper  Rhine,  were  the  most  powerful ;  near 
them  were  the  Boii,  settled  in  Bavaria  and  Bohemia.  To 
the  south-east  came  the  Taurisci,  next  to  whom  were  the 
Iapydes,  partly  Ulyrian,  partly  Celtic  ;  while  in  the  interior 
the  powerful  and  cruel  Celtic  tribe  of  the  Scordisci  roamed 
hither  and  thither,  leaving  a  path  marked  by  crime  and 
bloodshed. 

Although  Roman  expeditions  against  Alpine  tribes  were 


252  HISTORY  OF  RCfoE. 

frequent,  no  adequate  scheme  of  conquest  was  attempted, 
so  as  to  create  a  barrier  strong  enough  to  ward  off  the 
constant  inroads  of  barbarism.  Marcus  Aemilius  Scaurus 
was  the  first  to  cross  the  eastern  Alps,  in  115  B.C.,  and  to 
compel  the  Taurisci  to  a  friendly  alliance  with  Rome ;  the 
first  Roman,  general  to  reach  the  Danube  was  Marcus 
Livius  Drusus,  in  112  B.C.;  and,  two  years  later,  Marcus 
Minucius  utterly  defeated  the  Scordisci  and  reduced 
them  to  harmless  insignificance. 

But  these  victories  only  brought  upon  the  scene  a  still 
more  terrible  foe  in  the  Cimbri,  or  "  champions."  Whence 
this  people  really  came  and  the  causes  of  their  migration, 
are  matters  of  which  we  cannot  be  certain.  That  they 
were  in  the  main  of  German  race,  as  wore  their  brothers- 
in-arms  the  Teutones,  is  shown  (a)  by  the  existence  of 
two  small  tribes  of  the  same  name,  left  behind,  probably, 
in  their  primitive  seats — the  Cimbri  in  Denmark  and  the 
Teutones  in  the  north-east  of  Germany,  near  the  Baltic ; 
(b)  by  the  insertion  of  the  Cimbri  and  Teutones  in  the 
list  of  Germanic  peoples  among  the  Ingaevones,  by  the 
side  of  the  Chauci ;  (c)  by  the  judgment  of  Caesar,  who 
first  showed  the  difference  between  Celts  and  Germans, 
and  who  includes  the  Cimbri  among  the  Germans ;  (d)  by 
their  names  and  the  account  given  of  their  physical 
appearance  and  habits. 

No  doubt  a  number  of  Celts  joined  these  hordes,  and 
thus  men  of  Celtic  name  directed  their  armies,  and  the 
Celtic  tongue  was  spoken  among  them.  The  invasion  was 
not  one  of  mere  plunder,  but  that  of  a  whole  nation 
seeking  a  new  home,  with  their  wives  and  children  drawn 
along  in  wagons,  which  served  as  house  and  means  of 
locomotion.  Their  army  was  accompanied  by  priestesses 
— a  truly  Germanic  custom.  They  came  like  lightning, 
like  lightning  they  vanished ;  and  in  that  dull  age  no 
observer  traced  this  marvellous  meteor.  Thus  the  first 
Germanic  movement  that  came  in  contact  with  civiliza- 
tion passed  away  unnoticed  till  it  was  too  late  to  have 
any  accurate  knowledge  of  it.  Owing  to  Roman  at- 
tacks on  the  Danubian  Celts  the  Cimbri  broke  through 
the  barrier  which  had  prevented  their  advance,  and 
reached  the  passes  of  the  Carnian  Alps  in  113  B.C.,  where 
the  consul  Gnaeus  Papirius  Carbo  was  posted  to  meet 


TEE  RULE  OF  THE  RESTORATION.  253 

them,  not  far  from  Aquileia.  He  ordered  them  to  evacuate 
the  territory  of  the  Taurisci,  and  they  complied  and 
followed  his  guides  into  an  ambush.  But  the  betrayed 
utterly  worsted  tbe  betrayer,  and  then  they  turned  west- 
ward, and  reached  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  and  passed 
over  the  Jura.  There,  some  years  after  the  defeat  of 
Carbo,  they  again  threatened  Roman  territory.  In  109  B.C., 
Marcus  Junius  Silanus  appeared  with  an  army  in  southern 
Gaul,  and  replied  to  the  Cirabrian  request  for  land  to 
settle  in  by  an  attack ;  he  was  completely  defeated. 

The  Cimbri  now  occupied  themselves  with  subduing 
the  neighbouring  Celtic  cantons,  and  for  a  time  left  the 
Romans  unmolested.  But,  fired  by  the  example  of  the 
Cimbri,  the  Helvetii  rose,  under  their  leader  Divico,  and 
sought  new  and  more  fertile  settlements  in  western  Gaul. 
The  consul  Longinus  with  most  of  his  army  was  decoyed 
by  the  Helvetii  into  an  ambush,  and  fell  fighting,  in 
107  B.C.  Then  for  a  time  all  was  quiet,  but  in  105  B.C., 
under  their  king  Boiorix,  the  Cimbri  again  moved  on- 
wards, this  time  with  the  serious  purpose  of  invading  Italy. 

Their  first  assault  fell  on  IVlarcus  Aurelius  Scaurus, 
whose  corps  was  easily  overthrown.  Then,  owing  to  the 
foolish  discord  between  the  two  Roman  commanders, 
Gnaeus  Maximus  and  the  proconsul  Caepio,  and  through 
the  rash  haste  of  the  latter,  the  battle  of  Arausio  (OrangeJ, 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhone,  took  place.  Both  Roman 
armies  were  utterly  annihilated.  Such  a  calamity  materi- 
ally and  morally  far  surpassed  tbe  day  of  Cannae.  Allia 
and.  the  burning  of  Rome  recurred  to  men's  minds,  and 
every  Italian  capable  of  bearing  arms  was  bound  by  oath 
not  to  leave  Italy.  But,  happily  for  Rome,  tbe  Cimbri 
turned  upon  the  Arverni,  and  then  set  out  to  the  Pyrenees. 

As  after  the  African  defeats,  so  now,  the  storm  of 
popular  indignation  at  Rome  fell  upon  individuals,  not 
on  the  rotten  system  of  senatorial  government.  Quintus 
Caepio  barely  escaped  with  his  life.  Gaius  Marius  was 
now,  in  defiance  of  the  law,  nominated  as  consul,  and  given 
the  chief  commaud  not  merely  for  one  year,  but  was  rein- 
vested with  the  consulship  for  five  years  in  succession 
(104-100  B.C.).  The  traces  of  this  unconstitutional  step 
remained  vis.ble  for  all  time. 

Owing  to  the  disappearance  of  the  Cimbri  from  the 


254  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

stage,  Marias  had  time  to  reduce  revolted  tribes  and  to 
reassure  the  wavering.  At  last  the  wave  of  the  Cimbri, 
having  broken  itself  on  the  resistance  of  the  brave  Celt- 
iberians,  flowed  back  over  the  Pyrenees.  Near  Ron  en 
they  received  reinforcements  from  the  Helvetii,  and  were 
also  joined  by  their  kinsmen  the  Teutones.  Having 
failed  to  overcome  the  brave  Belgae,  they  now  resolved 
to  invade  Italy.  But  for  some  reason  they  broke  up 
again  into  two  hosts,  one  of  which,  the  Cimbri,  was  to 
recross  the  Rhine  and  invade  Italy  by  way  of  the  Rhaetian 
Alps,  while  the  other,  the  Teutones,  together  with  some 
of  the  bravest  Cimbrian  troops,  was  to  invade  Italy  by 
way  of  Roman  Gaul  and  the  western  passes  of  the  Alps. 

In  102  B.C.,  the  latter  host  attacked  the  camp  of  Marius 
at  the  confluence  of  the  Isere  and  Rhone,  for  three  days, 
but  in  vain  ;  they  then  marched  onward  to  Italy,  occupy- 
ing six  days  in  defiling  past  the  Roman  camp.  Marius 
followed  them  to  the  district  of  Aquae  Sextiae,  and  defeated 
the  rear-guard.  On  the  third  day  after  this  success, 
Marius  drew  up  his  army  on  a  hill ;  the  barbarians  rushed 
up  with  hot  impatience.  For  a  long  while  the  struggle 
was  terrible,  but,  owing  to  the  heat  of  the  sun  and  a  false 
alarm  raised  in  the  rear  by  Roman  camp-boys,  the  bar- 
barian ranks  broke  and  were  utterly  cut  to  pieces. 

The  Cimbri,  meanwhile,  owing  to  a  panic  which  seized 
the  army  of  the  consul  Quintus  Lutatius  Catulus,  had 
passed  the  Alps  and  reached  the  plain  between  the  Po 
and  the  Alps  in  the  summer  of  102  B.C.,  when  their 
brethren  were  annihilated  at  Aquae  Sextiae.  Fortunately 
for  Rome,  they  remained  in  the  rich  land  for  the  winter, 
and  thus  gave  the  Romans  time  to  prepare  for  the  coming 
struggle.  Marius,  having  refused  a  triumph  for  his  first 
victory,  returned  in  the  spring  and  crossed  the  Po  with 
his  army.  On  the  invitation  of  the  Cimbri  he  named  the 
Raudine  plain  as  the  place  for  battle.  There,  in  a  dense 
morning  mist,  the  Celtic  cavalry  of  the  barbarians  were 
driven  back  on  to  the  infantry  ;  and  thus  taken  by  surprise 
and  thrown  into  disorder,  the  whole  Cimbrian  host  fell  an 
easy  victim.  Thus  the  battle  of  Vercellae,  in  101  B.C., 
ended  the  dreaded  invasion  of  these  Germanic  peoples. 
Marius  was  justly  regarded  as  the  conqueror  of  the  Cimbri, 
although  Catulus,  a  polished  art-critic  and  member  of  the 


THE  RULE  OF  THE  RESTORATION.  255 

aristocracy,  had  overthrown  the  centre  of  the  Cimbrian 
hosts  and  captured  thirty-one  standards,  while  Marius  took 
bat  two.  Bat  the  victory  of  Vercellae  was  only  rendered 
possible  by  that  of  Aquae  Sextiae.  With  the  victories  of 
Marius  were  associated  hopes  of  the  overthrow  of  the 
detested  government.  Could  it  be  that  the  rough  farmer 
of  Arpinum  was  destined  to  be  the  avenger  of  Gracchus, 
and  to  continue  the  revolution  which  he  had  begun  ? 


AUTHORITIES. 

Narbo.—VeYl.  i.  15.     Eutrop.  4,  23.     Cic.  Brut.  43. 

Domain  land.— Appian  B.  C.  i.  27.     Sail.  Jug,  32,  33.     Marq.  Stv.  1. 

108,  sqq. 
Quint  us  Caepio.     Liv.  Epit.  70.     Tac.  Ann.  xii.  60. 
Titus  Vetti us.— Diod.  Sic.  Fr.  30. 
Cilician  fleet. — Liv.  Epit.  68. 
Slave  insurrections. — Liv.   Epit.  69.     Dio  Cass.  Fr.  93.     Diod.  Sic. 

36,  p.  536,  608.     Florus.  3,  19. 
Jugurthine  war. — Appian   Numid.     Dio  Cass.  Fr.  89.     Plut.  Marina, 

Sulla.     Liv.  Epit.  62,  64,  65,  66.     Sail.  Jug. 
Salassi. — Dio  Cass.  Fr.  74. 
Arverni. — Liv.  Epit.  61. 
Gallia  Narbonensis. — Liv.  Epit.  47,   60,  61.       Polyb.  xxxiii.  5,  7,  8. 

Strab.  185,  191.     Marq.  Stv.  i.  262. 
Delmium. — Liv.  Epit.  62.     Appian  Illyr.  5. 
Scordisci. — Liv.  Epit.  63,  65. 
Cimbri  and  Tent  ones.—  Liv.  Epit.  63-68.      Appian  Gall.  13  ;  Illyr.  4. 

Plut.  Marius  and  Seitorius.     Dio  Casa.  Fr.  90,  91,  94. 


255  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAPTER   XXII. 

MARIUS    AS   REVOLUTIONIST,    DRUSCS   AS   REFORMER. 

Harius — His  army  reform  and  its  significance — His  political  position 
and  alliance  with  Glaucia  and  Saturninus — The  Appuleian  laws — 
Rupture  between  Marius  and  his  colleagues — Overthrow  of 
Saturninus  and  his  party — Action  of  the  equestrian  jury-courta 
— Reform  proposals  ot  Livius  Drusus — His  murder. 

Such  were  the  fears  and  hopes  that  moved  the  people  in 
the  capital  on  the  nevvs  of  the  final  overthrow  of  the 
Germanic  invaders.  These  hopes  were  raised  afresh  when 
the  saviour  of  Rome  himself  returned,  late  in  101  B.C.,  by 
far  the  first  man  in  Rome,  atid  yet  a  mere  tyro  in  politics. 
Born  in  155  B.C.,  Gaius  Marius  had,  as  a  poor  day-labourer's 
son,  schooled  his  frame  to  bear  hunger  and  thirst,  cold 
and  heat.  His  early  training  had  fitted  him  to  rise  rapidly 
from  the  ranks  and  to  gain  distinction,  first  as  a  mere 
soldier,  and  then  as  governor  of  Further  Spain.  His  sub- 
sequent military  career  in  Africa  and  Gaul  has  been 
already  described.  Success  in  speculation  had  given  him 
wealth,  and  a  union  with  one  of  the  ancient  Julian  gens 
had  given  him  powerful  connections.  But  he  never  rid 
himself  of  the  taint  of  his  plebeian  origin.  No  one  was 
ever  so  popular  with  the  masses,  either  before  or  after, 
both  on  account  of  his  thorough  honesty  and  disinterested- 
ness, and  of  his  boorish  uncouthness. 

The  time  had  now  come  to  test  the  power  of  the  rustic 
soldier  to  realize  the  expectations  of  the  people,  and  to 
justify  the  extraragmt  joy  manifested  at  his  return. 
The  newly  organized  army  might  prove  a  formidable 
weapon  in  his  hand,  though  the  day  was  hardly  yet  come 


MAEIUS  AS  REVOLUTIONIST.  257 

for  the  sword  to  achieve  what  it  afterwards  did  in  the 
world  of  politics.  His  military  revolution  was  as  fol- 
lows. Before  his  time  the  old  Servian  constitution  had 
undergone  considerable  relaxation  ;  and  the  minimum 
census,  which  bound  a  man  to  serve  in  the  army,  had  been 
lowered  from  eleven  thousand  to  four  thousand  asses 
(from  £43  to  £17).  The  cavalry  was  still  drawn  from  the 
wealthiest  and  the  light-armed  troops  from  the  poorest 
citizens,  but  the  arrangement  of  the  infantry  of  the  line 
was  no  longer  determined  by  property,  but  by  duration  of 
service  in  the  three  divisions  of  hastati,  principes,  and 
triarii.  Moreover,  the  Italian  allies  had  long  taken  part  in 
the  military  service.  Still,  the  primitive  organization  was 
in  the  main  the  basis  of  the  Roman  military  system,  and 
it  was  no  longer  suited  to  the  altered  circumstances  of  the 
state.  The  better  classes  held  aloof  more  and  more  from 
service,  and  the  middle  class  of  both  Romans  and  Italians 
was  fast  disappearing ;  while  the  allies  and  subjects  out- 
side Italy,  as  well  as  the  Italian  proletariate,  were  available 
to  fill  up  the  gaps  thus  caused.  The  cavalry  formed  of 
the  wealthiest  burgesses  had  acted  as  a  guard  of  honour 
in  the  Jugurthine  war,  and  thenceforth  it  ceases  to  appear. 
In  ordinary  circumstances  it  was  a  very  difficult  task  to 
fill  up  the  legions  with  properly  qualified  persons  ;  in 
times  of  emergency,  as  after  the  battle  of  Arausio,  it  was 
impossible.  Already  the  cavalry,  as  a  rule,  came  from 
Thrace  and  Africa,  while  the  light  Ligurian  infantry 
and  Balearic  slingers  were  employed  in  daily  increasing 
numbers.  Moreover,  owing  to  the  dearth  of  properly 
qualified  citizens,  non-qnalified  and  poorer  men  pressed 
into  the  service,  nor  could  it  be  hard  to  find  plenty  of 
volunteers  for  so  lucrative  a  profession.  Thus  it  was  a 
necessary  result  of  the  social  and  political  changes  that 
the  old  system  of  the  burgess  levy  should  give  place  to 
that  of  contingents  and  enlisting,  that  the  cavalry  and 
light  troops  should  mainly  consist  of  subject  contingents, 
and  that  every  free-born  citizen  should  be  admitted  to 
the  line  service,  as  was,  in  fact,  first  allowed  by  Marius  in 
107  B.C. 

Marius  also  abolished  all  the  old  aristocratic  distinctions, 
whether  of  definite  rank  and  place  or  of  standards  and 
equipments,  which  had  hitherto  obtained  among  the  four 

17 


258  DISTORT  OF  ROME. 

divisions  of  the  army.  All  were  uiiif^mjv^iiaiiied,  under 
the  new  method  of  drill  devfsed  Tly  PuBlms  Rufus,  consul 

in    105    B.C.,  and    hnrrnupd     f '•«""•"    flip    gln.rlia+ojMgl    gnTinnla  • 

and  thus  the  infantry  of  the  line  were  reduced  to  a 
common  level.  The  thirty  maniples,  or  companies,  of  the 
legion  were  now  replaced  by  ten  cohorts,  each  cohort 
having  its  own  standard  and  being  formed  of  six  or  five 
sections  of  one  hundred  men  apiece.  The  light  infantry 
were  suppressed,  but  the  numbers  of  the  legion  were  raised 
from  4200  to  6000  men.  Although  the  custom  of  fighting 
in  three  divisions  was  retained,  yet  the  general  could 
distribute  his  cohorts  in  the  three  lines  as  he  thought 
fit.  The  old  four  standards  of  the  wolf,  the  ox  with  a 
man's  head,  the  horse,  the  boar,  gave  place  to  the  new 
standard  of  the  silver  eagle,  given  by  Marius  to  the  legion 
as  a  whole.  Thus  all  the  old  civic  and  aristocratic  dis- 
tinctions were  abolished,  and  all  future  distinctions  were 
purely  military.  The  praetorian  cohort,  or  body-guard 
of  the  general,  owed  its  existence  to  a  pure  accident. 
In  the  Nnmantine  war  Scipio  Aemilianus  had  been 
obliged,  owing  to  the  insufficiency  and  unruly  nature  of 
the  soldiers  with  which  he  was  supplied,  to  form  out  of 
volunteers  a  band  of  five  hundred  men,  into  which  he 
afterwards  admitted  his  ablest  soldiers.  This  cohort  had 
the  duty  of  serving  at  the  praetorium,  or  headquarters, 
and  was  exempt  from  encamping  and  entrenching  service, 
and  enjoyed  higher  pay  and  greater  prestige. 

This  revolution  in  the  military  system  probably  saved 
the  state,  in  a  military  point  of  view,  from  destruction, 
but  it  involved  a  complete  political  revolution,  the  effects 
of  which  time  could  alone  develop.  "  The  republican  con- 
stitution was  essentially  based  on  the  view  that  the  citizen 
was  also  a  soldier,  and  that  the  soldier  was,  above  all,  a 
citizen;  it  .was  at  an  end,  so  soon  as  a. soldier  class  was 
formed."  Under  the  new  system  of  drill,  the  military  ser- 
vice-became gradually  a  profession.  The  admission,  though 
at  first  restricted,  of  the  proletariate  to  the  service  speedily 
took  effect,  the  more  so  as  the  general  had  a  right  to 
reward  the  successful  soldier  and  give  him  a  share  in  the 
spoil.  To  the  burgess  in  old  times  the  service  had  always 
been  a  burden  and  duty,  but  little  alleviated  by  the  rewards 
it  might  give  him.     To  the  proletarian  this  was  far  from 


MARIUS  AS  REVOLUTIONIST.  259 

the  case.  All  his  hopes,  both  of  pay,  rewards,  and  citizen- 
ship lay  in  his  success  in  war  and  in  his  general ;  thus  the 
camp  became  his  only  home  and  hope.  Marios  defended 
his  action  in  giving  Roman  citizenship  to  two  Italian  cohorts 
on  the  Raudine  plain,  by  saying  that  amid  the  din  of  battle 
he  could  not  distinguish  the  voice  of  the  laws.  So,  if  once 
the  interests  of  the  general  and  army  concurred  in  pro- 
ducing unconstitutional  demands,  it  was  unlikely  that  any 
law  would  be  of  much  avail  amid  the  clashing  cf  arms. 

"  They  had  now  the  standing  army,  the  soldier  class,  the 
body-guard  :  as  in  the  civil  constitution,  so  also  in  the 
military,  all  the  pillars  of  the  future  monarchy  were  already 
in  existence  ;  the  monarch  alone  was  wanting.  When  the 
twelve  eagles  circled  round  the  Palatine  hill,  they  ushered 
in  the  kings  ;  the  new  eagle  which  Gaius  Marias  bestowed 
on  the  legions  proclaimed  the  advent  of  the  emperors." 

Marios,  in  the  eyes  of  the  populace,  who  still  mourned 
the  death  of  Gaius  Gracchus,  was  the  one  man  capable  alike 
from  his  military  and.  political  position  of  averting  the  ruin 
of  the  state,  and  of  substituting  in  the  place  of  the  effete 
oligarchy  a  new  and  vigorous  administration.  It  remains 
for  us  to  see  how  he  realized  the  expectations  so  confidently 
formed  of  him.  Two  methods  of  operation  were  apparently 
open  to  him  :  one,  to  overthrow  the  oligarchy  by  means  of 
the  army  ;  the  other,  to  follow  the  example  of  Gracchus 
and  effect  his  object  in  a  constitutional  manner.  The  first 
plan,  perhaps,  he  never  entertained,  relying,  maybe,  on  his 
immense  popularity  and  on  the  support  of  his  discharged 
soldiers,  but  still  more  on  the  weakness  of  his  opponents, 
whose  downfall  he  probably  thought  could  be  more  easily 
compassed  than  proved  to  be  the  case.  Moreover,  the 
army  was  still  in  a  state  of  transition,  and  as  yet  ill  adapted 
for  effecting  a  coup  d'etat,  and  at  the  beginning  of  this 
crisis  the  use  of  such  an  instrument  might  well  have  re- 
coiled upon  the  user.  Having  therefore  discharged  his 
army,  Marios  depended  for  further  action  upon  the  leaders 
of  the  popular  party,  which  now  once  more  sprang  into 
active  existence.  This  party  had  much  deteriorated  during 
the  interval  between  Gaius  Gracchus  and  Marios  ;  much 
of  the  enthusiasm,  faith,  and  purity  of  aim  had  been  rubbed 
off  in  the  years  of  confusion  and  turmoil  ;  and  the  popular 
leaders  were,  for  the  most  part,  either  political  novices,  or 


260  HISTORY  OF  ROME- 

men  who  had  nothing-  to  lose  in  respect  of  property,  in- 
fluence,  or  even  honour,  and  who,  from  personal  motives 
of  malice  or  a  wish  to  attract  notice,  busied  themselves 
with  inflicting-  annoyance  and  damage  on  the  government. 
To  the  first  class  belonged  Gaius  Memmius  and  the  noted 
orator,  Lucius  Crassus  ;  to  the  second,  and  these  were  the 
most  notable  leaders,  belonged  Gaius  Glaucia,  the  Roman 
Hyperbolus,  as  Cicero  called  him,  and  his  better  and  abler 
colleague,  Lucius  Appuleiua  Saturniuus.  The  latter, 
owing  to  a  personal  slight  at  the  senate's  hands,  had 
joined  the  ranks  of  the  opposition.  As  tribune  of  the 
people  in  103  B.C.  he  excited  popular  indignation  by  his 
public  speeches  touching  the  briberies  practised  in  Rome 
by  the  envoys  of  Mithradates,  and  also  by  his  invectives 
against  Quintus  Metellus,  when  he  was  a  candidate  for 
the  censorship  in  102  B  c.  Moreover,  he  had  canned  the 
election  of  Marius  as  consul  for  102  B.C.  in  the  teeth  of 
a  fierce  opposition.  His  violence  and  nnscrupulousness 
marred  his  very  considerable  powers  both  as  a  politician 
and  orator,  but  he  was  the  most  prominent  and  dreaded 
enemy  of  the  senate.  He  and  Glaucia  now  entered  into 
partnership  with  Marius,  and  it  was  agreed  that  the 
latter  should  become  a  candidate  for  his  sixth  consulship, 
Satnrninus  for  a  second  tribunate,  and  Glaucia  for  the 
praetorship,  for  the  year  100  B.C.,  in  order  to  carry  out 
the  intended  revolution. 

Despite  all  the  opposition  of  the  senate,  they  sncceeded 
in  effecting  their  object — partly  by  craft,  partly  by  violence. 
The  laws  of  Saturninus,  known  as  the  Appuleian,  revived 
the  chief  objects  of  Gaius  Gracchus.  Marius  was  called 
upon  to  conduct  the  assignations  of  land  which  had  been 
promised  his  soldiers,  firstly  in  Africa,  and  then  in  all 
provincial  land,  and  even  in  that  beyond  the  Alps,  which 
was  still  occupied  by  independent  Celtic  tribes.  As  the 
Italian  allies  were  to  receive  these  assignations  together 
with  Roman  burgesses,  this  was  practically  a  first  step  to 
placing  them  on  an  equality  with  Romans  ;  and  thus  not 
only  the  extensive  schemes  of  transalpine  and  transmarine 
colonization,  as  sketched  by  Gaius  Gracchus,  were  revived, 
but  also  his  project  of  gradually  giving  first  the  Italians 
and  then  all  Roman  subjects  the  same  political  privileges. 
For    this   work  of    land    distribution    it    was,    doubtless, 


MARIUS  AS  REVOLUTIONIST.  261 

necessary  that  Marius  should  have  his  consulship  annually 
renewed,  and  thus  practically  he  king  of  Rome.  The  main 
difference  between  his  case  and  that  of  Gracchus  was  that 
he  occupied  a  military  as  well  as  civil  position.  Following 
the  example  of  Gracchus,  Marius  and  his  confederates 
made  advances  to  the  equites  and  the  proletariate.  They 
extended  the  powers  of  the  former  as  jurymen,  and  gave 
them  greater  control  over  the  extortions  of  provincial 
magistrates,  while  to  the  latter  they  now  sold  grain  at 
the  merely  nominal  price  of  five-sixths  of  an  as,  instead 
of  six  asses  and  a  half,  per  modius.  Still  their  real  power 
lay  in  the  discharged  Marian  soldiers,  and  this  fact  lent  a 
strong  military  colour  to  their  attempt  at  a  revolution. 

In  spite  of  the  vehement  opposition  of  the  aristocrats, 
by  means  of  the  tribunician  veto,  the  invocation  of  portents, 
and  the  armed  interference  of  the  urban  quaestor  Quintus 
Caepio,  the  Appuleian  laws  were  ratified.  This  was  partly 
due  to  the  firmness  of  Saturninus,  and  still  more  to  the 
appearance  of  the  dreaded  soldiers  of  Marius.  Quiutus 
Metellus,  rather  than  take  the  oath  which  bound  every 
senator  to  observe  the  new  laws,  went  into  exile,  but  that 
was  only  a  gain  to  his  opponents.  Wl  en,  however,  the 
plans  came  to  be  executed,  it  was  soon  clear  that  a  politi- 
cally incapable  general,  and  a  violent  street  demagogue 
could  not  long  be  allies.  In  the  first  place,  Marius,  from 
his  utter  incapacity  as  a  statesman,  was  unable  either  to 
keep  his  own  party  in  check  or  to  gain  over  his  opponents. 
The  wealthy  classes  had  no  liking  for  Saturninus  and  his 
street-riots  ;  nay,  the  equites  had  skirmishes  with  his  aimed 
bands,  and  he  was  only  with  difficulty  elected  tribune  in 
100  B.C.  Thus  this  powerful  body  began  to  side  with  the 
aristocracy,  when  they  saw  that  Marius  was  practically  the 
tool  of  his  more  violent  associates. 

But  the  attitude  of  Marius  not  only  alienated  those  who 
should  have  been  his  most  powerful  supporters,  but,  what 
was  more  important,  caused  Saturninus  and  Glaucia  to 
lose  all  trust  in  him.  His  refusal  to  go  the  lengths  that 
they  went,  his  negotiations  with  his  own  party  and  the 
senate  at  one  and  the  same  time,  his  reservation  when  he 
swore  as  a  senator  to  observe  the  Appuleian  laws,  "so  far 
as  they  were  really  valid,"  soon  caused  a  total  rupture 
between   himself  and  the  most  violent  democrats.     But 


262  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Satur£irui$  and  Glauciajhad  gone  too  far  to  recede;  they 
now  reSoWed  to  grasp  the  sovereignty  for  themselves. 
They  arranged  that  the  former  should  again  seek  the 
tribuneship,  the  latter  the  consulship,  for  which  he  was 
not  legally  eligible  till  two  years  had  elapsed.  For  the 
latter  office  Gaius  Memmius  was  the  government  candidate ; 
he  was  suddenly  murdered.  Hereupon  the  senate  called 
upon  the  consul  Marius  to  interfere  :  he  complied,  and  a 
hasty  levy  of  young  men  was  drawn  up  in  array,  while 
the  senators  appeared  armed  in  the  Forum,  led  by  Marcus 
Scaurus.  The  democrats  saw  their  danger,  and  set  free 
all  the  slaves  in  prison;  on  the  10th  of-DeeembeivlOO 
B.C.,  a  great  battle  took  place  in  the  market-place,  the  first 
ever  fought  within  the  walls  of  the  capital.  It  ended  in 
the  utter  overthrow  of  the  popular  party.  Saturninus 
was  stoned  to  death  with  a  number  of  other  prisoners, 
who  were  shut  up  in  the  senate-house.  Glaucia  was 
likewise  put  to  death  ;  and  thus,  without  sentence  or  trial, 
perished  on  one  day  four  Roman  magistrates,  a  praetor, 
quaestor,  and  two  tribunes,  together  with  a  number  of 
other  notable  men,  in  some  cases  of  good  family.  The 
victory  of  the  government  was  complete.  Not  only  were 
its  noisest  opponents  dead,  but  the  one  man  who  might 
have  proved  really  dangerous  had  publicly  and  completely 
effaced  himself ;  and,  what  was  perhaps  still  more  im- 
portant, the  two  chief  elements  of  the  opposition — the 
capitalists  and  the  proletariate  —  emerged  from  the 
struggle  bitter  enemies. 

Thus  the  force  of  circumstances,  and,  still  more,  the 
incapacity  of  Marius,  had  completely  destroyed  the  fabric 
reared  by  Gaius  Gracchus.  Pitiful,  indeed,  was  the 
position  of  the  great  general ;  he  retired  to  the  East  so  as 
not  to  witness  the  return  of  his  rival  Metellus.  When  he 
came  back  to  Rome  his  counsel  was  not  sought,  and  the 
continuance  of  profound  peace  rendered  vain  his  hopes 
that  the  time  would  come  when  his  strong  arm  would  be 
needed.  But  his  superstitious  soul  ever  kept  in  mind 
the  oracular  promise  of  seven  consulships,  and,  though  in 
the  eyes  of  all  insignificant  and  harmless,  he  brooded  over 
his  schemes  of  vengeance,  and  in  moody  sullenness  bided 
his  time.  In  addition  to  this,  the  current  of  popular 
feeling  now  set  in  strongly  against  the  remnants  of  the 


MAUI  US  AS   REVOLUTIONIST.  263 

party  left  behind  by  Safurninus.  The  tribunals  of  the 
equites  condemned  with  the  utmost  severity  every  one 
who  professed  the  views  of  the  Populares ;  nay,  they  even 
assailed  men  on  the  ground  of  injuries  years  old  against 
toe  aristocrats.  Moreover,  abroad  the  Roman  arms  were 
everywhere  successful.  In  Spain,  a  serious  rising  of  the 
Lusitanians  and  Celtiberians  was  quelled  by  the  consuls, 
Titus  Didius  and  Publius  Crassus,  in  the  years  98-93  B.C. 
In  the  East,  too,  much  greater  energy  was  displayed  than 
had  been  shown  for  many  years.  At  home  the  government 
was  more  popular  and  secure  thaa  it  had  ever  been  since 
the  restoration.  The  l:tws  of  Saturninus  were,  of  course, 
cancelled,  aud  the  transmarine  colonies  of  Marius  dwindled 
down  to  a  small  settlement  in  Corsica.  When  the  tribune 
Sextos  Titius  reintroduced  and  carried  the  Appuleian 
agrarian  law  in  99  B.C.,  the  senate  annulled  it  on  religious 
grounds,  and  the  equites  punished  Titius  for  bringing  it 
forward . 

In  98  B.C.,  the  two  consuls  passed  a  law  which  made  an 
interval  of  seven  days  between  the  introduction  and  passing 
of  a  bill  obligatory,  and  forbade  the  combination  in  a  single 
proposal  of  several  enactments  differing  in  their  nature. 
Thus  the  government  was  protected  from  being  taken  by 
surprise  by  new  laws,  and  some  restriction  was  placed  on 
the  initiative  power  in  legislation. 

It  was  clear  that  the  Gracchan  constitution,  which  had 
rested  on  the  union  of  the  multitude  and  the  moneyed 
aristocracy,  was  on  the  eve  of  perishing,  and  that  the  hour 
had  come  to  re-establish  the  governing  oligarchy  in  undis- 
puted possession  of  political  power.  All  depended  on  the 
recoverv  by  the  senate  of  the  nomination  of  jurymen  ;  for 
of  late  the  governors  of  provinces  had  administered  them, 
not  for  the  senate,  but  for  the  order  of  capitalists  and 
merchants.  But  the  latter  fiercely  resisted  all  attempts  to 
wrest  their  power  from  them  ;  and  even  Quir.tus  Mucius 
Scaevola,  one  of  the  most  eminent  jurists  and  most  noble- 
minded  men  of  the  time,  was  rewarded  for  his  stern 
repression  of  all  crime,  and  for  his  scrupulous  justice  in 
administering  the  province  of  Asia.,  by  seeing  his  legate, 
Publius  Rufus,  brought  to  trial  before  the  equites  on  the 
most  absurd  charge  of  maladministration.  Rufus  refused 
to  submit  to  the  moneyed  lords,  and  was  condemned  and 


264  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

had  his  property  confiscated.  He  retired  to  the  province 
which  he  was  accused  of  plundering,  and  was  there 
welcomed  with  every  honour  by  all  men,  and  there  spent 
the  rest  of  his  life.  Soon  after,  Marcus  Scaurus,  seventy 
years  of  age,  and  for  twenty  years  the  chief  of  the  senate, 
was  tried  for  unjust  extortions  ;  and  it  was  evident  tbat 
neither  nobility  of  descent,  blamelessness  of  life,  nor  age 
itself  were  any  screen  against  the  wildest  charges  preferred 
by  men  who  made  a  regular  profession  of  reckless  accusa- 
tion. The  very  commission  touching  exactions,  became  the 
scourge  instead  of  the  shield  of  the  provincials ;  the  vilest 
scoundrel,  provided  that  he  satisfied  the  claims  of  his 
fellow-robbers,  went  unpunished  ;  while  those  who  trusted 
to  their  innocence,  and  attempted  to  do  their  duty  by  the 
provinces  they  governed,  were  found  guilty  by  the  juries 
whom  they  neglected  to  bribe. 

Marcus  Livius  Drusus,  tribujifi_iifc-2J^£.C.,  son  of  the 
overtBrower  ot  Gtartns  GraccEusV  a  conservative  of  the  con- 
servatives, the  proudest  and  noblest  of  the  aristocrats, 
vehemently  earnest,  pure  of  life,  and  an  object  of  respect 
to  the  humblest  citizen,  felt  that  the  time  had  come  to 
attack  the  equestrian  jury-courts.  He  was  aided  by 
Marcus  Scaurus  and  Lucius  Crassus,  the  famous  orator; 
but*agaTrTsrhim  were  not  only  the  consul  Lucius  Philippus 
and  the  reckless  Quintus^  Caepio,  but  also  thelnore  corrupt 
and  cowardly  mass  of  the  aristocracy,  who,  sooner  than 
lose  all  chance  of  plunder,  were  quite  content  to  share  the 
spoils  of  the  provinces  with  the  equites.  Drusus  proposed 
to  take  away  the  functions  of  jurymen  from  the  equestrian 
order,  and  to  restore  them  to  the  senate,  and  to  add  three 
hundred  new  members  to  the  senate,  in  order  to  enable  it 
to  meet  its  increased  obligations.  Moreover,  a  special 
criminal  commission  was  to  be  appointed  to  try  all  jury- 
men who  had  been  or  should  be  guilty  of  taking  bribes. 
But  he  also  had  a  wide  and  well-considered  scheme  of 
reform.  He  proposed  (l}_to_incx£ase  the  largesses  of  corn 
and  to  cover  the  increased  expense  by  the  permanent  issue 
of  copper-plated. by  thejhie^f_Jh^silve7^enarii ;  (2)  to 
reserve  all  the  still  undistributed  arable  land  of  Italy,  and 
the  best  part.pf  Sicily,  for  the  settlement  of  burgess 
colonists  ;  (3)  lastly,  he  bound  himself  to  give  the  Italian 
allies  the  Roman  franchise. 


DRUSUS  AS  REFORMER.  265 

There  is  a  marked  similarity  of  means  and  aims  in  the 
cases  of  Drusns  and  Gains  Gracchus  ;  both  relied  on  the 
proletariate,  and  both  had  practically  the  same  measures 
of  reform  in  view.  The  great  difference  was  as  to  who 
should  be  the  governing  power  in  the  state  ;  in  all  other 
points  the  best  men  of  both  political  parties  had  much  in 
common,  widely  different  as  often  were  the  processes  of 
reasoning  by  which  they  arrived  at  such  views. 

In  order  to  carry  his  laws,  Drusus  wisely  kept  in  the 
background  his  proposal  touching  the  Italian  franchise, 
and  embodied  all  his  other  measures  in  one  law  ;  thus  he 
caused  those  interested  in  largesses  of  corn  and  distribu- 
tions of  land  to  also  carry  the  proposal  touching  the 
transference  of  the  jury-courts.  He  was  stoutly  opposed, 
especially  by  the  consul  Philippus,  whom  he  caused  to  be 
imprisoned.  Though  the  Livian  laws  were  carried,  the 
consul  summoned  the  senate  to  reject  them.  On  its 
refusal,  Philippus  declared  he  would  seek  another  state 
council,  and  seemed  to  meditate  a  coup  d'etat.  Many  of 
the  senate  now  began  to  waver,  and  their  fears  were  still 
further  aroused  by  the  sudden  death  of  Lucius  Crassus  in 
September,  91  B.C.  Gradually  the  connections  of  Drusus 
with  the  Italians  became  known,  and  a  furious  cry  of  high 
treason  was  raised.  The  opposition  grew  more  powerful, 
and  the  senate  at  last  issued  a  decree  cancelling  the  Livian 
laws  on  the  ground  of  informality.  Drusus  refused  to 
interpose  his  veto,  and  thus  the  senate  once  more  became 
subject  to  the  yoke  of  the  capitalists. 

Shortly  after,  Drusus  perished  by  the  hand  of  an  assassin, 
who  escaped  undetected ;  nor  was  the  crime  investigated. 
Thus  the  same  end  which  swept  away  the  democratic 
reformers  was  the  fate  of  the  Gracchus  of  the  aristocracy. 
The  weakness  of  the  aristocracy  frustrated  reform,  even 
when  the  attempt  came  from  their  own  ranks. 

"  Drusus  had  staked  his  strength  and  his  life  in  the 
attempt  to  overthrow  the  dominion  of  the  merchants,  to 
organize  emigration,  to  avert  the  impending  civil  war  ;  he 
himself  saw  the  merchants  ruling  more  absolutely  than 
ever,  found  all  his  ideas  of  reform  frustrated,  and  died  with 
the  consciousness  that  his  sudden  death  would  be  the 
signal  for  the  most  fearful  civil  war  that  ever  desolated 
the  fair  land  of  Italy." 


263  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 


AUTHORITIES. 

Marius's  reforms. — Sail.  Jug.  86.    Pint.  Mar.  9.    Appian  B.  C.  v.  17. 

Val.  Max.  2,  3.     Plin.  N.  H.  x.  4.     Marq.  Stv.  ii.  354,  430-442. 
Political  alliances.— Liv.  Epit.  69.      App.  B.  C.  i.  28-36.      Cic.  pro 

Balb.  21. 
Appuleian  laics. — Cic.  de  Orat.  ii.  25,  27,  39 ;  pro  Sest.  16,  47  ;  Brut. 

85.     Marq.  Stv.  i.  110. 
Titian  law.— Cic.  de  Legg.  2,  6,  12. 
Equestrian  jury-courts. — Liv.  Epit.  70.      Veil.  ii.  13. 
Drusus. — Appian  B.  C.  i.  35.     Cic.  de  Orat.  i.  25;  de  Domo,  50;  pro 

Domo,  16.     Liv.  Epit.  71.     Diod.  Sic.  xxxvii.  10. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

THE   SOCIAL  OR  MARSIC   WAR,  AND   THE    SDLPICIAN  REVOLUTION. 

91  B.C.  Death  of  Drusus. — 90  B.C.  First  year  of  the  war — Lex  Julia 
and  Lex  Plautia  Papina. — 89  B.C.  Second  year  of  the  war — Latin 
rights  conferred  on  the  Transpadani. — 88  B.C.  Outbreak  of  the 
Mithridatic  war — The  Sulpician  laws — Occupation  of  Eome  by 
Sulla. — 87  B.C.  Departure  of  Sulla  for  the  East. 

Just  as  the  failure  of  the  previous  attempt  of  Flaccus, 
in  125  B.C.,  to  confer  the  citizenship  on  the  Italians  was 
followed  by  the  revolt  of  Fregellae,  so  the  despair  of  the 
subjects  of  Rome  after  the  death  of  Drusus  broke  forth  in 
a  revolt  of  all  Italy. 

The  Italian  allies  had  two  inducements  to  revolt ;  they 
wished  to  obtain  the  enjoyment  of  certain  privileges;  they 
wished  also  to  free  themselves  from  many  disabilities  and 
wrongs.  The  voting  power  was  perhaps  the  chief,  but  by 
no  means  the  only  privilege  which  they  sought.  There 
were  others,  such  as  immunity  from  taxation  and  flogging. 
On  the  other  hand,  they  were  subject  to  vexation  and 
oppression  in  many  forms  from  which  Roman  citizens 
were  exempt.  The  rigour  of  martial  law,  largely  modified 
for  the  burgess  soldiers,  remained  unsoftened  for  them. 
Italian  officers  of  any  rank  might  be  condemned  and 
executed  by  sentence  of  court-martial,  while  the  meanest 
burgess-soldier  could  appeal  to  the  civil  courts  at  Rome. 
The  contingent  furnished  by  the  allies  to  the  army  was 
disproportionate  to  their  number,  and  the  disproportion 
was  increasing.  In  civil  matters  the  general  super- 
intendence of  the  Roman  government  over  the  dependent 


268  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

communities  was  extended  till  the  allies  were  at  the  mercy 
of  the  caprice  of  any  Roman  magistrate.  At  Teanum 
Sidicinum,  the  chief  magistrate  had  been  scourged  by 
order  of  the  Roman  consul  for  supposed  remissness  in 
gratifying  a  whim  of  the  consul's  wife.  In  the  Latin 
colony  of  Venusia  a  free  peasant  was  whipped  to  death 
for  a  laugh  at  the  passing  litter  of  a  young  Roman 
holding  no  office.  Incidents  like  these  must  have  been 
frequent ;  and  all  non-citizens,  from  Latins  downwards, 
became  united  by  the  bond  of  a  common  oppression.  Since 
the  completion  of  the  Roman  conquests  the  Roman  citi- 
zenship had  become  the  one  thing  worth  having;  it  alone 
could  give  protection  from  tyranny  and  a  status  in  the 
world ;  for  the  Roman  empire  by  this  time  embraced  all 
civilization,  and  to  be  outside  the  Roman  state  was  to 
be  outside  the  world. 

The  privilege  was  thus  more  valuable  than  it  had  ever 
been  before ;  but  it  was  also  becoming  more  and  more 
difficult  to  acquire.  The  tendency  of  the  body  of  Roman 
citizens  was  to  close  their  ranks.  The  practice  of  bestow- 
ing the  franchise  on  whole  communities  had  ceased  ;  the 
right  of  individuals  to  acquire  it  by  residence  at  Rome  was 
curtailed  ;  and  in  126  B.C.  all  non-burgesses  were  expelled 
from  the  city  by  decree  of  the  senate. 

It  might  have  been  thought  that  the  senate  and  the 
conservative  party  objected,  not  to  the  demands  of  the 
Italians,  but  to  the  revolutionary  schemes  of  those  by 
whom  these  demands  were  supported  ;  but  in  95  B.C.  the 
deliberate  policy  of  the  oligarchy  was  made  clear  by  a 
consular  law  (Lex  Licinia-Mucia)  which  prohibited  under 
penalties  any  non-burgess  from  laying  claim  to  the 
franchise.  With  Drusus  hope  arose  once  more  for  the 
Italians;  Drusus  accomplished  nothing  but  his  own 
destruction,  and  now  no  resource  was  left  but  an  appeal 
to  arms. 

The  chief  difficulty  with  which  rebellions  always  have  to 
contend  is  waut  of  organization.  They  have  to  contend 
against  an  established  government  completely  equipped 
and  organized,  and  to  create  their  own  organization  during 
the  course  of  the  struggle.  The  Italian  peoples  were  not 
entirely  unprepared  in  this  respect.  In  the  first  place,  a 
secret    league   had    been   formed   in  connection   with  the 


TEE  SOCIAL   OR  MARSIC   WAR.  269 

attempt  of  Drusus,  with  members  in  all  the  most  important 
Italian  towns,  bound  by  oath  to  be  faithful  to  each  other 
and  to  the  common  cause.  Again,  each  allied  town 
furnished  a  contingent  to  the  Roman  army,  and  these 
trained  troops  formed  a  valuable  nucleus  for  the  allied 
army.  Thirdly,  there  were  the  old  Roman  confederacies 
of  the  various  Italian  peoples — of  the  Marsians,  Paelig- 
nians,  and  others, — which  had  of  course  lost  all  political 
significance  after  the  conquest  by  Rome,  but  which  still 
existed  for  purposes  of  common  sacrifice. 

The  revolt  broke  out  prematurely  at  Asculum  in 
Picenum,  where  all  the  resident  Romans  were  massacred. 
The  flame  spread  rapidly  through  all  central  and  southern 
Italy.  The  Marsians  were  the  first  to  declare  war,  and 
round  them  gathered  the  Paeligni,  the  Marrucini,  the 
Frentani,  and  the  Vestini,  while  the  Samnites  were  the 
centre  of  the  southern  group  of  peoples,  from  the  Liris  to 
Apulia  and  Calabria. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Romans  had  many  adherents 
where  the  richer  classes  were  influential.  Thus  the  whole 
of  Umbria  and  Etruria,  where  the  middle  class  had  entirely 
disappeared,  remained  faithful  :  so  also  many  isolated 
communities  in  insurgent  districts,  such  as  Pinna  in  the 
Vestini.  Lastly,  many  of  the  most  favoured  of  the  allied 
communities,  such  as  Nola,  Nuceria,  and  Neapolis  in  Cam- 
pania, and  Rhegium  ;  and  Latin  colonies,  such  as  Alba  and 
Aesernia  remained  steadfastly  loyal.  The  strength  of  the 
revolt  was  in  the  middle  classes  and  the  small  farmers ; 
the  moneyed  and  aristocratic  classes  held  with  Rome. 

After  the  first  blood  had  been  shed  at  Asculum  the  in- 
surgents still  made  an  attempt  at  negotiation  :  they  offered 
even  now  to  lay  down  their  arms  if  Rome  would  grant 
them  the  citizenship.  Instead  of  complying,  the  Roman 
government  instituted  a  commission  (quaestio  Varia),  on 
the  proposal  of  the  tribune  Varius,  to  investigate  the  con- 
spiracy set  on  foot  in  connection  with  the  agitation  of 
Drusus.  The  result  was  the  banishment  of  many  members 
of  the  moderate  senatorial  party  who  were  favourable  to 
compromise,  including  Gaius  Cotta  and  Marcus  Scaurus. 
Great  preparations  were  made  for  the  struggle.  Officers 
of  all  parties,  including  both  Sulla  and  Marius,  offered 
themselves   to  the  government.      The  largesses  of   corn 


270  HISTORY  Oh   ROME. 

were  curtailed  in  order  to  husband  supplies ;  and  all 
business,  except  military  preparations,  was  at  a  standstill. 

The  Italians  on  their  side  were  preparing  not  merely  to 
secede  from  Rome,  but  to  crush  her  and  form  a  new  state. 
Corfinium,  a  town  of  the  Paeligni,  was  to  be  the  head  of 
the  new  government,  under  the  new  name  of  Italica.  All 
burgesses  of  insurgent  communities  were  declared  citizens 
of  Italica.  A  new  forum  and  senate-house  were  made ;  a 
senate,  consuls,  and  praetors  appointed.  The  Latin  and 
Samnite  languages  were  placed  on  an  equality  as  the 
official  tongues  ;  and  the  imitation  of  the  Roman  constitu- 
tion was  carried  out  in  the  minutest  details.  The  most 
important  feature  of  the  new  organization  is  this — that 
Italica,  like  Rome,  was  to  remain  merely  a  governing  city- 
state.  The  Italians,  like  Rome  itself,  were  unable  to  rise 
above  the  conception  of  the  7ro\is.  No  idea  occurred  to 
them  of  any  means,  such  as  modern  representative  insti- 
tutions, by  which  a  vast  population  could  be  welded  into 
a  united  nation. 

Their  plan  of  campaign  was  settled  for  the  Romans  by 
the  character  and  extent  of  the  revolt.  They  had  to 
relieve  the  many  fortresses  which  held  out  for  them  in 
various  parts  of  the  insurgent  districts,  and  they  had  to 
combat  a  numerous  enemy  at  widely  distant  points. 
Accordingly,  two  consular  armies  were  formed,  one  under 
Publius  Rutilius  Lupus,  to  confront  the  Italian  consul, 
Quintus  Silo,  in  the  northern  group  of  insurgent  states  ;  the 
other  under  Lucius  Julius  Caesar,  who  commanded  against 
the  Samnite,  GaiusPapius  Mutilus,in  the  southern  districts. 
Under  each  consul  on  both  sides  were  several  lieutenant- 
generals,  who  were  responsible  for  particular  districts. 

The  war  was  begun  in  the  south  by  the  attack  of 
Mutilus  on  the  important  Latin  fortress  of  Aesernia  in 
Samnium,  which  offered  the  most  obstinate  resistance. 
Caesar,  after  securing  Capua,  advanced  to  its  relief,  but 
was  driven  back  with  severe  loss.  The  town  of  Venafrum 
and  its  garrison  was  taken  by  the  Italians  and  the  road 
to  Aesernia  blocked  against  the  Roman  advance.  Aesernia 
accordingly  fell  by  famine  at  the  end  of  the  season. 

In  Lucania,  Caesar's  lieutenant,  Publius  Crassus,  was 
shut  up  in  the  town  of  Grumentum,  which  fell  after  a  long 
siege. 


TEE  SOCIAL   OB  MAESIC   WAR.  271 

In  Campania,  Nola  and  almost  all  the  country  except 
Nuceria  fell  before  Mutilus.  The  Numidian  troops  of 
Caesar  deserted  to  the  enemy.  An  attack  npon  Caesar's 
camp  was  victoriously  repelled,  but  his  army  was  soon 
after  disastrously  defeated  by  Marius  Egnatius,  and  had 
to  retire  to  Teanum.  Acerrae  was  closely  besieged  by  the 
Samnite  army. 

The  war  in  central  Italy  was  most  favourable  to  the 
Romans.  Their  main  army,  under  Lupus,  was  massed  on 
the  Marsian  frontier  to  protect  the  capital,  separated  from 
the  enemy  by  the  stream  Tolenus.  Lupus  crossed  the 
stream  in  two  divisions,  and  was  himself  destroyed  with 
eight  thousand  of  his  troops  ;  but  the  other  division,  under 
Marius,  occupied  the  enemies'  camp,  and  was  able  to 
prevent  them  from  gaining  further  successes.  Quintus 
Caepio,  who  was  associated  with  Marius  in  the  command, 
was  drawn  into  an  ambush  and  cut  to  pieces.  But  Marius, 
now  sole  commander,  gradually  pressed  the  enemy  back, 
and  finally  defeated  them  in  two  important  engage- 
ments. 

In  Picenum,  a  corps  under  Strabo  advanced  to  threaten 
Asculum,  but  was  defeated  and  shut  up  in  Firmum,  while 
a  portion  of  the  Italian  army  entered  Apulia,  and  induced 
Canusium  and  Venusia  to  join  the  revolt.  But  another 
Roman  division,  under  Servius  Sulpicius,  after  defeating 
the  Paeligni  advanced  to  the  relief  of  the  Romans  The 
insurgents  were  taken  front  and  rear,  and  driven  to  take  re- 
fuge in  Asculum,  which  was  closely  besieged  by  the  Romans. 

The  course  of  the  war  had  induced  many  communities 
in  Umbria  and  Etruria  to  declare  against  Rome,  but  here 
the  Roman  divisions  maintained  a  decided  superiority. 

The  campaign  was,  on  the  whole,  adverse  to  the 
Romans.  They  had  lost  the  important  towns  of  Nola 
and  Venusia ;  the  Umbrians  and  Etruscans  had  joined 
the  revolt,  and  communications  with  the  southern  army 
could  only  be  maintained  by  a  chain  of  posts  from  Cumae 
to  Rome,  which  strained  to  the  utmost  the  resources  of 
the  city. 

The  change  in  popular  feeling  at  Rome  was  shown  in 
the  law  of  the  tribune  Marcus  Plautius  Silvanus  with 
regard  to  the  Varian  commission.  This  body  had  sent 
into  exile  many  prominent  men  of  the  party  favourable  to 


272  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

concession.  The  equites  of  whom  it  was  composed  were 
now  dismissed,  and  a  new  commission  elected  by  the 
tribes  without  class  distinction. 

The  new  commission  became  a  scourge  of  the  extreme 
non-concession  party,  and,  amongst  others,  its  original 
author,  Quintus  Varius,  wTho  was  charged  with  the 
murder  of  Drusus,  was  banished. 

About  the  same  time  a  policy  of  concession  was  adopted. 
The  Lex  Julia  of  the  consul  Lucius  Julius  Caesar  (end  of 
90  B.C.)  granted  the  citizenship  to  all  Italian  communities 
which  had  not  declared  against  Rome.  The  Lex  Plautia 
Papiria  (December,  90  or  beginning  of  89  B.C.)  granted  the 
citizenship  to  all  allies  who  presented  themselves  before  a 
Roman  magistrate  within  sixty  days. 

At  the  same  time,  the  effect  of  these  concessions  was 
largely  nullified  by  the  restriction  which  allowed  the  new 
citizens  to  be  enrolled  in  eight  only  of  the  thirty-five 
tribes.  These  laws  applied  to  all  Italy  south  of  the  Po , 
while  the  Celts  between  the  Po  and  the  Alps  were  in- 
vested with  the  inferior  privileges  which  had  hitherto 
belonged  to  Latin  towns.  The  aim  of  these  measures  was 
to  secure  the  loyalty  of  the  allies  who  had  hitherto  re- 
mained faithful,  and  to  draw  over  deserters  from  the 
enemy.  But  they  by  no  means  constituted  a  complete 
capitulation ;  only  "  so  much  of  the  existing  political 
institutions  had  been  pulled  down  as  seemed  necessary  to 
arrest  the  progress  of  the  conflagration." 

In  the  second  year  of  the  war,  Lucius  Porcius  Cato  com- 
manded against  the  Marsians,  Lucius  Sulla  in  the  south, 
while  Gnaeus  Strabo  retained  his  command  in  Picenum. 
The  insurgents  began  their  northern  campaign  by  an 
attempt  to  send  a  body  of  fifteen  thousand  men  to  aid  the 
insurrection  in  Etruria,  but  it  was  totally  defeated  by 
Strabo. 

Cato  invaded  the  Marsian  territory,  but  was  defeated 
and  slain ;  and  the  whole  central  command  now  fell  upon 
Strabo.  A  great  battle  was  fought  at  Asculum,  where  the 
garrison  sallied  out  to  meet  a  relieving  army  under  Juda- 
cilius.  Victory  remained  with  the  Romans,  and,  after  a 
protracted  siege,  Asculum  was  compelled  to  surrender. 
The  Marrucini,  Apulia,  the  Marsi,  were  successively  sub- 
dued, and  in  the  next  year  the  Vestini  and  Paeligni.    The 


TEE  SOCIAL   OR  MARSIC   WAR.  273 

revolt  in  central  Italy  was  at  an  end,  and  Italica  once 
more  became  the  country  town  of  Corfinium. 

In  Campania,  Stabiae  and  Herculanenm  were  captured, 
and  Sulla  totally  defeated  the  Samnite  general,  Cluentius. 
He  then  invaded  Samnium,  surrounded  and  defeated  the 
Samnite  army  under  Mutilus,  and  compelled  the  capital 
Bovianum  to  surrender  Thus,  at  the  close  of  the  second 
year,  the  revolt  was  on  the  whole  overpowered.  Venusia 
in  Apulia  and  Nola  in  Campania  still  held  out ;  but  besides 
these  isolated  towns,  only  the  Samnites  and  Lucaniaus 
remained  unsubdued.  The  Samnites  made  great  efforts 
to  continue  the  struggle  ;  a  fresh  army  was  raised  with 
the  Marsian  Silo  in  command,  and  Aesernia  became  the 
head-quarters  of  the  final  campaign. 

In  Apulia,  Venusia  was  captured  by  Q.  Metellus  Pius. 
In  Samnium,  Bovianum  was  recaptured  by  Silo,  but  he 
was  soon  defeated  and  slain  by  Mamercus  Aemilius.  In 
Campania,  Nola  was  invested  and  smaller  towns  cap- 
tured. In  Lucania  the  Roman  general  was  defeated,  and  a 
desultory  warfare  was  still  carried  on  ;  the  siege  of  Nola, 
too,  was  unfinished  :  but  with  these  exceptions  the  war 
was  at  an  end. 

While  the  war  was  progressing  favourably  to  Rome, 
the  internal  condition  of  the  city  was  becoming  more 
and  more  critical.  At  the  end  of  89  B.C.  it  had  become 
necessary  to  declare  war  against  Mithradates,  and  Rome 
was  by  no  means  prepared.  The  treasury  was  ex- 
hausted ;  no  new  army  could  be  raised,  but  that  of 
Sulla  was  destined  to  embark  as  soon  as  it  could  safely 
be  spared ;  money  was  raised  by  the  sale  of  unoccupied 
sites  within  the  city  In  Rome  and  in  Italy  all  classes 
were  seething  with  discontent.  The  Varian  prosecutions 
had  embittered  the  strife  between  the  moderate  and  the 
extreme  parties.  The  former  was  dissatisfied  with  the  con- 
cessions already  made  to  the  Italians,  the  Italians  them- 
selves were  dissatisfied  with  an  enfranchisement  which 
limited  their  influence  to  eight  tribes — a  limitation  all 
the  more  galling  that  it  found  a  precedent  in  the  restric- 
tion of  the  freedmen  to  four  tribes.  The  revolted  com- 
munities who  had  been  subdued  were  in  the  position  of 
dediticii — that  is,  in  the  eye  of  the  law  they  were  as 
prisoners  of  war,  absolutely  at  the  mercy  of  their  con- 

18 


274  BISTORT  OF  ROMK 

querors  ;  they  were  not  yet  admitted  to  the  citizenship, 
and  they  had  forfeited  their  ancient  treaties;  where  these 
treaties  had  been  restored  they  had  been  made  revocable  at 
the  will  of  the  Roman  people.  It  was  desirable  to  recall  the 
men  exiled  by  the  Varian  commission,  who  included  many 
of  the  best  men  of  the  senatorial  order ;  bnt  the  cancel- 
ling of  a  legal  verdict  by  a  decree  of  the  people  was  seeu  to 
be  *  most  undesirable  precedent.  Lastly,  Marius  was  thirst- 
ing tor  a  fresh  command  to  recover  his  lost  influence,  and 
was  ready  to  go  to  any  length  to  accomplish  his  purpose. 

To  all  these  elements  of  disorder  must  be  added  tho 
decay  of  military  discipline  and  an  economic  crisis  The 
social  war  had  necessitated  the  enrolment  of  every  avail- 
able man  in  the  army,  and  had  carried  party  spirit  imo 
the  ranks.  The  result  was  an  appailmg  slackness  of  dis- 
cipline ;  and  more  than  one  Rnman  division  had  put  its 
commander  to  death  and  escaped  all  punishment. 

At  the  same  time  the  old  cry  of  the  oppression  of  capital 
was  heard  again.  Debtors  unable  to  pay  the  interest  on 
their  loans  had  applied  to  the  urban  praetor  Asellio  for 
time  to  realize  their  property,  and  w  Te  trying  to  get  the 
obsolete  laws  against,  usury  eufo  eeJ.  Asellio  sanctioned 
actions  to  recover  interest  under  Qiese  laws,  and  was 
murdered  by  the  offended  creditors  under  the  leader- 
ship of  the  tribune  Lucius  Cassius.  The  debtors  now 
clamoured  for  novae  tabulae — the  cancelling  of  all  ex- 
isting debts. 

At  this  critical  point  the  tribune  Publius  Sulpicius  Rufus 
came  forward  and  proposed  three  laws  :  (1)  That  every 
senator  who  owed  more  than  two  thousand  denarii  (c. 
£S2)  should  be  expelled  from  the  senate.  (2)  That  those 
who  had  been  exiled  by  the  Varian  commission  should  be 
recalled.  (3)  That  the  new  burgesses  and  the  freedmen 
should  be  distributed  among  all  the  tribes. 

Sulpicius  was  no  revolutionary ;  by  these  laws  he 
attempted  simply  to  carry  out  the  traditional  policy  of 
the  moderate  senatorial  party,  of  the  party  of  Crassus 
and  Drusus.  During  the  early  period  of  his  office  he  had 
been  a  supporter  of  constitutional  forms,  had  opposed  the 
recall  of  the  Varian  exiles,  and  had  vehemently  resisted  an 
attempt  of  Gaius  Caesar  to  stand  for  the  consulship  before 
he  had  been  praetor.     Nor  was  the  tendency  of  his  pro- 


THE  SULPICIAV  REVOLUTION  275 

posals  towards  revolution  «  The  first  was  necessary  on 
account  of  the  venality  of  the  senate  and  the  dependence 
of  the  poorer  senators  upon  their  richer  colleagues.  The 
second  was  necessary  if  there  was  to  be  a  moderate  party 
at  all.  The  third,  so  far  as  it  concerned  the  allies,  was 
merely  a  measure  of  justice,  and  necessary  to  render  the 
Roman  concessions  a  reality  ;  and  the  admission  of  the 
freedmen  into  all  the  tribes  would  extend  the  influence 
of  a  class  largely  dependent  on  the  great  aristocratic 
houses.  But  though  the  proposals  of  Sulpicius  need  not 
have  alarmed  the  senate,  he  became  exasperated  by  oppo- 
sition, kept  a  hired  bodyguard  in  his  pay,  and  carried  on 
the  struggle  with  great  violence. 

The  proposals  were  strongly  resisted  by  the  senate  ; 
and  the  consuls,  Sulla  and  Pompeius  Rufus,  suspended  all 
popular  assemblies  on  pretence  of  extraordinary  religious 
observances.  Sulpicius  replied  by  a  violent  tumult. 
The  consuls  then  yielded,  and  the  proposals  became  law. 
But  Sulpicius  could  not  yet  feel  secure ;  Sulla  had  de- 
parted to  the  army  in  Campania,  and  Sulpicius  feared 
lest  he  might  lead  his  legions  to  overthrow  the  recent 
laws.  Accordingly  a  fourth  Lex  Sulpicia  was  brought 
forward,  and  by  decree  of  the  people  the  supreme  com- 
mand against  Mithradates  was  transferred  from  Sulla  to 
Marius. 

On  the  arrival  of  two  tribunes  from  Rome  to  take  over 
the  command  of  the  army,  Sulla  refused  to  submit.  The 
command  had  been  conferred  upon  him  legally  and  con- 
stitutionally ,  he  knew  that  he  could  count  upon  the 
devotion  of  the  legions,  and  he  had  no  scruple  about 
using  force  against  his  country.  He  laid  the  matter 
before  the  troops,  and  hinted  to  them  that  Marius  would 
raise  a  fresh  army  for  service  in  the  East.  The  superior 
officers  held  aloof,  but  the  common  soldiers  tore  the  tri- 
bunes in  pieces, and  clamoured  to  be  led  to  the  city.  Sulla 
availed  himself  of  their  enthusiasm,  and  for  the  first  time 
a  Roman  army  was  led  against  Rome,  The  city  was 
reached  by  forced  marches,  and  troops  posted  at  the  bridge 
over  the  Tiber  and  at  the  gates ;  the  sacred  boundary 
was  crossed  by  two  legions  in  battle  array.  Stones  were 
thrown  from  the  roofs,  but  Sulla  brandished  a  blazing 
torch    and  threatened  to  fire  the   city,   and  the   legions 


276  HISTORY  OF  HOME. 

steadily  advanced.  The  forces  of  Marius  and  Sulpicius 
were  overcome ;  when  they  summoned  the  slaves  to  arms, 
not  more  than  three  appeai-ed,  and  in  a  few  hours  Sulla 
was  master  of  Rome. 

Sulla's  first  step  was  to  declare  the  Sulpician  laws  null 
and  void  ;  his  next,  to  proscribe  Sulpicius  and  twelve  of 
his  most  strenuous  adherents.  Sulpioius  was  captured  at 
Laurentum,  and  put  to  death,  and  his  head  was  exposed  in 
the  Forum  before  the  rostra.  The  adventures  of  Marius 
are  well  known.  After  escaping  successively  the  cavalry 
of  Sulla,  the  magistrates  of  Minturnae,  and  the  treachery 
of  the  Numidian  king,  he  found  a  temporary  rest  in  a 
small  island  off  the  coast  of  Tnui.3. 

The  legislation  which  Sulla  now  undertook  aimed  at 
relieving  the  debtors  and  strength  -ning  the  power  of  the 
senate.  His  chief  measures  were  (1)  A  lex  unciaria, 
which  probably  revived  the  old  law  fixing  the  maximum  of 
interest.  (2)  Schemes  for  a  number  of  new  colonies  were 
set  on  foot.  (3)  The  reduced  numbers  of  the  senate 
were  filled  up  by  the  addition  of  three  hundred  new 
members.  (4)  The  old  Servian  arrangement  for  voting 
in  the  cornitia  centuriata  was  restored,  giving  nearly  one 
half  of  the  votes  to  the  first  class  alone,  eon,,  sting  of  those 
who  possessed  an  estate  of  a  hundred  thousand  sesterces. 
(5)  The  full  probouleutic  power  of  the  senate  was  restored ; 
no  proposal  could  henceforth  be  submitted  to  the  people, 
unless  it  had  first  been  approved  by  the  senate. 

Formally  these  laws  of  Sulla  appeared  revolutionary 
in  the  extreme.  The  proscription  of  Sulpicius  and  his 
adherents  was  a  violation  of  the  sacred  laws  of  appeal. 
The  initiative  in  legislation  was  taken  from  the  magis- 
trates and  given  to  the  senate,  which  had  legally  no 
privilege  but  that  of  giving  advice.  The  old  voting 
arrangements  in  the  centuries,  now  revolutionized  by 
Sulla,  had  existed  unchanged  for  a  century  and  a  half. 
But  in  substance  these  changes  contained  little  which 
violated  the  spirit  of  the  constitution.  In  occupying 
Rome  and  in  proscribing  the  adherents  of  Sulpicius, 
Sulla  merely  accepted  actual  facts  and  repelled  violence 
with  violence.  The  extension  of  the  power  of  the  senate 
was  but  giving  legal  sanction  to  a  power  which  it  had 
always  exercised  until  recent  times  by  means  of  the  tri- 


THE  SULPICIAN  REVOLUTION.  277 

buuician  or  augural  veto ;  and  the  later  practice,  accord- 
ing to  which  any  magistrate  proposed  a  law  to  the  tribes 
without  previous  deliberation  in  the  senate,  was  already 
seen  to  be  fraught  with  great  inconvenience  and  danger. 
The  measures  with  regard  to  interest  and  colonization 
show  that  Sulla  was  not  indifferent  to  the  wrongs  of  the 
poorer  classes,  and  they  were  proposed  by  him  after  the 
victory,  and  of  his  own  free  will.  Lastly,  it  is  important 
to  remember  not  only  what  he  changed,  but  what  he  left 
unchanged.  The  principal  foundations  of  the  Gracchan 
constitution,  the  corn  largesses  and  the  equestrian  jury 
courts,  were  left  untouched. 

Meanwhile,  affairs  in  the  East  grew  more  threatening 
every  day,  and  Sulla  could  no  longer  postpone  his  depar- 
ture. He  endeavoured  to  insure  the  permanence  of  his 
measures  by  procuring  the  election  of  consuls  favourable 
to  the  restored  government,  and  by  transferring  the  armv 
of  the  north  from  the  doubtful  Strabo  to  his  own  devoted 
friend,  Quintus  Rufus. 

Bnt  one  of  the  new  consuls  was  Cinna,  a  most  deter- 
mined opponent  of  Sulla,  and  Rufus  had  no  sooner  taken 
over  his  command  than  he  was  murdered  by  the  soldiers, 
and  Strabo  resumed  the  leadership.  Sulla  himself,  on  the 
expiration  of  his  consulship,  was  summoned  to  appear  on 
his  defence  before  the  people. 

Notwithstanding  these  ominous  incidents,  Sulla  merely 
exacted  an  oath  from  the  consuls  to  maintain  the  exist- 
ing constitution,  and  immediately  embarked  for  the  East 
(beginning  of  87  B.C.). 

AUTHORITIES. 
Social  War.— Plut.  Sull.  6,  7-10 ;  Marins,  32-40.     Liv.  Epit.  72-77. 

Veil.  ii.  15-19.     Appian  B.  C.  i.  37-64.     Flor.  iii.  18.     Eutrop. 

v.  3-5. 
Lex  Licinia  Mucia. — Cic.  de  Off.  iii.  11. 

Expulsion  of  Aliens. — Cic.  de  Off.  iii.  11.     Festus,  s.v.  Respublica. 
Quaestio  Varia. — Appian  B.  C.  i.  37.     Cic.  pro  Scaur,  i. ;  Brut.  56. ; 

pro  Corn.  fr.  27.     Ascon  in  Scaur,  in  Corn.,  p.  79.     Val.  Max. 

viii.  vi.  4. 
Asellio. — Liv.  Ep.  74.     Val.  Max.  ix.  vii.  4. 
Leges  Sulpici<ie.—  {1)  Plut.  Sull.  8.     (2)  Liv.  Epit.  77.      (3)  Appian 

B.  C.  i.  55. 
Sulla's  laws. — Appian  B.  C.  i.  59.     Fest.  s.v.  Unciaria. 


278  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

THE    MITHRADATIC   WAR. 

89  B.C.  Declaration  of  war  by  Rome. — 88  b.c.  Occupation  of  Asia 
Minor  by  Mithradates  —Massacre  of  Roman  citizens. — 87  B.C. 
Pontic  invasion  of  Greece — Arrival  of  Sulla — Siege  of  Athens 
and  the  Piraeeus. — 86  b.c.  Battle  of  Chaeronea. — 85  B.C.  Battle 
of  Orchomenus. — 84  B.C.  Conclusion  of  Peace. 

Ever  since  the  beginning  of  the  revolution  under  Tiberius 
Gracchus,  Rome  had  been  too  much  occupied  with  her 
internal  affairs  to  bestow  much  attention  upon  the  pro- 
vinces. During  this  period  important  changes  had  taken 
place  in  the  East  The  two  kingdoms  of  Armenia,  which 
dated  their  existence  from  the  war  with  Antiochus.  had 
been  united  under  Tigranes,  originally  king  of  the  north- 
eastern portion ;  and  to  him  the  title  of  Great  Kin<;  and  the 
titular  supremacy  of  Asia  now  passed  Phrygia  became, 
in  the  time  of  Gaius  Gracchus,  an  independent  kingdom 
in  connection  with  the  Roman  province  of  Asia ;  but  other- 
wise Asia  remained  unchanged,  except  for  the  oppression 
of  the  Roman  tax-farmers,  which  was  ever  growing  more 
merciless  and  more  intolerable. 

The  ruler  of  the  kingdom  of  Pontus  was,  at  that  time, 
Mithradates  VI.,  surnamed  Eupator.  After  the  death  of 
his  father  he  became  a  fugitive  and  a  wanderer  for  seven 
years.  Eastern  legend  ascribed  to  him  a  stature  more 
than  human,  strength  and  swiftness  surpassing  that  of  all 
other  men,  and  a  constitution  inured  alike  to  any  fatigue 
or  excess.  He  collected  Greek  and  Persian  antiquities 
and  works  of  art,  and  kept  Greek  poets  and  philosophers 
in  his  train. 

As    a    ruler   he   does   not    rise   beyond    the    ordinary 


TEE  M1THBADATIC   WAR  279 

Eastern  sultan  :  "  of  higher  elements — desire  to  advance 
civilization,  earnest  leadership  of  national  opposition, 
special  gifts  of  genius — there  is  no  distinct  trace."  His 
government  is  marked  by  all  the  ruthless  crime  usual  to 
an  Eastern  despot — by  the  execution  or  life-long  captivity 
of  mother,  brothers,  daughters,  sons,  and  of  his  most 
confidential  servants.  "What  really  distinguishes  Mithra- 
dates  is  his  boundless  activity  and  energy.  He  extended 
the  limits  of  his  dominions  in  every  direction,  founded 
a  new  empire  on  the  northern  sbores  of  the  Black  Sea, 
and,  alone  among  the  princes  of  the  East,  was  able  seri- 
ously to  contend  with  the  Roman  power. 

His  ancestral  dominion  was  Pontus,  or  Cappadocia  on 
the  Black  Sea,  between  Bithynia  on  the  west  and  Armenia 
on  the  east.  It  was  a  iich  and  fertile  country,  producing 
large  quantities  of  grain  and  fruit,  but  almost  entirely 
destitute  of  towns  properly  so  called,  though  there  were 
numerous  fortresses  where  the  peasants  might  take  refuge, 
and  where  the  king's  treasure  was  deposited.  The  real 
basis  of  his  wealth  and  power  lay  in  the  flourishing 
Greek  seaports  of  Trapezus,  Amisus,  and  Sinope. 

Instead  of  developing  the  resources  of  his  dominions, 
Mithradates  devoted  himself  to  extending  them.  His 
first  conquest  was  the  district  of  Colchis  with  the  Greek 
town  of  Dioscurias,  east  of  Pontus.  His  next  enterprise, 
which  was  begun  though  not  completely  executed  before 
the  first  Roman  war,  was  the  foundation  of  the  Bosporan 
kingdom  in  the  region  of  the  modern  Crimea. 

The  country  north  of  the  Caucasus  and  the  Black  Sea 
was  inhabited  by  Scythian  and  Sarmatian  tribes,  who  led 
a  pastoral  life  and  fought  on  horseback  with  sword,  lance, 
and  bow,  the  ancestors  of  the  modern  Cossacks.  It  was 
the  relations  of  the  Greek  settlements  in  the  Tauric  Cher- 
sonese with  these  barbarians  which  gave  Miihradates  his 
opportunity.  The  most  important  of  the  Greek  cities 
were  Chersonesus,  a  free  town  at  the  south  of  the  penin- 
sula, and  Panticapaeum  on  the  European  side  of  the 
Cimmerian  Bosporus,  which  ruled  the  eastern  division  of 
the  peninsula,  together  with  Phanagoria  and  the  district 
of  Sindice  on  the  opposite  coast.  The  inhabitants  of  these 
cities  purchased  peace  from  the  barbarians  by  payment 
of  a  tribute,  but  the  exactions  and  oppressions  to  which 


280  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

they  had  to  submit  grew  heavier  and  heavier,  and  they 
were  glad  to  be  delivered  bj  the  arms  of  Mithradates,  and 
to  acknowledge  his  supremacy.  The  new  kingdom,  based, 
like  Pontus,  on  a  number  of  Greek  cities,  was  called  the 
Bosporus.  It  embraced  the  peninsula  and  the  opposite 
coast,  and  paid  an  annual  tribute  of  two  hundred  talents 
(£48,800),  besides  enormous  quantities  of  grain,  to  the 
king.  The  barbarian  tribes  acknowledged  some  sort  of 
dependence  upon  Mithradates,  and  supplied  a  valuable 
recruiting  ground. 

At  the  same  time  Lesser  Armenia  was  annexed  to 
Pontus.  Mithradates  gave  his  daughter  in  marriage  to 
Tigranes,  king  of  Greater  Armenia,  and  it  was  by  his  help 
that  Tigranes  established  his  supremacy  in  Asia. 

The  king  now  turned  his  attention  to  Paphlagonia  and 
Cappadocia,  and  it  was  his  conduct  with  regard  to  these 
countries  which  made  Roman  interference  at  length 
inevitable. 

Paphlagonia  was  claimed  by  Mithradates  as  having 
been  left  to  his  father,  Mithradates  Euergetes,  by  will. 
He  gained  over  the  king  of  Bithynia  by  allowing  him  to 
occupy  the  western  half  of  the  kingdom.  Cappadocia  had 
once  been  united  with  Pontus,  and  after  the  murder  of  the 
Cappadocian  king  Ariarathes,  brother-in-law  of  Mithra- 
dates, and  of  his  young  son,  the  reunion  was  practically 
accomplished.  Nominally  the  country  was  ruled  by  a 
pseudo- Ariarathes,  actually  by  Gordius,  a  Cappadocian 
instrument,  of  Mithradates 

The  Roman  senate  had  been  entirely  passive  during  all 
these  aggressions.  Their  first  interference  was  in  the 
wrong  direction.  In  response  to  an  appeal  of  the  Tauric 
chieftains,  they  had  ordered  Mithradates  to  restore  these 
to  their  old  supremacy  over  the  Greek  cities — so  far  were 
they  from  fulfilling  their  duties  to  the  Hellenic  name. 
The  reunion  of  Cappadocia  at  last  aroused  them  to  energy. 
Paphlagonia  was  declared  independent,  and  Mithradates 
was  commanded  to  evacuate  Cappadocia.  No  army  was 
sent  to  enforce  these  decrees,  but  the  energy  of  Sulla,  the 
governor  of  Cilicia,  compelled  Mithradates  to  submit  at 
all  points.  The  Cappadocian  Ariobarzanes  was  elected 
king  by  the  people.  Sulla  marched  to  the  Euphrates,  and 
gained  great  fame  by  a  conference  in  which,   as  repre- 


TEE  MITEEADATIC   WAR.  281 

sentative  of  Rome,  lie  arranged  the  relations  between 
Tigranes  and  the  Parthians.  This  was  the  first  time  that 
the  Romans  came  into  contact  with  the  great  nation  with 
which  they  were  destined  to  dispute  the  sovereignty  of 
the  world.  Thus  the  status  quo  in  the  East  was  restored 
(b.c.  92). 

But  Sulla  had  no  sooner  retired  than  Mithradates'  ally 
Tigranes  expelled  Ariobarzanes  from  Cappadocia.  This 
was  followed  by  fresh  disturbances  in  Bithynia.  In 
91  B.C.  Nicomedes  III.  had  been  recognized  as  legitimate 
king  by  the  Romans ;  but  his  younger  brother,  Socrates, 
displaced  him  and  assumed  the  throne.  In  Paphlagonia 
the  sea-coast  was  still  occupied  by  Mithradates,  and  in  the 
Bosporus  he  even  extended  his  dominions.  Again  order 
was  restored  by  the  commissioner  Manius  Aquillius,  with 
the  aid  of  the  small  Roman  force  in  Asia  and  the  native 
levies.  Mithradates  made  no  resistance,  though  he  did  not 
furnish  the  contingents  of  troops  required  of  him  (b.c.  90). 

Though  the  Italian  insurrection  was  at  its  height, 
Mithradates  did  not  use  the  opportunity  to  make  open 
war  on  the  Romans  ;  none  the  less  did  he  prosecute  his 
schemes  of  territorial  conquest.  He  seems  to  have  fluctu- 
ated between  a  sense  of  his  own  weakness  and  a  greedy 
desire  of  aggrandizement.  He  gave  ample  excuse  for 
war  to  the  Romans  had  they  desired  it,  but  yielded  at  the 
first  show  of  energy. 

Aquillius  was  determined  to  put  an  end  to  this  unsatis- 
factory condition  of  things  ;  he  resolved  to  make  use  of 
Nicomedes  of  Bithynia  to  compel  his  government  to 
declare  war.  Accordingly  Nicomedes  was  instigated  to 
attack  ;  he  occupied  the  frontier  districts  of  Pontus,  and 
his  ships  closed  the  Bosporus  against  those  of  Mithradates. 
The  latter  contented  himself  with  appealing  to  the  Romans. 
He  was  ordered,  in  any  case,  to  refrain  from  war  against 
Nicomedes.  Then  the  king's  decision  was  taken.  His 
son  Ariobarzanes  was  ordered  to  invade  Cappadocia,  and 
envoys  were  sent  to  the  Roman  envoys  to  demand  their 
ultimatum.  War  now  ensued  as  a  matter  of  course 
(B.C.  89). 

Mithradates  made  the  most  energetic  preparations  :  he 
obtained  a  promise  from  Tigranes  of  an  auxiliary  army ; 
to  the  Greeks  he  presented  himself,  like  Philip  of  Mace- 


282  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

don,  as  a  deliverer  from  an  alien  yoke  ;  and  he  had  hopes 
of  the  revolt  of  Numidia  and  Syria,  of  risings  in  Thrace 
and  Macedonia.  The  Mediterranean  swarmed  with  Pontic 
privateers  :  a  foreign  corps,  composed  chiefly  of  Italian 
refugees,  was  formed  in  Asia,  armed  and  equipped  in  the 
Roman  fashion.  The  king's  infantry  is  said  to  have 
amounted  to  250,000,  and  his  cavalry  to  40,000,  while  his 
fleet  numbered  400  vessels. 

For  the  Romans  the  moment  was  most  unfavourable. 
The  Italian  insurrection  was  yet  unsubdued,  and  it  was 
impossible  for  a  Roman  army  from  Italy  to  arrive,  at 
earliest,  till  the  summer  of  88  B.C.  Besides  the  native 
levies  there  was  but  a  small  Roman  force  in  Asia  ;  but 
the  Roman  officers  hoped  to  protect  the  Roman  province 
and  maintain  their  present  positions.  The  Bithynian  fleet 
still  blockaded  the  Bosporus. 

The  war  began  in  88  B.C.,  and  the  first  operations  were 
all  in  favour  of  Mithradates.  He  defeated  the  Bithynians 
and  captured  their  military  chest.  The  Roman  officers 
were  everywhere  worsted,  and  had  to  shut  themselves  up 
in  fortified  towns— in  Apamea,  in  the  Phrygian  Laodicea, 
and  in  Pergamus.  To  conciliate  the  inhabitants,  all  Asiatic 
prisoners  were  immediately  dismissed  by  the  king.  The 
whole  country,  to  the  Maeander,  was  in  his  hands.  The  only 
hope  of  the  Romans  was  in  Sulla,  and  now  news  arrived  of 
the  Sulpician  revolution  and  of  Sulla's  march  upon  Rome. 
The  Asiatics  everywhere  sided  with  Mithradates ;  the  Ro- 
man officers,  Quintus  Oppius  and  Aquillius,  were  delivered 
into  his  hands.  In  the  hour  of  conquest  the  savagery  of  the 
king  broke  forth  in  a  stupendous  crime.  Orders  were  issued 
from  Ephesus  that  on  one  and  the  same  day  all  Italians, 
bond  and  free,  should  be  put  to  death.  Severe  penalties 
were  threatened  against  any  who  should  shelter  the  pro- 
scribed, and  while  one  half  of  their  property  was  to  go  to 
the  royal  treasury,  the  other  half  was  given  over  to  the 
murderers.  The  orders  were  strictly  carried  out,  and  by 
the  smallest  computation  eighty  thousand  persons  perished 
in  the  massacre.  The  act  was  one  of  brutal  and  impolitic 
revenge.  By  striking  not  merely  at  Romans  but  at  all 
Italians  the  king  alienated  his  most  important  allies. 

The  new  conquests  were  now  organized.  Pergamus 
became  the  new  capital,  the  old  Pontus  was  given  over  to 


THE  MITHMADATIC   WAR.  283 

the  sons  of  Mithradates,  and  the  other  provinces  of  Asia 
Minor  became  Pontic  satrapies.  All  arrears  of  taxes  were 
forgiven,  and  exemption  from  all  taxes  for  five  years  was 
promised.  Besides  the  petty  ruler  of  Paphlagonia,  the 
only  communities  still  adhering  to  Rome  were  the  city 
leagues  of  Caria  and  Lycia  and  the  cities  of  Rhodes  and 
of  Magnesia  on  the  Maeander,  which  successfully  with- 
stood all  attempts  to  reduce  them. 

The  king  now  determined  to  carry  war  into  Europe  and 
to  occupy  Hellas.  During  the  last  few  years  there  had 
been  several  inroads  of  Thracian  tribes  into  Macedonia, 
with  which  Mithradates  was  probably  not  unconnected.  His 
son  now  advanced  by  land,  subduing  the  country  before 
him,  and  parcelling  it  into  Pontic  satrapies.  Abdera  and 
Philippi  were  made  the  principal  bases  for  operations,  and 
the  whole  Aegean  was  occupied  by  the  Pontic  fleet.  All 
the  islands  were  occupied  and  the  mainland  was  soon 
attacked.  At  Athens,  Aristion,  a  philosopher  by  trade,  per- 
suaded the  people  to  renounce  Roman  rule  ;  the  Piraeeus 
became  a  Pontic  harbour ;  and  the  other  free  states — 
Achaia,  Boeotia,  Laconia — followed  the  example  of  Athens. 

The  position  of  the  Roman  government  was  critical : 
three  armies  were  required  to  keep  down  Rome,  Italy,  and 
Asia;  only  one,  that  of  Sulla,  was  available.  Sulla  had 
to  choose  between  these  three  tasks.  He  chose  Asia,  and  in 
the  spring  of  87  B.C.,  he  landed  in  Epirus — but  with  only 
thirty  thousand  men  :  he  was  without  a  single  ship  and 
his  treasury  was  empty.  But  his  action  was  none  the 
less  vigorous  :  as  soon  as  his  proposals  for  peace  on  the 
basis  of  the  status  quo  before  the  war  were  rejected,  he 
advanced  into  Boeotia,  defeated  the  Pontic  generals,  and 
quickly  possessed  himself  of  the  whole  of  the  mainland 
except  Athens  and  Piraeeus,  which  he  failed  to  carry  by 
assault.  He  then  established  camps  at  Eleusis  and 
Megara,  and  proceeded  to  besiege  the  city  and  port  of 
Athens.  The  siege  of  Athens  was  long  and  tedious.  The 
Pontic  relieving  army  was  overthrown  under  the  walls  of 
the  city;  but  abundant  supplies  arrived  at  the  Piraeeus 
by  sea,  and  considerable  quantities  even  reached  Athens. 
The  winter  passed  without  result :  all  the  Roman  assaults 
on  the  Piraeeus  were  repulsed,  and  the  siege  was  turned 
into  a  blockade.     Athens  at   length  made   overtures  of 


284  HISTORY  OF  POME. 

■surrender;  but  when  there  was  delay  in  accepting  Sulla's 
terms,  the  city  was  captured  by  escalade.  It  was  plundered 
and  the  ringleaders  of  the  insurrection  executed ;  but 
the  Athenians  were  allowed  to  retain  their  liberty  and  their 
possessions,  including  Delos,  just  presented  to  them  by 
Mithradates.  Thus  once  more  was  Athens  "  saved  by 
its  illustrious  dead"  (86  B.C.). 

The  Piraeeus  still  held  out,  and  a  fleet  became  impera- 
tively necessary  to  prevent  supplies  from  entering  by  sea. 
Lucullus  had  been  despatched  to  raise  ships,  but  the 
Egyptian  court  refused  his  request  for  aid.  Sulla  was 
compelled  to  confiscate  the  temple  treasures  to  supply  his 
needs,  and  compensated  the  gods  by  devoting  to  them  one 
half  of  the  territory  of  Thebes.  The  worst  blow  was  the 
news  of  the  democratic  revolution  at  Rome,  and  the  trans- 
ference of  the  Eastern  command  from  Sulla  to  Flaccus. 

From  these  difficulties  Sulla  was  extricated  by  the  rash- 
ness of  Mithradates,  who  forbade  his  generals  to  act  on  the 
defensive,  and  ordered  them  to  crush  Sulla  at  once.  An 
army  of  over  100,000  men,  under  Taxiles,  arrived  at 
Thermopylae ;  Archelaus  evacuated  the  Piraeeus  and  joined 
the  main  army.  In  the  plain  of  the  Cephissus  the  great 
battle  of  Chaeronea  was  fought.  The  Pontic  forces  were 
three  times  as  numerous  as  the  Roman,  and  were  especially 
superior  in  cavalry,  so  that  Sulla  had  to  protect  his  flank 
by  trenches ;  and  in  front,  between  his  first?  and  second 
lines,  palisades  were  erected. 

The  battle  began  with  the  advance  of  the  Pontic  war 
chariots ;  the  Roman  first  line  immediately  retired  behind 
the  palisade,  while  the  Roman  slingers  and  archers  poured 
their  missiles  on  the  enemy,  and  drove  them  back  upon 
their  own  line,  which  was  thus  broken.  Arihtlaus  hur- 
riedly brought  up  his  cavalry  from  the  flanks  and  made 
them  charge,  to  give  time  for  the  infantry  to  recover.  The 
Roman  line  was  broken,  but  still  offered  stubborn  resist- 
ance. At  this  moment  Sulla,  on  the  right,  charged  with  his 
cavalry  the  exposed  flank  of  the  enemy ;  the  confusion 
into  which  their  infantry  were  thrown  spread  to  the 
cavalry,  and  the  Roman  infantry  seized  the  moment  for  a 
general  charge.  The  rout  was  complete  ;  the  Pontic  camp 
was  captured  and  the  remnant  of  the  army  pursued  to  the 
Euripus. 


THE  MITHBABATIC   WAR.  283 

The  effect  of  the  victory  was  slight — partly  for  want  of 
a  fleet,  partly  because  of  the  approach  of  Flaccus,  who  was 
now  in  Thessaly.  For  some  days  the  two  Roman  armies 
were  encamped  opposite  to  each  other  ;  but  the  soldiers  of 
Flaccus  began  to  desert,  and  he  turned  northwards,  intend- 
ing to  march  through  Thrace  to  Asia.  Sulla,  from  what- 
ever motives,  remained  at  Athens  for  the  winter. 

In  the  spriug  of  the  next  year  a  second  Pontic  army 
reached  Boeotia  by  way  of  Euboea,  where  it  was  joined  by 
the  relics  of  the  army  of  Archelaus ;  the  latter  general 
was  suspected  of  treason  by  his  master,  and  the  most 
peremptory  orders  were  given  to  fight  a  derisive  battle. 
The  armies  met  in  the  same  plain  of  the  Cephissus — near 
Orchomenus.  The  Pontic  cavalry  caused  the  Roman  line 
to  waver  by  the  fury  of  its  charges  ;  but  Sulla  rallied 
his  soldiers  in  person, — the  horse  were  driven  back  and  the 
defeat  of  the  infantry  was  then  an  easy  task.  The  Pontic 
camp  was  stormed  on  the  next  day ;  the  army  was  almost 
annihilated.  The  Boeotian  communities  were  severely 
punished  for  their  defection,  many  being  almost  totally 
destroyed.  The  way  was  now  open  through  Macedonia 
and  Thrace  ;  Philippi  and  Abdera  were  occupied,  and  the 
winter,  85-84  B.C.,  was  consumed  by  Sulla  in  preparing  a 
fleet  for  the  next  year's  campaign  in  Asia. 

During  the  course  of  the  war  in  Europe  circumstances 
had  greatly  changed  in  Asia  Minor.  The  hopes  with 
which  the  Asiatic  communities  had  hailed  their  deliverer 
were  bitterly  disappointed :  the  Roman  whips  were  as 
nothing  to  the  Pontic  scorpions,  and  even  the  long  suffering 
Asiatics  were  driven  to  revolt.  The  most  anarchical  decrees 
were  issued  by  the  new  sovereign,  giving  independence  to 
the  revolting  communities,  full  remission  of  debts  to  debtors, 
lands  to  the  poor  and  liberty  to  slaves.  All  manner  of 
outrage  and  violence  was  the  consequence.  The  most  im- 
portant mercantile  cities,  Smyrna,  Ephesus,  Snrdes,  revolted 
from  the  king.  At  Adramyttium  the  whole  of  the  senate 
were  put  to  death  by  his  ordei-s.  The  Chians,  suspected  of 
disloyalty,  were  first  heavily  fined,  and  then  deported  to 
the  coast  of  Colchis.  A  massacre  of  Celtic  chiefs  in  Asia 
was- planned  and  carried  out,  in  order  to  convert  Galatia 
into  a  Pontic  province.  But  those  who  escaped  raised  the 
powerful  Celtic  tribes  and  expelled  the  Pontic  governor. 


286  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

At  the  same  time,  the  king  was  hard  pressed  by  the 
Romans  by  sea  and  land.  Lucullus  Lad  at  length  suc- 
ceeded in  raising  a  considerable  fleet,  and  Lad  wrested 
several  islands  from  the  enemy.  The  army  of  Ftaccus  had 
reached  CLalcedon  in  86  B.C.,  but  a  mutiny  Lad  deposed 
Flaccus  and  placed  Fimbria  in  command,  and  tLe  new 
general  Lad  defeated  tLe  younger MitLradates  and  dislodged 
tLe  king  himself  from  Pergamus  ;  and  it  was  only  tLrough 
tLe  refusal  of  tLe  Optimate  Lucullus  to  co-operate  witL  tLe 
democrat  Fimbria  tLat  MitLradates  was  enabled  to  escape  to 
Mitylene.  TLus,  by  tLe  end  of  85  B.C.,  Europe  was  entirely 
lost  to  MitLradates ;  and  of  Asia  Minor  tLe  greater  part 
was  in  revolt  or  occupied  by  the  Romans.  TLe  fleet  of 
Lucullus  fougLt  two  successful  engage  men  ts  off  tLe 
Trojan  coast,  and,  wLen  joined  by  tLe  fresL  vessels 
equipped  by  Sulla  in  Tbessaly,  completely  commanded  tLe 
Hellespont. 

MitLradates  now  opened  negotiations  for  peace.  He 
applied  to  botL  Sulla  and  Fimbria,  but  Le  knew  well  that 
it  was  Sulla  with  whom  Le  Lad  really  to  reckon. 

TLe  king  offered  Sulla  Lis  aid  against  the  democratic 
party  at  Rome  in  return  for  tLe  cession  of  Asia  to  himself. 
But  Sulla  refused  to  cede  one  foot  of  ground,  and  would 
take  nothing  but  the  following  terms  :  (1)  Restoration  of 
all  the  king's  conquests,  both  continental  and  insular. 
(2)  Surrender  of  prisoners  and  deserters,  and  of  the  Pon- 
tic fleet.  (3)  Pay  and  provisions  for  the  army,  and  a  war 
indemnity  of  three  tbousand  talents  (£732,000).  ("4)  TLe 
CLians  to  be  restored  to  tbeir  homes,  and  the  Macedonian 
refugees,  friendly  to  Rome,  to  be  allowed  to  return. 

Tbese  negotiations  were  carried  on  at  Delium,  but 
Archelaus  could  not  at  first  persuade  his  master  to  agree. 
Sulla  meanwhile  proceeded  to  settle  Macedonian  affairs, 
and  set  out  witL  fleet  and  army  for  tLe  Hellespont.  At 
last  MitLradates  was  brougbt  to  consent.  But  Sulla's  march 
was  still  continued  ;  he  crossed  the  Hellespont,  and  at 
Dardanus  concluded  peace,  orally,  with  MitLradates.  At 
lengtL  Le  encamped  close  to  Fimbria,  at  TLyntira,  near 
Pergamus.  Fimbria's  troops  refused  to  attack  tLe  Sullan 
army,  and  an  attempt  to  assassinate  Sulla  failed.  When 
Sulla  refused  a  conference,  Fimbria  gave  up  all  for  lost, 
and   fell   upon  his  sword  ;  the   main  body  of  the  troops 


TEE  MITER  AD A1IC   WAR.  287 

joined  Sulla,  while  those  who  were  most  deeply  com- 
promised repaired  to  Mithradates. 

The  settlement  of  Asia  was  now  proceeded  with.  Two 
legions  were  left  under  command  of  Lucius  Licinius 
Murena,  and  their  interference  was,  in  some  cases,  neces- 
sary to  enforce  the  Sullan  regulations  The  most  impor- 
tant of  these  were  as  follows:  (1)  The  revolutionary 
decrees  of  Mithradates  were  cancelled.  (2)  The  most 
prominent  adherents  of  the  king  and  the  authors  of  the 
massacre  of  the  Italians  were  put  to  death.  (3)  The 
arrears  of  tithes  and  customs  for  the  last  five  years  were 
exacted,  together  with  a  war  indemnity  of  twenty  thousand 
talents  (£4,880,000)  (4)  The  few  faithful  communities 
— Rhodes,  the  province  of  Lycia,  Magnesia  on  the  Maeander 
— were  rewarded,  and  compensation  was  made  to  the  Chians 
and  to  the  people  of  Ilium  for  the  exceptional  cruelty  with 
which  they  had  been  treated. 

During  the  winter  of  84-83  B.C.  Sulla  allowed  his  troops 
to  enjoy  luxurious  winter  quarters  in  Asia,  and  in  the 
spring  transferred  them  across  the  Aegean  and  the  Adriatic 
to  Brundisium. 


AUTHORITIES. 

Pint.  Sull.  11-27.     Lucull.  2-4.     Appian  Mithr.  1-63.     Liv.  Epit.  74, 

76-78,  81-83.     Flor.  iii.  5.     Veil.  ii.  18.     Justin,  xxxvii.  i.  7-m. ; 

xxxviii.  i.-viii.    Plin.  N.  H.  xxv.  2.    Gell.  xvii.  17.    Val.  Max. 

viii.  7  ;  ix.  2.     Strab.  xii.  545  ;  vii.  306,  307,  309-312 ;  xi.  499  ; 

xii.  540,  541,  555,   562.     Eutrop.  v.  5.     Memn.  v.  5.    Dio.   fr. 

99-105.     Pro  L.  Manil.  3.     Pro  Flacc.  24,  25.     Tac.  Ann.  iv.  14. 
Terms  of  peace. — Appian  Mithr.  55. 
Settlement  of  Asia. — Appian  Mithr.  61,  62. 


HISTORY  OF  ROME. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

THE  DEMOCRATIC  REVOLUTION  AND  ITS  OVERTHROW  BY  SCLLA. 

87  B.C.  Cinnan  revolution — Return  of  Marius — Reign  of  terror. — 
86-84  b.c.  Despotism  of  Cinna — Most  of  the  provinces  adhere 
to  the  senate.  — 83  b.c.  Sulla  lands  at  Brundisium — His  modera- 
tion and  military  successes. — 82  B.C.  Further  Sullan  successes 
— Battle  of  the  Colline  Gate. — 82-80  B.C.  Remaining  opposition 
to  Sulla  crushed  in  various  quarters. 

The  departure  of  Sulla  left  Italy  full  of  the  discontented 
elements  from  which  revolution  might  be  expected  to 
arise.  The  Italian  revolt  still  smouldered  dangerously  in 
many  quarters,  and  the  principal  army  was  in  the  hands 
of  a  general  whose  loyalty  to  the  senate  was  doubtful 
The  capitalists  had  suffered  greatly  through  the  severe 
financial  crisis.  The  insurgents  who  had  laid  down  their 
arms  since  the  expiration  of  the  sixty  days  appointed  by 
the  Lex  Plautia  et  Papiria  were  in  the  position  of  dedi- 
ticii — that  is  of  subjects  entirely  destitute  of  rights.  The 
new  citizens  and  the  freedmen  were  exasperated  by  the 
cancelling  of  the  Sulpician  laws  ;  while  the  large  class  of 
those  who  adhered  to  the  men  outlawed  by  Sulla  after 
the  revolution  of  Sulpicius  were  bent  on  obtaining  the 
recall  of  their  banished  friends. 

So  far  as  the  malcontents  had  a  common  aim,  they  were 
united  upon  this  last  point  of  the  recall  of  the  exiles  ;  but 
the  movement  was  mainly  one  of  pure  discontent,  and  had 
no  distinct  political  object.  Its  aimlessness  is  shown  by 
the  character  of  the  person  chosen  to  lead  it — Lucius  Cor- 
nelius Cinna.  He  was  unknown  except  as  an  officer  in  the 
social  war;   he  had  no  political  aim  but  that  of  vulgar 


THE  CINNAN  REVOLUTION.  289 

selfishness,  and  is  said  to  have  been  bought  over  by  the 
party  of  Marhis  merely  because  the  restriction  of  the 
power  of  tribunes  made  it  necessary  for  the  conspirators 
to  have  a  consul  as  their  instrument.  There  were  abler 
men  in  the  second  rank  of  the  conspiracy — Gnaeus  Papirius 
Carbo,  a  powerful  popular  orator,  and  Quintus  Sertorius, 
a  man  of  the  highest  ability  and  integrity. 

Immediately  on  Sulla's  departure  (87  B.C.)  the  conspira- 
tors took  action.  Cinna,  supported  by  the  majority  of  the 
tribunes,  proposed  two  laws :  (1)  the  re-enactment  of 
the  Sulpician  law  permitting  the  enrolment  of  the  freed- 
men  and  the  new  citizens  in  any  of  the  tribes  :  (2)  that 
the  Sulpician  exiles  should  be  recalled  and  restored  to 
"their  rights. 

On  the  day  of  voting  both  sides  appeared  in  arms.  The 
senatorial  tribunes  vetoed  the  new  law.  When  swords 
were  drawn,  the  bands  of  the  other  consul,  Octavius,  cleared 
the  Forum,  and  committed  the  most  frightful  atrocities  on 
the  assembled  multitude.  Ten  thousand  persons  are  said 
to  have  been  slain.  There  was  no  legal  means  of  proceed- 
ing against  the  conspirators,  but  a  prophet  opportunely 
gave  out  that  the  banishment  of  Cinna  and  of  six  tribunes 
was  necessary  for  the  peace  of  the  country,  and  a  decree  of 
outlawry  was  accordingly  passed  by  the  senate  against  these 
persons.  Lucius  Cornelius  Merula  was  chosen  consul  in 
place  of  Cinna. 

But  the  senate  omitted  to  expel  the  new  exiles  from 
Italy,  and  they  appeared  in  Tibur,  in  Praeneste,and  in  all  the 
new  burgess  communities  of  Latium  and  Campania,  asking 
money  and  arms  for  the  common  cause.  The  army  besieging 
]N"ola,  induced  partly  by  their  own  democratic  leanings, 
partly  by  the  bribes  of  the  exiles,  made  common  cause 
with  Cinna,  and  furnished  a  valuable  nucleus  for  the 
recruits  who  soon  flocked  in.  Cinna  now  moved  towards 
Rome,  and  was  soon  joined  by  fresh  forces  from  the  north. 
Marius  and  the  refugees  of  the  previous  year  had  landed 
in  Etruria  with  a  body  of  five  hundred  horse.  He  now 
ordered  the  ergastula,  or  prisons  in  which  the  slaves  were 
confined  at  night,  to  be  broken  open  ;  and  soon  gathered 
round  him  a  force  of  six  thousand  men  ;  he  also  contrived 
to  collect  a  force  of  forty  ships,  with  which  he  intercepted 
the  corn  supply  of  Rome.      He  placed  himself   at   the 

19 


290  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

disposal  of  Cinna,  though  the  wiser  leaders,  like  Sertorius, 
saw  the  imprudence  of  associating  themselves  with  so 
dangerous  a  man. 

The  democratic  forces  gathered  round  the  city,  and  the 
senate  appealed  to  Strabo  for  protection.  He  pitched  his 
camp  at  the  Coliine  Gate,  but  refrained  from  battle,  and 
allowed  the  insurgents  to  invest  the  city  Cinna  was 
posted  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  opposite  the  Jani- 
culum  ;  Sertorius  on  the  left  bank,  by  the  Servian  wall. 
Marius  increased  his  fleet  and  his  army,  and  gained  pos- 
session of  Ostia,  which  was  plundered.  Strabo,  though  he 
resisted  the  attack  of  the  insurgents,  remained  inactive,  and 
demanded  the  consulship  for  the  next  year  But  this  the 
senate  refused,  and  sought  help  elsewhere.  A  decree  was 
passed  conferring  the  franchise  on  all  the  Italian  allies 
who  had  forfeited  their  old  treaties.  This  was  meant  to 
gratify  one  large  and  important  class  of  malcontents,  but 
the  concession  did  not  produce  more  than  ten  thousand 
men.  Negotiations  were  opened  with  the  Samnites,  in 
order  to  make  the  troops  of  Metellus  in  that  quarter 
available  for  the  defence  of  the  city  ;  but  the  Samnite 
terms  were  too  humiliating,  and  when  Metellus  marched 
to  Rome,  leaving  behind  him  a  small  division,  the  latter 
was  at  once  attacked  and  defeated.  Moreover,  Cinna  and 
Marius  granted  all  that  the  Samnites  required  and  were 
reinforced  by  a  Samnite  contingent. 

The  insurgents  were  already  in  possession  of  the  sea, 
and  the  land  communications  were  soon  cut  off  by  the 
capture  of  Ariminum,  which  shut  off  the  supplies  of  food 
and  men  expected  from  the  region  of  the  Po  ;  they  also  held 
Antium,  Lanuvium,  and  Aricia,  which  closed  all  approaches 
from  the  south.  At  the  same  time  a  terrible  pestilence 
broke  out  among  the  troops  of  the  city,  by  which  seventeen 
thousand  men  perished.  The  sudden  death  of  Strabo  was, 
no  doubt,  a  relief  to  the  government ;  his  troops  were 
incorporated  with  those  of  Octavius,  but  their  temper  was 
such  that  the  consul  dared  not  fight.  The  Optimates  were 
at  variance  with  each  other :  Octavius  opposed  all  con- 
cession, while  Metellus  was  in  favour  of  compromise.  The 
soldiers  first  besought  Metellus  to  take  over  the  command, 
then,  on  his  refusal,  deserted  in  large  numbers.  At  length 
the    government  was  compelled  to   think   of  surrender. 


TEE  CINNAN  REVOLUTION.  291 

Envoys  were  sent  to  Cinna,  but,  while  the  negotiations 
dragged  on,  Cinna  moved  close  up  to  the  city  gates,  and 
desertions  became  so  common  that  the  senate  was  reduced 
to  unconditional  surrender.  Cinna  promised,  at  the 
entreaty  of  the  senate,  to  abstain  from  bloodshed ;  but 
Marius  kept  an  ominous  silence. 

Marius  scoffingly  refused  to  set  foot  in  the  city  till  his 
sentence  of  exile  had  been  revoked ;  and  a  hurried  assembly 
was  held  m  the  Forum,  and  the  necessary  decree  passed. 
The  old  man  at  length  entered,  and  the  work  of  blood- 
shed began  The  gates  were  closed,  and  the  slaughter 
was  uninterrupted  for  five  days ,  but,  for  months  after- 
wards, individuals  who  had  escaped  at  first  were  put  to 
death.  Gnaeus  Octavius  was  the  first  victim ,  others  of 
the  illustrious  slain  were  Lucius  Caesar,  consul  in  90  B.C., 
and  the  victor  of  Acerrae ;  Marcus  Antonius,  the  first 
pleader  of  his  time ,  Lucius  Merula,  Cinna's  successor ; 
and  Quintus  Catulus,  Marius'  colleague  in  the  Cimbiian 
wars.  The  fury  of  Marius  amounted  to  madness  ;  he  could 
scarce  be  restrained  from  hunting  out  the  bitterest  of  his 
enemies  and  slaying  them  with  his  own  hand ;  he  forbade 
the  burial  of  the  bodies,  and  had  the  corpse  of  Caius 
Caesar  stabbed  afresh  at  the  tomb  of  Quintus  Varius. 
The  man  who  presented  to  him,  as  he  sat  at  table,  the  head 
of  Antonius  was  publicly  embraced.  His  own  associates 
were  appalled  at  his  frenzy,  but  rone  had  the  courage  or 
the  power  to  oppose  him,  and  he  was  even  elected  consul 
with  Cinna  for  the  following  year  He  lived  to  enter  upon 
his  seventh  consulship ;  the  few  remaining  days  of  his 
life  were  passed  in  a  delirium  which  ended  in  a  burning 
fever  He  expired  on  the  13th  of  January,  86  B.C.  "  He 
died  in  full  possession  of  what  he  called  power  and 
honour,  and  in  his  bed ,  but  Nemesis  assumes  various 
shapes,  and  does  not  always  requite  blood  with  blood. 
Was  there  no  sort  of  retaliation  in  the  fact  that  Rome 
and  Italy  now  breathed  more  freely  on  the  news  of  the 
death  of  the  famous  deliverer  of  the  people,  than  at  the 
tidings  of  the  battle  on  the  Randine  plain  ?  " 

With  the  death  of  Marius  the  massacre  ceased ;  though 
there  were  individual  instances  of  murder.  Thus  Fimbria 
attempted  to  kill  the  revered  pontifex  maximus,  Quintus 
Scaevola,  whom  even  Marius  had  spared ;   but  Sertorius 


292  HISTORY  OF  ROME, 

secured  the  public  tranquillity  by  calling  together  the 
Marian  slaves,  to  the  number  of  four  thousand,  and  having 
them  cut  down  by  his  Celtic  troops. 

During  the  next  three  years  Cinna  enjoyed  a  power  as 
absolute  and  despotic  as  any  ever  exercised  by  the  tyrant 
of  a  Greek  city.  He  was  consul  each  year,  and  nominated 
himself  and  his  colleague  without  going  through  the  form 
of  consulting  the  people.  During  this  period  he  gave  no 
sign  of  any  definite  political  plan  or  aim  :  no  attempt  was 
made  to  reorganize  the  constitution  and  to  place  the  new 
government  on  a  firm  basis.  Only  the  reactionary  measures 
of  Sulla  were  annulled,  and  a  few  laws  passed  as  the 
exigencies  of  the  moment  demanded. 

1.  The  law  of  Sulpicius,  granting  to  the  new  burgesses 
and  to  the  freed  men  equality  with  the  old  citizens,  was 
revived  and  confirmed  by  the  senate,  and  censors  were 
appointed  to  distribute  the  Italians  among  the  thirty-five 
tribes. 

2.  It  was  at  this  time  probably  that  the  restrictions  on 
the  largesses  of  corn,  introduced  on  the  outbreak  of  the 
Social  war,  were  removed. 

3.  The  old  design  of  Gracchus  for  the  colonization  of 
Capua  was  carried  out. 

4.  All  debts  were  reduced  to  one-fourth  of  their  nominal 
amount. 

No  steps  were  taken  to  secure  the  support  of  either 
senate  or  equites,  or  to  regulate  the  position  of  the 
Samnites,  who,  though  nominally  Roman  citizens,  were 
really  Rome's  bitterest  enemies,  and  whose  one  aim  was 
still  their  country's  independence.  The  real  strength  of 
the  government  lay  in  the  new  citizens,  with  whose 
privileges  its  existence  appeared  bound  up  ;  while  many 
of  the  old  citizens  acquiesced,  because  they  saw  that  a 
restoration  of  the  Sullan  constitution  meant  a  fresh  reign 
of  terror  under  the  opposite  party. 

Most  of  the  provinces  adhered  to  the  oligarchy.  Quintus 
Metellus  and  the  young  Marcus  Crassus  attempted  to  hold 
Africa  for  the  same  party,"  but  were  compelled  to  submit 
to  the  revolutionary  governor.  Most  of  the  senatorial 
refugees  fled  to  Macedonia,  which  was  to  some  extent  in 
Sulla's  power.  Sulla,  like  many  of  the  refugees,  was 
outlawed  and  deprived  of  his  command ;  but  the  govern- 


TEE  SELL  AN  CIVIL    WAR.  293 

rnent  took  no  adequate  steps  to  enforce  its  decrees,  so  that 
Sulla  was  enabled  to  finish  his  work:  in  the  East  without 
serious  opposition.  In  8-4  B.c  he  addressed  a  letter  to  the 
senate,  announcing  his  return  to  Italy.  He  promised  to 
respect  the  rights  of  the  new  burgesses,  and  that  the 
inevitable  punishment,  should  fall,  not  on  the  rank  and  file, 
but  on  the  leaders  of  the  revolution.  On  the  arrival  of 
this  letter,  Cinna  hastily  set  out  for  Ancora,  intending  to 
cross  the  Adriatic ,  but  his  troops  mutinied  and  he 
himself  was  killed.  His  colleague,  Carbo,  abandoned  the 
idea  of  carrying  war  iuto  Greece,  and  went  into  winter 
quarters  at  Ariminum.  Meanwhile  the  moderate  party 
had  tried  to  bring  about  a  compromise,  but  without 
success,  Sulla's  envoys  were  not  admitted  into  the  city, 
and  he  was  summoned  to  lay  down  his  arms.  For 
the  year  83  B.c  consular  elections  were  once  more  held  : 
the  choice  fell  upon  Lucius  Scipio  and  Gains  Norbanns — 
neither  of  them  men  of  capacity  The  delay  caused  by 
Sulla's  crossing  into  Asia  was  utilized  at  Koine  in  making 
energetic  preparations  for  war,  and  100,000  men  are  said 
to  have  been  under  arms  at  Sulla's  landing. 

Against  this  force  Sulla  had  barely  forty  thousand  men, 
all  of  them  veterans,  it  is  true,  and  devoted  heart  and  soul 
to  their  leader  and  to  him  alone.  But  still  Sulla  saw  that 
these  numbers  would  be  powerless  against  a  united  Italy, 
and  he  took  measures  to  gain  over  the  strength  of  the 
nation — the  mass  of  respectable  men  who  desired  nothing 
but  peace  and  quiet,  and  the  new  burgesses  who  feared  for 
their  new  privileges.  Accordingly  he  offered  unconditional 
pardon  to  all  who  would  break  off  from  the  revolutionary 
government;  he  made  the  most  binding  declarations  to 
maintain  the  privileges  of  the  new  citizens,  and  caused  his 
soldiers  to  swear  singly  to  welcome  all  Italians  as  friends 
and  fellow-citizens. 

In  the  spring  of  83  B.C.  Sulla  landed  at  Brundisium  with- 
out opposition ;  the  town  opened  its  gates  to  him,  and  all 
Apulia  followed  its  example.  Many  members  of  the 
oligarchical  party,  like  Quintus  Metellus  and  Marcus 
Crassus,  and  some  deserters  from  the  democratic  ranks, 
repaired  to  Sulla's  camp,  but  brought  no  appreciable 
increase  to  his  numbers. 

By  far  the  most  important  accession  was   that  of  the 


294  HISTORY   OF  ROME. 

young  Gnaeus  Pompeius,  by  whose  exertions  the  district  of 
Piceuum  was  induced  to  declare  for  Sulla.  Pompeius  had 
made  bis  peace  with  the  revolution,  but  the  part  which 
his  father,  Strabo,  had  played  against  Cinna  was  not 
forgotten  :  an  indictment,  charging  him  to  give  up  the 
booty  said  to  have  been  embezzled  by  his  father  at 
Asculum,  threatened  his  ruin,  from  which  he  was  only 
saved  by  the  protection  of  Carbo  As  soon  as  Sulla 
itiuaed  in  Italy,  Pompeius  repaired  to  Picenum,  raised 
the  oligarchical  standard  at  Auximum,  and  gathered 
ronnd  him  a  force  of  three  legions,  with  which  he 
skilfully  effected  a  junction  with  Sulla  in  Apulia  Sulla 
received  him  with  great  honour,  and  rebuked  the  slack- 
ness of  the  rest  of  his  partisans  by  greeting  the  young 
commander  with  the  title  of  Imperator 

Thus  reinforced,  Sulla  advanced  into  Campania ;  the 
army  of  Norbanus  was  at  Capua,  that  of  Scipio  was 
advancing  along  the  Via  Appia  from  Rome  But  before  its 
arrival  Norbanus  had  been  crushed,  and  the  remnants  of 
his  army  were  blockaded  in  Capua  and  Neapolis.  Sulla 
hurried  to  Teauum,  where  Scipio  was  posted,  and  made 
proposals  for  peace;  an  armistice  was  concluded,  and  a 
personal  conference  took  place  between  the  two  generals, 
while  the  soldiers  of  the  two  armies  mingled  as  they 
pleased.  An  agreement  was  almost  concluded,  and  envoys 
were  sent  to  procure  the  opinion  of  Norbanus  at  Capua ; 
but  the  negotiations,  after  all,  fell  through,  and  Scipio 
denounced  the  armistice.  Sulla  hereupon  maintained  that 
the  agreement  had  already  been  actually  concluded  The 
imprudence  of  allowing  the  common  soldiers  to  fraternize 
was  now  forcibly  demonstrated,  and  Scipio's  soldiers  passed 
over  to  Sulla  in  a  body  The  consul  was  required  to 
resign  his  office,  and  was  escorted  to  a  place  of  safety. 
Sulla  and  Metellns  took  up  winter  quarters  in  Campania, 
and  maintained  the  blockade  of  Capua. 

Thus  the  first  campaign  had  ended  in  the  submission  of 
Apulia,  Picennm,  and  Campania,  and  the  discomfiture  of 
both  consular  armies.  The  Italian  communities  already 
began  to  negotiate  with  Sulla,  and  had  their  rights  secured 
to  them  by  separate  formal  treaties.  Sulla  boasted  that 
in  the  next  year  he  would  march  into  Rome,  and  overthrow 
the  revolutionary  government. 


TEE  SELL  AN  CIVIL    WAli.  2tf5 

The  government  made  the  greatest  preparations  for 
the  next  campaign.  The  consuls  were  Carbo  and  the 
younger  Marius  ;  Sertorius  was  sent  to  raise  new  levies 
in  Etruria  ;  the  gold  and  silver  in  the  temples  was  melted 
down  ;  new  divisions  came  from  Umbria  and  the  Po.  But, 
most  important  of  all,  the  most  strenuous  exertions  were 
made  in  Samnium  and  Lucania.  It  was  well  understood 
that  Sulla  would  not,  like  the  Cinnan  government, 
acquiesce  in  the  independence  of  these  districts,  and  they 
made  ready  for  a  renewal  of  their  old  struggle  against  the 
hated  Latin  race. 

For  the  campaign  of  82  B.C.  the  army  of  the  Optimates 
was  divided :  Metellus,  resting  on  Picenum,  advanced 
towards  Upper  Italy  ,  the  main  body,  with  Sulla,  marched 
straight  upon  Rome.  Near  Signia  he  came  upon  the 
enemy  under  Marius,  who  retired  to  Sacriportus  and  drew 
up  his  line  of  battle.  The  icaue  was  not  long  doubtful, 
and  was  made  certain  by  the  desertion  of  one  of  the 
divisions  of  Marius.  By  this  battle  the  capital  was  lost, 
and  Marius  sent  orders  to  the  praetor  Lucius  Brutus 
Damasippus  to  evacuate  it,  after  putting  to  death  all  the 
notable  men  of  the  other  party.  Among  the  victims  of 
this  latest  massacre  were  the  pontifex  maximus,  Quintus 
Scaevola,  who  had  so  narrowly  escaped  the  vengeance  of 
Fimbria.  Sulla  left  behind  Quintus  Ofella  to  blockade 
Praeneste,  into  which  Marius  had  thrown  himself,  and 
pushed  on  to  Rome,  which  offered  no  resistance ;  he  then 
hurried  on  to  Etruria. 

This  march  of  Sulla  northward  altered  the  position  of 
affairs,  and  three  Sullan  armies,  from  Gaul,  Umbria,  and 
Rome,  were  now  advancing  upon  Carbo  in  Etruria.  On 
the  side  of  Gaul,  Metellus  sailed  with  the  fleet  to 
Ravenna,  cut  off  the  communications  of  the  enemy  with 
Ariminum,  and  sent  forward  a  division  to  Placentia. 
Pompeius  and  Crassus  penetrated  from  Picenum  into 
Umbria,  and  shut  up  the  lieutenant  of  Carbo  at  Spole- 
tium,  whence  however  he  subsequently  escaped  to  join 
Carbo.  Lastly,  Sulla,  advancing  from  Rome  in  two  divi- 
sions, fell  in  with  Carbo  near  Clusium,  but  was  so  far 
unsuccessful  that  he  was  unable  to  continue  his  advance. 

Meanwhile  the  democratic  party  were  making  every 
effort  to  relieve  Praeneste,  but  without  success ;  help  was 


296  HISTORY  OF  HOME. 

sent  from  Sicily  and  from  Carbo,  but  did  not  reach  the 
town.  In  the  south,  however,  a  large  force  of  Samnites 
and  Lueanians,  which,  with  reinforcements  from  Capua, 
is  said  to  have  amounted  to  seventy  thousand  men, 
could  not  be  prevented  from  marching  to  the  relief; 
and  Sulla  was  obliged  to  hurry  from  Etruria,  and  take  up 
a  strong  position  south  of  Praeneste  to  intercept  them; 
and  in  this  position  both  sides  for  the  present  remained. 

In  the  region  of  the  Po  the  Sullans  had  -rained  great 
successes.  Marcus  Lucullus,  the  lieutenant  of  Metellus,  was 
at  first  shut  up  in  Placentia,  while  Norbanus  advanced 
upon  Metellus  himself.  But  Xorbanus  was  completely 
defeated,  and  deserted  by  his  Lueanian  troops  ;  and  Lu- 
cullus was  emboldened  to  make  a  sally  in  which  he 
defeated  the  troops  left  behind  to  blockade  him.  Arinii- 
n um  was  occupied  by  Metellus,  and  the  whole  country 
from  the  Apennines  to  the  Alps  was  reduced  to  sub- 
mission. 

The  troops  of  Metellus  were  now  available  for  service 
in  Etruria  ;  but  Carbo,  on  receiving  the  news,  departed 
secretly  and  embarked  for  Africa.  His  abandoned  troops 
either  dispersed  or  were  destroyed  by  the  enemy ;  only  a 
small  remnant  joined  the  army  of  Praeneste. 

The  democratic  army  of  Praeneste  was  now  in  danger 
of  being  caught  in  a  net — by  the  arrival  of  Metellus  it 
might  be  completely  surrounded.  In  his  desperation, 
Pontius  of  Telesia,  the  Samnite  general,  resolved  to  throw 
himself  upon  Rome,  which  was  but  one  day's  march  distant. 
From  a  military  point  of  view  the  step  was  ruinous ;  even 
if  successful  the  democratic  army  must  be  crushed  at 
Rome,  wedged  in  between  the  armies  of  Sulla  and  of 
Metellus.  But  the  measure  was  dictated,  not  by  policy, 
but  by  revenge  ;  it  was  the  last  outbreak  of  revolutionary 
fury  and  of  Samnite  hatred. 

On  the  1st  of  November,  Pontius,  with  the  Lueanian 
general  Lamponius,  and  the  democratic  commanders 
Damasippus  and  Carrinas,  encamped  close  to  the  Colline 
Gate.  The  force  which  sallied  from  the  city  was  scattered 
like  chaff,  and  the  citizens  gave  way  to  despair.  But 
before  morning  a  body  of  horse  appeared,  which  proved 
to  be  Sulla's  advanced  guard  under  Balbus,  and  before 
noon    Sulla  arrived   in  person.     He  had  set   out   imme- 


TEE  SULLAN  CIVIL   WAR.  297 

diately  on  hearing  of  the  departure  of  the  Samnites,  and, 
in  spite  of  his  forced  march,  immediately  drew  up  his 
army  in  line,  and  ordered  the  attack.  The  battle  lasted 
the  whole  night  through,  and  into  the  following  morning. 
The  left  wing,  under  Sulla,  was  driven  back,  aud  the  battle 
was  reported  to  be  lost;  but  the  right  wing,  under  Crassus, 
routed  its  opponents  and  pursued  them  to  Antemnae,  and 
gradually  the  left  wing  likewise  gained  ground.  The  defec- 
tion of  a  division  of  three  thousand  of  the  enemy  decided 
the  issue,  and  Rome  was  saved.  The  insurgents  were  all 
but  extirpated.  The  three  or  four  thousand  prisoners 
who  were  taken — including  Damasippus,  Carrinas,  and 
Pontius — were,  on  the  third  day  after  the  battle,  massacred 
by  Sulla's  orders,  in  the  Campus  Martius. 

Praeneste  surrendered  on  the  news  of  this  disaster,  and 
the  leaders  put  themselves  to  death.  Of  the  twelve 
thousandprisoners,  alltheRoman  senators,  all  the  Simnites, 
and  most  of  the  Praenestines  were  slaughtered,  and  the 
town  was  given  up  to  pillage.  Capua  was  voluntarily 
surrendered,  but  other  towns  made  the  most  obstinate 
resistance.  Nola  was  not  evacuated  till  the  year  80  B.C. 
As  to  S  imnium,  Sulla  declared  that  the  very  name  ought 
to  be  extirpated;  he  invaded  the  country,  and  made  it  a 
waste%  as  it  has  remained  to  this  day.  In  Etruria  a  long 
resistance  was  offered  by  some  towns.  Volaterrae  stood 
a  siege  of  nearly  three  years,  and  the  garrison  was  mas- 
sacred after  a  free  departure  had  been  granted  to  it. 

Of  the  provinces  there  still  remained  Sicily,  Spain,  and 
Africa  to  be  subdued.  Gnaeus  Pompeius  was  seut  to 
Sicily  with  six  legions,  and  the  island  was  immediately 
evacuated  by  the  governor  Perpenna  (82  B.C.).  Pompeius 
then  proceeded  to  Africa  where  he  defeated  the  forces 
of  the  governor  Lucius  Domitius  Ahenobarbus,and  Hiarbas 
the  usurping  king  of  Numidia,  and  captured  their  camp. 
Hiempsal  was  restored  to  the  kingdom  of  Numidia,  and 
various  Gaetulian  tribes,  hitherto  independent,  were  made 
subject  to  him.  In  forty  days  the  war  in  Africa  was  at 
an  end  (80  B.C.). 

In  Spain,  Sertorius  was  too  weak  to  resist  the 
Sullan  officers,  and,  on  his  departure,  both  provinces 
willingly  submitted  (81  B.C.). 

At  the  close  of   the  African  campaign  Pompeius   had 


298  HISTORY   0      ROME 

been  ordered  to  break  up  his  army — a  command  at  which 
both  general  and  soldiers  were  discontented.  Pompeius 
desired  a  triumph,  though,  as  an  extraordinary  officer, 
he  had  no  legal  claim  to  the  honour.  Sulla,  however, 
yielded  to  his  wish,  and  Pompeius  could  boast  of  having 
been  the  first  Roman  who  had  enjoyed  a  triumph  before 
he  was  a  senator.  It  was  now  that  Pompeius  was  saluted 
by  Sulla  by  the  surname  of  Magnus. 

In  the  East  there  had  been  no  cessation  of  warfare; 
the  carrying  out  of  Sulla's  regulations  had  in  many  cases 
to  be  accomplished  by  force ;  and  fresh  difficulties  had 
arisen  with  Mithradates.  The  king  was  preparing  an 
expedition  into  his  Bosporan  kingdom  ,  and  Murena,  the 
governor  of  Asia,  perhaps  fearing  lest  the  preparations 
were  really  directed  against  Rome,  had  crossed  the 
Pontic  frontier.  Mithradates  complained  to  the  Roman 
government;  and  Sulla  had  sent  envoys  to  dissuade  the 
governor,  who  nevertheless  continued  his  advance  Mithra- 
dates now  resolved  to  repel  him  by  force,  and  Murena  was 
driven  over  the  frontier  with  great  loss  (82  B.C.). 

Peace  was  now  renewed  with  Mithradates ;  and  at  last 
the  ten  years  of  war  and  insurrection  which  had  convulsed 
the  whole  Roman  world  were  at  end. 


AUTHORITIES. 

General.— Liv.  Epit.  79,  80,  82-89.     Appian  B.  C.  i.  64-96.     Licin- 

ianus  fragg.     Plut.  Marius,  40-end ;  Sull.  27-32  ;  Sertor.  4-7 ; 

Pomp.  5-8.      Flor.  iii.  21.     Veil.  ii.  18,  20,  23,  24,  28.      Dio,  fr. 

102,  106-109.    Eutrop.  v.  4-9.     Cic.  Philipp.  viii.  2. 
Cinna's  proposed  laws. — Appian  B.  C.  i.  63,  64.     Dio.  fr.  102-108. 

Veil.  ii.  20. 
Civitas  conferred  on  dediticii. — Liv.  Epit.  80.     Cic.  Phil.  xii.  11,  27. 

Licinianns,  p.  15. 
Colonization  of  Capua. — Cic.  de  Leg.  Agr.  ii.  33,  sqq 
Reduction  of  debts. — Veil.  ii.  23. 
Bulla' 8  promise  to  maintain  rights  of  Italians. — Liv.  Epit.  86. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

THE    SULLAN    CONSTITUTION. 

Solla's  office — Measures  of  punishment  and  reward — Constitutional 
changes — The  senate — The  comitia — The  magistrates — Reform 
of  criminal  jurisdiction — Reform  of  the  municipal  system — 
Sulla's  retirement — His  character  and  career — His  work — His 
death. 

The  problem  which  lay  beyond  Sulla  after  his  victories 
was  vast  beyond  conception — it  was  the  reconstruction  of 
a  whole  state  in  ruins.  "  About  the  time,"  says  Mommsen, 
"  when  the  first  pitched  battle  was  fought  between  Romans 
and  Romans,  in  the  night  of  the  6th  July,  83  B.C.,  the 
venerable  temple  which  had  been  erected  by  the  kings, 
dedicated  by  the  youthful  republic,  and  spared  by  the 
storms  of  five  hundred  years, — the  temple  of  the  Roman 
Jupiter  in  the  Capitol, — perished  in  the  flames.  It  was  no 
augury ;  but  it  was  an  image  of  the  state  of  the  Roman 
Constitution  That,  too,  lay  in  ruins,  and  needed  reconstruc- 
tion." The  mass  of  the  aristocratic  party  had  no  idea  of 
the  magnitude  of  the  task.  They  imagined  that  now,  when 
the  revolution  had  been  suppressed,  it  would  be  enough  to 
return  to  the  old  lines,  taking  precautions  against  similar 
outbreaks  in  future.  Hence  it  was  that  Sulla  chose  his 
instruments,  with  the  exception  of  Quintus  Metellus,  from 
the  moderate  party,  or  from  the  deserters  from  the  demo- 
cratic camp — Lucius  Flaccus,  Lucius  Philippus,  Quintus 
Ofella,  Gnaeus  Pompeius.  Sulla  was  quite  in  earnest 
about  restoring  the  old  constitution  ;  bnt  he  alone  saw  the 
enormous  difficulties  of  restoration.  He  saw  clearly  that 
comprehensive  concession  and  energetic  repression  were 


300  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

alike  necessary.  He  also  saw  that  the  senate  would 
mutilate  every  measure  of  either  kind,  and  that  it  was 
necessary  to  accomplish  the  work  by  his  own  hand,  with- 
out check  or  hindrance.  At  the  same  time,  even  Sulla 
was  far  from  grasping  the  whole  truth  about  the  condition 
of  the  empire  ;  otherwise  he  must  have  given  up  the  work 
in  despair.  In  fact,  the  constitution  was  past  reconstruc- 
tion ;  the  ancient  polity  had  broken  down  irretrievably; 
economic  causes  had  corrupted  or  destroyed  every  class  in 
the  state — aristocracy,  middle  class,  and  lower  class  ;  and 
where  no  class  in  the  state  remained  sound,  absolute  rule 
by  the  authority  and  intelligence  of  a  single  man  alone 
remained  possible.  But  not  for  another  generation  was 
this  truth  to  be  brought  home  in  all  its  remorseless 
fatality. 

The  authority  with  which  Sulla  was  at  present  provided 
was  the  purely  military  proconsulship.  It  was  necessary 
that  he  should  be  endowed  with  an  office  which  should 
preserve  as  far  as  possible  constitutional  forms,  and  yet  be 
powerful  enough  to  coerce  both  friends  and  foes.  Sulla 
accordingly  requested  the  senate  to  place  the  regulation  of 
the  state  in  the  hands  of  a  single  man  with  unlimited 
powers,  and  intimated  that  he  considered  himself  qualified 
for  the  task.  The  senate  directed  the  interrex  Lucius  Vale- 
rius Flaccus  to  propose  a  law  to  the  people,  conferring  upon 
Sulla  the  "  dictatorship  for  the  making  of  laws  and  the 
regulation  of  the  commonwealth,"  and  approving,  retrospec- 
tively, of  all  his  acts  as  consul  or  proconsul.  His  office 
was  unlimited  in  point  of  time,  and  included  absolute 
power  to  dispose  of  the  lives  and  property  of  the  citizens 
and  of  the  state  lands.  He  might  alter  the  boundaries  of 
the  city,  of  Italy,  or  of  the  empire;  dissolve  or  establish 
communities  in  Italy ;  regulate  the  provinces  and  depen- 
dencies ;  confer  the  imperium  on  whom  he  pleased,  and 
nominate  proconsuls  and  propraetors.  Lastly,  he  might 
regulate  the  state  by  new  laws.  This  new  office  took  its 
name  from  the  old  dictatorship,  obsolete  since  the  Hanni- 
balian  war.  The  boundlessness  of  its  power  recalled  the 
old  decemviri  legibus  scribundis  ;  but  in  reality  it  was 
nothing  but  the  monarchy.  "  The  protector  of  the  oli- 
garchic constitution  had  himself  to  come  forward  as  a 
tyrant,  in   order  to  avert  the    ever-imper.ding  tyrannies. 


THE  SULLAN  CONSTITUTION.  301 

There  was  no  little  of  defeat  in  this  last  victory  of  the 
oligarchy." 

The  work  of  punishment  was  first  taken  in  hand.  Sulla 
was  not  of  a  vindictive  temperament ; — even  after  his 
landing  in  Italy  he  had  shown  himself  ready  to  forget  and 
forgive, — but  the  democrats  had  used  their  last  moments  of 
power  to  set  on  foot  fresh  massacres,  and  henceforth  Sulla 
showed  no  mercy.  He  immediately  outlawed  all  civil  and 
military  officers  who  had  taken  part  in  favour  of  the  revo- 
lution after  the  convention  with  Scipio,  and  any  other 
citizens  who  had  actively  aided  the  cause.  A  reward  of 
twelve  thousand  denarii  (£488)  was  offered  to  the 
murderer  of  any  of  these  outlaws  ;  sheltering  them  was 
forbidden  under  the  severest  penalties  ;  their  property  was 
forfeited  to  the  state,  their  children  and  grandchildren 
excluded  from  a  political  career;  and  this  confiscation  was 
also  extended  to  the  property  of  those  who  had  fallen 
during  the  war.  Sulla  caused  a  list  of  the  proscribed  to 
be  posted  up,  and  fixed  the  1st  of  Jnne,  81  B.C.,  as  the  day 
for  closing  it.  It  was  said  at  last  to  have  amounted  to 
4700  names. 

The  fury  of  the  persecution  fell  primarily  upon  the 
Marians.  The  tomb  of  Marius  himself  was  broken  open, 
and  his  ashes  scattered.  His  nephew  was  executed  with 
torments  at  the  tomb  of  Catulus.  Of  the  leaders  of  the  first 
rank  few  remained  ;  but  other  classes  suffered  severely. 
Sixteen  hundred  equites  who  had  speculated  in  the 
Marian  confiscations  were  upon  the  list,  and  the  profes- 
sional accusers  were  largely  represented.  The  heads 
of  the  slain  were  publicly  piled  at  the  junction  of  the  Vicus 
Jugarius  with  the  Forum.  Bands  of  soldiers  ravaged  all 
Italy  to  earn  the  rewards  of  murder,  and  many,  even  of 
the  oligarchy,  fell  victims  to  private  revenge. 

In  the  disposal  of  the  confiscated  property  the  greatest 
abuses  prevailed.  Sulla  himself,  and  his  immediate 
dependents  and  connections,  bought  largely,  and  bad  the 
purchase-money  wholly  or  partially  remitted.  If  there 
was  any  difference  between  the  Marian  and  the  Sullan 
reign  of  terror,  it  was  that  Marius  murdered  to  satisfy  his 
personal  vengeance,  while  Sulla  showed  no  personal 
feeling,  but  regarded  the  work  almost  as  a  political 
necessity. 


802  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

With  regard  to  the  new  citizens,  the  general  rule  was 
laid  down  that  every  citizen  of  an  Italian  community  was 
ipso  facto  a  citizen  of  Rome  ;  all  distinctions  between 
citizens  and  allies — between  citizens  old  and  new — were 
abolished.  Bat  the  freedmenwere  restricted,  as  before,  to 
their  old  four  tribes.  There  were,  however,  exceptions  to 
the  general  rule ;  particular  communities  were  punished, 
or,  less  frequently,  rewarded.  For  instance,  Brundisium 
obtained  exemption  from  customs  ;  but,  of  the  guilty  com- 
munities, many  had  to  pay  fines,  to  raze  their  walls,  or  to 
forfeit  a  part  or  the  whole  of  their  lands.  Praeneste  and 
Spoletium,Florentia,  Faesulae,  Arretium,Volaterrae,all  fell 
under  the  last  penalty.  The  dispossessed  burgesses  were 
placed  in  the  position  of  Latins  of  the  lowest  class,  with 
the  additional  hardship  that  they  were  attached  to  no 
particular  community,  but  were  without  either  home  or 
city. 

The  lands  thus  confiscated  were  mainly  utilized  in 
settling  the  soldiers  of  the  victorious  army,  mostly  in 
Etruria,  Latium,  and  Campania ;  and  in  many  cases,  as 
in  the  Gracchan  colonies,  the  settlers  were  attached  to 
existing  communities.  The  number  of  allotments  is  stated 
at  120,000.  This  arrangement  was  made  by  Sulla  with 
varied  objects.  Firstly,  he  redeemed  the  pledge  given  to 
his  soldiers ;  secondly,  he  carried  out  the  idea  of  the 
moderate  conservative  party  of  strengthening  the  class  of 
small  proprietors  in  Italy — an  idea  which  he  had  attempted 
to  realize  in  88  B.C.  To  accomplish  this  object  the  settlers 
were  forbidden  to  sell  their  allotments  Lastly,  and  this 
was  no  doubt  the  strongest  reason,  the  new  colonists 
formed  standing  garrisons,  as  it  were,  for  the  support  of 
the  restored  constitution ;  and  for  this  reason,  where  they 
were  attached  to  an  old  community,  as  at  Pompeii,  the  new 
citizens  were  not  amalgamated  with  the  old,  but  formed 
a  separate  body  within  the  same  enclosing  wall.  Very 
similar  in  its  aim  was  the  object  of  another  act  of  Sulla's 
— the  manumission  of  a  body  of  ten  thousand  of  the 
slaves  of  the  proscribed,  who  formed  a  body-guard  in 
support  of  the  oligarchy,  and  a  garrison  for  the  capital. 

Sulla  now  destroyed  at  one  blow  the  constitution  so 
carefully  built  up  by  Gaius  Gracchus,  and  restored  in  all 
its  plenitude  the  rule  of  the  senate.     Gracchus  had  bribed 


TEE  SULLAN  CONSTITUTION.  303 

the  mob  of  the  capital  into  quiescence  by  introducing 
free  distributions  of  corn  ;  these  were  now  completely 
abolished.  Gracchus  had  organized  the  order  of  equesv 
trians,  and  tried  to  give  them  a  definite  place  in  the  con- 
stitution by  introducing  the  system  of  farming  the  taxes 
of  the  provinces,  by  entrusting  to  them  the  functions  of 
jurymen,  and  by  assigning  them  a  special  place  in  the 
theatre  at  popular  festivals.  Sulla  abolished  the  farming 
system,  and  converted  the  former  taxes  into  fixed  tributes  ; 
the  jurymen  were  now  taken  from  the  senatorial  order 
alone ,  and  the  equites  were  deprived  of  their  seats  of 
honour  in  the  theatre,  and  relegated  to  the  ordinary 
benches.  The  senate  was  henceforth  to  be  the  only 
privileged  order. 

In  order  to  fill  up  the  fearfully  reduced  numbers  of  the 
senate,  probably  also  with  the  intention  of  permanently 
increasing  the  number  of  its  members,  three  hundred  new 
senators  were  nominated  by  the  tribes  from  men  of 
equestrian  census — chiefly  from  the  younger  men  of  the 
senatorial  houses,  and  from  Sullan  officers  whom  the  late 
events  had  brought  into  prominence.  At  the  same  time, 
the  mode  of  admission  to  the  senate  was  changed. 
Hitherto,  men  had  entered  the  senate  either  by  summons 
from  the  censors,  or  by  holding  one  of  the  curule  magis- 
tracies— the  consulship,  the  praetorship,  or  the  aedileship  : 
the  tribunate  and  quaestorship  gave  no  right  to  a  seat,  but 
the  choice  of  the  censors  was  generally  directed  towards 
men  who  had  held  these  offices.  The  censorial  functions 
of  appointing  to  the  senate  and  of  deleting  from  its  roll 
were  now  set  aside ;  the  senatorial  seat  was  taken  from 
the  aediles  and  given  to  the  quaestors,  who  were  now 
raised  from  eight  to  twenty  in  number.  Several  im- 
portant results  followed  from  these  regulations.  In  the 
first  place,  the  abolition  of  the  censorial  deletion  made  the 
senator  irremovable.  Secondly,  the  number  of  members 
was  considerably  increased  :  hitherto  the  average  number 
had  probably  been  something  below  three  hundred ;  in 
Cicero's  time  a  full  meeting  consisted  of  417  members. 
Thirdly,  as  both  the  new  extraordinarily  nominated  senators 
and  the  augmented  body  of  quaestors  were  nominated  by 
the  comitia  tributa,  the  senate  was  now  thoroughly  based 
on  popular  election. 


304  HISTORY   OF  HOME. 

The  comitia  tributa  remained,  as  before,  formally 
sovereign ;  but  the  initiative  of  the  senate  in  all  legislation 
was  solemnly  enacted.  This  was  sufficient  to  exclude  the 
people  from  interference  in  administration,  or  in  criminal 
jurisdiction,  and  the  voice  of  the  people  was  confined 
practically  to  giving  assent  to  alterations  in  the  consti- 
tution. 

The  right  of  the  people  to  elect  magistrates  in  the 
comitia  centuriata  was  not  interfered  with  by  Sulla,  nor 
did  he  even  attempt,  as  in  88  B.C.,  to  restore  the  old  Servian 
voting  arrangements ;  but  the  election  to  the  priestly 
offices  was  entirely  taken  from  the  tribes,  and  the  right  of 
co-optation  restored  to  the  sacerdotal  colleges.  At  the  same 
time,  various  restrictions  were  imposed  or  confirmed  afresh 
with  regard  to  the  qualifications  for  office.  The  limit  of 
age  for  holding  each  office  was  strictly  enforced ;  and  the 
first  step  in  the  gradation  of  offices  was  in  future  to  be  the 
quaestorship  instead  of  the  aedileship,  so  that  the  quaestor- 
ship  was  now  the  necessary  step  to  the  praetorship,  and 
the  praetorship  to  the  consulship.  Two  years  at  least  must 
elapse  between  the  holding  of  any  office  and  of  the  next 
above  it ;  while  a  ten-years  interval  was  required  before 
re-election  to  the  same  office. 

The  senate  was  originally,  and  was  still  in  theory,  a 
council,  from  which  the  magistrates  might  seek  advice  ; 
but  it  had  gradually  acquired  the  right,  not  merely  of 
advising,  but  of  controlling  the  magistrates.  It  was  Sulla's 
aim  to  consolidate  this  power,  and,  accordingly,  all  magis- 
tracies emerged  from  his  hands  with  diminished  rights. 

The  heaviest  blow  fell  upon  the  tribunate,  an  office 
naturally  most  independent  of  the  senate.  The  original 
right  of  the  tribunes  to  veto  the  official  acts  of  magistrates, 
and  the  further  right  to  fine  and  punish  all  who  disregarded 
their  veto,  were  still  left  to  them ;  but  the  abuse  of  the 
right  of  intercessio  was  punished  by  a  heavy  fine.  At 
the  same  time  the  power  and  influence  of  these  magistrates 
were  heavily  fettered  by  two  ordinances,  which  forbade 
them  to  consult  the  people  or  submit  laws  to  them  without 
permission  from  the  senate ;  and  made  the  holding  of  the 
tribunate  a  bar  to  the  holding  of  any  curule  magistracy. 

The  power  of  the  consuls  and  praetors  was  restricted  by 
the  complete  separation  of  their  civil  and  military  functions, 


THE  SULLAN  CONSTITUTION.  305 

— an  arrangement  for  which  the  practice  of  recent  times 
had  formed  a  precedent.  Hitberto  there  had  devolved 
upon  the  two  chief  magistrates,  besides  the  proper  consular 
functions,  all  official  duties  for  which  no  special  magistrates 
were  appointed.  The  administration  of  justice  in  the 
capital,  aud  the  government  of  the  four  transmarine  pro- 
vinces, Sicily,  Sardinia,  and  the  two  Spains,  was  provided 
for  by  the  six  praetorships,  and  with  these  functions  the 
consuls  had  nothing  to  do.  There  remained  the  non- 
judicial business  of  the  capital,  and  the  military  command 
in  the  continent  of  Italy.  At  times,  when  these  eight 
magistrates  did  not  suffice,  and  when  there  were  extra- 
ordinary commands  to  be  provided  for,  there  were  two 
usual  expedients :  a  particular  military  command  was 
prolonged  after  its  term  had  expired,  or  non-military 
functions  were  combined  ;  as,  for  instance  —  the  two 
judicial  departments  at  Rome  might  be  managed  by  one 
praetor  instead  of  two,  or  the  duties  of  the  consul  in  the 
capital  might  be  performed  by  the  praetor  urbanus,  and 
so  one  magistrate  set  at  liberty  for  extraordinary  duties. 
But  in  such  cases  the  senate  merely  defined  the  sphere 
and  function  of  the  extraordinary  office  ;  the  particular 
person  who  was  to  fill  it  was  left  to  the  magistrates  them- 
selves to  decide  by  agreement  or  by  lot. 

Within  the  last  century  six  new  official  departments  had 
been  created, — the  governorships  of  the  five  new  provinces 
Macedonia,  Africa,  Asia,  Narbo,  Cilicia,  and  the  pre- 
sidency of  the  quaestio  de  repetundis  of  Calpurnius  ;  and 
yet  the  number  of  magistrates  had  not  been  increased. 
The  senate  preferred  to  fill  up  vacancies  by  prolonging 
the  term  of  office ;  for  this  prolongation  might  be  granted 
or  refused,  and  thus  the  senate  kept  a  hold  over  the 
magistrates.  Usually  those  magistrates  who  during  their 
year  of  office  were  confined  to  the  city  were  appointed  for 
a  second  year  to  a  transmarine  command. 

This  expedient  of  prolongation  was  seized  upon  by  Sulla 
as  the  basis  for  a  complete  separation  between  the  political 
authority  of  the  magistrate  over  Roman  citizens  and  his 
military  authority  over  non-citizens.  The  consulship  and 
praetorship  were  in  future  uniformly  extended  for  a  second 
year ;  the  first  year  was  devoted  to  civil,  the  second  to 
military  functions.     Moreover,  as  the  Roman  citizen  body 

20 


306  HISTORY   OF  ROME. 

now  embraced  all  Italy  south  of  the  Rubicon,  the  military 
jurisdiction  of  the  magistrate  did  not  extend  south  of  that 
river,  and  it  was  a  fundamental  principle  of  the  constitution 
that  there  should  ordinarily  be  no  troops  and  no  command- 
ant within  that  district. 

The  praetors  were  now  increased  from  six  to  eight ; 
and  according  to  the  new  arrangement  the  ten  chief 
magistrates  devoted  themselves  in  the  first  year  of  their 
office  to  the  business  of  the  capital ;  the  two  consuls  to 
government  and  administration;  two  praetors  to  the  admin- 
istration of  civil  law — the  other  six  to  the  administration 
of  the  newly  organized  criminal  justice.  During  the  second 
year,  they  were  invested  with  the  command  of  the  ten  chief 
governorships,  Italian  Gaul  having  been  added  to  the  list 
of  provinces. 

The  effect  of  these  regulations  was  very  largely  to 
increase  the  power  of  the  senate  over  the  magistrates.  In 
the  first  place,  all  offices,  whether  at  home  or  abroad,  were 
for  the  future  strictly  limited  to  one  year ,  whereas  in 
former  times  the  same  man  had  held  the  same  office  for  two 
or  even  more  years.  Secondly,  by  the  arrangement  as  to 
military  commands,  no  one  could  in  future  be,  as  Marius 
had  been,  both  commander-in-chief  and  supreme  civil 
magistrate.  Thirdly,  the  whole  military  power  became, 
formally  at  least,  dependent  on  the  senate ;  the  people 
chose  the  consuls  and  praetors,  but  it  was  the  senate  that 
conferred  on  them  the  military  authority  by  prolonging 
their  term  of  office  for  a  second  year  as  proconsuls  or 
propraetors. 

The  censorship  was  not  formally  abolished,  but  its  chief 
functions  were  taken  from  it.  The  new  arrangement  as 
to  the  quaestorship  provided  for  the  filling  up  of  the  senate, 
and  the  register  for  purposes  of  taxation  and  military 
service  was  unnecessary  now  that  Italy  was  tax  free, 
and  the  army  was  raised  by  enlistment ;  there  remained 
only  the  financial  functions,  which  were  in  future  to  be 
performed  by  the  consuls. 

The  finances  of  the  state  were  largely  affected  by  three 
of  Sulla's  acts  :  the  first,  the  con  version  of  the  Asiatic  taxes 
into  a  fixed  tribute,  certainly  produced  no  gain  to  the  state, 
though  the  tax-payers  were  greatly  benefited  :  but  the 
resumption  of  the  Campanian  domain  lands  to  the  state, 


THE  SULLAN  CONSTITUTION.  307 

and  the  abolition  of  the  corn  largesses,  secured  an  ample 
revenue  for  the  future. 

But  the  most  important  and  enduring  part  of  Sulla's 
work  was  the  reform  of  the  criminal  law. 

As  Sulla  found  it  the  judicial  system  was  threefold.  The 
whole  citizen  body  formed  a  court  of  appeal  from  sentences 
of  the  magistrate  affecting  the  caput  of  a  citizen.  Then 
there  was  the  ordinary  procedure  for  all  cases  civil  or 
criminal,  except  crimes  directed  against  the  state.  In 
these  cases,  one  of  the  two  praetors  investigated  the  general 
character  of  the  case,  and  determined  the  law  under  which 
it  was  to  be  tried  ;  he  then  nominated  a  single  judex,  who 
decided  the  case  on  the  lines  laid  down  by  the  praetor. 
Thirdly,  there  was  the  extraordinary  procedure  applicable 
to  particular  cases  or  groups  of  cases  of  importance, 
whether  civil  or  criminal.  For  such  cases,  not  a  single 
judex,  but  a  special  body  of  judices  was  appointed  by  a 
special  law.  Such  were  the  special  tribunals  appointed  in 
110  B.C.  for  the  investigation  of  the  alleged  treason  in 
connection  with  Numidian  affairs,  and  in  103  B.C.  with 
regard  to  the  treason  of  the  Roman  generals  in  Gaul,  in  105 
B.C.  Such  also  were  the  standing  commissions  for  the 
investigation  of  special  crimes,  the  earliest  of  which  was 
the  quaestio  Calpurnia  de  repetundis  of  149  B.C.,  and  the 
court  of  the  centumviri,  or  spear-court  (hasta),  (so  called 
from  the  shaft  of  a  spear  used  as  a  symbol  in  processes 
affecting  property,  and  really  consisting  of  105  men — three 
being  elected  by  each  of  the  thirty-five  tribes) ,  for  dealing 
with  cases  with  regard  to  inheritances.  Special  provision 
was  made  for  the  presidency  of  each  of  these  courts,  in  the 
law  constituting  them, — to  some  a  praetor  was  assigned,  to 
others  an  ex-aedile  or  ex-quaestor. 

The  reforms  introduced  by  Sulla  were  also  threefold. 
First,  he  largely  increased  the  number  of  standing  com- 
missions or  jury-courts.  Henceforth  there  were  at  least 
eight  of  these  quaestiones,  called  respectively,  quaestio  de 
repetundis  (exaction),  de  majestate  (treason),  de  vi  et 
injuriis  (injuries  to  person  or  honour),  inter  sicarios 
(murder),  de  ambitu  (bribery  at  elections),  de  falsis 
(fraud),  de  peculatu  (embezzlement),  de  adulteriis 
(adultery).  By  these  reforms  the  judicial  power,  both  of 
the  citizen  body  and  of  the  ordinary  courts,  was  curtailed, 


308  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

since  the  crime  of  majestas  was  withdrawn  from  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  former,  and  many  of  the  most  serious 
crimes  from  that  of  the  latter. 

Secondly,  the  presidents  of  these  new  courts  were  six 
of  the  praetors  and  other  specially  appointed  officers.  The 
power  to  appoint  special  commissions  for  special  cases  of 
course  still  remained. 

Thirdly,  the  jurymen  (judices)  were  in  future  drawn, 
not  from  the  equites,  but  from  the  senate.  The  constitu- 
tion of  the  spear-court  remained  unchanged. 

The  political  aim  of  these  measures  was,  of  course,  to 
exclude  the  equites  from  any  share  in  the  government ; 
but  they  also  constituted  a  most  valuable  system  of  legal 
reform.  From  this  time  dates  the  distinction,  hitherto 
unknown,  between  civil  and  criminal  causes  ;  the  former 
were  now  such  as  came  before  a  single  judex,  the  latter 
such  as  came  before  a  jury.  Moreover,  Sulla's  legislation 
may  be  regarded  as  forming  the  first  Roman  code  since 
the  Twelve  Tables,  and  the  first  criminal  code  which  had 
ever  been  issued  at  all.  Among  other  noteworthy  results 
of  Sulla's  arrangements  were  these :  that  capital  punish- 
ment fell  into  abeyance ;  for  the  whole  body  of  citizens 
could  alone  pronounce  sentence  of  death,  and  the  cogni- 
zance of  cases  of  high  treason  was  now  withdrawn  from 
it,  and  given  to  a  special  commission,  which  could  sentence 
neither  to  death  nor  imprisonment :  and  that  the  appoint- 
ment of  special  commissions  for  particular  cases  of  high 
treason,  such  as  the  quaestio  Varia  during  the  social  war, 
was  minimized,  now  that  there  was  a  special  court  for 
trying  the  offence. 

It  may  be  added  that  new  sumptuary  laws  were  enacted, 
to  restrain  luxury  at  funerals  and  banquets,  so  that  the 
law  now  attempted  to  perform  what  had  formerly  been 
the  functions  of  the  censors. 

To  the  Sullan  period,  though  perhaps  not  to  Sulla, 
belongs  an  important  development  of  the  municipal  system 
of  Italy.  Hitherto  the  government  of  Italy  had  been 
completely  centralized  in  Rome  ;  but  from  this  period 
dates  a  great  advance  in  the  direction  of  local  self-govern- 
ment by  each  particular  community.  "Antiquity  was 
certainly  as  little  able  to  dovetail  the  city  into  the  state 
as   to    develop   of   itself    representative  government   and 


THE  SULLAN  CONSTITUTION.  309 

other  great  principles  of  our  modern  state  life  ;  but  it 
carried  its  political  development  up  to  those  limits  at 
which  it  outgrows  and  bursts  its  assigned  dimensions,  and 
this  was  the  case  especially  with  Rome,  which  in  every 
respect  stands  on  the  line  of  separation  between  the  old 
and  the  new  intellectual  worlds."  The  social  war  was 
a  sufficiently  striking  proof  that  the  old  Roman  polity 
was  outgrown,  and  the  subsequent  arrangements  were  a 
great  stride  in  the  advance  from  the  city-state  to  the 
nation. 

Before  the  social  war  the  dependent  communities 
were  either  allowed  to  keep  their  municipal  constitution 
by  being  formally  declared  sovereign  independent  states 
of  non-citizens,  or,  if  they  obtained  the  franchise,  they 
were  deprived  of  all  local  municipal  rights,  so  that  even  the 
administration  of  justice  and  the  charge  of  building 
devolved  upon  the  Roman  praetors  and  censors.  The 
utmost  concession  ever  made  was  that  the  most  urgent  law 
cases  might  be  settled  on  the  spot  by  a  deputy  nominated 
from  Rome.  After  the  social  war,  when  all  Italy  became 
one  civic  community  by  the  extension  of  the  franchise,  it 
was  necessary  to  form  smaller  communities  within  the 
larger ,  it  was  impossible  that  the  local  affairs  of  all  Italy 
should  be  settled  by  the  magistrates  of  the  city  of  Rome. 
These  new  communities  were  formed  very  much  on  the 
model  of  Rome;  there  were  the  same  institutions  but 
with  different  names,  and  names  such  as  implied  In- 
feriority to  the  institutions  of  the  capital.  There  was 
a  citizen-assembly,  which  passed  laws  and  chose  the  local 
magistrates,  and  a  council  of  one  hundred  members  repre- 
senting the  Roman  senate.  The  duumviri  corresponded 
to  the  Roman  consuls ;  two  quaestors  managed  the  local 
funds,  and  there  were  the  local  colleges  of  pontifices  and 
augurs. 

The  imperial  authority  of  Rome,  however,  existed  side 
by  side  with  the  municipal  constitution.  Taxation  might 
be  imposed  or  public  buildings  set  on  foot  by  the  Roman 
authorities  as  well  as  by  those  of  the  town ;  and  in  event 
of  collision  the  town,  of  course,  gave  way.  It  is  probable 
that  in  judicial  matters  a  formal  division  of  functions  was 
made  to  avoid  the  extreme  inconvenience  of  a  collision  of 
authority.      The   more   important   cases,    both   civil    and 


310  HISTORY   OF  ROME. 

criminal,  would  probably  be  reserved  for  the  Roman 
authorities,  while  minor  suits,  or  such  as  were  most 
urgent,  were  decided  on  the  spot. 

Such  was  the  constitution  which  Sulla  now  presented 
to  the  Roman  state.  He  had  used  the  power  which  he  had 
gained  by  the  sword  to  introduce  really  valuable  reforms, 
and  to  compel  all  classes  in  the  state,  and  especially  the 
soldiery,  to  submit  once  more  to  civil  authority.  The 
mass  of  the  community,  if  they  did  not  welcome  the 
Sullan  arrangements,  at  any  rate  acquiesced  in  them 
without  open  opposition.  But  not  so  the  military  officers. 
The  two  most  trusted  lieutenants  of  Sulla,  Gnaeus  Pom- 
peius  and  Quintus  Ofella,  were  the  first  to  rebel.  The 
former  had  resisted  the  command  of  the  senate  to  disband 
his  army,  and  had  only  been  conciliated  by  the  concession 
of  the  honour  of  a  triumph.  The  latter,  in  defiance  of 
the  new  ordinance,  became  a  candidate  for  the  consul- 
ship without  passing  through  the  inferior  magistracies. 
In  his  case  no  lenience  was  shown.  Sulla  had  him  cut 
down  in  the  Forum,  and  then  explained  to  the  assembled 
citizens  his  reasons  for  the  act. 

On  the  completion  of  his  work,  Sulla  abdicated  the 
extraordinary  office  conferred  on  him  by  the  Valerian 
law.  Although  endowed  with  absolute  power,  he  had,  in 
the  case  of  many  of  his  enactments,  consulted  the  people 
or  the  senate.  Consuls  had  been  elected  for  81  B.C. ;  and 
for  the  next  year  Sulla  himself  was  consul  with  Quintus 
Metellus,  retaining  the  regency  but  without  exercising  it 
for  the  time.  For  79  B.C.  the  elections  were  left  entirely 
free,  and  early  in  that  year  he  resigned  the  regency, 
dismissed  his  lictors,  and  invited  any  citizen  who  wished 
to  call  him  to  account  to  speak. 

The  family  to  which  Sulla  belonged  had  remained  for 
many  generations  in  comparative  obscurity,  and  his 
character  at  first  gave  no  promise  of  an  extraordinary 
career.  Personally  he  was  blue-eyed  and  of  a  fair  com- 
plexion, with  piercing  eyes.  His  tastes  made  him  incline 
to  a  life  of  cultivated  luxury,  sometimes  descending  to 
debauchery.  He  was  a  pleasant  companion  in  city  or  in 
camp,  and  even  in  the  days  of  the  regency  would  unbend 
after  the  business  of  the  day.  One  of  the  most  curious 
traits    in   his   character   was  a  vein  of   cynicism,  which 


THE  SULLAN  CONSTITUTION.  311 

showed  itself  in  the  playful  but  dangerous  irony  of  many 
of  his  acts.  Thus  he  ordered  a  donation  from  the  spoil  of 
the  proscribed  to  be  given  to  a  wretched  author,  who  had 
written  a  panegyric  upon  him,  upon  condition  of  never 
singing  his  praises  again.  When  he  seized  the  treasures 
of  the  Greek  temples  he  declared  that  the  man  could  never 
fail  whose  chest  was  replenished  by  the  gods  themselves. 
He  displayed  great  vigour  both  of  body  and  mind  ;  even 
in  his  last  years  he  was  devoted  to  the  chase,  and,  after 
the  conquest  of  Athens,  he  could  remember  to  bring  with 
him  the  writings  of  Aristotle  to  Borne.  In  religion  he 
followed  the  general  tendency  of  the  age  towards  unbelief 
and  superstition.  He  nattered  himself  that  he  was  the 
chosen  favourite  of  the  gods,  and  believed  that  he  held 
intercourse  with  them  in  dreams  and  omens.  When  at 
the  summit  of  his  power,  he  formally  adopted  the  surname 
of  Felix,  and  used  it  from  that  time  forward. 

Sulla's  brilliant  career  seemed  to  come  to  him  rather  by 
caprice  of  fortune  than  by  any  seeking  of  his.  He  passed, 
like  the  ordinary  aristocrat,  through  the  usual  routine  of 
office ;  and  in  107  B.C.  the  quaestorship  under  Marius  in 
Africa  fell  to  his  lot.  He  soon  made  himself  master  of 
the  military  art,  and,  after  the  close  of  the  Jugurthine 
war,  performed  the  task  of  organizing  supplies  for  the 
Roman  army  in  the  war  with  the  Cimbri.  During  his 
praetorship,  in  93  B.C.,  the  first  Roman  victory  over  Mithra- 
dates  and  the  first  treaty  with  the  Parthians  took  place. 
He  took  a  prominent  part  in  the  social  war,  and,  as 
consul,  suppressed  the  Sulpician  revolution  with  startling 
energy  Wherever  Sulla  and  Marius  had  come  into 
competition  the  result  had  always  been  loss  of  renown 
to  the  elder  general,  and  increase  of  reputation  to  the 
younger;  and  the  revolution  of  88  B.C.,  which  ended  in 
the  outlawry  and  flight  of  Marius,  gave  to  Sulla  the  most 
important  position  within  the  empire.  Then  came  the 
Mithradatic  war  and  the  Cinnan  revolution, — and  it  was 
Sulla  who  crushed  the  enemies  of  Rome  abroad,  and  put 
down  anarchy  at  home.  Now  absolute  autocrat  of  the 
state,  he  abolished  the  Gracchan  constitution  which  had 
fettered  the  oligarchy  for  forty  years,  and  compelled  all 
orders  and  classes  to  yield  a  common  obedience  to  the 
law;   he  established  the  oligarchy  with  all  the  stability 


312  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

tliat  laws  and  constitution  can  give,  and  provided  it 
with  a  body-guard  and  an  army.  He  was  one  of  the  few 
generals  who  never  lo.st  a  battle,  nor  in  his  political  career 
was  he  ever  compelled  to  retrace  a  single  step  "  The 
capricious  goddess  of  fortune  seemed  in  his  case  to  have 
exchanged  caprice  for  steadfastness,  and  to  have  taken 
a  pleasure  in  loading  her  favourite  with  successes  and 
honours  whether  he  desired  them  or  not. 

There  is  nothing  original  in  the  character  of  Sulla's  con- 
stitution ;  and  the  reason  is  to  be  found  in  the  very  nature 
of  his  work.  His  task  was  to  restore,  not  to  create  :  the 
germ  at  least  of  every  one  of  his  institutions  existed 
before  ;  they  had  grown  up  out  of  the  previous  regime, 
and  were  merely  regulated  and  fixed  by  Sulla.  Even  the 
horrors  attaching  to  his  work  are  but  a  larger  edition  of 
the  doings  of  Nasica,  Opimius,  Caepio, — the  traditional 
oligarchic  mode  of  getting  rid  of  opponents.  Sulla  was 
but  the  instrument  of  the  oligarchy  to  which  he  belonged, 
and  for  the  Sullan  restoration,  not  Sulla  alone,  but  the 
body  of  the  Roman  aristocracy  and  its  government  in 
the  past  must  be  held  responsible.  When  the  work  was 
done,  Sulla  readily  gave  back  the  power  which  had  been 
conferred  upon  him ;  and  if  his  motive  was  rather  ennui 
than  public  spirit,  he  at  any  rate  must  be  acquitted  of 
the  charge  of  political  self-seeking  His  constitution 
could  not  last,  because  of  the  worthlessness  of  the  aris- 
tocracy. Sulla  might  "  erect  a  fortress,"  but  could  not 
"  create  a  garrison."  The  gratitude  of  posterity  is  due  to 
the  man  who,  in  the  course  of  his  hopeless  task,  carried 
out  such  admirable  isolated  reforms  as  those  of  the 
Asiatic  revenue  system  and  of  criminal  justice. 

Sulla's  worst  fault  was  the  unscrupulous  and  cynical 
violence  with  which  his  work  is  defiled.  The  public  posting 
of  the  lists  of  the  proseribed  ;  the  exposure  of  heads  in  the 
public  streets ;  the  public  auction  of  confiscated  goods,  as 
though  of  the  spoils  of  an  enemy  ;  the  cutting  down  of  a 
refractory  officer  in  the  Forum, — these  things  surpassed 
all  that  previous  revolutions  had  known.  Uncertainty 
and  frivolity  marked  many  of  his  public  acts.  He  could 
be  culpably  lenient  or  brutally  severe,  as  his  personal  likes 
or  dislikes  prompted ;  the  worst  enormities  which  were 
perpetrated  in  his  name  were  permitted  through  indiffer- 


THE  SULLAN  CONSTITUTION.  313 

ence  and  carelessness  ;  he  punished  with  the  same  non- 
chalance with  which  he  pardoned. 

The  short  remainder  of  his  life  was  passed  in  the  strictest 
retirement ;  in  a  little  more  than  a  year  he  died,  at  the  age 
of  sixty,  in  full  vigour  of  body  and  mind.  Immediately 
after  his  death,  voices  were  raised  in  opposition  to  the  pro- 
posal of  a  public  burial ;  but  his  memory  was  still  too 
fresh,  and  he  was  honoured  with,  perhaps,  the  grandest 
funeral  procession  Italy  had  ever  seen. 


AUTHORITIES. 

Sulla's  character  and  life. — Plutarch. 

Dictatorship.— Appian  B.  C.  i.  98,  99.    Plut.  33.    Liv.  Epit.  89.     Veil. 

ii.  28.     Cic.  De  L.  Agr.  iii.  2. 
Proscriptions—  Appian  B.  C.  95,  96,  103.     Plut.  31.     Val.  Max.  ix.  2. 

1.     Liv.  88,  89.     Flor.  ii.  9.    Veil.  ii.  28,  29 ;  Cic.  pro  Rose.  Am. 

43,  44. 
New  citizens. — Liv.  86.    Cic.  pro  Dom.  30  ;  pro  Caecina,  33,  35.    Sail. 

frag.  i.  Or.  Lep. 
Allotments.—  Liv.  89.    Appian  B.  C.  i.  100, 104.    Cic.  de  L.  Agr.  i.  8; 

ii.  28,  29  j  iii.  2,  3 ;  pro  Dom.  30. 
Lex  frumentaria. — Sail.  Hist.  frag.  i.  Or.  Lep. 
Equites — seats  in  the  theatre;    probable   because   restored   by  Lex 

Roscia,  67  B.C. 
Farming  system  abolished. — Cic.  pro  Flacc.  14,  32 ;  in  Verr.  i.  35,  89 ; 

ad  Q.  F.  i.  1,  11,  23.     Momm.  H.  of  R.  iv.  c.  5,  note.     Marq. 

Stv.  i.  p.  338  and  note. 
Judicia.— Veil.  ii.  32.     Tac.  Ann.  xi.  22. 
Senate  increased. — Appian  B.  C.  i.  100.     Liv.  89. 
Comitia  Tributa. — Cic.  pro  Clu.  40. 
Priestly  colleges. — Dio.  xxxvii.  37. 

Lex  Annalis. — Appian  B.  C.  i.  100,  101.     Cic.  Phil.  xi.  5. 
Tribunate.— Caes.  B.  C.  i.  7.     Appian  B.  C.  i.  100.     Liv.  89.     Veil.  ii. 

30.     Cic.  de  Leg.  iii.  4,  9,  19 ;   pro.   Clu.  40 ;   in  Verr.  i.  60. 

Ascon.  in  Cor.  p.  78.     Sail.  Hist.  fr.  i.  Or.  Lep.    Tac.  Ann.  iii.  27. 

Mom.  H.  of  R.  iv.  c.  10,  note. 
Provincial  governorships. — Cic.  ad  Fam.  i.  9  (Watson,  29)  ;  iii.6,  8  ;  ad. 

Att.  vi.  3. 
Quaestors.— Tac.  Ann.   xi.   22.     Lex.  Corn.  C.    I.  L.  1168,  n.  202. 

Bruns,  pt.  i.  c.  i.  12. 
Extension  of  bounds  of  Italy. — Seneca  de  Brev.  Vit.   14.     Dio.  xliii, 

50.     Momm.  H.  of  R.  iv.  c.  10,  note. 
Praetors. — Pomponius  Dig.  i.  2,  32.     Suet.  Jul.  41.     Dio.  xlii.  51. 
Cisalpine  Gaul. — Momm.  iv.  c.  10,  note. 
Censorship. — Schol.  ad  Cic.  Div.  in  Caec.  3  (Gronov.). 


314  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Criminal  law. — Cic.  in  Verr.  Act.  i.  13,  16.     Lex.  Cor.  Bruns,  pt.  i.  c. 

iii.  13. 
Centumviri. — Festus,  s.v.  Centum viralia. 
Sumptuary  laws. — Gell.  ii.  24.     Plut.  35.     Cic.  ad  Att.  xii.  35,  36. 

Macr.  bk.  ii. 
Municipal  system. — Cic.  De  L.  Agr.  ii.  31;  in  Pis.  c.  23;  pro  Sest. 

14;    Philipp.   xiii.  8.     Tac.  Hist.  iii.  34.     Caes.  B.  C.  iii.  22. 

Momms.  B.  St.  iii.  797,  815. 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

ECONOMIC   AND    FINANCIAL    CONDITION   OF   THE    EMPIRE    DURING 
THE    REVOLUTION   PERIOD. 

Revenue  :  from  Italy ;  from  the  provinces. — Expenditure :  for  mili- 
tary purposes ;  for  public  works. — Agriculture — Trade  and 
commerce — Social  life. 

The  general  tendency  and  result  of  the  revolution  period 
are  evident  from  the  history  of  the  time  and  from  the 
legislation  of  Sulla.  The  financial  condition  of  the  empire 
is  worth  more  particular  attention,  and  will  furnish  valu- 
able evidence  on  many  points  with  regard  to  the  social  and 
political  relations  of  the  time. 
Revenue. 

I.  From  Italy.  The  land-tax,  with  other  minor  imposts 
upon  Italians,  had  for  some  time  been  in  abeyance ; 
so  that  from  Italy,  including  Cisalpine  Gaul,  the  Roman 
exchequer  drew  nothing  but  (1)  the  produce  of  the  state- 
lands,  chiefly  those  in  Campania,  and  of  the  gold  mines  in 
the  north ;  (2)  customs  dues  on  goods  imported  for 
trading  purposes  ;  (3)  taxes  levied  on  the  manumission 
of  slaves. 

II.  From  the  provinces. 

(i.)  State  lands.  These  were  either  the  lands  belonging 
to  cities  destroyed  by  martial  law,  such  as  Leontini, 
Carthage,  Corinth ;  or  domain  lands  which  had  belonged 
to  former  rulers  dispossessed  by  the  Romans,  such  as  the 
lands  of  the  kings  of  Macedonia,  Pergamus,  Cyrene,  and 
the  mines  in  Spain.  All  such  property  was  leased,  like 
the  state  lands  in  Italy,  by  the  state  to  tenants,  and  the 
rents  formed  a  large  part  of  the  public  revenue. 


316  UI6T0RY  OF  ROME. 

• 

(ii.)  Taxation.  Within  the  bounds  of  the  empire  there 
were  some  states,  like  the  kingdoms  of  Numidia  and 
Cappadocia,  which  were  recognized  as  fully  sovereign  and 
independent ;  there  were  others,  like  Rhodes,  Massilia, 
Gades,  which  enjoyed  a  free  and  equal  alliance  by  special 
treaty  with  Rome,  (civitates  foederatae).  Both  classes 
were  exempt  from  ordinary  taxation,  and  were  merely 
bound  to  supply  ships  and  men  at  their  own  expense  in 
time  of  war.  Besides  these  there  were  a  few  scattered 
cities,  like  Narbo,  on  which  the  Roman  franchise  had  been 
specially  conferred ;  and  others  such  as  Centuripa  in 
Sicily  (civitates  immunes),  which  were  specially  exempted 
from  taxation ;  but  with  these  four  exceptions  the  whole 
extent  of  the  empire  contributed  to  the  Roman  exchequer. 

The  taxes  fall  under  three  principal  heads  : — 

1.  Decumae  and  scriptura.  The  first  was  a  tenth  of  the 
produce  of  arable  land;  the  second,  a  corresponding  tax 
upon  pasture  land.  Of  these  kinds  were  the  taxes  levied 
in  the  fertile  islands  of  Sicily  and  Sardinia. 

2.  Stipendium,  or  tributum — i.e.  a  fixed  sura  paid 
annually  by  a  community  to  the  Roman  exchequer ; 
amounting,  for  Macedonia,  to  about  £24,000  of  our 
money ;  for  Gyaros,  a  small  island  near  Andros,  to  about 
£6  4s.  This  tax  was  usually  lower  than  that  paid  by  the 
community  to  its  former  rulers  before  the  Roman  con- 
quest :  the  amount  was  fixed  by  the  Roman  authorities, 
while  the  magistrates  of  each  community  were  responsible 
for  collecting  and  paying  over  the  amount  to  the  Roman 
treasury. 

3.  Customs.  The  Romans  recognized  the  right  of  each 
community  to  levy  its  own  customs  at  its  own  ports  and 
frontiers,  and  made  no  attempt  to  set  up  a  general  tariff 
for  the  whole  empire.  Dues  were  levied  by  the  Romans 
themselves  at  all  the  ports  of  Italy ;  most  of  the  subject 
communities  in  the  same  way  levied  dues  on  their  own 
frontiers,  which  would  have  to  be  paid  even  by  Roman 
citizens,  unless  special  exemption  was  secured  by  treaty. 
Bnt  in  the  provinces  proper,  like  Sicily  and  Asia,  where 
the  Roman  state  was  sole  ruler  and  sovereign,  the 
customs,  of  course,  went  into  the  imperial  coffers.  The 
amount  raised  was  five  per  cent,  on  all  imports  or 
exports  in   Sicily,  and  two   and   a   half   in   Asia.      The 


CONDITION  OF  THE  EMPIRE.  317 

customs,  like  the  decumae  and  scriptura,  were  invariably 
leased  to  tax-farmers. 

These,  with  the  unimportant  item  of  tolls  from  roads, 
bridges,  canals,  etc.,  were  the  only  regular  taxes  imposed 
upon  the  provincials  by  the  Roman  government.  But 
they  are  far  from  representing  the  full  amount  of  the 
burdens  borne  by  the  provinces. 

In  the  first  place,  the  expenses  of  collection  were  large ; 
so  that  the  amount  paid  by  the  contributors  was  much 
greater  than  that  received  by  the  government.  Collection 
hj  middlemen  is  well  known  to  be  the  most  expensive 
system  of  all ;  and  at  Rome  the  lettings  were  so  large  that 
only  a  few  capitalists  could  undertake  them,  and  con- 
sequently the  competition  was  small,  and  the  profits  of 
the  lessees  large. 

Secondly  r  there  were  the  military  requisitions  in  time 
of  war ,  frequently,  also,  in  time  of  peace.  Legally,  all 
transport  pay  and  provisions  for  the  soldiers  were  provided 
by  the  Roman  government;  the  provincial  communities  had 
only  to  furnish  housing,  wood,  hay,  and  such  things.  But 
in  time  of  war  the  governor  demanded  from  them  grain, 
ships,  money,  or  anything  he  required  ;  and  though  such 
requisitions  were  considered  as  advances  to  be  made  good 
by  the  government,  yet  practically  they  became  a  serious 
burden.  This  is  proved  by  frequent  laws  restricting 
requisitions,  fixing  their  maximum  amount  and  the  rate  of 
compensation.  At  extraordinary  times  of  course  requisi- 
tions assumed  the  form  of  a  punishment,  as  when  Sulla  com- 
pelled the  subjects  of  Asia  to  give  forty-fold  pay  to  every 
common  soldier  among  them,  and  seventy-five  fold  to  every 
centurion. 

Thirdly  :  there  were  all  kinds  of  extortions,  legal  or 
illegal,  for  which  the  Roman  official  had  ample  opportunity. 
The  right  of  requisition,  the  free  quartering  of  soldiers 
and  of  the  clerks  and  lictors  and  innumerable  officials  in 
the  train  of  a  Roman  governor,  gave  him  sufficient  pre- 
text for  amassing  a  princely  fortune.  The  existence  of  a 
standing  commission  for  the  trial  of  such  offences  shows 
their  frequency. 

Lastly,  it  must  be  remembered  that  Rome  undertook 
the  military  expenses  only  of  her  subjects  :  all  other 
burdens — the  maintenance  of  roads  and  buildings,  the  pay 


318  BISTORT  OF  ROME. 

of  fleets  and  of  the  local  contingent  to  the  Roman  army — 
were  supported  by  the  subject  community,  and  must  have 
formed  a  considerable  addition  to  their  taxation.  For 
instance,  in  Judea,  the  Jews  paid  a  tenth  to  their  native 
princes  in  addition  to  the  temple  tribute  and  to  their 
payments  to  Rome. 

The  general  conclusion  at  which  we  must  arrive  with 
regard  to  provincial  taxation  is,  that,  though  moderate  in 
theory,  it  must  have  been  extremely  oppressive  in  practice. 

Expenditure. — I.  Military  and  administrative  expenses. 
The  taxation  of  the  Roman  empire,  like  the  tribute  paid 
to  Athens  by  her  subject  allies,  was  in  the  main  meant 
to  defray  the  expense  of  the  military  system  alone.  Hence 
its  comparatively  small  amount,  200,000,000  sesterces 
(£2,055,000), — only  two-thirds  of  the  annual  revenue  of 
the  King  of  Egypt.  Hence,  too,  it  may  be  guessed  that  the 
surplus  revenue  after  payment  of  expenses  was  small,  and 
that  provinces  like  the  Spains  and  Macedonia,  which 
required  a  large  garrison,  cost  more  than  they  yielded. 
Still,  in  the  times  before  the  revolution,  the  surplus  was 
large  enough  to  defray  the  expenses  of  public  buildings 
and  to  form  a  reserve  fund.  But  the  old  principle,  that 
the  Roman  hegemony  should  not  be  treated  as  a  privilege 
from  which  profit  might  be  derived,  was  infringed  upon  in 
the  latter  portion  of  this  period  in  several  ways  :  the 
customs  in  conquered  territories  were  appropriated  by 
Rome,  and  the  mode  of  levying  them  was  oppressive.  By 
Gaius  Gracchus  Roman  citizenship  was  treated  as  a 
privilege  conferring  a  right  to  a  certain  amount  of  corn  ; 
and  to  provide  the  money  for  these  largesses  the  soil  of 
Asia  was  declared  to  belong  absolutely  to  the  Roman  state, 
and  was  taxed  accordingly. 

II.  Public  works.  The  earlier  portion  of  this  epoch  was 
an  era  of  vast  public  undertakings.  A  new  road  was  made, 
in  132  B.C., from  Capua  to  the  Straits  of  Sicily — branching 
from  the  great  road  which  led  from  Rome  through  Capua 
to  Tarentum  and  Brundisium.  The  coast  road  on  the  east 
was  completed  by  extension  southwards  to  Brundisium  and 
northwards  to  Aquileia.  About  Rome  itself,  the  Mulvian 
bridge  over  the  Tiber  was  rebuilt  of  stone.  In  North  Italy 
the  Via  Postumia  was  constructed  in  148  B.C.,  from  Genua 
to  Aquileia  through  Placentia,  Cremona,  and  Verona,  thus 


CONDITION  OF  TEE  EMPIRE.  319 

connecting  the  two  seas.  Gaius  Gracchus  provided  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  roads  by  assigning  pieces  of  ground  by 
the  side  of  them  to  which  was  attached  the  duty  of  keep- 
ing them  in  repair. 

To  the  same  period  belong  the  great  provincial  high- 
ways :  the  Via  Domitia,  connecting  Italy  with  Spain  ;  the 
Via  Egnatia  and  the  Via  Gabinia,  connecting  the  ports  of 
the  East  coast  of  the  Adriatic  with  the  interior.  The 
draining  of  the  Pomptine  marshes  was  undertaken  in  160 
B.C.  The  two  ancient  aqueducts  were  thoroughly  repaired, 
and  two  new  ones,  the  Marcia  and  the  Calida,  constructed. 
Not  only  were  these  stupendous  works  carried  out,  but  paid 
for  in  cash  ;  the  Marcian  aqueduct,  which  cost  two  millions 
of  our  money,  was  paid  for  in  three  years.  Nor  did  these 
costly  undertakings  prevent  the  accumulation  of  a  reserve, 
which  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  period  amounted  to 
£860,000. 

At  the  same  time,  it  must  be  said  that,  even  in  the  early 
part  of  this  epoch,  before  the  revolution,  other  duties  of 
the  government  at  least  as  imperative  as  these  were  entirely 
neglected.  Brigands  infested  the  frontier  countries,  and 
even  the  valley  of  the  Po.  There  was  no  Roman  fleet,  and 
the  vessels  raised  by  the  provincials  were  not  numerous 
enough  to  check  piracy,  much  less  to  carry  on  a  naval 
war.  The  traffic  of  Rome  had  still  to  depend  upon  the 
old  wooden  Janicnlau  bridge  over  the  Tiber,  and  the 
roadstead  of  Ostia  was  allowed  to  become  blocked  with 
Band. 

But  from  the  time  of  the  revolution  the  picture  is  far 
worse.  Public  works  were  at  a  standstill ;  either  because 
the  corn  largesses  drained  the  treasury,  or  because  the 
oligarchy  were  bent  upon  accumulating  a  large  reserve 
fund  in  self-defence.  (The  reserve  is  said  to  have  reached 
its  highest  point  in  91  B.C.)  The  Social  war  was  the  first 
severe  strain  to  which  the  Roman  state  had  been  subjected 
since  the  Hannibalic  war.  During  the  latter  the  reserve 
wras  not  touched  till  the  tenth  year,  when  the  resources 
of  taxation  were  exhausted ;  the  Social  war  was  sup- 
ported from  the  first  from  the  reserve,  and  when  this  was 
exhausted  the  government  preferred  to  sell  the  public 
sites  in  the  city  to  imposing  a  tax  upon  the  citizens. 

Agriculture. — During  this  epoch  the  forces  previously  at 


320  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

work  are  visible  in  increased  activity,  and  already  produced 
startling  results.  The  smaller  holdings  were  absorbed  by 
the  large  estates,  "  as  the  sun  absorbs  the  drops  of  rain." 
The  senatorial  government  rather  favoured  than  opposed 
this  process,  which  the  opposition  constantly  endeavoured 
to  counteract.  The  two  Gracchi  gave  80,000  new  farmers 
to  Italy,  and  Sulla  settled  120,000  of  his  veterans  on  the 
land,  but  the  process  still  went  on ;  the  small  farms  were 
constantly  being  absorbed,  while  the  creation  of  new 
farmers  was  only  intermittent.  In  the  provinces  the  same 
evils  existed,  and  not  the  slightest  attempt  was  made  to 
check  them  ;  wThile  they  were  attended  with  this  additional 
disadvantage,  that  the  rents  were  of  course  sent  out  of 
the  country  to  Italy. 

In  Trade  and  Commerce,  there  is  little  but  inactivity  to 
record  ;  the  Romans  destroyed  the  industries  of  Corinth, 
and  created  nothing  in  their  place.  Building  was,  perhaps, 
an  exception  to  the  general  stagnation,  but  produced  little 
benefit  to  the  commonwealth,  as  only  slave  labour  was 
employed. 

Commerce  was  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  the  Romans, 
and  the  political  ascendancy  of  Rome  was  unscrupulously 
used  to  favour  this  monopoly.  Usury  was  one  of  the  most 
lucrative  of  trades  :  for  instance,  the  indemnity  imposed 
by  Sulla  upon  the  province  of  Asia  was  advanced  by  the 
Roman  capitalists,  and  swelled  in  fourteen  years  to  six 
times  the  original  amount;  public  buildings,  woi'ks  of  art, 
even  their  children,  had  to  be  sold  by  the  unfortunate 
communities  to  meet  their  claims.  Next  in  importance  to 
money  dealing  came  the  export  of  wine  and  oil  from  Italy 
to  all  parts  of  the  Mediterranean,  and  the  import  of  all 
kinds  of  articles  of  luxury.  The  importation  of  slaves  was 
enormous,  especially  from  Syria  and  Asia  Minor.  The  chief 
emporia  for  the  reception  of  imports  were  Ostia  and 
Puteoli,  which  traded  chiefly  with  Alexandria  and  the 
cities  of  Syria,  in  the  valuable  commodities  of  the  East. 

Thus,  side  by  side  with  the  political  oligarchy  of  sena- 
torial families,  there  was  a  financial  oligarchy  of  capital- 
ists. These  men  absorbed  the  rents  of  the  soil  of  Italy, 
and  of  the  richest  parts  of  the  provinces  ;  the  usury  and 
the  commerce  of  the  whole  empire  were  in  their  hands,  and 
even  of  the  state  revenue  itself  they  drew  a  considerable 


CONDITION  OF  THE  EMPIRE.  321 

share  by  their  profits  as  lessees.  Their  influence  in  the 
state  is  clearly  seen  in  the  destruction  of  Corinth  and 
Carthage,  the  commercial  rivals  of  Rome ;  and  it  is  to 
be  remembered  that  their  wealth  was  based,  not  upon 
sound  economic  principles,  but  upon  the  political  supre- 
macy of  Rome ;  hence  every  political  crisis  was  attended 
by  a  financial  crisis. 

Oue  important  result  of  the  commercial  monopoly  of 
Rome  was  an  interchange  of  population,  greatly  to  the  dis- 
advantage of  the  Roman  state.  Everywhere  in  the  pro- 
vinces there  were  large  numbers  of  Italians  temporarily 
settled,  mostly  for  commercial  reasons.  We  have  seen  that 
80,000  Italians  perished  in  a  single  day  in  Asia  Minor,  and 
20,000  in  Delos.  Again,  the  population  of  Italy  suffered 
enormous  diminution  during  the  Social  wars,  when  300,000 
persons  are  said  to  have  perished.  In  return  for  the  loss 
of  these  citizens  Italy  received  vast  numbers  of  provincials, 
chiefly  oriental  Greeks,  who  acted  as  physicians,  school- 
masters, and  priests,  or  who  came  to  her  ports  as  traders 
and  mariners ;  while  the  proportion  of  slaves  to  freemen  was 
continually  increasing.  The  servile  insurrections — the 
appeals  to  slaves,  in  times  of  disturbance,  to  take  up  arms 
against  their  masters,  are  plain  enough  signs  of  the  times. 
"If  we  conceive  of  England  with  its  lords,  its  squires, 
above  all  its  city,  but  with  its  freeholders  and  farmers 
converted  into  proletarians  and  its  labourers  and  sailors 
converted  into  slaves,  we  shall  gain  an  approximate  image 
of  the  population  of  the  Italian  peninsula  in  those  days." 

Social  Features. — Socially,  no  less  than  politically  or 
financially,  the  period  is  one  of  decadence,  and  is  marked 
by  growing  extravagance  and  frivolity.  Enjoyment  lost  all 
freshness  and  spontaneity,  and  became  a  laborious  and 
pedantic  study.  Animal  hunts  and  gladiatorial  games 
became  the  chief  feature  in  the  public  festivals.  Huge 
sums  were  expended  at  every  great  funeral  on  public 
games — Marcus  Aemilius  Lepidus  left  strict  injunctions 
to  his  children  to  avoid  empty  show,  and  not  to  spend  more 
at  his  obsequies  than  1,000,000  asses  (£10,200).  Houses 
and  gardens  reached  fabulous  prices  ;  gambling  and  extra- 
vagance in  dress  were  fashionable  foibles  ;  but  the  favourite 
mode  of  expenditure  was  on  the  luxuries  of  the  table. 

Every  villa  along  the  coast  had  its  tanks  for  securing  a 

21 


322  HlSTOTiY  OF  ROME. 

constant  supply  of  fish.  At  the  best  entertainments,  not 
whole  birds,  but  only  the  most  delicate  portions  were  served 
up ;  and  the  guests  were  expected  merely  to  taste  of  the 
multitude  of  dishes  presented  to  them.  There  were 
sumptuary  laws  totally  prohibiting  certain  delicacies, 
regulating  the  price  <>f  meals  and  the  amount  of  plate,  but 
of  all  the  Roman  nobles  only  three  are  said  to  have  kept 
these  laws,  and  that  on  account  of  regard  for  the  prin- 
ciples of  Stoic  philosophy,  not  for  the  law.  A  century 
earlier,  few  houses  contained  any  silver  plate  beyond  the 
traditional  salt  dish,  but  in  Sulla's  time  there  were  150 
silver  dishes  at  Rome  of  100  lb.  weight.  Some  of  it  was 
of  such  exquisite  workmanship  as  to  be  valued  at  eighteen 
times  its  weight  of  metal,  and  Lucius  Crassus  gave  100,000 
sesterce3  (£1050)  for  a  pair  of  silver  cups. 

Perhaps  the  most  significant  mark  of  the  corruption  of  the 
a^e  is  the  frequency  of  divorce  and  the  general  aversion  to 
marriage.  Even  Metellus  Macedonicus,  censor  in  131  B.C.,  a 
man  renowned  for  his  honourable  domestic  life,  urged  the 
duty  of  marriage  upon  his  fellow-citizens  in  the  following 
terms  :  "  If  we  could,  citizens,  we  should  indeed  all  keep 
clear  of  this  burden.  But  as  nature  has  so  arranged  it  that 
we  cannot  either  live  comfortably  with  wives  or  live  at  all 
without  them,  it  is  proper  to  have  regard  rather  to  the 
permanent  weal  than  to  our  own  brief  comfort."  These 
facts  are  important,  for  it  is  only  by  trying  to  realize  the 
ignoble  private  life  of  the  time  that  we  can  comprehend 
the  political  corruption  which  prevailed.  There  were 
exceptions,  especially  among  the  rural  towns,  but  immo- 
rality was  the  rule.  One  of  the  censors  of  92  B.C.  publicly 
reproached  his  colleague  with  having  shed  tears  over  a  pet 
murena ;  the  other  retaliated  on  the  former  that  he  had 
buried  three  wives  and  shed  tears  over  none  of  them. 

In  161  B.C.,  an  orator  in  the  Forum  gave  the  following 
description  of  the  senatorial  juryman  : — 

"  They  play  hazard,  delicately  perfumed,  surrounded  by 
their  mistresses.  As  the  afternoon  advances,  they  summon 
the  servant  and  bid  him  make  inquiries  at  the  comitium, 
what  has  occurred  in  the  Forum,  who  has  spoken  in  favour 
of  or  against  the  new  project  of  law,  what  tribes  have 
voted  for  and  what  against  it.  At  length  they  go  them- 
selves to  the  judgment  seat,  just  early  enough  not  to  bring 


CONDITION  OF  THE  EMPIRE.  323 

the  process  down  on  their  own  neck.  Reluctantly  they 
come  to  the  tribunal  and  give  audience  to  the  parties. 
Those  who  are  concerned  bring  forward  their  cause.  The 
juryman  orders  the  witness  to  come  forward ;  he  himself 
goes  aside.  When  he  returns,  he  declares  that  he  has  heard 
everything,  and  asks  for  the  documents.  He  looks  into  the 
writings — he  can  hardly  keep  his  eyes  open  for  wine. 
When  he  thereupon  withdraws  to  consider  his  sentence,  he 
says  to  his  boon  companions,  '  What  concern  have  I  with 
these  tiresome  people  ?  Why  should  we  not  rather  go  to 
drink  a  cup  of  mulse  mixed  with  Greek  wine,  and  accom- 
pany it  with  a  fat  fieldfare,  and  a  good  fish — a  veritable 
pike  from  the  Tiber  island  ?  ' 

"  All  this  was,  no  doubt,  very  ridiculous  ;  but  was  it 
not  a  very  serious  matter  that  such  things  were  subjects  of 
ridicule  ?  " 


AUTHORITIES. 

Italian  Domains. — Cic.  de  L.  Agr.  ii.  28  and  passim.     Liv.  xxvi.  16. 

App.  B.  C.  i.  7. 
Mines.— Pirn.   N.    H.   33,  34,  37.     Liv.   xxxiv.  21;    xxxix.  24;   xlv. 

18,  29.     Strab.  iii.  146 ;  v.  151. 
Taxation  generally.— Mar q.  Stv.  182-203,  247-252,  298-301. 
Manumission  tax. — Cic.  ad  Att.  ii.  16.     Liv.  xxvii.  10. 
Provincial  Domains,  civitates  foederatae,  immunes,  liberae :  decumae. 

—Cic.  in  Verr.    ii    iii.  6,   8,  9,  and  passim;  Caes.  de  B.  Afr. 

cap.  ult. 
Scriptura. — Fest.  saltum,  scriptuarius.     Varro    R.    R.   II.   i.     Cic.   in 

Verr.  ii.  2 ;  ad  Fam.  xiii.  65 ;  pro  L.  Manil.  6.     Plin.  N.  H.  xix. 

3,  15. 
Tributum. — Cic.  in  Verr.  ii.  53,  55,  sqq. ;   ad  Att.  v.  16 ;   ad    Fam. 

iii.  8.     Appian  B.  C.  v.  4. 
Portoria. — Cic.  in  Verr.  ii.  75.     Plin.  N.   H.  xii.  14.     Liv.  xxxii.  7; 

xl.  51.     Cic.  de  L.  Agr.  ii.  29 ;  pro  L.  Manil.  6. 
Societates. — Tac.  Ann.  iv.  fi.     Cic.  in  Verr.  ii.  3,  64,  70;  iii.  41:  ad 

Att.  i.  17 ;  xi.  10 :  ad  Fam.  xiii.  9,  65  ;  Brans,  pt.  i.  c.  v.  6,  SC.  De 

Oropiis. 
Requisitions  and  exactions. — Cic.  pro  L.  Manil.  14.     Div.  in.   Q.  C. 

10;  in  Verr.  i.  34,  38;  ii.  60;  iii.  5,  81,  86,  87;  v.  17,  23,  31, 

38,  52  ;  pro  Flacc.  12,  14 ;  Philipp.  xi.  12. 
Amount  of  revenue. — Pint.  Pomp.  45. 
Public  works. — Frontin.  de  Aqneductibus.     Plin.  N.  H.  xxxi.  3,  6; 

xxxvi.  15.     Vitrnv.  de  Aq.  vii. ;    viii.    6,    7.     Plut.  C.  Grac.  7. 

Aur.  Vic.  de  V.  I.  Ixxvii.  8. 


324  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Trade    and    Agriculture. — Rei    Rusticae    Scriptores    (vid.   pp.   xvii., 

xviii.).     Plin.  N.  H.  xvii.,  xviii. 
Usury. — In  Verr.  iii.  70.     Hor.  Sat.  I.  ii.  14. 
Social  features. — Cic.  ad.  Att.  ii.  19;   xi.  23;  xii.  35,  36;  ad.  Fam. 

viii.  7  ;  pro  Mur.  18 ;  de  Orat.  40,  56  ;  de  Legg.  ii.  24 ;  de  Off.  ii. 

16  ;  Seneca  de  Brev.  Vit.  20 ;  Liv.  Epit.  48.     Gell.  i.  6  ;  ii.  24  and 

passim.     Macrob.  ii.  13  and  passim.     Plut.  Sulla  35.     Cic.  41. 

Val.  Max.  iii.  10,  15 ;  ix.  1,  and  passim.    "Suet.  Ang.  89.    Nero,  2. 

Plin.  N.  H.  x.  50,  s.  71 ;  xxxvi.  3  ;  viii.  16,  s.  20;  xvii.  1.    Aelian. 

Hist.  Anim.  viii.  4.     Cic  speeches  and  letters  passim,  esp.  pro 

Cluent.  pro  Caul. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

MARCUS    LEPIDDS   AND    SERTOKIUS. 

Classes  which  composed  the  Opposition,  and  characters  of  ite 
leading  men,  after  the  death  of  Sulla. — Insurrection  of 
Lepidus  (78-77  B.c.).^Sertorian  war  (80-72  B.C.). 

Sulla's  arrangements  had  been  acquiesced  in  by  all  the 
chief  classes  in  the  state,  and  on  his  death  his  constitution 
had  nothing  to  fear  from  any  organized  body  of  opponents. 
There  was,  however,  a  large  but  heterogeneous  body  of 
malcontents  opposed  to  the  present  condition  of  things 
for  widely  different  reasons. 

1.  There  were  the  jurists — men  of  strict  legal  training, 
who  detested  Sulla's  arbitrary  mode  of  procedure,  and  who 
even  during  his  life  had  ventured  to  disregard  several  of 
his  laws;  for  instance,  those  depriving  certain  Italian 
communities  of  the  franchise. 

2.  There  was  the  liberal  minority  in  the  senate,  who 
had  always  favoured  reform  and  compromise  with  the 
democratic  party  and  the  Italians. 

3.  The  thorough- going  democrats,  who  clung  to  the 
traditional  watch-words  of  the  party,  and  whose  special 
aim  wTas  the  restoration  of  the  tribunician  power-  Besides 
these,  there  were  many  important  classes  of  men,  whom 
Sulla's  enactments  had  either  injured  or  left  unsatisfied. 

4.  The  population  who  lived  between  the  Po  and  the 
Alps  (Transpadani),  upon  whom  Latin  rights  had  been 
conferred,  and  who  were  eager  for  the  full  Roman  franchise. 

5.  The  freedmen,  who  swarmed  in  the  capital,  and 
whose  political  influence  had  been  annihilated  by  their 
relegation  to  the  old  four  city  tribes. 


326  niSTORY  OF  ROME. 

6.  The  capitalists,  chiefly  of  equestrian  rank,  for  whose 
grievances  see  p.  303. 

7.  The  populace,  who  had  been  deprived  of  their  free 
corn. 

8.  All  that  numerous  class  of  burgesses  whose  property 
had  been  curtailed  or  confiscated  to  furnish  allotments  for 
Sulla's  veterans. 

9.  The  proscribed  and  their  children  and  connections. 
It  was  a  point  of  honour  with  the  friends  of  these  to 
procure  the  recall  of  the  living,  and  the  removal,  in  the  case 
of  the  dead,  of  the  stigma  attaching  tc  their  memory. 

10.  To  all  these  classes  one  more  remains  to  be  added — 
the  men  of  ambition  and  the  men  of  ruined  fortunes.  The 
latter  included  alike  the  aristocratic  lords,  who  had  lost 
their  patrimony  by  riotous  living,  and  the  Sullan  colonists, 
who  refused  to  settle  down  to  a  life  of  husbandry  and  were 
eager  for  fresh  spoil.  The  former  included  men,  outside 
the  senatorial  circle,  who  were  eager  to  force  their  way  into 
office  by  popular  favour  ;  and  men  of  more  daring  ambition, 
who  might  perhaps  emulate  Gaius  Gracchus. 

It  is  most  necessary,  for  the  understanding  of  the  history 
of  the  following  years,  that  all  these  elements  of  opposition 
should  be  fully  grasped  ;  and  it  may  be  well  here  to  recall 
to  mind  the  two  great  and  constant  difficulties  of  the  Roman 
government — the  difficulty  of  controlling  its  military 
governors  in  the  provinces  ;  and  the  difficulty  of  managing 
the  masses  of  slaves  and  freedmen  in  the  capital,  without 
either  police  or  troops  at  its  disposal. 

It  was,  perhaps,  the  greatest  misfortune  of  all  that 
there  was  everywhere  at  this  period  a  dearth  of  political 
leaders.  The  management  of  parties  was  in  the  hands  of 
political  clubs,  or  hetaeriae,  a  system  which  had  existed  for 
centuries  at  Rome,  but  which  was  now  seen  in  its  worst 
and  most  aggravated  form.  These  clubs  were  formed 
among  optimates  and  populares  alike;  and  even  the 
mass  of  burgesses  was  formed  into  societies  according  to 
voting  districts,  under  the  direction  of  officers  called 
divisores  tribuum.  "  Everything  with  these  political 
clubs  was  bought  and  sold  ;  the  vote  of  the  electors  above 
all,  but  also  the  votes  of  the  senator  and  the  judge  ;  the 
fists,  too,  which  produced  the  street  riot,  and  the  ring- 
leader who  directed  it.     The  associations  of  the  upper  and 


MARCUS  LEriDUS  AND  SERTORIUS.  327 

of  the  lower  classes  were  distinguished  only  in  the  matter 
of  tariff.  The  hetaeria  decided  the  elections  ;  the  hetaeria 
decreed  the  impeachment ;  the  hetaeria  conducted  the 
defence ;  it  secured  the  distinguished  advocate ;  and  it 
coutracted,  in  case  of  need,  respecting  an  acquittal  with  one 
of  the  speculators  who  prosecuted  on  a  great  scale  the 
lucrative  traffic  in  judges'  votes."  One  of  the  most  expert 
wire-pullers  of  these  caucuses  was  Publius  Cethegus. 

Among  the  Optimates  the  most  notable  men  were 
Quintus  Metellus  Pius,  consul  in  80  B.C.;  Quintus  Luta- 
tius  Catulus,  son  of  the  victor  of  Vercellae ;  Lucius  and 
Marcus  Lucullus,  who  had  shown  considerable  military 
talents.  But  none  of  these  men  had  any  conception  of 
the  greatness  of  the  crisis ;  their  political  creed  did  not  go 
beyond  the  maintenance  of  the  oligarchy  and  the  sup- 
pression of  demagogism  ;  their  ambition  was  satisfied  by 
a  consulship  and  a  triumph. 

Three  men  alone  are  worth  a  longer  consideration.  The 
first  is  Ghiagas  Pompeius.  born  106  B.C.  He  had  raised 
troops  and  fought  for  Sulla  in  the  second  civil  war,  and 
had  enjoyed  the  titles  of  imperator  and  triumphator  before 
his  age  permitted  him  to  stand  for  any  office.  Already 
he  began  to  be  known  by  the  title  of  Magnus.  He  was 
an  able  soldier  but  no  genius ;  cautious  to  timidity,  and 
averse  to  strike  till  he  had  established  an  immense 
superiority  over  his  opponent.  In  culture,  as  well  as  in 
integrity  of  character,  he  was  at  least  up  to  the  level  of 
the  time ;  he  was  a  good  neighbour,  a  good  husband  and 
father.  His  temperament  was  kind  and  humane ;  and  he 
was  the  first  to  depart  from  the  custom  of  putting  to 
death  captive  kings  and  generals  after  a  triumph.  Yet 
he  sent  a  divorce  to  the  wife  whom  he  loved,  at  the 
command  of  Sulla,  because  she  belonged  to  an  outlawed 
family.  For  politics  he  had  little  aptitude.  He  was 
awkward  and  stiff  in  public ;  easily  managed  by  his 
freedmen  and  clients ;  eager  for  power,  but  affecting  to 
despise  it.  His  relations  to  the  parties  of  the  time  was 
peculiar.  Though  a  Sullan  officer  he  was  opposed  to  Sulla 
personally.  Nor  was  he  in  sympathy  with  the  senatorial 
government ;  for  his  family  was  not  yet  fully  established 
among  the  aristocracy,  and  Pompeius  himself  had  once 
been  a  Cinnan  adherent.     He  had  no  political  sagacity, 


328  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

and  little  political  courage.  "  He  might  have  had  a 
definite  and  respectable  position,  had  lie  contented  himself 
with  being  the  general  of  the  senate — the  office  for  which 
he  was  from  the  beginning  destined.  With  this  he  was 
not  content,  and  so  he  fell  into  the  fatal  plight  of  wishing 
to  be  something  else  than  he  could  be.  He  was  constantly 
aspiring  to  a  special  position  in  the  state,  and  when  it 
offered  itself  he  could  not  make  up  his  mind  to  occupy  it. 
He  was  deeply  indignant  when  persons  and  laws  did  not 
bend  unconditionally  before  him,  and  yet  he  bore  himself 
everywhere  with  no  mere  affectation  of  modesty,  as  one  of 
many  peers,  and  trembled  at  the  mere  thought  of  under- 
taking anything  unconstitutional.  .  .  Constantly  tormented 
by  an  ambition  which  was  frightened  at  its  own  aims, 
his  deeply  agitated  life  passed  joylessly  away  in  a  per- 
petual inward  contradiction." 

Marcus  Crassus  was  famed  for  his  boundless  activity, 
especially  in  the  acquisition  of  wealth :  he  was  contractor, 
builder,  banker,  and  usurer,  and  carried  on  numerous 
other  trades  through  his  freedmen.  Unlike  Pompeius,  he 
was  unscrupulous  in  the  means  he  employed.  He  was 
proved  to  have  committed  a  forgery  in  the  matter  of 
the  Sullan  proscription  lists;  he  did  not  refuse  a  legacy 
because  the  will  which  gave  it  him  was  known  to  be 
forged;  and  he  allowed  his  bailiffs  to  dislodge  the  small 
farmers  adjoining  his  estates  by  force  and  by  fraud. 
He  soon  became  the  richest  man  in  Rome ;  and  at  his 
death,  after  expending  enormous  sums,  he  was  still  worth 
170,000,000  sesterces  (£1,700,000).  But  his  wealth  was 
only  a  means  to  the  gratification  of  his  ambition ;  he 
extended  his  connection  by  every  possible  means ;  he 
could  salute  every  burgess  of  the  capital  by  name ;  never 
refused  his  services  as  an  advocate,  and,  though  without 
any  gift  of  oratory,  overcame  all  obstacles  by  his  pertina- 
city in  speaking.  He  advanced  money  on  loan  to  in- 
fluential men  without  distinction  of  party,  and  thus 
acquired  a  power  which  none  dared  to  provoke.  His 
ambition  knew  no  bounds ;  while  he  stood  alone  the 
crown  of  Rome  was  beyond  his  grasp,  but  it  was  not 
impossible  that  with  the  aid  of  a  suitable  partner  he 
might  attain  to  supremacy  in  the  state. 

In  the  ranks  of  the  democrats  the  revolution  had  made 


MARCUS  LEPIDUS  AND  SERTORIUS.  329 

such  havoc  that  scarcely  a  man  of  note  survived.  Of  the 
rising  generation,  Gaius  Julius  Caesar  was  now  only 
twenty-four  years  of  age,  but  was  already  perhaps  the 
third  most  important  man  in  Rome.  His  family  connec- 
tions naturally  inclined  him  towards  the  democratic 
party ;  for  his  father's  sister  had  been  the  wife  of  Marius,  / 
and  his  own  wife  was  the  daughter  of  Cinna ;  while  his 
own  early  career  had  so  far  been  one  of  opposition  to  the 
senatorial  rule.  He  had  refused  to  divorce  his  wife  at 
the  bidding  of  Sulla,  and  with  difficulty  escaped  pro- 
scription at  the  intercession  of  his  relatives. 

But  Caesar  could  only  be  the  hope  of  the  future,  and 
the  actual  leadership  of  the  democratic  party  fell  into 
the  hands  of  Marcus  Aprpilina  TiPpidnsJ  who  had  been  an 
optimate,  but  had  joined  the  opposition  to  escape  im- 
peachment for  extortion  during  his  government  of  Sicily. 
He  was  a  vehement  orator,  but  had  none  of  the  qualities 
of  a  leader,  whether  in  the  council  or  in  the  field.  How- 
ever, he  was  elected  as  the  democratic  leader  to  the  con- 
sulship of  78  B.C. 

Thus  the  death  of  Sulla  found  the  opposition  leader  in 
possession  of  the  chief  magistracy ;  while,  by  a  train  of 
events  to  be  shortly  described,  the  important  province  of 
Spain  was  practically  abandoned  to  the  enemies  of  the 
senate 

Lepidus  resolved  to  strike  an  immediate  blow.  An  out- 
break at  the  very  funeral  of  the  regent  was  hardly  pre- 
vented by  the  influence  of  Pompeius,  and  by  fear  of  the 
Sullan  veterans ;  and  preparations  were  at  once  begun  for 
a  new  revolution.  The  conspirators  aimed  at  the  over- 
throw of  Sulla's  constitution ;  at  the  revival  of  the  free 
distributions  and  of  the  tribunician  power;  at  the  recall  of 
the  banished,  and  the  restoration  of  confiscated  lands. 
The'  exiles  already  began  to  return.  Many  noted  Marians, 
such  as  Graius  Perpenna  and  Lucius  Cinna,  joined  the  plot, 
but  Caesar  more  prudently  abstained.  All  this  went  on 
under  the  very  eye  of  the  senate,  which  was  too  indolent 
to  take  the  advice  of  the  other  consul,  Catulus,  and  crush 
the  plot  at  its  birth.  They  allowed  a  limited  corn-law  to 
be  enacted,  probably  permitting  a  definite  number  only  of 
poorer  citizens  to  purchase  corn  at  a  low  rate — a  measure 
which  emboldened  without  satisfying  the  opposition. 


330  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

The  war  broke  out  first  in  Etruria,  where  the  dispos- 
sessed Faesulans  resumed  their  estates  by  force,  several  of 
the  Sullan  veterans  being  slain  in  the  tumult.  The  senate 
adopted  the  worst  possible  course  of  sending  both  consuls 
to  Etruria  to  raise  an  army — a  proceeding  which  was 
scarcely  likely  to  be  efficacious  when  they  thought  it 
necessary  to  bind  them  over  by  a  solemn  oath  not  to  turn 
their  arms  against  each  other.  Lepidus,  of  course,  armed 
for  the  insurrection,  not  for  the  senate,  and  evaded  the 
efforts  of  the  latter  to  induce  him  to  return.  When  at 
length,  in  77  B.C.,  he  was  peremptorily  ordered  to  proceed 
to  Rome,  he  refused,  and  demanded  (1)  that  the  tribuni- 
cian  power  should  be  restored ;  (2)  that  those  who  had 
been  deprived  of  their  rights  of  citizenship  or  of  their 
property  should  be  reinstated  ;  (3)  his  own  re-election  as 
consul  for  the  current  year. 

The  senate  could  rely  upon  the  Sullan  veterans  and  upon 
the  army  raised  by  Catulus  ;  and  the  latter  was  entrusted 
with  the  defence  of  the  capital  and  the  conduct  of  the  war  in 
Etruria,  while  Pompeius  was  sent  to  crush  the  democrats 
under  Marcus  Brutus  in  the  valley  of  the  Po.  Lepidus 
meantime  advanced  upon  the  capital,  and  made  himself 
master  of  the  right  bank  of  the  Tiber,  and  was  even  able 
to  cross  the  river.  A  battle  followed  in  the  Campus 
Martius,  in  which  Lepidus  was  defeated.  He  retreated  to 
Etruria,  while  another  division  of  his  army  shut  itself  up 
in  Alba.  By  this  time  Pompeius  had  accomplished  his 
work  in  the  north,  and  was  marching  southward,  so  that 
Lepidus  wras  enclosed  between  two  armies.  He  succeeded 
in  reaching  Sardinia  with  most  of  his  army,  but  soon 
afterwards  died.  The  flower  of  his  troops,  under  Perpenna, 
joined  Sertorius  in  Spain. 

Spain  was  now  the  only  province  of  the  empire  where 
opposition  to  the  senate  still  existed.  It  only  remains  to 
trace  the  steps  by  which  Sertorius  had  there  established 
a  power  which  taxed  the  whole  strength  of  the  govern- 
ment to  subdue  it.  Sertorius  was  a  native  of  Nursia,  in 
the  Sabine  land,  a  man  of  tender  sensitive  nature,  and  at 
the  same  time  of  the  most  chivalrous  courage.  Although 
untrained  in  speaking,  he  had  considerable  oratorical  gifts  ; 
and  in  the  revolutionary  war  his  military  talent  and  his 
genius  for  organization  presented  a  striking  contrast  to  the 


MARCUS  LEPIDUS  AND  SERTORIUS.  331 

incapacity  of  the  other  democratic  leaders.  His  Spanish 
followers  called  him  the  New  Hannibal,  and  indeed  his 
adroitness  and  versatility,  in  politics  and  in  war,  savour 
far  more  of  the  Phoenician  than  of  the  Roman  genius.  On 
being  driven  from  Spain,  he  led  a  life  of  adventure,  chiefly 
along  the  African  coasts.  Among  his  other  exploits  he 
besieged  and  took  Tingis  (Tangiers),  though  the  native 
prince  was  aided  by  the  Romans.  His  fame  spread  abroad, 
and  he  was  soon  invited  to  Spain  by  the  Lusitanians,  who 
in  spite  of  nominal  submission  maintained  a  practical 
independence.  Sertorius  was  well  acquainted  with  the 
resources  of  the  country,  and  accepted  the  invitation, 
though  he  had  to  fight  his  way  through  the  Roman 
squadron  which  commanded  the  straits. 

80  B.C. — Upon  his  arrival,  Sertorius  found  that  he  had 
only  2600  men  armed  in  Roman  fashion.  He  immediately 
raised  his  force  to  a  full  legion  by  levying  four  thousand 
infantry  and  seven  hundred  cavalry,  and,  accompanied  by 
swarms  of  Lusitanian  auxiliaries,  gave  battle  to  the  Roman 
governor  Lucius  Fufidius,  who  was  defeated  with  the  loss 
of  two  thousand  men  on  the  Baetis. 

79  B.C. — Tn  this  year  Quintus  Metellus  was  sent  to  relieve 
Fufidius ;  but  further  misfortunes  awaited  the  Roman 
arms.  Calvinus,  governor  of  the  Ebro  province,  was 
defeated  and  slain  by  Hirtuleius,  the  lieutenant  of  Serto- 
rius ;  and  Lucius  Manlius,  governor  of  Transalpine  Gaul, 
who  had  crossed  the  Pyrenees,  had  to  return  to  his  province 
after  suffering  a  disastrous  defeat.  Metellus  himself  in 
Further  Spain  penetrated  into  Lusitanian  territory,  and 
besieged  Longobriga,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Tagus ;  but 
one  of  his  divisions  was  lured  into  an  ambush,  and  the 
siege  had  to  be  raised ;  another  division  was  defeated 
during  the  retreat,  and  great  damage  was  inflicted  on  the 
main  army  by  the  harassing  tactics  of  Sertorius. 

Sertorius  had  been  careful  always  to  act,  not  as  ring- 
leader of  the  Lusitanian  revolt,  but  as  Roman  governor  of 
the  province  ;  and  he  had  already  begun  to  organize  the 
country  in  the  same  spirit,  though  the  work  was  probably 
carried  out  chiefly  in  later  years.  He  formed  the  chief 
men  of  the  exiles  into  a  senate  to  conduct  affairs  and  to 
nominate  magistrates.  The  officers  of  the  army  were 
exclusively  Roman ;  to  the  Spaniards  he  was  the  Roman 


332  HISTORY   OF  ROME. 

governor  who  levied  troops  by  virtue  of  his  office.  At  the 
same  time  he  endeavoured  to  attach  the  provincials  to 
Rome  and  to  himself.  After  the  custom  of  the  country, 
numbers  of  the  noble  Spaniards  swore  to  stand  by  him  to 
the  death,  and  formed  the  life-guard  of  the  general.  Even 
superstition  was  enlisted  on  his  side,  and  he  allowed  it  to 
be  believed  that  he  received  counsel  from  the  gods  through 
the  medium  of  a  white  fawn.  The  strictest  discipline  was 
maintained  in  the  army,  and  the  inhabitants  were  relieved 
from  all  fear  of  outrage  on  the  part  of  the  soldiers.  The 
tribute  of  the  province  was  reduced,  and  the  soldiers  were 
made  to  build  winter  barracks  for  themselves,  to  avoid  the 
necessity  of  quartering  them  on  the  inhabitants.  The 
children  of  the  noble  Spaniards  were  educated  in  an 
academy  at  Osca,  where  they  learned  to  speak  Latin  and 
Greek,  and  adopted  the  Roman  dress — the  first  attempt 
to  Romanize  the  provinces  by  Romanizing  the  provincials 
themselves. 

78  B.C. — By  the  end  of  this  year  Further  Spain  was 
completely  in  the  hands  of  Sertorius,  except  the  places 
actually  occupied  by  the  troops  of  Metellus.  In  Hither 
Spain  there  was  no  Roman  army,  and  the  agents  of  Ser- 
torius roamed  through  Gaul,  urging  the  communities  to 
revolt.  The  passes  of  the  Alps  became  insecure,  and  the 
sea  was  commanded  by  the  insurgents  through  their 
alliance  with  the  pirates  in  the  western  Mediterranean ; 
these  corsairs  had  a  fixed  station  on  the  coast  whence 
they  intercepted  supplies,  and  maintained  communications 
with  Italy  and  Asia  Minor. 

77  B.C. — After  the  suppression  of  the  revolt  of  Lepidus, 
it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  send  a  capable  general  to 
Spain.  This  office  Pompeius  demanded  for  himself,  and 
as  there  was  no  one  else  fit  for  the  command,  and  Pompeius 
was  at  the  head  of  an  army,  the  senate  resolved  to  yield. 
The  first  task  of  Pompeius  was  to  quiet  the  disturbances 
which  had  already  begun  in  Gaul,  and  to  lay  out  a  new 
road  over  the  Alps,  in  order  to  secure  a  shorter  communica- 
tion with  Italy.  In  the  autumn  he  crossed  the  Pyrenees. 
Meanwhile  Sertorius,  leaving  Hirtuleius  to  keep  Metellus 
in  check,  had  been  completing  the  subjection  of  Hither 
Spain,  and  had  reduced  one  after  another  the  towns 
adhering  to    the   senate.      Perpenna,    who    had    hitherto 


MARCUS  LEPIDUS  AND  SERTORWS.  333 

maintained  his  command  independently  of  Sertorius,  was 
forced  at  the  approach  of  Pompeius  to  put  himself  under 
the  orders  of  his  colleague. 

76  B.C. — Perpenna  with  a  strong  force  stood  ready  to 
oppose  Pompeius  if  he  should  attempt  to  cross  the  Ebro, 
and  to  march  southwards.  Herennius  was  in  command 
of  another  division  to  support  Perpenna,  while  Sertorius 
continued  to  subdue  the  districts  friendly  to  Rome. 
Pompeius,  however,  forced  the  passage  of  the  Ebro, 
defeated  Herennius,  and  took  Valentia.  Sertorius  now 
appeared  on  the  scene,  and  besieged  Lauro,  south  of 
Valentia,  which  had  declared  for  Pompeius.  The  latter, 
at  the  moment  when  his  efforts  to  relieve  the  town  seemed 
on  the  point  of  success,  was  outmanoeuvred  by  Sertorius, 
and  saw  the  town  captured  and  the  inhabitants  carried  off 
before  his  eyes — an  event  which  confirmed  many  wavering 
towns  in  their  adherence  to  the  insurgents. 

Meanwhile,  Metellus  had  defeated  Hirtuleius  at  Italica, 
near  Seville,  and  driven  him  into  Lusitania. 

75  B.C. — The  next  year,  Metellus  marched  to  join  Pom- 
peius at  Valentia,  and  defeated  and  killed  Hirtuleius,  who 
endeavoured  to  intercept  him.  But  Pompeius,  anxious  to 
wipe  out  the  disgrace  of  Lauro  before  Metellus  arrived,  gave 
battle  on  the  Sucro  to  Sertorius.  Pompeius  was  defeated 
on  the  right  wing,  while  his  lieutenant,  Afranius,  was 
victorious  on  the  left.  The  latter,  however,  was  suddenly 
attacked  by  Sertorius  while  occupied  in  pillage,  and  com- 
pelled to  retreat.  By  the  next  day,  Metellus  had  over- 
thrown Perpenna  and  joined  Pompeius,  who  was  now  too 
strong  to  be  attacked. 

For  a  time  the  fortune  of  Sertorius  languished,  and  his 
army  melted  away ;  but  he  soon  appeared  with  a  new 
army  south  of  Saguntum,  while  his  privateers  prevented 
supplies  from  reaching  the  Romans.  There  was  a  long 
and  doubtful  battle  in  the  plains  of  the  river  Turia 
(Guadalaviar),  the  result  of  which  was  unfavourable  to 
Sertorius.  His  army  melted  away,  and  Valentia  was 
taken  and  razed  to  the  ground.  The  general  himself  was 
besieged  at  Clunia  (on  the  Upper  Douro),  but  escaped, 
and  at  the  end  of  the  year  was  once  more  at  the  head  of 
an  army. 

As  the  result  of  the  campaign,  southern  and  central 


334  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Spain  had  been  recovered  by  the  Romans,  and  their  con- 
quests were  secured  by  the  occupation  of  the  towns  of 
Segobriga  and  Bilbilis.  But  the  country  was  so  exhausted 
that  Metellus  had  even  to  spend  his  winter  quarters  in 
Gaul. 

74  B.C. — With  two  fresh  legions  from  Italy,  the  Romans 
again  took  the  field ;  but  Sertorius  confined  himself 
entirely  to  guerilla  warfare.  Metellus  reduced  the  Ser- 
torian  towns  in  southern  Spain,  and  carried  away  the 
male  population  with  him. 

In  the  province  of  the  Ebro  Pompeius  was  prevented 
by  Sertorius  from  taking  Pallantia,  and  was  defeated 
before  Calagurris. 

73  B.C. —  During  this  year  the  warfare  was  of  the  same 
uneventful  character ;  but  Pompeius  succeeded  in  induc- 
ing many  communities  to  withdraw  from  the  insurrection. 

The  war  had  now  continued  for  eight  years.  The  losses 
of  the  state  in  men  and  treasure  are  difficult  to  estimate : 
not  only  were  the  Spanish  revenues  lost,  but  vast  suras 
h;:d  annually  to  be  sent  for  the  support,  of  the  army  in 
Spain.  The  province  itself  was  devastated ;  whole  com- 
munities had  frequently  perished,  and  the  towns  which 
adhered  to  Rome  had  countless  hardships  to  endure. 
Gaul  suffered  scarcely  less  from  the  constant  requisitions 
of  men  and  money,  and  from  the  burden  of  providing 
winter  quarters.  Generals  and  soldiers  were  alike  dis- 
satisfied ;  the  former  because  victory  was  difficult  and  of 
a  kind  that  brought  no  fame  ;  the  latter  because  the  booty 
was  poor,  and  even  their  pay  irregular.  At  the  same  time 
the  government  was  contending  against  its  enemies  all 
over  the  Mediterranean  ;  on  the  sea,  in  Macedonia  and 
in  Asia  Minor ;  while  Sertorius  was  already  in  open 
league  with  the  pirates,  and  was  negotiating  with  Mithra- 
dates  on  the  basis  of  mutual  assistance. 

But  the  position  of  Sertorius  was  even  less  enviable. 
His  influence  waned  as  he  was  compelled  more  and  more 
to  stand  on  the  defensive.  The  Spanish  militia  was  un- 
stable as  water,  melting  away  at  the  first  disaster;  and 
the  Roman  emigrants  were  insubordinate  and  stubborn. 
It  was  difficult  to  maintain  an  adequate  force  of  cavalry, 
the  training  of  which  required  considerable  time.  The 
best  of  his  lieutenants  and  the  flower  of  his  troops  had 


MARCUS  LEPJDUS  AND  SERTORIUS.  335 

perished  in  the  war,  and  the  most  trustworthy  communi- 
ties showed  signs  of  wavering.  Like  Hannibal.  Sertorius 
knew  that  one  day  he  must  fall,  and  was  always  ready  to 
lay  down  his  command,  if  he  might  be  allowed  to  live 
peaceably  in  Italy.  Soon  projects  were  formed  against 
his  life,  and  Sertorius  withdrew  the  custody  of  his  person 
from  Romans  and  entrusted  it  to  select  Spaniards,  while 
the  suspected  were  punished  with  fearful  severity.  A 
second  conspiracy  was  quickly  formed  among  his  own 
staff,  and  only  partially  discovered,  and  the  conspirators 
were  induced  to  hurry  on  the  catastrophe.  At  the 
instigation  of  Perpenna  a  great  victory  was  announced 
to  the  general,  and  a  banquet  was  held  to  celebrate  it. 
At  the  banquet  an  altercation  took  place,  and  a  wine-cup 
was  dashed  on  the  floor — the  signal  for  assassination. 
Sertorius  and  his  faithful  attendants  were  slain  (72  B.C.). 
"  History  loves  not  the  Coriolani ;  nor  has  she  made 
any  exception  even  in  the  case  of  this,  the  most  mag- 
nanimous, most  gifted,  most  worthy  to  be  regretted  of 
them  all." 

Perpenna  succeeded  to  the  command,  but  at  the  first 
encounter  the  despondent  ranks  of  the  insurgents  were 
broken,  and  Perpenna  with  many  other  officers  captured. 
The  correspondence  of  Sertorius,  which  implicated  many 
of  the  leading  men  at  Rome,  was  burnt  by  Pompeius 
unread.  The  emigrants  dispersed — many  to  join  the 
pirates  ;  but  soon  the  Plotian  law  allowed  them  to  return. 
The  Sertorian  towns  surrendered  or  were  captured  by 
force,  and  the  two  provinces  were  regulated  anew.  The 
tribute  of  the  most  guilty  communities  was  increased, 
and  others  lost  their  independence.  One  band  of  Ser- 
torians  was  settled  by  Pompeius  near  Lugdunum  as  the 
community  of  the  Convenae. 

At  the  close  of  71  B.C.  Metellus  and  Pompeius  returned 
to  Rome.  "  The  good  fortune  of  Sulla  seemed  still  to  be 
with  his  creation  after  he  had  been  laid  in  the  grave,  and 
to  protect  it  better  than  the  incapable  and  negligent 
watchmen  appointed  to  guard  it.  The  opposition  in  Italy 
had  broken  down  owing  to  the  incapacity  and  precipita- 
tion of  its  leader,  and  that  of  the  emigrants  from  dissen- 
sion within  their  Own  ranks.  .  .  .  The  curule  chairs  were 
rendered  once  more  secure." 


836  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 


AUTHORITIES. 

Lepidus.— Liv.  Epit.  90.     Plut.  Sul!.  34,  38  ;  Pomp.  15,  16.     Graniua 

Licinianus,  fragg.     Flor.  iii.  23.     Sail.  Hist.  frag.  bk.  i.      Ap. 

pian  B.  C.  i.  105,  107.     Tac.  Ann.  iii.  27.     Cic.  in  Cat.  in.  10 

Plin.  N.  H.  vii.  36,  54. 
Sertorius  —  Liv.  Epit.  90-94,  96 ;  frag.  bk.  91.     Pint.  Sertor.  8-end  ; 

Pomp.   17-21.     Flor.  iii.   22.     Veil.  ii.  29,  30.     Eutrop.    vi.    1. 

Appian  B.  C.  i.  108-115.    Hisp.  101.    Orosius  v.  10,  23.     Frontin. 

I.  ii.  13.     Caes.  B.  G.  iii.  20.     Sail.,  frag.  lib.  iii. 
Disregard  of  Sulla's  la»;s. — Cic.  pro  Dom.  30;  pro  Caec.  33-35. 
Hetaeriae. — Cic.  pro  Plauc.  15,  18,  23,  37,  and  passim ;  pro  Cluent. 

26;  ad.  Att.  i.  16;  ad  Q.  F.  ii.  3;  Ascon.  in  Corn.  75  (Bruns,  pt. 

iii.  4). 


Note  on  Caesar's  age. — The  year  of  Caesar's  birth  is  usually  given 
as  100  B.C.,  because  Suetonius  (Jul.  88),  Plutarch  (Caes.  69),  Appian 
(B.  C.  ii.  149)  all  state  that  he  was  at  his  death  (15  Mar.  41  B.C.)  in 
his  fifty-sixth  year.  But  this  account  would  make  him  enter  upon 
the  three  offices  of  aedile,  praetor,  and  consul,  which  he  held  in  65, 
62,  and  59  B.C.  respectively,  in  his  thirty-fifth,  fortieth,  and  forty- 
third  years,  that  is,  in  each  case,  two  years  before  the  legal  time. 
The  fact  that  this  irregularity  is  nowhere  noticed,  suggests  that  the 
statements  of  Suetonius,  Plutarch,  and  Appian  are  errors  derived 
from  a  common  source,  especially  as  such  errors  must  have  been 
common  before  the  commencement  of  the  acta  diurna.  The  date 
102  B.C.  would  agree  better  than  100  b.c.  with  the  statement  of 
Velleius,  that  Caesar  was  appointed  Flamen  Dialis  when  paene  puer ; 
since  the  latter  date  would  make  him  thirteen  years  six  months  old, 
i.e.,  not  almost,  but  actually  a  boy.  Further,  the  number  til.  on  the 
coins  struck  by  Caesar  about  the  outbreak  of  the  civil  war  would 
agree  with  the  years  of  his  life  if  he  was  born  in  102  B.c. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

RULE  OF  THE  SULLAN  RESTORATION. 

I.  Subjection  of  Thrace  and  Dalmatia. — ii.  Rise  of  Tigranes  in  the 
East;  third  Mithradatic  war  (74-65  B.C.)  ;  war  with  Tigranes; 
invasion  of  Armenia. — iii.  The  pirates :  their  organization,  and 
the  Roman  attempts  to  destroy  them. — iv.  The  Servile  war 
(73-71  B.C.). 

The  Sullan  constitution  had  thus  survived  the  dangers 
which  beset  it  on  the  death  of  its  author.  It  remains  to 
be  seen  how  the  senate  fulfilled  the  duties  of  government 
during  its  new  lease  of  power.  In  order  to  do  this  it  is 
necessary  to  go  back  a  little,  and  to  review  the  condition 
of  other  parts  of  the  empire  during  the  last  years  of  Sulla's 
regency  and  the  first  years  after  his  death  in  78  B.C. 
The  condition  of  Spain  had  thrown  all  other  questions 
into  the  shade:  but  there  were  other  serious  dangers 
threatening — especially  from  Thrace  and  Macedonia,  from 
the  East,  and  from  the  pirates  of  the  Mediterranean. 

In  Thrace  and  the  adjacent  regions  there  was  warfare 
for  the  space  of  twelve  years,  the  result  of  which  was 
that  the  pirates  of  the  Dalmatian  coast  and  the  tribes 
between  Macedonia  and  the  Danube  were  subdued,  while 
Thrace  became  a  portion  of  the  province  of  Macedonia. 

The  most  important  feature  in  the  history  of  the  East, 
during  the  years  succeeding  the  settlement  of  Sulla, 
was  the  rapid  increase  of  the  power  and  territory  of 
Tigranes,  king  of  Armenia,  and  so-n-in-law  of  Mithra- 
dates.  The  Parthians,  who  were  at  this  time  torn  by 
internal  dissensions,  were  deprived  by  him  of  several 
of  their  dependent  kingdoms — Cordueue,  Atropatene,  and 

22 


338  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Nineveh:  of  Mesopotamia  the  northern  half  was  subject 
to  him.  But  it  was  on  the  west  that  his  proceedings 
necessarily  affected  the  Romans.  He  took  Melitene  from 
Cappadocia ;  and  after  Sulla's  death  he  advanced  into 
Cappadocia  itself,  and  carried  off  the  inhabitants  of  the 
capital  and  of  other  towns  Even  by  83  B.C.  he  had  subdued 
eastern  Cilicia,  reduced  Upper  Syria  and  the  greater  part 
of  Phoenicia,  and  threatened  the  Jewish  state.  Antioch 
became  one  of  the  residences  of  the  great  king.  It  was 
the  aim  of  Tigranes  to  become  supreme  monarch  of  the 
East ;  and  it  is  always  as  an  Oriental  sultan,  not  as  a 
Western  ruler,  that  he  appears.  His  conquests  were 
accomplished  by  huge  heterogeneous  hosts  gathered  from 
all  parts  of  his  dominions.  The  inhabitants  of  many  of 
the  conquered  cities  were  carried  off  to  found  a  new  great 
city,  Tigranocerta,  near  the  frontier  of  Mesopotamia,  in 
the  most  southern  province  of  Armenia.  "  In  other 
respects,  too,  the  new  great  king  proved  faithful  to  his 
part.  As  amidst  the  perpetual  childhood  of  the  East  the 
childlike  conception  of  kings  with  real  crowns  on  their 
heads  has  never  disappeared,  Tigranes,  when  he  showed 
himself  in  public,  appeared  in  the  state  and  costume  of  a 
successor  of  Darius  and  Xerxes,  with  the  purple  caftan, 
the  half-white  purple  tunic,  the  long  plaited  trousers,  the 
high  turban,  and  the  royal  diadem, — attended,  moreover, 
and  served  in  slavish  fashion,  wherever  he  went  or  stood, 
by  four  '  kings.'  " 

Mithradates  had  been  careful  to  give  the  Romans  no 
provocation,  but  at  the  same  time  he  strengthened  himself 
by  every  means  not  forbidden  by  treaty.  He  greatly 
extended  his  dominions  in  the  Black  Sea,  and  devoted 
himself  to  arming  and  training  his  troops  in  the  Roman 
fashion,  in  which  he  was  aided  by  the  Roman  emigrants 
at  his  court. 

But  the  Romans  were  anxious  to  avoid  interference  in 
the  East.  In  81  B.C.,  King  Alexander  II.  died,  leaving 
by  will  his  kingdom  of  Egypt  to  the  Romans ;  but  Pto- 
lemy Auletes  and  Ptolemy  the  Cyprian  were  allowed  to 
assume  the  kingship  in  Egypt  and  in  Cyprus,  though 
these  princes  had  notoriously  no  legal  claim.  Nor  did 
the  Romans  interfere  with  the  conquests  of  Tigranes, 
and  if  they  did  not  recognize  his  title,  they  did  nothing 


RULE  OF  TUB  SULLAN  RESTORATION.  339 

to  deprive  him  of  his  provinces.  There  were  special 
reasons  why  they  should  not  interfere  in  Egypt,  but,  in 
allowing  an  Asiatic  king  to  establish  himself  on  the 
Mediterranean,  they  abandoned  the  very  basis  of  the 
Roman  power. 

Thus  there  was  no  desire  for  war  on  either  side ;  but 
the  third  Mithradatic  war,  like  the  first,  grew  out  of 
mutual  suspicion  and  distrust.  It  was  the  policy  of  Rome 
to  pursue  every  war,  not  merely  to  the  conquest,  but  to 
the  annihilation  of  her  opponents ;  and  the  Romans  were 
discontented  with  the  peace  of  Sulla,  as  they  had  been  dis- 
contented with  the  terms  granted  by  Scipio  Africanus  to 
the  Carthaginians.  It  was  ominous,  too,  that  the  new 
preparations  of  Mithradates  coincided  with  a  serious  civil 
war,  and  with  difficulties  m  other  parts  of  the  empire. 
In  77  B  c.  it  was  declared  in  the  senate  that  the  king  was 
only  waiting  his  opportunity,  and  the  garrisons  of  Asia 
and  Cilicia  were  reinforced 

Mithradates,  on  his  side,  felt  that  a  war  between  the 
Romans  and  Tigranes  was  inevitable,  and  that  he  would 
not  be  able  to  remain  neutral ;  and  his  suspicions  were 
roused  by  the  fact  that  he  was  unable  to  obtain  from  the 
Romans  the  documentary  record  of  the  terms  of  the  last 
peace.  If  there  was  to  be  war  no  moment  could  be  more 
favourable  ,  the  Sertorian  v  ai  was  at  its  height,  and  the 
king  knew  that  instead  of  a  single-handed  struggle  against 
the  whole  Roman  power,  he  wrould  have  the  alliance  of  an 
important  section  within  it.  Just  at  this  time — 75  B.C. — 
Bithynia  was  occupied  by  the  Romans,  in  virtue  of  the 
will  of  King  Nicomedes  III.,  who  died  heirless ;  and 
Cyrene,  which  had  also  been  bequeathed,  was  made  a 
Roman  province  The  fears  of  the  king  lest  the  Romans 
meant  henceforth  to  pursue  an  aggressive  policy  turned 
the  scale,  and  he  yielded  to  the  persuasions  of  the  Roman 
emigrants,  and  declared  war  in  the  winter  of  75—74  B.C. 

Tigranes  declined  the  overtures  of  his  father-in-law ; 
but  an  alliance  was  at  once  concluded  wTith  Sertorius  and 
with  the  pirates.  From  the  former,  the  king  obtained 
officers  for  his  army;  from  the  latter,  a  large  force  of 
ships ;  as  for  stores,  the  royal  granaries  contained  two 
million  medimni  of  grain. 

74  B.C. — The  war  began  with  the  advance  of  Diophantus 


340  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

into  Cappadocia  to  close  the  road  to  Pontus  against  the 
Romans,  while  agents  were  sent  to  rouse  the  Roman 
province  and  Phrygia  to  revolt.  The  main  army  of 
100,000  infantry  and  16,000  cavalry  advanced  along  the 
coast  to  occupy  Paphlagonia  and  Bithynia. 

On  the  Roman  side,  the  consul  Lucius  Lucullus,  with 
thirty  thousand  infantry  and  sixteen  hundred  cavalry,  was 
ordered  to  invade  Pontus  :  his  colleague,  with  the  fleet  and 
a  body  of  troops,  was  sent  to  the  Propontis,  to  cover  Asia 
and  Bithynia.  A  general  arming  of  the  coast  was  ordered, 
and  the  task  of  clearing  the  seas  of  the  pirates  was  en- 
trusted to  Marcus  Antonius,  praetor  for  the  year. 

Fortunately  for  the  Roman  government  the  power  of 
Sertorius  began  from  this  moment  to  decline,  and  it 
was  able  to  devote  itself  exclusively  to  the  Asiatic  war 
At  first,  many  cities  opened  their  gates  to  the  officers  of 
Mithradates  ;  the  Roman  families  in  them  were  massacred , 
and  the  Pisidians,  Isaurians,  and  Cilicians  took  up  arms. 
Something  was  done  by  individual  energetic  men  like 
Gaius  Caesar,  who  hurried  from  Rhodes  and  raised  volun  • 
teers  to  oppose  the  insurgents ;  and  Deiotarus,  tetrarch  of 
the  Tolistoboii,  fought  against  them  with  success  ;  but 
still  Lucullus  was  delayed  for  some  time  in  restoring 
order  in  the  province  before  he  could  advance. 

Meantime  Cotta  was  besieged  by  Mithradates  in  Chalce- 
don,  and,  anxious  to  distinguish  himself  before  his  col- 
league could  arrive  to  relieve  him,  was  not  only  repulsed 
in  a  sally  which  he  made  by  land,  but  suffered  the  loss  of 
all  his  ships,  which  were  burnt  in  the  harbour  by  the 
enemy.  On  the  approach  of  Lucullus,  Mithradates  moved 
towards  the  Hellespont  and  besieged  Cyzicus.  The  citizens 
defended  themselves  with  heroic  vigour.  The  town  is  on 
an  island  connected  with  the  mainland  by  a  bridge  ;  but 
though  the  royal  army  was  able  to  occupy  the  Dindymene 
heights  on  the  island  itself,  all  efforts  to  storm  the  town 
were  in  vain.  Meanwhile  Lucullus  established  himself  in 
the  rear,  and  the  besieging  army  was  itself  blockaded,  and 
could  only  procure  supplies  by  sea.  A  storm  destroyed 
a  large  portion  of  the  siege  works,  and  the  scarcity  of 
provisions  became  intolerable.  The  greater  part  of  the 
cavalry,  which  was  sent  to  convoy  some  of  the  beasts 
of  burden,  was  cut  to  pieces  as  it  attempted  to  make  its 


RULE  OF  THE  SULLAN  RESTORATION  341 

way  out  of  the  lines,  and  another  body  was  forced  to  Teturn 
to  the  camp,  which  suffered  fearfully  from  famine  and 
disease. 

73  B.C. — In  the  spring  the  besieged  redoubled  their  exer- 
tions, and  the  king  could  only  try  to  escape  and  save  a 
portion  of  his  army.  He  went  in  person  with  the  fleet  to 
the  Hellespont.  The  land  army  under  Hermaeus  and  the 
Roman  Marius  succeeded  in  retreating,  after  considerable 
losses,  to  Lampsacus,  which  was  in  the  hands  of  the  king. 
Here  the  arcny  and  all  the  citizens  embarked  and  sailed 
away. 

The  enemy  had  lost  200,000  men,  but  their  fleet  still 
commanded  the  sea.  With  it  they  besieged  Perinthus 
and  Byzantium  on  the  European  coast,  pillaged  other 
towns,  and  established  their  head-quarters  at  Nicomedia. 
A  squadron  of  fifty  sail,  with  ten  thousand  men  on  board, 
destined,  it  is  said,  to  effect  a  landing  in  Italy,  sailed  into 
the  Aegean.  But  Lucullus  had  by  this  time  collected  some 
new  ships,  and  captured  the  whole  squadron  at  the  island 
of  Neae,  between  Lemnos  and  Scyros.  At  the  same  time 
the  legates  of  Lucullus  continued  the  war  in  Bithynia, 
and  after  capturing  many  towns  attacked  the  king  himself 
at  Nicomedia.  The  king  hastily  fled  by  sea  and  occupied 
Heraclea,  which  was  betrayed  to  him ;  but  a  storm  sank 
sixty  of  his  ships  and  destroyed  the  rest,  and  he  arrived  at 
Sinope  almost  alone. 

Lucullus  now  assumed  the  offensive.  Leaving  his 
lieutenants  to  blockade  the  Hellespont  and  besiege 
Heraclea,  he  advanced  into  Pontus.  The  king  retired 
in  order  to  draw  Lucullus  into  the  interior,  but  the 
Romans  rapidly  followed  him,  leaving  detachments  to 
blockade  the  towns  which  they  passed. 

72  B.C. — Winter  stopped  the  advance  of  the  army,  but 
not  the  blockades,  which  were  continued  in  spite  of  the 
murmurs  of  the  soldiery.  In  the  spring,  Lucullus  im- 
mediately advanced  against  Cabira,  where  a  considerable 
army  under  Diophantus  and  Taxiles  had  assembled.  The 
Romans,  with  only  three  legions,  were  too  weak  to  attack ; 
and  the  two  armies  lay  fronting  each  other,  both  in  great 
straits  to  procure  supplies.  Mithradates  had  organized  a 
flying  column  under  the  two  generals  mentioned  above,  to 
scour  the  country  and  intercept  the  Roman  convoys  ;  but 


342  HISTORY  OF  BOMB. 

the  lieutenant  of  Lucullus,  Marcus  Fabins  Hadrianus,  who 
was  escorting  a  store-train,  not  only  defeated  the  band 
which  lay  in  wait  for  him,  but,  when  reinforced,  defeated 
the  whole  column.  This  defeat  determined  the  king  to 
retreat  from  Cabira ;  but  on  his  determination  becoming 
known  a  panic  seized  his  troops,  during  which  Lucullus 
attacked  and  massacred  them,  as  they  scarcely  offered 
resistance.  Had  the  legions  been  less  eager  for  plunder, 
not  a  man  could  have  escaped  The  great  king  escaped 
through  the  mountains,  and  finding  himself  pursued,  took 
refuge  with  his  son-in-law  in  Armenia,  where  he  remained 
in  a  sort  of  honourable  captivity 

All  the  flat  country  of  Pontus  and  Lesser  Armenia  was 
now  overrun  by  the  Romans,  and  the  treasure  and  stores 
of  the  king  fell  into  their  hands.  But  the  towns,  especially 
those  on  the  coast,  offered  an  obstinate  resistance,  many 
of  them  holding  out  for  two  years.  Amisus,  Sinope, 
Amastris,  and  Heraclea,  not  only  defended  themselves 
desperately,  but  even  sent  out  snips,  which  did  great 
damage  by  cutting  off  Roman  supplies  ;  partly  because 
they  were  attached  to  the  king,  who  had  protected  their 
free  Hellenic  constitution, — partly  overawed  by  the  pirates, 
who  fought  for  the  king.  The  reduction  of  these  towns 
was  left  to  lieutenants,  while  Lucullus  devoted  himself 
to  the  task  of  reorganizing  the  province  of  Asia.  The 
cause  of  Mithradates  appeared  hopeless  Tigranes  showed 
no  intention  of  restoring  him  to  his  kingdom  ,  the  best  of 
the  Roman  emigrants  had  fallen,  or  had  made  their  peace 
with  Lucullus,  and  were  serving  in  his  army  ;  Sertoriua 
was  killed  in  the  year  of  the  battle  of  Cabira  (72  B.C.)  ; 
the  king's  ships,  as  they  returned  from  Crete  and  Spain, 
were  attacked  and  destroyed  by  the  Romans  ,  and  even  his 
son  Machares,  governor  of  his  Bosporan  kingdom,  deserted 
him  and  made  a  separate  peace  with  the  Romans.  Lucullus 
applied  himself  to  redressing  the  grievances  of  the  pro- 
vincials of  Asia,  and  only  awaited  the  arrival  of  a  commis- 
sion from  the  senate  to  reduce  the  Pontic  kingdom  into  a 
province. 

A  far  more  difficult  question  presented  itself  in  the 
relations  between  the  kingdom  of  Armenia  and  Rome. 
Lucullus  saw  clearly  that  the  aggressions  of  the  new 
great  king  must  be  stopped,  and  the  dominion  of  Rome 


-RULE  OF  THE  SULLAN  IiESTORATION.  343 

over  the  Mediterranean  re- established.  Moreover,  as  a 
Philhellene,  he  felt  that,  as  the  heritage  of  Alexander  in  the 
East  had  at  length  come  to  the  Romans,  so  they  could  not 
escape  the  obligation  of  being,  like  Alexander,  the  shield 
and  sword  of  the  Greeks  in  the  East.  But  he  knew  that 
the  timid  and  incapable  government  at  home  would  not, 
unless  compelled,  undertake  an  expedition  so  costly  and  so 
vast.  Antiochus  Asiaticus  and  his  brother,  the  represen- 
tatives of  the  Seleucidae,  had  already  implored  interference 
in  the  affairs  of  Syria,  but  without  result.  If  the  war  was 
to  be  undertaken,  it  must  be  over  the  head  of  the  home 
government. 

There  were  pretexts  enough  for  a  declaration  of  war ; 
but,  as  the  mission  of  Lucullus  had  reference  to  Mithra- 
dates  alone,  he  preferred  to  take  the  preliminary  step  of 
sending  an  officer  to  Tigranes  to  demand  the  surrender  of 
Mithradates.  The  resolution  was  bold  to  rashness.  In 
the  first  place,  Lucullus  had  but  thirty  thousand  men  ;  and 
he  must  leave  behind  him  a  large  force  to  hold  Pontus, 
and  to  secure  his  communications.  Nor,  under  the  circum- 
stances, could  he  ask  for  reinforcements  from  home  ;  so  that 
after  incorporating  in  his  army  some  of  the  Pontic  mer- 
cenaries, he  found  himself  compelled  to  cross  the  Euphrates 
with  not  more  than  fifteen  thousand  men.  Secondly,  the 
temper  of  the  soldiers  was  most  dangerous.  The  general 
himself  was  of  a  haughty  aristocratic  demeanour,  un- 
popular with  the  soldiers  on  account  of  the  strict  dis- 
cipline which  he  maintained  and  the  tremendous  toils 
which  he  imposed  upon  them.  Moreover,  many  of  his  best 
troops  had  served  continuously  ever  since  their  arrival 
in  the  East  under  Flaccus  and  Fimbria  in  the  first  Mithra- 
datic  war  (86  B.C.),  and  justly  demanded  their  discharge. 
Thirdly,  Lucullus  had  made  himself  widely  unpopular  in 
the  pi-ovince  of  Asia  by  the  stern  justice  with  which  he 
checked  the  usury  of  the  Roman  capitalists. 

69  B.C. — The  demand  for  the  surrender  of  Mithradates 
was  of  course  refused,  and  in  the  spring  of  69  B.C.  the 
Euphrates  was  crossed.  Lucullus  marched  direct  for 
Tigranocerta,  "  whither  the  great  king  had  shortly  before 
returned  from  Syria,  after  having  temporarily  deferred 
the  prosecution  of  his  plans  of  conquest  on  the  Mediter- 
ranean on  account  of  the  embroilment  with  the  Romans. 


3A  H1ST0EY  OF  ROME. 

He  was  just  projecting  an  inroad  into  Roman  Asia  from 
Cilicia  and  Lycaonia,  and  was  considering  whether  the 
Romans  would  at  once  evacuate  Asia,  or  would  previously 
give  him  battle,  possibly  at  Ephesus,  when  a  messenger 
interrupted  him  with  the  tidiugs  of  the  advance  of  Lu- 
cullus.  He  ordered  him  to  be  hanged,  but  the  disagree- 
able reality  remained  unaltered  ;  so  he  left  his  capital  and 
resorted  to  the  interior  of  Armenia  to  raise  a  force — which 
had  not  yet  been  done — against  the  Romans."  Lucullus 
held  the  newly  raised  forces  of  the  king  in  check  with  a 
division  of  his  troops,  and  himself  vigorously  prosecuted 
the  siege  of  the  city. 

Mancaeus,  the  governor,  held  out  bravely  till  Tigranes 
had  raised  a  huge  army  of  relief  from  all  parts  of  his 
empire,  with  which  he  advanced  to  the  city.  Taxiles, 
the  old  general  of  Mithradates,  advised  him  to  avoid  battle 
and  starve  out  the  enemy  ;  but  Tigranes,  seeing  the 
ridiculously  small  number  of  the  Romans — not  much 
more  than  ten  thousand  men, — resolved  to  accept  the 
engagement  which  Lucullus  offered  him.  As  the 
Armenians  were  forming  line,  Lucullus  noticed  that  they 
had  omitted  to  occupy  a  height  which  commanded  the 
position  of  their  cavalry.  He  hastened  to  occupy  it, 
diverting  attention  from  the  movement  by  a  flank  attack 
with  his  cavalry.  As  soon  as  the  height  was  reached,  he 
threw  this  division  of  his  troops  on  the  rear  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry.  They  broke,  and  were  driven  upon  the  infantry, 
who  were  not  yet  formed,  and  who  fled  without  striking  a 
blow.  The  bulletin  of  Lucullus  announced  that  100,000 
Armenians  and  five  Romans  had  fallen ,  and  that  the 
king  had  thrown  away  his  diadem  and  galloped  off  un- 
recognized. 

Tigranocerta  and  all  the  conquests  of  Tigranes  im- 
mediately passed  into  the  power  of  the  Romans.  Envoys 
arrived  even  from  the  Red  Sea,  Hellenes,  Syrians.  Jews, 
Arabs,  to  do  homage  to  their  new  sovereigns.  But  Guras, 
brother  of  Tigranes,  maintained  himself  in  Mesopotamia. 
Lucullus  restored  Antiochus  Asiaticus  to  Syria,  and  sent 
back  the  forced  settlers  of  Tigranocerta  to  their  homes. 
The  immense  stores  and  wealth  which  were  captured  de- 
frayed all  the  expenses  of  the  war,  and  furnished  a  present 
of  800  denarii  (£33)  for  each  soldier.     The  great  king  was 


RULE  OF  TEE  SULLAN  RESTORATION.  345 

completely  humbled,  and  peace  would  probably  have  been 
made  but  for  the  influence  of  Mithradates.  To  him  the 
continuance  of  the  war  was  the  only  hope  of  safety.  He 
represented  to  Tigranes  that  by  war  he  had  everything  to 
gain  and  nothing  to  lose,  and  persuaded  him  to  entrust 
himself  with  the  whole  management.  Great  exertions 
were  made  to  rouse  the  whole  East  against  the  Romans, 
and  to  represent  the  struggle  not  merely  as  national — the 
East  against  the  West — as  it  certainly  was,  but  also  as 
religious ;  and  the  Asiatics  flocked  to  the  standard  to 
defend  their  gods  against  the  impious  invaders.  Mithra- 
dates spared  no  pains  to  make  his  cavalry  irresistible,  and 
in  the  new  army  half  the  force  was  mounted,  while  the 
•infantry  were  carefully  selected  and  trained  by  his  Pontic 
officers.  Armenia  proper  was  to  be  the  theatre  of  the 
war,  which  was  to  be  entirely  defensive. 

68  B.C. — The  position  of  Lucullus  became  more  difficult 
every  day.  The  senate  resented  his  arbitrary  conduct, 
and  appointed  two  new  governors  to  the  provinces  of 
Cilicia  and  Asia,  restricting  him  to  the  military  com- 
mand. The  capitalists  were  against  him  to  a  man,  and  did 
everything  to  procure  his  recall ;  while  discontent  grew 
louder  and  louder  in  the  camp,  and  was  fostered  by  several 
of  the  general's  own  officers.  But  Lucullus,  nothing 
daunted,  resolved,  like  a  desperate  gambler,  to  double  his 
stakes,  and  to  march  for  Artaxata,  the  capital  of  Armenia 
proper,  hoping  thus  to  compel  the  king  to  fight.  The 
difficulties  were  tremendous.  Troops  had  to  be  summoned 
from  Pontus  to  hold  Tigranocerta,  and,  as  the  Armenian 
summer  lasted  but  four  months,  the  whole  campaign  must 
be  completed  in  that  short  period. 

Lucullus  set  out  at  midsummer,  68  B.C.,  crossed  the 
Euphrates,  and  at  length  reached  the  table-land  of 
Armenia,  after  a  march  continually  harassed  by  the 
enemy's  cavalry.  Winter  had  set  in  before  Artaxata 
was  reached,  and  when  the  troops  saw  snow  and  ice 
around  them  they  mutinied,  and  compelled  Lucullus  to 
retreat.  On  reaching  the  plain,  where  the  season  still 
permitted  operations,  the  Romans  crossed  the  Tigris  and 
besieged  Nisibis,  the  capital  of  Mesopotamia ;  the  city  was 
stormed,  and  the  array  went  into  winter  quarters. 

Meanwhile  the  weak  Roman  divisions  in  Pontus  and  at 


346  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Tigranocerta  had  fared  hardly.  Mithradates  once  more 
overran  Pontus,  and  raised  the  country  against  the  Romans. 
Hadrianus,  the  Roman  commander,  after  a  battle  lasting: 
two  days,  was  only  just  able  to  shut  himself  up  in  Cabira, 
and  the  other  lieutenants  of  Lucullus  met  with  no  better 
success. 

67  B.C. — These  disasters,  and  the  insubordination  of  his 
troops,  which  had  increased  during  the  winter,  compelled 
Lucullus  to  recross  the  Euphrates  ;  but  he  was  too  late 
to  save  the  troops  in  Pontus,  which  had  been  defeated 
and  almost  annihilated  at  Ziela. 

At  this  very  time,  news  arrived  from  Rome  that  the 
people  had  resolved  to  grant  discharge  to  those  soldiers 
whose  term  of  service  had  expired,  and  to  entrust  the 
conduct  of  the  war  to  Manius  Acilius  Glabrio,  consul  for 
the  year.  This  news  dissolved  all  the  bonds  of  authority 
just  when  Lucullus  needed  them  most ;  for,  at  the  moment, 
he  was  confronted  by  the  Pontic  army,  while  the  main 
army  under  Tigranes  was  advancing  upon  him  from 
Armenia.  He  tried  to  procure  aid  from  the  new  governor 
of  Cilicia,  but  in  vain ;  while  Glabrio,  who  had  landed  in 
Asia  Minor,  refused  to  take  over  the  command.  When 
the  soldiers  were  ordered  to  advance  into  Armenia  against 
Tigranes,  they  took  the  road  to  Cappadocia  and  the  pro- 
vince of  Asia  instead,  and  the  Fimbrians  were  with 
difficulty  dissuaded  from  disbanding  at  once ;  but,  when 
the  winter  arrived,  and  no  enemy  confronted  them,  they 
dispersed. 

Thus  the  eight-years'  war  left  the  Romans  exactly  in 
the  same  position  as  at  the  beginning.  Mithradates 
regained  his  old  dominions  and  Tisrranes  his  conquests. 
When  we  consider  the  means  with  which  Lucullus  accom- 
plished all  that  he  did,  his  achievements  are  unsurpassed 
by  those  of  any  Roman  general.  His  retreat  from 
Armenia  to  Asia  Minor  excels  the  celebrated  retreat  of 
the  Ten  Thousand ;  and,  if  the  name  of  Lucullus  is  less 
known  than  the  names  of  other  Roman  generals,  it  is 
probably  because  in  war,  more  than  in  any  other  depart- 
ment of  human  action,  the  judgment  is  awarded  almost 
solely  by  the  final  result ;  and  because  no  tolerable  narra- 
tive of  his  campaigns  has  come  down  to  us. 

The  remissness  of  the  senatorial   government  is  most 


RULE  01  TUE  SULLAN  RESTORATION.  347 

strikingly  seen  in  the  extraordinary  growth  of  piracy. 
The  whole  Mediterranean  was  infested  with  corsairs,  so 
that  all  traffic  by  sea  was  at  an  end.  Th?  import  of  corn 
into  Italy  ceased,  while  the  cornfields  of  the  provinces 
could  find  no  vent  for  their  produce.  Romans  of  rank 
were  carried  off  for  the  sake  of  the  ransom  paid  for  their 
liberation  ,  merchants  and  even  troops  put  off  their 
voyages  till  the  winter  season,  preferring  the  risk  of 
storm  and  tempest  to  that  of  capture.  Worst  of  all 
were  the  outrages  on  the  islands  and  coast  towns  of  Asia 
Minor,  which  were  either  sacked  or  compelled  to  purchase 
safety  by  the  payment  of  large  sums.  All  the  rich 
temples  of  this  region  were  plundered,  and  even  towns  one 
or  two  days'  march  from  the  coast  were  no  longer  safe. 

The  pirates  of  this  day  were  no  longer  mere  free- 
booters or  slave-catchers,  but  formed  a  regular  state,  with 
an  organization,  a  home  of  their  own,  and  at  least  the  germs 
of  a  political  league.  They  called  themselves  Cilicians, 
but  drew  their  recruits  from  all  sources — discharged  merce- 
naries, citizens  of  destroyed  communities,  soldiers  from 
the  Sertorian  or  Fimbrian  armies,  the  refugees  of  all 
vanquished  parties.  The  motto  of  the  new  state  was 
vengeance  upon  civil  society ;  its  members  were  bound 
together  by  a  strong  sense  of  fellowship — by  a  determina- 
tion to  be  true  to  each  other,  and  by  loyalty  to  their 
chosen  chiefs.  They  regarded  their  plunder  as  military 
spoil,  and  as  in  case  of  capture  they  were  sure  of  the 
cross,  they  too  claimed  the  right  of  executing  their 
prisoners  Their  ships  were  small,  open,  and  swift — 
mostly  light  "  myoparones,"  and  they  sailed  in  squadrons 
under  regularly  appointed  admirals.  Their  home  was 
the  whole  Mediterranean ;  but  their  special  haunts, 
where  they  kept  their  plunder  and  their  wives,  were 
Crete  and  the  southern  coast  of  Asia  Minor.  Here  the 
native  leagues  were  weak,  and  the  Roman  station  was  in- 
adequate for  the  guardianship  of  the  whole  coast;  while 
the  Armenian  king  troubled  himself  little  about  the  sea. 
In  the  prevailing  weakness  of  the  legitimate  governments 
of  the  time  the  pirates  gained  a  body  of  client  states 
among  the  Greek  maritime  cities,  which  made  treaties 
and  carried  on  an  extensive  trade  with  them.  The  town 
of    Side   in    Pamphylia,    for   instance,   allowed   them   to 


348  niSTOTlY  OF  ROME. 

build  ships  on  its  quays  and  to  sell  their  captures  in  it3 
market. 

This  pirate  state  even  formed  alliances  with  Mitbra- 
dates  and  with  the  Roman  emigrants;  it  fought  battles 
with  the  fleets  of  Sulla,  and  some  of  its  princes  reigned 
over  many  coast  towns. 

Evidently  the  Romans  had  shamefully  neglected  all  the 
duties  of  maritime  police.  Instead  of  keeping  up  a  fleet 
to  guard  the  whole  sea,  they  left  each  province  and  each 
client  state  to  defend  itself  as  it  could.  Though  the 
provincials  paid  tribute  to  the  Romans  for  their  defence, 
there  was  no  Italian  fleet.  The  government  depended  on 
ships  furnished  by  the  maritime  towns  at  the  expense  of 
the  provinces,  which  were  even  called  upon  to  contribute 
to  the  ransom  of  Roman  captives  of  rank. 

Though  no  systematic  and  continuous  efforts  were  made 
to  meet  the  evil,  there  were  many  expeditions,  which  were 
more  or  less  successful  for  the  time.  Sulla  had  left  in- 
structions for  the  raising  of  a  fleet  which  were  never 
carried  out. 

In  79  B.C.,  one  of  the  consuls,  Publius  Servilius,  defeated 
the  pirate  fleet  and  destroyed  the  pirate  towns  on  the 
south  coast  of  Asia  Minor,  including  Olympus  and 
Phaselis,  which  belonged  to  the  prince  Zenicetes.  He 
next  led  an  army  over  the  Taurus,  captured  Isaura,  and 
subdued  the  Isaurians  in  the  north-west  of  rough  Cilicia. 
His  campaigns  lasted  for  three  years,  and  were  not  with- 
out fruit ;  but,  naturally,  the  main  body  of  the  pirates 
simply  betook  itself  to  other  regions — especially  Crete. 
Nothing  but  the  establishment  of  a  strong  maritime 
police  could  meet  the  case  ;  and  this  the  Romans  would 
not  undertake. 

In  74  B.C.  they  did  entrust  the  clearance  of  the  seas 
to  a  single  admiral  in  supreme  command.  But  such 
appointments  were  managed  by  the  political  clubs :  and 
the  choice  fell  upon  the  praetor  Marcus  Antonius,  who 
was  quite  unfit  for  the  post.  Moreover,  the  government 
did  not  furnish  supplies  and  money  adequate  for  the 
purpose,  so  that  the  requisitions  of  the  admiral  were 
more  burdensome  to  the  provincials  than  were  the  pirates 
themselves.  The  expedition  came  to  nothing  :  the  Roman 
fleet  was  defeated  off  Cydonia  by  the  pirates  and   the 


RULE  OF  THE  SULLAN  RESTORATION.  349 

Cretans  combined ;  Antonius  died  in  Crete  in  71  B.C. ;  and 
the  government  fell  back  upon  the  old  system  of  leaving 
each  state  to  protect  itself. 

The  defeat  of  Cydonia  roused  even  the  degenerate 
Romans  of  that  day  from  their  lethargy ;  yet  the  bribes 
of  the  Cretan  envoys  would  probably  have  bought  off 
Roman  vengeance,  had  not  the  senate  decreed  the  loans 
to  the  envoys  from  Roman  bankers  at  exorbitant  interest 
not  recoverable — thus  incapacitating  itself  for  bribery. 
The  most  humiliating  terms  were  now  offered  to  the 
Cretans,  and  on  their  rejection  Quintus  Metellus,  the  pro- 
consul, appeared,  in  68  B.C.,  in  Cretan  waters.  A  battle 
was  fought  under  the  walls  of  Cydonia,  which  the  Romans 
with  difficulty  won;  but  the  siege  of  the  towns  lasted  for 
two  years.  With  the  conquest  of  Crete  the  last  spot  of 
free  Greek  soil  passed  under  the  power  of  the  Romans. 
"  The  Cretan  communities,  as  they  were  the  first  of  all 
Greek  commonwealths  to  develop  the  free  urban  con- 
stitution and  the  dominion  of  the  sea,  were  also  to  be  the 
last  of  all  the  Greek  maritime  states  formerly  filling  the 
Mediterranean,  to  succumb  to  the  Roman  continental 
power  " 

Metellus  assumed  the  surname  of  Creticus,  as  Servilius 
had  become  Isauricus ;  but  the  power  of  the  pirates  in  the 
Mediterranean  was  never  higher  than  now.  The  coast 
towns  paid  taxes  for  defence  to  the  Roman  governor,  and 
blackmail  to  the  pirates  at  the  same  time  ;  the  admiral  of 
the  Cilician  army  was  carried  off,  as  well  as  two  praetors 
with  all  their  retinue  and  insignia;  the  Roman  fleet, 
equipped  to  clear  the  seas,  was  destroyed  by  the  pirates  in 
the  port  of  Ostia  itself :  and  so  things  went  on,  from  bad 
to  worse,  until  Pompeius  put  an  end  to  the  pest  in  67  B.C. 

The  rule  of  the  restored  oligarchy  in  Macedonia,  in  the 
East,  and  on  the  sea  has  already  been  reviewed ;  we  have 
now  to  see  how  it  fulfilled  its  duties  within  the  confines 
of  Italy. 

Politically  and  economically  slavery  was  the  curse  of  all 
ancient  states  ;  and  it  is  to  be  remembered  that,  where  this 
institution  exists,  the  richer  and  more  prosperous  the 
state,  the  greater  the  proportion  of  slaves  to  the  free 
population  becomes.  There  had  already  been  serious 
servile  wars,  and  the  evil  had  grown  with  the  growth  of 


350  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

the  plantation  system ;  but  the  decade  after  the  death  of 
Sulla  was  "  the  golden  age  of  buccaneers  "  by  sea  and 
land.  Violence  of  all  kinds  was  rife  in  the  less  populated 
parts  of  Italy ;  but  the  crime  of  abduction  both  of  men 
and  of  estates  was  peculiarly  dangerous  to  the  state.  For 
it  was  frequently  perpetrated  by  the  overseers  and  slaves 
of  great  land-owners,  who  did  not  disdain  to  keep  what 
their  officious  subordinates  had  thus  acquired  for  them  ; 
and,  of  course,  bands  of  slaves  and  proletarians  were 
ready  enough  to  learn  their  lesson,  and  to  carry  on  the 
business  of  plunder  on  their  own  account.  Thus  Italy 
was  full  of  inflammable  material,  and  a  spark  was  not 
long  wanting  to  set  it  ablaze. 

In  73  B.C.,  a  number  of  gladiators  broke  out  from  one  of 
the  training  schools  of  Capua,  and  took  up  a  position  on 
Mount  Vesuvius,  under  the  leadership  of  two  Celtic  slaves, 
Crixus  and  Oenomaus,  and  of  Spartacus,  a  Thracian  of 
noble,  perhaps  even  of  royal  lineage.  At  first  only  seventy - 
four  in  number,  they  quickly  increased,  until  aid  had  to  be 
sought  from  Rome  to  repel  them.  A  hastily  collected 
army  of  three  thousand  men  blockaded  the  mountain,  but 
when  attacked  by  the  robbers  it  at  once  fled.  This 
success  of  course  increased  the  number  of  the  insurgents, 
and  the  praetor  Varinius  found  them  encamped  like  a 
regular  army  in  the  plain. 

The  Roman  militia  soon  became  sorely  weakened  by 
disease,  and  undermined  by  cowardice  and  insubordina- 
tion. The  greater  number  refused  to  obey  the  order  to 
attack,  and  when  at  length  Varinius  advanced,  the  enemy 
had  retreated  southwards  out  of  his  reach.  He  followed,  but 
was  disastrously  defeated  in  Lucania.  The  robber  band 
soon  rose  to  the  number  of  forty  thousand  men;  Campania 
was  overrun,  and  many  strong  towns  were  stormed.  The 
slaves  naturally  showed  no  more  mercy  to  their  captives 
than  was  shown  to  themselves  by  their  masters ;  they 
crucified  their  prisoners,  and,  with  grim  humour,  com- 
pelled them  to  slaughter  each  other  in  gladiatorial  combat. 

72  B.C. — For  the  next  year  both  consuls  were  sent 
against  the  slaves.  The  Celtic  band  under  Crixus,  which 
had  separated  from  the  rest,  was  destroyed  at  Mount 
Garganus  in  Apulia;  but  Spartacus  won  victory  after 
victory  in  the  north,  and  overcame  both  consuls  and  every 


RULE  OF  THE  SULLAN  RESTORATION.  351 

Roman  commander  who  opposed  him.  Still  the  in- 
surgents remained  a  mere  band  of  robbers,  roaming 
aimlessly  in  search  of  plunder;  and  all  the  efforts  of 
Spartacus  to  restrain  the  mad  orgies  of  his  followers,  and 
to  induce  them  to  carry  on  a  systematic  war,  were  in 
vain.  Nor  was  the  band  united  in  itself,  but  separated 
into  two  parts  ;  the  one  consisting  of  half-Greek  bar- 
barians, the  other  of  Celts  and  Germans.  It  is  said  that 
Spartacus  wished  after  his  victories  to  cross  the  Alps,  and 
lead  his  followers  to  their  old  homes,  but  was  unable  to 
persuade  them ;  and  that  he  then  turned  south  to 
blockade  Rome,  which  again  was  too  arduous  an  enter- 
prise to  suit  the  wishes  of  slaves. 

The  supreme  command  was  now  entrusted  by  the 
Roman  government  to  Marcus  Crassus,  the  praetor.  He 
raised  an  army  of  eight  legions,  and  restored  discipline  by 
decimating  the  first  division  which  ran  away.  Spartacus 
was  defeated  and  marched  south  to  Rhegium,  where  he 
attempted  to  throw  a  corps  into  Sicily,  but  without 
success.  Crassus  followed,  and  made  his  troops  build  a 
wall  across  the  whole  peninsula  of  Bruttium  :  but 
Spartacus  broke  through,  and  in  71  B.C.  appeared  again 
in  Lucania.  But  their  own  disunion  and  arrogance  were 
more  fatal  to  the  robbers  than  the  Roman  armies.  Once 
more  the  Celts  and  Germans  broke  off  from  the  rest,  and 
though  after  a  narrow  escape  they  once  more  pitched 
their  camp  for  safety  near  that  of  Spartacus,  Crassus 
managed  to  compel  them  to  a  separate  engagement,  and 
slaughtered  the  whole  body.  Spartacus  even  now  gained 
a  slight  success  over  the  Roman  vanguard,  but  his  men 
compelled  him  to  lead  them  into  Apulia  and  to  fight  a 
decisive  battle.  Crassus  gained  a.  dearly  bought  victory  ; 
and,  being  joined  by  the  troops  of  Pompeius  from  Spain, 
he  hunted  out  the  refugees  in  every  part  of  southern 
Italy:  six  thousand  crucified  slaves  lined  the  road  from 
Capua  to  Rome. 

If  the  events  of  the  ten  years  after  the  death  of  Sulla 
are  viewed  as  a  whole,  what  must  be  the  judgment  on  the 
senatorial  government  ?  The  most  striking  fact  about  all 
the  movements  of  that  period  is,  that  though  none  of  them 
— neither  the  insurrection  of  Lepidus,  nor  the  Sertorian  war, 
nor  the  wars  in  Asia  and  Macedonia — any  more  than  the 


352  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

risings  of  the  pirates  and  of  the  slaves  constituted  a  really 
great  and  serious  danger,  yet  they  were  allowed  to  grow 
by  neglect  into  struggles  in  which  the  very  existence  of  the 
empire  was  at  stake.  "  It  was  no  credit  to  Rome  that  the 
two  most  celebrated  generals  of  the  government  party  had, 
during  a  struggle  of  eight  years,  marked  by  more  defeats 
than  victories,  failed  to  master  the  insurgent  chief  Ser- 
torius  and  his  Spanish  guerillas ;  and  that  it  was  only  the 
dasher  of  his  friends  that  decided  tue  Sercorian  war  in 
favour  of  the  legitimate  government.  As  to  the  slaves, 
it  was  far  less  an  honour  to  have  conquered  them  than 
a  disgrace  to  have  been  pitted  against  them  in  equal 
strife  for  years.  Spartacus,  ton,  as  well  as  Hannibal,  had 
traversed  Italy  with  an  army  from  the  Po  to  the  Sicilian 
straits,  beaten  both  consuls,  and  threatened  Rome  with 
blockade.  The  enterprise  which  it  required  the  greatest 
general  of  antiquity  to  undertake  against  the  Rome  of 
former  days,  could  be  undertaken  against  the  Rome  of 
the  present  by  a  daring  captain  of  banditti." 

The  external  wars  produced  a  result  less  unsatisfactory, 
but  quite  disproportionate  to  the  expenditure  of  money 
and  men.  The  Romans  were  driven  from  the  sea;  and  in 
Asia,  iu  spite  of  the  ganius  of  Lucullus,  the  result  was 
tantamount  to  defeat.  And  though,  to  some  extent,  evpry 
class  in  the  Roman  state  is  responsible  for  this  deplorable 
state  of  affairs,  as  "  every  rotten  stone  in  the  building 
helps  to  bring  about  the  ruin  of  the  whole,"  yet,  in  great 
part,  it  can  be  distinctly  traced  to  the  mismanagement  of 
the  governing  body.  For  instance,  the  failure  of  the 
Asiatic  war  was  due  to  the  remissness  of  the  government  io 
abandoning  their  client  states  in  the  first  instance,  and  to 
their  neglect  to  support  their  general  after  the  war  had 
begun  ;  while  the  power  of  the  pirates  was  clue  to  the 
culpable  reluctance  of  the  government  to  deal  with  the 
evil  in  the  comprehensive  manner  by  which  alone  it  could 
be  met.  To  sum  up :  "  The  material  benefits  which  a 
state  exists  to  confer — security  of  frontier,  undisturbed 
peaceful  intercourse,  legal  protection,  and  regulated  ad- 
ministration— began,  all  of  them,  to  vanish  for  the  whole 
of  the  nations  united  in  the  Roman  state ;  the  gods  of 
blessing  seemed  all  of  them  to  have  ascended  to  Olympus, 
and  to  have  left  the  miserable  earth  at  the  mercy  of  official 


RULE  OF  THE  SULLAN  RESTORATION.  353 

or  volunteer  plunderers  and  tormentors.  Nor  was  this 
decay  of  the  state  felt  as  a  public  misfortune  by  such  only 
as  had  political  rights  and  public  spirit ;  the  insurrection 
of  the  proletariate,  and  the  prevalence  of  brigandage  and 
piracy  carried  the  sense  of  this  decay  into  the  remotest 
valley  and  the  humblest  hut  of  Italy,  and  made  every  one 
who  pursued  trade  or  commerce,  or  who  bought  even  a 
bushel  of  wheat,  feel  it  as  a  personal  calamity." 


AUTHORITIES. 

Thracian  and  Dalmatian  icars. — Liv.  Epit.  91, 92,  95, 103.    Flor.  iii.  4. 
Eastern  war. — Liv.  Epit.  93-98.     Flor.  iii.  5.     Veil.  ii.  33.  Eutrop. 

vi.  8-11.     Justin,  xxxvii.   2,  3 ;  xxxviii.  1-3,  5.     Plut.  Lucull. 

5-37.    Appian  Mithr.  67-91.    Memn.  37-57.    Oros.  vi.  2.    Strab. 

xii.  546,  547.     Sail.  Hist.  frag.  lib.  iv.,  vi.     Cic.  pro  L.  Maoil. 

2,  5,  8,  9  ;  pro  Murena,  15  ;  ad  Att.  xiii.  6.     Dio.  xxxv.  1-17. 
Pirates.— Liv.  Epit.  90,  93,  98-100.     Flor.  iii.  6,  7.     Veil.  ii.  31,  32. 

Eutrop.    vi.   12.     Appian   Mithr.    91-93 ;    Sic.  6.     Oros.  v.   23. 

Strab.  xiv.   667,  671.     Frontin.  in.  vii.  1.     Val.  Max.  viii.  5,  6. 

Tac.  Ann.  xii.    62.     Cic.  in  Verr.  ii.  3 ;  iii.  91.     Plut.  Pomp.  24. 

Suet.  Jul.  4.     Dio.  xxxvi.  3-7. 
Spartacus. — Plut.  Pomp.  21.    Crass.  8-11.    Liv.  Epit.  95-97.    Appian 

B.  C.  i.  116-120.     Veil.  ii.  30;  iii.  20.     Flor.  iii.  19. 


Note  on  the  will  of  Alexander,  king  of  Egypt. — Mommsen  ascribes 
this  document  to  Alexander  II.,  who  died  in  81  B.C.,  not,  as  most 
authorities,  to  Alexander  I.,  ob.  88  B.C.  His  chief  argument  is  that 
Alexander  II.  was  the  last  of  the  genuine  Lagidae,  and  the  similar 
testaments  of  the  kings  of  Pergamus,  Cyrene  and  Bithynia  were  all 
executed  by  the  last  representative  of  the  ruling  family.  The  fact 
that  the  treasure  bequeathed  was  deposited  at  Tyre  is  accounted 
for  by  the  fact  that  Alexander  was  killed  only  nineteen  days  after 
his  arrival  in  Egypt  (Letronne,  Inscrr.  de  l'Egypte,  ii.  20) ;  and  the 
words  of  Cicero  (De  L.  Agr.  i.  4,  15,  16)  are  not  inconsistent  with 
the  assignment  of  the  will  to  the  year  81  B.C. 


23 


354  BISTORT  OF  ROME. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

FALL   OF  THE   OLIGARCHY — RULE   OF   POMPEIUS. 

Abuses  of  the  senatorial  rule  :  powerlessness  of  the  aristocrats — 
Coalition  of  Pompeius  and  Crassus  with  the  democratic  party — 
Pompeius  becomes  practically  Regent  of  the  Empire  by  means 
of  the  Gabinian  and  Manilian  laws. 

The  new  government  had  survived  the  danger  of  external 
war  and  of  insurrection  in  Italy.  We  have  now  to  con- 
sider its  relations  with  parties  in  Rome  during  the  same 
decade  of  years.  With  characteristic  want  of  energy  it 
had  not  even  completed  the  half-finished  arrangements  of 
Sulla.  The  lands  destined  by  him  for  distribution  had  not 
been  parcelled  out ;  even  domain  lands  were  again  occupied 
in  the  old  arbitrary  fashion  which  prevailed  before  the 
Gracchan  reforms.  Whatever  in  the  new  constitution  was 
inconvenient  to  the  optimates  was  ignored,  such  as  the 
disfranchisement  of  particular  communities  and  the  pro- 
hibition against  conjoining  the  new  farms. 

Still  the  Gracchan  constitution  remained  formally 
abolished,  and  it  was  the  aim  of  the  democratic  party  to 
restore  it  in  its  main  features  ,  so  the  old  watchwords  were 
heard  again  —  the  corn-largesses,  the  tribunician  power, 
and  the  reform  of  the  senatorial  tribunals.  The  govern- 
ment consented,  in  the  year  of  Sulla's  death  (78  B.C.),  to  a 
limited  revival  of  the  corn  distributions  ;  and  in  73  B.C. 
a  new  corn-law  regulated  the  purchases  of  Sicilian  grain 
for  this  purpose. 

The  agitation  regarding  the  tribunician  power  was  begun 
as  early  as  76  B.C.,  and  continued  in  later  years,  though 
without  result.     But  for  the  reform  of  the  tribunals  the 


FALL   OF  THE  OLIGARCHY.  355 

cry  was  louder  and  the  need  more  pressing.  The  crime  of 
extortion  had  become  habitual,  and  the  condemnation  of 
any  man  of  influence  could  scarcely  be  obtained.  Not 
only  was  there  a  fellow-feeling  with  the  accused  on  the 
part  of  the  senatorial  jurymen,  many  of  whom  had  either 
been  guilty  or  hoped  some  day  to  be  guilty  of  a  similar 
offence,  but  the  sale  of  the  votes  of  the  jurymen  had 
become  an  established  custom.  A  specially  flagrant  case 
might  provoke  an  outcry  for  the  time,  but,  generally 
speaking,  bribery  was  so  universal  that  "the  commission 
as  to  extortions  might  be  regarded  as  an  institution  for 
taxing  the  senators  returning  from  the  provinces  for  the 
benefit  of  their  colleagues  that  remained  at  home."  Even 
Roman  citizens  in  the  provinces,  unless  senators  or 
equites,  were  no  longer  safe  from  the  rods  and  axes  of 
the  Roman  magistrates.  The  opposition  did  not  fail  to 
avail  itself  of  this  state  of  things ;  for  the  prosecution 
of  a  powerful  opponent  in  the  law  courts  was  the  only 
weapon  left  to  it.  So  Caesar  prosecuted  Gnaeus  Dolabella 
and  Gaius  Antonius,  and  Cicero  made  himself  famous  by 
his  indictment  of  Verres ;  while  the  whole  party  loudly 
demanded  the  restoration  of  the  tribunician  power  and  of 
the  equestrian  tribunals,  and  the  renewal  of  the  censorship 
as  the  only  means  of  purifying  the  governing  board. 

With  all  this  no  progress  was  made  ;  the  restoration  of 
corn  distributions  had  conciliated  the  mob  of  the  capital, 
and  the  senate  could  afford  to  be  resolute  on  the  other 
points.  Some  slight  concession  was  made  with  regard 
to  the  exiles  of  the  insurrection  of  Lepidus ;  and  the  in- 
fluence of  Gaius  Cotta,  leader  of  the  moderate  reform 
party  in  the  senate,  abolished  the  provision  which  forbade 
the  tribunes  of  the  plebs  to  stand  for  other  magistracies ; 
but  the  other  restrictions  remained,  and  neither  party  was 
satisfied. 

The  present  condition  of  affairs,  so  happy  for  the 
government,  was  completely  changed  by  the  return  of 
Pompeius  from  Spain  in  71  B.C.  Pompeius  belonged  to  the 
optimates,  but  he  was  very  little  at  home  in  his  own  party. 
He  had  ambition  above  that  of  the  ordinary  aristocrat,  and 
could  not  be  content  with  passing  through  the  regular 
routine  of  office,  with  nothing  before  him  but  a  luxurious 
and  indolent  retirement.     Yet  this  was  all  that  his  own 


356  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

party  could  offer.  The  command  in  the  Mithradatic  war, 
which  he  ardently  desired,  he  knew  the  senate  would  never 
give  him.  The  interests  of  the  oligarchy  could  not  permit 
him  to  add  fresh  laurels  to  those  he  had  already  gained  in 
Africa  and  Europe  ;  they  dared  not  entrust  the  Eastern 
command  to  any  but  the  most  approved  and  stanchest 
aristocrat.  And  there  were  other  grounds  of  dissension 
It  was  only  with  reluctance  that  the  senate  had  conferred 
upon  him  the  Spanish  command  ;  while,  in  return,  the 
general  accused  the  government  of  neglecting  the  Spanish 
armies  and  endangering  the  expedition  Moreover,  he 
demanded  for  himself  a  triumph  and  the  consulship,  and 
for  his  soldiers  assignations  of  land  But  Pompeius  had 
never  filled  any  of  the  subordinate  magistracies,  and 
therefore  could  not  legally  be  consul.  Nor  could  he 
triumph,  for,  in  spite  of  his  extraordinary  commands,  he 
had  never  been  invested  with  the  ordinary  supreme  power 
There  were  but  two  courses  open  to  him :  he  could  either 
make  his  demands  openly  at  the  head  of  his  army  and  in- 
timidate the  senate  into  compliance,  or  he  could  ally  him- 
self with  the  democrats.  The  timid  nature  of  Pompeius 
and  his  want  of  political  adroitness  inclined  him  to  the 
latter  course ;  he  thus  gained  for  himself  able  political 
adjutants  like  Gaius  Caesar,  while  the  forlorn  democratic 
party  were  only  too  glad  of  the  alliance — they  knew  that 
the  government  could  refuse  no  demand  presented  by  so 
formidable  a  combination. 

There  was  still  one  man  whose  influence,  though  it  might 
not  be  able  to  give  victory  to  either  side,  was  yet  consider- 
able. This  was  Marcus  Crassus,  who  was  at  the  head  of  the 
army  with  which  he  had  crushed  the  servile  rising,  and 
who,  moreover,  was  the  richest  man  in  Rome,  and  had  great 
influence  in  the  political  clubs.  He,  like  Pompeius,  was 
a  Sullan,  but  had  personal  aims,  quite  outside  the  ordinary 
constitutional  routine.  He  chose  the  safer  course  of  join- 
ing the  coalition,  and  was  welcomed  by  the  democrats,  who 
were  not  unpleased  to  find  in  him  a  possible  counterpoise 
to  the  now  all-powerful  Pompeius.  This,  the  first  coalition, 
took  place  in  the  summer  of  71  B.C.  The  terms  were 
simple.  The  generals  adopted  the  democratic  programme, 
while  they  were  to  have  the  consulship  for  the  following 
year.      Pompeius,  in  addition,  was  to  get  his  triumph  and 


FALL  OF  THE  OLIGARCHY.  357 

the  allotments  promised  to  bis  soldiei'S,  and  Crassus  the 
honour  of  a  solemn  entrance  into  the  capital.  The  seDate 
had  nothing  to  oppose  to  the  coalition,  for  Metellus  had 
already  disbanded  bis  troops.  They  granted  the  necessary 
dispensations,  and  Pompeius  gave  formal  adherence  to  the 
democratic  proposals  in  an  assembly  of  the  people. 

The  Sullan  constitution  was  now  speedily  abolished.  1. 
Pompeius  himself,  as  consul,  introduced  a  law  restoring  to 
the  tribunes  all  their  old  prerogatives,  especially  the  right 
of  initiating  legislation.  2.  The  law-courts  were  reformed 
by  the  lex  Aurelia  of  Lucius  Cotta,  the  praetor,  and  brother 
of  Gaius  Cotta  (p.  355)  ;  and  this  fact,  taken  together  with 
the  provisions  of  the  law  itself,  seems  to  show  that  the 
moderate  senatorial  party  lent  its  support  to  the  coalition : 
for  the  senators  were  not  altogether  excluded  from  the 
roll  of  jurymen,  who  in  future  were  to  be  composed  one- 
third  of  senators,  two-thirds  of  equestrians  ;  but,  of  the 
latter,  one-half  must  have  filled  the  office  of  tribuni  aerarii, 
or  district  presidents.  As  these  officers  were  elected  by 
the  tribes,  one-third  of  the  jurymen  were  now  indirectly 
elective.  3.  The  farming  system  was  reintroduced  for  the 
taxes  of  the  Asiatic  province ;  this,  of  course,  was  to  con- 
ciliate the  capitalists  at  the  expense  of  the  provincials. 
4.  The  censorship  was  restored — probably  without  the 
earlier  limitation  which  restricted  the  term  of  office  to 
eighteen  months.  The  two  first  censors  under  the  new 
law  were  two  consulars  who  had  been  removed  by  the 
senate  from  their  commands  against  Spartacus.  They  now 
revenged  themselves  by  expelling  eighty-four  senators 
(one-eighth  of  the  whole). 

The  constitution  of  Sulla  had  been  based  on  a  monopoly 
of  power  by  the  senate,  and  on  the  political  annihilation  of 
every  other  class  in  the  state  ;  but  under  the  new  arrange- 
ment the  senate  was  held  in  check  by  fear  of  the  censors 
and  of  the  equestrian  jurymen.  The  tribunes  of  the  people 
could  propose  new  laws  and  overturn  any  existing  arrange- 
ments at  will,  while  the  moneyed  classes,  as  farmers  of 
the  revenue  and  as  judges  of  the  provincial  governors, 
again  raised  their  heads  beside  the  senate. 

The  democrats  had  further  aims,  such  as  the  recall  of 
the  proscribed  and  the  punishment  of  the  murderers  of 
the  Sullan  proscriptions ;  but  the  generals  had  been  too 


358  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

intimately  connected  with  these  events  to  take  any  part  in 
such  measures,  and  nothing  was  done  beyond  the  collection 
of  the  outstanding  purchase-money  for  estates  confiscated 
by  Sulla. 

Meanwhile  the  armies  of  the  two  generals  still  lay  before 
the  walls  of  Rome,  and  the  danger  was  great  lest  Pompeius 
should  yield  to  the  temptation  of  making  himself  absolute 
master  of  the  city  and  of  the  empire.  The  coalition  had 
only  one  bond  of  union — the  desire  to  destroy  the  Sullan 
constitution ;  that  work  was  now  accomplished,  and  the 
combination  was  in  reality  dissolved.  Crassus  had  through- 
out played  an  inferior  part,  and  his  terror  became  so  great 
that  he  began  to  make  advances  to  the  senate  and  to 
attempt  to  gain  over  the  mob  by  immense  largesses.  But 
Pompeius  really  lacked  the  courage  to  take  a  decisive 
step ;  he  wished  to  be  master  of  Rome  and  loyal  citizen 
at  the  same  time.  The  adroit  leaders  of  the  democratic 
party  plied  him  with  flatteries,  urged  him  to  surpass  his 
former  services  to  the  state  by  a  still  greater  victory,  and 
to  banish  the  fearful  spectre  of  civil  war.  Crassus  was 
induced  to  make  the  first  overtures  for  disbandment,  and  at 
length  the  great  general  yielded,  and  the  troops  dispersed. 
The  Mithradatic  war  appeared  now  at  an  end  (70  B.C.), 
and  as  Pompeius  would  not  accept  a  province  he  retired 
at  the  expiry  of  his  consulship  wholly  from  public  affairs. 

During  the  next  few  years  the  condition  of  parties  was 
very  much  what  it  had  been  before  the  time  of  Sulla.  The 
direction  of  affairs  lay  with  the  senate,  while  the  constitu- 
tion through  which  it  governed  was  pervaded  by  a  hostile 
spirit.  The  democrats  were  impotent  without  a  leader; 
and  the  chief  feature  of  the  period  is  the  increase  of  the 
influence  of  the  capitalist  party,  which,  though  courted  by 
both  sides,  on  the  whole  drew  closer  to  the  senate.  Their 
influence  is  seen  in  the  law  of  the  year  67  B.C.,  which  restored 
to  them  the  fourteen  special  benches  in  the  theatre,  and  in 
the  fact  that  the  senate  withdrew,  at  their  instance,  the 
administration  of  Asia  from  Lucius  Lucullus. 

But  the  course  of  the  war  in  the  East  soon  brought 
about  a  change  (see  p.  346).  All  the  conquests  in  the  East 
were  lost,  and  the  sea  was  given  up  to  the  undisputed 
sway  of  the  pirates.  The  democrats  eagerly  seized  the 
opportunity    of   settling   accounts    with   the   senate,    and 


FALL   OF  THE  OLIGARCHY.  359 

Pompeius  saw  once  more  before  him  an  opportunity  of 
gratifying  his  ambition.  Accordingly,  in  67  B.C.,  two 
projects  of  law  were  introduced  in  the  assembly  of  the 
tribes  at  his  instigation. 

1.  The  first  measure  decreed  the  discharge  of  the  soldiers 
in  the  East  who  had  served  their  term  ;  and  the  substitution 
of  Glabrio,  one  of  the  consuls  of  the  year,  for  Lucullus  in 
the  command. 

2.  The  second  proposed  a  comprehensive  plan  for  clearing 
the  seas  from  pirates.  The  terms  of  the  proposal  are 
extraordinary,  and  require  close  attention. 

(a)  A  generalissimo  was  to  be  appointed  by  the  senate 
from  the  consulars,  to  hold  supreme  command  over  the 
whole  Mediterranean  and  over  all  the  coasts  for  fifty  miles 
inland,  concurrently  with  the  ordinary  governors,  for  three 
years. 

(b)  He  might  select  from  the  men  of  senatorial  rank 
twenty-five  lieutenants  with  praetorian  powers,  and  two 
treasurers  with  quaestorian  power. 

(c)  He  might  raise  an  army  of  120,000  infantry  and 
7000  cavalry,  and  a  fleet  of  500  ships  ;  and  for  this  purpose 
might  dispose  absolutely  of  all  the  resources  of  the 
provinces.  Besides  this,  a  large  sum  of  money  and  a  con- 
siderable force  of  men  and  ships  were  at  once  handed  over 
to  him. 

By  the  introduction  of  this  law  the  government  was 
practically  taken  out  of  the  hands  of  the  senate ;  it  was 
the  final  collapse  of  the  oligarchic  rule.  But  it  was  more 
than  this — it  was  practically  the  institution  of  an  unlimited 
dictatorship. 

1.  Like  all  extraordinary  commands,  this  new  office  no 
doubt  required  the  confirmation  of  the  people ;  but  it  was 
an  undoubted  prerogative  of  the  senate  to  define  the  sphere 
of  every  command,  and,  in  fact,  to  control  and  limit  it  in 
all  ways.  The  people  had  hitherto  interfered  only  on  the 
proposition  of  the  senate,  or  at  any  rate  of  a  magistrate 
himself  qualified  for  the  office  of  general.  Even  during 
the  Jugurthan  Avar,  when  the  command  was  transferred  to 
Marius  by  popular  vote,  it  was  only  to  Marius  as  consul 
for  the  year.  But  now  a  private  man  was  to  be  invested 
by  the  tribes  with  extraordinary  authority,  and  the  sphere 
of  his  office  was  defined  by  themselves. 


300  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

2.  The  new  commander  was  empowered  to  confer  prae- 
torian powers — that  is,  the  highest  military  and  civil 
authority — upon  adjutants  chosen  by  himself,  though 
hitherto  such  authority  could  only  be  conferred  with  the 
co-operation  of  the  burgesses. 

3.  The  office  of  general  was  usually  conferred  for  one 
year  only,  with  strict  limitations  as  to  forces  and  supplies ; 
but  now  the  whole  resources  of  the  state  were  committed 
almost  without  reserve  to  one  man. 

Thus  at  one  stroke  the  government  was  taken  out  of  the 
hands  of  the  senate,  and  the  fortunes  of  the  empire  com- 
mitted for  the  next  three  years  to  a  dictator.  The  step, 
no  doubt,  was  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  Pompeius, 
for  it  would  naturally  lead  in  the  end  to  the  command 
against  Mithradates,  and  it  gave  him  an  extraordinary 
position  in  the  state  without  violating  constitutional  forms. 
Still,  it  was  probably  due  immediately  to  the  instigation 
of  his  bold  adherents,  in  particular  of  Aulus  Gabinius, 
the  tribune,  who  proposed  the  law,  who  grasped  the 
situation  more  completely  than  Pompeius  himself,  and  took 
the  decision  out  of  his  hands.  The  senate  and  the  moneyed 
aristocracy  alike  were  furious,  while  the  democrats,  though 
they  could  not  but  dislike  a  bill  which  threatened  to  annihi- 
late all  parties,  dared  not  break  with  their  ally  ;  accord- 
ingly, Caesar  and  Lucius  Quinctius  supported  the  measure. 
The  scarcity  of  corn,  and  the  rumours  as  to  the  conduct 
of  Lucullus  were  enough  to  secure  the  support  of  the 
multitude. 

On  the  day  of  the  voting,  the  Forum  and  even  the  roofs 
of  the  buildings  around  were  covered  with  men.  All  the 
colleagues  of  Gabinius  had  promised  to  veto  the  measure  ; 
but  only  one,  Lucius  Trebellius,  had  the  courage  to  keep 
his  pledge.  Gabinius  immediately  proposed  to  deal  with 
him  as  Tiberius  Gracchus  had  dealt  with  Octavius,  but 
after  seventeen  tribes  had  voted,  Trebellius  withdrew  his 
veto.  All  was  now  lost ;  attempts  were  made  to  secure 
the  appointment  of  two  generals  instead  of  one,  and  to 
make  the  twenty-five  lieutenant-generals  eligible  by  the 
tribes,  but  the  bill  passed  without  alteration. 

Pompeius  and  Glabrio  immediately  set  out.  The  success 
of  Pompeius  was  rapid  and  complete  ;  indeed,  such  was  the 
confidence  in  his  powers  that  the  price  of  grain  had  fallen 


FALL   OF  THE  OLIGARCHY.  361 

to  the  ordinaiy  rate  as  soon  as  the  law  was  passed.  But 
in  Asia  the  condition  of  affairs  passed  from  bad  to  worse ; 
Glabrio,  instead  of  taking  command  of  the  forces,  con- 
tented himself  with  fomenting  the  discontent  of  the  soldiers 
against  Lucullus,  who,  of  course,  was  powerless.  It  seemed 
the  most  natural  course  to  appoint  Pompeius  to  the  Asiatic 
command,  which  he  was  known  to  ardently  desire.  But 
no  party  in  the  state  was  willing  to  increase  his  already 
enormous  authority.  At  this  juncture,  Gaius  Manilius,  a 
tribune,  who  was  without  influence  in  either  party,  wishing 
to  force  himself  into  the  favour  of  the  great  general,  brought 
forward  a  proposal  to  recall  Glabrio  from  Pont  us  and 
Bithynia,  and  Marcius  Rex  from  Cilicia,  and  to  confer  both 
their  offices — apparently  without  limit  of  time — together 
with  free  authority  to  conclude  peace  and  alliance,  upon  the 
proconsul  of  the  seas  and  coasts.  (Early  in  66  B.C.)  The 
proposal  was  repugnant  to  every  party,  and  jet  was  passed 
almost  unanimously.  The  democrats  concealed  their  fears, 
and  openly  supported  it ;  the  moderate  optirnates  declared 
themselves  on  the  same  side ;  they  saw  that  resistance  was 
hopeless,  and  that  their  best  policy  was  to  try  to  bind 
Pompeius  to  the  senate.  Marcus  Cicero  made  his  first 
political  speech  in  support  of  it,  and  the  only  opposition 
was  from  the  strict  aristocratic  party  headed  by  Quintus 
Catulus.  Thus,  by  the  action  of  an  irresponsible  dema- 
gogue, Pompeius,  in  addition  to  his  former  powers,  ob- 
tained command  of  the  most  important  Eastern  provinces, 
and  the  conduct  of  a  war  of  which  no  man  could  foresee 
the  end.  "  Never  since  Rome  stood  had  such  power  been 
united  in  the  hands  of  a  single  man." 

The  two  laws  of  Gabinius  and  Manilius  terminate  the 
struggle  between  the  senate  and  the  popular  party,  which 
was  begun  sixty-seven  years  before  by  Tiberius  Gracchus. 
The  first  breach  in  the  existing  constitution  was  made 
when  the  veto  of  Octavius  was  disregarded  by  Tiberius 
Gracchus  ;  and  the  last  bulwark  of  senatorial  rule  fell  in 
like  manner  with  the  withdrawal  of  Trebellius.  But  the 
struggle,  which  was  begun  by  men  of  high  ideals  and  of 
noble  personal  character,  was  brought  to  a  close  by  venal 
and  intriguing  demagogues.  And  the  contrast  was  but 
an  indication  of  the  change  which  the  whole  state  had 
undergone  ;   everything — law,  military  discipline,  life  and 


362  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

manners — had  changed.  A  comparison  between  the  Grac- 
chan  ideal  and  its  later  realization  could  only  provoke  a 
painful  smile. 

But  the  end  of  the  first  struggle  was  but  the  beginning 
of  a  second — of  a  new  struggle  between  the  allies  who  bad 
overthrown  their  common  enemy  the  senate,  between  the 
democratic  civil  opposition  and  the  military  power.  The 
exceptional  position  of  Porapeius  was  incompatible  with  a 
republican  constitution :  he  was  not  general,  but  regent 
of  the  empire.  If,  at  the  close  of  his  Eastern  campaign, 
he  sbould  stretch  forth  his  arm  and  seize  the  crown, 
who  was  to  prevent  him  ?  " '  Soon,'  exclaimed  Catulus, 
'  it  would  be  necessary  once  more  to  flee  to  the  rocks  of 
the  Capitol,  in  order  to  save  liberty.'  It  was  not  the  fault 
of  the  prophet  that  the  storm  came  not,  as  he  expected, 
from  the  East,  but  that,  on  the  contrary,  fate,  fulfilling  his 
words  more  literally  than  he  himself  anticipated,  brought 
on  a  destroying  tempest  a  few  years  later  from  Gaul." 


AUTHORITIES. 

Liv.  Epit.  97-100.     Plut.  Pomp.  21-23,  25,  36.     Crass.  11-12.     Cic. 

ad  Att.  vii.  9,  10;  pro  L.  Manil.  pro  Cornel,  frag.     Dio.  xxxvi. 

6-20.     Appiaa  B.  C,  i.  121  ;  Mithr.  97.     Ascon.  in  Corn.  U4,  65. 

Veil.    ii.    31-33.     Sail.    Hist.    Frag.  iii.     Letter   of    Pompeius; 

Speech  of  Licinius  Macer.     Licinianns,  frag. 
Restoration  of  free  corn. — Licin.  fra?.     Cie.  in  Verr.  iii.  70,  136 ;  v. 

21,  52.     Momms.  V.  i.  note.     Sail.  Hist.  iii.  61. 
Gains  Cotta's  concessions. — Cic.  fr.  pro  Cor.  25  (Nobbe)  and  Ascon.  in 

Cor.    Sail.  H.  fr.  iii.  Or.  Lie.  Mac. 
Lex  Aurelia  Judiciaria. — Liv.  Ep.  97.     Suet.  Jul.  41. 
Publicani  restored. — Marq.  Stv.  185. 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

POMPEIUS   AND   THE    EAST. 

67  B.C.  The  Mediterranean  cleared  of  pirates — Command  against 
Mithradates  conferred  on  Pompeius.  —  66-64  b.c.  War  with 
Mithradates — His  death. — 61-62  b.c.  Pompeius  regulates  the 
affairs  of  Syria  and  Asia. — 59  B.C.  Ptolemy  Auletes  acknow- 
ledged king  of  Egypt  by  Rome. — 58  B.C.  Annexation  of  Cyprus. 

Pompeius  began  the  work  of  subjugating  the  pirates  by 
dividing  the  whole  field  of  operations  into  thirteen 
districts,  each  of  which  was  assigned  to  a  lieutenant,  who 
equipped  vessels,  searched  the  coast,  and  captured  the 
ships  of  the  freebooters.  He  himself,  with  the  best  of  his 
6hips,  swept  the  Sicilian,  African,  and  Sardinian  waters, 
while  his  lieutenants  dealt  with  the  coasts  of  Spain  and 
Gaul.  Within  forty  days  the  western  Mediterranean  was 
free,  and  the  dearth  at  Rome  relieved.  The  general  now 
repaired,  with  sixty  of  his  vessels,  to  Lycia  and  Cilicia. 
The  pirates  everywhere  disappeared  from  the  sea  on  his 
approach,  and  many  even  of  the  mountain  strongholds  of 
Lycia  accepted  the  terms  offered  to  them,  and  opened  their 
gates.  But  the  Cilicians,  after  placing  their  families  and 
their  treasures  in  their  strongholds,  awaited  the  Romans, 
with  a  large  fleet,  off  the  western  frontier  of  Cilicia. 
Pompeius  gained  a  complete  victory ;  landed  and  subdued 
the  strongholds,  and  in  forty-nine  days  after  his  first 
appearance  in  the  eastern  seas  brought  the  war  to  a  close. 
The  whole  affair  was,  of  course,  rather  an  energetic  and 
skilful  police-raid  than  a  victorious  war  ;  but  the  rapidity  of 
the  achievement  was  astounding,  and  made  a  great  impres- 
sion on  the  public  mind.     Thirteen  hundred  pirate  vessels 


334  HISTORY  OF  110MK 

are  said  to  have  been  destroyed  ;  ten  thousand  pirates 
perished,  and  more  than  twenty  thousand  were  captured, 
while  numerous  captive  Romans,  among  them  Publius 
Clodius,  regained  their  liberty  (67  B.C.). 

An  interlude  of  the  pirate  war  in  the  island  of  Crete 
shows  the  indescribable  weakness  and  disorganization  of 
the  central  government  at  the  period.  In  the  year  67  B.C. 
Quintus  Metellus  was  in  Crete,  completing  the  subjugation 
of  the  island ;  the  command  of  Pompeius  extended  over 
the  whole  island,  as  it  was  nowhere  more  than  eighty 
miles  broad  (see  p.  359).  Out  of  consideration  for 
Metellus,  Pompeius  did  not  assign  it  to  any  lieutenant ; 
but  the  Cretan  towns,  seeing  that  Pompeius  was  acting 
with  the  greatest  clemency,  preferred  to  make  their 
surrender  to  him.  He  accepted  their  submission,  and 
sent  Lucius  Octavius  to  take  over  the  towns.  Metellus, 
however,  ignoi*ed  these  negotiations,  and  continued  the 
sieges  ;  and  when  Octavius  summoned  troops  from  Achaia 
formal  conflicts  took  place,  several  towns  were  stormed  by 
Metellus,  and  in  one  of  them  Octavius  was  taken  prisoner, 
but  afterwards  released.  The  island  was  at  last  subdued 
by  Metellus,  and  nothing  came  of  these  scandalous  pro- 
ceedings beyond  a  bitter  correspondence  between  the  twc 
generals  !     \+i  fact,  the  new  civil  war  had  already  begun. 

Meanwhile,  Pompeius  remained  in  Cilicia,  ostensibly 
preparing  for  a  Cretan  campaign,  bat  really  waiting  for  a 
pretext  to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  Asia  Minor.  At 
length  the  Manilian  law  gave  him  the  desired  authority; 
but  in  the  midst  of  more  important  matters  the  pirates 
were  not  iorgotten.  Pompeius  caused  a  fleet  to  be  main- 
tained to  protect  the  Asiatic  coasts,  and  on  his  return  to 
Rome  persuaded  the  senate  to  take  similar  measures  for 
Italy ;  and  though  there  were  subsequent  expeditions  in 
58  B.C.  and  in  55  B.C.,  piracy  never  regained  its  old  pre- 
dominance in  the  Mediterranean. 

As  soon  as  Pompeius  was  invested  by  the  Manilian  law 
with  the  command  he  had  so  long  desired,  he  began 
strenuously  to  prepare  for  his  new  campaign.  At  the 
outset  a  great  piece  of  good  fortune  befell  him.  A  son 
of  the  great  king  Tigranes,  who  bore  the  same  name  as 
his  father,  rebelled,  and  took  refuge  at  the  Parthian 
court,   and   by  his   influence  determined   that   power  to 


POMPEIUS  AND  THE  EAST.  365 

adhere  to  the  Roman  side  and  to  renew  with  Pompeius 
the  agreement  formed  with  Lucullus  to  accept  the 
Euphrates  as  the  boundary  of  the  two  empires.  At 
the  same  time  the  great  king  suspected  Mithradates  of 
secretly  encouraging  his  rebellious  son,  and  the  good 
understanding  between  the  two  monarchs  was  disturbed. 
Meanwhile  Pompeius  completed  his  preparations,  and 
collected  a  force  of  from  40,000  to  50,000  men,  many 
of  whom  were  discharged  Fimbrian  veterans  who  had 
enlisted  again  as  volunteers. 

In  the  spring  of  66  B.C.  Pompeius  took  over  the  com- 
mand of  the  legions  from  Lucullus,  but  the  meeting  of  the 
two  generals,  from  which  a  reconciliation  had  been  hoped 
for,  ended  in  bitter  recriminations.  The  Roman  army 
then  invaded  Pontus,  where  they  were  opposed  by  a  force 
of  30,000  infantry  and  3,000  cavalry  under  Mithradates. 
The  king  refused  to  surrender  unconditionally,  and 
retreated  slowly,  seizing  every  opportunity  to  inflict 
damage  upon  the  Romans.  At  length  Pompeius,  weary 
of  the  pursuit,  desisted,  and  began  to  subdue  the  country. 
He  reached  the  Upper  Euphrates,  and  crossed  it,  but  was 
intercepted  by  Mithradates  in  the  Acilisenian  province  at 
the  castle  of  Dasteira.  Pompeius  now  retreated  into 
Pontic  Armenia,  and  waited  the  arrival  of  the  troops 
expected  from  Cilicia ;  with  these  he  once  more  took  the 
offensive  and  blockaded  the  Pontic  army  in  its  camp. 
When  the  king  escaped  secretly  by  night,  Pompeius 
followed,  and  finding  himself  drawn  further  and  further 
into  an  unknown  country,  made  a  circuit  unknown  to  the 
enemy,  and  occupied  a  defile  in  front  of  them,  on  the  southern 
bank  of  the  river  Lycus.  At  the  close  of  the  next  day's 
march,  the  Pontic  army  encamped  in  this  very  valley,  the 
heights  of  which  were  commanded  by  the  Romans.  In  the 
silence  of  the  night  the  terrible  battle-cry  of  the  legions 
broke  forth,  and  missiles  were  showered  on  the  Asiatic 
host,  scarcely  one  of  which  failed  to  take  effect  upon  the 
dense  mass.  A  charge  of  the  legions  followed,  by  which 
the  whole  army  was  annihilated.  The  king  escaped  with 
but  three  attendants  to  the  fortress  of  Sinoria,  whence  he 
hastened,  with  what  stragglers  he  could  bring  together, 
towards  Armenia.  But  the  moment  was  unfavourable. 
Tigranes  had  just  succeeded  in  ridding  his  kingdom  of  the 


S6C  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Parthian  corps  which  had  invaded  it  and  besieged  Artaxata, 
and  was  negotiating  with  the  Romans  for  a  separate 
peace.  A  price  of  one  hundred  talents  (£24,000)  was  set 
upon  the  head  of  Mithradates,  and  the  old  king  had  to 
fly  northwards  towards  his  Bosporan  kingdom,  while 
Pompeius  turned  aside  to  settle  matters  with  Tigranes. 
The  latter  was  resolved  to  purchase  peace  at  any  price, 
and  hastened  to  throw  himself  at  Pompeius'  feet,  and  to 
place  in  his  hands  the  diadem  and  tiara  in  token  of  un- 
conditional surrender.  He  had  to  pay  a  fine  of  six 
thousand  talents  (£1,400,000)  besides  a  present  of  fifty 
denarii  (£1  16s.)  to  each  of  the  Roman  soldiers  ;  and  to 
cede  all  his  conquests  in  Syria,  Phoenicia,  Cilicia,  and 
Cappadocia,  besides  Sophene  and  Carduene,  east  of  the 
Euphrates.  He  thus  became  once  more  merely  king  of 
Armenia.  In  one  campaign  Pompeius  had  utterly  routed 
the  mighty  monarchs  of  Pont  us  and  Armenia ;  and  his 
army  wintered  on  Armenian  soil,  in  the  country  between 
the  Upper  Euphrates  and  the  river  Kur. 

During  the  winter,  and  before  starting  to  cross  the 
Caucasus  in  pursuit  of  Mithradates,  Pompeius  had  to  repel 
the  attacks  of  the  Iberians  and  Albanians — two  tribes 
which  had  preserved  their  independence  from  time 
immemorial  in  the  country  watered  by  the  Kur,  at  the 
foot  of  the  Caucasus  range,  and  who  fought  chiefly  with 
arrows  and  light  javelins,  which  they  often  discharged,  like 
the  North  American  Indians,  from  lurking  places  in  the 
woods  or  from  behind  trees.  He  then  led  his  army  down 
the  Phasis  to  the  Black  Sea,  where  the  fleet  awraited  him. 
But  the  long  march  over  the  mountains,  through  unknown 
country  peopled  by  hostile  tribes,  appeared  too  dangerous 
an  enterprise  to  be  undertaken  on  the  mere  chance  of 
capturing  Mithradates  ;  an  insurrection  of  the  Albanians 
gave  a  pretext  for  retreat,  and,  ordering  the  fleet  to 
blockade  the  Bosporus,  Pompeius  returned  to  the  Alba- 
nian plain.  The  force  of  the  Albanians  and  their  allies 
was  said  to  amount  to  sixty  thousand  infantry  and  twelve 
thousand  cavalry.  With  this  they  attacked  the  Roman 
cavalry,  not  knowing  that  the  masses  of  the  infantry  were 
drawn  up  behind  the  horsemen ;  the  legions  soon  drove 
the  enemy  into  a  wood,  which  was  set  on  fire.  After  this 
engagement   the  Albanians,   Iberians,    and  other   neigh- 


POMPEIUS  AND  THE  EAST.  367 

bouring  tribes  made  peace,  and  thus,  for  a  time  at  least, 
were  brought  into  relations  of  dependence  upon  Rome. 

In  the  mean  timeMithradates  bad  reached  Panticapaeum, 
where  he  drove  bis  rebellious  son  Macbares  from  the 
tbrone,  and  forced  bim  to  commit  suicide.  He  knew  the 
deep  hatred  with  which  Orientals  regarded  tbe  Roman 
domination,  and  was  well  acquainted  with  tbe  laxity  of 
the  senatorial  rule ;  hence  he  was  not  without  hopes  of 
establishing  some  day  his  old  dominion.  For  the  present 
he  sent  envoys,  asking  that  his  paternal  kingdom  should 
be  restored  to  him,  and  offered  to  pay  tribute  as  a 
vassal  to  Rome.  But  Pompeius  insisted  upon  personal 
submission  ;  and  Mithradates  immediately  began  to  strain 
every  nerve  to  raise  a  new  army.  He  had  collected 
a  force  of  thirty-six  thousand  men,  armed  and  dis- 
ciplined after  the  Roman  fashion,  and  a  war  fleet.  It 
was  rumoured  that  he  intended  to  march  through  Thrace, 
Macedonia,  and  Pannonia,  and,  carrying  with  him  the 
Scythians  and  the  Celts  from  the  Danube,  to  throw  himself 
like  an  avalanche  upon  Italy  from  the  north.  But  these 
preparations  had  caused  the  severest  suffering  to  his 
subjects,  whose  houses  had  been  destroyed  and  their  oxen 
slaughtered  to  furnish  beams  and  sinews  for  the  engines 
of  war;  moreover  Mithradates  had  never  possessed  the 
gift  of  calling  forth  the  affection  and  fidelity  of  his 
servants ;  and,  lastly,  the  Roman  emigrants  and  deserters, 
for  reasons  of  their  own,  were  extremely  disinclined  for 
the  rumoured  expedition  into  Italy.  Treason  was  every- 
where rife,  and  the  standard  of  insurrection  was  raised  at 
Phanagoria  by  Castor,  who  delivered  up  the  sons  of  Mith- 
radates to  the  Romans.  Pharnaces,  the  favourite  son  of 
the  king,  headed  the  insurrection,  the  troops  and  the  fleet 
joined  it,  and  at  last  the  city  of  Panticapaeum  opened  its 
gates  and  delivered  over  the  king,  shut  up  in  his  castle. 
The  latter  in  vain  entreated  Pharnaces  to  spare  his  life ; 
he  then  compelled  his  wives  and  daughters  and  concubines 
to  swallow  the  poisoned  draught,  after  which  he  drained  it 
himself,  and  then,  too  impatient  to  wait  for  death,  presented 
his  neck  to  the  stroke  of  a  Celtic  mercenary.  He  was  in 
the  sixty-eighth  year  of  his  life  and  tbe  fifty-seventh  of 
his  reign.  For  years  he  had  sustained  an  unequal  contest 
with  a  superior  foe,  without  success  indeed,  but  yet  with 


3C3  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

honour  :  and  the  Romans  regarded  his  death  as  a  victory, 
just  as  Scipio  had  triumphed  even  more  over  Hannibal 
than  over  Carthage. 

Pompeius  had  completed  the  reduction  of  Pontus,  and 
in  the  summer  of  64  B.C.  set  out  to  regulate  the  affairs  of 
Syria.  The  Syrian  provinces  were  now  in  the  hands  of 
three  powers — the  Bedouins,  the  Jews,  and  the  Nabataeana. 
The  Bedouins,  who  were  masters  of  northern  Syria, 
had  their  home  in  the  desert  which  stretches  from  the 
peninsula  of  Arabia  up  to  the  Euphrates,  where  they 
lived  under  their  emirs,  the  most  noted  of  whom  were 
Abgarus  and  Sampsiceramus.  The  Jews,  under  Jannaeus 
Alexander,  who  died  in  79  B.C.,  had  extended  their  dominion 
south wai-ds  to  the  Egyptian  frontier,  and  northwards  to 
the  Lake  of  Gennesareth,  including  a  considerable  stretch 
of  coast.  Their  further  expansion  was  checked  by  internal 
dissension  between  the  Pharisees  and  the  Sadducees. 
Their  fierce  religious  and  political  contentions  broke  out 
with  violence  after  the  death  of  Jannaeus,  and  a  civil 
war  ensued,  in  which  the  Pharisees  supported  one  of  his 
sons,  Hyrcanus,  and  the  Sadducees  another,  Aristobulus, 
a  strong  and  able  prince.  These  divisions  gave  an  oppor- 
tunity to  the  Nabataeans,  who  were  settled  in  the  region 
of  Petra,  to  obtain  a  footing  in  southern  Syria.  At  the 
invitation  of  the  Pharisees,  the  Nabataean  king  Aretas 
advanced  with  a  large  force  and  besieged  Aristobulus  in 
Jerusalem. 

To  pnt  an  end  to  the  anarchy  Pompeius  resolved  to 
annex  Syria,  and  in  the  person  of  Antiochus  Asiaticus, 
who  had  been  acknowledged  by  the  senate  and  by  Lu- 
cullus,  the  house  of  Seleucus  was  ejected  from  the  throne 
it  had  held  for  two  hundred  and  fifty  years.  At  the  same 
time,  Pompeius  advanced  with  his  army  into  the  province, 
and  enforced  his  regulations,  where  necessary,  by  arms. 
The  Jews  alone  refused  to  obey,  and  when  Aristobulus,  after 
much  hesitation,  resolved  to  submit,  the  more  fanatical 
portion  of  his  army  would  not  comply  with  his  orders, 
and  sustained  a  siege  of  three  months  on  the  steep  temple 
rock.  The  Nabataeans  still  remained.  King  Aretas 
retired  from  Judaea,  but  retained  the  city  of  Damascus, 
and  would  not  acknowledge  the  supremacy  of  Rome.  The 
expedition  against  him  was  entrusted  to  Marcus  Scaurus ; 


POMrEIUS  AND   THE  EAST.  3G9 

it  obtained  only  trifling  successes,  but  ultimately  Aretas 
was  persuaded  to  purchase  for  a  sum  of  money  a  guarantee 
for  all  his  possessions,  includiug  Damascus,  from  the 
Roman  governor. 

Thus  the  work  begun  by  Lucullus  was  compleced  by 
Pompeius.  The  system  of  protectorate  had  been  exchanged 
for  that  of  direct  sovereignty  over  the  more  important 
dependent  territories — Bithynia,  Pontus,  and  Syria;  while 
to  the  indirect  dominion  of  Rome  were  added  Armenia 
and  the  district  of  the  Caucasus,  and  the  kingdom  of  the 
Cimmerian  Bosporus.  The  town  of  Phauagoria  was,  for 
its  important  services  declared  free. 

In  his  settlement  with  the  Parthians  Pompeius  was  true 
to  the  old  Roman  policy  of  favouring  the  humbled  foe  at 
the  expense  of  the  powerful  ally.  The  younger  Tigranes 
and  his  family  were  arrested  and  taken  to  Rome  to  grace 
the  general's  triumph.  The  province  of  Corduene, 
which  was  claimed  by  both  Phraates  and  Tigranes,  was 
occupied  by  Roman  troops  for  tlie  latter.  What  was  most 
serious  of  all  was  the  fact  that  the  Romans  did  not  respect 
the  agreement  by  which  the  Euphrates  was  fixed  as  the 
boundary.  Oruros,  a  point  between  Nisibis  and  the 
Tigris,  and  220  miles  east  of  the  Euphrates,  was  fixed  as 
the  limit  of  the  Roman  dominion.  When,  in  64  B.C., 
Phraates  declared  war  upon  Tigranes  on  the  question  of 
the  frontier,  it  stemed  certain  that  he  had  resolved  to  defy 
the  power  of  Rome,  but  he  yielded  and  acquiesced  in  the 
Roman  award. 

From  the  new  territories  four  new  provinces  were 
formed  :  Bithynia  with  Pontus ,  Cilicia,  which  was  an 
enlargement  of  the  old  province  of  that  name,  and  which 
now  embraced  Pamphylia  and  Isauria  ;  Syria ;  Crete.  The 
government  of  the  mass  of  countries  now  added  to  the 
empire  probably  remained  substantially  as  before,  only 
Rome  stepped  into  the  place  of  the  former  monarchs  ;  and 
the  new  dominion  included  a  number  of  kingdoms,  prince- 
doms, and  lordships  of  various  kinds,  all  in  different 
relations  of  dependence  upon  Rome.  Such  were  the 
kingdoms  of  Cappadocia  and  Commagene  ;  the  tetrarchies 
ruled  by  Deiotarus  and  Bogodiatarus  ;  the  territories  of 
the  high  priest  of  the  mother  of  the  gods  at  Pessinus,  and 
of  the  two  high  priests  of  the  goddess  Ma  in  Comana. 

24 


370  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

There  were  also  leagues,  like  that  of  the  twenty-three 
Lycian  cities,  whose  independence  was  secured  by  charter. 

Both  Lucullus  and  Pompeius  did  every  thing  in  their 
power  to  protect  and  extend  the  urban  communities  in 
the  East.  They  were  centres  of  Romanization,  of  the 
civilization  of  trade  and  commerce  as  opposed  to  the 
Oriental  military  despotism.  Cyzicus,  Heraclea,  Sinope, 
and  Amisus,  all  received  a  number  of  new  inhabitants  and 
extensions  of  territory,  and  everything  was  done  to  repair 
the  devastation  they  had  suffered  in  the  late  war.  Many 
of  the  captured  pirates  were  settled  in  the  desolated  cities 
of  Plain  Cilicia,  especially  at  Soli ;  and  many  new  towns 
were  founded  in  Pontus  and  Cappadocia ;  the  most 
famous  of  which  were  Nicopolis  in  Pontus,  Megalopolis 
on  the  Cappadocian  frontier,  and  Ziela.  In  fact  nearly 
the  whole  of  the  domain  land  of  these  provinces  must 
have  been  used  for  these  settlemeuts.  At  the  same  time, 
many  existing  cities  obtained  an  extension  of  rights : 
autonomy  Avas  conferred  upon  Antioch  on  the  0 routes, 
upon  Seleucia  in  Pieria,  upon  Gaza,  Mytilene,  and  Phaua- 
goria. 

Pompeius  had  done  good  work  for  Rome,  but  he  had 
not  performed  miracles,  and  had  done  nothing  to  call  forth 
the  absurd  exaggerations  of  his  triumph  or  the  fulsome 
adulation  of  his  adherents.  His  triumphal  inscriptions 
enumerated  twelve  millions  of  people  as  subjugated,  1538 
cities  and  strongholds  taken,  while  his  conquests  were 
made  to  extend  from  the  Palus  Maeotis  to  the  Caspian  and 
to  the  Red  Sea,  not  one  of  which  he  had  ever  seen.  Coins 
were  struck  in  his  honour,  exhibiting  the  globe  itself 
surrounded  by  triple  laurels  plucked  from  three  conti- 
nents, and  surmounted  by  the  golden  chaplet  which  was 
conferred  upon  him  by  the  citizens.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  were  voices  which  affirmed  that  he  had  only  worn 
the  laurels  which  another  had  plucked,  and  that  the 
honours  belonged  of  right  to  Lucullus.  What  really 
deserves  praise  in  the  conduct  of  Pompeius  is  his  rare 
self-restraint.  The  most  brilliant  undertakings  against 
the  Bosporus,  or  the  Parthians,  or  Egypt,  offered  them- 
selves on  all  sides,  but  he  had  resisted  all  temptations,  and 
had  turned  to  the  less  glorious  task  of  regulating  the 
territories   already  acquired.       But   his  conduct  towards 


POMPEIUS  AND  THE  EAST.  371 

the  Parthians  deserves  grave  censure  :  he  might  have 
made  war  upon  them,  but  when  once  he  had  decided 
against  this  course  he  should  have  loyally  observed  the 
agreement  to  regard  the  Euphrates  as  the  boundary,  in- 
stead of,  by  his  silly  perfidy,  sowing  seeds  of  hatred  which 
were  to  bear  bitter  fruit  for  Eome  at  a  later  time. 

The  financial  gain  to  Eome  from  the  arrangements  of 
Pompeius  was  immense,  and  her  revenues  were  raised  by 
one-half.  And  if  the  exhaustion  of  Asia  was  severe,  and 
if  both  Pompeius  and  Lucullus  brought  home  large  private 
fortunes,  the  blame  falls  rather  upon  the  government  at 
home  and  on  the  system  by  which  the  provinces  were 
regularly  plundered  for  the  benefit  of  Rome,  than  upon 
the  generals  themselves. 

After  the  departure  of  Pompeius  peace  was  on  the  whole 
maintained  in  the  East ;  but  the  governors  of  Cilicia  had 
constantly  to  fight  against  mountain  tribes,  and  those  of 
Syria  against  the  tribes  of  the  desert.  There  were  also 
dangerous  revolts  among  the  Jews  which  were  with  diffi- 
culty suppressed  by  the  able  governor  of  Syria,  Aulus 
Gabimus,  and  after  which  the  Jews  were  subjected  to  a 
specially  heavy  taxation. 

Egypt  with  its  dependency  of  Cyprus  now  remained 
the  only  independent  state  in  the  East.  It  had  indeed 
been  formally  bequeathed  to  Eome  (pp.  338,  353),  but  was 
still  governed  by  its  own  kings,  who  were  themselves  con- 
trolled by  the  royal  guard  which  frequently  appointed  or 
deposed  its  rulers  The  isolation  of  Egypt,  surrounded  as  it 
is  by  the  desert  and  the  sea,  and  its  great  resources,  which 
gave  its  rulers  a  revenue  almost  equal  to  that  of  Eome 
even  after  its  recent  augmentation,  made  the  oligarchy 
unwilling  to  entrust  the  annexation  of  the  kingdom  to  any 
one  man.  Propositions  were  frequently  made  at  Eome  for 
its  incorporation  in  the  empire,  particularly  by  the  demo- 
cratic party,  but  the  Egyptian  ruler  succeeded  always  in 
purchasing  a  respite  by  heavy  bribes.  Cyprus  was  annexed 
by  decree  of  the  people  in  58  B.C.,  and  the  measure  was 
carried  out  by  Cato  without  the  interference  of  an  army. 
But  in  59  B.C.  Ptolemy  Auletes  purchased  his  recognition 
from  the  masters  of  Eome — it  is  said,  for  the  sum  of  six  thou- 
sand talents  (£1,460,000).  On  account  of  the  oppression 
which  the  payment  of  this  money  brought  upon  the  people 


372  EIS10SY  OF  SOME. 

the  king  was  chased  from  his  throne,  but  after  the  con- 
ference of  Luca  in  56  B.C.,  and  on  the  promise  of  a  further 
sum  of  ten  thousand  talents  (£2,400,000),  Aulus  Gabmius 
was  ordered  to  restore  him.  Victory  was  secured  by  a 
decisive  battle  on  the  Nile,  and  Ptolemaeus  once  more  sat 
on  the  throne.  The  sum  promised  could  not  possibly  be 
paid  in  full,  though  the  last  penny  was  exacted  from  the 
miserable  inhabitants.  At  the  same  time  the  praetorians 
were  replaced  by  a  force  of  regular  Roman  infantry,  with 
Celtic  and  German  cavalry. 


AUTHORITIES. 

Eastern  Provinces. — Marqt.  i.  p.  333.  Plut.  Pomp.  25-45.  Li  v.  Epit 
100-103.  Flor.  iii.  5,  6.  Eutrop.  12-14.  Veil.  ii.  37^0.  Ap. 
pian  Mithr.  94-121.  Syr.  49,  50,  70.  Strab.  xi.  496,  497 
xii.  555.  Dio.  xxxvi.  28-37;  xxxvii.  1-20.  Oros.  vi.  4,  5.  Aur, 
Vict.  De  V.  I.  76,  77.     Val.  Max.  ix.  2. 

Egypt— Cic.  frag,  de  R.  Alex. ;  ad  Fam.  i.  1-7  ;  ad  Q.  Fr.  ii.  2,  3 
de  Leg.  Agr.  i.  1,  ii.  16,  17.     Plut.  Cato  Min.  35-38 ;  Pomp.  49, 
Appian  Syr.  51.     Suet.  Julius,  54. 


Note. — Mommsen  ascribes  the  speech  of  Cicero,  de  Rege  Alexandrino, 
to  65  B.C.,  not  to  56  B.C.,  on  the  grounds  (1)  that  the  question  dealt 
with  by  Cicero  is  the  assertion  of  Crassus  that  Egypt  had  been 
rendered  Roman  property  by  the  will  of  Alexander — a  question 
which  had  lost  significance  since  the  Julian  law  of  59  B.C. ;  (2)  that 
in  56  B.C.  the  discussion  related  to  the  restoration  of  the  king,  a 
transaction  in  which  Crassus  took  no  part;  (3)  that  after  the  con- 
ference of  Luca,  Cicero  was  not  in  a  position  to  seriously  oppose  on© 
of  the  triumvirs  (Momm.  Hist,  of  R.  v.  5,  note). 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

STRUGGLE   OF    PARTIES   AT    ROME   DURING   THE    ABSENCE   OP 
POMPEICS    IN   THE    EAST. 

Isolated  successes  of  the  democratic  party. — 66  B.C.  First  Catili- 
narian  conspiracy. — 64  B.C.  Servilian  rogation. — 63  b.c.  Cicero 
and  Antonius  consuls — Second  Catilinarian  conspiracy. — 62  B.C. 
Defeat  and  death  of  Catilina. 

After  the  departure  of  Pompeius  the  optimates  remained 
nominally  in  possession  of  the  government ;  that  is,  they 
commanded  the  elections  and  the  consulate.  But  the  con- 
sulship was  no  longer  of  primary  consequence  in  the  face 
of  the  new  military  power  ;  and  the  best  of  the  aristocrats 
— men  like  Quintus  Metellus  Pius,  and  Lucius  Lucullus — 
retired  from  the  lists,  and  devoted  themselves  to  the 
elegant  luxury  of  their  private  life.  The  younger  men 
either  followed  their  example  or  turned  to  court  the 
favour  of  the  new  masters  of  the  state. 

There  was  one  exception — Marcus  Porcius  Cato.  Born 
in  95  B.C.,  he  was  now  about  thirty  years  of  age.  He  was 
by  nature  a  man  of  great  courage  and  firmness,  and  of  the 
strictest  integrity,  but  dull  of  intellect,  and  destitute  of 
imagination  or  passion.  The  two  influences  which 
moulded  his  character  were  Stoicism,  the  principles  of 
which  he  adopted  with  the  greatest  ardour,  and  the  example 
of  his  great-grandfather,  the  famous  censor.  Like  him  he 
went  about  the  capital  rebuking  the  sins  of  the  times,  a 
living  model  of  the  prisca  virtus  of  the  good  old  days — the 
"  Don  Quixote  of  the  aristocracy."  In  a  corrupt  and 
cowardly  age,  his  courage  and  integrity  gave  him  an 
influence  which  was  warranted  by  neither  his  age  nor  his 


374  BISTORT  OF  ROME. 

capacity,  and  he  soon  became  the  recognized  champion  of 
the  optimates.  He  did  good  work  in  the  region  of  finance, 
checking  the  details  of  the  public  bndget,  and  waging 
constant  war  with  the  farmers  of  the  taxes ;  but  he  had 
none  of  the  higher  qualities  of  a  statesman  ,  he  failed  com- 
pletely, if  indeed  he  ever  tried,  to  grasp  the  political 
situation.  All  his  policy  consisted  in  steadfastly  opposing 
every  one  who  appeared  to  deviate  from  the  traditional 
aristocratic  creed. 

During  the  next  few  years  the  activity  of  the  democrats 
showed  itself  in  two  ways  :  by  attacks  upon  individuals  of 
the  senatorial  party,  and  upon  the  abuses  of  which  the 
senate  was  guilty ;  and  by  efforts  to  complete  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  democratic  ideas  which  had  been  in  the  air 
ever  since  the  time  of  the  Gracchi. 

Various  abuses  of  the  senatorial  rule  were  restrained  by 
the  following  measures.  The  senate  was  obliged  to  give 
audiences  to  foreign  envoys  on  fixed  days  ;  before  this 
regulation  audiences  were  frequently  postponed  in  order 
to  extort  bribes  from  the  envoys.  This  kind  of  bribery 
was  also  rendered  more  difficult  by  declaring  loans  to 
foreign  ambassadors  at  Rome  non-actionable  (67  B  c ) 
The  power  of  the  senate  to  grant  dispensation  from  the 
laws  in  particular  cases  was  restricted  in  the  same  year. 

In  63  B.C.  restrictions  were  placed  upon  the  abuse  of  the 
fiction  by  which  a  Roman  noble,  wishing  to  travel,  got 
himself  invested  with  the  character  and  privileges  of  a 
public  envoy  (libera  legatio).  The  penalties  for  corruption 
at  elections  were  increased;  and  the  custom  by  which  a 
Roman  praetor  bound  himself  to  administer  justice  accord- 
ing to  the  rules  which  he  laid  down  on  entering  office  was 
enforced  by  law  (67  B.C.). 

At  the  same  time,  individual  senators  were  subjected 
to  prosecutions  or  insults.  Marcus  Lucullus  was  pro- 
secuted by  Gaius  Memmius.  Lucius  Lucullus  was  com- 
pelled to  wait  three  years  for  his  triumph  outside  the 
city  ;  Quintus  Rex  and  Quintus  Metellus  were  similarly 
treated.  In  63  B.C.  Gaius  Caesar  defeated  two  leading 
aristocrats  in  the  contest  for  the  supreme  pontificate;  the 
heirs  of  Sulla  were  threatened  with  an  action  for  the 
recovery  of  moneys  alleged  to  have  been  embezzled  by 
the  regent ;  and  even  Cato  demanded  back  their  rewards 


DURING  THE  ABSENCE  OF  POMPEIUS.  375 

from  the  murderers  of  the  proscribed,  as  property  illegally 
alienated  from  the  state.  Gains  Caesar,  as  president  of 
the  commission  concerning  murder,  treated  as  null  and 
void  the  ordinance  of  Sulla  which  declared  the  killing 
of  a  proscribed  person  no  murder ;  and  some  of  the  more 
notorious  executioners  were  condemned. 

At  the  same  time  the  democratic  restoration  was  pressed 
on.  The  election  of  pontiffs  and  augurs  by  the  tribes  was 
restored  in  63  B.C.  An  agitation  was  begun  for  the  com- 
plete restoration  of  the  corn- laws.  The  Transpadani  were 
taken  under  the  protection  of  the  populares,  and  an  agitation 
was  set  on  foot  for  conferring  upon  them  the  full  franchise, 
just  as  Gracchus  had  supported  the  enfranchisement  of  the 
Latins.  In  a  quite  contrary  spirit  the  democratic  leaders 
discountenanced  the  movement  for  allowing  the  freedmen 
to  be  enrolled  in  all  or  any  of  the  tribes,  and,  when  a  law 
was  passed  to  this  effect,  they  allowed  it  to  be  cancelled 
by  the  senate  on  the  same  day  (Dec.  31,  67  B.C.).  Again, 
all  strangers  not  possessing  burgess-rights  were  expelled 
from  Rome  by  decree  of  the  people  in  65  B.C.  It  is  clear 
that  the  policy  of  the  democrats  was  radically  inconsistent. 
With  one  hand  they  aided  the  political  liberation  of  the 
distant  Transpadani ;  with  the  other  they  restricted  the 
rights  and  liberties  of  the  freedmen  and  foreigners  of 
the  capital :  in  effect  they  attempted  both  to  maintain  and 
to  destroy  the  system  of  exclusive  rights. 

That  ancient  palladium  of  the  Roman  people,  the 
criminal  jurisdiction  of  the  Comitia,  was  once  more 
restored  by  the  trial  of  Rabirius.  This  man  was  alleged 
to  have  slain  the  tribune  Saturninus,  thirty-eight  years 
before,  and  was  brought  before  the  people  by  the  tribune 
Titus  Labienus  in  63  B.C.  This  jurisdiction  had  not  been 
abolished  by  Sulla,  but  was  practically  superseded  by 
the  commissions  for  high  treason  and  murder.  No  one 
seriously  meant  to  restore  it;  the  accuser  and  his 
supporters  were  content  with  their  assertion  of  the 
ancient  right  of  appeal,  and  acquiesced  when  the  assembly 
was  dissolved  on  some  pretext  by  their  opponents. 

Lastly,  the  long  proscribed  heroes  and  martyrs  of  the 
democracy  were  rehabilitated  in  the  public  memory : 
Saturninus  by  the  means  just  described ;  Gaius  Marius 
by  the  audacity  of  his  nephew  Gaius  Caesar.     The  latter 


JlG  HISTORY  OF  HOME 

had  dared  to  display  the  features  of  his  uncle  in  spite  of 
prohibitions  at  the  burial  of  the  widow  of  Marius  in  68  B.C., 
and  now  the  emblems  of  victory  erected  by  Marius  and 
thrown  down  by  Sulla  were  restored  to  their  old  places 
in  the  Capitol. 

Such  were  the  successes  of  the  democrats,  but,  after  all, 
they  did  not  amount  to  much.  In  their  contest  with  the 
aristocracy  the  democrats  had  conquered,  and  it  was  but 
natural  that  they  should  insult  the  prostrate  foe.  But 
they  knew  that  the  real  reckoning  was  to  come, — not  with 
the  vanquished  oligarchy,  but  with  the  too-powerful  ally 
by  whose  aid  they  had  conquered.  Their  schemes  were 
directed  ostensibly  against  the  optimates,  but  really 
against  Pompeius.  If  direct  proofs  of  this  are  few  it  is' 
because  both  the  present  and  the  succeeding  age  had 
an  interest  in  throwing  a  veil  over  the  events  of  this 
period ;  but  such  proofs  are  not  wanting.  It  is  stated  by 
Sail ust  (Cat.  39)  that  the  Gabinian  and  Manilian  laws 
inflicted  a  grievous  blow  on  the  democracy.  Again, 
the  Servilian  Rogation  (see  p.  378)  was  directed  against 
Pompeius,  as  is  clear  from  the  character  of  the  bill  itself, 
and  from  the  statements  of  Sallust  (Cat.  19),  and  Cicero 
(De  Lege  Agr.  ii.  17,  46).  Finally,  the  more  than  suspicious 
attitude  of  Caesar  and  Crassus  towards  the  Catilinarian 
conspiracies  is  proof  enough  in  itself.  The  object  of  the 
democratic  party  during  the  years  67-63  B.C.  was  to 
possess  themselves  of  the  reins  of  government  by  securing 
the  return  of  one  or  more  members  of  the  conspiracy  for 
the  consulship,  and  then  to  entrust  one  of  their  leaders 
with  the  conquest  of  Egypt,  or  some  such  commission, 
which  would  give  an  opportunity  for  raising  a  military 
power  capable  of  counterbalancing  that  of  Pompeius. 

First  Catilinarian  Conspiracy,  B.C.  66. — The  first  object 
of  the  democratic  leaders  was  the  overthrow  of  the  exist- 
ing government  by  means  of  an  insurrection  in  which  they 
would  not  themselves  appear.  Materials  for  such  a  con- 
spiracy existed  in  abundance  in  the  capital.  There  were 
the  slaves ;  there  was  the  herd  of  free  paupers  who  lived 
by  the  corn  distributions  and  who  were  always  ready  for 
any  scheme  which  promised  anarchy  and  license.  Again, 
there  were  numbers  of  young  men  of  rank,  ruined  in 
fortunes,  ruined  in  body  and  mind  by  a  life  of  fashionable 


DURING   THE  ABSENCE  OF  POMPEIUS.  377 

debauchery,  who  sighed  openly  for  a  return  of  the  times 
of  Cinna  and  for  release  from  their  burden  of  debt.  Among 
them  two  men  were  marked  out  as  leaders  by  their  superior 
ability — Gnaeus  Piso  and  Lucius  Catilina.  The  latter, 
in  spite  of  a  dissoluteness  conspicuous  even  in  that 
dissolute  age,  had  courage,  military  talent,  and  a  certain 
criminal  energy  which  gave  him  an  ascendancy  over  other 
men.  He  had  been  one  of  Sulla's  executioners,  and  had 
hunted  down  the  proscribed  at  the  head  of  a  band  of 
Celts ;  but  he  had  now  a  special  quarrel  with  the  aristo- 
cracy because  they  had  opposed  his  candidature  for  the 
consulship.  A  secret  league  was  formed,  numbering  more 
than  four  hundred  members  and  including  associates  in 
all  the  urban  districts  of  Italy. 

In  December,  66  B.C.,  the  two  consuls  elect  for  65  B.C. 
were  rendered  ineligible  for  office  by  conviction  for 
electoral  bribery.  They  immediately  joined  the  associa- 
tion, and  it  was  determined  to  procure  the  consulship 
for  them  by  force.  On  the  1st  of  January,  65  B.C.,  the  senate 
house  was  to  be  assailed  and  the  new  consuls  were  to 
be  killed  ;  Crassus  was  to  be  invested  with  the  dictator- 
ship, Caesar  with  the  mastership  of  the  horse.  But  the 
signal  w#s  never  given  and  the  plot  was  foiled.  A  similar 
plan  for  the  5th  of  February  also  failed,  and  the  secret 
became  known.  Guards  were  assigned  to  the  new  con- 
suls, and  Piso  was  got  rid  of  by  a  mission  to  Hither 
Spain  with  praetorian  powers;  but  farther  the  govern- 
ment dared  not  go.* 

Second  Catilinarian  Conspiracy,  63  B.C. — For  the  present 
no  further  attempt  was  made  by  the  conspirators  ;  but  in 
64  B.C.  Pompeius  was  in  Syria,  and  approaching  the 
conclusion  of  his  task  ;  and  it  was  therefore  resolved  to 
set  up  as  candidates  for  the  consulship  of  63  B.C.  Catilina 
and  Gaius  Antonius — an  ex-Sullan  and  an  ex-senator, 
who  was  willing  to  lend  himself  to  the  conspiracy.     The 

*  That  this  account  is  true  as  to  the  main  point — the  participation 
of  Caesar  and  Crassus — is  rendered  probable  by  the  following  facts, 
which  show  that  they  were  at  any  rate  heartily  in  accord  with  the 
democratic  policy.  (1)  Crassus,  censor  in  this  year,  attempted 
arbitrarily  to  enrol  the  Transpadani  in  the  burgess  list ;  (2)  he  pre- 
pared to  enrol  Egypt  and  Cyprus  in  the  list  of  Roman  domains  ;  (3) 
Caesar,  in  65  B.C.  or  64  B.C.,  got  a  proposal  submitted  to  the  burgesses 
to  send  him  to  Egypt  to  reinstate  King  Ptolemaeus. 


378  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

plan  was,  to  seize  the  children  of  Pompeius,  and  to  arm  in 
Italy  and  in  the  provinces  against  him.  Piso  was  to  raise 
troops  in  Hither  Spain;  and  to  securecommuuications  with 
him,  negotiations  were  entered  into  with  the  Transpadani 
and  with  several  Celtic  tribes. 

The  optimates  had  no  one  of  their  own  order  who 
possessed  the  requisite  courage  and  influence  to  defeat 
the  democratic  candidates ;  they  therefore  supported 
Marcus  Cicero,  who  as  yet  belonged  properly  to  no  poli- 
tical party,  but  was  always  a  supporter  of  the  party  of 
material  interests.  The  result  was  the  election  of  Cicero 
and  Antonius  ;  and  for  the  moment  the  conspiracy  was 
checked.  A  little  before  this,  Piso  had  been  put  to  death 
by  his  escort  in  Spain ;  and  now  Cicero  gained  over 
Antonius  by  voluntarily  giving  up  to  him  the  lucrative 
governorship  of  Macedonia,  instead  of  insisting  on  his 
privilege  of  having  the  provinces  determined  by  lot. 

Meanwhile  the  settlement  of  Syria  proceeded  rapidly, 
and  it  was  more  than  probable  that  Pompeius  would  soon 
advance  into  Egypt.  Caesar's  attempt  to  get  the  settle- 
ment of  Egypt  entrusted  to  himself  was  foiled.  A  bold 
stroke  was  imperatively  necessary,  and  as  soon  as  the 
new  tribunes  entered  on  their  office  the  Servilian  rogation 
was  brought  forward. 

The  nominal  object  of  this  bill  was  the  founding  of 
colonies  in  Italy  ;  the  Campanian  domain  land  was  to  be 
parcelled  out,  and  other  land  was  to  be  acquired  by  pur- 
chase. The  money  necessary  for  this  purpose  was  to  be 
provided  in  various  ways :  (1)  by  the  sale  of  all  the  re- 
maining domain  land  both  in  and  out  of  Italy  (including 
the  royal  domain  lands  in  Macedonia,  Bithynia,  Pontus, 
and  other  provinces :  and  the  territories  in  Spain,  Africa, 
Sicily,  Hellas,  and  Cilicia  belonging  to  cities  which  had 
fallen  to  Rome  by  right  of  conquest).  (2)  By  the  sale 
of  all  other  state  property  acquired  since  88  B.C. — a 
provision  which  was  aimed  at  Egypt  and  Cyprus.  (3) 
All  taxable  subject  communities  were  to  be  burdened 
with  heavy  taxes  and  tithes.  (4)  By  the  produce  of  the 
new  provincial  revenues  opened  up  by  Pompeius,  and  by 
the  sums  found  in  his  hands. 

The  execution  of  this  measure  was  to  be  entrusted  to 
decemviri  armed  with  special  jurisdiction  and  with  the 


DURING  TEE  ABSENCE  OF  I'OMPEIUS.  379 

imperium,  who  were  to  remain  in  office  for  five  years,  and 
to  choose  two  hundred  subordinate  officers  from  the 
equestrian  ranks.  All  candidates  were  to  announce  them- 
selves personally ;  and  only  seventeen  tribes  were  to  vote. 

The  real  object  of  the  bill  was  to  create  a  power  which 
might  counterbalance  that  of  Pompeius  :  but  it  pleased 
no  class  ;  the  mob  preferred  to  subsist  on  the  corn  largesses 
rather  than  by  tilling  the  soil ;  the  mass  of  the  democrats 
were  afraid  to  offend  Pompeius,  and  the  measure  was  with- 
drawn by  its  author  (January  1,  63  B.C.). 

Catilina  now  determined  to  strike  a  decisive  blow.  All 
through  the  summer  prepai'ations  for  civil  war  went  on. 
Faesulae  was  to  be  the  head-quarters  of  the  insurrection — 
thither  arms  and  money  were  sent,  and  troops  were  raised 
by  Gams  Manlius,  an  old  Sullan  captain.  The  Transpadani 
seemed  ready  to  rise ;  bodies  of  slaves  were  ready  for 
insurrection  in  the  Bruttian  land,  on  the  east  coast,  and 
in  Capua  The  plan  of  the  conspirators  was  to  put  to 
death  the  presiding  consul  and  the  rival  candidates  on 
the  day  of  the  consular  elections  for  62  B.C.  (October  20), 
and  to  carry  the  election  of  Catilina. 

But  on  the  day  fixed  Cicero  denounced  the  conspiracy 
in  full  senate ;  and  Catilina  did  not  deny  the  accusation. 
On  the  21st  the  senate  invested  the  consuls  with  the 
exceptional  powers  usual  in  such  crises.  On  the  28th,  to 
which  day  the  elections  had  been  postponed,  Cicero 
appeared  in  the  Campus  Martius  with  an  armed  body- 
guard, and  the  plots  of  the  conspirators  again  failed. 

But  on  the  27th,  the  standard  of  insurrection  had  been 
raised  by  Manlius  at  Faesulae,  and  proclamations  had  been 
issued  demanding  the  liberation  of  debtors  from  their 
burdens,  and  the  reform  of  the  law  of  insolvency,  which 
still,  in  some  cases,  permitted  the  enslavement  of  the 
debtor.  But  the  rising  was  isolated.  The  government 
had  time  to  call  out  the  general  levy,  and  to  send  officers 
to  various  regions  of  Italy  in  order  to  suppress  the 
insurrection  in  detail.  Meantime  the  gladiatorial  slaves 
were  ejected  from  the  capital,  and  patrols  were  kept  in 
the  streets  to  prevent  incendiarism. 

Catilina  was  now  in  a  difficult  position.  The  outbreak 
in  the  city,  which  should  have  been  simultaneous  with 
the  rising  at  Faesulae,  had  miscarried.     He  could  hardly 


380  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

remain  longer  in  Rome,  and  yet  there  was  no  one  among 
his  associates  who  could  be  trusted  to  carry  out  his  design 
with  courage  and  capacity,  or  who  could  command  suf- 
ficient influence  to  induce  the  conspirators  in  the  city  to 
strike  an  effective  blow  at  once.  So  he  remained,  brazen- 
ing out  the  situation  with  the  most  audacious  insolence. 
The  spies  of  the  government  had  made  their  way  into  the 
circle  of  the  conspirators,  and  kept  it  informed  of  every 
detail  of  the  plot.  An  attempt  to  surprise  Praeneste 
failed.  On  the  night  of  November  6-7  a  conference  was 
held,  and  in  accordance  with  the  resolution  passed  by 
those  who  met,  an  attempt  was  made  early  in  the  morning 
to  murder  the  consul  Cicero.  But  the  men  selected  found 
the  guard  round  his  house  reinforced — the  consul  was 
already  aware  of  the  result  of  the  conference. 

On  the  8th,  Cicero  convoked  the  senate  and  acquainted 
them  with  the  events  of  the  last  few  days.  Catilina  could 
not  obtain  a  hearing,  and  departed  at  ouce  for  Etruria. 

The  government  declared  Catilina,  Manlius,  and  such  of 
their  followers  who  should  not  lay  down  their  arms  by  a 
certain  day,  to  be  outlaws,  and  called  out  new  levies, 
which,  with  incredible  folly,  were  placed  under  the  com- 
mand of  Antonius. 

It  had  been  arranged,  before  Catilina's  departure,  that 
Cethegus  should  make  another  attempt  to  kill  Cicero  in 
the  night,  and  that  Gabinius  and  Statilius  should  set  fire 
to  the  city  in  twelve  places.  Meanwhile  Catilina  was  to 
advance  toward  Rome.  But  now  that  their  leader  was 
gone  the  conspirators  seemed  incapable  of  action,  though 
the  government  took  no  measures  against  them. 

At  last  the  decisive  moment  came.  Lentulus  had 
entered  into  relations  with  the  deputies  of  the  Allobroges 
— a  Celtic  canton,  which  was  deeply  in  debt — and  had  given 
them  letters  to  carry  to  his  associates.  On  the  night 
of  December  2-3  the  envoys  were  seized  as  they  were 
leaving  the  city — probably  in  accordance  with  a  pre- 
conceived plan  ;  and  from  their  evidence  and  from  the 
documents  they  carried,  full  details  of  the  plot  were 
furnished  to  Cicero.  Some  of  the  conspirators  saved 
themselves  by  flight;  but  Lentulus,  Cethegus,  Gabinius, 
and  Statilius  were  arrested.  The  evidence  was  laid  before 
the  senate;  the  prisoners  and  other  witnesses  were  heard; 


DURING   THE  ABSENCE  OF  FOMPEIUS.  381 

and  other  proofs,  such  as  deposits  of  arms  in  the  houses  of 
the  conspirators  and  threatening  expressions  used  by  them, 
were  afterwards  procured.  The  most  important  documents 
were  published,  to  convince  the  public  of  the  facts  of  the 
plot. 

The  plans  of  the  conspirators  were  now  made  bare,  and 
their  leaders  arrested.  In  a  well-ordered  commonwealth 
there  would  have  been  an  end  of  the  matter.  The  military 
and  the  legal  tribunals  would  have  done  the  rest.  But  the 
government  of  Rome  was  so  disorganized  that  for  the 
moment  the  most  difficult  question  for  settlement  was 
the  custody  of  the  prisoners.  These  had  been  given  into 
the  keeping  of  certain  eminent  private  men — two  of  whom 
were  Caesar  and  Crassus — who  were  responsible  for  their 
safety.  But  the  freedmen  of  the  prisoners  were  stirring ; 
the  air  was  full  of  rumours  of  schemes  for  liberating  them 
by  force ,  Rome  was  full  of  desperadoes,  and  the  govern- 
ment had  no  efficient  force  of  military  or  of  police  at  its 
disposal.  Finally,  Catilina  was  near  enough  to  attempt  a 
coup  de  main.  Accordingly  the  idea  was  suggested  of 
executing  the  prisoners  at  once.  By  the  constitution  of 
Rome,  no  citizen  could  be  put  to  death  except  by  sentence 
of  the  whole  body  of  citizens  ,  and  as  such  sentences  had 
fallen  into  disuse,  capital  punishment  was  now  no  longer 
carried  out.  Cicero  shrank  from  the  step  ;  he  convoked 
the  senate  and  left  to  it  the  decision,  although  it  had  even 
less  title  to  act  than  the  consul,  and  therefore  could  not 
possibly  relieve  him  of  the  responsibility.  All  the  con- 
sulars  and  the  great  majority  of  the  senate  had  already 
declared  for  the  execution,  when  Caesar,  in  a  speech  full  of 
covert  threats,  violently  opposed  the  proposal :  and  prob- 
ably the  limits  of  the  law  would  have  been  observed  had 
not  Cato,  by  throwing  suspicion  upon  those  who  were  for 
milder  measures,  and  by  throwing  the  waverers  into  fresh 
alarm,  secured  a  majority  for  the  immediate  execution  of 
the  prisoners. 

On  the  night  of  the  5th  of  December  the  prisoners 
were  conducted  under  strong  guards  to  the  Tullianum,  a 
dungeon  at  the  foot  of  the  Capitol.  No  one  knew  the 
object  of  their  removal,  until  the  consul,  from  the  door  of 
the  prison,  proclaimed  over  the  Forum,  in  his  well-known 
voice,  "  They  are  dead."     And  now  the  first  men  of  the 


382  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

nobility — Cato,  and  Quintus  Catulus — saluted  for  the  first 
time  the  author  of  the  deed  with  the  proud  title  of 
"  father  of  his  country."  "  Never  perhaps  had  a 
commonwealth  more  lamentably  declared  itself  bankrupt 
than  did  Rome  through  this  resolution  ...  to  put  to 
death  in  all  haste  a  few  political  prisoners,  who  were  no 
doubt  culpable  according  to  the  laws,  but  had  not  forfeited 
life ;  because,  forsooth,  the  security  of  prisons  was  not  to 
be  trusted,  and  there  was  no  sufficient  police." 

There  still  remained  the  insurrection  in  Etruria.  Cati- 
lina  had  now  under  him  nearly  ten  thousand  men,  of  whom 
scarcely  more  than  a  fourth  were  armed.  On  the  news  of 
the  failure  at  Rome,  the  mass  of  them  dispersed,  and  the 
remnant  of  desperate  men  determined  to  cut  their  way 
through  the  passes  of  the  Apennines  into  Gaul.  But  on 
their  arrival  at  the  foot  of  the  mountains  near  Pistoria, 
they  were  confronted  by  the  troops  of  Quintus  Metellus, 
who  had  come  up  from  Ravenna  and  Ariminum.  In  their 
rear  was  Antonius,  and  there  was  nothing  left  but  to 
throw  themselves  upon  his  army.  The  battle  took  place 
in  a  narrow  rocky  valley  where  superiority  <>f  numbers  was 
of  small  avail.  The  forces  of  Antonius  were,  for  the  day, 
commanded  by  the  veteran  Marcus  Petreins.  The  battle 
was  long  and  bloody ;  and  quarter  was  neither  given  nor 
received.  At  length  Petreius  broke  the  centre  of  the 
enemy,  and  attacked  the  two  wings  from  within.  The 
Catilinarians  covered  with  their  corpses  the  ground  on 
which  they  had  fought ;  the  officers,  with  their  general,  had 
sought  death  by  charging  into  the  thickest  of  the  enemy 
(early  in  62  B.C.).  Antonius  was  "  branded  "  by  the  senate 
with  the  title  of  imperator,  and  then  thanksgivings  were 
ordered  by  the  senate  for  this  victory  over  the  civil  foe. 

The  plot  was  suppressed ;  but  the  blow  had  fallen,  not 
merely, on  the  conspirators  themselves,  but  on  the  whole 
democratic  party.  If  the  complicity  of  the  democratic 
leaders,  Caesar  and  Crassus,  is  not  an  ascertained  fact, 
they  are  at  any  rate  open  to  the  gravest  suspicion.  That 
they  were  accused  of  complicity  by  Catulus,  and  that 
Caesar  spoke  and  voted  against  the  judicial  murder  of  the 
prisoners,  is  of  course  no  proof ;  but  there  are  other  facts 
of  greater  weight.  (1)  Crassus  and  Caesar  supported  the 
candidature   of   Catilina  for  the   consulship.     (2)  When 


DURING   THE  ABSENCE  OF  POMPEIUS.  383 

Caesar,  in  64  B.C.,  indicted  the  Sullan  executioners  for 
murder,  he  allowed  Catilina  alone  to  be  acquitted.  (3)  In 
his  revelations  to  the  senate,  Cicero  did  not  indeed  include 
the  names  of  Caesar  and  Crassus ;  but  it  is  known  that  he 
erased  the  names  of  many  "  innocent  persons,"  and  in 
later  years  he  named  Caesar  as  among  the  accomplices. 
(4)  The  fact  that  Gabinius  and  Statilius  were  intrusted 
to  the  custody  of  Crassus  and  Caesar,  is  probably  to  be 
explained  by  the  wish  of  the  government  to  place  them  in 
a  dilemma.  If  they  allowed  the  prisoners  to  escape,  they 
would  be  regarded  as  accessories  ;  if  they  detained  them, 
they  would  incur  the  hatred  and  vengeance  of  their  fellow- 
conspirators.  (5)  After  the  arrest  of  Lentulus,  a  messenger 
from  him  to  Catilina  was  arrested  and  brought  before  the 
senate;  but  when,  in  his  evidence,  he  mentioned  Crassus 
as  having  commissioned  him,  he  was  interrupted,  his 
whole  statement  was  cancelled  at  the  suggestion  of 
Cicero,  and  he  was  committed  to  prison  until  he  should 
confess  who  had  suborned  him.  The  senate  were  clearly 
afraid  to  allow  the  revelations  to  go  beyond  a  certain 
limit.  The  general  public  were  less  scrupulous,  and 
Caesar  narrowly  escaped  with  his  life,  when  he  left  the 
senate  on  the  5th  of  December.  (6)  When  Caesar  had 
made  himself  head  of  the  state,  he  was  in  close  alliance 
with  Publius  Sittius,  the  only  surviving  Catilinarian,  the 
leader  of  Mauretanian  banditti.  (7)  The  facts  that  the 
government  offered  no  serious  hindrance  to  the  conspiracy 
until  the  last  moment ;  that  the  chief  conspirator  was 
allowed  to  depart  unmolested  ;  that  the  troops  sent  against 
the  insurrection  were  put  under  the  command  of  Antonius, 
who  had  been  deeply  concerned  in  the  plot, — all  point  to  the 
suspicion  that  there  were  powerful  men  behind  the  scenes, 
who  threw  their  protection  over  the  conspiracy  while  they 
kept  in  the  background  themselves. 

That  the  evidence  is  not  more  abundant  is  no  matter 
for  surprise.  The  government  were  too  weak  to  provoke 
the  democratic  party  a  outrance ;  and,  after  the  failure  of 
the  plot,  the  democratic  leaders  naturally  made  every 
effort  to  conceal  their  participation  in  it ;  and  when  Caesar 
had  got  the  upper  hand  the  veil  was  only  drawn  all  the 
more  closely  over  the  darker  \  ears  of  his  life. 

The  close  of  this  period  found  the  democratic  party  at 


384  HISTORY   OF  ROME. 

its  lowest  ebb.  By  its  alliance  with  anarchists  and 
murderers  it  had  alienated,  not  only  the  party  of  material 
interests,  but  even  the  city  mob,  who,  "although  having 
no  objection  to  a  street  riot,  found  it  inconvenient  to 
have  their  houses  set  on  fire  over  their  heads." 

In  63  B.C.  the  full  restoration  of  the  Sempronian  corn 
largesses  was  carried  out  by  the  senate,  on  the  motion  of 
Cato ;  the  oligarchy  were  taking  advantage  of  the  move- 
ment to  draw  over  the  masses  to  their  side.  Worst  of  all, 
Pompeius  was  warned  by  the  course  of  events,  and  hia 
eyes  were  opened  to  the  folly  and  weakness  of  his  allies, 
if  not  to  their  treachery  and  designs  against  himself :  at 
the  present  moment  the  identity  of  his  own  interests  with 
those  of  the  optimates  was  plain.  The  popular  leaders 
felt  the  hopelessness  of  their  position.  Crassus  prepared 
to  carry  his  family  and  his  riches  to  a  safe  refuge  in  the 
East ;  and  even  Caesar  declared,  in  63  B.C.,  as  he  left  bis 
home  on  the  morning  of  the  election  for  the  office  of 
pontifex  maximus,  that,  if  he  failed  in  this  too,  he  would 
never  cross  the  threshold  again. 

AUTHORITIES. 

Pint.  Cat.  Min.  22,  23.  Cic.  10-23.  Caes.  6-8.  Crass.  13.  Liv. 
Epit.  101,  102.  Dio.  xxxvi.  21-27  ;  xxxvii.  20-46.  Sail.  Bell. 
Cat.  Flor.  iii.  24.  Veil.  ii.  35.  Eutrop.  vi.  15.  Appian  B.  C. 
ii.  2,  7.  Suet.  Jul.  7-15,  17.  Cic,  speeches  of  those  years — pro 
Leg.  Man.  (66  B.C.);  frag,  pro  Manil.  (65  B.C.);  de  It.  Alex. 
(65  B.C.  ?)  ;  frag,  pro  Cornel.  (65  B.C.) ;  frag,  in  Tog.  Cand.  (64 
B.C.).  Speeches  of  63  B.C. — de  Leg.  Agr. ;  frag,  de  Rose.  Oth.; 
pro  Rabir. ;  frag,  de  Proscriptorum  liberis;  in  Catilinam  ;  pro 
Murena.  Of  62  B.C. — frag,  contra  cone.  Met.;  pro  Corn.  Sull. 
Also  In  Pisonem,  2;  pro  Flacc.  40;  pro  Plane.  37.  The  most 
important  letters  of  the  time  are  found  in  Watson's  Selection, 
pt.  i.  1-3.  A  most  useful  table  of  all  the  letters  arranged 
chronologically  will  be  found  in  Nobbe's  collected  edition  of 
Cicero,  p.  967. 

Audiences  to  foreign  envoys. — Cic.  ad  Q.  F.  ii.  11,  12;  ad  Fam.  i.  4. 

Loans  forbidden — dispensing  power — praetor's  edicts. — Asc.  in  Cic.  pro 
Cor.  Ad.  Att.  v.  21. 

Libera  legatio. — Cic.  de  Legg.  iv.  8;  de  L.  Agr.  i.  3;  pro  Flacc.  34; 
Phil.  i.  2. 

Bribery  laws. — Dio.  xxxvi.  21 ;  xxxvii.  29.     Cic.  pro  Mur.  23. 

Sullan  executioners  condemned. — Suet.  Jul.  11. 

Lex  Domitia  restored. — Dio.  xxxvii.  37.     Suet.  13. 

Transpadani — Suet-  Jul.  8.     Dio.  xxxvii.  9. 

Expulsion  of  foreigner*. — Dio.  xxxvii.  9.  Cic.  de  Off.  iii.  11 ;  pro  Balb. 
23 ;  pro  Arch.  5 ;  de  L.  Agr.  1,  4  ;  ad  Att.  iv.  16. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

RETURN   OF   POMPEIUS — THE    SECOND  COALITION    OF   POMPEITJS, 
CAESAR,   AND   CRASSDS. 

63  B.C.  Quintas  Metellus  Nepos  arrives  in  Rome  as  the  emissary  of 
Pompeius. — 62  b.c.  Pompeius  lands  at  Brundisium  and  disbands 
his  army. — 60  B.C.  Coalition  between  Pompeins  and  the  demo- 
crats.— 59  B.C.  Consulship  of  Caesar — Lex  Vatinia  passed. 

Recent  events  had  fully  demonstrated  the  impotence  of 
both  the  senate  and  the  democratic  party ;  neither  was 
strong  enough  to  defeat  the  other  or  to  govern  the  state. 
There  was  no  third  party — no  class  remaining  out  of 
which  a  government  might  be  erected :  the  only  alterna- 
tive was  monarchy — the  rule  of  a  single  person.  Who 
the  monarch  would  be  was  still  uncertain ;  though,  at  the 
present  moment,  Pompeius  was  clearly  the  only  man  in 
whose  power  it  lay  to  take  up  the  crown  that  offered 
itself.  The  new  regime  presented  one  great  advantage, 
obvious  to  the  dullest  perception  :  no  government  can  rule 
unless  it  has  military  power  at  its  command,  and,  amidst 
the  disorganization  which  prevailed,  the  control  of  the 
military  was  vested  absolutely  in  the  general — only  to  him 
could  the  state  look  tor  the  maintenance  of  social  order. 
For  the  moment  the  question  which  agitated  all  minds 
was  whether  Pompeius  would  accept  the  gift  offered  him 
by  fortune,  or  would  retire  and  leave  the  throne  vacant. 
It  was  possible,  indeed,  that  all  parties  should  combine 
against  the  general  in  one  last  strugle  for  what  they 
deemed  their  liberty ;  but  in  face  of  the  victorious  legions 
of  Pompeius  any  combination  of  parties  could  be  of  little 
avail. 

25 


386  HISTORY  OF  HOME. 

In  the  autumn  of  63  B.C.,  Quintus  Metellus  Nepos 
arrived  in  the  capital  from  the  camp  of  Pompeius,  and  got 
himself  elected  tribune  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  procur- 
ing for  Pompeius  the  command  against  Catilina  by  special 
decree,  and  afterwards  the  consulship  for  61  B.C.  Every- 
thing depended  upon  the  reception  which  parties  at  Rome 
might  give  to  these  proposals.  It  must  be  remembered 
that,  whatever  cause  Pompeius  might  have  to  be  discon- 
tented with  the  conduct  of  Caesar  and  his  partisans,  no 
open  rupture  had  taken  place.  The  coalition  of  70  B.C. 
was  still  formally  in  existence.  The  democracy  still 
treated  Pompeius  with  the  greatest  outward  respect,  and 
this  very  year  had  granted  him,  spontaneously  and  by 
special  decree,  unprecedented  honours  (see  p.  370)  At 
the  same  time  nothing  had  occurred  to  bridge  over  the 
chasm  which  the  coalition  had  created  between  Pompeius 
and  the  optimates.  The  senate  had  decreed  him  no 
exceptional  honours,  and  two  of  its  most  influential 
members,  Lucullus  and  Metellus,  were  his  bitterest 
personal  enemies  (see  pp.  364—5).  Lastly,  the  aristocracy 
were  at  present  under  the  guidance  of  the  uncompromis- 
ing pedant  Cato ;  while  the  democracy  were  led  by  "  the 
most  supple  master  of  intrigue  " — Caesar.  Accordingly 
the  aristocracy  at  once  showed  their  hostility  to  the 
proposals  of  Metellus,  and  Cato  had  himself  elected 
tribune  expressly  for  the  purpose  of  thwarting  him. 
But  the  democrats  were  more  pliant,  and  it  was  soon 
evident  that  they  had  come  to  a  cordial  understanding 
with  the  general's  emissary.  Metellus  and  his  master 
both  adopted  the  democratic  view  of  the  illegal  execu- 
tions ;  and  the  first  act  of  Caesar's  praetorship  was  to  call 
Catulus  to  account  for  the  moneys  alleged  to  have  been 
embezzled  by  him  in  rebuilding  the  Capitoline  temple,  and 
to  transfer  the  superintendence  of  the  works  to  Pompeius. 
By  this  stroke  Caesar  brought  to  light  a  disgraceful  abuse 
of  public  money,  and  threw  odium  upon  the  aristo- 
cracy in  the  person  of  one  of  its  most  distinguished 
members ;  while  Pompeius  would  be  delighted  at  the 
prospect  of  engraving  his  name  upon  the  proudest  spot  in 
the  capital  of  the  Roman  state. 

On  the  day  of  voting,  Cato  and  another  of  the  tribunes 
put  their  veto  upon  the  proposals  of  Metellus,  who  dis- 


RETURN  OF  POMPEIUS.  387 

regarded  it.  There  were  conflicts  of  the  armed  bands  of 
both  sides,  which  terminated  in  favour  of  the  government. 
The  senate  followed  up  the  victory  by  suspending  Me- 
tellus  and  Caesar  from  their  offices.  Metellus  immediately 
departed  for  the  camp  of  Pompeius  ;  and  when  Caesar 
disregarded  the  decree  of  suspension  against  himself,  the 
senate  had  ultimately  to  revoke  it. 

Nothing  could  have  been  more  favourable  to  the 
interests  of  Pompeius  than  these  late  events.  After  the 
illegal  executions  of  the  Catilinarians,  and  the  acts  of 
violence  against  Metellus,  he  could  appear  at  once  as  the 
defender  of  the  "  two  palladia  of  Roman  liberty" — the  right 
of  appeal,  and  the  inviolability  of  the  tribunate, — and  as 
the  champion  of  the  party  of  order  against  the  Catil'inarian 
band.  But  his  courage  was  unequal  to  the  emergency ; 
he  lingered  in  Asia  during  the  winter  of  63-62  B.C.,  and 
thus  gave  the  senate  time  to  crush  the  insurrection  in 
Italy,  and  deprived  himself  of  a  valid  pretext  for  keeping 
his  legions  together.  In  the  autumn  of  62  B.C.  he  landed 
at  Brundisium,  and,  disbanding  his  army,  proceeded  to 
Rome  with  a  small  escort.  On  his  arrival  in  the  city  in 
61  B.C.  he  found  himself  in  a  position  of  complete  isola- 
tion ;  he  was  feared  by  the  democrats,  hated  by  the  aris- 
tocracy, and  distrusted  by  the  wealthy  class.* 

He  at  once  demanded  for  himself  a  second  consulship, 
the  confirmation  of  all  his  acts  in  the  East,  and  the  ful- 
filment of  the  promise  he  had  made  to  his  soldiers  to 
furnish  them  with  lands.  But  each  of  these  demands 
was  met  with  the  most  determined  opposition.  From  the 
senate,  led  by  Lucullus,  Metellus,  and  Cato,  there  was  no 
hope  of  obtaining  dispensation  from  the  Sullan  law  as  to 
re-election  (see  p.  304).  As  to  the  arrangements  of  Pom- 
peius in  the  East,  Lucullus  carried  a  resolution  that  they 
should  be  voted  upon  separately,  thus  opening  a  door  for 
endless  annoyances  and  defeats. 

His  promise  of  lands  to  his  soldiers  was  indeed  ratified, 
but  not  executed,  and  no  steps  were  taken  to  provide  the 
necessary  funds  and  lands.  When  the  general  turned 
from  the  senate  to  the  people,  the  democrats,  though  they 

*  Cic.  ad  Att.,  i.  14  :  "  Prima  contio  Pompei  non  jucunda  miseris 
(the  rabble),  inanis  improbis  (the  democrats),  beatis  (the  wealthy), 
non  grata,  bonis  (the  aristocrats)  non  gravis ;  itaque  frigebat." 


388  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

offered  no  opposition,  did  nothing  to  assist  him,  and  when 
the  proposal  for  the  grant  of  lands  was  submitted  to  the 
tribes,  it  was  defeated  (early  in  60  B.C.).  To  such  straits 
was  he  reduced,  that  he  bad  to  court  the  favour  of  the 
multitude  by  causing  a  proposal  to  be  introduced  for 
abolishing  the  Italian  tolls ;  but  he  had  none  of  the 
qualifications  of  a  demagogue,  and  merely  damaged  his 
reputation  without  gaining  his  ends. 

From  this  disagreeable  position  Pompeius  was  rescued 
by  the  sagacity  and  address  of  Caesar,  who  saw  in  the 
necessities  of  Pompeius  the  opportunity  of  the  democratic 
party.  Ever  since  the  return  of  Pompeius,  Caesar  had 
grown  rapidly  in  influence  and  weight.  He  had  been 
praetor  in  62  B.C.,  and,  in  61,  governor  of  Further  Spain, 
where  he  utilized  his  position  to  free  himself  from  his 
debts,  and  to  lay  the  foundation  of  the  military  position 
he  desired  for  himself.  Returning  in  60  B.C.,  he  readily 
relinquished  his  claim  to  a  triumph,  in  order  to  enter  the 
city  in  time  to  stand  for  the  consulship.  At  last  the 
democracy  seemed  on  the  eve  of  realizing  its  hopes,  and 
of  seeing  one  of  its  own  leaders  invested  with  the 
consulship  and  a  province  where  he  might  build  up  a 
military  position  strong  enough  to  make  it  independent 
of  external  allies.  But  it  was  quite  possible  that  the 
aristocracy  might  be  strong  enough  to  defeat  the  can- 
didature of  Caesar,  as  it  had  defeated  that  of  Catilina ; 
and  again,  the  consulship  was  not  enough ;  an  extra- 
ordinary command,  secured  to  him  for  several  years,  was 
necessary  for  the  fulfilment  of  his  purpose.  Without 
allies  such  a  command  could  not  be  hoped  for ;  and  allies 
were  found  where  they  had  been  found  ten  years  before, 
in  Pompeius  and  in  Crassus,  and  in  the  rich  equestrian 
class.  Such  a  treaty  was  suicide  on  the  part  of  Pom- 
peius, for  he  owed  his  strength  entirely  to  his  position  as 
the  only  leader  who  could  rely  on  a  military  force ;  but 
he  had  drifted  into  a  situation  so  awkward  that  he  was 
glad  to  be  released  from  it  on  any  terms.  The  capitalists 
were  at  the  moment  all  the  more  inclined  to  join  the 
coalition  because  of  the  severity  with  which  they  were 
being  treated  with  regard  to  their  tax  leases  by  the  senate, 
at  the  instigation  of  Cato. 

The   bargain   was   struck   in    the   summer    of   60  B.C. 


RETURN  OF  POMPEIUS.  389 

Caesar  was  promised  the  consulship  and  a  governorship 
afterwards ;  Pompeius,  the  ratification  of  his  arrange- 
ments in  the  East,  and  land  for  his  soldiers  ;  Crassus 
received  no  definite  equivalent,  but  the  capitalists  were 
promised  a  remission  of  part  of  the  money  they  had  under- 
taken to  pay  for  the  lease  of  the  Asiatic  taxes.  The  parties 
to  the  coalition  were  the  same  as  in  70  B.C.,  but  their  rela- 
tive positions  were  entirely  changed.  Then  the  democracy 
was  a  faction  without  a  head,  now  it  was  a  strong  party 
with  leaders  of  its  own,  and  could  demand  for  itself,  not 
merely  concessions  to  democratic  traditions,  such  as  the 
restoration  of  the  tribunician  power,  but  office  and  autho- 
rity, the  consulship  and  the  supreme  military  command, 
while  it  conceded  nothing  material  to  its  allies. 

Caesar  was  easily  elected  consul  for  59  B.C.  All  that 
the  exertions  of  the  senate  could  do  was  to  give  him  an 
aristocratic  colleague  in  Marcus  Bibulus.  Caesar  at  once 
proceeded  to  fulfil  his  obligations  to  Pompeius  by  pro- 
posing an  agrarian  law.  All  remaining  Italian  domain 
laud,  which  meant  practically  the  territory  of  Capua, 
was  to  be  given  up  to  allotments,  and  other  estates  in 
Italy  were  to  be  purchased  out  of  the  revenues  of  the  new 
Eastern  provinces  The  allotments  were  to  be  small,  and 
to  be  given  to  poor  burgesses,  fathers  of  three  children. 
The  soldiers  were  simply  recommended  to  the  commis- 
sion, and  thus  the  principle  of  giving  rewards  of  land  for 
military  service  was  not  asserted.  The  execution  of  the 
bill  was  to  be  intrusted  to  a  commission  of  twenty. 

This  proposal,  together  with  that  for  the  ratification  of 
Pompeius'  arrangements  collectively,  and  the  petition  of 
the  tax  farmers  for  relief,  were  first  of  all  laid  before  the 
senate,  which  had  now  opportunity  to  reflect  on  its  folly  in 
driving  Pompeius  and  the  equites  into  the  arms  of  Caesar. 
The  agrarian  law,  moderate  and  statesmanlike  as  it  was, 
was  rejected  without  discussion,  and  also  the  decree  as  to 
the  acts  of  Pompeius.  Caesar  could  now  go  to  the  people 
and  ask  them  to  pass  these  rational  and  necessary  decrees 
which  the  senate  in  its  levity  had  refused.  When  the 
aristocracy  seemed  inclined  to  push  the  matter  to  open 
violence,  Pompeius  called  upon  his  veterans  to  appear  on 
the  day  for  voting  with  arms  under  their  dress  ;  and 
when  Bibulus  tried  to  prevent  the  vote  by  proclaiming 


390  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

that  he  was  observing  the  heavens,  Caesar  disregarded 
him, as  he  had  disregarded  the  tribunician  veto,  and  Bibulus 
had  to  be  content  with  shutting  himself  np  in  his  own 
house  and  intimating  by  placard  that  he  intended  to 
watch  the  signs  of  the  sky  on  all  days  appropriate  for 
public  assemblies  throughout  the  year.  At  length  all 
these  proposals  were  passed  by  the  assembly,  and  the 
commission  of  twenty,  with  Pompeius  and  Crassus  at  their 
head,  began  the  execution  of  the  agrarian  law. 

Now  that  the  first  victory  was  won,  the  coalition  were 
able  to  carry  out  the  rest  of  its  programme  without 
much  difficulty.  Caesar  had  loyally  fulfilled  his  obliga- 
tions to  Pompeius,  and  the  most  important  question  now 
to  be  considered  was  his  own  future  position.  The  senate 
had  already  selected  for  the  year  of  his  proconsulship 
two  provinces  where  nothing  but  the  work  of  peaceful 
administration  could  be  expected  ;  but  it  was  determined 
by  the  confederates  that  Caesar  should  be  invested  by 
decree  of  the  people  with  a  special  command  resembling 
that  lately  held  by  Pompeius.  Accordingly  the  tribune 
Vatinius  submitted  to  the  tribes  a  proposal  which  was 
at  once  adopted.  By  it  Caesar  obtained  the  governor- 
ship of  Cisalpine  Gaul,  and  the  supreme  command  of  the 
three  legions  stationed  there,  for  five  years,  with  the  rank 
of  propraetor  for  his  adjutants.  His  jurisdiction  extended 
southwards  as  far  as  the  Rubicon,  and  included  Luca  and 
Ravenna.  Subsequently  the  province  of  Narbo  was  added 
by  the  senate,  on  the  motion  of  Pompeius.  Since  no 
troops  could  be  stationed  in  Italy,  it  was  evident  that  such 
a  command  as  Caesar's  dominated  both  Italy  and  Rome. 
The  coalition  had  succeeded;  it  was  master  of  the  state. 
It  kept  its  adherents  in  good  humour  by  the  most  lavish 
exhibitions  of  games  and  shows,  and  kept  the  exchequer 
filled  by  selling  charters  and  privileges  to  subject  com- 
munities and  princes  :  for  instance,  the  king  of  Egypt  at 
last  obtained  recognition  by  decree  of  the  people,  in  return 
for  a  large  sum.  The  permanence  of  the  present  arrange- 
ment was  assured  by  securing  the  return  of  Aulus  Ga- 
binius  and  Lucius  Piso  for  the  consulship  of  the  ensuing 
year.  Pompeius  watched  over  Italy  while  he  executed  the 
agrarian  law,  and  Caesar's  legions  in  North  Italy  were  a 
guarantee  against  all  opposition.     Caesar  and  Pompeius 


RETURN  OF  POMPETUS.  391 

were  at  present,  kept  united  by  community  of  interest, 
and  the  personal  bonds  between  them  were  cemented  by 
the  marriage  of  Pompeius  with  Julia,  the  only  daughter 
of  Caesar. 

The  aristocracy  were  in  despair.  "  On  all  sides,"  wrote 
one  of  them,  "we  are  checkmated;  we  have  already, 
through  fear  of  death  or  of  banishment,  despaired  of 
'  freedom  ; '  every  one  sighs,  no  one  ventures  to  speak." 
Nevertheless  Caesar  had  hardly  laid  down  his  consulship 
when  it  was  proposed,  in  the  senate,  to  annul  the  Julian 
laws  ;  there  were  clearly  some  among  the  optimates  who 
would  not  be  content  with  the  policy  of  sighing  and  silence. 
The  regents  determined  to  make  examples  of  some  of  the 
most  determined  of  their  opponents,  and  to  drive  them 
into  exile.  An  infamous  attempt  was  made  to  involve 
the  heads  of  the  aristocracy  in  a  charge  of  conspiring  to 
murder  Pompeius  on  the  evidence  of  a  worthless  informer 
named  Vettius  ;  but  the  scheme  was  too  hollow,  and  the 
whole  matter  was  allowed  to  drop. 

Ultimately  they  were  content  with  a  few  isolated 
victims.  Cato  openly  proclaimed  his  conviction  that  the 
Julian  laws  were  null  and  void,  and,  to  get  rid  of  him, 
he  was  entrusted  by  special  decree  with  the  regulation  of 
the  municipal  affairs  of  Byzantium,  and  with  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  kingdom  of  Cyprus.  Cicero  was  abandoned  to 
the  vengeance  of  the  thorough-going  democrats,  who 
could  not  leave  unpunished  the  judicial  murder  of  De- 
cember 5th.  And  so  the  tribune  Publius  Clodius,  his  bitter 
private  enemy,  proposed  to  the  tribes  a  resolution  de- 
claring the  execution  of  a  citizen  without  trial  a  crime 
punishable  with  banishment.  Both  this  decree  and  that 
relating  to  Cato  were  passed  without  opposition,  and, 
though  the  majoritr  of  the  senate  put  on  mourning,  and 
Cicero  besought.  Pompeius  on  his  knees  for  mercy,  he  had 
to  go  into  exile  even  before  the  passing  of  the  law. 
Cato  accepted  his  commission,  and  set  out  for  the  East; 
and  Caesar  could  now  safely  leave  Italy,  to  face  the  heavy 
task  he  had  imposed  on  himself  in  Gaul. 


302  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 


AUTHORITIES. 

Pint.  Pomp.  46-48;  Caes.  8-14;  Crass.  14;  Cic.  23-32.     Liv.  103. 

Flor.  ii.  8-12.     Veil.  ii.  40-45.     Suet.  Jul.  16-23.      Dio.  xxxvii. 

49-51 ;  xxxviii.  1-17,  50.     Appian  ii.  8-16.     Cic.  frag,  in  Clod. 

et  Cur.  (61  B.C.)  ;    pro   Scip.  Nas.   (60  B.C.)  ;   pro   Flacc.   (59 

B.C.);    Watson's   Select.    Lett.   i.  3-end.     Lex  Julia   Agraria: 

Bruns,  I.  c.  iii.  15. 
Recognition  of  Ptolemy. — Suet.  Jul.  54. 
Vettius. — Suet.  Jul.  17,  20.     Dio.  xxxvi.  41,  xxxviii.  9.     Cic.  ad  Att. 

ii.  24;  pro  Sest.  63,  in  Vatin.  10, 11.    Appian  B.  C.  ii.  12.    Plut. 

Lucnllus,  42. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

CAESAR   IN   GAUL. 

Political  and  social  organization  of  Gaul. — 58  B.C.  First  campaign- 
Defeat  of  the  Helvetii  and  of  Ariovistus. — 57  B.C.  Second  cam- 
paign— The  Belgian  League  subdued. — 56  B.C.  Third  campaign 
— Defeat  of  the  Aremorican  cantons ;  of  the  Morini,  Menapii, 
and  Aquitani. — 55  B.C.  Fourth  campaign — Massacre  of  Usipetes 
and  Tencteri — The  Rhine  crossed — First  expedition  to  Britain. 
— 54  B.C.  Fifth  campaign — Second  invasion  of  Britain — Attacks 
on  Sabinus  and  Cicero  during  the  winter. — 53  B.C.  Sixth  cam- 
paign— General  insurrection  crushed  by  defeat  of  the  Nervii, 
Senones,  Carnntes,  Treveri,  and  Menapii — The  Rhine  again 
crossed. — 52  B.C.  Seventh  campaign — Great  national  rising 
under  Vercingetorix — Sieges  of  Avaricum,  Gergovia,  and 
Alesia. — 51  B.C.  Eighth  campaign — Remains  of  the  insur- 
rection stamped  out. 

It  has  been  too  generally  assumed  that  Caesar  regarded 
Gaul  merely  as  a  parade  ground  on  which  to  exercise 
himself  and  his  troops  for  the  impending  war  ;  but  though 
the  conquest  of  Gaul  was  undoubtedly  for  him  a  means  to 
an  end,  yet  it  was  much  more — "it  is  the  special  privilege 
of  a  statesman  of  genius  that  his  means  themselves  are 
ends  in  their  turn.  Caesar  needed,  no  doubt,  for  his  party 
aims  a  military  power,  but  he  did  not  conquer  Gaul  as  a 
partisan."  It  was  necessary  tbat  Italy  should  be  pro- 
tected by  a  barrier  against  the  ever- threatening  in- 
vasions of  the  Germans  ;  and  it  was  also  necessary,  now 
that  Italy  had  become  too  narrow  for  its  population,  that 
a  fresh  field  of  expansion  should  be  provided  elsewhere. 
The  Roman  state  remained  a  chaotic  mass  of  countries 
which  requii'ed  to  be  thoroughly  occupied,  and  to  have 
their  boundaries  fixed  and  defined :  the  senate  had  done 


394  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

little  or  nothing  to  carry  out  this  great  work  ;  it  was  only 
when  the  democracy  assumed  the  reins  in  67  B.C.  and  in  fid 
B.C.  that  the  Roman  sovereignty  over  the  Mediterranean 
was  restored,  and  the  dominion  in  the  East  consolidated 
by  the  annexation  of  Pontus  and  Syria.  Now  that  the 
democracy  and  its  leaders  were  supreme,  another  and  even 
more  important  section  of  the  work  was  at  last  taken  in 
hand. 

Something  had  been  accomplished  by  Caesar  towards 
the  subjugation  of  the  West  during  his  governorship  in 
Spain  in  61  B.C.  :  the  Lusitanians  and  Gallaeci  were  sub- 
dued, the  tribute  of  the  subjects  was  reduced,  and  their 
financial  affairs  were  regulated. 

The  term  Gallia  has  been  applied,  since  the  age  of 
Augustus,  to  the  country  bounded  by  the  Pyrenees,  the 
Rhine,  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  and  the  Mediterranean.  The 
Roman  province  which  had  been  constituted  for  sixty 
years,  and  which  corresponded  pretty  nearly  to  the  modern 
Languedoc,  Dauphine,  and  Provence,  had  seldom  been  iu 
a  state  of  peace.  Pompeius  had  had  to  fight  his  way 
through  the  insurgent  tribes  in  order  to  reach  Spain  in 
77  B.C. ;  while  the  connection  of  the  Allobroges  with  the 
Catilinarian  conspiracy  is  but  one  indication  of  the  per- 
petual ferment  in  which  the  more  remote  cantons  lived. 
Still  the  bounds  of  the  province  were  not  extended , 
Lugdunum  Convenarum  (the  colony  of  Sertorians),  Tolosa, 
Vienna,  and  Genava  remained  the  most  remote  Roman 
townships  towards  the  west  and  north 

But  the  importance  of  Gallia  was  continually  increasing  ; 
its  glorious  climate,  the  fertility  of  the  soil,  the  commercial 
routes  stretching  northwards  as  far  as  Britain,  the  easy 
communication  with  Italy,  the  civilization  and  luxury 
which  were  to  be  found  in  the  city  of  Massilia,  all  com- 
bined to  make  Gallia  the  most  attractive  of  the  Roman 
provinces.  Ten  years  before  Caesar's  arrival  it  was  swarm- 
ing with  Roman  burgesses  and  merchants,  with  Roman 
farmers  and  graziers,  while  a  large  proportion  of  the  land 
was  owned  by  Roman  nobles,  who  lived  in  Italy  and 
cultivated  their  estates  by  means  of  stewards. 

This  region  had  for  a  long  time  been  under  the  influence 
of  Hellenism,  spreading  from  the  great  Greek  colony  of 
Massilia  ;  and  even  in  the  Roman  period  Greek  physicians 


CAESAR  IN  GAUL.  395 

and  rhetoricians  were  employed  in  the  Gallic  cantons  :  but, 
as  elsewhere,  Hellenism  was  superseded  by  the  mixed 
Latino-Greek  culture.  The  Celtic  and  Ligurian  popula- 
tions gradually  lost  their  nationality,  were  compelled  to 
exchange  the  sword  for  the  plough,  which  they  were  forced 
to  use  in  the  service  of  a  foreign  master,  and  they  attested 
by  many  insurrections  the  hardness  of  the  bondage  into 
which  they  had  fallen.  But  the  towns  flourished  and 
grew;  Aquae  Sextiae,  Narbo,  and,  above  all,  Massilia, might 
be  mentioned  in  comparison  with  the  most  prosperous 
Italian  towns. 

But  as  soon  as  the  Roman  frontier  was  crossed,  Roman 
influence  practically  ceased.  North  of  the  Cevennes  the 
great  Celtic  race  was  found  in  all  its  native  freedom. 
The  great  body  of  this  people  had  settled  in  modern 
France,  in  the  western  districts  of  Germany  and  Switzer- 
land, and  in  the  south  of  England  ;  but  there  were  Celts 
in  modern  Austria  and  Spain,  though  cut  off  from  their 
kinsmen  by  the  barriers  of  the  Alps  and  the  Pyrenees. 
Little  can  be  known  of  the  development  of  this  great 
people ;  we  have  to  be  content  with  a  mere  outline  of 
their  culture  and  political  condition  in  the  time  of  Caesar. 

The  population  of  Gaul  appears  to  have  been  compara- 
tively dense.  From  the  numbers  of  the  Belgic  levy  against 
Caesar  it  may  be  computed  that  in  those  regions  the  pro- 
portion was  about  200  persons  to  the  square  mile — about 
the  same  rate  which  holds  at  present  for  Wales ;  in  the 
canton  of  the  Helvetii  it  was  about  245 :  hence  in  the 
more  cultivated  districts  of  the  Haedui  and  Arverni  it  was 
probably  higher.  Agriculture  was  no  doubt  known  in 
Gaul,  and  a  kind  of  beer  was  made  from  the  barley  which 
was  grown  there.  But  the  pursuit  was  despised,  and, 
even  in  the  south,  was  held  unbecoming  for  a  free  Celt. 
Pastoral  husbandry  was  much  more  esteemed.  The 
Romans  availed  themselves  of  the  Celtic  breed  of  cattle, 
and  of  the  skill  of  Celtic  slaves  in  the  rearing  of  animals  ; 
Gallic  oxen  and  ponies  were  much  used,  and  in  the  northern 
districts  the  rearing  of  cattle  was  almost  universal.  In 
the  north-east,  between  the  sea  and  the  Rhine,  dense 
woods  covered  the  ground,  and  on  the  plains  of  Flanders 
and  Lorraine,  the  Menapian  and  Treverian  shepherd  fed 
his  half-wild  swine  in  the  impenetrable  oak  forests.     In 


396  HISTORY  OF  EOME. 

Britain  there  was  hardly  any  agriculture,  and  the  culture 
of  the  olive  and  the  vine  did  not  extend  beyond  the 
Cevennes. 

The  Gauls  lived  mainly  in  open  villages,  of  which  the 
Helvetii  alone  had  four  hundred,  besides  many  single 
homesteads.  But  there  were  also  walled  towns,  of  which 
the  walls  were  an  admirable  combination  of  timber  and 
wood,  while  the  buildings  were  wholly  of  wood.  There 
were  twelve  of  such  towns  among  the  Helvetii,  and  the 
same  number  among  the  Suessiones.  But  in  the  northern 
parts  morasses  and  forests,  and  in  Britain  a  sort  of  wooden 
abatis,  were  the  only  protection  in  time  of  war. 

Roads  and  bridges  were  numerous,  and  the  number  and 
character  of  the  largest  rivers — the  Rhone,  Garonne, 
Loire,  and  Seine — made  river  intercourse  easy  and  profit- 
able. In  maritime  affairs  the  Gauls  had  attained  no  in- 
considerable skill,  and  in  one  respect  had  surpassed  the 
nations  of  the  Mediterranean.  They  were  the  first  nation 
that  regularly  navigated  the  Atlantic,  and  the  tribes  which 
bordered  on  the  ocean  employed  sailing  vessels,  with 
leathern  sails  and  iron  anchor-chains,  not  only  for  com- 
merce but  for  war ;  while  the  war  vessels  of  the  Phoenicians, 
Greeks,  and  Romans,  were  all,  up  to  this  time,  propelled  by 
oars,  and  used  the  sail  only  as  an  occasional  aid ,  their 
trading  vessels  alone  were  sailers  properly  so-called.  In 
the  Channel,  the  Gauls,  still  and  for  long  afterwards,  em- 
ployed a  sort  of  leather-covered  skiffs. 

There  was  considerable  commercial  intercourse  between 
even  the  most  northern  Celtic  regions  and  the  Roman 
province.  The  people  of  modern  Brittany  brought  tin  from 
the  mines  of  Cornwall,  and  carried  it  by  river  or  by  land 
to  Narbo  and  Massilia.  Among  the  tribes  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Rhine,  fishing  and  the  collection  of  birds'  eggs  was  an 
important  industry.  The  tolls  levied  on  rivers  and  at 
maritime  ports  play  a  large  part  in  the  finance  of  certain 
cantons.  In  manufactures,  working  in  metals  was  the 
only  important  known  industry  :  the  copper  implements 
even  now  discovered  in  tombs,  and  the  gold  coins  of  the 
Arverni  attest  the  skill  of  the  Gallic  workmen ;  and  they 
are  even  said  to  have  taught  the  Romans  the  arts  of 
tinning  and  silvering.  Naturally  the  art  of  mining  went 
hand  in  hand  with  the  working  of  metals.     There  were 


CAESAR  IN  GAUL.  397 

extensive  iron  mines  on  the  Loire,  and  the  art  of  mining 
"was  adapted  in  those  regions  to  the  purposes  of  war. 
The  Romans  believed  that  Gaul  was  very  rich  in  gold ; 
but  the  idea  is  negatived  by  the  small  amount  of  gold 
discovered  in  tombs,  and  probably  arose  from  the  fables 
of  travellers.  Still  the  streams  flowing  from  the  Alps 
and.  Pyrenees  may  then  have  yielded  sufficient  produce 
to  make  the  search  for  gold  profitable  through  the 
employment  of  slave  labour. 

The  taste  of  the  Celtic  workmen  was  not  equal  to  their 
mechanical  skill.  The  ornaments  they  produced  were 
gaudy  and  parti-coloured,  and  their  coins  invariably 
imitate  two  or  three  Greek  dies.  But  the  art  of  poetry 
was  highly  valued,  and  was  intimately  connected  with 
religion.  Science  and  philosophy  existed,  though  in 
subordination  to  theology.  The  knowledge  of  writing 
was  general  among  the  priests. 

Among  the  Celts  "the  town  had,  as  in  the  East,  merely 
mercantile  and  strategic — not  political — importance."  The 
Greeks  and  Romans  had  lived,  in  early  times,  in  cantons, 
each  clan  by  itself;  they  had  villages  in  which  they 
bought  and  sold,  and  strong  places  whither  they  fled  for 
refuge  in  case  of  invasion.  But  very  soon  the  tower  of 
refuge  grew  into  a  town,  and  became  the  head  and  centre 
of  the  clan,  and  the  seat  of  law  and  justice.  Among  the 
Celts,  however,  this  development  never  took  place ;  they 
remained  a  mere  collection  of  clans,  and  never  took  the 
step  by  which  the  clan  becomes  a  state  with  a  fixed  centre 
of  government. 

The  constitution  of  the  clan  canton  was  based  upon  three 
elements,  the  prince,  the  council  of  elders,  and  the  body  of 
freemen  capable  of  bearing  arms.  The  supreme  authority 
rested  with  the  general  assembly  by  which,  in  important 
matters,  the  prince  was  bound.  The  council  was  often 
numerous,  sometimes  reaching  the  number  of  six  hundred, 
but  had  not  more  power  than  the  Roman  senate  in  the 
regal  period.  In  some  southern  clans — the  Arverni, 
Haedui,  Sequani,  and  Helvetii — a  revolution  had  taken 
place,  before  the  time  of  Caesar,  which  had  overthrown 
the  power  of  the  kings  and  set  up  that  of  the  senate  in  its 
place.  In  all  cases  their  towns,  even  when  walled,  were 
destitute  of  political  importance. 


398  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

The  dominant  feature  in  all  Celtic  commonwealths  is  the 
high  nobility — a  class  the  existence  of  which  is  almost 
incompatible  with  that  of  a  flourishing  urban  life.  This 
nobility  consisted  for  the  most  part  of  members  of  royal, 
or  formerly  royal,  families.  It  monopolized  all  power  in 
the  state,  financial,  warlike,  or  political.  The  nobles 
forced  the  common  freemen  to  surrender  their  freedom 
first  as  debtors  and  then  as  slaves.  They  maintained  large 
bodies  of  mounted  retainers,  ambacti,  and  by  tbeir  means 
defied  the  government  and  broke  up  the  commonwealth. 
These  retainers  sometimes  reached  the  number  of  ten 
thousand,  besides  tbe  bondmen  and  debtors  who  were 
equally  dependent.  Moreover,  the  leading  families  in 
different  states  were  connected  by  marriage  aud  by  treaty 
and  were  together  stronger  than  any  single  clan.  The 
community  could  no  uuger  maintain  peace  or  protect 
individuals  :  only  those  who  were  clients  of  some  powerful 
noble  enjoyed  security. 

The  general  assembly  lost  its  importance  ;  the  monarchy 
usually  succumbed  to  the  nobilitv7,  and  the  king  was  super- 
seded by  the  vergobretus,  or  judgment-dealer,  who,  like 
the  Roman  consul,  held  office  for  a  year.  So  far  as  the 
canton  held  together  it  was  led  by  the  council,  which  was 
governed  by  the  heads  of  the  aristocracy. 

Like  the  Greeks  in  the  Persian  wars,  the  Transalpine 
Gauls  seem  to  have  become  conscious  of  their  unity  as  a 
nation  only  in  their  wars  with  Rome.  The  combination 
of  the  whole  Celtic  nobility  was  favourable  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  idea,  and  there  were  many  who  were  willing  to 
sacrifice  the  independence  of  the  canton  or  of  the  nobility, 
to  purchase  the  independence  of  the  nation.  The  universal 
popularity  of  the  opposition  to  Caesar  is  attested  by  the 
telegraphic  rapidity  with  which  news  was  carried  through- 
out the  length  and  breadth  of  Gaul. 

But  though  politically  divided,  the  Gauls  had  long  been 
held  together  by  the  bond  of  a  close  religious  union.  The 
corporation  of  Druids  embraced  the  British  islands  and  all 
Gaul,  perhaps  even  other  Celtic  countries.  It  possessed  a 
special  head,  elected  by  the  priests  themselves ;  schools,  in 
which  its  traditions  were  transmitted ;  special  privileges, 
such  as  exemption  from  taxation  and  military  service. 
Annual   councils    were    held    near  Chartres;    and,    above 


CAESAR  IN  GAUL.  399 

all,  the  blind  devotion  of  the  people  to  their  priests  was 
*'in  nowise  inferior  to  that  of  the  Irish  at  the  present  day." 

Such  a  priesthood  could  not  but  possess  considerable 
political  power :  in  monarchical  cantons  it  conducted  the 
government  in  case  of  an  interregnum  ;  it  excluded  indi- 
viduals or  states  from  religious  and  therefore  also  from  civil 
society ,  it  decided  important  suits,  especially  with  regard 
to  boundaries  and  inheritance  ;  it  had  an  extensive  criminal 
jurisdiction,  and  even  claimed  the  right  of  deciding  on  "war 
or  peace.  "  The  Gauls  were  not  much  removed  from  an 
ecclesiastical  state  with  its  pope  and  councils,  its  immuni- 
ties, inderdicts,  and  spiritual  courts  ;  only  this  ecclesiastical 
state  did  not,  like  that  of  recent  times,  stand  aloof  from  the 
nations,  but  was  on  the  contrary  pre-eminently  national." 

But  though  the  priests  and  nobility  constituted  a  certain 
union  of  the  clans,  their  class  interests  were  too  strong  to 
allow  this  Union  to  become  really  national.  The  only 
attempt  at  political  union  was  the  system  of  hegemony 
among  the  cantons ;  a  stronger  clan  induced  or  compelled 
a  weaker  to  become  subordinate  to  it.  The  stronger  had 
control  of  all  external  relations  for  both,  while  the  weaker 
was  obliged  to  render  military  service,  and  sometimes  to 
pay  tribute.  Thus  aseries  of  leagues  arose — like  that  among 
the  Belgae.  in  the  north-east,  under  the  Suessiones  ;  that, 
in  southern  and  central  Gaul,  under  the  Arverni ;  and  that 
of  the  maritime  cantons  in  the  north  and  west. 

The  union  in  these  confederacies  was  of  the  loosest  kind. 
The  league  was  represented  in  peace  by  the  federal  diet,  and 
in  war  by  the  general.  Contests  for  the  hegemony  went  on 
in  every  league,  and  the  rivalry  spread  into  every  dependent 
clan,  and  into  every  village  and  house,  just  as  the  rivalry 
between  Athens  and  Sparta  split  up  every  independent 
community  in  Greece. 

In  a  country  where  knighthood  was  the  predominant 
social  feature,  the  strength  of  the  army  was  naturally  the 
cavalry ;  war-chariots  wrere  also  used  among  the  Belgae  and 
in  Britain.  When  the  general  levy  was  called  out,  every 
man  who  could  keep  his  seat  on  horseback  took  up  arms,  and, 
when  attacking  an  enemy  wrhom  they  despised,  they  swore, 
man  by  man,  in  the  true  spirit  of  chivalry,  to  charge  at 
least  twice  through  the  enemy's  line.  There  were  also 
hired  free-lances  who  displayed  in  its  extremest  form  the 


400  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

spirit  of  Titter  indifference  to  their  own  lives  and  to  those 
of  others  which  such  a  mode  of  life  produces.  They  would 
often,  we  are  told,  fight  for  life  and  death  at  a  banquet, 
for  sport ;  and  even  sell  themselves  to  be  killed  for  a  fixed 
sum  of  money  or  a  number  of  casks  of  wine. 

Besides  the  mounted  force  there  was  the  levy  en  masse 
of  infantry.  Their  arms  were  still  a  large  shield  and  a 
long  thrusting  spear.  There  is  no  trace  of  military  organi- 
zation or  of  tactical  subdivisions  ;  each  canton  fought  en 
masse,  without  other  arrangement.  The  baggage  was 
carried  in  waggons,  which  were  used  as  a  barricade  at 
night.  The  infantry  of  certain  cantons,  such  as  the  Nervii, 
was  more  efficient  ;  but  the  Nervii  had  no  cavalry,  and 
were,  perhaps,  an  immigrant  German  tribe.  Caesar's 
estimate  of  the  Celtic  infantry  is  made  plain  enough  by 
the  fact  that,  after  the  first  battle,  he  never  employed  them 
in  conjunction  with  Roman  troops. 

Undoubtedly  the  Celts  of  Transalpine  Gaul,  as  they 
appeared  in  Caesar's  time,  had  advanced  as  compared  with 
their  kinsmen  who  had  come  into  contact  with  the  Romans 
a  century  and  a  half  previously  in  the  valley  of  the  Po.  The 
militia  had  been  replaced  by  the  cavalry  as  the  preponderat- 
ing arm.  Open  villages  had  been  replaced  by  walled 
towns.  Articles  found  in  the  tombs  of  Lombardy  are  cer- 
tainly inferior  to  those  found  in  northern  Gaul.  Lastly, 
the  sense  of  nationality,  which  scarcely  appears  in  the 
battles  fought  south  of  the  Alps,  is  seen  with  striking  force 
in  the  struggle  against  Caesar. 

Many  aspects  of  Celtic  civilization  are  interesting  as 
approaching  nearly  to  modern  culture — its  sailing  vessels, 
its  knighthood,  its  ecclesiastical  constitution,  its  attempts 
to  build  the  nation,  not  on  the  city,  but  on  the  tribe  ; — but 
a  genex*al  view  of  the  whole,  so  far  as  the  materials  exist 
for  it,  suggests  the  thought  that  the  Celtic  nation  had 
reached  its  culminating  point  of  development.  "  It  was 
unable  to  produce  from  its  own  resources  either  a  national 
art  or  a  national  state,  and  attained  at  most  to  a  national 
theology  and  a  peculiar  order  of  nobility."  Thus  the 
original  simple  valour  was  no  more,  while  the  higher 
military  courage,  based  on  morality  and  organization, 
appears  but  in  a  very  stinted  form.  Again,  the  coarser 
features  of  barbarism  were  gone :  faithful  retainers  were 


CAESAR  IN  GAUL.  401 

no  longer  sacrificed  at  the  death  of  their  chief;  but  human 
sacrifices  remained ;  torture,  inadmissible  in  the  case  of 
a  free  man,  was  still  inflicted  upon  free  women  or  upon 
slaves.  "  The  Celts  had  lost  the  advantages  which  specially 
belong  to  the  primitive  epoch  of  nations,  but  had  not 
acquired  those  which  civilization  brings  with  it  when  it 
intimately  and  thoroughly  pervades  a  people." 

The  Celts  had  long  ceased  to  press  on  the  Iberian  tribes, 
and  the  country  between  the  Pyrenees  and  Garonne  was 
occupied  by  the  Aquitani,  a  number  of  tribes  of  Iberian 
descent.  The  Roman  arms  and  the  Roman  culture  had 
already  made  great  inroads  upon  the  Celtic  nation.  The 
latter  wras  now  cut  off  by  the  Roman  province  from  Italy, 
Spain,  and  the  Mediterranean.  Trade  and  commerce  had 
already  paved  the  way  for  conquest  north  of  the  Roman 
bounds.  Wine  especially,  which  the  Gauls  drank  undiluted, 
was  greatly  prized ,  and  Italian  horses  were  imported. 
Roman  burgesses  already  possessed  land  in  cantons  north 
of  the  frontier,  and  the  Roman  language  was  by  no  means 
unknown  in  free  Gaul. 

Bat  the  strongest  pressure  came  from  the  Germans  on 
the  north  and  east :  "a  fresh  stock  from  the  cradle  of 
peoples  In  the  east,  which  made  room  for  itself  by  the  side  of 
its  elder  brethren  with  youthful  vigour,  although  also  with 
youthful  rudeness."  The  German  tribes  nearest  the  Rhine 
■ — the  Usipetes,  Tencteri,  Sugambri,  and  Ubii — were  by 
this  time  partly  civilized,  and  inhabited  fixed  territories ; 
but  in  the  interior,  agriculture  was  of  small  importance ; 
even  the  names  of  the  various  tribes  were  unknown  to  the 
Celts,  who  called  them  by  the  general  appellation  of  Suebi 
(wanderers),  and  Marcomanni  (border- warriors).  Before 
this  period  the  Celts  had  been  driven  over  the  Rhine ;  the 
Boii,  who  were  once  in  Bavaria  and  Bohemia,  were  harm- 
less wanderers,  and  the  region  of  the  Black  Forest,  formerly 
possessed  by  the  Helvetii,  was  a  desert,  or  occupied  by 
Germans.  Nor  had  the  intruders  stopped  at  the  Rhine ; 
certain  tribes,  amongst  whom  were  the  Adnatuci  and  the 
Tnngri,  perhaps  also  the  Nervii  and  the  Treveri,  had  formed 
settlements  west  of  the  river,  and  exacted  hostages  and 
tribute  from  the  neighbouring  Gauls.  Thus  free  Gaul  was 
threatened  at  once  by  two  powerful  nations,  and  was  at 
the  same  time  torn  by  internal  dissensions  :  "  how  should 

26 


402  .    HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

a  nation,  which  could  name  no  day  like  those  of  Marathon 
and  Salauiis,  of  Aricia  and  the  Raudine  field,— a  nation 
which,  even  in  its  time  of  vigour,  had  made  no  attempt  to 
destroy  Massilia  by  an  united  effort — now,  when  evening 
had  come,  defend  itself  against  so  formidable  foes  ?  '' 

The  internal  condition  of  Gaul  readily  became  mixed  up 
with  its  external  relations.  The  Romans,  from  their  first 
interference,  had  availed  themselves  of  the  perpetual  con- 
tests for  the  hegemony,  by  which  every  canton  was  torn 
asunder;  they  had  supported  the  Haedui  in  their  rivalry 
with  the  Arvemi  for  predominance  in  the  south,  had  re- 
duced to  subjection  the  Allobroges  and  many  of  the  client 
cantons  of  the  Arvemi,  and  got  the  hegemony  transferred 
from  the  latter  to  the  Haedui.  But  the  power  of  Rome  was 
not  the  only  foreign  force  which  might  be  invoked  The 
Sequani  in  central  Gaul,  who  were  at  the  head  of  the 
anti-Roman  faction,  had  availed  themselves  of  the  remiss- 
ness of  the  senatorial  government,  to  make  an  attempt  to 
destroy  Roman  influence  and  to  humble  their  rivals,  the 
Haedui.  A  dispute  arose  between  the  two  tribes  as  to  tolls 
on  the  river  Saone,  which  separated  the  two  cantons  ;  and 
about  the  year  71  B.C.  the  German  prince  Ariovistus  crossed 
the  Rhine  at  the  head  of  fifteen  thousand  men  in  support 
of  the  Sequani.  After  a  long  war,  the  Haedui  were  re- 
duced to  conclude  a  most  unfavourable  peace,  by  which 
they  became  tributary  to  the  Sequani,  and  swore  never  to 
invoke  the  intervention  of  Rome  (61  B.C.).  The  Romans 
talked  of  assisting  the  Haedui,  and  even  issued  orders  to 
that  effect  to  the  governors  of  Gaul ;  but  nothing  was 
done,  and  Ariovistus  was  even  enrolled  upon  the  list  of 
friends  of  the  Roman  people.  The  result  of  this  inaction 
was  that  numerous  bands  of  Germans  continued  to  cross 
the  Rhine,  and  that  Ariovistus  determined  to  extend  his 
power  over  the  whole  of  Gaul.  The  Celts  were  treated  as 
a  conquered  nation  :  even  his  friends,  the  Sequani,  were 
forced  to  cede  a  third  of  their  territory  to  make  room  for 
his  followers  ;  and  a  second  third  was  soon  demanded  for 
the  tribe  of  the  Harudes. 

But  the  invasion  of  Ariovistus  was  not  the  only  move- 
ment in  progress.  The  Usipetes  and  Tencteri,  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  hard  pressed  by  Suebian  hordes, 
had  set  out  to  find  new  settlements  lower  down  the  Rhine. 


CAESAR   IN  GAUL.  403 

Suebian  bands  gathered  opposite  the  canton  of  the  Treveri. 
Lastly,  the  Helvetii,  the  most  easterly  of  the  Celtic  cantons, 
in  modern  Switzerland,  formed  the  desperate  resolution  of 
evacuating  their  own  territory,  in  order  to  find  a  more 
spacious  and  less  exposed  habitation  west  of  the  Jura 
mountains,  hoping  at  the  same  time  to  acquire  the  hege- 
mony of  central  Gaul.  The  Rauraci,  in  southern  Alsace, 
and  the  remnant  of  the  homeless  Boii  were  induced  to 
make  common  cause  with  the  Helvetii.  If  their  scheme 
were  carried  out,  their  original  settlement  would,  of  course, 
fall  to  the  German  invader.  "  From  the  source  of  the 
Rhine  to  the  Atlantic  Ocean  the  German  tribes  were  in 
motion  ;  the  whole  line  of  the  Rhine  was  threatened  bv 
them.  It  was  a  moment  like  that  when  the  Alamanni  and 
the  Franks  threw  themselves  on  the  falling  empire  of  the 
Caesars  ;  and  even  now  there  seemed  on  the  eve  of  being 
carried  into  effect  against  the  Celts  that  very  movement 
which  was  successful,  five  hundred  years  afterwards,  against 
the  Romans." 

It  was  at  this  moment  that  Caesar  entered  upon  his 
province  (58  B.C.).  He  was  now  governor  of  both  the 
Gauls,  including  Istriaand  Dalmatia;  his  office  was  secured 
to  him  for  five  years,  and  it  was  extended,  in  55  B.C.,  for 
five  years  more  ;  he  had  the  right  of  nominating  ten  lieu- 
tenants and  (at  any  rate,  according  to  his  own  interpre- 
tation of  his  powers)  to  fill  up  his  legions  or  form  new 
ones  from  the  population  of  his  provinces.  His  army 
consisted  of  four  veteran  legions,  the  seventh,  eighth, 
ninth,  and  tenth,  in  all  about  24,000  men,  besides  auxi- 
liaries ;  he  had  some  Spanish  cavalry,  and  archers  and 
slingers  from  Numidia,  Crete,  and  the  Balearic  isles.  His 
staff  contained  several  able  officers,  such  as  Publius 
Cra^sus,  son  of  Caesar's  old  political  ally,  and  Titus 
Labienus.  "  Caesar  had  not  received  definite  instructions  ; 
to  one  who  was  discerning  and  courageous  these  were 
implied  in  the  circumstances  with  which  he  had  to  deal. 
The  negligence  of  the  senate  had  to  be  retrieved,  and, 
first  of  all,  the  stream  of  German  invasion  had  to  be 
checked." 

The  invasion  of  the  Helvetii  had  just  begun ;  they  had 
burned  their  towns  and  villages  to  make  return  impossible, 
and  had  gathered  to  the  number  of  380,000  souls  at  the 


404  IIISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Lacus  Lemannus,  near  Genava.  The  difficulty  of  crossing 
the  mountains  had  determined  them  to  cross  the  Rhone  in 
a  southern  direction  into  the  territory  of  the  Allobroges, 
and  to  march  first  south  and  then  west,  until  they  reached 
the  cauton  of  the  Santo nes  on  the  Atlantic,  where  they  had 
determined  to  settle.  Their  route  lay  though  Roman  terri- 
tory, and  Caesar  was  resolved  to  prevent  them  from  crossing 
the  river.  He  gained  some  days  by  negotiation,  and  in 
the  mean  time  hurried  up  his  legions  from  Aquileia,  called 
out  the  militia  of  the  province,  and  broke  down  the  bridge 
over  the  Rhone  ;  he  then  proceeded  to  bar  the  southern 
bank  against  the  Helvetii  by  an  entrenchment  nineteen 
miles  long.  Baulked  of  their  scheme,  the  invaders  were 
obliged  to  turn  to  the  difficult  mountain  route,  through  the 
passes  of  the  Jura,  and  a  free  passage  was  procured  for  them 
from  the  Sequani  by  the  influence  of  the  anti-Roman  party 
in  the  central  cantons,  who  hoped  to  find  in  the  Helvetii  a 
valuable  reinforcement.  Caesar  immediately  decided  to 
follow  them ;  he  crossed  the  Rhone  with  five  legions  and 
the  troops  stationed  at  Genava.  He  overtook  the  enemy 
at  the  Saone,  where  he  destroyed  the  division  which  had 
not  yet  crossed.  His  appearance  in  the  territory  of  the 
Haedui  at  once  restored  the  predominance  of  the  Roman 
party,  and  thus  obviated  any  difficulty  with  regard  to  sup- 
plies ;  but  his  task  still  remained  formidable.  For  fifteen 
days  Caesar  followed  the  unwieldy  host,  which  had  turned 
north  in  the  hope  that  Caesar  would  not  venture  to  advance 
far  into  the  interior.  No  opportunity  of  fighting  a  battle 
under  favourable  circumstances  was  given  ;  the  leaders 
carefully  guarded  against  surprise,  and  appeared  to  have 
accurate  intelligence  of  Caesar's  movements.  Moreover, 
the  Romans  now  began  to  be  in  want  of  provisions ;  the 
cavalry  had  turned  out  untrustworthy,  and  were  suspected 
of  carrying  information  into  the  enemy's  camp.  Such  was 
the  critical  state  of  affairs  when  the  armies  were  just 
marching  past  Bibracte,  the  capital  of  the  Haedui.  Caesar 
resolved  to  seize  the  place  before  continuing  the  pursuit — 
perhaps  to  establish  himself  there  permanently.  But  the 
Helvetii,  imagining  that  the  Romans  were  preparing  to 
fly,  attacked  them. 

The  armies  were  drawn  up  on  parallel  ranges  of  hills. 
The  Celts  charged  and  broke  the  Roman  cavalry,  but  had 


CAESAR  IN   GAUL.  405 

to  retire  before  the  legions ;  and  when  the  Romans 
charged  in  turn,  the  Celts  again  advanced,  while  their 
reserve  took  the  Romans  in  the  flank.  But  the  latter 
were  met  by  the  reserve  of  the  Roman  attacking  column, 
and.  destroyed  ;  and  now  the  main  body  gave  way,  and. 
retreated  northwards.  The  Romans  were  too  exhausted 
for  pursuit ;  but,  in  consequence  of  Caesar's  threats,  the 
cantons  through  which  the  Helvetii  passed  refused,  them 
supplies  and  plundered  their  baggage,  and  the  whole  host 
were  soon  reduced  to  submit  without  reserve.  Caesar 
treated  them  with  clemency.  The  Haedui  were  directed 
to  assign  territory  to  the  Boii  within  their  own  bounds  ; 
while  the  survivors  of  the  Rauraci  and  Helvetii  were  sent 
back  to  their  former  territory,  to  defend,  under  Roman 
supremacy,  the  upper  Rhine  against  the  Germans.  Only 
the  south-western  point  of  the  Helvetian  territory  was 
occupied  by  the  Romans,  and  the  town  of  Noviodunum 
was  converted  into  the  fortress  of  Julia  Equestris,  or  the 
colony  of  the  horsemen  of  Caesar. 

By  the  battle  of  Bibracte  the  threatened  invasion  on  the 
upper  Rhine  was  prevented,  and  the  anti-Roman  party  in 
Gaul  humbled.  But  on  the  middle  Rhine  Roman  inter- 
ference was  even  more  urgently  called  for.  The  yoke  of 
Ariovistus  had  now  become  more  intolerable  than  Roman 
supremacy,  and  at  a  diet  of  the  tribes  of  central  Gaul  the 
Roman  general  was  asked  to  come  to  the  aid  of  the  Celts 
against  the  Germans.  Caesar  consented  ;  at  his  suggestion 
the  Haedui  refused  the  customary  tribute  and  demanded 
the  restoration  of  the  hostages.  "When  Ariovistus  pro- 
ceeded to  attack  the  Roman  clients,  Caesar  sent  to  demand 
from  him  the  hostages  of  the  Haedui,  and  a  promise  to 
leave  the  latter  tribe  at  peace,  and  to  bring  no  more 
Germans  over  the  Rhine.  Ariovistus  rrplied  in  terms 
which  asserted  a  claim  to  equal  right  and  equal  power 
with  the  Romans.  Northern  Gaul,  he  said,  had  become 
subject  to  himself  as  southern  Gaul  to  the  Romans ;  he 
did  not  hinder  the  Romans  from  levying  tribute  on  the 
Allobroges,  and  the  Romans  had  no  right  to  prevent  him 
from  taxing  his  own  subjects.  He  also  showed  that  he 
was  acquainted  with  the  political  condition  of  Italy,  and 
offered,  to  aid  Caesar  to  make  himself  ruler  of  Italy,  if 
only  Caesar  would  leave  him  alone  in  Gaul.     When  Caesar 


406  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

requested  him  to  appear  personally  like  a  client  prince  in 
his  camp,  Ariovistus  ref  used. 

The  Roman  troops  at  once  began  their  march.  They 
occupied  Vesontio,  the  capital  of  the  Sequani,  and  after  an 
abortive  conference  between  the  generals,  in  which  an 
attempt  was  made  to  carry  off  Caesar,  the  war  languished 
for  a  time.  At  length  the  Germans  established  them- 
selves in  Caesar's  rear,  and  cut  off  his  supplies ;  but, 
imitating  their  own  manoeuvre,  he  sent  l-ound  two  legions 
which  foi-tified  themselves  beyond  the  German  camp,  and 
repulsed  the  attempts  of  the  enemy  to  dislodge  them.  The 
whole  Roman  army  was  immediately  led  on,  and  after  a 
desperate  struggle,  in  which  the  right  wing  of  each  army 
was  victorious,  the  Roman  reserve  line  under  Publius 
Crassus  decided  the  day  in  favour  of  the  Romans.  The 
pursuit  was  continued  as  far  as  the  Rhine,  and  only  a  few 
besides  the  king  escaped. 

The  line  of  the  Rhine  was  by  this  battle  won.  Caesar 
might  have  expelled  the  Germans  who  had  already  settled 
themselves  on  the  left  bank  ;  but  preferring,  as  everywhere, 
"  conquered  foes  to  doubtful  friends,"  he  allowed  them  to 
remain,  and  intrusted  them  with  the  defence  of  the  Rhine 
against  their  countrymen. 

The  consequences  of  this  one  campaign  were  great  and 
lasting.  It  was  now  finally  determined  that  the  whole  of 
Gaul  should  be  under  Roman  sway,  and  that  the  Rhine 
should  be  the  boundary  of  the  empire  against  the  Germans. 
"  People  felt  that  now  another  spirit  and  another  arm  had 
begun  to  guide  the  destinies  of  Rome." 

Second  campaign,  57  B.C. 

After  the  first  campaign  all  central  Gaul  submitted  to  the 
Romans,  while  the  middle  and  upper  Rhine  were  rendered 
safe  from  German  incursions.  But  the  northern  cantons 
were  not  affected  by  the  blow  ;  moreover,  close  relations 
subsisted  between  them  and  the  Germans  over  the  Rhine ; 
while,  at  the  mouth  of  the  river,  Germanic  tribes  were 
making  ready  to  cross.  Accordingly,  in  the  spring  of 
57  B.C.,  Caesar  set  out  with  eight  legions  against  the 
Belgic  cantons.  The  confederacy  sent  the  whole  first  levy 
of  300,000  men  to  the  southern  frontier  to  receive  him. 
One  canton  alone,  that  of  Remi,  seized  the  opportunity  to 
shake  off  the  yoke  of  the  Suessiones,  and  to  play  the  part  of 


CAESAR  IN  GAUL.  401 

the  Haedui  in  central  Gaul.  Caesar  entrenched  himself  on 
the  Aisne  and,  allowing  the  enemy  no  opportunity  to  attack, 
waited  for  their  army  to  dissolve.  The  Bellovaci,  hearing 
that  the  Haedui  were  about  to  enter  their  territory,  were 
the  first  to  retire,  and  soon  the  whole  host  broke  up, 
binding  themselves  by  oath  to  hasten  to  the  assistance  of 
the  first  canton  attacked.  Some  of  the  contingents  were 
destroyed  by  Caesar  during  their  retreat,  and  the  western 
cantons — the  Suessiones,  Bellovaci,  and  Ambiani — at  once 
submitted. 

But  in  the  east  the  Nervii,  aided  by  the  Viromandui, 
the  Atrebates,  and  the  Aduatuci,  concluded  a  second  and 
closer  league,  and  assembled  their  forces  on  the  upper 
Sambre.  They  had  accurate  knowledge  of  every  move- 
ment of  the  Romans  while  concealing  their  own.  When 
Caesar's  forces  arrived  at  the  Sambre,  as  the  legions  were 
pitching  the  camp  on  the  left  bank,  while  the  cavalry 
explored  the  right,  the  latter  were  suddenly  attacked  and 
driven  across  the  river.  In  a  moment  the  enemy  had 
crossed  too,  and  the  legions  had  scarcely  time  to  take  up 
their  arms  when  they  found  themselves  engaged  in  a 
desperate  contest  without  order  or  connexion,  and  with 
no  proper  command.  Labienus,  on  the  left  wing,  over- 
threw the  Atrebates,  while  the  Roman  centre  forced  the 
Viromandui  down  the  slope  towards  the  river ;  but  the 
right  wing  was  outflanked  by  the  Nervii,  and  its  two 
legions,  each  driven  separately  into  a  dense  mass  and 
assailed  on  three  sides,  were  on  the  verge  of  destruction. 
Caesar  himself  seized  a  shield  and  induced  the  wavering 
ranks  to  rally,  and  already  connexion  between  the  two 
legions  had  been  restored  when  help  arrived — partly  from 
the  rear-guard  which  came  up — partly  from  Labienus, 
who  had  sent  the  tenth  legion  to  help  the  general.  The 
Nervii  fell  almost  to  a  man  where  they  stood  ;  and  of  their 
six  hundred  senators  only  three  are  said  to  have  survived. 

The  eastern  cantons  now  for  the  most  part  submitted  ; 
the  Aduatuci,  who  were  too  late  for  the  battle  and  who 
still  attempted  to  hold  out,  were  sold  for  slaves  en  masse, 
and  their  clients  were  declared  independent.  The  Remi, 
of  course,  became  the  leading  canton  of  the  district,  and 
only  the  country  between  the  Scheldt  and  the  Rhine 
remained  unsubdued. 


408  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Third  campaign,  56  B.C. 

The  next  year  was  occupied  with  the  subjection  of  the 
Aremorican  cantons.  Publius  Crassus  had  been  sent  to 
them  in  the  autumn  of  57  15. c,  and  had  induced  the  power- 
ful Veueti  to  submit.  But  they  soon  repented,  and  during 
the  winter  detained  as  hostages  the  Roman  officers  who 
came  to  levy  grain  among  them  The  whole  coast  from 
the  Rhine  to  Loire  rose  against  Rome,  and  the  leaders 
were  calculating  on  the  rise  of  the  Belgae  and  on  aid  from 
Britain  and  from  the  Germans 

Caesar  sent  Labienus  with  the  cavalry  to  the  Rhine,  and 
Q.  Titurius  Sabinus  to  Normandy,  while  the  main  attack 
was  directed  against  the  Veneti  by  land  and  sea  Decimus 
Brutus  hastily  formed  a  fleet  of  ships,  which  he  levied 
from  the  maritime  cantons,  or  caused  to  be  built  on  the 
Loire,  while  Caesar  advanced  with  the  best  of  his  infantry. 
But  the  country  was  poor  in  supplies  :  the  towns  were 
built  on  islands  close  to  the  shore  or  on  spits  of  land, 
and  when  the  Romans  had  at  length  reduced  any  one 
of  them,  they  had  to  look  on  while  the  enemy  transferred 
their  goods  and  families  by  sea  to  another  At  length 
the  Roman  fleet  arrived  off  the  coast  of  Brittany,  but 
their  light,  vessels  were  no  match  for  the  strong  sailing 
ships  of  the  Veneti,  which  were  too  high  to  be  exposed  to 
damage  from  the  Roman  missiles,  and  too  strong  to  be 
injured  by  the  iron  beaks  of  their  ships  But  the  Romans 
disabled  the  enemy  by  cutting  the  ropes  which  fastened 
the  sails  to  the  yards  with  long  poles  to  which  sickles 
were  fastened,  and  then  boarded  and  captured  the  ship. 
A  calm  set  in,  which  prevented  the  Veneti  from  gaining 
the  high  seas,  and  the  whole  immense  fleet  was  nearly 
destroyed.  Thus,  as  at  Mylae  two  hundred  years  before 
this,  the  earliest  naval  battle  fought  on  the  Atlantic, 
was  decided  in  favour  of  the  Romans  by  a  lucky 
invention.  The  whole  coast  submitted,  and  as  an  ex- 
ample of  severity  Caesar  caused  the  whole  council  of  the 
Veneti  to  be  executed,  and  the  people  to  be  sold  to  the 
last  man. 

Meanwhile  Sabinus  had  stood  on  the  defensive  until  he 
could  provoke  the  army  opposed  to  him  to  an  attack,  which 
he  defeated.  The  Morini  and  Menapii,  who  were  now 
threatened  by  Caesar,  retired  into  the  depths  of  the  Ar- 


CAESAR  IN  GAUL.  409 

dennes,  and  after  persevering  for  some  days  in  his  advance, 
he  was  obliged  to  retire  without  accomplishing  anything. 

Communications  with  Gaul  had  hitherto  Leen  carried 
on  by  the  road  over  the  western  Alps,  laid  out  by 
Pompeius  in  77  B.C.  Now  that  central  Gaul  was  open  to 
intercourse  with  Italy,  a  shorter  route  crossing  the  Alps  in 
a  northerly  direction  was  required.  Accordingly,  in  57 
B.C.  Servius  Galba  was  sent  to  occupy  Octodurum  and  to 
subdue  the  neighbouring  tribes,  in  order  to  secure  the 
merchant  route  over  the  St.  Bernard  and  along  the  lake 
of  Geneva.  In  5G  B.C.  Publius  Crassus  was  sent  into  Aqui- 
tania  with  the  similar  object  of  conquering  the  Iberian 
tribes  there,  and,  though  opposed  by  contingents  from 
beyond  the  Pyrenees  led  by  officers  trained  in  the  Ser- 
torian  wars,  he  succeeded  in  reducing  all  the  country 
between  the  Garonne  and  the  Pyrenees. 

Fourth  campaign,  55  B.C. 

The  pacification  of  Gaul,  so  far  as  it  could  be  effected 
by  the  sword,  was  now  accomplished  ;  but  the  work  of 
defending  Gaul  from  the  Germans  was  still  unfinished. 
During  the  winter  the  Usipetes  and  Tencteri  had  effected 
a  crossing  in  numbers  amounting  to  430,000  and  were 
intending  to  advance  into  central  Gaul.  On  the  approach 
of  the  Roman  legions  the  invaders  seemed  ready  to 
acknowledge  the  supremacy  of  Rome;  but  a  suspicion 
arose  in  Caesar's  mind  that  they  were  only  negotiating 
to  obtain  delay,  and,  when  this  was  confirmed  by  an 
attack  upon  his  vanguard  during  the  de  facto  suspension  of 
arms,  he  believed  himself  absolved  from  all  obligation 
to  observe  the  principles  of  international  law.  When  the 
German  princes  appeared  to  apologize  for  the  attack,  they 
were  arrested ;  and  the  whole  host,  thus  deprived  of  its 
leaders,  was  attacked  and  cut  to  pieces.  However  deserving 
of  censure  Caesar's  conduct  may  have  been,  the  German 
encroachments  were  effectually  checked. 

Caesar  determined  to  follow  up  this  blow  by  an  expe- 
dition to  the  other  side  of  the  river,  for  which  the  protection 
afforded  by  the  Sugambri  to  the  fugitives  of  the  Usipetes 
and  Tencteri  furnished  a  sufficient  excuse.  He  accord- 
ingly crossed  into  the  Ubian  territory,  and  received  the 
submission  of  several  cantons.  But  the  Sugambri  with- 
drew into  the  interior;  the  districts  adjoining  the  Ubii 


410  HISTORY  CF  ROME. 

were  laid  waste,  while  a  large  force  assembled  at  a  distance. 
Caesar  did  not  accept  the  challenge,  but  recrossed  the 
Rhine  after  a  stay  of  eighteen  days. 

The  remainder  of  the  season  was  occupied  with  an 
expedition  into  Britain,  which  furnished,  if  not  armed 
assistance,  at  any  rate  a  safe  asylum  to  the  patriots  of  the 
continent.  Publius  Crassus  had  already,  in  57  B.C.,  crossed 
to  the  Scilly  islands,  and  in  the  summer  of  55  u.C.  Caesar 
himself  crossed,  in  the  narrowest  part  of  the  Channel, 
with  two  legions.  The  coast  was  covered  with  multitudes 
of  the  enemy,  and  the  war  chariots  moved  on  as  fast  by 
land  as  the  Roman  galle}Ts  by  sea  ;  and  it  was  only  with 
great  difficulty  and  under  cover  of  the  missiles  thrown 
from  the  ships  of  war,  that  a  landing  was  effected.  Some 
villages  submitted,  but  soon  the  natives  appeared  from 
the  interior  and  threatened  the  camp  ;  a  storm  severely 
damaged  the  fleet,  and,  as  soon  as  the  necessary  repairs 
were  accomplished,  the  Romans  returned  to  Gaul. 

Fifth  campaign,  54  B.C. 

During  the  winter  a  fleet  of  eight  hundred  sail  was 
fitted  out,  and  in  the  spring  Caesar  sailed  a  second  time, 
with  five  legions  and  two  thousand  cavalry.  The  landing 
was  unopposed ;  but  a  second  time  the  fleet  was  nearly 
destroyed  by  the  storms,  and  while  the  Romans  repaired 
the  disaster  the  British  tribes  made  preparations  for 
defence.  The  resistance  was  headed  by  Cassivellaunus, 
who  ruled  in  what  is  now  Middlesex  and  the  surrounding 
counties.  He  dismissed  the  general  levy,  retaining  only 
the  war  chariots,  with  which  he  dogged  Caesar's  footsteps, 
threatening  his  communications  and  devastating  the 
country  through  which  he  was  about  to  pass.  The 
Thames  was  crossed,  and  the  Trinobantes  gave  in  their 
submission ;  but  an  attack  by  the  men  of  Kent  upon  the 
fleet  warned  Caesar  of  the  danger  to  which  he  was  con- 
stantly subject,  and  the  storming  of  a  huge  abatis  where 
the  cattle  of  the  country  were  collected  was  an  exploit 
considerable  enough  to  afford  an  excuse  for  retreat. 
Cassivellaunus  promised  hostages  and  tribute,  probably 
with  no  intention  of  giving  either,  and  Caesar  recrossed 
into  Gaul.  His  immediate  object — of  "  rousing  the  islanders 
from  their  haughty  security "  seems  certainly  to  have 
been  attained. 


CAESAR  IN  GAUL.  411 

The  subjection  of  Gaul  was  now  complete,  while  both 
Britons  and  Germans  had  been  impressed  with  a  sense  of 
the  power  of  Rome  ;  but  many  circumstances  combined  to 
make  the  Celtic  nation  restive  under  its  yoke.  They  were 
ashamed  when  they  had  to  confess  that  a  nation  numbering 
a  million  armed  men  had  been  subdued  by  fifty  thousand 
Romans.  Central  Gaul  and  the  Belgian  confederacy  had 
submitted  almost  without  striking  a  blow ;  but  the  heroic 
resistance  of  the  Veneti  and  of  the  Britons  incited  the 
patriotic  Celts  to  make  another  attempt  to  recover  their 
freedom.  Even  in  54  B.C.  the  Treveri  had  absented  them- 
selves from  the  general  diet,  and  Caesar  had  earned  with 
him  into  Britain  their  foremost  men  as  hostages ;  and 
when  the  Haeduan  Dumnorix  refused  to  embark,  he  was 
pursued  and.  cut  down  by  Caesar's  orders.  His  death 
created  a  deep  impression  all  through  the  ranks  of  the 
Celtic  nobility;  every  man  felt  that  the  fate  of  Dumnorix 
might  be  his  own. 

Sixth  campaign,  53  B.O. 

In  the  winter  of  54-53  B.C.  the  main  body  of  the  Roman 
army  was  quartered  in  Belgian  territory,  in  six  separate 
divisions  for  convenience  in  the  matter  of  supplies.  The 
most  easterly  division  of  all,  in  the  territory  of  the 
Eburones  near  Aduatuca,  consisting  of  a  legion  under 
Quintus  Titurius  Sabinus,  and  some  cohorts  under  Lucius 
Aurunculeius  Cotta,  was  suddenly  surrounded  by  the 
general  levy  of  the  Eburones,  under  their  kings  Ambiorix 
and  Catuvolcus.  Provisions  were  ample,  and  the  attacks 
of  the  Eburones  were  futile  against  the  Roman  en- 
trenchments. But  Ambiorix  informed  Sabinus  that  all 
the  Roman  divisions  were  being  assailed  simultaneously, 
and  that  all  was  lost  unless  they  could  effect  a  junction. 
Out  of  friendship  for  the  Romans  he  offered  them  a  free 
retreat  to  the  nearest  camp,  two  days'  march  distant.  This 
account  was  credible  enough ;  but  the  immediate  duty  of 
Sabinus  was  undoubtedly  to  maintain  at  all  costs  the  post 
committed  to  his  trust ;  but  though  he  was  strongly  dis- 
suaded by  Cotta  and  others,  the  proposal  of  Ambiorix  was 
accepted.  About  two  miles  from  the  camp  the  Romans 
found  themselves  surrounded  in  a  narrow  valley.  The 
Eburones  plied  them  with  missiles,  but  would  not  enter 
into  a  close  combat.     Escape  was  impossible,  and  Sabinus 


412  HISTORY   OF  ROME. 

demanded  an  interview  with  Ambiorix.  At  the  conference 
he  was  killed  with  his  principal  officers,  and  the  whole 
Roman  division  was  slain  in  the  attack  which  followed, 
except  a  few  who  regained  the  camp,  and  threw  themselves 
upon  their  swords  in  the  following  night. 

The  insurrection  now  broke  out  at  every  point.  First 
the  Eburones,  reinforced  by  the  Aduatuci,  the  Menapii, 
and  the  Nervii,  attacked  the  division  under  Quintus 
Cicero  in  the  last-mentioned  canton.  The  besiegers  con- 
structed ramparts  and  entrenchments,  and  showered  tire- 
balls  and  burning  spears  against  the  thatched  huts  of  the 
Roman  camp.  The  insing  was  so  universal  that  it  was 
long  before  the  news  of  this  or  of  the  preceding  attack 
upon  Sabiuus  reached  the  general.  At  length  a  Celtic 
horseman  stole  through  the  enemy  from  Cicero.  Caesar  set 
out  with  only  seven  thousand  men  and  four  hundred  cavalry; 
but  the  news  of  his  approach  was  enough  to  raise  the 
siege  at  the  critical  moment,  when  not  one  in  ten  of  Cicero's 
men  remained  unwounded.  The  insurgent  army  attacked 
Caesar,  but  were  defeated,  and  the  whole  insurrection 
almost  immediately  collapsed.  The  Eastern  levies  returned 
to  their  homes.  The  Treveri,  who  had  advanced  to  attack 
Labienus  among  the  Remi,  also  desisted  for  the  present. 
Towards  the  close  of  the  winter  Caesar  set  out,  with  his 
army  largely  reinforced,  to  crush  the  remains  of  the  revolt. 
The  Nervii,  Senones,  and  Carnutes  were  routed.  Even 
the  unconquered  Menapii  had  now  to  submit.  The  Treveri 
were  crushed,  and  the  chief  power  among  them  reverted 
to  the  Roman  party.  The  Germans,  who  had  sent  aid  to 
the  insurgents,  were  intimidated  by  a  second  crossing  of 
the  Rhine.  As  to  the  Eburones,  Caesar  had  worn  mourn- 
ing ever  since  the  disaster  of  Aduatuca,  and  had  sworn 
not  to  remove  it  till  he  had  revenged  the  treacherous 
death  of  his  soldiers.  Ten  Roman  legions  now  advanced 
into  their  country,  after  the  cavalry  had  all  but  surprised 
Ambiorix  in  his  house.  At  the  same  time  the  neighbouring 
tribes  were  invited  to  join  in  the  pillage,  and  even  a  band 
of  Sugambrian  horsemen  from  beyond  the -Rhine  accepted 
the  invitation.  It  was  a  man-hunt  rather  than  Avar.  Many 
of  the  Eburones  put  themselves  to  death.  Some  few, 
including  Ambiorix,  escaped  over  the  Rhine.  Punish- 
ment now  fell  upon  particular  men  in  the  several  cantons, 


CAESAR  IN  GAUL.  413 

and  the  Carnutic  knight,  Acco,  was  beheaded  by  the 
Roman  lictors.  At  the  end  of  53  B.C.  Caesar  crossed  the 
Alps  to  watch  the  daily  increasing  complications  of  the 
capital. 

Seventh  campaign,  52  B.C. 

But  for  once  Caesar  had  miscalculated.  "  The  fire  was 
smothered,  but  not  extinguished."  The  death  of  Acco 
again  filled  the  whole  Celtic  nobility  with  consternation. 
The  position  of  affairs  was  most  favourable  for  revolt. 
Caesar  was  at  a  distance  on  the  other  side  of  the  Alps, 
while  his  army  was  encamped  on  the  Seine.  The  Roman 
troops  might  be  surrounded  and  the  province  overrun 
before  he  could  appear,  even  if  affairs  in  Italy  did  not 
prevent  his  return.  The  signal  was  given  at  Cenabum 
(Orleans),  and  all  the  Romans  there  were  massacred. 
Everywhere  the  patriots  were  astir.  Even  the  Arverni,  the 
stanchest  supporters  of  the  Romans  in  all  Gaul,  were 
brought  to  join  the  insurrection,  after  a  revolution  which 
overthrew  the  government  of  the  common  council  and  made 
Vercingetorix,  the  leader  of  the  Arvernian  patriots,  king. 
The  latter  soon  became  for  the  Celts  what  Cassivellaunus 
had  been  for  the  Britons.  It  was  felt  that  he,  if  any  man, 
was  to  save  the  nation.  The  insurrection  spread  in  the 
west  from  the  Garonne  to  the  Loire,  and  Vercingetorix 
was  everywhere  recognized  as  commander-in-chief.  But 
in  central  Gaul  the  Haedui,  on  whom  the  accession  of 
the  eastern  cantons — the  Sequani  and  Helvetii — de- 
pended, wavered.  The  patriotic  party  was  strong  among 
them,  but  their  old  antagonism  to  the  Arverni  was 
stronger ;  and  while  they  still  wavered,  Caesar  appeared 
north  of  the  Alps,  to  the  astonishment  alike  of  friend  and 
foe.  He  quickly  provided  for  the  defence  of  the  old 
province,  and  sent  a  force  northwards  into  Arvernian 
territory ;  then,  attended  by  only  a  few  horsemen,  he  stole 
through  the  country  of  the  Haedui,  and  was  again  at  the 
head  of  his  troops. 

The  presence  of  Caesar  made  it  impossible  for  the  in- 
surgents to  proceed  in  the  ordinary  manner  of  warfare. 
Vercingetorix  determined  to  make  his  cavalry  enormously 
superior  to  that  of  the  Romans,  to  lay  waste  the  land 
far  and  wide,  to  burn  down  the  towns,  villages,  and  depots 
of  supplies,  and  to  cut  off  the  enemy's  communications. 


414  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

The  infantry  he  did  not  allow  to  face  the  Romans,  but 
attempted  gradually  to  impart  to  them  some  of  the  rudi- 
ments of  discipline  and  training.  He  persuaded  his 
countrymen  to  destroy  all  towns  not  capable  of  defence, 
and  to  concentrate  all  their  powers  upon  a  few  strong 
fortresses. 

The  first  operation  of  the  insurgents  was  an  attack  upon 
the  Boii,  made  with  the  view  of  annihilating  them  before 
Caesar  could  arrive.  The  latter  started  immediately  from 
Agedincum,  got  together  a  small  force  of  cavalry  formed 
of  German  mercenaries  mounted  on  Italian  and  Spanish 
horses,  and,  after  causing  Cenabum  to  be  burnt,  crossed 
the  Loire  into  the  country  of  the  Bituriges.  Here  the 
new  mode  of  warfare  was  tried  for  the  first  time.  Twenty- 
four  townships  of  the  Bituriges  perished  on  the  same  day, 
and  the  neighbouring  cantons  were  ordered  t  >  follow  this 
example.  Avaricum  (Bourges),  the  capital  of  the  Bituriges, 
was  to  have  met  the  same  fate,  but,  in  compliance  with  the 
entreaties  of  the  magistrates  of  the  Bituriges,  it  was 
resolved  to  defend  the  city. 

The  infantry  were  placed  in  a  position  near  the  town, 
where  they  were  completely  protected  by  morasses.  The 
cavalry  commanded  all  the  roads  and  obstructed  commu- 
nications. Caesar  could  not  bring  on  a  battle,  and  all  his 
attacks  upon  the  town  were  repelled  by  the  courage  of 
the  besieged.  The  difficulty  of  supplies  became  daily 
more  serious,  and  the  Roman  soldiers  were  at  length 
reduced  to  flesh  rations.  But  at  the  same  time  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  besieged  increased,  until  the  town  could  no 
longer  be  held.  It  was  determined  to  evacuate  and  destroy 
it,  but  on  the  night  of  departure  the  wailing  of  the 
women  betrayed  the  plan  of  Vercingetorix  to  the  Romans, 
and  the  attempt  miscarried  :  on  the  following  day  the 
walls  were  scaled,  and  neither  age  nor  sex  was  spared. 

Judging  by  former  experience  Caesar  might  have  ex- 
pected that  the  revolt  would  now  collapse ;  so,  after 
making  a,  demonstration  in  the  country  of  the  Haedui,  he 
sent  Labienus  with  two  legions  to  Agedincum.  where  were 
two  more  guarding  the  baggage  ;  while  he  himself,  with 
six,  advanced  into  the  Arvernian  mountains. 

Labienus  advanced  from  Agedincum  to  get  possession 
of  Lutetia  (Paris),  but  the  town  was  burned  by  Camulo- 


CAESAR  IN  GAUL.  415 

genus,  the  insurgent  leader,  who  refused  to  give  battle, 
but  took  up  a  position  where  he  held  the  Roman  army  in 
check. 

The  main  army  succeeded  in  baffling  the  attempts  of 
Vercingetorix  to  stop  it,  and  arrived  before  Gergovia,  the 
capital  of  the  Arverni.  Here  immense  stores  had  been 
collected,  and  the  insurgent  troops  were  encamped  in  a 
strong  position  under  the  walls  of  the  town,  which  was 
on  a  hill,  and  were  protected  by  strong  ramparts.  Caesar 
was  not  strong  enough  either  to  besiege  the  town  or  to 
blockade  it,  but  remained  inactive,  facing  his  antagonist. 
Such  a  check  was  almost  equivalent  to  a  defeat ;  the 
Haedui  prepared  to  join  the  revolt  in  earnest,  and  a  body 
of  Haeduan  troops,  on  the  march  to  join  Caesar,  was  induced 
by  its  officers  to  declare  against  him,  and  was  only  recalled 
to  nominal  obedience  by  the  presence  of  Caesar,  who  had 
hurried  to  meet  it  with  two-thirds  of  his  army.  But 
during  his  absence  Vercingetorix  had  attacked  the  Roman 
camp  and  very  nearly  stormed  it,  and  it  was  plain  that 
the  Haeduan  troops  could  scarcely  be  relied  on.  He 
determined  therefore  to  withdraw  from  Gergovia,  and  to 
march  at  once  into  the  canton  of  the  Haedui,  but  first  to 
make  one  more  attempt  to  capture  the  town.  While  the 
majority  of  the  garrison  were  entrenching  one  side  of 
the  ramparts,  Caesar  attacked  the  other  ;  the  walls  of  the 
camp  were  scaled,  but  the  whole  garrison  took  the  alarm, 
and  Caesar  dared  not  attack  the  city  wall.  He  gave  the 
signal  for  retreat,  but  the  foremost  legions  were  carried 
away  by  the  fervour  of  victory,  and  pushed  on — some 
even  into  the  city.  They  were  met  by  masses  upon  masses 
of  the  garrison,  who  gradually  forced  them  back,  and  at 
last  chased  them  down  the  hill,  where  the  troops  stationed 
in  the  plain  received  them  into  safety.  Seven  hundred 
men,  including  forty-six  centurions,  had  fallen  ;  Gergovia 
remained  untaken,  and  the  halo  of  victory  that  had  sur- 
rounded Caesar  in  Gaul  began  to  fade  away. 

The  Haedui  at  once  arose,  their  contingent  deserted 
from  Caesar,  and  carried  off  with  it  the  Roman  depots  on 
the  Loire.  The  Belgae  began  to  stir,  the  Bellovaci  marched 
to  attack  Labienus  in  the  rear,  and,  with  the  exception  of 
the  Remi  and  the  cantons  immediately  depending  upon 
them,  "  the  whole  Celtic  nation,  from  the  Pyrenees  to  the 


416  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Rhine,  was  now  for  the  first  and  last  time  in  arms  for 
freedom  and  nationality." 

It  was  a  grave  crisis,  and  many  voices  were  raised  in 
favour  of  a  retreat  over  the  Cevennes  into  the  old  province. 
But  Caesar  rejected  these  timid  counsels,  called  out  the 
general  levy  of  the  province,  and  set  out  for  Agedincum, 
whither  Labienus  was  ordered  immediately  to  retreat. 
Labienus  crossed  the  Seine  under  the  eyes  of  the  enemy, 
fought  a  battle  in  which  Camulogenus  was  defeated  and 
slain,  and  succeeded  in  effecting  a  junction  with  Caesar. 

The  insurgents  adhered  to  the  same  plan  of  campaign. 
A  national  assemhly  confirmed  Vercingetorix  in  the 
supreme  command,  and  adopted  his  plans  without  altera- 
tion. A  new  position  was  selected  at  Alesia  (Alise  Sainte 
Reine  in  the  Cotf;  d'Or),  and  another  camp  constructed. 
The  army  was  ordered  thither,  and  the  cavalry  raised  to 
fifteen  thousand.  Caesar  marched  southwards  to  protect  the 
province,  and  repulsed,  with  his  newly  levied  German  squad- 
rons, the  Celtic  cavalry  which  attacked  him  on  the  route. 
Vercingetorix  shut  himself  up  in  Alesia,  and  Caesar  had 
no  alternative  but  to  besiege  him  there  or  to  abandon  the 
offensive  altogether.  But  the  whole  of  the  Roman  troops 
were  now  united,  and  the  cavalry  of  Caesar  were  successful 
in  every  encounter :  the  communications  of  the*  Celtic 
army  were  cut,  and  the  supplies  of  the  town  would  soon 
be  exhausted  by  the  enormous  army  (80,000  foot  and 
15,000  horse)  and  the  numerous  inhabitants.  At  the 
moment  when  the  Roman  lines  were  on  the  point  of 
completion,  Vercingetorix  dismissed  all  his  cavalry  with 
orders  to  rouse  the  whole  nation  for  the  relief  of  Alesia. 
The  miserable  inhabitants  were  turned  out  of  the  town, 
and  perished  of  hunger  between  the  lines  on  either  side. 
At  last  the  huge  host  of  the  relieving  army  appeared — 
in  number  amounting  to  250,000  infantry  and  8,000 
cavalry.  But  Caesar  had  prepared  himself  to  be  besieged, 
and  his  rear  was  protected  by  a  strong  line  of  entrench- 
ments. A  determined  assault  was  made  upon  the  Romans 
from  without  and  from  within  ;  and  on  the  second  day  the 
Celts  succeeded,  at  a  point  where  the  lines  ran  over  the 
slope  of  a  hill,  in  filling  up  the  trenches  and  hurling 
the  defenders  from  the  ramparts.  Labienus  threw  him- 
self with  four  legions  upon  the  enemy.     It  was  the  crisis 


CAESAR  IN   GAUL.  417 

of  the  struggle,  and  the  assailants  were  gradually  forced 
back,  while  squadrons  of  cavalry  assailed  them  in  the  rear 
and  completed  the  rout. 

The  fate  of  Alesia  and  of  the  Celtic  nation  was  decided. 
The  army  dispersed,  and  the  king  was,  by  his  own  consent, 
delivered  up  to  the  Romans  for  punishment,  in  order  to 
avei't  as  far  as  possible  destruction  from  the  nation,  by 
bringing  it  upon  his  own  head.  "  Mounted  on  his  steed 
and  in  full  armour  the  king  of  the  Arvernians  appeared 
before  the  Roman  proconsul,  and  rode  round  his  tribunal ; 
then  he  surrendered  his  horse  and  arms,  and  sat  down  in 
silence  on  the  steps  at  Caesar's  feet."  Five  years  after- 
wards he  was  led  in  Caesar's  triumph,  and  beheaded  at  the 
foot  of  the  Capitol.  "  As  after  a  day  of  gloom  the  sun 
breaks  through  the  clouds  at  its  setting,  so  destiny  bestows 
on  nations  that  are  going  down  a  last  great  man.  Thus 
Hannibal  stands  at  the  close  of  the  Phoenician  history,  and 
Vercingetorix  at  the  close  of  the  Celtic.  They  were  not 
able  to  save  the  nations  to  which  they  belonged  from  a 
foreign  yoke,  but  they  spared  them  the  last  remaining 
disgrace,  an  inglorious  fall.  .  ,  .  The  whole  ancient  world 
presents  no  more  genuine  knight  (than  Vercingetorix), 
whether  as  regards  his  essential  character  or  his  outward 
appearance.  But  man  ought  not  to  be  a  mere  knight,  and 
least  of  all  the  statesman.  It  was  the  knight,  not  the  hero, 
who  disdained  to  escape  from  Alesia,  when  he  alone  was  of 
more  consequence  to  the  nation  than  a  hundred  thousand 
ordinary  brave  men.  It  was  the  knight,  not  the  hero,  who 
gave  himself  up  as  a  sacrifice,  when  the  only  thing  gained 
by  that  sacrifice  was  that  the  nation  publicly  dishonoured 
itself,  and  with  equal  cowardice  and  absurdity  employed 
its  last  breath  in  proclaiming  that  its  great  historical 
death-struggle  was  a  crime  against  its  oppressor.  How 
very  different  was  the  conduct  of  Hannibal  in  similar 
positions !  It  is  impossible  to  part  from  the  noble  king 
of  the  Arverni  without  a  feeling  of  historical  and  human 
sympathy ;  but  it  is  characteristic  of  the  Celtic  nation, 
that  its  greatest  man  was  after  all  merely  a  knight." 

After  the  fall  of  Alesia  no  united  effort  was  made  to 
continue  the  insurrection  ;  the  league  fell  to  pieces,  and 
every  clan  made  what  terms  it  could  with  the  conqueror. 
Caesar  was  anxious  for  many  reasons  to  bring  the  war  to 

27 


418  HISTORY   OF  ROME. 

a  close,  and  the  easy  temperament  of  the  Gauls  met  him 
halfway.  Where  there  was  a  strong  Roman  party,  as 
among  the  Haedui  and  Arverni,  the  cantons  obtained 
a  complete  restoration  of  their  former  relations  with  Rome, 
and  their  captives  were  released  without  ransom,  while 
those  of  the  other  clans  became  the  slaves  of  the  legion- 
aries. But  not  a  few  cantons  refused  to  make  submission, 
until  the  Roman  troops  appeared  within  their  borders. 
Such  expeditions  were  undertaken  in  the  winter  aud  in 
the  following  summer  against  the  Bituriges  and  Carnutes, 
the  Bellovaci  and  other  Belgic  cantons.  The  Bellovacian 
king  Correus  offered  a  brave  resistance,  but  was  at  last 
slain  in  a  skirmish.  On  the  Loire  considerable  bands 
assembled,  and  required  a  considerable  Roman  force  to 
defeat  them.  The  last  remnant  of  opposition  was  at  Ux- 
ellodunum  on  the  Lot,  where  Drappes  and  Lucterius,  the 
brave  adjutant  of  Vercingetorix,  shut  themselves  up  in  the 
last  resort.  The  town  was  taken  only  after  Caesar  had 
appeared  in  person,  and  the  spring  from  which  the  garrison 
derived  water  had  been  diverted.  The  whole  garrison 
were  dismissed  to  their  homes  after  their  hands  had  been 
cut  off. 

Thus  Gaul  was  finally  subdued  after  eight  years'  war. 
Hardly  a  year  later  the  Roman  troops  had  to  be  with- 
drawn, owing  to  the  outbreak  of  civil  war;  yet  the  Celts 
did  not  rise  against  the  foreign  yoke,  and  Gaul  was  the  only 
pai't  of  the  Roman  empire  where  there  was  no  fighting 
against  Caesar.  Later  disturbances,  like  the  rising  of  the 
Bellovaci  in  46  B.C.,  were  easily  dealt  with  by  the  local 
governors.  This  state  of  peace  was,  it  is  true,  purchased 
to  a  large  extent  by  allowing  the  more  distant  districts  to 
withdraw  themselves  de  facto  from  the  Roman  allegiance; 
but  however  unfinished  the  building  of  Caesar  may  have 
been,  its  foundations  remained  firm  and  unshaken. 

For  the  present  the  newly  acquired  provinces  were 
united  with  the  province  of  Narbo,  but  when  Caesar  gave 
up  this  governorship,  in  46  B.C.,  two  new  governorships, 
of  Gaul  proper  and  Belgica,  were  formed.  The  individual 
cantons  of  course  lost  their  independence,  and  paid  to 
Rome  a  fixed  tribute  which  they  levied  themselves.  The 
total  was  £400,000  ;  but  masses  of  gold  from  the  treasures 
of  temples  and  of  rich  men  also  flowed  to  Rome,  to  such 


CAESAR  IN  GAUL.  419 

an  extent  that,  as  compared  with  silver,  gold  fell  twenty- 
five  per  cent. 

Existing  arrangements  were  everywhere  allowed  to 
remain  as  far  as  possible :  the  hereditary  kingships,  the 
feudal  oligarchies,  even  the  system  of  clientship  by  which 
one  canton  was  dependent  on  another  still  existed.  Caesar's 
sole  object  was  to  arrange  matters  in  the  interest  of  Rome, 
and  to  bring  into  power  the  men  favourably  disposed  to 
Roman  rule.  Cantons  where  the  Roman  party  was  strong 
and  trustworthy,  such  as  the  Renii,  the  Lingones,  and  the 
Haedui,  received  the  right  of  alliance  which  gave  them 
much  greater  communal  freedom,  and  were  invested  with 
the  hegemony  over  other  cantons.  The  national  worship 
and  its  priests  were  preserved  as  much  as  possible. 

At  the  same  time,  Caesar  did  what  he  could  to  stimulate 
the  Romanization  of  Gaul.  A  number  of  Celts  of  rank 
were  admitted  into  the  Roman  citizenship — perhaps  into 
the  Roman  senate  ;  Latin  was  made  the  official  language  in 
several  cantons  ;  and  while  smaller  money  might  be  coined 
by  the  local  authorities  for  local  circulation,  this  might  only 
be  done  in  conformity  with  the  Roman  standard,  and  the 
coinage  of  gold  and  of  denarii  was  reserved  for  the  Roman 
magistrates  alone.*  Hereafter  the  organization  of  the 
cantons  approached  more  nearly  to  the  Italian  urban  con- 
stitution, and  both  the  common  councils  and  the  chief 
towns  became  of  far  greater  importance  than  hitherto.  If 
Caesar  did  little  in  the  way  of  founding  colonies — only  two 
settlements  can  be  traced  to  him,  that  of  Noviodunum 
and  that  of  the  Boii — it  was  because  circumstances  did  not 
allow  him  to  exchange  the  sword  for  the  plough.  No  one 
probably  saw  more  clearly  than  himself  the  military  and 
political  advantages  of  establishing  a  series  of  Transalpine 
colonies  as  bases  of  support  for  the  new  centre  of  civiliza- 
tion. 

Gaul  as  a  nation  had  ceased  to  exist ;  it  was  absorbed  in 
a  politically  superior  nationality.  The  course  of  the  war 
was  significant  enough  of  the  character  of  the  nation  :  at 
the  outset  only  single  districts,  and  those  German  or  half 
German,  offered  energetic  resistance ;    and  when  foreign 

*  The  followiBg  inscription  occurs  on  a  semis  struck  by  a  vergo- 
brete  of  the  Lexovii :  "  Cisiambos  Cattos  vercobreto;  Simissos 
publicos  Lixovio."    The  writing  and  stamping  are  as  bad  as  the  Latin. 


420  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

rule  was  established,  the  attempts  to  shake  it  off  were  either 
without  plan  or  were  the  work  of  certain  prominent  nobles, 
and  with  the  death  or  capture  of  an  Indutiomarus  or  a 
Vercingetorix  the  struggle  was  at  an  end.  In  the  severe 
words  of  a  Roman,  "  The  Celts  boldly  challenge  danger 
in  the  future,  but  lose  their  courage  before  its  presence." 
All  accounts  of  the  ancient  Celts  bring  out  a  strik- 
ing similarity  between  them  and  the  modern  Irish. 
"  Every  feature  reappears  :  the  laziness  in  the  culture  of 
the  fields  :  the  delight  in  tippling  and  brawling ;  the  osten- 
tation— we  may  recall  that  sword  of  Caesar  hung  up 
in  the  sacred  grove  of  the  Arvernians  after  the  victory  of 
Gergovia,  which  its  alleged  former  owner  viewed  with 
a  smile  at  the  consecrated  spot,  and  which  he  ordered 
to  be  carefully  preserved  ; — the  language  full  of  com- 
parisons and  hyperboles,  of  allusions  and  quaint  turns ; 
the  droll  humour — an  excellent  example  of  which  was 
the  rule,  that  if  any  one  interrupted  a  person  speaking  in 
public,  a  substantial  and  very  visible  hole  should  be  cut, 
as  a  measure  of  police,  in  the  coat  of  the  disturber  of  the 
peace ;  .  .  the  curiosity,  .  .  the  extravagant  credulity,  .  . 
the  childlike  piety,  .  .  the  unsurpassed  fervour  of  national 
feeling,  .  .  .  the  incapacity  to  preserve  a  self-reliant 
courage  equally  remote  from  presumption  and  from  pusil- 
lanimity. ...  It  is,  and  remains,  at  all  times  and  places 
the  same  indolent  and  poetical,  irresolute  and  fervid, 
inquisitive,  credulous,  amiable,  clever,  but — in  a  political 
point  of  view — thoroughly  useless  nation  ;  and  therefore  its 
fate  has  been  always  and  everywhere  the  same." 

Bat  the  ruin  of  the  Celtic  nation  was  not  the  most 
important  result  of  Caesar's  wars.  Nothing  but  the  insight 
and  energy  of  Caesar  prevented  Gaul  from  being  overrun 
by  the  Germans,  in  whom  the  Roman  statesman  saw  the 
rivals  and  antagonists  of  the  Romano-Greek  world.  By  his 
conquests  and  organization  he  gained  time  for  the  West  to 
acquire  that  culture  which  the  East  had  already  assumed : 
but  for  him  the  great  "  migration  of  peoples  "  which  took 
place  four  hundred  years  later  under  the  Gothic  Theodoric 
would  have  taken  place  under  Ariovistns ;  and  if  the  Roman 
empire  had  escaped  destruction,  the  Western  world  at  any 
rate  would  have  been  cut  off  from  it. 

While  Caesar  was  creating'  for  Rome  a  scientific  frontier 


CAESAR  IN  GAUL.  421 

in  the  West,  the  whole  northern  frontier  had  been  dis- 
turbed from  time  to  time.  In  north-east  Italy,  in  Illyria, 
in  Macedonia,  and  in  Thrace  there  had  been  resistance  to 
the  Roman  rule,  which  had  been  usually  met  in  a  temporary 
and  partial  manner  by  the  senatorial  governors.  In  one 
quarter  only,  among  the  Dacians,  north  of  the  Danube,  a 
new  power  had  arisen.  Among  this  people  there  had  been 
in  primeval  times  a  holy  man  called  Zamolxis,  associated 
with  the  king.  This  divine  personage,  after  years  of  travel 
in  foreign  lands  and  after  studying  the  wisdom  of  the 
Egyptian  priests  and  of  the  Greek  Pythagoreans,  had 
returned  to  his  native  country  to  end  his  life  as  a  hermit. 
He  was  accessible  only  to  the  king  and  to  his  servants,  and 
gave  forth  through  the  king  oracles  with  reference  to  all 
important  undertakings.  By  the  nation  he  was  regarded 
first  as  priest  of  the  supreme  god,  then  as  god  himself  :  and 
this  peculiar  combination  of  monarchy  and  theocracy  had 
become  a  permanent  institution,  and  probably  gave  to 
the  kings  of  the  Getae  a  position  something  similar  to  that 
of  the  caliphs.  About  this  time  a  marvellous  reform  of 
the  nation  was  carried  out  by  Boerebistas,  king  of  the  Getae, 
and  the  god  Dekaeneos.  The  people  were  metamorphosed 
from  unexampled  drunkenness  to  temperance  and  valour, 
and  the  king  used  their  puritanic  enthusiasm  to  found  a 
mighty  kingdom,  which  extended  along  both  banks  of  the 
Danube  and  stretched  southward  into  Thrace,  Illyria  and 
Nbricum.  No  direct  contact  with  the  Romans  had  yet 
taken  place,  "  but  this  much  it  needed  no  prophetic  gift 
to  foretell,  that  proconsuls  like  Antonius  and  Piso  were 
nowise  fitted  to  contend  with  gods." 

AUTHORITIES. 

Plat.  Caes.  16-27.  Caes.  de  Bell.  Gall.  Liv.  Epit,  103-108.  Veil. 
ii.  46,  47.  Flor.  iii.  10.  Appian  Celt.  15-end.  Hisp.  102. 
Dio.  xxxvii.  52,  53  ;  xxxviii.  31-50  ;  xxxix.  1-5,  40-53  ;  xl.  1-11, 
31-43.  Snet.  Jul.  24,  25.  Tac.  German,  esp.  28.  Strab.  iv., 
vii.  Varro  R.  R.  i.  7,  8  ;  ii.  5-9  ;  ii.  10,  4.  Plin.  N.  H.  ii.  67, 
170 ;  iii.  4 ;  iv.  17-19 ;  xvii.  6, 42.  Cic.  ad.  Att.  iv.  16.  Pomponius 
Mela,  ii.  7  ;  iii.  2. 

Most  of  the  above  writers  touch  upon  Gaul  incidentally,  as  well  as 
in  the  particular  passages  mentioned.  For  identification  of 
localities,  see  notes  to  Momms.  Hist,  of  R.  v.  ch.  vii.  Of.  also 
Momms.  Hist,  of  R.  bk.  viii.  "  The  Provinces  from  Caesar  to 
Diocletian,"  passim,  especially  ch.  1,  3,  4,  5. 


422  EISTOBT  OF  HOME 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 

THE   JOINT    RULE   OF    POMPEIUS   AND   CAESAR. 

58-56  B.C.  Growing  opposition  to  the  regents — Pompeius  fails  tc 
control  the  capital. — 56  b.c.  Conference  at  Luca. — 55  b.c.  Pom- 
peiuB  and  Crassus  consuls. — 53  B.C.  Murder  of  Clodius. — 52  B.C. 
Pompeius  dictator. 

Of  the  three  joint  rulers  Pompeius  was  undoubtedly 
the  foremost  in  the  eyes  of  the  Roman  world.  Nor  is  this 
surprising,  for  Pompeius  was  undoubtedly  the  first  general 
of  his  time,  while  Caesar,  so  far  as  he  was  known,  was  only 
a  dexterous  party  leader.  In  the  eyes  of  the  multitude  he 
was  to  Pompeius  what  Flavius  and  Afranius  had  been — a 
useful  instrument  for  political  purposes.  And  if  the  position 
of  Pompeius  under  the  Gal  in  an  law  was  compared  with 
that  of  Caesar  under  the  Yatmian,  the  comparison  was  to 
the  advantage  of  the  former  ;  for  Pompeius  had  almost  the 
whole  resources  of  the  state  under  his  control,  and  ruled 
nearly  the  whole  empire,  while  Caesar  had  only  certain 
fixed  sums  and  four  legions,  and  ruled  two  provinces. 
Caesar,  again,  was  to  resign  his  command  after  five  years, 
while  Pompeius  had  fixed  his  own  time  for  retirement. 

But  Pompeius  attempted  a  task  beyond  his  powers  when 
he  undertook  to  rule  the  capital — a  problem  always  in- 
finitely difficult,  because  there  was  no  armed  force  at  the 
disposal  of  the  government,  whatever  it  might  be.  The 
result  was  complete  anarchy:  "after  Caesar's  departure 
the  coalition  still  ruled  doubtless  the  destinies  of  the  world, 
but  not  the  streets  of  the  capital."  The  senate  felt  its 
impotence,  and  attempted  no  show  of  authority  ;  Pompeius 
shut  himself  up  and  sulked  in  silence ;  the  sound  portion 


JOINT  RULE  OF  POMPEIUS  AND  CAESAR.  423 

of  the  citizens,  who  had  at  heart  freedom  and  order,  kept 
rigorously  aloof  from  politics.  But  for  the  rabble  of  all 
sorts,  high  and  low,  it  was  a  time  of  carnival ;  "  deruagogism 
became  quite  a  trade,  which  accordingly  did  not  lack  its 
professional  insignia — the  threadbare  mantle,  the  shaggy 
beard,  the  long  streaming  hair,  the  deep  bass  voice." 

Greeks  and  Jews,  freedmen  and  slaves,  were  the  most 
regular  attendants  at  the  popular  assemblies,  and  often 
only  a  minority  of  those  voting  consisted  of  burgesses 
legally  constituted.  The  real  rulers  of  Eome  were  the 
armed  bands,  raised  by  adventurers  out  of  gladiatorial 
slaves  and  blackguards  of  all  sorts.  These  bands  had 
hitherto  been  usually  under  the  control  of  the  popular 
leaders,  but  now  all  discipline  was  at  an  end,  and  the  leaders 
of  the  bands  fought  either  for  the  democracy,  for  the  senate, 
or  for  Crassus  :  Clodius  had  fought  at  different  times  for 
all  three. 

The  most  noted  of  these  street  leaders  was  Publius 
Clodius,  whom  the  regents  had  already  made  use  of  against 
Cato  and  Cicero.  During  his  tribunate  he  had  exerted  all 
his  great  talent,  energy,  and  influence  to  promote  an  ultra- 
democratic  policy  :  he  gave  the  citizens  corn  gratis ;  pro- 
hibited the  obstruction  of  the  comitia  by  religious 
formalities  ;  re-established  the  street-clubs  (collegia  com  pi - 
talicia),  which  constituted  a  complete  organization  of  the 
whole  proletariate  of  the  city  according  to  streets  ;  and  set 
the  seal  of  Divine  favour  upon  his  doings  by  erecting  a 
grand  temple  of  Liberty  on  the  Palatine. 

The  position  of  Pompeius  was  soon  seriously  compro- 
mised :  Clodius  opposed  him  in  a  trifling  matter  about  the 
sending  back  of  a  captive  Armenian  prince,  and  the  quarrel 
became  a  serious  feud.  Pompeius  revenged  himself  by 
allowing  the  return  of  Cicero,  the  bitter  enemy  of  Clodius. 
But  the  real  battle-ground  was  in  the  streets ;  and  here, 
though  Pompeius  had  his  own  hired  gangs,  Clodius  was 
usually  victorious.  To  complete  the  spectacle,  both  parties 
in  the  quarrel  courted  the  favour  of  the  senate  ;  Pompeius 
pleased  it  by  recalling  Cicero,  Clodius  by  declaring  the 
Julian  laws  null  and  void.  Naturally  no  positive  result 
came  from  this  "  political  witches'  revel " — it  was  quite 
aimless  ;  demagogism  was  a  mere  makeshift  in  the  inter- 
regnum between  republic  and  monarchy.     It  had  not  even 


424  BISTORT  OF  ROME. 

the  effect  of  kindling  the  desire  for  a  strong  government 
based  on  military  power;  for  those  citizens  likely  to  be 
affected  in  this  way  lived  mostly  away  from  Rome,  and 
were  not  touched  by  the  anarchy  which  prevailed  there; 
and  besides,  they  had  already  been  thoroughly  convei'ted  to 
the  cause  of  authority  by  the  Catilinarian  attempts.  The 
only  important  result  of  all  this  confusion  was  the  painful 
position  of  Pompeius,  which  must  have  had  considerable 
influence  upon  his  future  conduct. 

Far  more  important  than  the  change  in  the  relations  of 
Pompeius  with  Clodius  was  his  altered  position  with  regard 
to  Caesar.  While  Pompeius  had  failed  to  fulfil  the  func- 
tions assigned  to  him,  Caesar  had  been  brilliantly  success- 
ful :  he  had  crushed  the  threatening  Cimbrian  invasion,  and 
in  two  years  had  carried  the  Roman  arms  to  the  Rhine  and 
the  Channel.  Already,  in  57  B.C.,  the  senate  had  voted  him 
the  usual  honours  in  far  richer  measure  than  had  ever  been 
accorded  to  Pompeius.  Caesar  was  now  the  hero  of  the  day, 
master  of  the  most  powerful  Roman  army  ,  while  Pompeius 
was  merely  an  ex-general  who  had  once  been  famous  No 
rupture  had  taken  place,  but  it  was  evident  that  the 
alliance  must  be  at  an  end  when  the  relative  position  of 
the  parties  was  reversed.  At  any  rate  Pompeius  found  it 
necessary  to  abandon  his  attitude  of  haughty  reserve,  and 
to  come  forward  and  attempt  to  gain  for  himself  a  com- 
mand which  would  again  put  him  on  equal  terms  with 
Caesar.  To  do  this  he  must  be  able  to  control  the  machinery 
of  government :  but  by  his  awkward  quarrel  with  Clodius 
he  had  lost  command  of  the  streets,  and  therefore  could 
not  count  on  carrying  his  point  in  the  popular  assembly ; 
and,  at  the  same  time,  it  was  doubtful  whether  after  his 
long  inaction,  even  the  senate  was  sufficiently  under  his 
influence  to  grant  what  he  wished. 

The  opposition  to  the  regents  had  been  growing  in 
strength  and  importance,  and  they  were  powerless  to  check 
it :  in  consequence,  a  change  occurred  in  the  position  of  the 
senate,  which  found  itself  largely  increased  in  importance. 
The  marriage  alliance  of  Caesar  and  Pompeius,  and  the 
banishments  of  Cato  and  of  Cicero  suggested  unpleasantly 
to  the  public  mind  the  decrees  and  alliances  of  monarchs, 
and  men  began  to  perceive  that  it  was  no  modification  of 
the  republican  constitution  which  was  at  stake,  but  the 


JOINT  RULE  OF  POMPEWS  AND  CAESAR.         425 

existence  of  the  republic  itself.  Many  of  the  best  men 
who  had  hitherto  belonged  to  the  popular  party  now- 
passed  over  to  the  other  side.  The  "  three  dynasts,"  the 
u  three-headed  monster,"  were  phrases  in  everybody's 
mouth.  Even  the  masses  began  to  waver  :  Caesar's  con- 
sular orations  were  listened  to  without  a  sound  ;  at  the 
theatre  no  applause  greeted  his  entrance,  and  his  tools 
and  associates  were  publicly  hissed.  The  rulers  hinted  to 
the  equites  that  their  opposition  might  cost  them  their  new 
special  seats  in  the  theatre,  and  that  the  commons  might 
lose  their  free  corn.  Caesar's  wealth  was  employed  in 
every  direction  to  gain  adherents  ;  no  one,  unless  hopelessly 
lost,  was  refused  assistance  in  distress,  and  the  enormous 
buildings  set  on  foot  by  Caesar  and  Pompeius  brought 
gain  to  great  numbers  of  men  in  every  position.  But 
corruption  could  only  touch  a  comparatively  small  number, 
and  every  day  brought  proofs  of  the  strong  attachment  of 
the  people  to  the  existing  constitution  and  of  their  hatred 
of  monarchy.  Under  representative  institutions  the 
popular  discontent  would  have  found  an  outlet  at  the 
elections,  but  under  the  existing  circumstances  the  only 
course  left  for  the  supporters  of  the  republic  was  to 
range  themselves  under  the  banner  of  the  senate.  Thus, 
for  the  moment,  the  senate  rested  on  a  firmer  support  than 
it  had  enjoyed  for  years  ;  it  began  to  bestir  itself  again. 
With  the  approval  and  support  of  the  senate,  a  proposal 
was  submitted  to  the  people,  permitting  the  return  of 
Cicero.  An  unusual  number  of  good  citizens,  especially 
from  the  country  towns,  attended  on  the  day  of  voting 
(Aug.  4,  57  B.C.),  and  the  journey  of  the  orator  from 
Brundisium  to  Rome  was  made  the  occasion  of  a  brilliant 
demonstration  in  favour  of  the  senate  and  the  constitution. 
Pompeius  was  helpless,  and  his  helplessness  disarmed  the 
party  in  the  senate  favourable  to  the  regents.  Had  the 
senate  possessed  a  leader  their  cause  might  even  yet  have 
won  ;  they  might  have  cancelled  the  extraordinary  powers 
as  unconstitutional,  and  summoned  all  the  republicans  of 
Italy  to  arm  against  the  tyrants.  But  the  necessary 
leader  was  wanting,  and  the  aristrcracy  were  too  indolent 
to  take  so  simple  and  bold  a  resolution.  They  preferred 
to  side  with  Pompeius  against  Caesar,  in  the  hope  that  a 
rupture  between   the  two   was  inevitable  ;  and   to   settle 


426  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

matters  with  Pompeius,  after  victory,  might  be  expected 
to  be  no  very  difficult  matter. 

It  seemed  natural  that  an  alliance  between  Pompeius 
and  the  republicans  should  be  formed,  but  the  matter  was 
brought  to  a  test  when,  in  the  autumn  of  57  B.C.,  Pom- 
peius came  before  the  senate  with  a  proposal  to  entrust 
him  with  extraordinary  official  power.  His  proposal  was 
based  upon  the  price  of  corn  in  the  capital,  which  had 
again  reached  an  oppressive  height,  owing  to  the  con- 
tinuance of  piracy  and  the  negligence  of  the  government 
in  supervising  the  supply.  He  wished  to  be  entrusted 
with  the  superintendence  of  all  matters  relating  to  corn 
supply  throughout  the  whole  empire,  and  for  this  purpose 
to  be  invested  with  unlimited  control  over  the  state 
treasure,  with  an  army  and  fleet,  and  with  powers  superior 
to  those  of  the  ordinary  governor  in  every  province  ;  and 
to  this  command  he  hoped  that  the  conduct  of  the 
impending  Egyptian  war  would  naturally  be  added.  The 
senate  accepted  the  proposal  in  principle  with  outward  ob- 
sequiousness, but  made  alterations  which  seriously  curtailed 
the  general's  authority.  Pompeius  obtained  no  unlimited 
power,  but  merely  certain  large  sums  and  fifteen  adjutants 
for  the  purpose  of  organizing  due  supplies  for  the  capital, 
arid,  in  all  matters  relating  to  grain  supply  only,  full 
proconsular  power  throughout  the  empire  for  five  years. 
The  decree  of  the  senate  was  ratified  by  the  people.  The 
regent  had  missed  his  object,  but  he  had  obtained  definite 
employment  and  an  excuse  for  leaving  the  capital,  and  the 
supply  of  corn  was  soon  in  a  more  satisfactory  condition. 
Still,  without  troops  his  proconsular  authority  was  only  a 
shadow,  and  he  got  a  second  proposal  made  in  the  senate, 
conferring  upon  him  the  charge  of  restoring-  the  expelled 
king  of  Egypt,  if  necessary  by  force  of  arms.  But  the 
senate  grew  less  and  less  compliant ;  it  was  discovered  in 
the  Sibylline  books  that  it  was  impious  to  send  a  Roman 
army  to  Egypt.  Pompeius  was  ready  to  accept  the  mission 
even  without  an  army,  but  the  senate  refused  to  risk  so 
valuable  a  life,  and  ultimately  resolved  not  to  interfere  at 
all  (Jan.,  56  b.c). 

These  rebuffs  of  Pompeius  were,  of  course,  regarded  as 
defeats  of  the  regents  generally  ;  and  the  tide  of  opposition 
rose  hisrher  and  higher.     The   elections  for  56  B.C.   had 


JOINT  RULE  OF  POMPEIUS  AND  CAESAR.         427 

gone  only  very  partially  according  to  the  wishes  of  the 
triumvirate,  and  for  the  consulship  of  55  B.C.  Lucius 
Domitius  Ahenobarbus  announced  himself  as  a  candidate 
with  the  avowed  object  of  actively  opposing  them.  The 
senate  solemnly  deliberated  over  an  opinion  which  was 
furnished  by  certain  Etruscan  soothsayers  of  repute,  that 
the  whole  power  over  the  army  and  treasure  threatened 
to  pass  to  one  ruler,  and  that  the  state  would  lose  its 
freedom.  But  they  soon  went  on  to  a  more  practical 
declaration  of  war.  As  early  as  December,  57  B.C.,  the 
opinion  had  been  expressed  in  the  senate  that  the  laws  of 
Caesar's  consulship,  especially  the  law  about  the  domain 
land  of  Capua,  must  be  cancelled  ;  and  in  April,  56  B.C., 
Cicero  moved  that  the  Capuan  law  should  be  taken  into 
consideration  on  May  the  1st.  Domitius  soon  afterwards 
declared  that  he  intended  as  consul  to  propose  to  the 
burgesses  the  immediate  recall  of  Caesar ;  and  in  this 
manner  the  nobility  threw  down  the  gauntlet  to  the 
regents. 

The  triumvirs  had  no  time  to  lose.  Crassus  im- 
mediately started  north  to  confer  with  Caesar,  whom  he 
found  at  Ravenna  ;  at  Lucathey  were  joined  by  Pompeius, 
who  had  left  Rome  ostensibly  on  business  connected  with 
the  supply  of  grain.  The  most  noted  adherents  of  the 
rulers,  such  as  Metellus  Nepos,  proconsul  of  Hither  Spain, 
and  Appius  Claudius,  propraetor  of  Sardinia,  followed 
them.  A  hundred  and  twenty  lictors  and  two  hundred 
senators  were  counted  at  the  conference  ;  it  was  almost  a 
rival  senate  of  the  monarchy  as  opposed  to  the  other 
senate  of  the  republic.  The  decisive  voice  lay  with 
Caesar,  and  he  used  it  to  re-establish  the  joint  rule  on  a 
firmer  basis,  with  a  more  equal  distribution  of  power. 
The  most  important  governorships  after  Gaul,  namely 
the  two  Spains  and  Syria,  were  assigned,  the  former  to 
Pompeius,  the  latter  to  Crassus,  and  were  to  be  secured  by 
decree  of  the  people  for  five  years.  Caesar  was  to  have 
his  own  office  prolonged  for  another  five  years,  from  54 
B.C.  to  the  close  of  49  B.C.  ;  and  to  be  allowed  to  increase 
his  legions  to  ten,  and  to  charge  the  pay  of  his  arbitrarily 
levied  troops  on  the  state  chest.  Pompeius  and  Crassus 
were  to  hold  the  consulship  for  55  B.C.,  before  departing 
for  their  provinces,  and  Caesar  was  to  be  consul  in  48  B.C., 


428  HISTORY  OF  EOME. 

after  the  termination  of  his  command.  The  military- 
support  necessary  for  the  regulation  of  the  capital  was  to 
be  supplied  by  raising  legions  for  the  Spanish  and  Syrian 
armies,  and  keeping  them  in  Italy  as  long  as  should  seem 
convenient.  Minor  details  were  easily  settled  by  Caesar's 
magic  influence;  Pompeius  and  Crassus  were  reconciled 
to  each  other,  and  even  Clodius  was  induced  to  give  no 
further  annoyance  to  Pompeius. 

The  reasons  which  induced  Caesar  to  concede  to  his  rival 
so  powerful  a  position — a  position  which  he  had  refused 
him  in  60  B.C.,  when  the  league  was  formed — can  only  be 
conjectured.  It  was  not  that  necessity  compelled  him,  for 
Pompeius  was  a  powerless  suppliant  at  Caesar's  feet ;  and 
even  if,  in  case  of  a  rupture,  he  had  joined  the  optimates,  the 
alliance  would  not  have  been  so  formidable  as  to  demand 
so  heavy  a  price  to  prevent  it.  Probably  Caesar  was  not 
yet  prepared  for  civil  war;  but  in  any  case  the  decision  of 
peace  or  war  rested,  not  with  Pompeius,  but  with  the  oppo- 
sition. Possibly  purely  personal  motives  may  have  contri- 
buted ;  Caesar  was  not  the  man  to  be  disloyal  to  his  allies, 
and  he  may  have  hesitated  to  break  the  heart  of  his 
beloved  daughter,  who  was  sincerely  attached  to  her 
husband : — "  in  his  soul  there  was  room  for  much  besides 
the  statesman."  But  the  main  reason  was  undoubtedly 
the  consideration  of  Gaul.  If  Caesar's  object  was  to 
become  king  of  Rome  as  soon  as  possible,  it  was  a  grave 
blunder  to  give  up  his  present  enormous  superiority  over 
his  rivals,  and  especially  to  put  Pompeius  in  a  position  to 
settle  matters  independently  with  the  senate.  But  Caesar's 
was  no  vulgar  ambition  ;  the  conquest  of  Gaul  was  an 
enterprise  on  which  depended  the  external  security  and 
internal  reorganization  of  the  empire ;  it  was  necessary 
for  the  repression  of  German  invasions,  and  necessary  to 
furnish  new  soil  for  Italian  civilization.  But  Caesar's 
Gallic  couquests  hindered  far  more  than  they  helped  him 
on  the  way  to  the  throne,  and  it  yielded  him  bitter  fruit 
that  he  postponed  the  revolution  from  56  to  48  B.C. 

The  aristocracy  did  not  make  good  its  gage  :  "  they  had 
taken  up  arms  only  to  lay  them  down  as  soon  as  the  adver- 
sary merely  put  his  hand  to  the  sheath."  Nothing  more 
was  heard  about  discussion  of  the  Julian  laws  in  the 
senate ;  the  legions  raised  by  Caesar  were  charged  on  the 


JOINT  RULE  OF  POMPEIUS  AND  CAESAR.        429 

public  chest,  and  the  attempts  to  take  from  him  one  or  both 
of  his  provinces  decisively  failed  (May,  56  B.C.).  Cicero  was 
among  the  first  to  repent,  and  applied  to  himself  "  epithets 
more  appropriate  than  flattering."  *  The  troops  for  Syria 
did  indeed  depart,  but  the  legions  for  Spain  were  dismissed 
on  furlough,  and  Potnpeius  remained  with  them  in  Italy. 
At  the  same  time  the  regents  acted  deliberately  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  withdraw  from  the  senate  what  had 
hitherto  been  its  especial  function — the  management  of 
military  matters  and  of  foreign  affairs.  The  arrangements 
made  at  Luca  with  regard  to  the  provinces  of  Gaul,  Spain, 
and  Syria  were  submitted  to  and  approved  by  the  people. 
The  regents  lent  and  borrowed  troops  from  each  other 
without  authority.  The  Transpadani  were  apparently 
treated  by  Caesar  as  full  burgesses  of  Rome,  though  they 
had  legally  only  Latin  rights.  Caesar  organized  his  con- 
quests and  founded  colonies,  such  as  Novum  Comum, 
without  the  consent  of  the  senate.  The  Thracian,  Egyptian, 
and  Parthian  wars  were  conducted  by  the  generals  in  com- 
mand without  consulting  or  even  reporting  to  the  senate. 
The  majority  of  the  senate  submitted  humbly  enough  to 
necessity.  Cicero  was  now  completely  in  the  service  of 
the  regents.  His  brother  was  an  officer  in  Caesar's  army, 
in  some  measure  as  a  hostage.  Cicero  himself  was  com- 
pelled to  accept  an  office  under  Pompeius,  on  pretence  of 
which  he  might  be  banished  at  any  moment;  and  he  sub- 
mitted to  be  relieved  from  his  pecuniary  embarrassments 
by  loans  from  Caesar  and  by  an  appointment  to  the  joint 
overseership  of  the  vast  building  operations  in  the  capital. 
Many  prominent  members  of  the  nobility  were  kept  sub- 
servient by  similar  methods  ;  but  there  remained  a  certain 
section  which  could  be  neither  intimidated  nor  cajoled. 
The  foremost  of  these  was  Cato,  who  ceaselessly,  at  the 
peril  of  his  life,  offered  the  most  determined  opposition  in 
senate-house  and  Forum.  The  regents  did  not  molest  him 
and  his  followers  ;  strong  measures  would  have  made  them 
martyrs,  and,  after  all,  their  activity  was  unavailing.  But 
though  destitute  of  important  results,  their  action  fostered 
and  gave  the  watchword  to  the  widespread  discontent 
which  fermented  in  secret :  and  they  were  often  able  to 
draw  the  majority  in  the  senate,  which  secretly  sympathized 
*  "Me  asinum  germanura  fuisse  "  (Ad  Att.,  iv.  5.  3). 


430  HISTORY  OF  HOME. 

with  them,  into  isolated  decrees  against  its  masters  and 
their  adherents.  Thus  Gabinius  was  refused  a  public 
thanksgiving  in  56  B.C.;  Piso  was  recalled  from  his  province; 
and  the  senate  wore  mourning  when  the  tribune  Gaius  Cato 
hindered  the  elections  of  55  B.C.  as  long  as  the  republican 
consul  Marcellinus  remained  in  office.  But  the  great  fact 
was  unaltered — the  regents  were  supreme.  "  No  one," 
says  a  contemporary  writer,  "is  of  the  slightest  account 
except  the  three  ;  the  regents  are  all  powerful,  and  they 
take  care  that  no  one  shall  remain  in  doubt  about  it ;  the 
whole  state  is  virtually  transformed,  and  obeys  the 
dictators." 

The  opposition,  powerless  in  the  field  of  government, 
could  not  nevertheless  be  dislodged  from  certain  depart- 
ments of  state  which  had  considerable  political  influence — 
the  elections  of  magistrates,  and  the  jury-courts.  The 
former,  which  belong  properly  to  the  government  of  the 
state,  were,  under  the  present  regime,  when  the  govern- 
ment was  really  wielded  by  extraordinary  magistrates, 
unimportant ;  the  ordinary  magistrates  themselves  were 
ciphers,  and  the  elections  sank  into  mere  demonstrations. 
The  regents  spared  no  pains  to  gain  the  victory  even  here  : 
the  lists  of  candidates  for  some  years  was  settled  at  Luca ; 
large  sums  were  expended  upon  elections,  and  numbers  of 
soldiers  were  sent  on  furlough  from  the  armies  of  Caesar 
and  Pompeius  to  vote  at  Borne.  But  the  result  was  only 
partial  success.  For  55  B.C.  Potnpeius  and  Crassus  were 
elected  only  by  open  violence  and  after  the  most  scanda- 
lous scenes.  For  54  B.C.  Domitius  was  elected  consul,  and 
Cato  praetor  ;  while  the  candidates  for  the  regents  were 
convicted  of  the  most  shameful  corruption  in  the  elections 
for  53  B.C.,  and  were  abandoned  by  their  principals.  These 
defeats  may  be  accounted  for  partly  by  the  wide  discontent 
at  the  rule  of  the  triumvirate  ;  mainly  by  the  elaborately 
organized  system  of  political  clubs  which  were  entirely 
controlled  by  the  nobility. 

The  jury-courts  gave  even  greater  trouble  and  annoy- 
ance. As  at  present  composed  (see  p.  357)  the  sena- 
torial party  was  influential  in  them,  but  the  middle 
class  was  predominant ;  and  the  fact  that  in  55  B.C. 
Pompeius  proposed  a  high-rated  census  for  jurymen, 
shows  that  the  strength   of   the   opposition   was  in  the 


JOINT  RULE  OF  P0MPE1US  AND  CAESAR.         431 

middle  clasp,  and  that  the  capitalists  were  more  easy  to 
manage.  A  constant  warfare  of  prosecution  was  waged 
against  the  adherents  of  the  rulers,  the  accusers  being 
generally  the  younger  and  more  fiery  members  of  the 
nobility.  Still,  even  here,  where  the  regents  chose  to 
insist,  the  courts  dared  not  refuse  to  comply.  Vatinius, 
the  best  hated  of  all  Caesar's  personal  adherents,  was 
acquitted  in  all  the  processes  against  him.  But  Pom- 
peius  did  not  know  so  well  how  to  protect  his  clients,  and 
Gabinius  was  sent  into  banishment  in  54  B.C.,  for  extor- 
tions in  the  provinces ;  and  even  where  unsuccessful, 
impeachments  by  such  masters  of  sarcasm  and  dialectics 
as  Gaius  Licinius  Calvus  and  Gaius  Asinius  Pollio  did 
not  miss  their  mark.  i 

Still  less  controllable  was  the  power  of  literature,  which 
throughout  these  years  is  pervaded  by  a  tone  of  the 
bitterest  opposition.  The  orations  of  the  accusers  in  the 
law-courts  were  regularly  published  as  political  pam- 
phlets ;  the  youth  of  the  aristocracy  and  of  the  middle 
class  in  the  country  towns  kept  up  a  constant  fire  of 
pamphlets  and  epigrams  ;  and  the  senator's  son,  Gaius 
Licinius  Calvus,  fought  side  by  side  with  Marcus  Furius 
Bibaculus  of  Cremona,  and  Quintus  Valerius  Catillus  of 
Verona.  The  literature  of  the  time  is  full  of  s;;rca>ras 
against  the  "  great  Caesar,"  "  the  unique  gem  ra  1,"  the 
affectionate  father-in-law  and  son-in-law  who  ransack  the 
globe  to  enrich  them  dissolute  favourites.  Caesar  saw 
that  such  opposition  could  not  be  checked  by  word  of 
command ;  he  tried  rather  to  gain  over  by  his  personal 
influence  the  more  eminent  authors.  Cicero  was  treated 
respectfully,  out  of  regard  for  his  literary  reputation  ;  and 
Catullus,  in  spite  of  his  sarcasms,  was  treated  with  the 
most  flattering  distinction.  The  commentaries  on  the 
Gallic  wars  were  intended  partly  to  meet  the  enemy  on 
their  own  ground,  and  to  set  forth  to  the  public  the 
necessity  and  constitutional  propriety  of  Caesar's  opera- 
tions. "  But  it  is  freedom  alone  that  is  absolutely  and 
exclusively  poetical  and  creative;  it  and  it  alone  is  able, 
even  in  its  most  wretched  caricature,  even  with  its  latest 
breath,  to  inspire  fresh  enthusiasm  .  .  .  Practical  politics 
were  not  more  absolutely  controlled  by  the  regents  than 
literature  by  the  republicans." 


432  BISTORT  OF  ROME. 

The  opposition  became  more  and  more  troublesome, 
and  the  regents  at  length  determined  to  take  stronger 
measures.  It  was  resolved  to  introduce  a  temporary  dic- 
tatorship. At  the  close  of  54  B.C.  the  dictatorship  was 
demanded  in  the  senate ;  but  Pompeius  himself  still 
shrank  from  openly  asking  it.  Even  when  the  elections 
for  53  B.C.  led  to  the  most  scandalous  scenes,  and  had  to 
be  postponed  for  a  full  year  beyond  the  time  fixed,  he 
still  hesitated  to  speak  the  decisive  word,  and  might  long 
have  hesitated  but  for  circumstances  which  forced  his 
hand.  For  the  consulship  of  52  B.C.  Titus  Annius  Milo 
came  forward  in  opposition  to  the  candidate  of  the  re- 
gents, who  were  both  personally  connected  with  Pompeius. 
Milo  was  the  great  rival  of  Clodius  in  the  game  of  the 
streets,  the  Hector  to  the  Achilles  of  Clodius.  As  Clodius 
was  on  the  side  of  the  regents,  Milo  was  of  course  for  the 
republic  ;  and  Cato  and  his  friends  supported  his  can- 
didature in  return.  In  a  chance  skirmish  between  the 
rival  bands  on  the  Appian  Way,  not  far  from  the  capital, 
Clodius  was  wounded  and  carried  into  a  neighbouring 
house,  from  which  he  was  afterwards  dragged  to  be  mur- 
dered by  Milo's  orders.  The  adherents  of  the  triumvirs 
saw  here  an  opportunity  for  thwarting  the  candidature 
of  Milo,  and  carrying  the  dictatorship  of  Pompeius.  The 
bloody  corpse  was  exposed  in  the  Forum,  ispeeches  were 
made,  and  a  riot  broke  forth.  The  mob  set  fire  to  the 
senate-house,  and  then  besieged  the  residence  of  Milo  till 
they  were  repulsed  by  his  band.  They  then  saluted 
Pompeius  as  dictator  and  his  candidates  as  consuls ;  and 
when  the  interrex,  Marcus  Lepidus,  refused  to  hold  the 
elections  at  once,  he  was  blockaded  in  his  house  for  five 
days.  Pompeius  certainly  desired  the  dictatorship,  but 
he  would  not  take  it  at  the  hands  of  a  mob.  He  brought 
up  troops  to  put  down  the  anarchy  in  the  city,  and  then 
demanded  the  dictatorship  from  the  senate.  To  escape 
the  name  of  dictator,  the  senate,  on  the  motion  of  Cato  and 
Bibulus,  perpetrated  a  double  absurdity,  and  appointed 
the  proconsul  Pompeius  "  consul  without  colleague "  * 
(25th  intercalary  f  month,  52  B.C.). 

*  "  Consul  means  colleague,  and  a  consul  who  is  at  the  same  time 
a  proconsul  is  at  once  an  actual  consul  and  a  consul's  substitute." 
t  Between  February  and  March. 


JOINT  RULE  OF  rOMPEIUS  AND  CAESAR.         433 

Pompeius  at  once  proceeded  energetically  to  use  his 
powers  against  the  republican  party  in  their  strongholds, 
the  electioneering  clubs  and  the  jury-courts. 

1.  The  existing  election  laws  were  repeated  and  en- 
forced ;  and  a  special  law,  which  prescribed  increased 
penalties  for  electioneering  intrigues,  was  endowed  with 
retrospective  force  as  far  back  as  70  B.C. 

2.  The  governorships  were  to  be  conferred  on  the  con- 
suls and  praetors,  not  as  heretofore,  immediately  on  their 
retirement  from  office,  but  after  an  interval  of  five  years. 
The  years  which  must  elapse  before  this  arrangement 
could  be  brought  into  action  were  to  be  provided  for  by 
special  decrees  of  the  senate  from  time  to  time — a  course 
which  put  the  provinces  for  the  next  few  years  at  the 
disposal  of  the  person  or  persons  whose  influence  might 
be  supreme  in  the  senate. 

3.  The  liberty  of  the  law-courts  was  curtailed  by 
limiting  the  number  of  advocates  and  the  time  of  speak- 
ing allowed  to  each ;  and  the  custom  of  bringing  for- 
ward laudatores  as  witnesses  to  character  was  prohibited. 

4.  The  senate  decreed  that  the  country  was  in  danger, 
owing  to  the  disturbances  connected  with  the  affair  on 
the  Appian  Way,  and  accordingly  a  commission  was  ap- 
pointed by  a  special  law  to  inquire  into  all  offences  con- 
nected with  the  affray,  the  members  being  nominated  by 
Pompeius. 

At  the  same  time,  all  the  men  capable  of  service  in 
Italy  were  called  to  arms,  and  made  to  swear  allegiance  to 
Pompeius ;  troops  were  stationed  at  the  Capitol,  and  the 
place  where  the  trial  respecting  the  murder  of  Clodius 
was  going  on  was  surrounded  by  soldiers. 

By  these  measures  opposition  was  checked,  but  not,  of 
course,  destroyed.  The  reins  were  drawn  tighter  and  the 
republican  party  was  humbled.  Milo  was  condemned  by 
the  jurymen,  and  Cato's  candidature  for  the  consulship 
frustrated.  But  many  mischances  occurred  through  the 
maladroitness  of  Pompeius ;  he  was  attempting  an  im- 
possible task — to  play  at  once  the  parts  of  impartial 
restorer  of  law  and  order,  and  of  party  chief.  Thus  he 
allowed  many  subordinate  persons  belonging  to  the  re- 
publican party  to  be  acquitted  by  the  commission,  and 
looked  on  in  silence  while  every  man  who  had  taken  part 

28 


434  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

for  Clodius — that  is  for  the  regents — in  the  late  riots 
was  condemned.  At  the  same  time  he  violated  his  own 
laws  by  appearing  as  a  laudator  for  his  friend  Plancus, 
and  by  protecting  from  condemnation  several  persons 
specially  connected  with  himself,  such  as  Metellus  Scipio. 
Still,  the  regents  were  on  the  whole  satisfied,  and  the 
public  acquiesced,  even  to  celebrating  the  recovery  of 
Pompeius  from  a  serious  illness  with  demonstrations  of 
joy.  On  the  1st  of  August,  52  B.C.,  Pompeius,  laid  down 
his  special  command  and  chose  Metellus  Scipio  as  his 
colleague. 


AUTHORITIES. 

Flut.  Pomp.  49-55 ;  Caes.  28 ;  Crass.  14,  15  ;  Cato,  41-52.  Appian 
B.  C.  ii.  16-25.  Cic.  post  Red.  in  sen.  (Sept.  57);  ad  Quir.  (Sept. 
57)  ;  pro  Dotn.  sua  (Sept.  57)  ;  de  Har.  Resp.  (56  B.C.) ;  pro 
Sext.  and  in  Vatin.  (Mar.  56) ;  pro  Cael.  Ruf.  (~>6  B.C.) ;  de  Prov. 
Consul.  (56  B.C.)  ;  in  Pisonem,  in  Aul.  Gab.,  and  pro  Cn.  Plane, 
frag.  (55  B.C.) ;  pro  Rabir.,  pro  Vatin.  frag.,  and  pro  Aem. 
Scauro  (54  B.C.) ;  de  Ae.  A.  Mil.  (53  B.C.) ;  pro  MiloDe  (52  B.C.). 
Watson's  Select.  Lett.  ii.  1-30.  Liv.  Epit.  104-109.  Veil.  ii. 
46-49.  Suet.  Jul.  26,  27.  Dio.  tribunate  of  Clodius,  xxxviii.  13  ; 
return  of  Cicero,  xxxviii.  30  and  xxxix.  6-8;  9-39;  56-59 
(Egyptian  war) ;  62-65 ;  xl.  44-56  (Dictatorship  of  Pompeius, 
52-56). 

Transpadani. — That  Caesar  treated  them  as  full  burgesses  not 
directly  stated.  Mommsen  infers  that  he  followed  the  tradi- 
tions of  his  party  by  so  treating  them,  from  Cic.  ad  Att.  v.  2, 
3;  ad  Fam.  viii.  1,  2.  B.  G.  viii.  24.  Suet.  Jul.  28.  Strabo,  v. 
i.  p.  213.  Pint.  Caes.  29.  Cic.  ad  Att.  v.  11.  2.  See  note 
Momras.  Hist,  of  R.  bk.  v.  c.  8. 

Lex  Pompeia  Judiciaria,  55  B.C. — Ascon.  in  Pison.  §  94.    Bruns,  ill.  iv. 


CHAPTER  XXXVL 

DEATH   OF  CRASSUS — RUPTURE   BETWEEN  POMPEIUS  AND  CAESAR, 

54  B.C.  Crassus  arrives  in  Syria. — 53  B.C.  Battle  of  Carrhae — Death 
of  Crassus. — 51  and  50  B.CT  Attempts  of  the  republicans  to 
deprive  Caesar  prematurely  of  his  command — Alliance  of  the 
extreme  republicans  and  Pompeius — War  declared. — 49  B.C. 
Caesar's  ultimatum  rejected  by  the  senate — He  crosses  the 
Rubicon.  "^ 

For  years  Marcus  Crassus  had  been  reckoned  one  of  the 
regents  of  Rome  without  any  claim  to  be  so  considered. 
But  after  the  conference  at  Luca  his  position  was  changed : 
Caesar  had  allowed  the  consulship  and  the  governorship  of 
Syria  to  be  assigned  to  him,  m  order  to  counterbalance  the 
great  concessions  he  found  it  advisable  to  make  to  Pom- 
peius ,  and  at  the  close  of  his  consulship  Crassus  had  an 
opportunity,  as  governor  of  Syria,  of  attaining,  through  the 
Parthian  war,  the  position  acquired  by  Caesar  in  Gaul. 
Avarice  and  ambition  combined  to  inspire  him,  at  the  age 
of  sixty,  with  all  the  ardour  of  youth.  He  arrived  in 
Syria  early  in  54  B.C.,  having  left  Rome  even  before  the 
close  of  his  consulship,  eager  to  add  the  riches  of  the  East 
to  those  of  the  West,  and  to  achieve  military  glory  "  as 
rapidly  as  Caesar  and  with  as  little  trouble  as  Pompeius." 
The  Parthian  war  had  already  begun.  Pompeius  had  not 
respected  his  engagements  with  regard  to  the  frontier  (pp. 
365,  369),  and  had  wrested  provinces  from  the  empire  to 
confer  them  upon  Armenia.  Accordingly,  after  the  death 
of  king  Phraates,  his  son  Mithradates  declared  war  upon 
Armenia.  This  was,  of  course,  a  declaration  of  war 
against  Rome,  and  Gabinius,  the  governor  of  Syria,  soon 


436  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

led  his  troops  across  the  Euphrates.  But  meantime  Mithra- 
dates  had  been  dethroned  by  the  grandees  of  the  empire 
with  the  vizier  at  their  head,  and  Orodes  now  reigned  in 
his  stead.  Mithradates  took  refuge  with  the  Romans ;  but 
at  this  juncture  Grbinius  was  ordered  by  the  regents  to 
restore  the  king  of  Egypt  to  Alexandria  by  force  of  arms, 
and  he  had  to  give  up  the  Parthian  war  for  the  present. 
But  he  induced  Mithradates  to  make  war  on  his  own 
account,  and  the  prince  was  supported  by  the  cities  of 
Seleucia  and  Babylon.  Soon  afterwards,  however,  Seleucia 
was  captured  by  storm,  Babylon  was  reduced  to  surrender, 
and  Mithradates  was  captured  and  put  to  death.  Gabi- 
nius,  who  had  finished  the  Egyptian  campaign,  was  on 
the  eve  of  resuming  operations  against  the  Parthians,  when 
Crassus  arrived  in  Syria  and  relieved  him  of  the  command. 

Crassus  spent  the  summer  of  54  B.C.  in  levying  troops 
and  contributions,  and  in  making  an  extensive  reconnais- 
sance. The  Euphrates  was  crossed  and  a  victory  won  at 
Ichnae  ;  garrisons  were  placed  in  several  of  the  neighbour- 
ing towns,  and  then  the  troops  returned  to  Syria.  This 
reconnaissance  determined  the  Romans  to  march  against 
the  Parthians  straight  across  the  Mesopotamian  desert, 
rather  than  by  the  circuitous  route  through  Armenia,  for 
the  numerous  Greek  and  half -Greek  towns  in  the  region 
of  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates  were  found  ready  at  once  to 
shake  off  the  Parthian  yoke. 

Next  year  (53  B.C.)  the  Euphrates  was  again  crossed, 
and  after  some  deliberation  it  was  decided  to  march  acros9 
the  desert  to  the  Tigris  rather  than  down  the  Euphrates 
to  Seleucia,  where  the  two  rivers  are  but  a  few  miles 
apart.  The  Roman  army  consisted  of  seven  legions,  four 
thousand  cavalry,  and  four  thousand  slingers  and  archers. 
For  many  days  they  marched,  and  no  enemy  appeared.  At 
length,  not  far  from  the  river  Balissus,  some  horsemen  of 
the  enemy  were  descried  in  the  distance.  The  Arab  prince 
Abgarus  of  Edessa,  who  had  been  loud  in  his  protesta- 
tions of  loyalty,  and  who  had  been  mainly  instrumental  in 
determining  Crassus  to  adopt  the  desert  route,  was  sent 
out  to  reconnoitre.  The  enemy  disappeared,  followed  by 
Abgarus  and  his  men ;  and  after  a  long  interval  it  was 
resolved  to  advance,  in  the  hope  of  coming  upon  the 
enemy.      The  river  was   crossed  and  the  army  was  led 


THE  RUPTURE.  437 

rapidly  forward,  when  suddenly  the  drums  of  the  Par- 
thians  were  heard,  their  silken  gold-embroidered  banners 
were  seen  waving  and  their  helmets  and  coats  of  mails 
blazing  in  the  sun;  and  by  the  side  of  the  Parthian 
vizier  stood  Abgarus  and  his  Bedouins. 

The  Romans  saw  at  once  the  net  in  which  they  were 
ensnared.  The  whole  Parthian  army  consisted  of  cavalry ; 
the  vizier  had  seen  that  no  Oriental  infantry  could  cope 
with  that  of  Rome,  and  had  dispensed  with  the  arm 
altogether.  The  mass  of  his  troops  were  mounted  archers, 
while  the  line  was  formed  of  heavy  cavalry,  armed  with 
long  thrusting  lances,  and  protected — man  and  horse — by 
armour  formed  of  leather  or  of  metal  plates.  The  Roman 
infantry  were  quite  unable  to  bring  such  an  enemy  to  a 
close  engagement,  and,  even  if  they  had  been  able,  these 
ironclad  hosts  would  probably  have  been  more  than  a 
match  for  them.  In  the  desert  every  advantage  was  on 
the  side  of  the  enemy  and  none  on  that  of  the  Romans. 
The  strength  of  the  Roman  system  of  warfare  lay  in  the 
close  order  in  which  the  legions  fought,  and  in  the  custom 
of  forming  entrenched  camps,  which  made  every  encamp- 
ment a  fortification.  But  the  close  order  now  only  served 
to  make  them  an  easier  mark  for  their  enemies'  missiles, 
and  in  the  desert  ditches  and  ramparts  could  often  hardly 
be  formed.  It  is  curious  that  the  irresistible  superiority  of 
the  Roman  infantry  led  the  enemies  of  Rome  at  about  the 
same  time,  in  widely  different  parts  of  the  world,  to  meet 
it,  and  meet  it  successfully,  by  the  same  means — by  the 
use  of  cavalry  and  missiles.  The  Parthian  vizier  was 
only  carrying  out  on  a  larger  scale,  and  under  infinitely 
more  favourable  conditions,  what  had  been  completely 
successful  under  Cassivellaunus  in  Britain,  and  partially 
successful  under  Vercingetorix  in  Gaul. 

Under  such  conditions  the  first  battle  between  Romans 
and  Parthians  was  fought  in  the  desert,  about  thirty  miles 
south  of  Carrhae.  The  Roman  archers,  who  began  the 
attack,  were  driven  back;  the  legions,  which  were  in  their 
usual  close  order,  were  soon  outflanked  and  overwhelmed 
by  the  archers  of  the  enemy.  In  order  that  they  might 
not  be  completely  surrounded,  Publius  Crassus,  the  same 
who  had  served  with  such  distinction  under  Caesar  in 
Gaul,  advanced  with  a  select  corps  of  cavalry,  archers,  and 


438  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

infantry.     The  Parthians  retreated,  hotly  pursued ;    but 
when  completely  out  of  sight  of  the  main  army  of  the 
Romans,  the  heavy  cavalry  made  a  stand  aud  soon  com- 
pletely surrounded  the  band  of  Crassus.     All  the  valour 
of  the  Romans  and  of  their  leader  was  in  vain ;  they  were 
driven  to  a  slight  eminence,  where  their  destruction  was 
completed.     Crassus  and  many  of  his  officers  put  them- 
selves to  death  ;  out  of  the  whole  number  of  six  thousand 
only  five  hundred  were  taken  prisoners,  not  one  was  able 
to  escape.     Meanwhile  the  main  army  was  left  compara- 
tively unmolested,  but  when  it  advanced  to  discover  the 
fate  of  the  detached  corps,  the  head  of  the  young  Crassus 
was  displayed  on  a  pole  before  his  father's  eyes,  and  the 
terrible  onslaught  was  at  the  same  time  renewed.     Night 
alone   put   an   end   to    the   slaughter       Fortunately   the 
Parthians   retired   from    the   field  to   bivouac ;    and    the 
Romans   seized   the   opportunity  to   retreat   to    Carrhae, 
They  left  the  wounded  and  the  stragglers — said  to  have 
been  four  thousand  in  number — on  the  6eld  ,  and  as  the 
Parthians  stayed  to  massacre  these,  and  the  inhabitants 
of  Carrhae  marched  forth  in  haste  to  succour  the  fugitives^ 
the  remnant   of   the   army  was  saved  from   destruction 
But  the  Romans,  either  from  want  of  provisions  or  from 
the  precipitation  of  Crassus,  soon  set  out  from  Carrhae 
and  marched  towards  the  Armenian  mountains.     March- 
ing by  night  and  resting  by  day  the  main  body  arrived  at 
Sinnaca,  within  a  day's  march  of  safety      There  the  vizier 
came  to  offer  peace  and  friendship,  and  to  propose  a  con- 
ference between  the  two  generals.     The  offer  was  accepted 
and  terms  were  discussed ;  a  richly  caparisoned  horse  was 
produced — a  present  from  the  king   to   Crassus;  and  as 
the  servants  of  the  vizier  crowded  to  assist  the  Roman 
general  to  mount,  the  suspicion  arose  among  the  Roman 
officers  that  it  was  a  design  to  seize  the  person  of  their 
leader.     Octavius  snatched  a  sword  from  a  Parthian  and 
stabbed     the     groom.       In    the   tumult   which    followed 
all  the  Roman  officers  were  killed ,    Crassus  refused  to 
survive  as  a  prisoner,  and   the  whole  Roman  force  left 
behind  in   the   camp   was  either  captured  or   dispersed. 
Only  one  small  body,  which  had  broken  off  from  the  main 
force,  and  some  straggling  bands  found  their  way  back 
to  Syria.     Ten  thousand  Roman  prisoners  were  settled 


THE  RUPTURE.  439 

in  the  oasis  of  Merv;  one  half  of  the  whole  force  had 
perished. 

This  disaster  to  the  Roman  arms  seemed  likely  to  shake 
the  very  foundations  of  the  Eoman  power  in  the  East. 
Armenia  became  completely  dependent  upon  Parthia,  and 
the  Hellenic  cities  were  again  enslaved.  More  than  this, 
the  Parthians  prepared  to  cross  the  Euphrates  and  to 
dislodge  the  Romans  from  Syria.  But,  fortunately  for 
Rome,  the  leaders  on  each  side  had  changed.  The  vizier 
was  executed  by  the  Sultan  Orodes,  and  the  command  of 
the  invading  army  given  to  the  young  prince  Pacorus  ; 
while  the  ad  interim  command  of  Syria  was  assumed  by 
the  able  quaestor  Gaius  Cassius.  For  two  years  the 
Parthians  sent  only  flying  bands,  which  were  easily  re- 
pulsed. Owing  to  the  negligence  of  the  Roman  govern- 
ment the  great  Parthian  invasion,  which  came  at  last  in 
51  B.C.,  found  nothing  to  oppose  it  but  two  weak  legions 
which  Cassius  had  formed  from  the  remains  of  the  army 
of  Crassus,  and  which  could,  of  course,  do  nothing  to 
oppose  the  advance.  However,  under  an  ordinary  general 
the  Parthians  were  no  more  formidable  than  any  other 
Oriental  army ;  and  though  the  Syrian  command  soon 
devolved  upon  the  incapable  Bibulus,  nothing  was  effected 
by  the  invaders,  and  Pacorus  soon  came  to  an  agree- 
ment with  the  Roman  commander,  and  turned  his  arms 
against  his  father  Orodes  instead. 

It  is  an  ominous  sign  of  the  times  that  the  national 
disasters  of  Carrhae  and  Sinnaca  attracted  almost  less 
attention  at  Rome  than  the  pitiful  brawl  upon  the  Appian 
Way.  But  it  is  hardly  wonderful ;  the  breach  between  the 
regents  was  now  becoming  imminent.  "  Like  the  boat  of 
the  ancient  Greek  mariners'  tale,  the  vessel  of  the  Roman 
community  now  found  itself,  as  it  were,  between  two  rocks 
swimming  towards  each  other ;  expecting  every  moment 
the  crash  of  collision,  those  whom  it  was  bearing  tortured 
by  nameless  anguish  into  the  eddying  surge  that  rose 
higher  and  higher,  were  benumbed ;  and  while  every 
slightest  movement  there  attracted  a  thousand  eyes,  not 
one  ventured  to  give  a  glance  to  the  right  or  left." 

After  the  conference  at  Luca,  it  seemed  that  the  division 
of  power  was  made  on  a  basis  sufficiently  firm  to  ensure 
its  endurance,  provided  that  both  parties  were  disposed  to 


440  HISTORY   OF  ROME. 

act  in  good  faith.  This  was  the  case  with  Caesar,  at  any 
rate  daring  the  internal  necessary  for  the  completion  of  hia 
Gallic  conquests  ;  but  probably  Ponipeius  was  never  even 
provisionally  in  earnest  about  the  collegiate  scheme.  Still, 
though  he  never  meant  to  acknowledge  Caesar's  equality 
with  himself,  the  idea  of  breaking  with  him  formed  it- 
self but  slowly  in  his  mind.  In  54  B.C.  the  death  of 
Julia,  followed  closely  by  that  of  her  child,  destroyed  the 
personal  bond  between  the  rivals  ;  and  when  Pompeius 
refused  Caesar's  overtures  for  fresh  marriage  connections, 
and  himself  married  the  daughter  of  Quintus  Metellus 
Scipio,  the  breach  had  unmistakably  begun.  Still  the 
political  alliance  remained,  and  Pompeius,  after  the  disaster 
of  Aduatuca  in  54  B.C.,  lent  Caesar  one  of  his  Italian  legions, 
while  Caesar  gave  his  consent  and  support  to  the  dictator- 
ship of  Pompeius.  But  as  soon  as  the  latter  found  himself 
in  a  position  completely  outweighing  in  influence  that  of 
Caesar,  and  when  all  the  men  of  military  age  in  Italy  had 
tendered  their  military  oath  to  himself  personally,  it  became 
clear  that  he  had  made  up  his  mind  to  a  rupture.  The 
proceedings  of  the  dictatorship  told  largely  against  the 
partisans  of  Caesar.  This  might  have  been  accident; 
but  when  Pompeius  selected  for  his  colleague  in  office  his 
dependent  Metellus  Scipio  instead  of  Caesar,  still  more 
when  he  got  his  governorship  of  the  two  Spains  prolonged 
for  five  years  more,  and  a  large  sum  of  money  assigned  to 
him  for  the  payment  of  troops,  without  procuring  similar 
arrangements  for  Caesar,  it  was  impossible  to  mistake  his 
intention.  Lastly,  the  new  regulations  as  to  the  holding 
of  governorships  had  the  ulterior  object  of  procuring 
Caesar's  premature  recall.  No  moment  could  have  been 
more  unfavourable  to  Caesar.  In  June,  53  B.C.,  the  death 
of  Crassus  occurred — and  Crassus  had  always  been  the 
closest  ally  of  Caesnr,  and  a  bitter  personal  enemy  of  Pom- 
peius. A  few  months  later  the  Gallic  insurrection  broke 
out  with  renewed  violence,  and  for  the  first  time  Caesar  had 
to  encounter  an  equal  opponent  in  Vercingetorix.  Pom- 
peius was  dictator  of  Rome  and  master  of  the  senate  ;  what 
might  have  occurred  if,  instead  of  intriguing  obscurely 
against  Caesar,  he  had  boldly  recalled  him  from  Gaul  ? 

The  impending  struggle  was,  of  course,  not  between  re- 
public and  monarchy,  but  between  Pompeius  and  Caesar 


TEE  RUPTURE.  441 

for  the  crown  of  Rome.  Nevertheless,  each  of  the  rivals 
found  it  convenient  to  adopt  one  of  the  old  party  battle- 
cries  ;  neither  dared  to  alienate  from  himself  the  mass  of 
respectable  conservative  citizens,  who  desired  the  continu- 
ance of  the  republic,  by  openly  aiming  at  monarchy. 
Caesar,  of  course,  inscribed  upon  his  banner,  "  The  people 
and  democratic  progress."  He  had  been  from  the  outset 
an  earnest  democrat,  and  the  monarchy  meant  to  him  some- 
thing which  differed  in  little  but  name  from  the  Gracchan 
government  of  the  people.  To  Caesar  this  subterfuge 
brought  little  advantage,  except  that  he  thus  escaped 
the  necessity  of  directly  employing  the  name  of  King. 
But  Pompeius,  who,  of  course,  proclaimed  himself  the 
champion  of  the  aristocracy  and  of  the  legitimate  consti- 
tution, gained  besides  a  large  and  influential  body  of  allies. 
In  the  first  place,  he  rallied  round  him  the  whole  republican 
party,  and  the  majority,  or,  at  any  rate,  the  soundest  part 
of  the  burgesses  of  Italy.  Secondly,  what  was  no  mean 
advantage  for  so  awkward  a  politician,  it  relieved  him  of 
the  difficulty  of  finding  a  plausible  pretext  for  provoking 
the  war.  His  new  allies  would  be  willing  enough  to  pro- 
voke a  conflict  with  Caesar,  and  to  entrust  the  conduct  of 
the  war  to  Pompeius,  who  would  then  come  forward,  in 
obedience  to  the  general  wish,  as  the  protector  of  the  con- 
stitution against  the  designs  of  anarchists  and  monarchists, 
— as  the  regularly  appointed  general  of  the  senate  against 
the  imperator  of  the  streets. 

Thus  the  republican  party  became  once  more  a  factor  in 
the  politics  of  Rome,  owing  to  the  rupture  between  the 
rulers.  The  heart  and  core  of  the  republican  opposition  was 
the  small  circle  of  the  followers  of  Cato,  who  were  resolved 
to  enter  on  the  struggle  against  monarchy  under  any  cir- 
cumstances. The  mass  of  the  aristocracy,  though  averse 
to  monarchy,  desired,  above  all  things,  peace,  and  could 
not  be  counted  on  for  decisive  action.  Hence  Cato's  only 
hope  lay  in  a  coalition  with  one  of  the  regents.  In  alliance 
with  Pompeius  he  might  compel  the  timid  majority  to 
declare  war ;  and  though  Pompeius  was  not  in  earnest  in 
his  fidelity  to  the  constitution,  yet  the  war  would  train  a 
really  republican  army  and  republican  generals,  and  it 
would  be,  at  any  rate,  easier  to  settle  matters  with  Pom- 
peius after  victory  than  with  Caesar.     The  rapprochement 


442  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

between  the  general  and  the  senate  was  made  easy  by  the 
events  of  the  dictatorship.  Pompeius  had  refused  to  accept 
the  office  except  from  the  senate  ;  he  had  shown  unrelenting 
severity  against  disorder  of  every  kind,  and  surprising 
indulgence  towards  Cato  and  his  followers  ;  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  was  directly  from  the  hands  of  Cato  and 
Bibulus  that  Pompeius  received  the  undivided  consulship. 
An  outward  and  visible  sign  that  the  alliance  was  already 
practically  concluded  was  given,  when,  for  the  consulship 
of  51  B.C.,  one  of  Cato's  pronounced  adherents,  Claudius 
Marcellus,  was  elected,  evidently  with  the  concurrence  of 
the  regent. 

Caesar  was  kept  constantly  informed  of  all  that  happened 
at  Rome,  and  formed  his  plans  accordingly.  He  had  doubt- 
less long  determined  to  take  for  himself,  if  necessary  by 
force  of  arms,  the  supreme  power  after  the  conclusion  of 
his  Gallic  wars  ;  but  he  wished  earnestly  to  avoid  the  deep 
disorganization  which  civil  war  must  produce  in  a  state ; 
and  even  if  civil  war  could  not  be  avoided,  no  time  could 
be  more  unfavourable  for  it  than  the  present,  when  the  in- 
surrection in  Gaul  was  at  its  height,  and  when  the  consti- 
tutional party  was  dominant  in  Italy.  If  he  became, 
according  to  the  arrangement  at  Luca,  consul  for  the  year 
48  B.C.,  he  might  confidently  reckon  on  out-manoeuvring 
his  awkward  and  vacillating  rival,  and,  with  the  compliant 
majority  in  the  senate  at  his  disposal,  might  either  reor- 
ganize the  state  by  peaceful  means,  or  at  least  enter  upon 
the  war  with  far  greater  prospects  of  success.  Meanwhile 
he  armed,  certainly,  and  raised  his  legions  during  the  winter 
of  52-51  B.C.,  to  the  number  of  eleven.  But,  at  the  same 
time,  he  publicly  approved  of  all  Pompeius'  acts  as  dictator, 
and  took  no  steps  when  he  saw  the  alliance  gradually 
formed  between  his  rival  and  the  aristocracy  ;  only  adher- 
ing immovably  to  the  one  demand,  that  the  consulship 
for  48  B.C.  should  be  granted  him  according  to  the  agree- 
ment. 

It  was  upon  this  demand  that  the  diplomatic  war  between 
Caesar  and  the  senate  began,  and  it  is  important  to  grasp 
fully  and  accurately  the  exact  point  in  dispute. 

If  there  should  be  any  interval  between  the  day  on  which 
Caesar  resigned  his  Gallic  command  and  the  day  on  which 
he  entered  upon  his  consulship,  he  would  be  liable  during 


TEE  RUPTURE.  443 

that  interval  to  criminal  impeachment,  which,  according 
to  Roman  law,  was  allowable  only  against  a  man  not  in 
office ;  and  in  that  case  it  was  extremely  probable  that  he 
would  meet  the  same  fate  as  Milo,  and  be  compelled  to  go 
into  exile.  Was  it  necessary  that  there  should  be  such  an 
interval  ?  According  to  the  usual  mode  of  reckoning,  a  pro- 
vincial command  began  in  theory  on  March  1st,  of  the 
magistrate's  year  of  office  in  Rome,  so  that  Caesar's  Gallic 
command  theoretically  began  on  March  1st,  59  B.C.,  the 
year  of  his  consulship,  and  the  ten  years  for  which  it  was 
secured  to  him  would  expire  on  the  last  day  of  February, 
49  B.C.  Accordingly  there  would  be  an  interval)  of  ten 
months  between  the  end  of  the  Gallic  command  and  the 
beginning  of  the  consulship.  Caesar's  opponents  aimed, 
both  directly  and  indirectly,  at  preventing  him  from 
retaining  his  provinces  during  this  interval. 

Firstly,  directly.  According  to  the  old  custom,  Caesar's 
successor  would  have  been  appointed  from  among  the 
magistrates  for  the  year  49  B.C.,  and  could  not,  therefore, 
have  taken  over  the  command  until  the  beginning  of  48 
B  0  ;  and  by  the  same  old  custom  Caesar  would  have  had 
the  right  to  the  command  for  the  remaining  ten  months  of 
the  year  49  B.C.,  pending  the  arrival  of  his  successor.  But 
by  the  new  regulation,  made  specially  for  this  purpose 
during  the  dictatorship  of  Pompeius  in  52  B.C.  (see  p.  433), 
the  senate  might  immediately  fill  up  any  legally  vacant 
governorship,  and  Caesar  might  therefore  be  relieved  of 
his  command  on  March  1st,  49  B.C. 

Secondly,  indirectly.  Even  without  this  special  regu- 
lation passed  for  the  purpose,  the  senate  had  a  very  simple 
means  of  compelling  Caesar  to  leave  his  command  before 
entering  upon  his  consulship.  The  law  required  every 
candidate  for  the  consulship  to  appear  in  person  before  the 

{residing  magistrate,  and  to  enter  his  name  upon  the  official 
ist  before  the  election ;  that  is,  about  half  a  year  before 
entering  on  office.  It  was  probably  assumed  at  Luca  that 
Caesar  should  be  exempted  from  this  regulation,  as  was 
often  done  with  regard  to  particular  candidates.  At  any 
rate,  during  the  dictatorship  of  Pompeius  in  52  B.C.,  Caesar's 
appearance  in  person  was  dispensed  with  by  a  tribunician 
law  ;  but  when  the  new  election  ordinance  (p.  433)  was 
passed,  the  obligation  to  appear  in  person  was  repeated  in 


444  EISTOEY  OF  LOME, 

general  terms,  and  no  exemption  in  Caesar's  case  was  men- 
tioned. Caesar  complained,  and  an  exempting  clause  was 
interpolated  by  Pompeius,  but  not  confirmed  by  the  people, 
and  was  therefore  legally  of  no  effect.  The  whole  matter  is 
a  good  example  of  Pompeius'  tortuous  methods.  "  Where 
he  might  have  simply  kept  by  the  law,  he  had  preferred 
first  to  make  a  spontaneous  concession,  then  to  recall  it, 
and  lastly  to  palliate  this  recall  in  a  manner  most  illegal."' 

The  remaining  events  to  the  outbreak  of  the  civil  war 
may  be  viewed  in  three  separate  stages. 

I.  The  discussion  at  the  beginning  of  51  B.C. 

In  accordance  with  custom,  the  governorships  of  the  year 
49  B.C.,  which  were  to  be  filled  by  consuls,  would  be  delibe- 
rated upon  in  the  beginning  of  51  B.C.  On  this  occasion  the 
consul  Marcus  Marcellus  proposed  that  the  two  provinces 
of  Caesar  should  be  banded  over  on  March  1,49  B.C.,  to 
the  two  consuls  who  were  to  hold  governorships  for  that 
year.  The  long  repressed  torrent  of  indignation  against 
Caesar  burst  forth.  The  followers  of  Cato  demanded  that 
the  exemption  of  Caesar  from  appearing  to  announce  his 
name  in  person  should  be  held  invalid  ;  that  the  soldiers  of 
his  legions  who  had  served  their  time  should  be  at  once 
discharged ;  and  that  the  bestowal  by  him  of  burgess- 
rights  and  the  establishment  of  colonies  in  upper  Italy 
should  be  considered  null  and  void.  Marcellus,  in  ac- 
cordance with  this  last  proposal,  caused  a  senator  of  the 
Caesarian  colony  of  Comum  to  be  scourged  as  a  non-burgess. 

On  the  other  side,  the  supporters  of  Caesar  affirmed  that 
both  equity  and  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Gaul  required 
that  Caesar  should  be  allowed  to  hold  his  command  and 
his  consulship  simultaneously ;  they  pointed  out  that 
Pompeius  had  in  time  past  combined  the  Spanish  pro- 
vinces and  the  consulship,  and  was  even  now  in  possession 
of  proconsular  power  for  the  purpose  of  the  supply  of 
grain,  of  the  Spanish  governorships,  and  of  the  supreme 
command  in  Italy.  The  timid  majority  in  the  senate 
prevented  any  resolution  being  taken  for  months.  Pom- 
peius at  last  declared  on  the  whole  in  favour  of  the 
proposal  of  Marcellus,  while  hinting  at  certain  concessions 
which  might  perhaps  be  made  to  Caesar ;  and  ultimately 
(September  29,  51  B.C.)  the  nomination  of  successors  was 
postponed  to  the  last  day  of  February,  50  B.C. 


THE  RUPTURE.  445 

Meanwhile  the  republicans  tried  to  break  up  Caesar's  array 
by  inducing  the  veterans  to  apply  for  their  discharge  ;  and 
the  elections  for  the  next  year  were  thoroughly  unfavour- 
able to  Caesar.  The  latter  had  at  length  quelled  the  in- 
surrection in  Gaul,  and  had  moved  one  of  his  legions  to 
North  Italy.  War  was  clearly  inevitable,  but  even  now  he 
was  willing  to  make  great  sacrifices ;  it  was  still  advisable 
to  keep  the  legions  for  some  time  in  Gaul,  and  he  had  still 
perhaps  some  hope  in  the  strong  desire  for  peace  which  the 
majority  of  the  senate  entertained.  When  the  senate,  at  the 
suggestion  of  Pompeius,  requested  each  general  to  furnish 
a  legion  for  the  Parthian  war,  and  when  Pompeius  at  the 
same  time  demanded  from  Caesar  the  legion  lent  him  some 
years  before,  Caesar  complied,  and  the  two  legions  from  his 
army  were  kept  by  the  government  at  Capua.  For  the 
discussions  of  50  B.C.  Caesar  had  succeeded  in  buying  the 
services  of  one  consul,  Lucius  Aemilius  Paullus,  and,  above 
all,  one  of  the  tribunes,  Gaius  Curio,  a  man  of  brilliant 
talents  but  of  the  most  profligate  character.*  Caesar  paid 
his  debts,  amounting  to  £575,000  of  our  money,  and  thence- 
forth his  great  gifts  of  eloquence  and  energy  were  exerted 
for,  instead  of  against,  the  enemy  of  the  senate. 

II.  The  discussions  of  the  year  50  B.C. 

In  March,  50  B.C., when  the  question  of  Caesar's  successors 
arose,  Curio  approved  of  the  decree  of  the  year  before 
superseding  Caesar  on  March  1,  49  B.C.,  but  demanded  that 
it  should  be  extended  to  Pompeius  ;  he  argued  that  the  con- 
stitution could  be  rendered  safe  only  by  the  removal  of  all 
exceptional  positions  ;  and  at  the  same  time,  declared  that 
he  would  prevent  any  one-sided  action  against  Caesar  by 
his  tribimician  veto.  Caesar  at  once  declared  his  consent 
to  Curio's  proposal ;  but  Pompeius  would  only  reply  that 
Caesar  must  resign,  and  that  he  himself  meant  soon  to  do  so, 
though  he  mentioned  no  definite  term.  The  decision  was 
delayed  for  months,  but  at  last  Curio's  proposal  was 
adopted  by  370  votes  against  20 — all  that  the  extreme 
republican  party  could  muster.  All  good  citizens  rejoiced, 
and  the  party  of  Cato  was  in  despair.  The  latter  had 
undertaken  to  force  the  senate  to  a  declaration  of  war,  and 
they  were  bitterly  reproached  for  their  failure  by  Pompeius. 
As  matters  stood,  Pompeius  and  Caesar  were  both  recalled 
*  "  Homo  ingeniosissime  nequam"  (Vellei.  ii.  48).' 


44G  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

by  the  senate ;  and  while  Caesar  was  ready  to  comply, 
Pompeius  refused — the  champion  of  the  constitution  and 
the  aristocracy  treated  the  constitutional  decisions  of  the 
senate  as  null !  But  the  extreme  republicans  were  deter- 
mined to  bring  matters  to  a  crisis.  A  rumour  arose  that 
Caesar  had  moved  four  legions  across  the  Alps,  and  stationed 
them  at  Placentia.  This  was  an  act  quite  within  his 
prerogative,  and  the  rumour 'was  shown  to  be  groundless, 
and  yet  the  consul  Gaius  Marcellus  proposed,  on  the 
strength  of  it,  to  give  Pompeius  orders  to  march  against 
Caesar.  When  the  senate  rejected  the  proposal,  Marcellus, 
in  concert  with  the  two  consuls  designate  for  49  B.C.,  who 
were  also  Catonians,  proceeded  to  Pompeius  and  requested 
him,  on  their  own  authority,  to  put  himself  at  the  head  of 
the  legions  at  Capua,  and  to  summon  the  Italian  militia  to 
arms.  No  more  informal  authorization  for  the  commence- 
ment of  civil  war  could  be  imagined,  but  it  was  enough 
for  Pompeius,  and  he  left  Rome  in  December,  50  B.C. 

III.  Caesar's  ultimatum. 

Caesar  had  fully  attained  his  object  of  throwing  upon  his 
opponents  the  onus  of  declaring  war;  and  while  himself 
keeping  on  legal  ground,  he  had  compelled  Pompeius  to 
begin  the  struggle  as  the  general  of  a  revolutionary 
minority  of  the  senate  which  overawed  tho  majority.  It 
was  now  his  interest  to  strike  a  blow  as  soon  as  possible ; 
his  opponents  were  only  just  beginning  to  make  prepara- 
tions, and  it  might  be  possible  to  surprise  the  city  un- 
defended, or  even  to  seize  all  Italy  and  shut  them  off  from 
their  best  resources.  Curio  represented  these  considera- 
tions strongly  to  his  chief,  and  Caesar  at  once  sent  to  hurry 
on  the  nearest  legion  to  Ravenna.  Meanwhile  he  sent  an 
ultimatum  to  Rome,  in  which  he  dropped  all  counter- 
demands,  offered  to  resign  Transalpine  Gaul  and  dismiss 
eight  of  his  ten  legions,  if  only  the  senate  would  allow  him 
either  Cisalpine  Gaul  and  Illyria  with  one  legion,  or  Cis- 
alpine Gaul  alone  with  two — and  that  not  up  to  his  in- 
vestiture with  the  consulship,  but  only  till  the  close  of  the 
consular  elections  for  48  B.C.  It  may  almost  be  doubted 
whether  Caesar  can  possibly  have  been  sincere  in  these 
proposals ;  but  it  is  probable  that  he  committed  the  fault 
of  playing  too  bold  a  game,  and  that  if  his  ultimatum  had 
been  accepted  he  would  have  made  good  his  word.     Curio 


TEE  RUPTURE  447 

undertook  once  more  to  enter  the  lion's  den.  On  the  1st  of 
January,  49  B.C.,  he  delivered  his  master's  letter  in  a  full 
meeting  of  the  senate.  "  The  grave  words  of  Caesar,  in 
which  he  set  forth  the  imminence  of  civil  war,  the  general 
wish  for  peace,  the  arrogance  of  Pompeius,  and  his  own 
yielding  disposition  with  all  the  irresistible  force  of  truth  ; 
the  proposals  for  a  compromise,  of  a  moderation  which 
doubtless  surprised  his  own  partisans ;  the  distinct  declara- 
tion that  this  was  the  last  time  that  he  should  offer  his  hand 
for  peace,  made  the  deepest  impression."  The  sentiment 
of  the  majority  was  so  doubtful  that  the  consuls  would 
not  allow  a  vote  to  be  taken,  even  on  the  proposal  of  Marcus 
Marcellus,  to  defer  the  determination  till  the  Italian  levy 
could  be  under  arms  to  protect  the  senate.  The  consul 
Lentulus  said  openly  that  he  would  act  on  his  own  authority 
whatever  the  senate  might  decree,  and  Pompeius  let  it  be 
known  that  he  would  take  up  the  cause  of  the  senate 
now  or  never.  Thus  overawed,  the  senate  decreed  that 
Caesar  should,  at  no  distant  day,  give  up  Transalpine  Gaul 
to  Lucius  Domitius  Ahenobarbus,  and  Cisalpine  Gaul  to 
Marcus  Servilius  Novianus,  and  should  dismiss  his  army, 
failing  which  he  should  be  esteemed  a  traitor.  The 
Caesarian  tribunes  who  tried  to  veto  the  decree  were 
menaced  with  death  in  the  senate-house,  and  had  to  fly 
in  Slaves'  clothing  from  the  capital.  The  senate  declared 
the  country  in  danger,  called  all  citizens  to  arms,  and  all 
magistrates,  faithful  to  the  constitution,  to  place  them- 
selves at  their  head  (January  7th,  49  B.C.). 

Hesitation  was  now  no  longer  possible  for  Caesar.  He 
called  together  the  soldiers  of  the  thirteenth  legion,  which 
had  now  arrived  at  Ravenna,  and  set  before  them  them  the 
whole  circumstances.  He  spoke  not  to  the  dregs  of  the 
city,  but  to  young  men  from  the  towns  and  villages  of 
northern  Italy  who  were  capable  of  real  enthusiasm  for 
liberty,  who  had  received  from  Caesar  the  burgess  rights 
which  the  government  had  refused  them,  and  whom 
Caesar's  fall  would  leave  once  more  at  the  mercy  of  the 
fasces  (see  p.  444).  He  set  before  them  the  thanks  which 
the  nobility  were  preparing  for  the  general  and  the  army 
which  had  conquered  Gaul,  the  overawing  of  the  senate 
by  the  extreme  minority,  and  the  last  violation  of  the 
tribunate  of  the  people,  wrested  the  hundred  years  ago 


448  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

by  their  fathers  from  the  nobility.  And  when  he  sum- 
moned them,  as  the  general  of  the  popular  party,  to  follow 
him  in  the  last  inevitable  struggle  against  the  despised 
perfidious  aristocracy,  not  an  officer  or  soldier  held  back. 
At  the  head  of  his  vanguard  Caesar  crossed  the  Rubicon, 
the  narrow  brook  which  separated  his  province  from  Italy, 
and  which  it  was  forbidden,  by  the  constitution,  to  the 
proconsul  of  Gaul  to  pass. 


AUTHORITIES. 

Egypt — Dio.  xxxix.  55-59. 

Parthian  war— Plut.  Anton.  5  ;    Crass.  16-end.     Appian   Syr.   51. 

Dio.  xl.  12-30.     Liv.  105,  106,  108.     Flor.  iii.  11 ;  iv.  2.     Veil. 

ii.  46.     Strab.  xi.     Justin,  xlii.  4. 
Rupture   with    Caesar—  Plut.  Caee.  29-32;    Pomp.  56-60;   Cic.  35. 

Appian  B.  C.  25-33.     Caes.  Bell.  Civ.  init.     Suet.  Jul.  26-32. 

Liv.    107-109.     Flor.   iv.  ii.   13-17.     Dio.  xl.    56-66;    xli.   1-3. 

Cic.  Watson,  ii.  31-45,  especially  33  and  34  (ad  Fani.  viii.  4,  8). 

For  the  whole  of  the  letters  of  this  period  see  Nobbe's  list,  p.  967. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

THE  CIVIL  WAR. 

49  R.c.  Resources  of  either  side — Caesar  occupies  Rome — The 
Pompeians  depart  for  Epirus — Spanish  campaign — Siege  of 
Ilerda — Surrender  of  Pompeians — Siege  of  Massilia — Conquest 
of  Sardinia,  Corsica,  and  Sicily — Death  of  Curio  in  Africa. — 
48  B.C.  Caesar  crosses  to  Epirus — Compelled  to  retreat  towards 
Thessaly — Battle  of  Pharsalus — Flight  and  death  of  Pompeiua. 
— 4-7  B.C.  Caesar  besieged  in  Alexandria  during  the  winter — 
Relieved  by  Mithradates  of  Pergamus — Affairs  of  Asia  Minor 
— Battle  of  Ziela. — i6  B.C.  War  in  Africa — Battle  of  Thapsus — 
Death  of  Cato. 

Before  describing  the  course  of  the  struggle  between  the 
two  aspirants  to  the  crown  of  Rome,  it  will  be  well  to 
examine  the  resources  at  the  disposal  of  each. 

Caesar's  authority  was  wholly  unlimited  within  his  own 
party ;  in  all  matters,  military  and  political,  the  decision 
lay  with  him.  He  had  no  confederates,  only  adjutants, 
who,  as  a  rule,  were  soldiers  trained  to  obey  uncondition- 
ally. So,  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  one  officer  alone,  and  he 
the  foremost  of  all,  refused  him  obedience.  Titus  Labienus 
had  shared  with  Caesar  all  his  political  and  military 
vicissitudes  of  defeat  and  victory.  In  Gaul  he  had  always 
held  an  independent  command,  and  had  frequently  led 
half  the  army.  As  late  as  the  year  50  B.o.,  Caesar  had 
given  to  him  supreme  command  in  Cisalpine  Gaul  ;  but 
from  this  very  position  he  entered  into  a  treaty  with  the 
other  side,  and  on  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  went  at  once 
to  the  camp  of  Pompeius.  It  was  the  one  great  dis- 
advantage on  Caesar's  side  that  he  had  no  officers  to 
whom  he  could  entrust  a  separate  command,  but  this  was 

29 


450  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

quite  outbalanced  by  the  unity  of  the  supreme  leadership 
— the  indispensable  condition  of  success. 

The  army  numbered  nine  legions — at  mo*t  fifty  thou- 
sand men,  two-thirds  of  whom  had  served  in  all  the 
campaigns  against  the  Celts.  The  cavalry  consisted  of 
mercenaries  from  Germany  and  Noricum,  and  had  been 
well  tried  in  the  war  against  Vercingetorix.  The  physical 
condition  of  the  soldiers  was  beyond  all  praise ;  by  the 
careful  selection  of  recruits  and  by  training  they  had  been 
brought  to  a  perfection  never  perhaps  surpassed  in  march- 
ing power  and  in  readiness  for  immediate  departure  at  any 
moment.  Their  courage  and  their  esprit  de  corps  had  been 
equally  developed  by  Caesar's  system  of  rewards  and 
punishments — a  system  so  perfectly  carried  out  that  the 
pre-eminence  of  particular  soldiers  or  divisions  was  acqui- 
esced in  even  by  their  less  favoured  comrades.  Their 
discipline  was  strict  but  not  harassing ;  and  while  main- 
tained with  unrelenting  rigour  in  the  presence  of  the 
enemy,  was  relaxed  at  other  times,  especially  after  victory, 
when  even  irregularities  and  outrages  of  a  very  question- 
able kind  went  unpunished.  Mutiny  was  never  pardoned, 
in  either  the  ringleaders  or  their  dupes.  Caesar  took  care 
that  victory  should  be  associated  in  the  minds  of  both 
officers  and  soldiers  with  hopes  of  personal  gain ;  every 
one  had  his  share  of  the  spoil,  and  the  most  lavish  gifts 
were  promised  at  the  triumph.  At  the  same  time  that 
unquestioning  obedience  was  exacted  from  all,  yet  all  were 
allowed  some  glimpse  at  the  general's  aims  and  springs 
of  action,  so  that  each  might  feel  that  he  was  doing  his 
part  towards  the  attainment  of  the  common  object,  and  no 
one  could  complain  that  he  was  treated  as  a  mere  instru- 
ment. During  the  long  years  of  warfare  a  sense  of 
comradeship  grew  up  between  soldiers  and  leader.  They 
were  his  clients,  whose  services  he  was  bound  to  requite, 
and  whose  wrongs  he  was  bound  to  revenge.  The  result 
was  that  Caesar's  soldiers  were,  and  knew  themselves  to 
be,  a  match  for  ten  times  their  number,  and  that  their 
fidelity  to  him  was  unchangeable  and  unparalleled.  With 
one  exception,  no  Roman  soldier  or  officer  ref  used  to  follow 
him  into  the  civil  war,  and  the  legionaries  even  determined 
to  give  credit  for  the  double  pay  which  Caesar  promised 
them  from  the  beginning  of  the  war,  while  every  sub- 


THE  CIVIL    WAR.  451 

altera  officer  equipped  and  paid  a  trooper  out  of  his  own 
purse. 

Thus  Caesar  had  two  requisites  for  success — unlimited 
authority  and  a  magnificent  and  trustworthy  army.  But 
his  power  extended  over  a  very  limited  space.  It  was 
based  essentially  on  the  province  of  Upper  Italy,  which 
was  indeed  devoted  to  him  and  furnished  an  ample  supply 
of  recruits.  But  in  Italy  the  mass  of  the  burgesses  were 
all  for  his  opponents,  and  expected  from  Caesar  only  a 
renewal  of  the  Marian  and  Cinnan  atrocities.  His  only 
friends  in  Italy  were  the  rabble  and  the  ruined  of  all  classes 
— friends  infinitely  more  dangerous  than  foes.  The  newly 
conquered  territory  in  Gaul  could  not,  of  course, be  relied  on, 
and  in  Narbo  the  constitutional  party  had  many  adherents. 
Among  the  independent  princes  Caesar  had  tried  to  effect 
something  by  gifts  and  promises,  but  without  important 
result  except  in  the  case  of  Voctio,  king  of  Noricum,  from 
whom  cavalry  recruits  were  obtained. 

Caesar  thus  began  the  war  without  other  resources 
than  efficient  adjutants,  a  faithful  army,  and  a  devoted 
province.  Pompeius,  on  the  other  hand,  was  chief  of  the 
Bx>man  commonwealth  and  master  of  all  the  resources  at 
the  disposal  of  the  legitimate  government  of  the  empire. 
But  unity  of  leadership  was  inconsistent  with  the  nature 
of  a  coalition  ;  and  though  Pompeius  was  nominated  by 
the  senate  sole  generalissimo  by  land  and  sea,  he  could  not 
prevent  the  senate  itself  from  exercising  the  political  su- 
premacy, or  from  occasionally  interfering  even  in  military 
matters.  Twenty  years  of  antagonism  made  it  impossible 
for  either  party  of  the  coalition  to  place  complete  con- 
fidence in  the  other. 

In  resources  Caesar's  opponents  had  an  overwhelming 
superiority.  They  had  exclusive  command  of  the  sea,  and 
the  disposal  of  all  ports,  ships,  and  naval  material.  The 
two  Spains  were  specially  devoted  to  Pompeius,  and  the 
other  provinces  had  during  recent  years  been  put  into  safe 
hands.  The  client  states  were  all  for  Pompeius  ;  many  of 
them  had  been  brought  into  close  personal  relations  with 
him  at  different  times.  He  had  been  the  companion  in 
arms  of  the  kings  of  Numidia  and  of  Mauretania  ;  he  had 
re-established  the  kingdoms  of  Bosporus,  Armenia,  and 
Cappadocia,  and  created  that  of  Deiotarus.    He  had  caused 


452  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

the  rale  of  the  Lagidae  to  be  re-established  in  Egypt,  and 
even  Massilia  was  indebted  to  him  for  an  extension  of 
territory.  Moreover,  the  democratic  policy  handed  down 
from  Gains  Gracchus  of  uniting  the  dependent  states  and  of 
setting  up  provincial  colonies  was  dreaded  by  the  dependent 
princes,  more  especially  by  Juba,  king  of  Numidia,  whose 
kingdom  Curio  had  lately  proposed  to  annex.  Even  the 
Pai'thians  by  the  convention  between  Pacorus  and  Bibulus 
(p.  439)  were  practically  in  alliance  with  the  aristocracy. 

In  Italy,  not  only  the  aristocracy  but  the  capitalists 
were  bitterly  opposed  to  Caesar,  together  with  the  small 
capitalists  and  landowners,  and  generally  all  classes  who 
had  anything  to  lose. 

The  army  of  Pompeius  consisted  chiefly  of  the  seven 
Spanish  legions —troops  in  every  way  trustworthy, — and 
of  scattered  divisions  in  Syria,  Asia,  Macedonia,  Africa, 
and  Sicily.  In  Italy  there  were  the  two  legions  lately 
given  over  by*  Caesar — not  more  than  seven  thousand 
men,  and,  of  course,  of  doubtful  trustworthiness.  There 
were  also  three  legions  remaining  from  the  levies  of  54  B.C. 
(p.  428),  and  the  Italian  levy,  which  had  been  sworn  to 
allegiance  and  then  dismissed  on  furlough.  Altogether  the 
Italian  troops  wrhich  might,  within  a  very  short  time,  be 
made  available,  amounted  to  about  sixty  thousand  men. 
Cavalry  there  was  none  ;  but  a  nucleus  of  three  hundred 
men  was  soon  formed  by  Pompeius,  out  of  the  mounted 
herdsmen  of  Apulia. 

Under  such  circumstances  the  war  began,  early  in 
January,  49  B.C.  Caesar  had  only  one  legion — five 
thousand  men  and  three  hundred  cavalry — at  Ravenna, 
distant  by  road  about  240  miles  from  Rome.  Pompeius 
had  two  weak  legions — seven  thousand  infantry  and  a 
small  force  of  cavalry — at  Luceria,  about  equally  distant 
from  Rome.  The  remainder  of  Caesar's  troops  were  either 
on  the  Saone  and  Loire  or  in  Belgica,  while  Pompeius's 
reserves  were  already  arriving  at  their  rendezvous.  Never- 
theless Caesar  resolved  to  assume  the  offensive  :  in  the 
spring  Pompeius  would  be  able  to  act  with  the  Spanish 
troops  in  Transalpine  and  with  his  Italian  troops  in  Cis- 
alpine Gaul ;  but  at  the  moment  he  might  be  disconcerted 
by  the  suddenness  of  the  attack. 

Accordingly  Marcus  Antonius  pushed  forward   across 


THE  CIVIL   WAR.  453 

the  Apennines  to  Arretinm,  while  Caesar  advanced  along 
the  coast.  The  recruiting  officers  of  Pompeius  and  their 
recruits  fled  at  the  news  of  his  approach  ;  several  small 
successes  were  gained,  and  Caesar  resolved  to  advance 
upon  Rome  itself,  rather  than  upon  the  army  of  Luceria. 
A  panic  seized  the  city  when  the  news  arrived  ;  Pompeius 
decided  not  to  defend  it,  and  the  senators  and  consuls 
hurried  to  leave,  not  even  delaying  to  secure  the  state 
treasure.  At  Teanum  Sidicinum  fresh  proposals  of  Caesar 
were  considered,  in  which  he  again  offered  to  dismiss  his 
army  and  hand  over  his  provinces  if  Pompeius  would 
depart  to  Spain  and  if  Italy  were  disarmed.  The  reply 
was  that  if  Caesar  would  at  once  return  to  his  province 
the  senate  would  bind  itself  to  procure  the  fulfilment 
of  his  demands.  As  to  the  war,  Pompeius  was  ordered  to 
advance  with  the  legions  from  Luceria  into  Picenum,  and 
personally  to  call  together  tbe  levy  of  that  district,  and 
try  to  stop  the  invader. 

But  Caesar  was  already  in  Picenum.  Auximum,  Came- 
rinum,  and  Asculum  fell  into  his  hands  ;  and  such  of  the 
recruits  as  were  not  dispersed  left  the  district  and  repaired 
to  Corfinium,  where  tbe  Marsian  and  Paelignian  levies 
were  to  assemble.  Here  Lucius  Domitius  Ahenobarbus  was 
in  command ;  and  instead  of  conducting  the  recruits, 
who  now  amounted  to  fifteen  thousand  men,  to  Luceria 
according  to  the  instructions  of  Pompeius,  he  remained 
where  he  was,  expecting  Pompeius  to  come  to  his  relief. 
Instead  of  Pompeius  Caesar  arrived,  now  at  the  head  of 
forty  thousand  men.  Domitius  had  not  the  courage  to  hold 
the  place  ;  neither  did  he  resolve  to  surrender  it,  but  rather 
to  escape  during  the  night  with  his  aristocratic  officers. 
But  his  dastardly  plan  was  betrayed  ;  the  troops  mutinied, 
arrested  their  staff,  and  handed  over  the  town  to  Caesar. 
Thereupon  the  forces  in  Alba  and  in  Tarracina  laid  down 
their  arms;  a  third  division,  of  3500  men,  in  Sulmo  had 
previously  surrendered. 

As  soon  as  Picenum  wis  lost,  Pompeius  had  determined 
to  abandon  Italy  and  had  set  out  at  once  for  Brundisium. 
Here  all  the  available  troops  were  assembled,  to  the  number 
of  twenty-five  thousand ;  part  of  them  were  at  once  con- 
veyed across  in  the  ships ;  the  remaining  ten  thousand 
were  besieged  by  Caesar  in  Brundisium,  but  were  skil- 


454  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

fully  withdrawn  by  Pompeius  before  Caesar  could  close  the 
harbour. 

In  two  months  Caesar  had  broken  up  an  army  of  ten 
legions,  and  made  himself  master  of  the  state  chest,  of  the 
capital,  and  of  the  whole  peninsula  of  Italy.  But  though  his 
resources  were  thus  largely  increased,  the  military  difficul- 
ties of  the  situation  were  proportionally  complicated.  He 
had  now  to  leave  behind  a  large  garrison  in  Italy,  and  to 
guard  against  the  closing  of  the  seas  and  the  cutting  off  of 
grain  supplies  by  his  opponents.  Financial  difficulties,  too, 
soon  arose,  now  that  Caesar  had  to  feed  the  population  of 
the  capital  while  the  revenues  of  the  East  were  still  in  the 
enemy's  hands. 

The  general  expectation  was  that  confiscations  and  pro- 
scriptions would  be  resorted  to.  Friends  and  foes  saw  in 
Caesar  a  second  Catilina;  and  it  must  be  allowed  that 
neither  his  own  antecedents  nor  the  character  of  the  men 
who  now  surrounded  him — men  of  broken  reputation  and 
ruined  fortunes  like  Quintus  Hortensius,  Curio,  and  Marcus 
Antonius — were  reassuring  But  both  friends  and  foes  were 
soon  undeceived  ;  from  the  beginning  of  hostilities  the 
common  soldiers  were  forbidden  to  enter  a  town  armed, 
and  the  people  were  everywhere  protcctei  from  injury. 
When  Corfininm  was  surrendered  late  at  night,  Caesar 
postponed  the  occupation  of  the  town  until  the  next  day, 
to  prevent  confusion  and  outrage  in  the  darkness.  Every- 
where the  officers  captured  were  allowed  to  carry  off 
their  private  property,  and  in  his  worst  financial  straits 
Caesar  preferred  borrowing  from  his  friends  to  levying 
exactions  from  his  foes.  The  aristocrats  indeed,  far  from 
being  appeased  by  Caesar's  moderation,  were  only  goaded 
to  more  frantic  hatred ;  but  the  mass  of  quiet  people,  in 
whose  eyes  material  interests  were  more  important  than 
politics,  were  completely  gained  over.  Even  the  senators 
who  had  ventured  to  remain  behind  acquiesced  in  Caesar's 
rule.  His  object  was  fully  attained:  anarchy,  and  even 
the  alarm  of  anarchy,  had  been  kept  under, — an  incalculable 
gain  with  regard  to  the  future  reorganization  of  the  state. 
The  anarchists,  of  course,  were  bitterly  disappointed,  and 
showed  a  spirit  which  might  be  expected  at  some  future 
time  to  give  trouble.  The  republicans  of  all  shades  were 
neither  converted  nor  disarmed.     In  their  eyes  their  duty 


THE  CIVIL   WAR.  455 

to  the  constitution  absolved  them  from  every  other  con- 
sideration. The  less  decided  members  of  the  party  who 
accepted  peace  and  protection  from  the  monarch,  were  none 
the  more  friendly  to  him  in  their  hearts,  and  the  con- 
sciences of  the  more  honourable  among  them  smote  them 
when  they  thought  of  other  members  of  the  party  who 
had  gone  into  exile  rather  than  compromise  their  prin- 
ciples. Besides,  emigration  had  become  fashionable  ;  it 
was  plebeian  to  remain  and  perhaps  take  a  seat  in  the 
Caesarian  senate  of  nobodies,  instead  of  emigrating  with 
the  Domitii  and  the  Metelli. 

Caesar  had  begun  the  war  as  the  protector  of  the  over- 
awed senate  against  the  violent  minority ;  but  the  same 
inertness  which  had  made  it  possible  for  Caesar  to  prevent 
strong  action  on  the  part  of  his  opponent,  prevented  him 
from  obtaining  aid  from  the  senate  himself.  The  first 
meeting  was  on  April  1st;"  but  Caesar  could  not  procure 
approval  of  his  acts  or  power  to  continue  the  war ;  he 
then  tried  in  vain  to  be  named  dictator.  When  he  sent 
men  to  take  possession  of  the  treasure,  the  tribune  Lucius 
Metellus  attempted  to  protect  the  state  chest  with  his 
person,  and  had  to  be  removed  by  force.  And  at  length 
Caesar  was  obliged  to  tell  the  senate  that,  since  it 
refused  him  its  assistance,  he  would  proceed  without  it. 
He  appointed  Marcus  Aemilius  Lepidus  prefect  of  the  city, 
and  hastened  to  resume  the  war. 

Pompeius,  for  whatever  reason,  had  preferred  to  remain 
in  Greece  rather  than  to  go  to  Spain,  where  he  had  able 
lieutenants,  a  strong  army,  and  provinces  devoted  to  him. 
Accordingly  Caesar  had  the  option  of  directing  his  first 
attack  against  Pompeius  himself  in  the  East,  or  against 
the  strong  Spanish  army  under  his  lieutenant.  He  had 
already  collected  on  the  lower  Rhone  nine  of  his  best 
legions  and  six  thousand  cavalry  ;  but  his  enemies  had 
been  active  in  the  same  region.  Lucius  Domitius  had 
induced  Massilia  to  declare  against  him  and  to  refuse  a 
passage  to  his  troops ;  and  the  five  best  Spanish  legions, 
together  with  forty  thousand  Spanish  infantry  and  five 
thousand  cavalry,  were  on  their  way,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Afranius  and  Petreius,  to  close  the  passes  of 
the  Pyrpnees.  But  Caesar  anticipated  them,  and  the  line 
of  the  Pyrenees  was  lost  to  the  Pompeians.     The  latter 


456  E1ST0UY  OF  ROME. 

now  established  themselves  at  Ilerda  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Sicoris,  about  twenty  miles  north  of  its  junction  with 
the  Ebro.  To  the  south  of  the  town,  the  mountains 
approach  pretty  close  to  the  river;  to  the  north  stretches 
a  plain  commanded  by  the  town.  Connection  with  the 
left  bank  of  the  Sicoris  was  maintained  by  means  of  a 
single  solid  bridge  close  to  the  town.  The  Caesarians  were 
stationed  above  Ilerda,  between  the  river  Sicoris  and  its 
tributary  the  Cinga,  which  joins  it  below  the  town  ;  but 
they  could  not  make  good  their  ground  betwreen  the  Pom- 
peian  camp  and  the  town,  which  would  have  given  them 
command  of  the  stone  bridge,  and  consequently  they 
depended  for  their  communications  upon  two  temporary 
bridges  twenty  miles  higher  up  the  river.  These  were 
swept  away  by  the  floods,  and  the  whole  army  was  now 
cooped  up  in  the  narrow  space  between  the  two  streams. 
Famine  and  disease  appeared.  A  body  of  reinforcements 
from  Gaul,  together  with  foraging  parties  on  their  way  back 
to  the  camp,  to  the  number  of  six  thousand,  were  attacked 
and  dispersed  under  the  eyes  of  the  Caesarians  on  the  other 
side  of  the  river.  Had  the  river  been  adequately  guarded 
the  Pompeians  could  hardly  have  failed  of  success  :  but  the 
further  bank  was  observed  to  be  unoccupied ;  Caesar  suc- 
ceeded in  restoring  the  bridges  without  much  difficulty,  and 
provisions  again  entered  the  camp  in  abundance.  Soon 
his  superior  cavalry  scoured  the  country  far  and  wide,  and 
the  most  important  Spanish  communities  to  the  north,  some 
even  to  the  south,  of  the  Ebro  passed  over  to  him,  while 
the  Pompeians  began  to  feel  the  want  of  supplies.  They 
determined  to  retreat  south  of  the  Ebro,  but  it  was  neces- 
sary first  to  build  a  bridge  of  boats  over  that  river.  This 
was  done  at  a  point  below  the  mouth  of  the  Sicoris.  Caesar 
sought  by  all  means  to  detain  the  enemy,  but  was  unable 
to  do  so  as  long  as  he  had  not  control  of  the  bridge  of  Ilerda, 
since  there  was  no  ford.  His  soldiers  worked  night  and  day 
to  draw  off  the  river  by  canals,  so  that  infantry  might  wade 
it;  but  the  Pompeians  had  finish  d  the'r  bridge  over  the 
Ebro  before  Caesar  had  completed  his  canals,  and  he  could 
only  order  his  cavalry  to  follow  them  and  harass  their  rear. 
But  when  the  legions  saw  the  enemy  retreating  they  called 
upon  the  general  to  lead  them  on ;  they  entered  the  river, 
and  though  the  water  reached  their  shoulders  it  was  crossed 


THE  CIVIL   WAR.  457 

in  safety.  The  Pompeians  were  now  within  five  miles  of 
the  mountains  which  lined  the  north  bank  of  the  Ebro,  and 
wonld  soon  be  in  safety.  But,  harassed  by  the  enemy's 
attacks  and  exhausted  with  marching,  they  pitched  their 
camp  in  the  plain  ;  here  Caesar's  troops  overtook  them  and 
encamped  opposite,  and  in  this  position  both  armies  re- 
mained for  the  next  day.  On  tbe  morning  of  the  third 
day  Caesar's  infantry  set  out  to  turn  the  position  of  the 
Pompeians  and  bar  the  way  to  the  Ebro,  and,  in  spite  of 
all  the  latter  could  do,  they  found  themselves  anticipated. 
They  were  now  strategically  lost,  and,  in  spite  of  ample 
opportunity,  Caesar  refrained  from  attacking  them.  The 
soldiers  of  the  two  armies  began  to  fraternize  and  to  dis- 
cuss terms  of  surrender,  but  Petreius  cut  short  the  negotia- 
tions and  began  to  retreat  towards  Uerda,  where  were 
a  garrison  and  magazines.  Shut  in  between  the  Sicoris 
and  the  enemy,  their  difficulties  increased  at  every  step  : 
Caesar's  cavalry  occupied  the  opposite  bank  and  prevented 
them  from  crossing  the  river  to  gain  the  fortress,  and  at 
last  the  inevitable  capitulation  took  place  (August  2,  49 
B.C.).  Caesar  granted  to  soldiers  and  officers  life,  liberty, 
and  property,  and  did  not,  as  in  Italy,  compulsorily  enrol 
the  captives  in  his  army.  The  native  Spaniards  at  once 
returned  to  their  homes,  and  the  Italians  were  disbanded 
at  the  borders  of  Transalpine  and  Cisalpine  Gaul. 

In  Further  Spain,  Varro  determined  to  shut  himself  up 
in  Gades ;  but  when  this  town,  together  with  all  the  most 
notable  places  in  the  province,  gave  itself  up  to  Caesar, 
and  when  even  Italica  closed  its  gates  against  the 
Pompeian  general,  he  himself  resolved  to  capitulate. 

About  the  same  time  Massilia  surrendered.  By  sea, 
Caesar's  lieutenant,  Decimus  Brutus — the  same  who  had 
conquered  the  Veneti  (p.  408), — had  defeated  with  his  im- 
provised fleet  the  far  stronger  force  of  the  Massiliots. 
He  gained  a  second  victory  not  long  afterwards,  when  a 
small  squadron  of  Pompeians  under  Lucius  Nasidius  had 
arrived  to  reinforce,  and  completely  shut  the  besieged  from 
the  sea.  On  land  Gaius  Trebonius  pressed  forward  the 
siege  with  energy  ;  the  works  were  pushed  up  to  the  very 
walls  of  the  city,  when  the  besieged  promised  to  desist 
from  the  defence  if  Trebonins  would  suspend  operations 
until  Caesar  arrived.     The  armistice  was  granted,  but  was 


458  HISTORY  OF  HOME. 

tised  by  the  Massiliots  to  make  a  treacherous  sally ;  the 
struggle  was  renewed,  aud  the  city  once  more  invested. 
On  Caesar's  arrival  it  was  reduced  to  surrender  on  any 
terms.  Domitius  stole  away  in  a  boat.  The  garrison  aud 
inhabitants  were  protected  by  Caesar  from  the  fury  of  his 
legions,  but  the  city,  while  it  retained  its  freedom  and 
nationality,  lost  a  portion  of  its  territory  and  privileges. 

While  Caesar  was  occupied  in  Spain  his  lieutenants 
had  been  at  work  to  prevent  the  other  great  danger  which 
was  imminent,  namely,  the  starvation  of  Italy.  The 
Pompeians  commanded  the  sea  and  the  corn  provinces, 
Sardinia  and  Corsica  through  Marcus  Cotta,  Sicily  through 
Cato,  Africa  through  Varus  and  Juba,  king  of  Numidia. 
Sardinia  was  quickly  recovered  for  Caesar,  by  Quintus 
Valerius  ;  the  conquest  of  Sicily  and  Africa  was  entrusted 
to  Curio.  He  occupied  Sicily  without  a  blow,  and,  leaving 
two  legions  in  the  island,  he  embarked  with  the  remaining 
two  and  with  five  hundred  horse  for  Africa.  He  effected 
a  landing,  and  pitched  his  camp  near  Utica :  his  legions 
were  for  the  most  part  composed  of  men  taken  over  from 
the  enemy,  but  he  knew  well  how  to  gain  their  affections, 
and  at  the  same  time  showed  himself  a  capable  officer. 
He  was  successful  in  several  minor  engagements,  and  at 
length  put  to  flight  the  whole  forces  of  Varus,  and  pro- 
ceeded to  lay  siege  to  Utica.  But  there  came  news  that 
king  Juba  was  advancing  with  all  his  forces  to  its  relief, 
and  Curio  raised  the  siege  and  returned  to  his  former 
camp  to  wait  for  reinforcements.  Soon  afterwards  came 
a  second  report,  that  the  king  had  turned  back,  and  was 
sending  on  only  a  moderate  corps  under  Saburra.  Curio 
immediately  sent  forward  his  cavalry,  which  surprised  and 
inflicted  much  damage  upon  this  body  ;  he  then  hastened 
himself  to  complete  their  defeat,  and  succeeded  in  putting 
them  to  flight.  But  Saburra  was  not  destitute  of  support. 
Only  five  miles  distant  was  the  Numidian  main  force, 
which  was  now  seen  rapidly  approaching.  The  Roman 
cavalry  were  by  this  time  dispersed  in  pursuit,  all  but  a 
band  of  two  hundred,  who  with  the  infantry  were  com- 
pletely surrounded  in  the  plain.  In  vain  Curio  attempted 
to  cut  his  way  through  :  the  infantry  were  cut  down  to  a 
man  ;  only  a  few  of  the  cavalry  escaped.  Curio,  unable  to 
bear  the  shame  of  defeat,  fell  sword  in  hand,  and  on  the 


THE  CIVIL   WAR  459 

following  day  the  force  in  camp  near  Utica  surrendered 
on  receiving  news  of  the  disaster. 

The  expedition  had  been  successful  in  relieving  the 
most  urgent  wants  of  the  capital  by  the  occupation  of 
Sicily,  but  the  loss  of  Curio  was  irreparable.  He  was 
the  only  one  of  Caesar's  subordinates  who  had  a  touch  of 
genius  and  a  certain  magnetic  power  over  the  minds  of 
men. 

It  is  uncertain  what  had  been  Pompeius's  plan  of  cam- 
paign for  the  year  49  B.C.  Probably  the  Spanish  army 
was  meant  to  stand  on  the  defensive  until  the  Macedonian 
army  was  ready  to  march ;  a  junction  would  then  have 
been  effected  between  the  two  armies,  and  a  combined 
attempt  made  by  land  and  sea  to  recover  Italy.  In 
pursuance  probably  of  some  such  plan,  the  admirals  of 
Pompeius  in  the  Adriatic,  Marcus  Octavius  and  Lucius 
Scribonius  Libo,  attacked  Caesar's  fleet  under  Dolabella, 
destroyed  his  ships,  and  shut  up  Gaius  Antonius  with 
two  legions  in  the  island  of  Curicta.  All  attempts  to 
rescue  the  latter  failed,  and  the  majority  had  to  lay  down 
their  arms  and  were  incorporated  in  the  Pompeian  army. 
Octavius  proceeded  to  reduce  Illyria;  most  of  the  towns 
gave  themselves  up  to  him,  but  the  Caesarians  maintained 
themselves  obstinately  in  Salonae  and  Lissus. 

This,  the  only  result  obtained  by  the  Pompeian  fleet 
in  the  year  49  B.C.,  is  miserably  small  considering  the 
superiority  of  the  party  by  sea.  and  suggests  an  appalling 
picture  of  the  discord  and  mismanagement  which  prevailed 
in  the  ranks  of  the  coalition.  The  general  result  of  the 
campaign  had  been  complete  success  for  the  Caesarians 
in  one  quarter  and  partial  success  in  another,  while  the 
plan  of  Pompeius  had  been  completely  frustrated  by  the 
destruction  of  the  Spanish  army. 

But  though  nothing  was  done  to  obstruct  Caesar  in  the 
West,  no  effort  was  spared  to  consolidate  the  power  of 
the  republican  party  in  Macedonia.  Hither  flocked  the 
emigrants  from  Brundisium,  and  the  refugees  from  the 
"West :  Marcus  Cato  from  Sicily,  Lucius  Domitius  from 
Massilia,  Afranius  and  Varro  from  Spain.  The  senate  of 
the  emigration  which  met  at  Thessalonica  counted  nearly 
two  hundred  members,  including  almost  all  the  consulars. 
Out  of  scrupulous  regard  to  formal  law  they  called  them- 


460  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

selves — not  the  senate,  for  that  could  not  exist  beyond 
the  sacred  soil  of  the  city — but  "the  three  hundred,"  the 
ancient  normal  number  of  senators.  The  majority  indeed 
were  lukewarm,  and  only  obstructed  the  energy  of  others 
by  their  querulousness  and  sluggishness  :  but  the  violent 
minority  showed  no  want  of  activity.  With  them  the  in- 
dispensable preliminary  of  any  negotiations  for  peace  was 
the  bringing  over  of  Caesar's  head;  bis  partisans  were 
held  to  have  forfeited  life  and  property,  and  it  was  even 
proposed  to  punish  every  senator  who  had  remained  neutral 
in  the  struggle  or  had  emigrated  without  entering  the 
army.  Bibulus  and  Labienus  caused  all  soldiers  and  officers 
of  Caesar  who  fell  into  their  bands  to  be  executed,  and 
probably  the  main  reason  why  no  counter-revolution  broke 
out  in  Italy  during  Caesar's  absence  was  the  fear  of  the 
unbridled  fury  of  the  extreme  section  of  the  aristocracy. 
Cato  alone  had  the  force  and  the  courage  to  check  such 
proceedings  :  he  got  the  senate  to  prohibit  the  pillage  of 
subject  towns  and  the  putting  to  death  of  burgesses  other- 
wise than  in  battle,  and  confessed  that  he  feared  the 
victory  of  his  own  party  even  more  than  their  defeat. 

The  position  of  Pompeius  became  more  and  more  dis- 
agreeable after  the  events  of  the  year  49  B.C.  All  the 
failures  of  his  lieutenants  were  visited  upon  himself, 
while  the  newly  formed  senate  took  up  its  abode  almost 
in  his  head-quarters,  and  impeded  his  action  at  every  step. 
There  was  no  man  of  sufficient  mark  to  put  a  stop  to  these 
preposterous  doings ;  Cato,  who  alone  might  have  effected 
something,  was  jealously  kept  in  the  background  by  Pom- 
peius, and  Pompeius  himself  had  not  the  necessary  intellect 
or  decision. 

The  flower  of  the  troops  were  the  legions  brought  from 
Italy,  out  of  which,  with  recruits,  five  legions  were  formed. 
Two  others  were  on  their  way  from  Syria  and  one  from 
Cilicia,  and  three  more  were  formed  from  Romans  settled 
in  Crete,  Macedonia,  and  Asia  Minor.  Finally,  there  were 
two  thousand  volunteers,  and  the  contingents  of  the 
subjects.  The  militia  of  Epirus,  Aetolia,  and  Thrace  were 
called  out  to  guard  the  coast,  and  a  body  of  archers  and 
slingers  was  drawn  from  Greece  and  Asia  Minor.  Of  cavalry 
there  was  a  considerable  body  formed  from  the  young 
aristocracy  of  Rome  and  from  the  Apulian  slave  herdsmen ; 


THE  CIVIL   WAR.  461 

the  rest  consisted  of  contingents  from  the  subjects  and 
clients — Celts  from  the  garrison  of  Alexandria  (p.  372) 
and  from  the  princes  of  Galatia,  Thracians,  Cappadocians, 
mounted  archers  from  Commagene,  Armenians,  and 
Numidians  :  amounting  in  all  to  seven  thousand. 

The  fleet  numbered  five  hundred  sail ;  one  fifth  of  which 
were  Roman  vessels,  and  the  rest  from  the  Greek  and 
Asiatic  maritime  states.  Immense  stores  of  corn  and  war 
material  were  collected  at  Dyrrachium,  and  for  money  the 
whole  Roman  and  non-Roman  population  within  reach, 
subjects,  senators,  and  tax-farmers,  were  laid  under  contri- 
bution. The  temper  of  the  soldiers  was  good,  but  a  great 
part  of  the  army  consisted  of  newly  raised  troops,  and 
required  time  for  training  and  discipline. 

The  design  of  the  commander  was  to  unite  his  whole 
force,  naval  and  military,  during  the  winter  along  the 
coast  of  Epirus.  The  land  army  moved  slowly  from  its 
winter  quarters  at  Berrhoea  towards  Dyrrachium  ;  the 
Syrian  legions  were  not  expected  until  the  spring.  The 
admiral  Bibulus  was  already  at  Corcyra  with  110  ships. 

The  Pompeians  were  taking  their  time,  but  Caesar  was 
not  slow  to  act.  On  the  conclusion  of  the  Western  cam- 
paign he  had  ordered  the  best  of  his  troops  to  set  out 
immediately  for  Brundisium,  where  ships  of  war  and  trans- 
ports were  already  collected.  These  unparalleled  exertions 
thinned  the  ranks  of  the  legions  more  than  their  conflicts, 
and  the  mutiny  of  the  ninth  legion  at  Placentia  showed 
the  dangerous  temper  of  the  soldiers  ;  it  was  mastered  by 
the  personal  authority  of  Caesar,  and  at  present  the  evil 
spread  no  farther.  But  at  Brundisium  only  twelve  ships  of 
war  were  found,  and  the  transports  were  scarcely  sufficient 
to  convey  a  third  of  the  army,  which  numbered  twelve 
legions  and  ten  thousand  cavalry,  while  the  enemy  com- 
manded the  Adriatic  and  all  the  islands  and  harbours  of 
the  opposite  coast.  However,  on  the  4th  of  January,  48 
B.C.,  Caesar,  with  a  temerity  which  is  not  justified  by  the 
success  of  the  immediate  enterprise,  set  sail  with  six 
legions  and  six  hundred  horse.  The  Pompeians  were  not 
ready  to  attack,  and  the  first  freight  was  landed  in  the 
middle  of  the  Acroceraunian  cliffs.  The  vessels  returned 
to  bring  over  the  remainder  of  the  army.  Caesar  at  once 
began  to  disperse  the   Epirote  militia,  and  succeeded  in 


462  HISlOli      Oh    ROME. 

taking  Oricum  and  Apollonia,  while  Dyrrachium,  the  arsenal 
of  Pompeius,  was  in  the  greatest  danger. 

But  the  further  course  of  the  campaign  did  not  fulfil 
the  promise  of  this  brilliant  beginning.  Thirty  of  Caesar's 
transports  were  captured  by  Bibulus,  and  destroyed  with 
every  living  thing  on  board.  The  whole  coast,  from  the 
island  of  Sason  to  Corcyra,  was  closely  watched,  and  for  a 
time  even  Brundisium  was  blockaded.  Nor  was  Dyrrachium 
captured,  for  Pompeius  had  hastened  his  march  and 
secured  it  in  time.  Thus  Caesar  was  wedged  in  among  the 
rocks  of  Epirus,  between  the  immense  fleet  of  the  enemy 
and  a  land  army  twice  as  strong  as  hi9  own.  Pompeius 
was  in  no  hurry  to  attack,  but  established  himself  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  river  Apsus,  between  Dyrrachium  and 
Apollonia,  facing  Caesar  on  the  left  bank,  and  awaited  the 
arrival  of  the  Syrian  legions  which  had  wintered  at  Per- 
gamus. 

Caesar  was  rescued  from  this  perilous  position  by  the 
energy  of  Marcus  Antonius,  the  commandant  of  Italy. 
Again  the  transport  fleet  set  sail,  with  four  legions  and 
eight  hundred  horse.  The  wind  fortunately  carried  it 
past  the  galleys  of  Libo,  the  Pompeian  admiral ;  but  the 
same  wind  carried  it  northward,  past  the  camps  of  Caesar 
and  Pompeius  to  Lissus,  which  still  adhered  to  Caesar, 
where  it  was  enabled  to  land  only  by  the  most  marvellous 
good  fortune.  At  the  moment  when  the  enemy's  squadron 
overtook  the  ships  of  Antonius,  at  the  mouth  of  the  har- 
bour, the  wind  veered  and  drove  them  back  into  the  open 
sea.  Pompeius  was  unable  to  prevent  the  junction  of 
Caesar's  forces,  and  now  took  up  a  new  position  on  the 
Genusus,  between  the  river  Apsus  and  Dyrrachium.  When 
he  refused  to  give  battle,  Caesar  succeeded  in  throwing 
himself  with  his  best  marching  troops  between  the  enemy's 
camp  and  the  town  of  Dyrrachium,  on  which  it  rested ; 
and  Pompeius  again  changed  his  position,  and  encamped 
upon  a  small  plain  enclosed  between  the  fork  formed  by 
the  main  chain  of  the  Balkans,  which  ends  at  Dyrrachium, 
and  a  lateral  branch  which  runs  to  the  sea  in  a  south- 
westerly direction.  His  communication  with  the  town 
was  secured  by  the  fleet,  and  there  was  therefore  no  diffi- 
culty about  supplies,  while  to  Caesar's  camp  provisions 
were   brought   at  intervals   only  by  strong  detachments 


THE  CIVIL   WAR.  463 

sent  into  the  interior,  and  flesh,  barley,  and  even  roots  had 
to  be  eaten  by  the  legions  instead  of  \\  heat. 

Under  these  circumstances  inaction  meant  destruction 
to  the  Caesaria  s,  and  they  proceeded  to  occupy  the  heights 
commanding  the  plain  on  which  Pumpeius  lay.  They 
invested  his  army  with  a  chain  of  posts  sixteen  miles  long, 
and  cut  off  the  rivulets  which  flowed  into  the  plain,  thus 
hoping  to  compel  him  either  to  fight  or  to  embark.  At 
the  same  time,  as  at  Alesia  (p.  416),  Caesar  caused  a  second, 
outer,  line  of  entrenchments  to  be  formed,  to  protect  him- 
self against  attacks  from  Dyrrachium  or  from  attempts  to 
turn  his  position.  The  works  advanced  amid  incessant 
conflicts,  in  which  the  tried  valour  of  the  Caesarians  had 
usually  the  advantage.  At  one  point,  for  instance,  a 
single  cohort  maintained  itself  against  four  legions  for 
several  hours  until  help  arrived.  At  length  the  want  of 
fodder  and  water  began  to  be  so  severely  felt  by  the  Pom- 
peians,  that  it  was  absolutely  necessary  for  them  to  strike 
a  decisive  blow.  The  general  was  informed  by  some  Celtic 
deserters  that  the  enemy  had  neglected  to  secure  the  beach 
between  his  two  lines  of  entrenchments,  six  hundred  feet 
distant  from  each  other.  Pompeius  could  thus  attack  from 
three  sides  at  once.  While  the  inner  line  was  attacked 
from  the  camp  and  the  outer  line  by  light- armed  troops, 
conveyed  in  vessels  and  landed  beyond  it,  a  third  division 
landed  in  the  space  between  the  two  lines  and  attacked  in 
the  rear  the  defenders  who  were  already  sufficiently  occu- 
pied. The  entrenchment  next  the  sea  was  taken,  and  the 
second  was  with  difficulty  held  by  Antonius  against  the 
advance  of  the  enemy.  Soon  afterwards  Caesar  eagerly 
seized  an  opportunity  of  attacking  a  Pompeian  legion, 
which  had  become  isolated,  with  the  bulk  of  his  infantry ; 
but  a  valiant  resistance  was  made,  and  as  the  ground  had 
been  already  used  for  the  encampment  of  several  suc- 
cessive divisions,  it  was  much  intersected  by  mounds  and 
ditches.  Caesar's  right  wing  and  cavalry  missed  their  way  ; 
Pompeius,  advancing  with  five  legions  to  the  aid  of  his 
troops,  found  the  two  wings  of  the  enemy  separated  and 
one  of  them  isolated.  A  panic  seized  the  Caesarians ;  a 
disorderly  flight  ensued,  and  the  matter  ended  with  the 
loss  to  Caesar  of  one  thousand  of  his  best  soldiers.  But 
the  results  of  the  day's  fighting  were  more  serious  than 


464  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

this.  Caesar's  lines  were  broken.  The  cavalry  of  Pompeius 
now  ranged  at  will  over  the  adjacent  country,  and  ren- 
dered it  almost  impossible  for  him  to  obtain  provisions. 
Gnaeus  Pompeius  the  younger  had  destroyed  his  few  ships 
of  war  which  lay  at  Oricum,  and  soon  afterwards  burnt 
the  transports  at  Lissus.  Caesar  was  thus  cut  off  from 
the  sea  more  than  ever,  and,  in  fact,  was  completely  at  the 
mercy  of  Pompeius. 

It  was  now  open  to  Pompeius  to  attack  or  to  blockade 
his  enemy,  or  to  cross  in  person  to  Italy  with  the  main 
army  and  try  to  recover  the  peninsula.  But  he  left  his 
opponent  to  make  the  first  move,  and  Caesar  had  no 
choice.  He  began  immediately  to  retreat  to  Apollonia, 
followed  by  the  enemy,  who,  however,  after  four  days, 
had  to  give  up  the  pursuit.  Many  voices  now  advised 
Pompeius  to  cross  to  Italy  ;  but  this  plan  would  necessitate 
the  abandonment  of  the  Syrian  legions,  now  in  Macedonia 
under  Metellus  Scipio  ;  and,  besides,  he  hoped  to  capture 
the  corps  of  Calvinus,  whom  Caesar  had  detached  to  en- 
counter Metellus.  Calvinus  was  now  on  the  Via  Egnatia 
at  Heraclea  Lyncestis,  and  only  learned  the  condition  of 
things  just  in  time  to  escape  destruction  by  a  quick 
departure  in  the  direction  of  Thessaly.  Caesar,  who  had 
arrived  at  Apollonia,  and  had  deposited  his  wounded  there, 
now  set  out  for  Thessaly,  in  order  to  get  beyond  the 
reach  of  the  enemy's  fleet.  He  crossed  the  mountain  chain 
between  Epirus  and  Thessaly,  effected  a  junction  with 
Calvinus  at  Aeginium,  near  the  source  of  the  Peneus,  and, 
after  storming  and  pillaging  Gornphi,  the  first  Thessalian 
town  before  which  he  appeared,  quickly  received  the  sub- 
mission of  the  others. 

Thus  the  victories  of  Dyrrachium  had  borne  little  fruit 
to  the  victors.  Caesar  and  Calvinus  had  escaped  pursuit, 
and  stood  united  and  in  full  security  in  Thessaly.  But 
the  former  caution  of  the  Pompeians  was  succeeded  by 
the  most  boundless  confidence.  They  regarded  the  victory 
as  already  won,  and  were  resolved  at  any  price  to  fight 
with  Caesar  and  crush  him  at  the  first  opportunity.  Cato 
was  left  in  command  at  Dyrrachium  and  in  Corcyra. 
Pompeius  and  Scipio  marched  southward  and  met  at 
Larissa. 

Caesar  was  encamped  near  Pharsalus,  on  the  left  bank 


THE  CIVIL   WAB.  465 

01  the  river  Enipeus,  which  intersects  the  plain  stretching 
southward  from  Larissa.  Pompeius  pitched  Ids  camp  on 
the  right  hank,  along  the  slope  of  Cynoscephalae.  His 
entire  army  was  assembled,  and  he  had  now  eleven  legions 
numbering  47,000  men  and  7000  horse,  while  Caesar  was 
still  expecting  two  legions  from  Aetolia  and  Thessaly,  and 
two  which  were  arriving  by  way  of  Illyria  from  Italy ; 
his  eight  legions  did  not  number  more  than  twenty-two 
thousand  men  and  his  cavalry  but  one  thousand  troopers. 
All  military  reasons  urged  Pompeius  to  fight  soon,  and  the 
impatience  of  the  emigrants  had  doubtless  more  weight 
than  these  reasons.  The  senators  considered  their  triumph 
secure.  Already  there  was  strife  about  filling  up  Caesar's 
pontificate,  and  houses  were  hired  in  the  Forum  for  the 
next  elections.  Great  indignation  was  excited  when  Pom- 
peius hesitated  to  cross  the  rivulet  which  separated  the 
camps.  He  was  only  delaying  the  battle,  they  alleged,  in 
order  to  perpetuate  his  part  of  Agamemnon  and  to  rule  the 
longer  over  so  many  noble  lords.  The  general  yielded,  and 
prepared  to  attack.  The  battle-field  was  almost  the  same 
on  which,  a  hundred  and  fifty  years  ago,  the  Romans  had 
laid  the  foundation  of  their  Eastern  dominion.  The  right 
of  the  Pompeians  rested  on  the  Enipeus,  Caesar's  left  upon 
the  broken  ground  in  front  of  the  river.  The  other  wings 
were  both  out  in  the  plain,  and  each  was  covered  by  cavalry 
and  light  troops.  The  plan  of  Pompeius  was  to  scatter 
with  his  cavalry  the  weak  band  of  horsemen  opposite  to 
him,  and  then  to  take  Caesar's  right  wing  in  the  rear. 
But  Caesar,  foreseeing  the  rout  of  his  cavalry,  had  stationed 
behind  his  right  flank  about  two  thousand  of  his  best 
legionaries.  As  the  enemy's  cavalry  galloped  round  the 
line,  driving  Caesar's  horsemen  before  them,  they  were  met 
and  thrown  into  confusion  by  this  unexpected  infantry 
attack,  and  galloped  from  the  field  of  battle.*  This  un- 
expected repulse  of  the  cavalry  raised  the  courage  of  the 

*  It  was  in  this  attack  that  the  well-known  direction  of  Caesar  to 
his  troops  to  strike  at  the  faces  of  the  enemy's  horsemen  was  given. 
The  infantry,  acting  in  an  irregular  way  against  cavalry,  were  not  to 
throw  their  pila,  but  to  use  them  as  spears,  and,  to  be  more  effective, 
were  to  thrust  at  the  faces  of  the  troopers.  It  was  probably  the 
rough  wit  of  the  camp  which  suggested  the  idea  that  the  Pompeian 
cavalry  fled  for  fear  of  scars  on  their  faces. 

30 


4C6  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

Caesarians.  Their  third  division,  which  had  been  held  in 
reserve,  advanced  all  along  the  line.  Pompeius,  who  had 
never  trusted  his  infantry,  rode  at  once  from  the  field  to 
the  camp.  His  legions  began  to  waver  and  to  retire  over 
the  brook,  an  operation  which  was  attended  with  much  loss. 
The  day  was  lost,  but  the  army  was  substantially  intact. 
Nevertheless  Pompeius  lost  all  hope,  and  when  he  saw  the 
troops  recrossing  the  brook  he  threw  from  him  his  general's 
scarf  and  rode  off  by  the  nearest  route  to  the  sea.  The 
army,  discouraged  and  leaderless,  found  no  rest  within 
the  camp.  They  were  driven  from  its  shelter,  and  with- 
drew to  the  heights  of  Crannon  and  Scotussa.  As  they 
attempted  to  march  along  the  hills  and  regain  Larissa 
Caesar's  troops  intercepted  their  route,  and  at  nightfall 
cut  them  off  from  the  only  rivulet  in  the  neighbourhood. 
Fifteen  thousand  of  the  enemy  lay  dead  or  wounded  upon 
the  field,  while  the  Caesarians  had  only  two  hundred  men 
missing.  The  next  morning  twenty  thousand  men  laid 
down  their  arms,  and  of  the  eleven  eagles  of  the  enemy 
nine  were  handed  over  to  Caesar.  Caesar  had  on  that  very 
day  reminded  his  men  that  they  should  not  forget  the 
fellow-citizen  in  the  foe ;  but  he  found  it  necessary  to  use 
some  severity.  The  common  soldiers  were  incorporated 
in  the  army,  fines  and  confiscations  were  inflicted  upon  the 
men  of  better  rank,  and  the  senators  and  equites  of  note 
were  with  few  exceptions  beheaded. 

The  immediate  results  of  this  day,  the  9th  of  August, 
48  B.C.,  were  soon  seen.  All  who  were  not  willing  or  not 
obliged  to  fight  for  a  lost  cause  now  passed  over  to  Caesar's 
side.  The  client  communities  and  princes  recalled  their 
contingents.  Pharnaces,  king  of  the  Bosporus,  went  so 
far  as  to  take  possession  of  Phanagoria,  which  had  been 
declared  free  by  Pompeius,  and  of  Little  Armenia,  which 
had  been  conferred  upon  Deiotarus.  So  also  many  luke- 
warm membei'S  of  the  aristocracy  made  their  peace  with 
the  conqueror.  But  the  flower  of  the  defeated  party  made 
no  compromise ;  aristocrats  could  not  come  to  terms  with 
monarchy.  "  Into  whatever  abyss  of  degeneracy  the 
aristocratic  rule  had  now  sunk,  it  had  once  been  a  great 
political  system ;  the  sacred  fire,  by  which  Italy  had  been 
conquered  and  Hannibal  had  been  vanquished,  continued 
to  glow — although  somewhat  dim  and  dull — in  the  Roman 


TEE  CIVIL   WAR.  467 

nobility  as  long  as  that  nobility  existed,  and  rendered  a 
cordial  understanding  between  the  men  of  the  old  regime 
and  the  new  monarch  impossible."  Many  submitted  out- 
wardly, and  retired  into  private  life.  Marcus  Marcel! us, 
•who  had  brought  about  the  rupture  with  Caesar,  retired 
into  voluntary  banishment  at  Lesbos  ;  but  in  the  majority 
passion  overwhelmed  reflection.  No  one  grasped  the  hope- 
lessness of  the  situation  more  clearly  than  Marcus  Cato. 
Convinced  from  this  moment  that  monarchy  was  inevit- 
able, he  doubted  whether  the  constitutional  party  ought 
to  continue  the  struggle.  But  when  he  resolved  still  to 
fight — not  for  victory,  but  for  a  more  honourable  fall — he 
suught  to  draw  no  one  into  the  struggle  who  chose  to 
make  his  peace.  It  was,  in  his  eyes,  merely  senseless  and 
cruel  to  compel  the  individual  to  share  the  ruin  of  the 
republic. 

Most  of  the  leading  men  who  escaped  from  Pharsalus 
made  their  way  to  Corcyra,  where  a  council  of  war  was 
held,  at  which  Cato,  Metellus  Scipio,  Titus  Labienus, 
Lucius  Afranius,  and  Gnaeus  Pompeius  the  younger  were 
present.  But  the  absence  of  the  commander-in-chief  and 
the  internal  dissensions  pi'evented  the  adoption  of  any 
common  resolution  ,  and  it  was  indeed  difficult  to  say 
what  ought  to  be  done.  Macedonia  and  Greece,  Italy  and 
the  East,  were  lost  to  the  coalition.  In  Egypt  there  was 
indeed  a  large  army,  but  it  was  soon  evident  that  the 
court  of  Alexandria  was  not  to  be  relied  on.  In  Spain 
Pompeian  sympathies  were  very  strong,  especially  in  the 
army,  so  much  so  that  the  Caesarians  had  to  give  up  the 
idea  of  invading  Africa  from  that  quarter ;  in  Africa, 
again,  the  coalition,  or  rather  king  Juba,  had  been  arming 
unmolested  for  more  than  a  year  :  so  that  in  two  regions 
it  was  still  possible  for  the  constitutionalists  to  prolong 
the  struggle  in  honourable  warfare  for  some  time  to 
come.  By  sea,  too,  their  power  was  still  considerable,  even 
after  the  recall  of  the  subject  contingents,  while  Caesar 
was  still  almost  without  a  fleet.  And  there  was  yet  another 
possibility — that  of  a  Parthian  alliance,  and  of  procuring 
the  restoration  of  the  republic  at  the  hands  of  the  common 
foe. 

Meanwhile,  Caesar  was  in  hot  pursuit  of  Pompeius.  The 
latter  had  gone  first  to  Lesbos,  where  he  joined  his  wife 


468  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

and  his  younger  son  Sextus ;  thence  he  proceeded  to 
Cilicia  and  to  Cyprus.  Fear  of  the  reception  he  might 
meet  with  from  his  aristocratic  allies  appears  to  have 
decided  him  to  take  refuge  with  the  Parthian  king,  rather 
than  to  fly  to  Corcyra.  He  was  in  Cyprus,  collecting 
money  and  arming  a  band  of  slaves,  when  he  heard  that 
Antioch  had  declared  for  Caesar  and  that  the  Parthian 
route  was  no  longer  open ,  he  thereupon  hastened  to 
Egypt,  from  the  resources  of  which  he  might  hope  to 
reorganize  the  war. 

After  the  death  of  Ptolemy  Auletes  in  51  B.C.,  his  two 
children — Cleopatra,  aged  about  sixteen,  and  Ptolemaeus 
Dionysius,  a  boy  of  ten — had  ascended  the  throne,  accord- 
ing to  their  father's  will,  as  consorts.  But  the  brother, 
with  his  guardian  Pothinus,  had  driven  Cleopatra  from  the 
kingdom,  and  was  lying  with  the  whole  Egyptian  army 
at  Pelusium,  to  protect  the  eastern  frontier  against  her, 
when  Pompeius  anchored  at  the  promontory  of  Casius, 
and  asked  permission  to  land.  His  request  was  about  to  be 
refused  when  the  king's  tutor,  Theodotus,  pointed  out  that, 
if  rejected,  Pompeius  would  probably  use  his  connections 
in  Egypt  to  instigate  rebellion  in  the  army,  and  that  it 
would  be  better  to  make  away  with  him.  Accordingly 
Achillas,  the  royal  general,  and  some  of  the  old  soldiers  of 
Pompeius  went  off  in  a  barge  to  Pompeius,  whom  they 
invited  to  come  on  board  in  order  to  be  conveyed  to  land. 
As  he  was  stepping  on  shore  the  military  tribune,  Lucius 
Septimius,  stabbed  him  in  the  back,  under  the  eyes  of  his 
wife  and  son,  who  had  to  watch  the  murder  from  the  deck 
of  their  vessel  (Sept.  28.  48  B.C.).  It  was  the  same  day 
of  the  same  month  on  which,  thirteen  years  ago,  he  had 
entered  the  capital  in  triumph  over  Mithradates  He  was 
"  a  good  officer,  but  otherwise  a  man  of  mediocre  gifts  of 
intellect  and  of  heart.  .  .  .  Barely  once  in  a  thousand  years 
does  there  arise  among  the  people  a  man  who  is  a  king  not 
merely  in  name  but  in  reality.  If  this  disproportion  be- 
tween semblance  and  reality  has  never  perhaps  been  so 
strongly  marked  as  in  Pompeius,  the  fact  may  wTell  excite 
grave  reflection  that  it  was  precisely  he  who  in  a  certain 
sense  opened  the  series  of  Roman  monarchs."  When  Caesar 
arrived  in  Alexandria  all  was  over.  He  turned  away  in 
deep  agitation  when  the  murderer  brought  the  head  of  his 


1LLE  CIVIL   WAB.  469 

rival  to  his  ship.  How  Caesar  would  have  dealt  with 
Pompeius  had  he  been  captured  alive  it  is  impossible  to 
say.  But  interest  as  well  as  humanity  would  probably 
have  counselled  clemency.  "  The  death  of  Pompeius  did 
not  break  up  the  Pompeians,  but  gave  them,  ...  in  his  sons 
Gnaeus  and  Sextus,  two  leaders,  both  of  whom  were  young 
and  active,  and  the  second  a  man  of  decided  capacity.  To 
the  newly  founded  hereditaiy  monarchy,  the  hereditary 
pretendership  attached  itself  at  once  like  a  parasite,  and 
it  was  very  doubtful  whether  by  this  change  of  persons 
Caesar  did  not  lose  more  than  he  gained." 

Caesar's  immediate  object  was  accomplished  :  but  he 
landed  and  proceeded  at  once  to  settle  matters  in  Egypt. 
He  was  accompanied  by  3,200  men  and  800  cavalry,  and, 
taking  up  his  abode  in  the  royal  palace,  he  began  collecting 
the  money  he  urgently  needed,  and  regulating  the  Egyptian 
succession.  No  war  contribution  was  imposed,  and  the 
arrears  of  the  sum  stipulated  for  in  59  B.C.  (p.  372)  were 
commuted  for  a  final  payment  of  ten  million  denarii 
(£400,000).  The  brother  and  sister  were  ordered  to 
suspend  hostilities,  and  it  was  decided  that  they  should 
rule  jointly,  in  accordance  with  their  father's  will.  The 
kingdom  of  Cyprus  was  given — as  the  appanage  of  the 
second-born  of  Egypt — to  the  younger  children  of  A  uletes, 
Arsiuoe  and  Ptoleuiaeus  the  younger. 

But  a  storm  was  brewing.  Alexandria  was  a  cosmo- 
politan city,  hardly  inferior  to  Rome  in  the  number  of 
its  population,  and  far  superior  in  stirring  commercial 
spirit.  In  the  citizens  there  was  a  lively  national  self- 
importance,  which  can  hardly  be  called  patriotism, — a 
turbulent  vein  which  made  them  indulge  in  street  riots  as 
heartily  as  the  Parisians  of  to-day.  Pothinus  and  the 
boy-king  were  much  discontented  with  Caesar's  arrange- 
ments, and  ostentatiously  sent  the  treasures  of  the  temple 
and  the  royal  plate  to  be  melted  at  the  mint.  Both  the 
piety  and  the  national  feeling  of  the  populace  were 
shocked.  The  Roman  army  of  occupation  had  become 
denationalized  by  its  long  sojourn  in  Egypt  and  by  inter- 
marriage with  the  women  of  the  country ;  they  were 
indignant  at  being  obliged  to  suspend  their  action  on  the 
frontier  at  the  bidding  of  Caesar  and  his  handful  of 
legionaries,  and  numerous  assassinations  of  his  soldiers  in 


470  U 1 STORY  OF  HOME. 

the  city  revealed  to  Caesar  the  danger  in  which  he  was 
placed.  He  contented  himself  with  ordering  up  rein- 
forcements from  Asia,  and  meantime  prosecuted  the 
business  in  hand.  It  was  a  time  of  rest  after  toil,  and 
never  was  there  greater  gaiety  in  the  camp.  "  It  was  a 
merry  prelude  to  a  grave  drama."  The  Roman  army  of 
occupation  suddenly  appeared  in  Alexandria,  under  the 
leadership  of  Achillas,  and  the  citizens  at  once  made 
common  cause  Avith  the  newly  arrived  soldiers. 

Caesar  hastily  collected  his  scattered  troops,  seized  the 
king  and  his  minister,  and  entrenched  himself  in  the 
palace  and  theatre.  The  war  fleet,  as  there  was  no  time 
to  place  it  in  safety,  was  burned  ;  and  the  lighthouse  island 
of  Pharos  was  occupied  by  means  of  boats.  Thus  the 
way  was  kept  open  for  reinforcements.  Orders  were  at 
once  issued  to  the  commandant  of  Asia  Minor  and  to  the 
nearest  subject  countries  to  send  troops  and  ships  in  all 
haste.  In  the  streets  the  insurrection  had  free  course  : 
fighting  went  on  from  day  to  day;  but  Caesar  could  not 
break  through  to  the  freshwater  lake  of  Marea,  nor  could 
the  Alexandrians  master  the  becieged  or  deprive  them  of 
water.  The  canals  from  the  Nile  were  spoiled  by  in- 
troducing saltwater,  but  wells  dug  on  the  beach  furnished 
a  sufficient  supply.  The  besiegers  then  directed  their 
attention  to  the  sea.  The  island  of  Pharos  and  the  mole 
which  connected  it  with  the  mainland  divided  the  harbour 
into  a  western  and  an  eastern  port.  The  latter  with  the 
island  were  in  Caesar's  power ;  the  former,  with  the  mole, 
in  that  of  the  Alexandrians.  The  fleet  of  the  latter  had 
been  burnt,  but  they  equipped  a  small  squadron  and 
attempted,  though  in  vain,  to  prevent  the  entrance  of 
transports  conveying  a  legion  from  Asia  Minor  But 
when,  soon  after,  the  besiegers  captured  the  island  and 
compelled  Caesar's  ships  to  lie  in  the  open  roadstead,  his 
position  was  indeed  perilous.  His  fleet  was  compelled  to 
fight  repeatedly,  and  if  it  should  once  be  defeated  he  would 
be  completely  hemmed  in  and  probably  lost.  Accordingly 
he  determined  to  attempt  to  recover  the  island.  The 
double  attack  from  the  sea  and  from  the  harbour  was 
successful,  and  both  the  island  and  the  part  of  the  mole 
nearest  it  were  captured,  and  henceforward  remained  in 
Caesar's  hands. 


TEE  CIVIL   WAR.  471 

But  relief  was  at  hand  :  Mithradates  of  Pergamus,  who 
claimed  to  be  a  natural  son  of  the  old  enemy  of  Rome, 
arrived  with  a  motley  army  gathered  from  all  the  communi- 
ties of  Cilicia  and  Syria.  He  occupied  Pelusium,  and  then 
marched  towards  Memphis  to  avoid  the  intersected  ground 
of  the  Delta.  At  the  same  time,  Caesar  conveyed  part  of  his 
troops  in  ships  to  the  western  end  of  lake  Marea,  and 
marched  round  the  lake  and  along  the  river  to  join  Mithra- 
dates. The  junction  was  effected ;  and  the  combined 
army  marched  into  the  Delta,  where  the  young  king  (who 
had  been  released  by  Caesar  in  the  hope  of  allaying  the 
insurrection)  was  posted  on  rising  ground  between  the 
Nile  and  some  marshy  swamps  Caesar  attacked  from  three 
sides  at  once,  the  camp  was  taken,  and  the  insurgents  were 
either  put  to  the  sword  or  drowned ;  among  the  latter  was 
the  young  king.  The  inhabitants  met  Caesar  on  his  entry 
in  mourning,  and  with  the  images  of  their  gods  in  their 
hands  implored  mercy.  The  conqueror  contented  himself 
with  granting  to  the  Jews  settled  in  Alexandria  the  same 
rights  as  the  Greek  population  enjoyed,  and  with  sub- 
stituting for  the  army  of  occupation,  which  nominally 
obeyed  the  Egyptian  king,  a  regular  Roman  garrison  of 
three  legions,  under  a  commander  nominated  by  himself, 
whose  birth  made  it  impossible  for  him  to  abuse  his 
position,— Rufio,  the  son  of  a  freedman.  Cleopatra  and 
her  younger  brother  Ptolemaeus  received  the  crown,  under 
the  supremacy  of  Rome  ;  the  princess  Arsinoe  was  carried 
off  to  Italy.  Cyprus  was  again  added  to  the  Roman 
province  of  Cilicia. 

The  Alexandrian  insurrection  is  unimportant  in  itself, 
but  it  compelled  the  man  on  whom  the  whole  empire  now 
depended  to  leave  his  proper  task  for  nearly  six  months. 
In  the  meantime,  accident  or  the  ability  of  individual 
officers  decided  matters  everywhere. 

In  Asia  Minor,  Calvinus  had  been  ordered,  on  Caesar's 
departure,  to  compel  Pharnaces  to  evacuate  the  territories 
he  had  occupied,  especially  lesser  Armenia  (p.  466).  But 
Calvinus  was  obliged  to  despatch  to  Egypt  two  out  of  his 
three  legions,  and  was  defeated  by  Pharnaces  at  Nicopolis. 
When  Caesar  himself  arrived,  Phnrnaces  promised  sub- 
mission, but  took  no  steps  to  relinquish  his  conquests,  in 
the   hope   that  Caesar  would    soon   depart.     But  Caesar 


472  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

broke  off  negotiations,  and  advanced  against  the  king's 
camp  at  Ziela.  A  complete  victory  was  gained,  and  the 
campaign  was  over  in  five  days.  The  Bosporan  kingdom 
was  bestowed  upon  Mithiadates  of  Pergamus.  Caesar's 
own  allies  in  Syria  and  Asia  Minor  were  richly  rewarded  ; 
those  of  Pornpeius  dismissed,  as  a  rule,  with  fines  and 
reprimands.  Bat  Deiotarus  was  confined  to  his  hereditary 
domain,  and  lesser  Armenia  was  given  to  Ariobarzanes, 
king  of  Cappadocia. 

In  Illyria  there  had  been  warlike  operations  of  some 
importance  while  Caesar  was  in  Egypt.  The  interior 
swarmed  with  dispersed  Pompeians,  and  the  Dalmatian 
coast  was  bitterly  hostile  to  Caesar  But  the  Caesarian 
lieutenant,  Quintus  Cornificius,  was  able  not  only  to  main- 
tain himself  but  to  defeat  Marcus  Octavius,  the  conqueror 
of  Curicta  (p.  459),  in  several  engagements.  During  the 
winter  Aulus  Gabinius  arrived  to  take  over  the  command 
of  Illyria,  and  soon  began  a  bold  expedition  into  the 
interior.  But  his  army  was  swept  away  ;  he  suffered  a 
disgraceful  defeat  during  his  retreat,  and  soon  afterwards 
died  at  Salonae.  Finally  Vatinius,  the  governor  of  Brun- 
disium,  defeated  the  fleet  of  Octavius  with  a  force  ex- 
temporized out  of  ordinary  ships  provided  with  beaks, 
and  compelled  him  to  quit  those  waters. 

But  the  condition  of  things  was  most  serious  in  Africa, 
where  the  most  eminent  of  the  Pompeians  had  gathered 
after  the  defeat  of  Pharsalu3,  and  had  had  ample  time  to 
reorganize  the  war  on  a  large  scale.  The  fanaticism  of 
the  emigrants  had,  if  possible,  increased ;  they  continued 
to  murder  their  prisoners,  and  even  the  officers  of  Caesar 
under  a  flag  of  truce.  King  Juba,  in  whom  was  com- 
bined all  the  fury  of  a  barbarian  and  of  a  partisan, 
wished  even  to  extirpate  the  citizens  of  every  community 
suspected  of  sympathizing  with  the  enemy,  and  it  was 
only  by  the  intervention  of  Cato  that  Utica  itself  was 
saved.  It  had  been  no  easy  task  to  fill  the  vacant  post 
of  commander-in-chief.  Juba,  Metellus  Scipio,  Varus,  the 
governor  of  the  province,  all  laid  claim  to  it,  while  the 
army  desired  Cato,  who  was  indeed  the  only  man  who 
had  the  necessary  devotion,  energy,  and  authority.  But 
through  Cato's  own  influence  the  decision  fell  upon  Scipio, 
as  the  officer  of  highest  standing ;  nevertheless  it  was  Cato 


TEE  CIVIL    WAR.  473 

alone  who  confronted  the  insolent  claims  of  king  Juba, 
and  made  him  feel  that  the  Roman  nobility  came  to  him, 
not  as  suppliants  to  a  protector,  but  as  to  a  subject  from 
whom  they  were  entitled  to  demand  assistance.  With 
Scipio  the  king  carried  bis  point,  that  the  pay  of  his 
troops  should  be  charged  on  the  Roman  treasury,  and 
that  the  province  of  Africa  should  be  ceded  to  him  in 
the  event  of  victory. 

The  senate  of  the  "  three  hundred  "  again  appeared, 
and  filled  up  their  ranks  from  the  best  or  wealthiest  of 
the  equites.  Warlike  preparations  went  forward  with 
great  activity.  Every  man  capable  of  bearing  arms  was 
enrolled,  and  the  land  was  stripped  of  its  cultivators. 
The  infantry  numbered  fourteen  legions,  of  which  four 
were  legions  of  King  Juba  armed  in  the  Roman  manner. 
The  heavy  cavalry,  consisting  of  Celts  and  Germans  who 
arrived  with  Labienus,  was  sixteen  hundred  strong,  to 
whom  must  be  added  Juba's  squadron,  equipped  in  the 
Roman  style.  The  light  troops  were  mostly  Numidians, 
and  very  numerous,  javelin  men,  and  archers  mounted 
or  on  foot.  Lastly  there  were  120  elephants,  and  the  fleet 
of  fifty-five  sail  under  Varus  and  Octavius.  Money  was 
provided  by  the  self-taxation  of  the  senate,  which  included 
many  very  wealthy  men ;  huge  stores  were  accumulated 
in  the  fortresses,  while  the  open  towns  were  denuded  of 
provisions. 

An  evil  star  seemed  to  preside  over  the  African  expe- 
dition of  Caesar.  Not  only  was  it  delayed  by  his  long 
absence  in  Egypt,  but  the  preparatory  measures  which  he 
set  on  foot  before  leaving  for  Egypt  miscarried.  Erom 
Spain,  Quintus  Cassius  Longinus  had  been  ordered  to 
cross  into  Africa  with  four  legions,  and  to  advance 
against  Numidia  in  conjunction  with  Bogud,  king  of 
western  Mauretania.  But  in  this  army  were  many  native 
Spaniards,  and  two  of  the  legions  had  formerly  been 
Pompeian.  Difficulties  arose,  which  were  only  aggravated 
by  the  unwise  and  tyrannical  conduct  of  the  governor.  A 
formal  revolt  broke  out,  and  was  only  repressed  on  the  dis- 
avowal of  Longinus  by  the  respectable  Caesarians  and  on 
the  interference  of  the  governor  of  the  northern  province. 
Gaius  Trebonius,  who  arrived  in  the  autumn  of  47  B.C.  to 
supersede  Longinus,  everywhere  received  obedience  ;  but 


474  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

meanwhile  nothing  had  been  done  to  hinder  the  enemy's 
organizations  in  Africa. 

Still   more    serions    difficulties    occurred    among    the 
troops  collected  in  southern  Italy  for  the   African   cam- 
paign.    The  majority  of  these  consisted  of  the  old  legions 
which  had  "founded  Caesar's  throne  in  Gaul,  Spain,  and 
Thessaly."    They  were  spoiled  by  victory  and  disorganized 
by  their  long  repose  in  Italy.     The  tremendous  demands 
made  on  them  by  their  general  had  thinned  their  ranks  to 
a  fearful  extent,  and  had  left  in  the   minds  of  the  sur- 
vivors a  secret  rancour  which  only  wanted  an  opportunity 
to  break  forth.     The  only  man   who  had   any  influence 
over  them  had  been  absent,  almost  unheard  of,  for  a  year; 
and  when  orders  to  embark  for  Sicily  arrived  the  storm 
burst.     The   men  refused  to  obey    unless   the    promised 
presents   were  paid  to  them,   and   threw    stones    at   the 
officers  sent  by  Caesar.     The  mutineers  set  out  in  bodies 
to  extort  fulfilment  of  the  promises  from  the  general  in 
the  capital.    Caesar  ordered  the  few  soldiers  in  the  city  to 
occupy    the   gates,   and    suddeuly   appeared    among    the 
furious   bands    demanding   to  know   what  they  wanted. 
They   exclaimed,    "Discharge."     Their    request    was  im- 
mediately granted.     As  to  the  presents   promised  on  the 
day  of  triumph,   as  well  as   the  lands  destined  for  them, 
though  not  promised,  Caesar  added,  they  might  apply  to 
him  on  the  day  when  he  and  the  other  soldiers  should 
triumph  ;  in  the  triumph  itself  they  could  not  of  course 
participate,  as  having  been  previously  discharged.     The 
men   were  not  prepared   for  this    turn  of  affairs.     They 
had  demanded  discharge  in  order  to  annex  their  own  con- 
ditions to  their  service  if  refused.     They  were  ashamed, 
too,   at  the  fidelity    with    which   the   imperator  kept  his 
word,  even  after  they  had  forgotten  their  allegiance,  and 
at  the  generosity  with  which  he  granted  more  than  he  had 
promised.     When  they  realized  that  they  must  appear  as 
mere  spectators  at  the  triumph  of  their  comrades,  when 
their  general  addressed  them  no  longer  as  "  comrades," 
but  as  "  burgessess  "  (quirites)— a  name  which  destroyed, 
as  it  were,  at  one  blow   the   whole  pride  of  their  past 
soldierly  career, — when  they  felt  once  more  the  spell  of 
the    man    whose    presence  had  for   them    an   irresistible 
power,  they  stood  for  a  while  mute  and  undecided,  till 


TEE  CIVIL   WAR.  475 

from  all  sides  a  cry  arose  that  the  general  should  once 
more  receive  them  into  favour,  and  again  permit  them  to 
be  called  Caesar's  soldiers.  After  a  sufficient  amount  of 
entreaty  Caesar  yielded ;  but  the  ringleaders  had  a  third 
cut  off  from  their  triumphal  presents.  "  History  knows 
no  greater  psychological  masterpiece,  and  none  that  was 
more  completely  successful." 

Thus  again  the  African  campaign  was  delayed.  When 
Caesar  arrived  at  Lilybaeum  the  ten  legions  destined  for 
embarkation  had  not  nearly  arrived,  and  the  experi- 
enced troops  were  the  farthest  distant.  However,  Caesar 
sailed  on  the  25th  of  December,  47  B.C.,  with  six  legions, 
five  of  which  were  newly  raised.  Storms  prevented  the 
enemy's  fleet  from  obstructing  their  passage,  but  the 
same  storms  scattered  Caesar's  fleet,  and  he  could  not  dis- 
embark near  Hadrumetum  more  than  3,000  men  and  150 
horsemen.  He  got  possession  of  the  two  seaports  of 
Ruspina  and  Little  Leptis,  and  kept  his  troops  within  en- 
trenchments, and  ready  at  a  moment's  notice  to  re-embark 
if  attacked  by  a  superior  force.  But  the  remaining  ships 
arrived  soon  afterwards,  and  on  the  following  day  Caesar 
made  an  expedition  with  three  legions  into  the  interior 
to  procure  supplies.  He  was  attacked  by  Labienus,  who 
had  nothing  but  light  troops ;  and  the  legions  were  soon 
surrounded.  By  deploying  his  whole  line,  and  by  a 
series  of  spirited  charges,  Caesar  saved  the  honour  of  his 
arms  and  made  good  his  retreat ;  but  had  not  Ruspina 
been  close  at  hand,  the  Moorish  javelin  might  have  accom- 
plished the  same  result  as  the  Parthian  bow  at  Carrhae. 

Caesar  would  not  again  expose  his  soldiers  to  snch  an 
attack,  and  remained  inactive  till  his  veteran  legions 
should  arrive.  In  the  interval  he  tried  to  organize  some 
force  to  counterbalance  the  enormous  superiority  of  the 
enemy  in  light-armed  troops.  He  equipped  light  horse- 
men and  archers  from  the  fleet,  and  succeeded  in  raising 
against  Jnba  the  Gaetnlian  tribes.  The  Mauretanian 
kings,  Bogud  and  Bocchus,  were  Juba's  natural  rivals, 
and  there  still  roamed  in  those  regions  a  band  of  Cati- 
linarians  under  Publius  Sittius  of  Nuceria,  who  had 
eighteen  years  ago  become  converted  from  a  bankrupt 
Italian  merchant  into  a  leader  of  free  bands.  Bocchus 
and  Sittius  fell  upon  Numidia,  occupied  Cirta,  and  com- 


476  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

pelled  Julia  to  semi  a  portion  of  his  troops  to  his  southern 
and  western  frontiers.  Still  Caesar's  position  was  un- 
pleasant enough :  his  array  was  crowded  together  within 
a  space  of  six  square  miles  ;  corn  was  supplied  by  the 
fleet,  but  there  was  great  dearth  of  forage.  If  Scipio 
retired  and  abandoned  the  coast  towns,  he  might  at  least 
endlessly  protract  the  war ;  this  plan  was  advised  by 
Cato,  who  offered  at  the  same  time  to  cross  into  Italy  and 
call  the  republicans  to  arms.  But  the  decision  lay  with 
Scipio,  who  resolved  to  continue  the  war  on  the  coast. 
This  blunder  was  all  the  more  serious  because  the  army 
which  they  opposed  to  Cresar  was  in  a  troublesome 
temper,  and  the  strictness  of  the  levy,  the  exhaustion  of 
the  country,  and  the  devastation  of  many  of  the  smaller 
townships  had  produced  a  feeling  of  exaspei*ation  in  the 
region  to  which  the  war  was  transfeiTed.  The  African 
towns  declared,  wherever  they  could,  for  Caesar,  and  de- 
sertion increased  continually  in  the  army.  But  Scipio 
marched  with  all  his  force  from  Utica,  appeared  before 
the  towns  occupied  by  Caesar,  and  repeatedly  offered  him 
battle.  Caesar  refused  until  all  his  veteran  legions  had 
arrived,  when  Scipio  on  his  part  grew  afraid,  and  nearly 
two  mouths  passed  away  in  skirmishes  and  in  efforts  to 
procure  supplies. 

When  Caesar's  last  reinforcements  had  arrived  he  made 
a  lateral  movement  towards  the  town  of  Thapsus,  strongly 
garrisoned  by  the  enemy.  Scipio  now  committed  the 
unpardonable  blunder  of  risking  a  battle  to  save  the  town, 
on  ground  which  placed  the  decision  in  the  hands  of  the 
infantry  of  the  line.  He  advanced  to  a  position  imme- 
diately opposite  Caesar's  camp  on  the  shore,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  the  garrison  of  Thapsus  prepared  for  a  sally. 
Caesar's  camp-guard  sufficed  to  repulse  the  latter ;  and 
his  legions,  forming  a  correct  estimate  of  the  enemy  from 
their  want  of  precision  and  from  their  ill-closed  ranks, 
compelled  a  trumpeter  to  sound  for  the  attack  even  before 
the  general  gave  the  signal.  The  right  wing,  in  advance 
of  the  rest  of  the  line,  turned  the  elephants  opposed  to 
them  back  upon  the  ranks  of  the  enemy  ;  they  then  broke 
the  left  wing  of  their  opponents,  and  overthrew  the  whole 
line.  The  old  camp  of  the  enemy  was  at  a  distance,  and 
the  new  one  was  not  yet  ready,  so  that  the  defeated  arruy 


THE  CIVIL  WAR.  477 

was  almost  annihilated.  The  legionaries  refused  all 
quarter ;  they  were  tired  of  being  hurried  from  one  con- 
tinent to  another  in  pursuit  of  an  enemy  who,  though 
always  defeated,  was  never  destroyed.  Fifty  thousand 
corpses  covered  the  field  of  Thapsus,  among  which  were 
those  of  several  Caesarian  officers  suspected  by  the  soldiers 
of  sympathy  with  the  enemy.  The  victorious  army 
numbered  no  more  than  fifty  dead  (April  6,  46  B.C.). 

The  struggle  was  over  in  Africa  :  Cato  convoked  the 
senate  at  Utica,  and  asked  them  to  decide  whether  they 
would  yield  or  continue  their  defence.  At  first  the  more 
courageous  view  seemed  likely  to  prevail,  but  ultimately 
it  was  resolved  to  yield.  Faustus  Sulla,  and  Lucius 
Afranius  soon  arrived  with  a  body  of  cavalry  and  wished 
to  defend  the  city  after  slaughtering  en  masse  the  un- 
trustworthy citizens.  Cato  indignantly  refused  ;  and  after 
checking,  as  far  as  he  could,  by  his  authority  and  by 
largesses,  the  fury  of  the  soldiery,  and  after  providing 
the  means  of  flight  for  those  who  feared  to  trust  them- 
selves to  the  mercy  of  Caesar,  he  at  last  held  himself 
released  from  his  command,  and,  retiring  to  his  chamber, 
plunged  his  sword  into  his  breast. 

Few  of  the  fugitive  leaders  escaped :  Afranius  and 
Faustus  were  delivered  up  to  Caesar,  and  when  he  did  not 
order  their  immediate  execution  were  cut  down  by  the 
soldiers.  Metellus  Scipio  was  captured  by  the  cruisers  of 
Sittius,  and  stabbed  himself.  King  Juba,  half  expecting 
the  issue,  had  caused  a  huge  funeral  pile  to  be  prepared 
in  the  market-place  of  Zaraa,  upon  which  he  proposed  to 
consume  himself  with  all  his  treasures  and  the  dead 
bodies  of  all  the  citizens.  But  the  latter  had  no  desire 
to  adorn  the  funeral  rites  of  "  the  African  Sardanapalus  ;  " 
and  closed  their  gates  when  he  appeared  in  company  with 
Marcus  Petreius.  The  king,  "  one  of  those  natures  that 
become  savage  amidst  a  life  of  dazzling  and  insolent 
enjoyment,  and  prepare  for  themselves  even  out  of  death 
an  intoxicating  feast " — resorted  with  Petreius  to  one  of 
his  country  houses,  where,  after  a  copious  banquet,  he 
challenged  Petreius  to  fight  him  in  single  combat.  The 
conqueror  of  Catilina  fell  by  the  hand  of  the  king ;  and 
the  latter  caused  himself  to  be  stabbed  by  one  of  his 
slaves.      Labienus  and    Sextus   Pompeius  fled  to  Spain, 


478  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

and  betook  themselves  to  a   piratical    warfare   by    land 
and  sea. 

The  kingdom  of  Massinissa  was  now  broken  up.  The 
eastern  portion  was  united  with  the  kingdom  of  Bocchns, 
and  king  Bogud  was  rewarded  with  considerable  gifts. 
Cirta  was  handed  over  to  Publius  Sittius  as  a  settlement  for 
his  half- Roman  bands  ;  but  this  same  district,  as  well  as 
the  largest  and  most  fertde  part  of  Numidia,  was  united 
as  "  New  Africa  "  with  the  older  province  of  Africa. 

The  struggle,  which  had  lasted  for  four  years,  thus 
terminated  in  the  complete  victory  of  the  new  monarch. 
The  monarchy  might  no  doubt  be  dated  from  the  moment 
when  Pompeius  and  Caesar  had  established  their  joint 
rule,  and  overthrown  the  aristocratic  constitution.  But 
it  was  only  the  battle-fields  of  Pharsalus  and  Thapsus  that 
set  aside  the  joint  rule,  and  conferred  fixity  and  formal 
recognition  on  the  new  monarch.  Pretenders  and  con- 
spiracies, even  revolutions  and  restorations,  might  ensue, 
but  the  continuity  of  the  free  republic,  uninterrupted 
during  five  hundred  years,  was  broken  through,  and 
monarchy  was  established  as  an  accomplished  fact. 

That  the  constitutional  struggle  was  at  an  end  was 
proclaimed  by  Cato  when  he  fell  upon  his  sword  at  Utica. 
The  republic  was  dead,  the  treasure  was  carried  off, — why 
should  the  sentinels  remain  ?  "  There  was  more  nobility, 
and,  above  all,  more  judgment  in  the  death  of  Cato  than 
there  had  been  in  his  life."  He  was  not  a  great  man ; 
he  was  the  ideal  of  unreflecting  republicanism,  and  this 
has  made  him  the  favourite  of  all  who  make  it  their 
hobby ;  but  he  was  "  the  only  man  who  honourably  and 
courageously  defended  in  the  last  struggle  the  great 
system  doomed  to  destruction.  Just  because  the  shrewdest 
lie  feels  itself  inwardly  annihilated  before  the  simple 
truth,  and  because  all  the  dignity  and  glory  of  human 
nature  ultimately  depend  not  on  shrewdness  but  on 
honesty,  Cato  has  played  a  greater  part  in  history  than 
many  men  far  superior  to  him  in  intellect.  ...  It  was 
a  fearfully  striking  protest  of  the  republic  p gainst  the 
monarchy,  that  the  last  republican  went  as  the  first 
monarch  came, — a  protest  which  tore  asunder  like  gos- 
samer all  that  so-called  constitutional  character  with 
which    Caesar    invested   his    monarchy,    and    exposed   in 


TEE  CIVIL   WAR.  479 

all  its  hypocritical  falsehood  the  shibboleth  of  the  recon- 
ciliation of  all  parties,  under  the  aegis  of  which  despotism 
grew  up.  .  .  .  The  unrelenting  warfare  which  the 
ghost  of  the  legitimate  republic  waged  for  centuries — 
from  Cassius  and  Brutus  down  to  Thrasea  and  Tacitus, 
nay  even  far  later — a  warfare  of  plots  and  literature,  was 
the  legacy  which  the  dying  Cato  bequeathed  to  his 
enemies."  Immediately  after  his  death  the  man  was 
revered  as  a  saint  by  the  party  of  which  in  his  life  he  was 
often  the  laughing-stock  and  the  scandal.  "  But  the 
greatest  of  these  marks  of  respect  was  the  involuntary 
homage  which  Caesar  rendered  to  him  when  he  made  an 
exception  to  the  contemptuous  clemency  with  which  he 
was  wont  to  treat  his  opponents,  Pompeians  as  well  as 
republicans,  in  the  case  of  Cato  alone,  and  pursued  him 
even  beyond  the  grave  with  that  energetic  hatred  which 
practical  statesmen  are  wont  to  feel  towards  antagonists 
who  oppose  them  in  a  domaiu  of  ideas,  which  is  as  danger- 
ous in  their  view  as  it  lies  beyond  their  reach." 


AUTHORITIES. 

Caes.  Bell.  Civ.,  especially  1-7 ;  Bell.  Alex. ;  and  Bell.  Afric.  Plufc. 
Caes.  33-56 ;  Pomp.  61-end  ;  Cato,  52-end  ;  Cic.  37,  38  ;  Brat 
4-6.  Ant.  5.  Liv.  109-116.  Veil.  ii.  49-55.  Flor.  iv.  2. 
Eutrop.  vi.  19-25.  Suet.  Julius,  32-37.  Dio.  xli.  xlii.  xliii.  1-4," 
Appian  B.  C.  34-100.  Cic,  Watson's  Sel.  Let.  pt.  iii.  and  iT. 
79-88 ;  pro  Maroello  (47  b.c.)  ;  pro  Ligario  (46  B.C.). 


480  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 


CHAPTER  XXXVin. 

THE   OLD   REPUBLIC   AND   THE    NEW    MONARCHY. 

Caesar's  lineage  and  character — His  attempts  to  unite  the  state,  to 
satisfy  his  own  extreme  partisans  and  conciliate  his  opponents 
— Principles  of  the  popular  party  and  of  Caesar — Caesarianism 
— Caesar's  offices — Title  of  Imperator — Monarchical  insignia  and 
prerogatives — 'Legislation — The  royal  edict — The  senate — The 
executive — The  subject  territories — The  magistrates — Religion 
—  Legal  administration  —  Military  reorganization  —  Financial 
reforms — Increase  of  soldiers'  pay — Condition  of  the  capital — 
Measures  of  reform  and  police — Condition  of  Italy — Agriculture 
— Money-dealing — The  middle  class — Rich  and  poor — Immo- 
rality— Influence  of  women — Depopulation — Caesar's  measures 
— Relief  of  debtors — Law  of  insolvency — Restrictions  on  money- 
dealing — Encouragement  of  agriculture — Regulation  of  the 
municipal  system — The  provinces — Tyranny  of  the  Roman 
magistrates  and  capitalists — Measures  of  relief  and  protection 
— Nationalities  of  the  empire — The  Greek  and  the  Jew  pro- 
tected— Latinization  of  the  provinces — Distinctions  between 
Italy  and  the  provinces  levelled — Elements  of  administrative 
unity — Survey  of  the  empire — Fusion  of  religions — Condition 
of  the  criminal  and  civil  law — Weights  and  measures — The 
Calendar. 

Caesar,  was  in  his  fifty-sixth  year  (horn  July  12, 102  B.C.  ?) 
when  the  battle  of  Thapsus  made  him  sole  monarch  of 
Rome.  He  was  sprung  from  one  of  the  oldest  noble 
families  of  Latium,  and  traced  his  lineage  back  to  the 
heroes  of  the  Iliad  and  to  the  kings  of  Rome ;  and  he 
spent  the  years  of  his  boyhood  like  any  other  noble  youth 
of  the  period,  in  playing  with  literature  and  verse-making, 
in  love  intrigues  and  the  arts  of  the  toilette,  together  with 
another  art  much  studied  at  that  period,  that  of  always 


THE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  THE  NEW  MONARCHY.    481 

borrowing  and  never  paying.  But  manhood  found  his 
vigour  both  of  mind  and  body  unimpaired  ;  in  fencing 
and  riding  he  was  a  match  for  any  of  his  soldiers,  and 
the  incredible  rapidity  of  his  journeys  astonished  both 
friend  and  foe.  His  power  of  intuition  was  remarkable, 
and  displayed  itself  in  the  practicability  and  precision  of 
his  orders,  even  when  he  had  not  seen  with  his  own  eyes, 
while  his  memory  never  failed  him.  "  Although  a  gentle- 
man, a  man  of  genius,  and  a  monarch,  he  had  still  a 
heart."  His  love  for  his  mother  was  deep  and  lasting, 
while  he  was  sincerely  devoted  to  his  wives,  and,  above 
all,  to  his  daughter  Julia.  His  fidelity  to  his  associates 
was  unwavering,  and  several  of  them,  such  as  Aulus 
Hirtius  and  Gaius  Matius,  showed  their  attachment  to  him 
after  his  death.  But,  above  all,  Caesar  was  a  realist  and 
a  man  of  sense  ,  his  passion  was  never  stronger  than  ho 
could  control.  Literature  and  verse-making  occupied  him 
at  times,  but  in  his  sleepless  hours  he  chose  to  meditate 
upon  the  inflections  of  Latin  nouns  and  verbs.  After  the 
revels  of  his  youth  he  avoided  wine  entirely,  and  though 
he  enjoyed,  even  when  a  monarch,  the  society  of  women, 
he  allowed  them  no  influence  over  him.  He  prided  himself 
upon  his  personal  appearance,  and  covered  the  baldness  of 
his  later  years  with  the  laurel  chaplet  which  he  wore  in 
public.  It  was  the  result  of  this  cool  realism  that  Caesar 
possessed  the  power  of  living  keenly  in  the  present 
moment,  undisturbed  by  memory  or  expectation  ;  that  he 
could  at  any  moment  apply  his  whole  genius  to  the  most 
incidental  enterprise.  To  this  he  owed  his  "  marvellous 
serenity,"  his  independence  of  control  by  favourite  or 
friend.  He  never  deceived  himself  as  to  the  power  of 
fate  and  the  ability  of  man  ;  he  felt  that  in  all  things 
fortune — accident — must  bestow  success,  and  this  perhaps 
is  the  reason  why  he  often  chose  to  play  so  desperate 
a  game. 

Caesar  was  from  the  beginning  of  his  political  career 
emphatically  a  statesman  :  his  aim  was  the  regeneration, 
political,  military,  intellectual  and  moral,  of  his  own  and 
of  the  Hellenic  nation.  He  was  a  brilliant  and  masculine 
orator,  an  author  of  an  inimitable  purity  and  simplicity  of 
style ;  as  a  general  he  disregarded  routine  and  tradition, 
and    conducted  each  campaign  with  regard   to   its    own 

31 


482  HISTORY  OF  HOME. 

requirements.  Like  William  of  Orange,  he  stood  always 
ready  for  battle  after  defeat,  and  in  the  rapid  movement 
of  masses  of  men — the  highest  and  most  difficult  element 
of  warfare — he  was  unrivalled.  But  he  was  all  these 
things  only  secondarily,  and  merely  because  he  was  a 
statesman :  they  were  but  the  means  to  an  end.  His 
original  plan  had  been  to  compass  his  aim,  like  Pericles, 
without  force  of  arms,  and  it  wras  not  till  the  age  of  forty 
that  he  found  himself  at  the  head  of  an  army.  This 
improvised  generalship  is  seen  in  the  temerity  with  wrhich, 
in  many  instances,  notably  when  he  landed  in  Epirus,  he 
set  aside,  without  absolute  necessity,  the  best- founded 
principles  of  war.  But,  though  a  master  of  the  art  of 
war,  he  did  his  utmost  to  avert  civil  strife,  and,  after  the 
struggle,  he  allowed  no  hierarchy  of  marshals  or  govern- 
ment of  praetorians  to  arise.  He  had  every  quality  which 
makes  the  statesman.  He  was  a  born  ruler,  and  compelled 
men  of  all  natures  to  work  in  his  service.  His  talent  for 
organization  was  unsurpassed,  and  is  seen  in  the  creation 
and  management  of  his  political  alliances  and  of  his  army. 
He  never  made  the  blunder,  which  so  many  others  have 
made,  of  carrying  into  politics  the  tone  of  military 
command :  he  was  a  monarch,  but  never  a  tyrant.  In  his 
life  there  were  doubtless  many  mistakes,  but  there  was  no 
false  step  of  passion  for  him  to  regret ;  nothing  to  be 
compared  with  the  murder  of  Kleitos  or  the  burning  of 
Persepolis,  in  the  life  of  Alexander.  Whatever  his  task, 
he  always  recognized  its  natural  limits ;  where  he  recog- 
nized that  fate  had  spoken,  he  always  obeyed.  Alexander 
on  the  Hyphasis,  Napoleon  at  Moscow,  turned  back 
because  they  were  compelled  :  Caesar  turned  back  volun- 
tarily on  the  Thames,  and  on  the  Rhine;  and  on  the 
Danube  and  the  Euphrates  he  thought,  not  of  unbounded 
conquests,  but  of  well-considered  frontiers. 

Such  was  the  man — so  easy  and  yet  so  difficult  to 
describe.  Tradition  has  handed  down  copious  and  vivid 
information  regarding  him,  and  yet  no  man  is  more  difficult 
to  reproduce  to  the  life.  The  secret  lies  in  his  perfection  ; 
the  artist  can  paint  anything  except  only  consummate 
beauty.  "  Normality  admits,  doubtless,  of  being  expressed, 
but  it  gives  us  only  the  negative  notion  of  the  absence  of 
defect."    In  the  character  of  Caesar,  the  great  contrasts  of 


THE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  THE  NEW  MONARCHY.    483 

existence  meet  and  balance  each  other.  He  was  of  the 
mightiest  creative  power,  and  yet  of  the  most  penetrating 
judgment ;  of  the  highest  energy  of  will  and  the  highest 
capacity  of  execution  ;  filled  with  republican  ideals,  and  at 
the  same  time  born  to  be  king,  He  was  "  the  entire  and 
perfect  man  ; "  and  he  wras  this  because  he  was  the  entire 
and  perfect  Roman  ;  he  was  in  the  full  current  of  his  time, 
and  possessed  in  perfection  the  special  gift  of  his  nation — 
practical  aptitude  as  a  citizen. 

In  the  work  of  regenerating  the  state,  Caesar  started  at 
once  from  the  principle  of  the  reconciliation  of  parties — 
so  far  as  antagonistic  principles  can  be  reconciled  at  all. 
The  statues  of  Sulla,  overthrown  by  the  mob  in  the  capital 
after  Pharsalus,  were  ordered  to  be  set  up  again  ;  the  men 
who  had  been  banished  in  the  Cinnan  and  Sertorian  times 
were  recalled,  and  the  children  of  those  outlawed  by  Sulla 
(p.  301)  were  restored  to  their  full  rights.  In  the  same 
way,  all  who  had  suffered  loss  of  rights  in  the  early  stages 
of  the  recent  struggle,  especially  through  the  impeach- 
ments of  52  B.C.  (p.  433),  received  full  restitution.  The 
only  exceptions  were  made  in  the  case  of  those  who  had 
put  to  death  the  proscribed  for  money,  and  of  Milo,  the 
condottiere  of  the  senatorial  party. 

These  steps  were  easy ;  but  it  was  much  more  difficult 
to  deal  with  the  parties,  which  even  now,  after  the  war, 
confronted  each  other  with  undiminished  hatred.  Caesar's 
own  adherents  were  among  the  most  dissatisfied  with  the 
results  of  the  struggle.  The  Roman  popular  party  expected 
Caesar  to  accomplish  for  them  what  Catilina  had  at- 
tempted ;  and  lond  was  their  outcry  when  it  became  plain 
that  the  most  which  debtors  could  expect  from  him  was 
some  alleviations  of  payment  and  modifications  of  pro- 
cedure. They  began  even  to  coquet  with  the  Pompeians, 
and  during  Caesar's  long  absence  from  Italy,  in  48  and 
47  B.C.,  to  instigate  a  second  civil  war. 

Just  before  the  battle  of  Pharsalus  the  praetor  Marcus 
Caelius  Rufus  proposed  to  the  people  laws  granting  to 
debtors  a  respite  of  six  years  free  of  interest,  and  cancel- 
ling all  claims  from  loans  or  house-rents.  When  deposed 
by  the  Caesarian  senate  he  entered  into  negotiations  with 
Milo  for  a  rising  in  Italy.  Milo  raised  his  standard  in  the 
region  of  Thurii,  and  Rufus  formed  a  plan,  which  was 


484  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

frustrated,  to  seize  Capua.  The  fall  of  the  two  leaders  put 
an  end  to  the  incident  (48  B.C.);  but  in  the  following  year 
Publius  Dolabella  revived  the  laws  of  Rufus,  and  dis- 
turbances took  place,  which  had  to  be  put  down  by  Marcus 
Antonius,  the  commandant  of  Italy,  by  military  force. 

At  the  same  time  that  Caesar  repressed  with  a  strong 
hand  the  ebullitions  of  his  own  left  wing,  he  tried  to  pave 
the  way  for  the  gradual  extinction  of  the  republican  party 
by  a  policy  of  combined  repression  and  conciliation.  He 
refused  to  triumph  on  the  ground  of  victories  won  over 
his  fellov\ -countrymen.  The  statue  of  Pompeius  was  re- 
stored to  its  former  distinguished  place  in  the  senate- 
house,  and  political  prosecutions  of  his  opponents  were 
confined  within  the  narrowest  limits.  The  papers  found 
in  the  enemy's  head-quarters  after  Pharsalus  and  Thapsus 
were  burnt  unread ;  all  the  common  soldiers,  except  those 
burgesses  who  had  enlisted  under  king  Juba,  escaped  with 
impunity.  Even  the  officers  obtained  free  pardon  until 
the  close  of  the  Spanish  campaign  of  49  B.C. ;  after  that 
date  all  who  served  as  officers  in  the  enemy's  army,  or  who 
sat  in  the  opposition  senate,  forfeited  property  and  political 
rights,  and  were  banished  from  Italy  for  life.  Any  who 
had  fought  once  more  after  accepting  pardon  forfeited 
life  at  once.  But  these  rules  were  applied  in  the  mildest 
possible  manner ;  the  punishment  of  death  was  rarely  in- 
flicted ;  many  were  pardoned  or  escaped  with  fines,  and  in 
fact  almost  all  were  pardoned  who  could  bring  themselves 
to  ask  favour  of  Caesar.  Ultimately,  in  44  B.C.,  a  general 
amnesty  was  issued. 

But  the  opposition  was  none  the  more  reconciled.  Open 
resistance  there  was  none,  but  secret  agitations  and,  above 
all,  the  literature  of  opposition  gave  expression  to  the 
seething  republican  discontent.  The  praise  of  Cato  was 
the  favourite  theme  of  opposition  pamphlets,  which  were 
replied  to  by  Caesar  and  his  confidants.  "  The  republican 
and  Caesarian  scribes  fought  round  the  dead  hero  of  Utica 
like  the  Trojans  and  Hellenes  round  the  dead  body  of 
Patroclus."  But,  naturally,  the  Caesarians  had  the  worst 
of  it  with  a  republican  public.  Hence  literary  men,  like 
Publius  Nigidius  Figulus,  and  Aulus  Caecina,  found  more 
difficulty  than  any  other  class  in  obtaining  permission  to 
return  to  Italy ;  and  in  Italy  itself  they  were  subjected  to 


TEE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  THE  NEW  MONARCHY.    485 

a  practical  censorship  whose  punishments  were  purely 
arbitrary.  But  though  risings  of  republicans  and  Pom- 
peians  were  perpetually  preparing  in  every  part  of  the 
empire,  and  conspiracies  were  formed  even  in  the  capital 
itself,  Caesar  was  not  induced  to  surround  himself  by  a 
body-guard,  but  contented  himself  with  making  known 
the  plots,  when  detected,  by  public  placards.  His  clemency 
and  his  indifference  were  not  the  fruit  of  sentiment,  but 
of  the  statesmanly  conviction  that  vanquished  parties  are 
absorbed  within  the  state  more  rapidly  than  they  can  be 
exterminated  by  proscription.  Besides,  he  needed  for  his 
own  high  objects  all  the  talent,  culture,  and  distinction 
which  the  aristocratic  party  embraced ;  for  here,  in  spite 
of  all,  was  still  to  be  found  all  that  remained  of  a  free  and 
national  spirit  among  the  Roman  burgesses.  Like  Henry 
TV.  of  France  and  William  of  Orange,  Caesar  found  that 
his  difficulties  only  began  with  victory.  For  the  moment 
all  parties  united  against  their  chief,  and  against  his  own 
great  ideal.  But  what  Caesar  lost  the  state  gained  ;  volun- 
tarily or  compulsorily,  men  of  all  parties  worked  at  the 
erection  of  the  new  mighty  edifice ;  and  if  the  reconcilia- 
tion was  but  external,  no  one  knew  better  than  Caesar  that 
antagonisms  lose  their  keenness  when  brought  into  out- 
ward union,  and  that  only  in  this  way  can  the  statesman 
anticipate  the  work  of  time. 

In  attempting  to  give  a  detailed  account  of  the  mode  in 
which  the  transition  was  effected  from  the  old  to  the  new, 
it  must  be  remembered  that  Caesar  came  not  to  begin  but 
to  complete.  The  principles  of  the  popular  party,  which 
Caesar  had  from  the  beginning  adopted  to  the  full,  were 
the  principles  of  Gaius  Gracchus,  and  had,  since  his  time, 
been  the  essential  principles  of  the  democracy.  They  were 
— the  alleviation  of  the  burdens  of  debtors  ;  transmarine 
colonization  ;  equalization  of  the  differences  of  rights  exist- 
ing between  the  classes  in  the  state ;  emancipation  of  the 
executive  from  the  senate.  And  these  remained  the 
principles  of  Caesar  as  monarch  ;  for  his  monarchy  was 
like  the  monarchy  of  Pericles  and  of  Cromwell,  "  the 
representation  of  the  nation  by  the  man  in  whom  it 
puts  supreme  and  unlimited  confidence." 

With  regard  to  the  judgment  to  be  passed  upon  Caesar, 
too  much  care   cannot   be  taken   to   avoid   the  common 


486  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

blunder  of  using  historical  praise  and  historical  censure, 
applied  to  particular  circumstances,  as  phrases  of  general 
application ;  and,  in  the  present  instances,  of  construing 
praise  of  Caesar  as  praise  of  what  is  called  "  Caesarianisin." 
History  is  instructive  with  respect  to  the  present  only  as 
she  reveals  the  necessary  organic  conditions  of  civilization — 
"the  fundamental  forces  everywhere  alike,  and  the  manner 
of  their  combination  everywhere  different," — the  knowledge 
of  which  leads  men,  not  to  slavish  imitation,  but  to  inde- 
pendent reproduction.  The  history  of  Roman  imperialism 
is  in  reality  the  bitterest  censure  of  modern  autocracy 
which  could  be  written  by  the  hand  of  man  "  Every  con- 
stitution which  gives  play  to  the  free  self-determination 
of  a  majority  of  citizens  infinitely  surpasses  the  most 
brilliant  and  humane  absolutism,"  just  as  the  smallest 
organism  is  superior  to  the  most  artistic  machine ;  the 
former  is  living  and  capable  of  development,  but  the  latter 
cannot  develop,  and  is  therefore  dead.  Caesar's  work 
could  bring  no  blessing  in  itself,  but  was  necessary  and 
salutary  because  the  ancient  political  organization,  based 
upon  slavery  and  ignorant  of  representative  government, 
ended  logically  in  military  monarchy  as  the  least  of  evils. 
"  When  once  the  slave-holding  aristocracy  in  Virginia  and 
the  Carolinas  shall  have  carried  matters  as  far  as  their 
congeners  in  the  Sullan  Rome,  Caesarianism  will  there  too 
be  legitimized  in  the  view  of  the  spirit  of  history  ;  where 
it  appears  under  other  conditions  of  development,  it  is  at 
once  a  caricature  and  a  usurpation."  *  History  too  "  is  a 
Bible,  and  if  she  cannot  any  more  than  the  Bible  hinder  the 
fool  from  misunderstanding,  and  the  devil  from  quoting  her, 
she  too  will  be  able  to  bear  with  and  requite  them  both." 

Formally  the  position  of  the  new  monarch  assumed  a 
singular  shape. 

1.  He  was  invested  with  the  dictatorship,  at  first  tempo- 
rarily, after  his  return  from  Spain  in  49  B.C. ;  again  for  an 
indefinite  time  after  Pharsalus ;    finally  from   the  1st  of 

*  la  later  editions  the  following  note  is  appended  by  Professor 
Mommsen  :  "  When  this  was  written,  in  the  year  1857,  no  one  could 
foresee  how  soon  the  mightiest  struggle  and  most  glorious  victory  as 
yet  recorded  in  human  annals  would  save  the  United  States  from 
this  fearful  trial,  and  secure  the  future  existence  of  an  absolute  self- 
governing  freedom  not  to  be  permanently  kept  in  check  by  any  local 
Caesarianism." 


TEE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  TEE  NEW  MONARCHY.     487 

January,  45  B.C.,  as  an  annual  office,  which  was  in  44  B.C. 
conferred  on  him  for  life. 

2.  He  held  the  consulship  for  48  B.C. — the  office  which 
immediately  occasioned  the  civil  war;  afterwards  he  was 
appointed  for  five  and  finally  for  ten  years — once  with- 
out colleague. 

3.  He  was  invested  with  tribunician  power  for  life,  in 
48  b.c. 

4.  With  the  first  place  and  the  leading  vote  in  the 
senate. 

5.  With  the  title  of  imperator  for  life. 

6.  He  was  already  pontifex  inaximus  (p.  374),  but  be- 
came a  member  of  the  college  of  augurs. 

7.  Numerous  decrees  of  the  senate  entrusted  him  with 
the  right  of  deciding  on  war  and  peace,  the  disposal  of 
armies  and  treasure,  the  nomination  of  provincial  governors, 
and  many  other  privileges ;  together  with  such  empty 
honours  as  the  title  of  pater  patriae,  and  the  designation 
of  the  month  in  which  he  was  born  by  the  name  of  Julius. 

It  is  difficult  in  this  confused  union  of  offices  to  deter- 
mine by  what  formal  shape  Caesar  chose  to  express  the 
new  absolute  power,  but  the  new  name  of  imperator  is  iu 
every  respect  its  appropriate  formal  expression,  jnst  be- 
cause it  is  new,  and  no  outward  occasion  for  its  introduc- 
tion is  apparent.  It  expresses  concisely  all  the  functions 
of  the  chief  of  the  stute — the  concentration  of  official 
power  in  the  hands  of  a  popular  chief  independent  of  the 
senate.  The  title  prevails  on  Caesar's  coins,  especially 
those  of  the  last  period,  by  the  side  of  the  dictatorship; 
in  his  law  as  to  political  crimes  the  monarch  is  designated 
by  this  name ;  and,  what  is  most  decisive,  the  authority 
of  imperator  was  given  to  Caesar  for  his  bodily  or  adopted 
descendants.  The  new  monarchy  was  to  be  hereditary. 
The  new  office  was  based  on  the  position  which  consuls  or 
proconsuls  occupied  outside  the  pomerium,  and  included 
not  only  the  military  but  the  supreme  administrative  and 
judicial  power.  Moreover,  the  imperator,  unlike  the 
consul,  had  never  been  checked  by  the  right  of  provo- 
catio  or  been  obliged  to  respect  the  advice  of  the  senate. 

In  fact  the  new  office  of  imperator  was  nothing  else  than 
the  regal  office  re-established  ;  as  the  consulship  was  only 
the  kingship  with  certain  restrictions  imposed,  so  for  the 


488  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

new  office  these  restrictions  were  once  more  removed. 
Almost  every  feature  of  the  old  monarchy  reappears  in 
the  new :  the  union  of  supreme  military,  judicial,  and 
administrative  power  in  the  hands  of  the  prince ;  the 
religious  presidency  over  the  commonwealth ;  the  right 
of  issuing  binding  ordinances ;  the  reduction  of  the  senate 
to  a  council  of  state,  the  revival  of  the  patriciate  and  of 
the  praefecture  of  the  city ;  the  power  of  the  prince  to 
nominate  his  successor  under  the  form  of  adoption.  Again, 
as  the  old  kings  of  Kome  had  been  the  protectors  of  the 
commons  against  the  nobility,  so  Caesar  came  "  not  to 
destroy  liberty  but  to  fulfil  it."  Nor  had  the  idea  of  the 
regal  office  ever  become  obsolete  at  Rome ,  at  various 
times,  in  the  republican  dictatorship,  in  the  decemviral 
power,  in  the  Sullan  regency — there  had  been  a  practical 
recurrence  to  it.  And  as  mankind  "  have  infinite  difficulty 
in  reaching  new  creations,  and  therefore  cherish  the  once 
developed  forms  as  sacred  heirlooms,"  it  was  natural  for 
Caesar  to  connect  himself  with  Servius  Tullius,  as  Charle- 
magne connected  himself  with  Caesar,  and  as  Napoleon 
attempted  to  connect  himself  with  Charlemagne.  Accord- 
ingly, beside  the  statues  of  the  traditional  seven  kings  on 
the  Capitol,  Caesar  ordered  his  own  to  be  erected  as  the 
eighth.  He  appeared  in  public  in  the  costume  of  the  old 
kings  of  Alba ;  in  the  formula  for  political  oaths  the 
genius  of  the  imperator  was  added  to  the  Jovis  and  the 
Penates  of  the  Roman  people  ,  from  the  year  44  B.C. 
the  head  of  Caesar  appears  on  the  coins — the  recognized 
outward  badge  of  monarchy.  There  could  be  no  doubt 
as  to  Caesar's  view  of  his  position ;  it  is  even  possible  that 
he  wished  to  assume  the  title  of  king;  certainly  he  was 
often  pressed  by  his  adherents  to  assume  it — most  strikingly 
when  Marcus  Antonius,  as  consul,  offered  him  the  diadem 
before  all  the  people.  But  it  is  probable  that  Caesar  was 
resolved  to  avoid  the  name  as  tainted  with  a  curse,  and 
as  familiar  to  the  Romans  of  his  day  chiefly  as  applied  to 
the  despots  of  the  East,  and  the  scene  with  Antonius  may 
have  been  designed  to  put  an  end  once  and  for  all  to 
rumours  on  the  subject. 

Whatever  the  title,  the  sovereign  was  there,  and  all  the 
due  accompaniments  of  royalty  at  once  made  their  appear- 
ance.   Caesar  appeared  in  public,  not  in  the  consular  robe 


TEE  OLD  REFUBLIC  AND  TEE  NEW  MONARCEY.    489 

with  purple  stripes,  but  in  the  robe  wholly  of  purple,  and 
received  without  rising  from  his  chair  the  procession  of 
the  senate.  Rents  rose  in  the  quarter  of  the  city  where 
he  lived ;  personal  interviews  became  so  difficult  that 
Caesar  was  often  obliged  to  communicate  in  writing  even 
with  his  nearest  friends.  A  new  monarchical  aristocracy 
arose  to  replace  the  old  patriciate,  which  still  existed  but 
had  dwindled  away  until  not  more  than  fifteen  or  sixteen 
genuine  patrician  families  remained.  Caesar  had  the 
right  of  creating  new  patrician  gentes  conferred  on  him 
by  popular  decree,  and  thus  established  a  new  nobility 
entirely  dependent  on  himself. 

Thus  the  regal  tradition  was  completely  renewed ;  the 
burgess  assembly  remained  by  the  side  of  the  king  as  the 
ultimate  expression  of  the  sovereign  will  of  the  people ; 
the  senate  was  reduced  to  its  old  function  of  giving  advice 
to  the  ruler  when  requested ;  aud  the  whole  magisterial 
authority  of  the  state  was  concentrated  in  the  monarch. 

In  legislation  the  primitive  maxim  of  Roman  law  was 
reverted  to,  that  the  assembly  in  concert  with  the  king 
can  alone  alter  the  law  of  the  state  ;  and  Caesar  regularly 
had  his  enactments  confirmed  by  the  people.  Though 
the  authority  of  the  comitia  wras  only  a  shadow,  yet  their 
existence  was  a  standing  acknowledgment  of  the  principle 
of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  and  an  energetic  protest 
against  sultanism. 

But  at  the  same  time  the  other  maxim  of  state  law  was 
revived,  that  the  command  of  the  supreme  magistrate  is 
binding  at  least  as  long  as  he  remains  in  office ;  and  hence 
the  royal  edict  now  obtained  the  force  of  law. 

On  the  other  hand,  while  Caesar  formally  acknowledged 
the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  it  was  no  part  of  his  plan  to 
divide  his  authority  with  the  senate.  He  made  use  of  it 
as  a  council  to  advise  him  with  regard  to  new  laws,  and  for 
issuing  important  administrative  regulations.  The  latter 
were  usually  issued  formally  in  the  name  of  the  senate, 
and  there  are  instances  of  such  decrees  of  which  none  of 
the  senators  recited  as  present  had  any  knowledge.  In 
order  to  make  it  i*epresentative  as  far  as  possible  of  all 
classes,  and  also  in  order  to  take  from  it  its  character  as 
head-quarters  of  the  opposition,  it  was  raised  at  once 
to  the  number  of  nine   hundred;  ami,  to  maintain  this 


490  BISTORT  OF  ROME 

increase,  the  number  of  quaestors — all  of  whom  became 
annually  members  of  the  senate — was  raised  from  twenty 
to  forty.  Of  these,  twenty  were  nonuhated  by  the  im- 
perator,  who  had  also  the  privilege  of  conferring  the 
honorary  rights  of  the  quaestorship  on  whomsoever  he 
pleased.  The  immediate  extraordinary  increase  was  carried 
ont  solely  by  Caesar's  nomination,  and  the  new  members 
included  many  non-Italians  and  persons  of  humble  or 
dubious  origin. 

At  the  same  time,  the  whole  executive  was  concentrated 
in  the  hands  of  the  monarch.  Every  question  of  any 
moment  was  decided  by  the  imperator  in  person ;  and 
Caesar  was  able  to  carry  personal  government  to  a  height 
which  seems  incredible  to  men  of  modern  times.  The 
Roman  house  was  a  machine,  and  the  intellectual  powers 
of  slaves  and  freedmen  were  as  much  at  the  disposal  of 
the  master  as  their  manual  labour.  So,  whenever  circum- 
stances permitted,  Caesar  6 lied  up  any  post  demanding 
special  confidence  with  slaves,  freedmen,  or  clients  of 
humble  birth.  "  It  was  the  beau-ideal  of  bureaucratic 
centralization." 

In  matters  strictly  political  Caesar  of  course  avoided, 
whenever  possible,  any  delegation  of  his  functions ;  when 
this  was  inevitable,  as  when  he  was  compelled  to  be  absent 
from  Rome,  his  representative  was  usually  no  political 
personage,  but  his  banker,  the  Phoenician  Lucius  Cornelius 
Balbus,  without  regular  official  jurisdiction.  In  finance, 
the  private  means  of  the  monarch  were  kept  strictly 
separate  from  the  property  of  the  state  ;  but  the  whole 
financial  management,  the  levying  of  the  provincial  re- 
venues and  the  coinage — were  entrusted  to  the  slaves  and 
freedmen  of  the  imperator.  The  provincial  governors, 
now  that  they  were  relieved  of  all  financial  business  by 
the  new  imperial  tax  receivers,  became  little  more  than 
military  commanders.  Egypt,  on  account  of  its  great 
resources,  and  its  geographical  isolation,  which  rendered  it 
peculiarly  liable  to  be  broken  off  from  the  central  power 
under  an  able  leader,  was  entrusted  to  a  man  little  likely 
to  abuse  his  position  (p.  471).  The  more  important 
of  the  other  provinces  were  given  to  those  who  had 
been  consuls,  the  others  to  those  who  had  been  praetors, 
and  the  distribution  of  provinces  among  qualified  candi- 


TEE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  TEE  NEW  MONARCHY.    491 

dates  was  vested  in  the  imperator.  The  consuls  for  the 
year  were  often  induced  to  abdicate  to  make  room  for 
other  men  (consules  suffecti)  ;  moreover  the  number  of 
praetors  was  raised  from  eight  to  sixteen,  and  the  nomina- 
tion of  them  entrusted  to  the  imperator  ;  finally,  the  prince 
could  nominate  titular  praetors  or  quaestors,  and  by  these 
various  means  could  always  count  upon  a  sufficient 
number  of  candidates  favourable  to  himself.  As  a  rule  the 
consular  governor  remained  not  more  than  two  years,  the 
praetorian  not  more  than  one  in  his  province.  The  Roman 
magistrates — consuls,  praetors,  aediles,  tribunes,  and  quaes- 
tors— retained  substantially  their  former  powers;  but 
their  position  was  radically  changed.  Formerly  they  had 
been  magistrates  of  the  empire,  now  they  were  magistrates 
of  the  city  of  Rome,  and  the  consulship  became  little  but 
a  titular  post,  important  only  as  implying  the  reversion 
of  a  Lngher  governorship.  The  election  of  consuls,  tribunes, 
and  plebeian  aediles  was  free  from  restriction  ;  but  half  of 
the  praetors,  curule  aediles,  and  quaestors  were  nominated 
by  the  monarch.  The  tribunician  power  was  left  in  the 
main  untouched,  but  a  refractory  tribune  would  of  course 
be  summarily  dealt  with. 

Thus,  for  all  general  and  important  questions,  the  im- 
perator was  his  own  minister;  he  controlled  the  finance 
by  his  servants  and  the  army  by  his  adjutants  ;  the  old 
state-magistracies  were  again  converted  into  magistracies 
of  the  city  of  Rome  ;  and,  in  addition  to  all  this,  he  acquired 
the  ri^ht  of  nominating  his  successor.  The  autocracy 
was  indeed  complete. 

In  spiritual  matters  Caesar  made  little  alteration,  except 
to  attach  the  supreme  pontificate  and  the  augurship  to  the 
person  of  the  monarch.  Such  support  as  religion  could 
give  to  the  state  was  now  transferred  to  the  monarchy,  but 
it  can  scarcely  have  been  worth  having. 

With  regard  to  the  administration  of  the  law,  Caesar 
revived  the  ancient  regal  right  of  bringing  both  capital 
cases  and  private  suits  before  himself  for  sole  and  final 
decision.  He  often  sat,  like  the  ancient  kings,  in  the  Forum 
to  try  burgesses  in  cases  of  high  treason  ;  client  princes 
accused  of  the  same  offence  were  tried  in  Caesar's  house  : 
so  that  the  only  privilege  of  burgesses  in  this  respect  was 
that  of  publicity.     But  for  all  ordinary  cases  the  former 


492  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

republican  procedure  was  retained.  Criminal  causes  went 
before  the  several  jury-commissions  appointed  to  deal 
with  them  :  civil  cases  came  either  before  the  centum- 
viri,  as  the  court  of  inheritance  was  called,  or  were  re- 
ferred to  single  judices.  The  general  superintendence  of 
judicial  proceedings  was  conducted  in  the  capital  chiefly 
by  the  praetor :  in  the  provinces  by  the  governors. 
Political  crimes  were  still  referred  to  a  special  commis- 
sion ;  the  law  on  this  subject  was  laid  down  with  great 
precision,  and  excluded  all  prosecution  of  opinions,  while 
it  fixed  as  the  penalty,  not  death,  but  exile.  The  question 
of  the  selection  of  jurymen  was  left,  as  before,  according 
to  the  law  of  Cotta  (p.  357)  except  that  the  tribuni  aerarii 
were  set  aside,  and  the  rating  of  jurymen  fixed  at  400,000 
sesterces  (£4000.) 

The  old  republican  jurisdiction  and  that  of  the  king 
were  on  the  whole  co-ordinate,  and  any  case  once  decided 
upon  before  either  bar  was  regarded  as  closed.  But  by 
his  tribunician  power  the  king  might  interfere  with  any 
sentence  (unless  where  the  law  specially  forebade  the  veto 
of  the  tribunes)  so  as  to  cancel  it,  and  might  then,  by 
virtue  of  his  judicial  supremacy,  order  the  case  to  be  tided 
anew  before  himself.  This  was  the  germ  of  the  system  of 
appeal  to  a  higher  court,  a  thing  unknown  to  earlier 
procedure.* 

But  these  innovations — which  cannot  with  certainty  be 
pronounced  improvements  in  themselves — could  not  cure 
the  evils  from  which  the  Roman  administration  of  justice 
was  suffering.  In  the  first  place,  criminal  procedure 
could  never  be  sound  in  a  slave  state.  For  the  duty  of 
proceeding  against  a  slave  must  be  left,  de  facto  at  any 
rate,  to  the  master,  who  will  punish  crime  in  a  slave  only 
so  far  as  it  impairs  his  value  :  slave  criminals  at  Rome 
were  sold  to  the  fighting  booth,  just  as  an  ox  given  to 
goring  was  sent  to  the  butchers  ;  but  punishment  for  crime 
as  crime  could  scarcely  exist  for  slaves.  Again,  during 
the  long  course  of  political  disturbance  criminal  prosecu- 
tions, even  against  freemen, had  become  mere  faction  fights, 
to  be  fought  out  by  means  of  favour,  money,  and  violence. 
All  classes  bear  the  blame  of  this  demoralization,  but  the 
class  of   advocates  must  take  the  lion's  share.      Among 

*  This  cannot  be  proved  to  have  existed  anterior  to  Augustus. 


THE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  THE  NEW  MONARCHY.    493 

all  the  numerous  pleadings  in  criminal  causes  which  have 
come  down  to  us  from  this  epoch,  scarcely  one  makes  a 
serious  attempt  to  fix  the  crime  and  to  put  the  proof  or 
counterproof  into  proper  shape.*  Civil  procedure  suffered 
in  the  same  way,  though,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  of 
course  in  a  minor  degree.  Caesar  retained  and  even  made 
more  severe  the  curb  imposed  on  forensic  eloquence  by 
Pompeius  (p.  433),  and,  under  his  rule,  of  course  open 
corruption  and  intimidation  of  the  courts  came  to  an  end. 
But  he  could  not  pluck  up  the  roots  of  the  evil,  or  repro- 
duce in  the  minds  of  the  people  the  sacred  sense  of  right 
and  reverence  for  law  which  alone  can  insure  the  purity 
of  judicial  administration. 

Nowhere  was  the  general  decay  of  the  state  more  con- 
spicuously exemplified  than  in  the  condition  of  the  military 
system.  This  was  now  in  much  the  same  condition  as  that 
of  the  Carthaginians  in  the  time  of  Hannibal.  The  govern- 
ing classes  furnished  the  officers:  the  subjects,  plebeians 
and  provincials,  the  rank  and  tile.  The  general  was  left 
practically  to  himself,  and  to  the  resources  of  his  province. 
All  civic  or  national  spirit  had  deserted  the  army  ;  esprit 
de  corps  alone  held  it  together;  it  had  ceased  to  be  the 
instrument  of  the  commonwealth,  and  had  become  that 
of  the  general  who  commanded  it.  Under  the  ordinary 
wretched  commanders  it  became  a  rabble;  but  in  the  hands 
of  a  capable  leader  it  attained  a  perfection  of  which  the 
burgess  army  was  incapable.  The  higher  ranks  in  the 
state  became  more  and  more  averse  to  arms  ;  so  that 
the  military  tribuneship,  once  so  keenly  competed  for, 
was  open  to  any  man  of  equestrian  rank  who  chose  to 
serve.  The  staff  of  officers  usually  gave  the  signal  for 
mutiny  and  desertion.  Caesar  himself  has  described  the 
scene  at  his  own  head-quarters  when  orders  were  given  to 
advance  aorninst  Ariovistus — the  cursing  and  weeping, 
the  making  of  wills,  the  requests  for  furlough.  The  levy 
was  held  with  great  unfairness  ;  and  soldiers  once  levied 
were  kept  thirty  years  under  the  standards.     The  burgess 

*  "  Plura  enim  multo,"  says  Cicero,  De  Orat.  (ii.  42.  178),  primarily 
with  reference  to  criminal  trials,  "  homines  judicant  odio  aut  amore 
aut  cupiditate,  aut  iracundia  aut  dolore,  aut  laetitia,  aut  spe,  aut 
timore,  aut  errore,  aut  aliqua  permotione  mentis,  quam  veritate,  aut 
praescripto,  aut  juris  norma  aliqua,  aut  judicii  formula  aut  legibus." 


494  HISTOBT  OF  ROME. 

cavalry  had  degenerated  into  an  ornamental  guard ;  the 
"  burgess  "  infantry  was  a  troop  of  mercenaries  collected 
from  the  lowest  dregs  of  the  populace.  The  subjects 
furnished  the  whole  of  the  cavalry  and  light-armed  troops, 
and  began  to  be  employed  extensively  in  the  infantry. 
The  post  of  centurion  went  by  favour,  or  was  even  sold  to 
the  highest  bidder :  the  payment  of  the  soldiers  was  most 
defective  and  irregular.  Of  the  decay  of  the  navy  enough 
has  been  said  before ;  here  too,  as  elsewhere,  everything 
that  could  be  ruined  had  been  reduced  to  ruin  under  the 
oligarchic  government. 

Caesar's  military  reorganization  was  limited  substantially 
to  the  tightening  and  strengthening  of  the  reins  of  disci- 
pline. The  system  itself  he  did  not  attempt — perhaps 
he  did  not  wish — to  reform.  He  did  indeed  enact  that,  in 
order  to  hold  a  municipal  magistracy  or  sit  on  a  municipal 
council  before  the  thirtieth  year,  a  man  must  serve,  either 
three  years  as  an  officer,  or  six  years  in  the  ranks ;  and 
thus  attempted  to  attract  the  better  classes  into  the  army. 
But  he  dared  not  associate  the  holding  of  an  honorary 
office  unconditionally  with  the  fulfilment  of  the  time  of 
service.  The  levy  was  better  arranged,  and  the  time  of 
service  shortened ;  for  the  rest,  the  infantry  continued  to 
be  raised  chiefly  from  the  lower  orders  of  burgesses,  the 
cavalry  and  light  infantry  from  the  other  subjects.  Two 
innovations  must  be  placed  to  Caesar's  account :  one 
the  use  of  mercenaries  in  the  cavalry,  to  which  he  was 
driven  by  the  untrustworthiness  of  the  subject  cavalry  ; 
the  other  the  appointment  of  adjutants  of  the  legion 
with  praetorian  powers  (legati  legionis  pro  praetore). 
Hitherto  the  legion  had  been  led  by  its  military  tribunes, 
who  were  appointed  partly  by  the  burgesses,  partly  by 
the  general,  and  who,  as  a  rule,  commanded  the  legion 
in  succession.  But  henceforward  colonels  or  adjutants  of 
the  whole  legion  were  nominated  by  the  imperator  in 
Rome,  and  were  meant  chiefly  as  a  counterpoise  to  the 
governor's  authority.  The  most  important  change  in 
the  military  system  was,  of  course,  the  new  supreme 
command  ;  for  the  first  time  the  armies  of  the  state 
were  under  the  real  and  energetic  control  of  the  supreme 
government.  In  all  probability  the  governor  would 
still   retain   the   supreme   military  authority  in  his  own 


TEE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  TEE  NEW  MONARCHY.    495 

province,  but  subject  to  the  authority  of  the  imperator, 
who  might  take  it  from  him  at  any  moment  and  assume 
it  for  himself  or  his  delegates.  There  was  no  longer  any 
fear,  either  that  the  armies  might  become  utterly  dis- 
organized, or  that  they  might  forget  that  they  belonged  to 
the  commonwealth  in  their  devotion  to  their  leaders. 

Perhaps  it  was  the  sole  illusion  which  Caesar  allowed 
himself  to  cherish,  that  the  monarchy  he  had  founded  could 
be  otherwise  than  military.  That  a  standing  army  was 
necessary  he  saw  of  course,  but  only  because  the  nature  of 
the  empire  required  permanent  frontier  garrisons  ;  and  to 
the  regulation  of  the  frontier  his  military  plans  were 
substantially  limited.  He  had  already  taken  measures 
for  the  tranquillization  of  Spain,  and  ha'd  provided  for  the 
defence  of  the  Gallic  and  the  African  boundaries ;  he  had 
similar  plans  for  the  countries  bordering  on  the  Euphrates 
and  the  Danube.  Above  all,  he  was  determined  to  avenge 
the  day  of  Carrhae,  and  to  set  bounds  to  the  power  of  Boere- 
bistas,  king  of  the  Getae  (p.  421),  who  was  extending  his 
dominions  on  both  sides  of  the  Danube.  Fabulous  schemes 
of  world-wide"  conquest  are  ascribed  to  Caesar,  but  on  no 
respectable  authority,  and  his  conduct  in  Gaul  and  Britain 
gives  little  countenance  to  such  traditions.  At  any  rate 
it  is  certain  that  he  did  not  intend  to  rest  his  monarchy 
primarily  on  the  army,  or  to  set  the  military  power  above 
the  civil.  The  magnificent  Gallic  legions  were  dissolved 
as  incompatible  with  a  civic  commonwealth  ;  only  their 
glorious  names  were  perpetuated  by  newly  founded 
colonies.  The  soldiers  who  obtained  allotments  were  not 
settled  together  to  form  military  colonies,  but  scattered 
throughout  Italy,  except  where,  as  in  Campania,  aggrega- 
tion could  not  be  avoided.  Caesar  attempted  in  every  way 
to  keep  the  soldiers  within  the  sphere  of  civil  life  :  by 
allowing  them  to  serve  their  term,  not  continuously,  but 
by  instalments ;  by  shortening  the  term  of  service ;  by 
settling  the  emeriti  as  agricultural  colonists ;  by  keeping 
the  army  aloof  from  Italy,  on  the  distant  frontiers.  No 
corps  of  guards — the  true  criterion  of  a  military  state — wyas 
ever  formed  by  him  ;  even  as  general  he  dropped  the  body- 
guard which  had  long  been  usual ;  and,  though  constantly 
beset  by  assassins  in  the  capital,  he  contented  himself 
with  the  usual  escort  of  lictors.     But  this  noble  ideal,  of  a 


496  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

kingship  based  only  on  the  confidence  of  the  people, 
could  but  be  an  illusion ;  amidst  the  deep  disorganization 
of  the  nation  it  was  impossible  for  the  eighth  king  of 
Rome  to  reign  merely  by  virtue  of  law  and  justice.  Just 
as  little  could  the  army  which  had  placed  him  on  the 
throne  be  really  absorbed  agaiu  into  the  state.  The  Cam- 
panian  mutiny  and  the  battle-field  of  Thapsus  showed  how 
the  legionaries  had  learned  their  lesson.  Thousands  of 
swords  still  flew  at  Caesar's  signal  from  their  scabbards, 
but  they  no  longer  returned  to  their  scabbards  at  his 
signal.  Caesar's  creation  could  not  but  be  a  military 
monarchy ;  he  had  overthrown  the  regime  of  the  aristo- 
crats and  bankers,  only  to  put  a  military  regime  in  its 
place.  Nevertheless,  it  was  important  that  at  the  outset 
Caesar  laboured,  however  uselessly,  to  avoid  military  rule  ; 
and  it  is  owing  to  his  exertions  that  for  centuries  the 
emperors  of  Rome  used  the  army  in  the  main,  not  against 
the  citizen,  but  against  the  foe. 

The  financial  embarrassment  in  which  the  state  found 
itself  during  recent  years  was  not  caused  by  deficiency  of 
revenue,  which  had  lately  been  increased  by  £850,000  since 
the  formation  of  the  provincas  of  Bithynia-Pontus,  and 
Syria.  The  taxation  of  foreign  luxuries,  too,  yielded  a  con- 
stantly increasing  revenue ;  and  immense  sums  had  been 
brought  into  the  state  chest  by  Lucullus,  Metellus,  Pom- 
peius,  Cato,  and  others.  But  expenditure  had  likewise  in- 
creased, and  the  whole  department  had  been  mismanaged. 
The  corn  distribution  had  gradually  come  to  absorb  one- 
fifth  of  the  revenue  ;  the  military  budget  had  risen  with  the 
addition  of  Cilicia,  Syria,  and  Gaul  to  the  list  of  provinces. 
Again,  special  warlike  preparations  had  swallowed  up 
enormous  sums.  Still,  boundless  as  were  the  resources  of 
the  empire,  the  exchequer  might  have  met  all  these  claims 
upon  it  but  for  mismanagement  and  corruption. 

Apart  from  these  last  two  causes  there  were  two  insti- 
tutions, both  introduced  by  Gaius  Gracchus,  which  "  ate 
like  a  gangrene  into  the  Roman  financial  system," — the 
corn  distributions  and  the  leasing  system.  The  latter  was 
retained  for  the  indirect  taxes ;  but  the  direct  taxes  were 
in  future  either  paid  in  kind,  like  the  contributions  of 
corn  and  oil  from  Sardinia  and  Africa,  or  converted  into 
fixed  money  payments,  the  collection  being  entrusted  to 


THE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  THE  NEW  MONARCHY.    497 

the  communities  themselves.  The  corn  distributions 
could  hardly  be  abolished ;  but  in  their  present  form 
they  were  an  assertion  of  the  principle  that  the  ruling 
community  had  a  right  to  be  supported  by  its  subjects. 
Caesar  reduced  the  number  of  persons  relieved  from 
320,000  to  150,000,  which  number  was  fixed  as  a  maxi- 
mum, and  he  excluded  from  the  list  all  but  the  most 
needy,  thus  converting  the  institution  from  a  political 
privilege  into  a  provision  for  the  poor. 

A  thorough  revision  of  income  and  expenditure  was 
carried  out.  The  ordinary  items  of  revenue  were  fixed 
anew.  On  many  communities  and  districts  total  exemp- 
tion from  taxation  was  conferred,  either  directly  or  by 
bestowal  of  the  franchise.  Many  others  had  their  tribute 
lowered  :  that  of  Asia  was  reduced  by  one-third  ;  in  the 
newly  conquered  districts  of  Illyria  and  in  Gaul  the 
tribute  was  fixed  at  a  low  rate ;  all  Gaul  paid  but  forty 
million  sesterces  (£400,000).  On  the  other  hand, 
some  communities,  as  Little  Leptis  in  Africa,  had  their 
tribute  raised ,  the  recently  abolished  Italian  harbour 
dues  (p.  388)  were  reimposed :  and  to  these  ordinary 
sources  of  income  were  to  be  added  great  sums  raised 
from  booty,  temple  treasures,  forced  loans  and  fines 
imposed  on  subject  communities  or  on  individuals ;  above 
all,  from  the  proceeds  of  the  estates  of  the  defeated  party. 
The  fine  of  the  African  capitalists  who  sat  in  the  senate 
at  Utica  amounted  to  a  hundred  million  sesterces 
(£1,000,000),  and  the  property  of  Pompeius  sold  for 
£700,000.  These  confiscations  were  necessary,  because 
the  strength  of  the  aristocrats  lay  in  their  colossal  wealth  ; 
but  the  proceeds  were  scrupulously  devoted  to  state 
purposes,  and  the  purchase  money  was  always  rigidly 
exacted,  even  from  Caesar's  closest  adherents,  such  as 
Marcus  Antonius. 

The  expenditure  was  largely  diminished  by  the  restric- 
tion of  the  corn  distributions  ;  and  these,  together  with 
supply  of  oil  for  the  baths,  were  now  provided  for  by 
contributions  in  kind  from  Sardinia  and  Africa,  and  thus 
kept  separate  from  the  exchequer.  But  the  military 
expenditure  was  increased,  both  by  the  augmentation  of 
the  standing  army  and  by  the  raising  of  the  pay  from  480 
sesterces  (£5)  to  900  (£9)  annually.     Both  steps  were 

32 


498  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

necessary:  the  first  owing  t>  the  w.mt  of  any  efficient 
defence  of  the  frontiers ;  the  second  because  the  former 
pay  of  1^  sesterces  (3^(2. )  per  day  had  been  fixed  at  a 
time  when  money  had  an  entirely  different  value,  and 
when  the  soldier  entered  the  army,  not  for  pay,  but  for 
the  irregular  gains  which  he  made  at  the  expense  of  the 
provincials.  The  new  scale  was  fixed  at  2+  sesterces 
(6W.)  per  day,  the  ordinary  day's  wages  at  the  same 
period  being  3  sesterces  (7hd.).  Caesar's  extraordinary 
expenses  during  and  after  the  civil  wars  were  enormous. 
The  war  had  cost  immense  sums  ;  every  common  soldier 
in  Caesar's  army  received  twenty  thousand  sesterces 
(£200)  at  its  close ;  every  neutral  burgess  in  the  capital, 
three  hundred  (£3).  Buildings  undertaken  in  the  capital 
cost  in  all  160,000,000  sesterces  (£1,600,000).  Yet,  in 
spite  of  these  immense  disbursements,  in  March,  44  B.C., 
there  was  in  the  public  treasury  a  sum  of  seven  hundred 
million  sesterces,  in  that  of  Caesar  one  hundred  millions 
(in  all  £8,000,000) — tenfold  the  amount  which  the  treasury 
had  held  in  the  most  flourishing  times  of  the  republic. 

But  the  task  of  breaking  up  the  old  parties,  and  furnish- 
ing the  state  with  a  suitable  constitution,  an  efficient 
army,  and  well-ordered  finances,  was  not  the  most  difficult 
part  of  Caesar's  work.  It  remained  to  regenerate  the 
Italian  nation,  to  reorganize  Rome,  Italy,  and  the 
provinces. 

As  to  Rome  itself,  nothing  could  be  more  deplorable 
than  the  condition  into  which  it  had  fallen.  In  it,  as  in 
all  capitals,  were  congregated  the  upper  classes,  who 
regarded  their  homes  in  town  as  mere  lodging  places,  the 
foreign  settlers,  the  fluctuating  population  of  travellers 
on  business  or  pleasure,  the  mass  of  indolent,  criminal, 
bankrupt,  and  abandoned  rabble.  All  real  communal 
life  had  ceased  in  Rome :  it  was  a  centre  to  which  people 
flocked  from  the  whole  extent  of  the  empire  for  specu- 
lation, debauchery,  intrigue,  or  crime.  All  the  evils  in- 
inseparable  from  great  capitals  were  found  intensified  at 
Rome,  and  there  were  others  peculiar  to  itself.  No  city, 
perhaps,  was  ever  s©  completely  without  free  industry  of 
any  kind,  which  was  rendered  impossible  by  the  importa- 
tion of  foreign  commodities  and  by  the  extensive  employ- 
ment of  slaves  in  domestic  manufacture.    Nowhere,  again, 


THE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  THE  NEW  MONARCHY.    499 

were  such  masses  of  slaves  congregated ;  nowhere  were 
the  slaves  of  so  many  different  nationalities — Syrians, 
Phrygians,  half-Hellenes,  Libyans,  Moors,  Getae,  Iberians, 
and,  of  late  years,  Celts  and  Germans  in  daily  increasing 
numbers.  Still  wrorse  were  the  masses  of  freedmen — often 
free  only  de  facto — a  mixture  of  beggars  and  of  rich 
parvenus,  no  longer  slaves  but  not  yet  burgesses,  econo- 
mically and  even  legally  dependent  on  their  masters. 
Retail  trade  and  minor  handicrafts  were  almost  entirely 
in  their  hands,  and  in  riots  and  at  elections  their  influence 
was  supreme.  The  oligarchical  government  had  done 
nothing  to  mend  these  evils.  The  law  prohibiting  persons 
condemned  for  capital  offences  from  living  in  the  capital 
was  not  enforced ;  the  police  supervision  over  clubs  and 
associations  was  first  neglected  and  then  forbidden  by 
law  (p.  423).  Popular  festivals  had  been  allowed  to  in- 
crease so  largely  that  the  seven  principal  celebrations 
alone  occupied  sixty-two  days.  The  grain  supply  was 
managed  with  the  greatest  remissness,  and  the  fluctuations 
in  prices  were  fabulous  and  incalculable.  Lastly,  the  free 
distributions  were  a  standing  invitation  to  all  destitute 
and  indolent  burgesses  to  come  and  take  up  their  abode 
in  the  capital.  Out  of  all  this  neglect  sprang  the  system 
of  clubs  and  bands,  the  worship  of  Isis  and  other  religious 
extravagances.  Dearth  and  famine  were  ordinary  inci- 
dents ;  life  was  nowhere  more  insecure  than  at  Rome. 
The  condition  of  the  buildings  and  streets  was  equally 
disgraceful ,  nothing  was  done  to  prevent  the  constant 
overflows  of  the  river,  and  the  city  was  still  content  with 
one  bridge  over  the  Tiber.  The  streets  were  narrow  and 
steep,  the  footpaths  small  and  ill-paved  Ordinary  bouses 
were  wretchedly  built,  and  of  a  giddy  height,  while  the 
palaces  of  the  rich  formed  a  striking  contrast  to  the  decay- 
ing temples  of  the  gods,  with  their  images  still  carved  for 
the  most  part  in  wood.  "  If  we  try  to  conceive  to  ourselves 
a  London  with  the  slave  population  of  New  Orleans,  with 
the  police  of  Constantinople,  with  the  non-industrial 
character  of  the  modern  Rome,  and  agitated  by  politics 
after  the  fashion  of  the  Paris  of  1848,  we  shall  acquire  an 
approximate  idea  of  the  republican  glory,  the  departure 
of  which  Cicero  and  his  associates  in  their  sulky  letters 
deplore." 


500  HISTORY  OF  HONE. 

Caesar  could  not,  of  course,  alter  the  essential  character 
of  the  city,  nor  would  this  have  suited  his  plan.  To  be 
the  head  of  the  Roman  empire  it  must  remain  what  it  was, 
the  denationalized  capital  of  many  nations,  situated  at  the 
meeting-point  of  East  and  West;  and  for  this  reason  Caesar 
tolerated  the  new  Egyptian  worship,  and  even  the  strange 
rites  of  the  Jews,  alongside  of  those  of  Father  Jovis ; 
while  at  his  popular  festivals  he  caused  dramas  to  be 
performed,  not  only  in  Latin  and  Greek,  but  in  Phoenician, 
Hebrew,  Syrian,  and  Spanish.  The  primary  evils  could 
not  be  eradicated  ;  Caesar  could  not  abolish  slavery  or 
conjure  into  existence  a  free  industry  in  the  capital.  But 
by  his  extensive  building  operations  he  at  any  rate  gave 
to  the  willing  an  opportunity  of  honourable  employment, 
while  the  limitation  of  the  distributions  must  have  stopped 
the  influx  of  the  destitute  into  Rome.  The  existing  pro- 
letariate was  reduced  by  measures  of  police  and  by  compre- 
hensive transmarine  colonization.  Eighty  thousand  settlers 
were  sent  abroad  during  the  few  years  of  Caesar's  govern- 
ment. The  grain  supply  was  placed  upon  a  regular  and 
efficient  basis,  and  entrusted  to  the  two  newly  appointed 
corn-aediles.  The  club  system  was  checked  by  laws,  and 
came  to  an  end  of  itself  as  the  elections  ceased  to  be  of 
practical  importance.  In  future,  with  some  few  excep- 
tions, the  right  of  forming  associations  depended  upon 
the  permission  of  the  monarch  and  the  senate.  At  the 
same  time,  the  laws  regarding  violence  wTere  rendered  more 
severe,  and  the  right  of  the  convicted  criminal  to  with- 
draw himself  from  part  of  the  penalty  by  self-banishment 
was  set  aside.  The  repair  of  the  streets  and  footpaths 
was  laid  as  a  burden  upon  house  proprietors,  and  the 
whole  regulation  of  the  streets  was  entrusted  to  the  four 
aediles,  who  each  superintended  a  distinct  police  district. 
Building  in  the  capital  received  a  stimulus  which  put  to 
shame  everything  that  had  been  accomplished  in  former 
days.  And  the  new  buildings  were  not  merely  monuments 
of  splendour,  but  contributed  largely  to  the  public  con- 
venience. The  crowded  Forum  was  relieved  by  the 
construction  of  a  new  comitium  in  the  Campus  Martins, 
and  of  a  new  place  of  judicature,  the  Forum  Julium.  In 
the  same  spirit,  oil  was  supplied  to  the  baths  free  of  cost, 
as  a  measure  of  sanitation.      Other  and   more   brilliant 


TEE  OLE  FErUBLIC  ANE  TEE  NEW  MONARCEY.    501 

projects,  suck  as  the  alteration  of  the  whole  lower  course 
of  the  Tiber,  so  as  to  provide  more  space  for  public 
edifices,  to  drain  the  Pomptine  marshes,  and  to  provide 
the  capital  with  a  safe  sea-port,  were  cat  short  by  the 
death  of  Caesar. 

But  when  all  was  done,  Rome,  just  because  it  was 
incapable  of  a  real  municipal  life,  was  essentially  inferior 
to  other  municipalities  of  the  period.  "  The  republican 
Rome  was  a  den  of  robbers,  but  it  was  at  the  same  time 
the  state :  the  Rome  of  the  monarchy,  although  it  began 
to  embellish  itself  with  all  the  glories  of  the  three  conti- 
nents, and  to  glitter  in  gold  and  marble,  was  yet  nothing  in 
the  state  but  a  royal  residence  in  connection  with  a  poor- 
house,  or,  in  other  words,  a  necessary  evil." 

The  reorganization  of  the  police  of  Rome  was,  of  course, 
a  small  task  compared  with  the  social  reorganization  of 
Italy.  The  plague-spot  in  the  condition  of  Italy  was,  as 
it  had  long  been,  the  disappearance  of  the  agricultural 
and  the  unnatural  increase  of  the  mercantile  population. 
In  spite  of  numerous  attempts  to  foster  the  system  of 
small  holdings,  f.irm  husbandry  was  scarcely  anywhere 
predominant  in  Italy.  In  the  districts  of  Tibur  and 
Tusculum,  on  the  shores  of  Tarracina  and  Baiae,  where 
the  Italian  farmer  had  once  sowed  and  reaped,  there  was 
now  to  be  seen  only  the  barren  splendour  of  the  villas  of 
the  nobles,  with  all  the  appurtenances  of  gardens  and 
fish-ponds  salt  and  fresh,  nurseries  of  snails  and  slugs, 
game  preserves,  and  aviaries.  The  stock  of  a  pigeon- 
house  was  valued  at  £1000 ,  the  fishes  left  behind  by 
Lucius  Lucullus  brought  £400.  Accordingly  the  supply 
of  such  luxuries  developed  into  a  trade  which,  if  intelli- 
gently prosecuted,  brought  large  profits.  Gardening,  the 
production  of  vegetables,  fruit,  and  flowers,  especially 
roses  and  violets,  in  Latium  and  Campania,  and  of 
honey,  were  the  most  profitable.  The  management  of 
estates  on  the  planter  system  gave  results  which,  from 
an  economic  point  of  view,  far  surpassed  anything  which 
the  old  system  of  small  cultivators  could  have  given, 
especially  in  central  Italy,  the  district  of  the  Fucine  lake, 
of  the  Liris  and  Volturnus.  Even  some  branches  of 
industry,  such  as  were  suitable  accompaniments  of  a 
slave  estate,  were  taken  up  by  intelligent  landlords,  and 


502  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

i'ins,  weaving  factoiues,  brickworks,  were  conducted  on 
the  demesne.  Pastoral  husbandry,  which  was  always 
spreading,  especially  in  the  south  and  south-east,  was 
indeed  in  every  respect  a  retrograde  movement,  but  it 
too  participated  in  the  general  progress,  and  accomplished 
much  in  the  way  of  improvement  of  breeds 

The  dimensions  which  money-dealing  assumed  by  the 
side  of  this  unnaturally  prosperous  estate  husbandry,  and 
the  extent  to  which  capital  flowed  to  Rome,  is  shown  by 
the  singular  fact  that  at  Rome  the  ordinary  rate  of  interest 
was  six  per  cent. ;  that  is,  one-half  the  average  rate  else- 
where in  ancient  times. 

The  result  of  this  economic  system,  based  upon  masses 
of  capital,  was  the  most  fearful  disproportion  in  the  dis- 
tribution of  wealth.  Nowhere  is  the  phrase  "a  common- 
wealth composed  of  millionaires  and  beggars  "  so  applicable 
as  at  Rome  in  the  last  stages  of  the  republic  ;  nowhere  has 
the  essential  maxim  of  the  slave  state,  that  the  rich  man  who 
lives  by  the  exertion  of  his  slaves  is  respectable,  and  the 
poor  man  who  lives  by  the  labour  of  his  hands  is  necessarily 
vulgar,  been  so  widely  recognized.  A  real  middle  class 
there  can  never  be  in  any  fully  developed  slave  state  ;  the 
nearest  approach  to  it  in  the  Roman  commonwealth  was 
composed  of  men  who  were  either  too  cultivated  or  too 
uncultivated  to  go  beyond  their  own  sphere  of  activity, 
and  to  take  any  share  in  public  life.  Of  the  former  class, 
Cicero's  friend,  Titus  Pomponius  Atticus,  is  a  typical 
example.  He  acquired  a  large  fortune  by  estate  farming 
and  by  extensive  money  transactions ;  but  he  was  never 
seduced  into  soliciting  office,  or  even  into  money  transac- 
tions with  the  state  ,  his  table  was  ample,  but  moderate, 
and  was  maintained  at  a  cost  of  one  hundred  sesterces 
(£1)  per  day ;  he  was  content  with  an  easy  existence, 
which  included  all  the  charms  of  a  country  and  a  city  life, 
together  with  intercourse  with  the  best  society  of  Rome 
and  Greece,  and  all  the  enjoyments  of  literature  and  art. 
Of  the  less  cultivated  rural  gentleman  (pater-familias 
rusticanus)  an  example  is  furnished  by  Sextus  Roscius, 
who  was  murdered  in  81  B.C.  He  manages  his  thirteen 
estates  in  person,  and  comes  seldom  to  the  capital,  where 
his  clownish  manners  contrast  strongly  with  those  of  the 
polished    senator.       In   such   men  and  in   their  country 


THE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  THE  NEW  MONARCHY.    503 

towns  the  discipline,  manners,  and  language  of  their 
fathers  were  best  preserved.  Traces  of  such  a  class  appear 
wherever  a  national  movement  arises  in  politics,  and  from 
it  sprung  Varro,  Lucretius,  Catullus,  and  all  the  freshest 
literature  of  the  time.  An  excellent  picture  of  this  simple 
landlord  life  may  be  found  in  the  graceful  introduction  to 
the  second  book  of  Cicero's  treatise  "  De  Legibus." 

But  the  vigorous  class  of  landlords  is  completely  out- 
balanced by  the  two  predominant  classes  in  the  state,  the 
mass  of  beggars,  and  the  world  of  quality.  The  relative 
proportions  of  poor  and  rich  we  have  no  means  of  accurately 
knowing.  But  fifty  years  earlier  the  number  of  families 
of  established  wealth  did  not  amount  to  two  thousand ; 
and  the  disproportion  had  probably  increased.  The 
growth  of  poverty  is  shown  by  tho  crowding  into  the  army, 
and  into  the  city  for  the  corn- largesses ;  that  of  wealth, 
by  the  fact  that  an  author  of  this  generation  describes 
an  estate  of  two  million  sesterces  (£20,000),  of  the  Marian 
period,  as  "  riches,  according  to  the  circumstances  of  that 
day,"  and  by  the  enormous  fortunes  possessed  by  indi- 
viduals. The  estate  of  Pompeius  amounted  to  70,000,000 
sesterces  (£700,000)  ;  Crassus,  who  began  with  a  fortune 
of  7,000,000  (£70,000),  died,  after  lavishing  enormous 
sums  on  the  people,  worth  170,000,000  (£1,700,000.)  The 
result  was,  on  both  sides,  economic  and  moral  dis- 
organization. The  Roman  plebeian  became  a  lazy  mendi- 
cant, fonder  of  gazing  in  the  theatre  than  of  working. 
The  gladiatorial  games  flourished  as  never  before  ;  freedom 
had  so  fallen  in  value  that  freemen  often  sold  themselves 
for  board  and  wages  as  gladiatorial  slaves.  In  the  world 
of  quality  essentially  the  same  features  occur.  As  the 
plebeian  lounged  on  the  pavement,  the  aristocrat  lay  in 
bed  till  late  in  the  day ;  unbounded  and  tasteless  luxury 
everywhere  prevailed  ;  huge  sums  were  lavished  on  politics 
and  on  the  theatre,  to  the  corruption  of  both.  In  54  B.C., 
the  first  voting  division  alone  was  paid  £100,000,  and  all 
intelligent  interest  in  the  drama  vanished  amidst  the 
insane  extravagance  of  decoration.  Rents  in  Rome  were 
four  times  as  high  as  in  the  country  ;  the  house  of  Marcus 
Lepidus,  at  the  time  of  Sulla's  death  the  finest  in  Rome, 
was,  a  generation  later,  not  the  hundreth  on  the  list  of 
Roman  palaces.     A  palatial  sepulchre  was  a  necessity  to 


50-1  HISTORY  OF  ROMR 

every  noble  who  wished  to  die  a^s  became  his  rank  ,  horses, 
dogs,  furniture,  dress,  plate,  all  cost  outrageous  sums. 
But  it  was  the  luxury  of  the  table,  the  coarsest  luxury 
of  all,  which  flourished  most  bravely.  There  were  dining- 
rooms  for  winter  and  summer ;  sometimes  the  meal  was 
served  on  a  platform  in  the  deer-park,  and  the  guests  were 
entertained  by  a  theatrical  Orpheus,  at  whose  notes  trained 
roes  and  wild  boars  gathered  round.  Italian  delicacies  had 
become  vulgar,  and  even  at  popular  festivals  three  sorts  of 
foreign  wine,  Sicilian,  Lesbian,  and  Chian  were  distributed. 
Emetics  were  commonly  taken  to  avoid  the  consequences 
of  a  meal.  Debauchery  of  every  sort  had  become  a  pro- 
fession, by  which  instructors  in  the  theory  and  practice 
of  vice  could  gain  a  living.  Of  course  no  fortune  could 
bear  the  ravages  of  such  expenditure.  Tue  canvass  for 
the  consulship  was  the  usual  high-road  to  ruin.  The 
princely  wealth  of  the  period  is  far  surpassed  by  the  more 
than  princely  liabilities.  Caesar  in  62  B.C.  owed  £250,000 
more  than  his  assets.  Marcus  Antonius  owed  at  the  age 
of  twenty-four,  £60,000,  fourteen  years  later  £400,000, 
Curio  owed  £600,000  ;  Milo  £700,000.  The  borrowing  of 
the  competitors  for  the  consulship  once  suddenly  raised  the 
rate  of  interest  from  four  to  eight  per  cent.  Insolvency 
was  usually  prolonged  by  the  debtor  as  long  as  possible,  and 
when  the  final  crash  came  the  creditors  perhaps  got — as 
in  the  case  of  Milo — four  per  cent,  of  their  lendings  The 
only  man  who  profited  by  such  a  condition  of  things  was, 
of  course,  the  cool  banker.  The  debtors  were  either  in 
servile  subjection  to  their  creditors,  or  ready  to  get  rid  of 
them  by  couspiracy  and  civil  war.  Hence  the  cry  of 
"clear  sheets"  (novae  tabulae),  the  motto  of  Cinna  and 
Catilina,  of  Caelius  and  Dolabella. 

Under  such  circumstances  morality  and  family  life  had 
become  antiquated  things  ;  poverty  was  the  only  disgrace, 
the  only  crime  ;  the  state,  honour,  freedom  were  alike  sold 
for  money.  Men  had  forgotten  what  honesty  was,  and  a 
man  who  refused  a  bribe  was  regarded  as  a  personal  foe. 
The  criminal  calendars  of  all  ages  and  countries  could 
scarcely  furnish  a  tale  of  crime  so  horrible,  so  varied,  and 
so  unnatural  as  the  trial  of  Aulus  Cluentius  reveals  in  the 
bosom  of  a  respectable  family  in  an  Italian  country  town. 
Nevertheless,  the  surface  of  life  was  overspread  with  a 


THE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  THE  NEW  MONARCHY.    £05 

veneer  of  polish  and  professions  of  universal  friendship. 
All  the  world  exchanged  visits.  At  houses  of  quality  the 
crowds  of  visitors  were  admitted  in  a  fixed  order,  the  more 
notable  one  by  one,  the  others  in  groups,  or  in  a  body  at 
the  close.  Invitations  to  dinner  and  the  customary 
domestic  festivals  became  almost  public  ceremonials,  and 
even  at  his  death  the  Roman  was  expected  to  provide  each 
of  his  countless  friends  with  a  keepsake.  Instead  of  the 
genuine  intimacy  of  family  ties  there  was  a  spectral  shadow 
of  "  friendship,"  not  the  least  of  the  evil  spirits  which 
brooded  over  the  horrors  of  the  age. 

Another  equally  characteristic  feature  was  the  emanci- 
pation of  women — not  merely  the  economic  emancipation 
from  father  or  husband — which  had  long  ago  been 
accomplished,  but  a  freedom  which  allowed  them  to 
interfere  in  every  department  of  life.  The  ballet  dancers 
(mimae)  and  all  their  tribe  pollute  even  the  pages  of 
history ;  liaisons  in  even  the  best  circles  were  so  common 
that  only  a  very  extraordinary  scandal  could  excite  com- 
ment. The  intrusion  of  Publius  Clodius  at  the  women's 
festival  of  the  Bona  Dea,  a  scandal  hitherto  unparalleled, 
passed  almost  without  investigation.  The  carnival  time 
for  license  of  this  sort  was  the  watering-place  season  (in 
April),  at  Baiae  and  Puteoli ;  but  the  women  were  not 
content  with  their  own  domain.  They  invaded  the  realm 
of  politics,  attended  political  conferences,  and  took  their 
part  in  all  the  coterie  intrigues  of  the  time.  The  lightness 
with  which  divorce  was  regarded  may  be  inferred  from  the 
conduct  of  the  stern  moralist  Cato,  who  did  not  hesitate  to 
divorce  his  wife  for  a  friend  who  wished  to  marry  her,  or 
to  marry  her  again  after  the  death  of  his  friend.  Celibacy 
and  childlessness  became  increasingly  common,  especially 
in  the  upper  classes ;  even  with  Cato  and  his  circle  the 
same  maxim  was  now  current  to  which  Polybins  had  traced 
the  decay  of  Hellas,  that  it  is  the  duty  of  a  citizen  to 
keep  great  wealth  together,  and  therefore  not  to  beget 
too  many  children. 

During  all  this  period  the  population  of  Italy  was  grow- 
ing steadily  smaller.  The  amount  of  talent  and  working 
power  necessary  for  the  government  of  the  empire  was  no 
longer  forthcoming  from  the  peninsula,  especially  as  a 
large  part  of  its  best  material  was  continually  being  lost 


505  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

for  ever  to  the  nation.  The  aristocracy  lost  the  habit  oi 
looking  on  Italy  as  their  home.  Of  the  men  enlisted  for 
service,  large  numbers  perished  in  the  numerous  wars,  and 
many  more  were  wholly  estranged  from  their  native 
land  by  the  long  period  of  service.  Speculation  kept 
many  of  the  land-holders  and  merchants  away  from  their 
country,  and  their  itinerant  habits  estranged  them  from 
civic  and  family  life.  In  return  for  these  sound  elements 
Italy  received  a  rabble  of  slaves  and  f reedmen,  handicrafts- 
men and  tradesmen  from  Asia  Minor,  Syria,  and  Egypt, 
who  moreover  flourished  chiefly  in  the  seaports  and  in 
the  capital ;  in  many  parts  of  Italy  there  was  not  even 
this  compensation,  and  the  population  visibly  declined. 
The  pastoral  districts,  such  as  Apulia  and  the  region  round 
Rome,  became  every  year  more  desolate  :  many  towns,  such 
as  Labici  and  Gabii,  could  hardly  find  representatives  for 
the  Latin  festival ;  Tusculum  consisted  almost  solely  of 
families  of  rank  who  lived  at  Rome  but  retained  their 
Tusculan  franchise.  In  some  portions  of  Italy,  especially 
Campania,  things  were  not  so  bad ;  but  in  general,  as 
Varro  complains,  "  the  once  populous  cities  of  Italy  stood 
desnUte." 

"  It  is  a  terrible  picture,  but  not  one  peculiar  to  Italy  ; 
wherever  the  government  in  a  slave-state  has  fully  de- 
veloped itself,  it  has  desolated  God's  fair  world  in  th3 
same  way.  .  .  .  As  in  the  Hellas  of  Polybius,  and  the 
Carthage  of  Hannibal's  time,  .  .  .  the  all-powerful  rule  of 
capital  ruined  the  middle  class,  raised  trade  and  estate- 
farming  to  the  highest  prosperity,  and  ultimately  led  to 
a  .  .  .  moral  and  political  corruption  of  the  nation.  .  .  . 
Not  until  the  dragon-seed  of  North  America  ripens,  will 
the  world  have  again  similar  fruits  to  reap."* 

The  evils  of  Italy  were  in  their  deepest  essence  irremedi- 
able ;  the  wisest  government  cannot  give  freshness  to  the 
corrupt  juices  of  the  organism,  or  do  more  in  such  a  case 
than  remove  obstructions  in  the  way  of  the  remedial  power 
of  nature.  The  worst  excrescences  vanished  under  the 
new  rule,  such  as  the  pampering  of  the  proletariate,  the 
impunity  of  crimes,  the  purchasing  of  offices.  But  Caesar 
was  not  one  of  those  overwise  men  who  refuse  to  embank 
the  sea  because  no  dyke  will  keep  out  a  sudden  influx  of 
*  Written  in  1857.     See  note  on  p.  486. 


TEE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  TEE  NEW  MONARCEY.    507 

the  tide.  Though  no  one  knew  better  than  himself  the 
limits  of  his  power,  he  applied  all  his  energies  to  bring 
back  tbe  nation  to  home  and  family  life,  and  to  reform  the 
national  economy  by  law  and  decree. 

In  order  to  check  the  absence  of  Italians  from  Italy  the 
term  of  military  service  was  shortened,  and  men  of  senatorial 
rank  were  prohibited  from  living  out  of  Italy  except  on  pub- 
lic business.  Other  Italians,  of  marriageable  age,  were  for- 
bidden to  be  absent  for  more  than  three  consecutive  years. 
In  his  first  consulship  Caesar  had  especially  favoured 
fathers  who  had  several  children,  in  founding  his  colony 
of  Capua.  As  imperator  he  offered  rewards  to  fathers  of 
numerous  families,  and  treated  divorce  and  adultery  with 
great  rigour.  In  order  to  repress  some  of  the  worst  forms 
of  luxury,  extravagance  in  sepulchral  monuments  was  cut 
down  by  law,  the  use  of  purple  robes  and  of  pearls  was 
restricted,  and  a  maximum  was  fixed  for  the  expenditure 
of  the  table.  Even  the  semblance  of  propriety  enforced  by 
these  police  measures  was,  under  the  circumstances,  not 
to  be  despised.  The  laws  designed  to  meet  the  existing 
monetary  crisis,  and  for  the  better  regulation  of  monetary 
dealings  in  future,  were  more  serious  and  promised  better 
results.  The  law  which  was  produced  by  the  outcry 
against  locked-up  capital,  and  which  provided  that  no  one 
should  have  on  hand  more  than  sixty  thousand  sesterces 
(£600)  in  gold  and  silver,  was  probably  only  meant  to 
allay  the  public  indignation,  and  can  hardly  have  been 
enforced.  The  treatment  of  pending  claims  was  a  more 
serious  matter.  Two  important  concessions  were  made  to 
debtors  in  49  B.C.  First,  the  interest  in  arrear  was  struck 
off,  and  that  already  paid  was  deducted  from  the  capital. 
Secondly,  the  creditor  had  to  accept  as  payment  the  pro- 
perty of  the  debtor  at  its  estimated  value  before  the  general 
depreciation  caused  by  the  civil  war  ;  which  of  course  was 
only  fair,  inasmuch  as  it  compelled  the  creditor  to  bear  his 
share  of  the  general  fall  in  values.  But  the  first  provision, 
which  in  practice  compelled  the  creditor  to  lose,  besides 
the  interest,  an  average  of  twenty- five  per  cent,  of  his 
capital,  amounted  to  a  partial  concession  to  the  cry  for  a 
total  cancelling  of  debts.  But  the  democratic  party  had 
always  taken  their  stand  upon  the  illegality  of  all  interest : 
interest  was,  in  fact,  forbidden  by  the  lex  Genucia,  which 


508  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

was  extorted  by  the  plebeians  in  342  B.C.,  and  which  was 
still  formally  valid ;  in  the  confusion  of  the  Marian  period 
it  had  even  been  enforced  for  a  time.  And  though  Caesar 
can  hardly  have  shared  the  crude  views  of  his  party, 
he  could  not  entirely  repudiate  its  traditional  maxims ; 
especially  as  he  had  to  decide  this  question,  not  as  the 
conqueror  of  Pharsalus,  but  even  before  his  departure 
for  Epirus. 

Besides  assisting  the  debtor  of  the  moment,  Caesar  did 
what  he  could  permanently  to  repress  the  fearful  omni- 
potence of  capital.  According  to  Roman  law  the  insolvent 
debtor  became  the  slave  of  his  creditor ;  and  though 
modified  in  secondary  points,  the  principle  had  remained 
unaltered  for  five  hundred  years.  It  was  Caesar  who  first 
gave  to  an  insolvent  the  right  of  saving  his  personal  freedom 
though  with  diminished  political  rights ;  of  ceding  his 
property  to  his  creditors,  and  beginning  a  new  financial 
existence.  Claims  arising  from  the  earlier  period  could  be 
enforced  against  him  only  if  he  could  meet  them  without 
renewed  financial  ruin.  At  the  same  time,  Caesar  did  not 
disown  the  antipathy  of  his  party  to  usury.  In  Italy,  for 
the  future,  no  single  capitalist  was  allowed  to  lend  sums 
amounting  to  more  than  a  fixed  proportion  (perhaps  one 
half)  of  the  value  of  his  landed  estate.  In  consequence  of 
this  law  every  money-lender  was  compelled  to  be  also  a 
landowner,  and  the  class  of  capitalists  subsisting  wholly 
on  their  interest  would  disappear  from  Italy.  It  was  also 
forbidden  to  take  a  higher  interest  than  one  per  cent,  per 
month ;  or  to  take  interest  on  arrears  of  interest,  or  to 
claim  interest  to  a  greater  amount  than  the  capital — pro- 
visions which  were  probably  first  introduced  by  Lucius 
Lucullus  in  Asia  Minor,  and  which  were  extended  to  all 
the  provinces  by  decree  of  the  senate  in  the  year  50  B.C. 

For  the  improvement  of  agriculture  the  first  necessity 
was  the  improvement  of  the  adminstration  of  law  and 
justice.  Hitherto  neither  movable  nor  immovable 
property  had  been  secure.  The  leaders  of  armed  bands, 
when  their  services  were  not  required  in  the  capital,  had 
applied  themselves  to  rounding  off  the  country  estates  of 
their  masters  by  violently  expelling  the  rightful  owners. 
Such  proceedings  were  now  at  an  end.  A  high  road  was 
made  from  Borne  through  the  passes  of  the  Apennines  to 


THE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  THE  NEW  MONARCHY    50D 

the  Adriatic,  and  the  level  of  the  Fucine  lake  was  lowered 
for  the  benefit  of  the  Marsian  farmers.  In  order  to  check 
brigandage  and  encourage  free  labour,  Italian  graziers  were 
required  to  take  at  least  a  third  of  their  herdsmen  from 
free-born  adults.  In  the  encouragement  of  small  holdings 
Caesar  showed  himself  scrupulously  observant  of  every 
legitimate  title,  whether  derived  from  Gracchus  or  Sulla; 
but  the  commission  of  twenty  was  revived  to  revise 
all  Italian  titles ;  and  the  whole  of  the  actual  domain 
land  of  Italy  which  was  suitable  for  agriculture  was 
destined  for  distribution.  In  the  selection  of  farmers  the 
veterans  were  first  considered ;  and  thus  Caesar  restored 
to  his  country  as  a  farmer  the  proletarian  whom  he  had 
levied  as  a  recruit.  Desolate  Latin  communities,  such  as 
Veii  and  Capena,  were  provided  with  new  colonists.  The 
new  owners  were  forbidden  to  alienate  their  lands  for 
twenty  years. 

The  newly  organized  municipal  system,  which  had  been 
developed  out  of  the  crisis  of  the  social  war  (p.  309),  was 
regulated  by  Caesar  in  two  ordinances  of  49  B.C.  and  45  B.C., 
the  former  of  which  applied  to  Cisalpine  Gaul  only,  while 
the  latter  remained  the  fundamental  law  for  all  succeeding 
time.  It  proceeded  on  the  line  of  purifying  the  urban 
corporations  from  all  immoral  elements,  and  of  restricting 
centralization  to  the  utmost.  The  communities  were  still 
allowed  to  elect  their  own  magistrates,  and  to  exercise  a 
limited  civil  and  criminal  jurisdiction. 

Such  were  Caesar's  regulations  for  the  reform  of  the 
social  economy  of  Italy.  It  would  be  easy  to  show  that 
they  were  insufficient,  and  that  they  acted  in  some 
respects  injuriously, — still  easier  to  show  that  the  evils 
of  Italian  economy  were  incurable.  But  Caesar  did  not 
hope  or  expect  from  them  the  regeneration  of  Italy.  This 
he  attempted  to  attain  in  a  very  different  way,  for  the 
understanding  of  which  it  is  necessary  to  review  the  con- 
dition of  the  provinces  as  Caesar  found  them. 

The  provinces  in  existence  at  this  time  were  fourteen 
in  number :  seven  European  —  Further  Spain,  Hither 
Spain,  Transalpine  Gaul,  Italian  Gaul  with  Ulyricum, 
Macedonia  with  Greece,  Sicily,  Sardinia  with  Corsica; 
five  Asiatic — Asia,  Bithynia  with  Pontus,  Cilicia  with 
Cyprus,  Syria,  Crete ;  two  African — Cyrene,  Africa.     To 


510  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

these  Ceesar  added  three  more — Lugdunese  Gaul,  Belgica, 
and  Illyria,  which  was  now  erected  into  a  separate  pro- 
vince. 

Under  the  oligarchy  the  provinces  were  reduced  to  a 
condition  of  hopeless  misery  which  it  seems  impossible 
for  any  government  ever  to  surpass.  It  is  true  that,  before 
the  Romans  had  their  day,  the  rule  of  Greeks,  Phoenicians, 
or  Asiatics  had  almost  everywhere  driven  from  the  nations 
all  sense  of  right  and  liberty.  The  Roman  provincial, 
when  accused,  was  obliged  to  appear  personally  at  Rome  ; 
the  Roman  governor  interfered  at  pleasure  in  every  detail 
of  administration ;  the  Roman  administrators  and  their 
train  were  bound  by  no  rule  of  morality  and  justice,  and 
outrages,  rapes,  murders  with  or  without  the  form  of  law, 
were  of  daily  occurrence.  But  these  things  had  gone  on 
from  time  immemorial  under  Carthaginian  overseers  and 
Syrian  satraps,  and  the  well-being  of  the  provincials  was 
far  less  disturbed  by  them  than  by  the  financial  exactions, 
in  which  the  Romans  outran  all  former  tyrants.  The 
ordinary  taxes  were  rendered  doubly  oppressive  by  the 
mode  of  levying  them.  As  to  the  quartering  of  troops, 
Roman  statesmen  themselves  confessed  that  a  town  suffered 
nearly  as  much  from  it  as  when  stormed  by  an  enemy. 
The  taxation  was  properly  an  indemnification  for  the  burden 
of  military  defence  undertaken  by  Rome,  and  the  com- 
munities taxed  had  a  ri^ht  to  be  exempt  at  any  rate  from 
the  ordinary  service.  But  garrison  duty  was  still  for  the 
most  part  imposed  upon  the  provincials,  as  well  as  the 
whole  burden  of  cavalry  service ;  and  the  extraordinary 
contributions  for  the  supply  of  grain  to  the  capital,  the 
costly  naval  armaments  and  coast  defences  against  the 
pirates,  the  military  requisitions  in  time  of  war,  were 
frequent  and  oppressive  in  the  extreme.  In  Sicily  the 
number  of  farms  decreased  fifty-nine  per  cent,  during 
three  years  of  the  administration  of  Gaius  Verres ,  and 
the  ruined  cultivators  were  not  small  farmers,  but  con- 
siderable planters  and  Roman  burgesses  !  In  the  client 
states  the  burdens  were,  if  possible,  heavier.  In  addition 
to  the  Roman  exactions  came  those  of  the  native  courts ; 
farmer  and  king  were  alike  bankrupt.  And  to  these, 
to  some  extent  regular  exactions,  are  to  be  added  the 
plunderings  of  the  governor  and  of  all  his  friends   each 


THE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  TEE  NEW  MONARCHY.    511 

of  whom  expected  to  retirrn  to  Rome  a  made  man.  The 
advocates  and  jurymen  at  home  expected  to  share  the 
spoil;  so  that  the  more  the  governor  stole,  the  greater 
his  security.  And  these  were  the  successors  of  the  men 
who  had  brought  nothing  home  from  the  provinces  but 
the  thanks  of  the  subjects  and  the  approval  of  their 
countrymen ! 

Nor  is  this  all.  The  tyranny  of  the  Italian  men  of 
business  was  even  worse  than  that  of  the  governors. 
Much  of  the  landed  property  and  most  of  the  commerce 
and  finance  of  the  provinces  were  in  their  hands.  Usury 
flourished  as  never  before.  The  small  landowners  managed 
their  estates  as  the  debtor-slaves  of  their  creditors.  Com- 
munities had  sometimes  to  pay  four  per  cent,  per  month 
for  loans.  Frequently  a  man  of  business  got  the  title  of 
envoy  (libera  legatio)  conferred  on  him,  and  sometimes 
had  men  put  at  his  disposal  for  the  more  effective  pro- 
secution of  his  affairs.  On  one  occasio.  ,  i  banker,  who  had 
a  claim  on  the  town  of  Salamis  in  Cyprus,  kept  its  council 
blockaded  in  the  town-house  until  five  members  died  of 
hunger.  And  still  to  all  these  miseries  and  oppressions 
there  remain  to  be  added  general  calamities,  for  some  of 
which,  such  as  war,  brigandage,  and  piracy,  the  inefficiency 
of  the  Roman  government  was  responsible.  The  general 
result,  even  in  the  comparatively  prosperous  provinces  of 
Spain  and  Narbonese  Gaul,  was  total  ruin.  Towns  like 
Samos  and  Halicarnassus  stood  empty;  even  the  patient 
Asiatic  was  weary  of  life.  The  statesmen  of  Rome  allowed 
that  the  Roman  name  was  unutterably  hateful  throughout 
Greece  and  Asia;  and  when  the  men  of  Heraclea,  in 
Pontus,  put  to  death  the  whole  of  the  Roman  tax-collectors, 
"  the  only  matter  for  regret  was  that  such  things  did  not 
occur  oftener." 

The  wounds  inflicted  could  only  be  healed  by  time ;  but 
Caesar  took  care  that  there  should  be  no  new  inflictions. 
The  new  governors  were  the  servants  of  a  stern  master, 
and  were  practically  appointed  by  him  (p.  491).  Their 
functions  were  largely  restricted  by  the  new  supreme 
command  in  Rome  and  by  the  new  adjutants  associated 
with  them  (p.  494).  The  raising  of  the  taxes,  too,  was 
probably  already  committed  to  imperial  officials,  so  that 
the   governor  was   now  surrounded   by   an   independent 


512  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

staff,  directly  responsible  to  tbe  imperator.  The  law 
against  exactions  had  been  made  more  stringent  by  Caesar 
in  his  first  consulate,  and  was  applied  with  inexorable 
severity.  At  the  same  time,  the  extraordinary  burdens 
were  limited  to  the  necessary  requirements,  and  the  ordi- 
nary burdens  materially  lessened.  Exemptions  from  tribute 
were  liberally  granted,  the  direct  taxes  lowered,  the  system 
of  decumae  (p.  316)  confined  to  Africa  and  Sardinia,  and 
the  system  of  middlemen  in  the  collection  was  set  aside. 
That  Caesar,-  like  Sertorius,  tried  to  free  the  subjects  from 
the  burden  of  quartering  troops  cannot  be  proved,  but 
it  was  in  this  spirit  that  the  heirs  of  his  policy  created 
military  camps,  and  converted  them  into  towns  which 
formed  rallying-points  in  the  barbarian  frontier  districts. 

To  deliver  the  provincials  from  the  tyranny  of  Roman 
capital  was  a  far  more  difficult  task.  Its  power  could  not 
be  directly  broken,  and  a  radical  cure  could  only  be  hoped 
for  from  the  gradual  revival  of  prosperity.  Isolated  abuses, 
such  as  the  custom  of  libera  legatio,  were  abolished,  and 
palpable  acts  of  violence  or  flagrant  wrong  were  sharply 
punished ;  but  this  was  all.  Caesar  had,  as  governor  of 
Further  Spain  in  60  B.C.,  assigned  to  the  creditors  two- 
thirds  of  the  income  of  their  debtors  in  order  to  pay 
themselves ;  and  Lucius  Lucullus  had  in  Asia  cancelled  a 
portion  of  the  arrears  of  interest,  and  assigned  to  the  cre- 
ditors a  fourth  part  of  the  produce  of  the  lands  of  their 
debtors.  It  is  probable  that  similar  liquidations  were  in- 
stituted in  the  provinces  generally  after  the  civil  wars. 
As  to  the  remaining  evils  of  piracy  and  brigandage,  these 
might  be  expected  to  disappear  through  the  fresh  vigour 
of  the  new  regime.  At  any  rate,  with  Caesar  hope  dawned 
afresh,  and  the  first  intelligent  and  humane  government 
which  had  appeared  for  centuries  began  to  rule.  "  Well 
might  the  subject*,  in  particular  mourn  along  with  the  best 
Romans  by  the  bier  of  the  great  liberator." 

We  have  now  surveyed  in  outline  the  principal  measures 
by  which  Caesar  attempted  to  reorganize  existing  institu- 
tions, to  get  rid  of  abuses,  and  to  reform  the  whole  system 
of  government.  But  this  was,  on  the  whole,  but  the 
negative  part  of  his  task.  For  the  regeneration,  it  might 
almost  be  said  the  re-creation,  of  the  state  he  tried  to  lay 
a  firm  foundation,  upon  which  might  be  realized  that  con- 


THE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  THE  NEW  MONARCHY.     513 

ception  which  had  first  been  grasped  by  Gaius  Gracchus, 
and  which  was.  afterwards  taken  up  by  Sertorius  in 
Spain.  Like  those  great  statesmen,  Caesar  looked  for- 
ward to  the  time  when  the  provinces,  as  such,  would 
disappear,  and  when  a  new  Helleno-Italic  nation  should 
arise  in  a  new  and  wider  home,  with  a  fresher,  broader, 
grander  national  life,  which  would  of  itself  be  the  ex- 
tinction of  the  sorrows  and  wrongs  of  the  nation  for 
which  there  could  be  no  redress  in  old  Italy.  The  emi- 
gration of  Italians  to  the  provinces  had  been  going  on  for 
centuries.  Gaius  Gracchus  was  the  first  to  guide  the 
Italians  systematically  to  settle  beyond  tlie  bounds  of  Italy 
by  his  colonization  of  Carthage  and  Narbo.  Sertorius 
had  done  his  best  to  Latinize  the  Spaniards  of  rank,  and 
to  introduce  Italian  culture  into  Spain,  and  by  Caesar's  time 
there  was  a  large  Italian  population  ready  to  his  hand  in 
nearly  every  province  of  the  empire.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  interpenet ration  of  the  Latin  and  the  Hellenic  character 
was  as  old  almost  as  Rome.  The  Roman  legionary  was 
followed  everywhere  by  the  Greek  schoolmaster,  and  the 
Latin  higher  culture  was  nothing  but  Hellenism  pro- 
claimed in  the  Latin  tongue.  Everywhere  it  was  felt  that 
Rome  was  the  protector  and  avenger  of  Hellenism.  The 
idea  of  a  new  Italo- Hellenic  empire  was  not  new,  but 
Caesar  was  the  first  to  grasp  it,  and  systematically  to  carry 
it  out.  The  first  conditions  for  the  realization  of  this  idea 
were  the  extension  and  preservation  of  the  two  nations 
which  were  destined  jointly  to  rule,  and  the  absorption  of 
the  barbarian  races.  There  was,  indeed,  a  third  nationality 
— the  Hebrews — which  might  almost  have  claimed  a  place 
by  the  side  of  the  other  two.  The  Jews  were  numerous  and 
powerful  in  the  city  of  Rome,  and  influential  everywhere 
as  traders ;  but  the  Jewish  nation  is  denied  the  gift  of 
political  aptitude.  The  Jew  stands  in  a  relation  of  in- 
difference to  the  state,  clothes  himself  readi.y  with  any 
nationality,  and  is  unfit  to  be  a  member  of  a  governing 
hierarchy.  But  for  this  very  reason  he  seemed  made  for 
the  purposes  of  this  new  state,  which  was  to  be  built  upon 
the  ruins  of  a  hundred  different  nationalities,  and  accord- 
ingly Judaism  was  everywhere  protected  by  Caesar  as 
"  an  effective  leaven  of  cosmopolitanism  and  of  national 
decomposition." 

33 


514  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

The  Greek  nationality  was  protected  wherever  it  ex- 
isted, notably  at  Massilia  and  Alexandria,  but  the  Italian 
none  the  less  remained  everywhere  in  the  ascendant. 
Hellenism  was  too  dangerous  by  its  intellectual  supe- 
riority, by  its  wide  extension,  and  by  the  firm  hold  which 
it  had  obtained  in  Italy,  to  make  it  desirable  for  the 
government  to  extend  it  by  direct  action.  The  rule  oi 
the  Greek  lackeys  had  already  begun  with  Theophanes,  the 
confidential  servant  of  Pompeius,  and  his  influence  wTas  at 
once  a  sign  of  the  times  and  a  warning  full  of  ill  omen 
for  the  future.  But  the  Roman  element  was  everywhere 
promoted  by  the  government,  both  by  means  of  colonies 
and  by  Latinizing  the  provincials,  and,  to  further  this 
object,  the  principle  that  all  the  land  in  the  provinces  not 
ceded  by  special  act  of  the  government  to  communities  or 
private  persons  was  the  property  of  the  state,  was  retained 
by  Caesar,  and  raised  from  a  democratic  party-theory 
to  a  fundamental  maxim  of  law  Cisalpine  Gaul  now 
(in  49  B.C.)  of  course  received  de  jure  the  full  citizenship 
which  it  had  already  enjoyed  de  facto  for  forty  years,  and 
remained  for  centuries  the  head-quarters  of  Italian  man- 
ners and  culture.  Transalpine  Gaul  henceforth  occupied 
the  place  of  the  old  sister  province,  and  became  more  and 
more  an  Italian  land.  Four  new  colonies  were  founded 
in  it,  at  Baeterrae  (Beziers),  Arelate  (Aries),  Arausio 
(Orange),  and  Forum  Julii  (Frejus),  with  which  were 
connected  the  names  of  the  most  famous  of  the  Gallic 
legions.  Other  communities,  such  as  Nemausus  (Mmes), 
received  Latin  rights.  In  other  non-Greek  and  non- 
Latin  regions  centres  of  Italian  civilization  were  estab- 
lished :  in  northern  Gaul,  Noviodunum  (Nyon)  arose  on 
the  Leman  Lake ;  in  Spain,  Emporiae  was  founded ;  and 
the  ancient  city  of  Gades  was  admitted  to  full  rights  (49 
B.C.).  A  few  years  later  (45  B.C.)  other  communities  were 
similarly  favoured,  and  others  received  Latin  rights.  In 
Africa,  the  project  of  Gaius  Gracchus  was  renewred,  and  a 
Roman  Carthage  arose  on  the  old  site ;  Utica  had  ap- 
parently already  received  Latin  rights,  and  Cirta  was 
constituted  as  a  Roman  military  colony.  In  Greece,  the 
restoration  of  Corinth  was  energetically  carried  out,  and 
a  plan  formed  for  cutting  through  the  Isthmus.  In  the 
remote  East,  Heraclea   and   Sinope  were   reinforced  by 


THE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  THE  NEW  MONARCHY.     515 

bodies  of  Roman  colonists  ;  Berytus  in  Syria  received  an 
Italian  constitution,  and  even  in  Egypt  a  Roman  station 
was  established  on  the  island  of  Pharos. 

Through  these  arrangements  the  Italian  municipal 
system  was  carried  into  the  provinces  in  a  manner  far 
more  comprehensive  than  ever  before.  The  fully  enfran- 
chised communities  of  the  provinces  were  on  an  equality 
with  those  of  Italy  in  two  respects ;  namely,  that  they  ad- 
ministered their  own  affairs  and  exercised  a  limited  legal 
jurisdiction,  while  the  more  important  processes  of  law 
came  before  the  Roman  authority,  usually  the  governor  of 
the  province.  The  autonomous  Latin  communities  had 
probably  unlimited  jurisdiction,  as  well  as  administrative 
freedom,  though  the  governor  could  of  course  interfere  in 
virtue  of  his  general  power  of  control.  There  was  now  for 
the  first  time  a  whole  province,  that  of  Cisalpine  Gaul,  con- 
sisting entirely  of  Roman  burgesses  ;  and  this  fact  marked 
the  disappearence  of  the  first  great  difference  between 
Rome  and  the  provinces.  The  second  began  soon  to  dis- 
appear, at  any  rate  in  practice  It  is  true  that  the  legal 
distinction  between  Italy  as  the  sphere  of  civil  law  and  of 
the  consuls  and  praetors,  and  the  provinces  as  the  sphere 
of  martial  law  and  of  the  proconsuls  and  propraetors,  re- 
mained ;  but  the  procedure  of  martial  and  of  civil  law  had 
for  long  been  practically  the  same  :  what  had  been  the 
true  and  vital  point  of  distinction  vanished  when  legions 
ceased  to  be  stationed  ordinarily  in  the  provinces,  and 
were  kept  only  where  there  was  a  frontier  to  be  guarded. 
"  The  rule  of  the  urban  community  of  Rome  over  the 
shores  of  the  Mediterranean  was  at  an  end  ,  in  its  stead 
came  the  new  Mediterranean  state  :  "  and  the  restoration 
of  Carthage  and  Corinth  showed  clearly  that  the  old 
regime  of  political  tyranny  which  had  destroyed  those  two 
famous  centres  of  commerce  was  over,  and  that  a  new  era 
of  national  and  political  equality  had  begun. 

The  new  united  empire  was,  of  course,  rather  an  in- 
animate product  of  art  than  a  vigorous  growth  of  nature  ; 
it  needed  unity  of  institutions  as  well  as  unity  of  govern- 
ment ;  unity  in  constitution  and  administration,  in  re- 
ligion and  jurisprudence,  in  money,  weights,  and  measures 
In  all  these  departments  Caesar  did  little  but  lay  the 
foundations ;  only  here  and  there  the  lines  which  he  drew 
can  still  be  traced. 


516  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

As  to  administration,  the  three  most  important  elements 
of  unity  have  already  been  noticed  :  the  transition  of  the 
sovereignty  from  the  municipal  council  of  Rome  to  the 
sole  master  of  the  Mediterranean  monarchy  ;  the  con- 
version of  that  council  into  a  supreme  imperial  council 
representing  Italy  and  the  provinces ;  above  all,  the 
transference,  which  was  now  begun,  of  the  Roman  and 
Italian  municipal  organization  to  the  provinces.  One  other 
important  work  in  this  department  was  undertaken  by 
Caesar — an  improved  census  of  Italy,  which  was  to  be 
taken  in  future,  not  at  Rome,  but  simultaneously  in  each 
Italian  community ;  and  a  survey  of  the  whole  empire, 
which  was  ordei'ed,  suggests  that  Caesar  intended  to  make 
arrangements  for  a  similar  census  in  the  provinces.  It 
was  of  the  first  importance  to  the  new  empire  that  the 
government  should  have  at  its  disposal  a  comprehensive 
view  of  the  resources  in  men  and  taxation  at  its  command. 

In  religion,  men  had  for  long  been  busied  in  forging 
together  the  Italian  and  Hellenic  worships,  a  task  which 
was  rendered  easier  by  the  abstract  formless  character  of 
the  Roman  gods.  At  the  same  time,  local  faiths  were 
tolerated  and  protected. 

In  the  field  of  law,  the  criminal  department,  in  which 
the  government  must  always  interfere  directly  to  a  large 
extent,  was  easily  made  uniform  by  judicial  enactment 
throughout  the  empire.  In  civil  law,  commercial  inter- 
course had  long  ago  developed  naturally  the  code  which 
the  united  empire  required.  Roman  urban  law  was  still 
based  formally  upon  the  Twelve  Tables.  But  commercial 
intercourse  between  Romans  and  non-Romans  had  long 
ago  developed  an  international  private  law  (jus  gen- 
tium), a  body  of  maxims  relating  chiefly  to  commercial 
matters,  according  to  which  Roman  judges  gave  judg- 
ment when  from  the  nature  of  the  case  they  were  com- 
pelled to  revert  to  the  common  notions  of  right  under- 
lying all  commercial  dealings.  This  body  of  law  arose 
originally  out  of  proceedings  between  Romans  and  non- 
Romans  ;  but,  in  practice,  dealings  between  Romans  and 
Romans,  particularly  commercial  matters,  had  come  to  be 
judged  by  the  standard  of  what  was  substantially  a  com- 
promise between  this  new  law  and  the  old  Twelve  Tables. 
Secondly,  this  new  law  was  to  a  certain  extent  in  use 


THE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  THE  NEW  MONARCHY.     517 

throughout  the  whole  extent  of  the  empire  as  subsidiary 
law;  the  various  local  statutes  were  retained  for  transac- 
tions between  members  of  the  same  legal  district,  while 
those  between  members  of  different  districts  were  regulated 
according  to  the  principles  of  the  new  law  as  expressed  in 
the  praetor's  edict.  Caesar's  design  for  a  new  code  was 
never  carried  out;  but  it  is  easy  to  guess  what  must  have 
been  his  intentions.  It  was  most  necessary,  first,  that  the 
new  urban  law  should  be  extended  as  subsidiary  law  to 
the  provinces  where  it  had  properly  no  application;  and, 
secondly,  that  the  old  law  of  the  Twelve  Tables  with  its 
accretions,  which  still  formally  outweighed  the  later  code, 
should  be  set  aside  in  favour  of  this  newer  and  spon- 
taneous growth. 

In  respect  of  money,  measures  and  weights,  and  kin- 
dred matters  the  Roman  standard  was  alone  used  in  all 
official  intercourse ;  and  the  non-Roman  systems  were 
restricted  to  local  currency,  and  placed  in  a  fixed  ratio  to 
the  Roman.  Under  the  republic  the  coinage  had  been 
exclusively  silver,  gold  being  given  and  taken  by  weight. 
But  from  Caesar's  time  gold  obtained  the  first  place ;  the 
new  Caesarian  gold  piece  (worth  about  20s.  7d.)  was 
coined  to  an  enormous  extent.  In  a  single  treasure, 
buried  only  a  few  years  after  his  death,  eighty  thousand 
of  them  were  found.  The  mint  of  Massilia  was  closed, 
but  the  coining  of  small  silver  and  copper  money  was 
permitted  to  many  western  communities.  Later  the  ar- 
rangement found  in  existence  is  this ;  that  the  denarius 
has  everywhere  legal  currency,  while  local  coins  are  in 
circulation  at  a  tariff  unfavourable  to  them  as  compared 
with  the  denarius. 

The  calendar,  like  every  other  institution,  had  become 
hopelessly  confused  under  the  oligarchical  government, 
and  had  come  to  anticipate  the  solar  time  by  sixty-seven 
days,  so  that,  e.g.,  the  festival  of  Flora  was  celebrated  on 
July  11th,  instead  of  on  April  28th.  This  evil  was  finally 
removed  by  Caesar,  and  the  Italian  farmer's  year  was 
introduced,  tog-ether  with  a  rational  system  of  intercalation, 
into  religious  and  official  use.  At  the  same  time,  the 
beginning  of  the  year  was  altered  from  the  1st  of  March 
to  the  1st  of  January,  the  date  which  had  already  been 
long  predominant  in  civil  life  owing  to  the  fact  that  the 


518  niSTORT  OF  HOME. 

supreme  magistrates  entered  upon  office  on  that  day. 
The  new  Julian  calendar,  which  is  still  in  the  main  the 
standard  of  the  civilized  world,  came  into  use  on  January 
1,  45  B.C. 

Such  was  the  manner  in  which  Caesar  attempted  to  lay 
the  foundations  for  the  regeneration  of  the  Roman  state. 
"  There  was  doubtless  much  corruption  in  this  regenera- 
tion ;  as  the  unity  of  Italy  was  accomplished  over  the  ruins 
of  Samnite  and  Etruscan  nations,  so  the  Mediterranean 
monarchy  built  itself  on  the  ruins  of  countless  states  and 
tribes  once  living  and  vigorous  ;  but  it  was  a  corruption 
out  of  which  sprang  a  rich  growth,  part  of  which  remains 
green  to  the  present  day."  Caesar  ruled  as  king  of  Rome 
for  about  five  years  and  a  half;  the  intervals  of  seven 
great  campaigns,  which  altogether  gave  him  but  fifteen 
months  in  the  capital,  were  all  the  time  allowed  him  to 
regulate  the  destinies  of  the  world.  This  very  rapidity 
proves  that  the  plan  had  long  been  meditated  and  its 
parts  settled  in  detail.  The  ontlines  were  laid  down,  the 
future  alone  could  complete  the  structure ;  and,  indeed, 
Caesar  was  heard  himself  to  say,  that  he  had  lived  long 
enough. 


AUTHORITIES. 

[The  references  include  the  arrangements  of  Augustus,  where  these 

interpret  or  carry  out  the  plans  of  Caesar.] 
General  authorities. — Suet.  Jul.     Pint.  Caes.     Cic,  Watson,  S.  L.,  pts. 

iv.  and  v.,  passim,  espec.  iv.  89-92,  103  ;  v.  114.     Philippics, 

espec.  i.  ii.     Liv.  Ep.  Ill,  113,  115,  116.     Appian  B.  C.  ii.  10, 

eeqq.     Dio.  xlii.  seqq.     Veil.  ii.  56-58.     Flor.  vi.  25.     Momms. 

Monumentum  Ancyranum. 
Tribunicia  potestas. — Tac.  Ann.  ii.  1;  iii.  56,  57.     Hist.  i.  42.     Gaius 

Constit.  i.  5;  Mon.  Anc.  p.  71. 
Title  of  imperator — Suet.  Jul.  76;    Dio.  xliii.  44;  lii.  41 ;  liii.  7;  lvii. 

8.     Momms.  notes  to  Bk.  v.  c.  11.     Princeps.  Mon.  Anc.  p.  98. 

Tac.  Ann.  i.  1,  6,  9.    Journal  of  Philology,  vol.  viii.  323.   Momms. 

B.  St.  ii.,  pt.  2. 
Election  of  magistrates. — Tac.  Ann.  i.  14;  ii.  36. 
Jus  edicendi. —  Gaius  i.  5. 
New  nobility. — Tac.  Ann.  xi.  25. 

Increase  of  magistrates. — Tac.  Ann.  i.  14 ;  ii.  32 ;  iii.  29 ;  iv.  6.  8. 
Lex  Julia  de  provinciis  and  lex  judiciaria. — Cic.  Phil.  i.  8. 
Allotments.— Cie.,  Watson,  S.L.  iv.  89,  102,  103. 


THE  OLD  REPUBLIC  AND  THE  NEW  MONARCHY.    519 

Regulation  of  Rome. — Lex  Julia  Munic.  Bruns.  pt.  I.  c.  iii.  18;  C.  I. 
L.  i.  206. 

Regulations  for  crime  and  for  social  and  economical  evils. — Lex  de  vi. 
Cic.  Phil.  i.  9.  Just.  Dig.  xlviii.  ±,  6,  7 ;  de  Bonis  ced.  and  de 
Foeuore  Caes.  B.  C.  iii.  1.  Suet.  Jul.  42.  Tac.  Ann.  vi.  16.  Dio. 
lviii.  21.  Lex  Jul.  et  P.  et  P.  Bruns.  i.  c.  iii.  23.  Lex  Sump- 
tuaria  Dio.  xliii.  25,  de  Adult.  Bruns.  pt.  I.  c.  iii.  21. 

The  provinces. — Lex  Rubria,  Lex  Julia  Municipal's,  Lex  Ursonensis, 
Lex  Salpensana,  Lex  Malacitana,  Bruns.  pt.  I.  c.  iii.  16,  18 ;  c.  iv. 
1,  2,  3,  besides  the  literary  authorities  and  Momms.  Hist,  of  R., 
Bk.  v.  ii.,  notes,  and  Bk.  viii.  "  The  Provinces  fiom  Caesar  to 
Diocletian  "  passim.     Cf.,  also,  authorities  for  ch.  xxvii. 

Colonies—  Cic.  de  Off.  ii.  7,  27.  Phil.  xiii.  15,  31,  32.  Caes.  B.  C.  i. 
35.     Dio.  xlii-  25.     Flor.  ii.  13.     Oros.  vi.  15. 

£The  references  are  to  the  fifth  edition  of  Bruns.] 


INDEX. 


Abgarns,  368,  436 

Abydns,  183,  191 

Acarnania  and  the  Acarnanians,  183, 

185,  186,  200 
Acco,  413 
Aoerrae,  158 
Achaean  colonies  in  Italy  and  Sicily, 

36  ,  league  of  cities,  37  ;  decay,  37 
league,    183,    186,    190;    war 

against  it,  219 
Aohaeans,  37,  38,  194 
Aohaia,  province  of,  219 
Achillas,  468 
Acilius  Glabrio  M\,  190 

M'.  Glabrio  (consul  67  B.C.),  346 

Aorae,  136 
Adcensi  velati,  24 
Adherbal,  245,  246 
Adoption,  16 
Adsidni,  50 
Adnatnca,  401,  411 
Aediles,  plebis,  54,  55,  56 

in  the  municipia,  87 

ceriales,  500 

Aegates  Insulae,  battle  at  the,  135 
Aemilius  Lepidus  Marcus,  329,  330 

(city  prefect),  455 

Aemilius  Papus  L.,  140 
Aemilius  Paullus  L.,  153,  154 

,  198 

Aemilius  Scaurus  M.,  246,  247,  252, 

262,  264,  269 

(adjutant    of  Pompeius),  368 

Aequi,  26,  85,  86 
Aerarii,  17,  42 


Aerarium,  27,  under  the  control  of 
the  quaestors,  46 

Aesernia  colonized,  108,  269,  270, 
273 

Aethalia,  33,  38 

Aetolians,  side  with  Rome  against 
Philip,  161,  181,  184,  186;  side 
with  Antiochus  against  Rome,  189, 
190,  194,  side  with  Rome  against 
Perseus,  197;  treatment  of,  by 
Rome,  20^ 

Afranins,  333,  422,  455,  477 

Africa,  before  the  Gracchan  period, 
215,  216,  made  a  province,  219; 
after  Pharsalus,  467,  473-479 

Agathocles,  78,  105 

Agedincnm,  414 

Ager  publicus.    See  Domains. 

Agnati,  13 

Agriculture,  known  to  Greeks  and 
Italians,  4 ;  basis  of  the  Italian 
economy,  11,  50;  distress  and 
diminution  of  the  farmers,  54,  65  ; 
relief  of,  69 ,  destruction  of,  167, 
173,  210,  211;  Carthaginian  sys- 
tem, 117,  118,  122;  condition  of 
before  and  at  the  time  of  the 
Gracchi,  224-227,  319,  501,  502, 
506-508 

Agrigentum  founded,  39 ;  taken  by 
Carthage,  106,  119,  127,  160; 
besieged  by  the  Romans,  129; 
given  up  to  them,  161 

Agron,  138 

Alae  sociorum,  112 


522 


INDEX. 


Alaesa,  138 

Alalia,  34,  39,  116 

Alba,  9,  25 

— — ,  on  the  Fucine  lake,  colonized, 
97,  198 

Albanians  in  the  Caucasus,  866 

Aleria,  130 

Alesia,  416,  417 

Aletrium.  97 

Alexander  Jannaeus,  368 

Alexander,  pretended  son  of  Perseus, 
219 

Alexander  the  Great,  102,  103,  221, 
482 

Alexander  the  Molossian,  93 

Alexander  II.  of  Egypt,  338,  353 

Alexandria,  180,  181,  468-471 

AUia,  battle  on  the,  80 

Allies,  Italian,  bound  to  furnish 
naval  or  military  contingents,  112  ; 
in  the  second  Punic  war,  168; 
diminution  of  rights  and  increas- 
ing oppression,  183,  205  ,  relations 
to  Rome  in  time  of  Gracchi,  238, 
239 ,  grievances  and  war  with 
Rome,  267,  seqq.,  289,  290,  seqq., 
321,  501,  505-507 

Allobroges,  146,  251,  380,  394,  402 

Alphabet,  116 

Alps,  Graian,  79 ,  passage  by  Hannibal 
146,  147  and  n.,  expeditions  against 
Alpine  peoples,  251,  252,  civiliza- 
tion of,  due  to  Etruscans,  82 ;  new 
roads  over,  332,  409 

Ambaoti,  398 

Ambiorix,  411,  412 

Amisus,  342,  370 

Anagnia,  96, 105 

Ancona,  77 

Anioius,  L.,  199 

Annius  Milo  T.,  432,  483,  505 

Antigonas,  102 

Antigonus  Doson,  144 

Antiooh  in  Syria,  338 

Antiochus  Asiaticus,  343 ;  restored 
by  Lucullus,  344 ,  ejected  by 
Pompeius,  368 

Antiochus  III.  the  Great,  allies  with 
Philip  against  Egypt,  182,  fonduct 
during  second  Macedonian  war. 
183,  187  ;  war  with  Rome.  188- 
194 


Antioohus  IV.  Epiphanes,  of  Syria, 

200,  220 
Antium,  34,  92,  109,  110 
Antonins  C,  355,  377,  380,  382 

,  lieutenant  of  Caesar,  459 

Antonins  M.,  expedition  against  the 

pirates,  340,  348 
,  the  Triumvir,  462,  484.  497, 

504 
Aons,  the  river,  184 
Apennines,  1,  2,  8,  150,  175 
Apollonia,  139,    161,    184,  fouuded 

37;  allied  with  Rome,  109 
Appeal  (provocatio),  17,  44,  45,  55, 

235,  267,  375,  391 
Appellate  jurisdiction  of  the  Impe- 

rator,  492 
Appnleins   Saturninus   L,    260-262, 

375 
Apulia,  38,  95,  173 
Aquae  Sextiae,  251,  254,  255,  395 
Aqueducts,  319 
Aqnileia,  founded  175 
Aquillius  M\,  245,  281,  282 
Aquitani,  409 
Aratus,  181,  183 
Arausio,  253 
Archelaus,  284-288 
Archidamus,  93 
Archimedes,  160 
Ardea,  65,  86,  87 
Area  Capitolma,  27 
Aretas,  368 
Arevacae,  213,  214 
Argos,  108,  18b 
Ariarathes  IV.,  king  of  Cappadocia, 

189,  193 
Ariarathes  VI.,  assassinated,  280 
Aricia,  86,  87 ;  battle  at,  77 ;  becomes 

a  municipium,  92 
Anminnm,     colonized,    108;    fleet- 
station,  109  ;  bulwark  against  the 

Celts,  139,  140 
Ariobarzanes,  280,  281,  472 
Ariovistus,  402,  405,  406 
Aristion,  283 
Aiistobnlus,  368 
Aristonicns,  220 
Aristotle,  120 
Armenia,  180,  193,  220 

Lesser,  280 

Army,  earliest  organization,  15,  16, 


INDEX. 


52b 


Servian  arrangements,  23,  24,  25 
service  of  aHies,  111,  112;  begin 
nings  of  a  standing  army,  178 
decay,  198,  204,  205,  208,  214, 
215,  217,  222,  274,  493;  reor 
ganized  by  Marius,  257-259  ;  by 
Caesar,  494,  497 

Arno,  the,  175 

Arpi,  resists  Samnites,  90,  95 ;  joins 
Hannibal,  155,  158  ;  recovered  by 
Rome,  166 

Arretium,  invokes  Roman  aid,  82 ; 
makes  peace  with  Rome,  9H  ; 
conduct  in  the  second  Punic  wa>, 
168 

Vrtaxata,  345 

Arverni,  250,  251,  253,  395-398, 
402,  413,  417 

Arx,  9,  27 

Asoulum,  269,  271,  272 

Asia  (Syria),  extent,  179,  180 :  posi 
tion  after  the  war  with  Antiochus, 
192,  193  (cf.  Antiochus) 

Asia  Minor,  180,  181,  220,  278,  285- 
287  ;  farming  of  taxes  abolished, 
303 ;  restored,  357,  358,  364 ; 
settlement  by  Pompeius,  369,  471, 
497,  508 

Asinius  Pollio,  431 

Atarbas,  133 

Atella,  155 

Athamanes,  184 

AthenagoraB,  184 

Athenians,  commercial  connection 
with  Etruscans,  35 ;  expedition 
against  Syracuse,  77  ;  during  war 
with  Philip,  183,  184,  186 

Athenion,  245 

Athens,  283-285 

Atilius  M.,  131,  132 

Atilius  Regulus  C,  140 

Atropatene.    See  Media. 

Attalidae,  195,  220 

Attains,  180-182,189 

Attains,  brother  of  Kumenes,  199 

Attins  Varus  P.,  473 

Anctoritas  Senatus,  45 

Augurs,  67,  304 

Aurelius  Cotta  C,  friend  of  Drusus, 
268,  355  ;  brother  of  L.  Cotta,  357 

Aurelius  M.,  340 

Aurelius  Scaurus  M.,  253 


Aurunci,  88 

Auruncnleins  Cotta  L.,  411 
Ausoulum,  105 
Ausones,  8,  95 
Avaricum,  414 

Bactrians,  180,  220 

Baebius  M.,  190 

Baecula,  164 

Balearic  Isles,  119,  124 

Bankruptcy,  507 

Belgae,  254,  399,  406,  411,  415,  418 

Bellovaci,  407,  415,  418 

Beneventum,  107,  108,  165 

Betuitus,  251 

Bibracte,  404 

Bithynia,  180,  193,  194;  a  Roman 
province,  339-341,  369 

Boarding-bridges,  130 

Bocchus.     See  Mauretania. 

Boeotians,  183,  186,  197 

Boii,  Italian,  79,  101,  139,  174,  175 

,  in  Germany,  251, 401-403,  405, 

414 

Boiorix,  253 

Bomilcar,  247 

Bononia,  79 

Bosporan  kingdom,  279,  seqq.,  364, 
seqq. 

Bovianum,  89,  96 

Boviilae,  87 

Brennus,  80 

Bridge  building,  11 

,  Milvian,  318 

,  Sublician,  27 

Brigandage,  168,  173 

Britain,  396,  399,  408,  410 

Brittany,  396,  408 

Brixia,  79 

Brundisium,  37,  108,  138,  183,  199, 
293,  302,  453,  461,  seqq, 

Bruttians,  90,  91,  93,  94,  104,  108, 
155,165,  166    168,  169,  172 

Building  in  Rome,  318,  319,  425, 
500 

Bulla,  203 

Burgess-body,  its  primitive  con- 
ditions, 15,  16;  duties  and  rights, 
17;  extension,  206;  clients  and  city 
rabble,  207  ;  incipient  corruption, 
207,  231 

— —  cavalry.     See  Army. 


524 


INDEX. 


Burgess  colony.     See  Colony. 

rights.     See  Civitas. 

Byzantium,  181,  182 

Cabira,  341,  346 

Caecilius  Macedonicus  Q.,  214,  219, 
228,  232,  247-249,  261,  262 

Caecilius  Metellus  G.,  133 

Caecilius  Metellus  Nepos  Q.,  386, 
387 

Caecilius  Metellus  Pius  Q.,  Creticus, 
273,290,  293,  295,  327,  331,seqq., 
349,  357,  364,  373 

Caecilius  Metellus  Scipio  Q.  (consul 
52  B.C.),  440,  464,  467,  472,  476, 
477 

Caecina  A.,  485 

Caelius  Rufus  M.,  483 

Caenina,  10,  25 

Calatia,  155 

Calendar,  517 

Cales,  92,  158;  naval  station,  109 

Calpurnius  Bibulus  M.,  389,  432, 
460-462 

Calpurnius  Piso  Cn.  (the  Catilina- 
rian),  377,  378 

Calpurnius  Piso  L.,  217,  223 

,  father-in-law  of  Caesar,  390 

Camars  =  Clusium,  88 

Cameria,  25 

Campanians  in  Sicily,  127.  See 
Capua. 

Canaan,  115 

Cannae,  153-156 

Cantonal  constitution  in  Gaul,  397 

Canusium,  153, 168 

Capena,  80,  81 

Capitolium,  9,  27 

Cappadooia,  180, 189,  193,  220,  279- 
281,  338,  366,  369,  370,  472 

Capua,  taken  from  the  Etruscans,  78, 
90  ;  under  Greek  influence,  90,  91 ; 
seeks  Roman  aid,  and  revolts,  91  ; 
recovered,  92,  95,  98;  receives 
Caerite  rights,  112 ;  its  nobles 
receive  privileges,  113;  resists 
Hannibal,  151  ;  joins  him,  155;  he 
winters  there,  158 ;  siege  and 
capture,  158-167  ;  its  ruin,  167, 
172,  205  ;  colonized,  235,  292,  294, 
297  ;  its  lands  resumed  bv  Sulla, 
306,  378,  389 


Caria,  193 

Carinae,  11 

Canutes,  412 

Carrhae,  437,  seqq. 

Carsioli,  97 

Carthage  and  Carthaginians  in  con« 
nexiuD  with  Etruscans  and  Greeks, 
34,  39,  76,  77,  78 ;  in  Sicily,  and 
her  early  relations  with  Rome,  1U6- 
109  ;  at  variance  with  Egypt,  114, 
origin,  position,  empire,  constitu- 
tion, wealth,  compared  with  Rome, 
115-125;  first  Punic  wary  127- 
135  ;  peace,  135,  136  ;  mercenary 
war,  137  ;  causes  of  second  Punic 
war,  141-144;  war,  145-173, 
Roman  policy  towards  Carthage, 
175-177;  war  with  Massinis-a, 
215-217;  third  Punic  war,  217- 
219;  colony  sent  by  C  Gracchus, 
235,  238,  239  ,  restored,  515 

Carthage,  New  or  Spanish  (Carta- 
gena), 143,  162,  163 

Carthalo,  (1)  Carthaginian  admiral. 
133  ;  (2)  leader  of  the  patriot  party, 
216 

Carthalo,  lieutenant  of  Crassus,  439 

Carthalo  L.,  224 

Carthalo  Longinus  L.,  253 

Carthalo  Longinus  Q.,  473 

Carthalo  Sp.,  58,  64,  65 

Casilinum,  151,  158,  165 

Cassivellaunus.  410 

Castrum  Novum,  108,  110 

Catena,  36 

Cato.     See  Porcius. 

Cattle,  52  ;  increase  of  stock-raising. 
211,  224 

Caudine  Forks,  94,  95 

Caulonia,  37 

Caunus,  189 

Ceietrum,  184 

Celtiberians,  162,  178,  213,  214,263 

Celts,  character  and  migrations  and 
invasion  of  Italy,  capture  of  Rome, 
subsequent  incursions,  result  of 
migrations,  78-82 ;  take  part  in 
the  Samnite  war,  97-102;  subdued 
by  Rome,  139  140,  174  175;  join 
Carthage  in  second  Punic  War, 
147-149,  168,  169  ;  different  tribes 
of.  250-252 


INDEX. 


51% 


Celts,  of  Asia,  180, 199;  war  with,  193 

,  Transalpine,  139,  advance  iDto 

Italy  checked,  174-175 

Cenomani,  79,  139,  140,  174 

Censorship  instituted,  63 ;  impor- 
tance, 64,  204  ;  plebeians  eligible, 
66  ;  under  Sulla,  303,  306  ;  restored 
by  Pompeius,  357  ;  reorganized  by 
Caesar,  516 

Census,  origin,  24 ;  every  fourth  year, 
46  ,  extended  to  Sicily,  138 

Centumviral  court,  307,  308,  492 

Centumviri,  a  Latin  senate,  16 

Cephallenia,  194 

Cermalus,  11 

Centrones,  147 

Chaeronea,  284 

Chalcedon,  182,  340 

Chalcis,  179,  184,  185,  190,  191 

Chersonese,  Tauric,  27a 

Chersonese,  Thracian,  180,  193,  251 

Chios,  181,  191,  285-  287 

Cilicia,  180, 188  ;  seat  of  piracy,  221, 
244,  338,  340,  347-349,  363,  364, 
369,  371 

Cimbri,  252-255 

Cincinnatus.    See  Quinctius. 

Cineas,  103,  104,  105 

Circeii,  86,  87 

Circus,  27 

Cirta,  177,  246,  475,  478 

Cius,  182 

Cives  sine  suffragio,  protected  bur- 
gesses, 24  ;  burgesses  without  right. 
of  electing  or  being  elected,  81 ; 
their  position,  96,  97,  111,  112; 
disappearance  of  this  class,  205 

Civic  communitv  as  opposed  to  a 
state,  308,  309*,  491,  499 

Civitas  (citizenship),  originally  coin- 
cident with  patriciate,  14 ;  could 
not  be  lost  within  the  state  or 
Latin  League,  26  ;  sparingly  con- 
ferred in  early  timps,  22,  23  ;  given 
to  the  Alban  clans,  28 ;  later  civitas 
of  the  plebeians,  47  ;  burgess  rights, 
formerly  forced  upon  the  holders, 
now  coveted  and  conferred  as  a 
favour,  111 ;  rarely  conferred  after 
conquest  of  Italy,  268  ;  bestowed 
on  Italians,  272,  274,  276,  289,  292, 
293,  302,  375,  444,  514 


Civitates  foederatae,  31* 

immunes,  316 

Clans,  form  the  community,  14  15; 
clan-villages,  8  ;  gentes  maiorei  efc 
minores,  21 ;  in  Gaul,  397 

Classes,  23 

Classici,  23 

Clastidium,  148 

Claudius  Ap.,  59,  60 

,  198 

,  228,  230,  232 

Claudius  C,  129 

Claudius  Caecus  Ap.,  70,  104 

Claudius  Caudex  Ap.,  129 

Claudius  Cento  C,  184 

Claudius  Marcellus  C.  (consul  50 
B.C.),  446,  seqq. 

Claudius  Marcellus  M.,  156,  158,  lflOs 
165,  167 

,  214 

(consul  51  B.C.),  442,  444,  447 

Claudius  Nero  C,  163,  166,  168,  169 

Claudius  Pulcher  Ap.,  166 

Claudius  Pulcher  P.,  133 

Clavus,  203 

Cleonymus,  96 

Cleopatra,  daughter  of  Ptolemy 
Auletes,  468 

Clientship,  14,  22,  23,  24,  42,  57 

Clodius  P.,  391,  423,  424,  428,  432 

Cluentius  A.,  504 

Clupea,  131,  132 

Clusium,  88,  140 

Cohorts.     See  Legion. 

Collatia,  10,  25 

Collegia  (clubs),  326,  423,  499,  500 

Colline  Gate,  battle  at,  296 

Collini,  12 

Coloniae  civium  Romanorum,  at  first 
on  the  sea-coast,  109,  110 

Latinae,  earliest    26 ;    Romans 

predominate,  85 

Colonies,  salutary  effect,  69,  208; 
stoppage  of,  226 ;  those  of  C. 
Gracchus,  233 ;  of  Drusus,  264 ; 
of  Sulla,  276,  302,  326;  of  Lex 
Servilia,  378.     Cf.  Capua. 

,  non-Italian,  235,  243:  pro- 
posals of  Saturninus,  260 ;  of 
Caesar,  419,  429,  513,  514 

Comana,  high-priest  of,  369 

Comitia  centuriata,  24,  44,  45  ;  re* 


526 


INDEX. 


formed,  208,  209,  235;  treatment 
by  Sulla,  276,  304 

Comitia,  composition  and  powers,  70, 
204;  nullity,  206;  condition  in 
time  of  Gracchi,  224,  231,  232;  of 
Sulla,  304 ;  of  Caesar,  489  ;  in  re- 
lation to  Lex  Gabiuia,  359  ;  cor- 
ruption of,  326,  503 

cunata,  summoned  by  the  king, 

17 ;  plebeians  admitted,  44,  45  ; 
plebeian  curiate  assembly,  55,  57 

tributa,  57  and  n.,  61 ;  treat- 
ment by  Sulla,  303,  304 

Comitium,  27 

Commercial  interests,  effect  on  poli- 
tics, 216,  219,  320,  321,  506 

Commercium,  denied  to  Italian  com- 
munities, 112  ;  to  Sicilian,  137 

Comnm,  4i:9 

Concilium,  denied  to  Italian  commu- 
nities, 112 

plebis,  57  n.,  61  n. 

Concord,  temple  of,  66 

Confarreatio,  14 

Confiscations,  by  Sulla,  301,  302  ;  by 
Caesar,  497 

Consentia,  93 

Consuls,  origin  and  powers,  41-44 ; 
position  in  reference  to  senate,  46 ; 
restrictions  and  suspension,  55,  56, 
59,  60,  63,  64 ;  plebeians  admitted, 
66  ;  exclusion  of  the  poorer  citi- 
zens, 205;  re-election  of,  304; 
regulation  of  powers  by  Sulla,  305  ; 
decay,  491 

Conubium,  between  Romans  and 
Latins,  26 ;  forbidden  to  Italian 
communities,  112 ;  to  provincial, 
137 

Cora,  85,  87 

Corbio,  87 

Corcyra,  37,  96, 138 

Corduene,  337,  366,  369 

Corfinium,  268,  270.  273, 453 

Corinth,  37,  179,  185,  186,  219  ;  re- 
stored, 514 

Corioli,  87 

Corn,  distribution  of,  235,  242,  261, 
264;  restricted,  269;  renewed, 
292 ;  abolished,  303  ;  restored, 
329, 354, 384 ;  restricted  by  Caesar, 
497 


Cornelia,  228,  232,  240 
Cornelii,  Sulla's  freedmen,  302 
Cornelius  Balbus  L.,  490 
Cornelius  Cethegus  P.,  327 
Cornelius  Cinna  L.,  277,  288,  seqq 

,  son  of  the  preceding,  329 

Cornelius,  Cossus  A.,  80 
Cornelius  Dolabella  P.,  101 

,  admiral  of  Caesar,  459,  484 

Cornelius  Lentulus  Crus  L.,  447 
Cornelius  Lentulus  Sura  P.,  380 
Cornelius  Merula  L.,  289,  291 
Cornelius    Scipio   Aemilianus    Afri- 
canus    P.,    takes    Carthage,   217 ; 
Numant-ia,  215;    chaiacter,     227, 
228,  230  ;  death,  233 
Cornelius  Scipio  Africanus  P.,  saves 
his  father,     148 ;    character    and 
Spanish     campaigns,     163,     164 ; 
African  expedition,    169-172;  op- 
posed to  Antiochus,  192;  separates 
the  orders  in  the  theatre,  204,  op- 
ponent of  Cato,    208 ;    courts  the 
rabble,  210;  death,  194,  195 
Cornelius  Scipio  Asiaticus   L.,   192, 

193 
Cornelius  Scipio    Calvus  Cn.,   140, 

154,  162 
Cornelius  Scipio  L.,  130 
Cornelius  Scipio  L.,  293,  294 
Cornelius  Scipio  Nasica  P.,  216,  230 
Cornelius  Scipio  P.,  147,  148,   154, 

162 
Cornelius  Sulla  L.,  in  Jugurthine  war, 
249  ;  in  Social  war,  269,  272,  273 ; 
consul  88  B.C.,  appointed  to  Eastern 
command,  273 ;  marches  on  Rome, 
275;    first    legislation,    276,    de- 
parted for  the  East,  277  ;  war  with 
Mithradates,    278-287;     in    civil 
war,  292-298;  dictatorship,  300; 
proscriptions,      301 ;      reconstitu- 
tion  of  Roman  state,  302-310 ;  his 
character    and    career,    310-313; 
political  results  of  his  death,  329 
Cornificius  L.,  472 
Corona  civica,  171 
Coronea,  197,  198 

Corsica,  Etruscan,  34,  77  ;  Carthagi- 
nian, 108  ;  Roman,  130,  137,  138 ; 
war  with,  175 ;  Marian  colony  in, 
263 


INDEX. 


527 


Cortona,  96 

Coruncanius  Tib.,  105 

Cosa,  108 

Cossyra,  119 

Cotta.    See  Aurelius. 

Cottian  Alps,  146,  332 

Cotys,  197 

Cremona,  140,  175 

Crete,  seat  of  piracv,  221,  347-349, 
364,  369 

Criminal  procedure  under  G.  Grac- 
chus, 235,  236 ;  under  Sulla,  307, 
seqq.,  375 ;  under  Caesar,  491,  492 

Critolaus,  219 

Croton,  37,  90 ;  occupied  by  Rome, 
101 ;  by  Hannibal,  170 

Crustnmerium,  25,  54 

Cumae,  oldest  Greek  settlement,  36, 
38  ;  checks  Etruscan  advance,  77, 
116 ;  conquered  by  Sabellians,  90  ; 
obtains  Caerite  rights,  92 

Cnria,  15,  16 

Cnrius  Dentatus  M.',  69,  70 

Cursor.     See  Papirius. 

Curnle  magistracies,  203,  204 

Customs,  Sicilian,  138 ;  in  the  empire, 
316,317 

Cyclades,  the,  180 

Cynoscephalae,  185 

Cyprus,  115,  180;  annexed  by  Rome, 
338,  371,  391,468,471 

Cyrene,  114, 117, 180, 182 ;  a  Roman 
province,  339 

Cyzicus,  181;  besieged  by  Mithra- 
dates,  340,  341 ;  enlarged  by  Pom- 
peius,  370 

Dacian  kingdom  founded,  421 

Dalmatia.     See  Illyricum 

Damascus,  368 

Dardani,  184 

Dea  Dia,  10 

Debt,  54,  65,  66,  68,  274 ;  reduced 
to  one-t'ourth,  292;  Cataline's  pro- 
jects, 377,  504.  Cf.  Coehus  Rufus, 
Cornelius  Dolabella  P.  (2),  and 
Bankruptcy. 

Decemvirs,  58-60;  decemviri  sacris 
faciundis,  66 

Decius  Mus.  P.,  98 

Decurio,  16 

Dediticii,   name   given   to   Bruttian 


and  Cisalpine  Celtic  communities, 
172,  205;  applies  to  allies  after 
Social  war,  274 

Deiotarus,  3-40,  369 

Delium,  peace  negotiations  at,  286 

Delmium,  251 

Delos,  200,  225,  284 

Delphic  oracle,  38 

Demetrias,  179,  190 

Demetrius  Poliorcetes,  102 

Demetrius,  son  of  Philip  of  Mace- 
donia, 196 

Diana,  temple  of,  on  the  Aventme,  28 

Dictator,  42^4;  has  to  allow  appeals, 
60 ;  plebeians  eligible,  66  ;  office 
set  aside,  152,  209;  Sulla's  dicta- 
torship, 300 ;  Caesar's,  486 

Dionysius  of  Syracuse,  77,  90, 1 19 

Divisores  tribuum,  326 

Dolabella.    See  Cornelius. 

Domains,  property  of  the  state,  17  ; 
treatment  of,  in  early  times,  52 ; 
mismanagement  of,  53 ;  attempt 
of  Cassius,  58;  increased  distress, 
65 :  new  regulation  by  the  Licinio- 
Sextian  laws,  66-68 ;  large  assig- 
nation of  208,  210;  occupation  of 
Italian  domains,  226,  229,  231,  232, 
233;  under  Sulla,  302,  306;  in 
provinces,  315;  Lex  Servilia,  378; 
under  Caesar,  509.     See  Capua. 

Domitius  Ahenobarbus  C,  251 

— — ,  governor  of  Africa  81  B.C., 
297 

Domitius  Ahenobarbus  L.  (consul  54 
B.C.),  430,  453,  455,  458 

Domitius  Calvinus  Cn.,  464 

Doric  colonies,  36,  37 

Drepana,  131,  133 

Druids,  398 

Duilius,  C,  130 

Dumnorix,  411 

Duoviri  navales,  109 ;  sacris  faciun- 
dis, 66 

Dyrrhachium,  461-464.  See  Epi- 
damnus. 

Eagle  introduced  as  a  standard,  258 

Eburones,  411,  412 

Ecnomus,  131 

Edessa.    See  Osroene. 

Edictum  praetoris  urbani,  374,  517 


528 


INDEX. 


Egesta.     See  Segesta. 

Egnatius  Gellius,  97 

Egypt,  character  of  the  kiDgdom, 
180 ;  first  contact  with  Italy, 
114;  supplies  Rome,  lt37 ;  before 
the  time  of  the  Gracchi,  215,  220 ; 
revenue,  318  ;  bequeathed  to  Rome, 
338,  371,  372  n.,  376,  378,  426, 
436,  468-471,  490 

Elephants,  use  of,  in  battle,  103, 104, 
105,  107  ;  Carthaginian,  132,  133, 
145,  149,  171 

Eleusinian  mysteries,  139 

Elymais,  192 

Emigrants,  Roman,  in  Spain,  330, 
332,  334,  3:>5  ;  with  Mithradates, 
338,  367  ;  with  the  pirates,  347 

Emporiae,  143,  175 

Ephesus,  190,  191 

Epioydes,  160 

Epidamnus,  37 

Epirus  and  the  Epirots,  35,  102, 
103,  107,  138,  185 

Equestrian  centuries,  204  ;  proposed 
increase  of,  208 

order,  204 ;  raised  by  C.  Grac- 
chus, 236,  237  ;  restricted  by  Sulla, 
303.    See  Jury  Courts. 

Ercte,  134 

Eryx,  134 

Etruria,  boundaries  of,  32  ;  southern 
part  conquered  by  Rome,  81 

Etruscans,  origin,  etc.,  30-35;  early 
relations  with  Romans  and  Phoeni- 
cians, 38,  41 ;  fall  of  power,  76- 
82  ;  in  the  Samnite  wars,  96,  97, 
101,  104 ,  after  the  war  with 
Pyrrhus,  112  ;  in  the  second  Punic 
war,  168  ;  in  Social  war,  269-272  ; 
struggles  against  Sulla,  295,  302  ; 
insurrection  of  Lepidus,  330 ;  cf. 
Catilina,  379-380 

Euboea,  179 

Eumenes,  189,  190,  193,  194,  197, 
199 

Eurymedon,  191 

Exports,  Italian,  320 

Fabii,  57 

Fabius  Hadrianus  M.,  342,  346 
Fabius  Maximus  Q.,  151,  152,   156, 
158,  165,  167,  171,  209 


Fabius,  Maximus  Allobrogicus  Q.,  251 

Fabius,  Rullianus  Q.,  70,  72,  96,  98 

Faesulae,  379,  380 

Falerii,  32,  80,  81,  88 

Family,  among  the  Romans,  13,  14, 

504,  507 
Felsina=Bononia,  79 
Ferentinum,  97 
Feriae  Latinae,  9 
Ficulnea,  25 

Fidenae,  10,  25,  26 ;  Roman,  78,  79 
Financial     position    during    second 
Punic  war,   165,   167  ;    in  seventh 
century,     306,     315-319:     under 
Caesar,  490,  491,  496-498 
Firmum,  108 
Fish-ponds,  321,  501 
Flamininus.     See  Quinctius. 
Flaminius  C,   140,   150,  151,  155, 

209,  210 
Flavius  Fimbria  C,  286,  287 
Fleet.    See  Maritime  affairs. 
Formiae,  92 
Forum  Romanorum,  2 
Fregellae,    92,    95,   105,    168;    de- 
stroyed, 234 
Freedmen,   confined  to   four  tribes, 
273 ;    under    Lex    Sulpicia,    274 ; 
under  Cinna,  289 ;    under  Sulla's 
constitution,  324,  375  ;  position  at 
Rome,  423,  499 
Frentani,  89 
Frusino,  97 
Fulvius  Flaccus  M,  232,  233,  234, 

239,  240,  250 
Fulvius  Flaccus  Q.,  166 

,  178 

Fulvius  Nobilior  M  ,  194 
Fulvius  Nobilior  Q.,  213 
Functions,  defined,  71 
Fundi,  92 

Furius,   Bibaculus  M.,  431 
Furius  Camilluj  L.,  81 
Furius  Camillus  M.,   66 ,    conquart 
Veii,  80 

Gabii,  10,  87 

Gabinius  A.,  359-361,  371,372,  390 

430,  431,  435,  436 
Gades,  119,  164,  457,  514 
Gala,  162 
Galba.     Sea  Sulpicius. 


INDEX. 


529 


Gallaeci,  subdued  by  Caesar,  394 
Gaul,  south  coast  (Narbonensis), 
2ri0,  251 ;  in  Sertonian  war,  332, 
334 ;  Caesar's  views  concerning, 
393,  394,  403,  418,  419,  428; 
boundaries,  394 ;  relations  to 
Rome,  394,  395,  402 ;  to  the 
Germans  and  others,  401,  403 ; 
population,  395 ;  urban  life,  396, 
397  ;  agriculture,  395  ;  commerce, 
396 ;  mining,  art,  science,  397 ; 
political  organization,  397-399 ; 
religion,  398,  399;  army,  399, 
400  ;  civilization,  400 ;  wars  with 
Caesar,  403-418;  taxation,  418, 
497;  Latinization,  419 ;  colonies, 
419,  514.     Cf.  Julius  Caesar. 

Gela,  36,  119 

Gelo,  77 

Gens.    See  Clan. 

Genthius,  198,  199 

Gentiles.    See  Agnati. 

Genucius  Cn.,  57 

Gergovia,  415 

Germans,  first  appearance  in  Roman 
history,  252 ;  relations  to  Celts, 
401, 4o2  ;  to  Romans,  402, 405,  406 

Geranium,  152,  153 

Glabrio.     See  Acilius. 

Gladiatorial  war,  349-351 

games,    first   in   Etruria,    82 ; 

Capuan,  91 ;  at  Rome,  321,  503 

Gold  mines,  250,  315,  397 

Gracchus.    See  Sempronius. 

Graeco-Italian  culture,  religion,  art, 
etc.,  4-6 

Grain,  sale  at  low  prices,  207,  210. 
See  Agriculture. 

Greece,  relations  with  Macedonia, 
179,  181,  183;  declared  free,  186; 
patriot  party,  196, 197  ;  treatment, 
200 

Greeks,  iu  Italy  and  Sicily,  35-39; 
struggles  with  Etruscans,  77,  78  ; 
with  the  Sabellian  races,  90,  91 ; 
adhere  to  Rome  in  the  Hannibalian 
war,  155 

Grumentum,  168,  270 

Hadrumetum,  118,  171 
Haedui,  251,   395,   397,   402,   404, 
405,411,  413,  415,418,419 


Ealiartus,197 

Halicarnassus,  181,  189 

Halicyae,  139 

Halys,  193 

Hamilcar  Barca,  war  in  Sicily,  130, 
131,  134,  135 ;  mercenary  war, 
137 ;  political  position  and  ex- 
ploits in  Spain,  141,  142,  147 

Hamilcar,  Carthaginian  general,  130 

Hannibal,  character  and  capture  of 
Saguntum,  143-145 ;  march  from 
Spain  to  Italy,  145-147,  first 
campaign,  147-149  ;  second  cam- 
paign, 150-152;  third  campaign, 
152-156;  fourth  campaign,  157, 
158;  his  isolation,  159,  161; 
gradual  retreat,  165 ;  fresh  suc- 
cesses and  march  on  Rome,  166  ; 
retreats  after  death  of  Hasdrubal, 
168,  169;  returns  to  Africa,  170; 
defeated  at  Zama,  171;  reforms 
the  Carthaginian  constitution,  176  ; 
goes  into  exile,  176;  received  by 
Antiochus,  whom  he  aids,  189- 
191 ;  death,  194 

Hannibal,  son  of  Gisgo,  129,  130 
Hanno,  (1)   son  of  Hannibal,   129; 

(2)  a  Carthaginian  general,  129  ; 

(3)  commands  the  Bruttian  army, 
165  ;  (4)  Carthaginian  general  in 
Sicily,  160;  (5)  son  of  Bomilcar, 
146  ;  (6)  the  Great,  141,  142 

Hasdrubal,  (1)  141  ;  (2)  son  of  Gisgo, 
164;  (3)  brother  of  Hannibal,  145, 
154,  159,  162-164;  reaches  Italy, 
168,  169 ;  (4)  brother-in-law  of 
Hannibal,  142,  143;  (5)  son  of 
Hanno,  132;  (6)  leader  of  the 
patriots  in  Carthage,  and  general, 
216;  (7)  commander  of  the  citadel, 
218 

Hatria,  on  the  Po,  38,  77,  82,  88 

in  the  Abruzzi,  98 

Helvetii,  251,  253,  254;  population 
of,  395,  397  ;  in  Black  Forest,  401 ; 
migration,  403-405,  413 

Heraclea  in  Italy,  36,  90 ;  battle  of, 
104,  105  ;  makes  peace  with  Rome, 
156  ;  joins  Hannibal,  166 

in  Trachinia,  191 

on  tha  Euxine,  341,  342,  370, 

511,  514 

34 


530 


INDEX. 


Herculaneum,  94 

Herdonius  A  pp.,  57 

Hormaean  promontory,  battle  at, 
132 

Heruioi,  allied  with  Rome,  26 ;  join 
the  Romano- Latin  league,  85  ;  rise 
against  Rome,  87;  refuse  to  join  a 
revolt,  92,  94  ;  join  the  Samnites, 
96  ;  punishment,  96,  97  ;  relation 
to  Rome,  112 

Hesiod,  36 

Hiempsal,  245 

Hiero  I.,  77 

Hiero  II.,  war  against  the  Mamer- 
tines,  127-1"20;  allies  with  Rome, 
129  ,  position  after  the  first  Punic 
war,  136,  137 ;  conduct  in  the 
second  Funic  war,  152,  155 

Hierinymus,  155,  159 

Himera  (Thermae),  36,  119,  133; 
batt  e  at,  77,  116 

Himilco,  (1)  133;  (2)  160 

Hippo  Reg  us,  118 

Hippocrates,  159,  160 

Hipponium,  90 

Hirpini,  89,  155 

Hirtuleius  L.,  331-333 

Homor,  36 

Hon  >rary  surnames,  207 

Hostilius  Manciuus  A.,  198 

Hosti-ias  Tubulus  C,  168 

Hon^e-i'ather,  13,  14 

Human  sacrifices  in  Gaul,  401 

Hyrcanns,  368 

Iapydes,  251 

Iapygians,  3 

Iberians  in  Georgia,  366 

Ilerda,  455-457 

Illyrians,  piracy,  138,  139,  145.  See 
Genthius. 

niyricuin,  subjugation  of  the  Dal- 
matians in,  251,  421,  497 

Ilva,  33 

Imbros,  186 

Imperator,  487,  488 

Imperium,  15 

Imports,  Italian,  320 

Indo-Ceonans,  3 

Insubres,  79,  139,  140,  147,  148, 
174 

Interamna,  95 


Intarest,  59,  68,  274,  276,  483,  507, 
508 

Interrex,  18 

Ionian  Sea,  35,  36 

Isanrians,  348 

Issa,  77 

Isthmian  games,  Romans  admitted 
to,  139 

Itali,  7-8 

Italia  (Corfinium),  270,  273 

Italians,  two  divisions  of,  3  ;  distinc- 
tion from  and  resemblance  to  the 
Greeks,  4-6 ;  migrations  of,  7-8 

Italy,  physical  character,  1,  2  ;  union 
of,  3, 113,  114  ;  natural  boundaries 
of,  136 ;  political  boundary  the 
Rubicon,  306  ,  North  Italy  =  Gallia 
Cisalpina  or  Italian  Gaul,  306, 514, 
515 

Janicnlum,  8,  10,  11,  26,  27 

Jannaeus,  368 

Jews,  368  ,  in  Alexandria,  471,  513 

Jnba,  452,  458,  467,  472,  475-477 

Judaea,  220,  338,  368,  371 ;  position 
in  Caesar's  state,  513 

Judges,  Carthaginian,  120,  121 

Judices  =  consuls,  41 

Jngnrtha,  245-249 

Julia,  Caesar's  daughter,  391,440, 481 

Julius  Caesar  C,  opposed  by  Sulpi- 
cius,  275,  291 

■  ,  family  and  connections,  329, 
480;  character,  329,  4*0-483; 
year  of  birth,  336  n. ,  abstains  from 
Lepidan  rising,  329  ;  against  Mith- 
radates,  340 ;  prosecutes  Sullan 
partisans,  355  ,  supports  Lex  Gabi- 
nia,  360 ,  Pontifex  Maximus,  374, 
384 ;  relations  with  Catilinarian 
conspiracy,  376,  377,  382,  383; 
democratic  zeal,  375,  376,  386 , 
praetorship,  386,  387;  his  rapid 
rise,  38*  ;  governor  of  Spain,  388, 
394;  alliance  with  Pompeius  and 
Crassus,  389;  consul  389-391; 
governor  of  two  Gauls,  390,  451  , 
wars  with  Gauls  and  Germans, 
403-418  ;  crosses  Rhine,  409,  412  , 
invades  Britain,  410;  settlement 
of  Gaol,  418,  419;  at  Luca  427, 
428  ;  rupture  with  Pompeius,  440- 


nwEx. 


531 


448;  recalled,  444 ,  bis  ultimatum, 
446  ;  crosses  Rubicon,  448  •,  Civil 
war,  449-479  ;  regulation  of  Italy, 
454,  455  ;  Egypt,  471  ,  attitude  to- 
wards the  old  parties,  483-485 ; 
Caesarianism,  486 ;  regulates  the 
new  monarchy,  486-489  ,  the  state, 
489-493;  the  army,  493-496; 
finance,  496-498  ;  Rome  and  Italy, 
498-509  ;  the  provinces,  509-512  , 
attitude  towards  Jews  and  Greeks, 
512-515  ;  census,  516;  law  of  the 
empire,  516,  517  ;  coinage,  517  , 
calendar,  517,  518 ,  length  of  his 
reign,  518 

Julius  Caesar  L.,  269,  seqq. 

Junius  Brutus  Damasippus  L.,  297- 
299 

Junius  Brutus  Dec,  240 

,  408,  457 

Junius  Pennus  M.,  233 

Junius  Pullus  L.,  132 

Junius  Silanus  M.,  163 

,  253 

Jupiter  Capitolinus,  28 

Jupiter  Latiaris,  9 

Jury  courts,  transferred  by  C  Grac- 
chus from  the  senate  to  the  equites, 
236,  237,  263,  264 ;  Drusus'  pro- 
posalx  264,  265  ;  Lex  Plautia,  271  ; 
under  Sulla,  303,  354,  355  ,  Lei 
Aurelia,  357  ,  regulations  of 
Pompeius,  433  ;  of  Caesar,  492 

Jus,  imaginum,  63,  203 

Jus  separated  from  mdicium,  42—43 

Juventius,  219 

King,  position,  powers,  etc.,  14-19 ; 
abolished,  40-43,  85 ;  powers  re- 
vived under  the  name  of  dictator, 
43—44 ;  compared  with  monarchy 
of  Caesar,  486-489 

lAbeo.    See  Fabius. 

Lablci,  65,  87 

Labienus  T.,  375 ;  with  Caesar  in 
Gaul,  403,  407,408,  412,414-416, 
449 ,  in  Civil  war,  449,  460,  467, 
473,  477 

Lae'ius  C,  163 

Sapiens  C,  227,  228 

Laevinus.    See  Valerius. 


Lampsacus,  181,  189 

Laud,  division  of,  at  the  time  of  Ser- 
vius,  23 ;  distribution  of,  by  T. 
Gracchus,  229-232;  by  Sulla,  302, 
354  ;  by  Pompeius,  356,  357,  387, 
389,  390;  by  Caesar,  495,  509 

Language,  Latin.    See  Latinizing. 

Lanuvium,  86,  87 

Larissa  on  the  Peneius,  185 

Latin  communities,  as  regards  the 
domain  question,  233;  right  of  mi- 
gration curtailed,  268 ;  in  Social 
War,  270  ,  in  Cisalpine  Gaul,  272  ; 
Latin  rights  given  to  insurgent 
communities,  302  -,  Jus  Latinum  to 
Cisalpine  Gaul,  272  ;  in  Transalpine 
Gaul,  514 

Latin  league  of  thirty  cantons  under 
Alba,  9 ;  new  position  under  Rome, 
25,  26,  28  ;  war  with  Rome,  and 
renewal  of  league  and  loss  of  power, 
85  ,  revolt  against  Rome,  86  ;  clos- 
ing of  the  league,  and  list  of  the 
towns  included,  87  ;  new  restric- 
tions by  Rome,  87  ;  anger  of  the 
Latins,  87,  88 ,  fresh  revolt,  91  ; 
dissolution  of  league,  politically, 
92 ,  treaties  between  Rome  and 
each  community,  92  ;  refuse  to  join 
Pyrrhus,  105 ,  position  after  the 
war  with  Pyrihus,  111;  increased 
oppression,  205 

Latinizing,  of  Italy,  113,  173 ;  of  the 
land  between  the  Alps  and  the  Po, 
174,  175;  of  Spain,  331,  332;  of 
Gaul,  394,  401,  419,  514;  of  the 
empire  by  Caesar,  513-517 

Latins,  first  immigrants  and  extent 
of  migration  and  settlements,  7,  8; 
relation  to  Umbro-Samnitcs,  88 

Latium,  physical  character,  8 ;  limits 
fixed,  87 

Laurentum,  87 

Laus,  37,  90 

Lavinium,  10.  87 

Law,  Roman  and  Latin,  harmonized, 
26 ;  administration  of,  in  muni- 
cipia  and  colonies,  112,  309,  310, 
515,  516 ;  codification  projected, 
517  ;  appeals,  492  ;  regal  jurisdic- 
tion restored,  491,  492.  Cf.  Jury 
courts .  Q.uaestion««. 


532 


INDEX. 


Legati  legionis  pro  praetore,  494 
Legatus,  42 
Leges : — 
Appuleia  agraria,  260,  263 

frumentaria,  261,  354 

Amelia,  357 
Baebia,  179 
Caecilia,  abolition  of  Italian  tolls, 

388 
Canuleia,  63 
Cassia  agraria,  58,  65 

fcabellaria,  223,  224,  227 

Corneliae.     See  Cornelius  Sulla. 
Domitia  de  sacerdotiia  abolished  by 

Sulla,  304 
Fabia  de  plagiariis,  abduction,  350 
Flaminia  agraria,  210 
Fulviade  civitate  sociis  danda,  233 
Gabinia,  223,  359-361 
Genucia,  68 
Hortensia,  67,  70 
I  cilia,  55 
Julia,  272 

agraria,  389,  390 

Juliae.    See  Julius  Caesar  C. 

Junia  de  peregrinis,  233 
Labiena   restoring    Lex    Domitia, 

375 
Lioiniae  Sextiae,  65-68 
Liviae  (of  the  elder  Drusus),  230 
(of  the  vounger  Drusus),  264, 

265 
Maecilia  agraria,  65 
Maenia,  68 
Manilia.  361 
Manlia,  68 

Mucia  de  civitate,  268 
Ogulnia,  67 
Plautia  iudiciaria,  272 

Papiria  de  civitate,  272 

Plotia,  335 
Poetelia,  68 

Pompeia  de  iudiciis,  430 
Publilia(of471  B.C.),  57 

(of  339  B.C.),  66 

Sacratae,  as  to  the  appointment  of 

plebeian  tribunes  and  aediles,  54 
Semproniae,   229,  231,  232.     See 

Sempronius  Gracchus. 
Servilia,  378 
Sulpiciae,  274,  289 
Sumptuariae,  308,  507 


Leges  (continued) : — 

Tabellariae  (Gabinia,  Cassia,  Papi« 

ria),  222,  223 
Terentilia,  58 
Titia  agraria,  263 
Valeria  de  provocatione,  42 

on  Sulla's  dictatorship,  300 

Valeriae  Horatiae,  60,  61 

Legion,  copied  by  Pyrrhus.  105; 
divided  into  cohorts,  258 

Legislation,  by  decree  of  the  com- 
munity, 17;  acquired  practically 
by  the  senate,  73 

Lentulus.    See  Cornelius. 

Leontini,  36 

Lepidus.     See  Aemilius. 

Leptis  Magna,  118,  177;  Minor,  118 

Leucopatra,  219 

Lex,  primarily  agreement,  17  ;  dis- 
tinct from  edict,  47 ;  interval 
between  the  introduction  and  pass- 
ing of,  263 

Liburnae,  138 

Libyans,  118,  124,  125,  177 

Libyphoenicians,  118,  124 

Licinius  Calvus  C.,  431 

Lioinius  Crassus  L.,  260,  264,  265 

Licinius  Crassus  M.,  character,  328 ; 
in  Sullan  war,  292,  293;  in 
Servile  war,  351  ;  coalition  with 
Pompeius,  356-358 ;  relation  to 
Catilinariau  conspiracy,  376,  377, 
381-383 ;  in  triumvirate,  388,  389 , 
at  Luca,  427  ;  second  consulship, 
430;  in  Syria,  435-438;  death, 
438  ;  his  wealth,  503 

Licinius  Crassus  Mucianus  P.,  228, 
232 

Licinius  Crassus  P.,  197 

■ ,  263 

,  Caesar's  lieutenant,  403,  406, 

408,  409,  410,  437,  438 

Lioinius  Lucullus  L.,  214 

,  character,  343,  345  ;  lieutenant 

of  Sulla,  284,  286;  war  against 
Mithradates  and  Tigranes,  340- 
346 ;  estimate  of  his  generalship, 
346;  his  aims  in  Asia,  342,  343, 
370 ;  superseded  by  Pompeius, 
365 ;  opposes  Pompeius,  387 ; 
humiliated  by  Caesar,  retires  from 
political  life,  373,  374 


INDEX. 


533 


Licinius  Lucullus  M.,  in  Sullan  war, 

296,  327,  373 
Licinius  Nerva  P.,  244 
Licinius  Stolo  C,  65 
Lietores,  15,  42 
Ligurians,  32,  79,  82,  139,  145,  148, 

169,  174,  175 
Lilybatum,  33,  107,  119,  132,  133, 

135,  145, 148 
Lingones,  139 ;  in  Gaul,  419 
Lissus,  77 
Livius  C,  191 
Livius  Drusus  M.,  239 

264,  265 

Livius  Salinator  M.,  168 

Locri,  occupied  by  the  Romans,  101 ; 

its  fate  in  the  Pyrrhic  war,  106, 

107 
Locris,  179,  186 
Luca,  conference  at,  427 
Lucanians,  90,  91,  93,  94,  96,  97, 

98,  101,  104,  107,  108,  112,  155, 

166,  173,  270,  273 
Luceres,  10,  12,  21 
Luceria,  95,  158 
Lucretius  Ofella  Q.,  in  Sullan  war, 

295,  299,  310 
Luna,  175 

Lugdunum  Convenarum,  335,  394 
Luperci,  12 
Lusioanians,  178;  war  with   Rome, 

213,  214;   revolt,   263;  subdued, 

394 
LutatiuS  Catulus  C,  135 
Lutatius  Catulus  Q.,  254,  291 
,  consul  78  B.C. ;  327,  330,  361, 

362,  382,  386 
Lycia,  193 
Lydia,  180 
Lysimacbia,  192 

Maccabees.    See  Judaea. 

Macedonia,  land  and  people,  179 ; 
power  in  Greece,  181;  relations 
with  Rome,  139,  144, (see  Philip); 
at  the  beginning  of  the  third  war 
with  Rome,  196 ;  broken  up  into 
four  confederacies,  198,  199;  be- 
comes a  province,  219,  251 ;  in 
Sertorian  times,  334,  337 ;  in 
Caesar's,  421.  Cf.  Perseus,  Philip- 
pus. 


Machares,  342,  367 
Maelius  Sp.,  64,  65 
Maenius  C,  92 
Magister  equiturn,  44 

Magister  populi,  44 

Magistrates,  deputies  only  military, 
43  ;  relation  to  the  senate,  45,  73  ; 
edicts  of,  valid  during  office,  4.' ; 
order  of  succession,  etc.,  prescribed, 
71 ;  unimpeachable  during  tenure 
of  office,  206  ;  distinction  between 
military  and  civil  authority,  48  ; 
Sulla's  regulations,  304-306; 
Caesar's,  490,  491 ;  provincial 
governorships,  359-361,  433,  443, 
490 

Magnesia,  192 

Mago,  Hannibal's  brother,  149  ;  in 
Spain,  164 ;  in  Italy,  169,  170 

Mallius  Maximus  C.  253 

Mamertines.    See  Messana. 

Manilius  C,  361 

Manilius  M.,  217 

Manlius  C,  379,  seqq. 

Manlius  Capitolinus  M.,  64,  65,  80 

Manlius  Imperiosus  Torquatus  T.,  92 

Manlius  Torquatus  T  ,  159 

Manlius  Volso  Cn.,  193 

Manlius  Vol>o  L.,  131 

Manumission,  tax  on,  68,  315; 
freedmen  restricted  to  the  four 
city  tribes,  70 ;  share  in  military 
service  and  in  the  suffrage,  208 ; 
this  equality  removed,  209 

Mantua,  31,  82 

Marcellus.    See  Claudius. 

Marcius  Censonnus  L.,  217 

Maroius  Coriolanus  C,  57 

Marcius  PhiJippus  L.,  264,  265,  299 

Marcius  Philippus  Q.,  197-199 

Marcomanni,  401 

Maritime  affairs,  Rome's  original 
position  in,  11;  piracy  and  efforts 
to  improve  position,  108-110,  125; 
building  of  fleets,  130,  132,  134- 
136;  neglect  of,  221,  348,349; 
reorganized,  363 

Marius  C,  character  and  career,  256  ; 
in  the  Jugurthine  war,  247-249  ; 
in  the  Teutonic  and  Cimbnc  wars, 
253-255 ;  military  reforms  and 
their  significance,  249,  250,  257- 


534 


INDEX. 


259 ;  political  position  and  failure 
of  projects,  259-263 ;  in  social 
war,  269,  seqq  ;  desires  Eastern 
command,  274 ;  appointed  to  it, 
275 ;  exiled,  276  ;  returns  to  Italy 
and  Rome.  2  <9-291 ;  seventh  con 
sulship  and  death,  291 ;  his 
memory  rehabilitated,  376 

Marias,  0.,  son  of  the  preceding,  294, 
295 

Mariu3  Gratidianus  M.,  nephew  of 
C.  Marias  (1>,  301 

Marriage,  14;  marital  powei,  13, 
between  patricians  and  plebeians 
null,  47  ;  made  valid,  63  ;  in  revo- 
lution period,  322 ,  in  Caesar's 
time,  504,  505,  507 

Marruoini,  94,  273 

Mars,  worship  of,  12 

Marsians,  offshoots  of  the  Umbrians, 
3,  89  ;  join  the  Samnites,  96 ,  in 
the  Social  war,  269,  seqq 

Massaesylians,  177 

Massilia,  39  ;  allied  with  Home,  109 ; 
conflicts  with  Carthage,  119,  in 
second  Punic  war,  145,  146,  175, 
power,  250  ,  position  in  Gaul,  394, 
395  ;  trade,  396  ;  in  Civil  war,  455, 
457, 458 ,  treatment  by  Caesar,  514 

Massinissa,  character  of,  17.^-177  ; 
part  in  second  Punic  war,  162, 164, 
170,  171 ;  after  the  war,  176, 177, 
216,  217,  245,  249 

Massiva,  246 

Maaretania,  177,  246,  248,  473,  475 

Maxitani,  117 

Media,  220 

Atropatene,  180 

Mediolaaam,  79,  140 

Mediterranean,  1 

Meduliia,  25 

Megalopolis,  founded  by  Pompeius, 
370 

Melita,  119 

Melpam,  79,  80,  82 

Memmius  C,  246,  260 

Menapii,  395,  408,  412 

Mesopotamia,  338,  345 

Messana,  36,  119;  seized  by  Mamer- 
tines,  106 ,  war  with  Hiero,  128  ; 
cause  of  the  first  Punic  war,  128, 
129,  148 


Metapontum,  37,  90,  166 

Met  auras,  168 

Metelius.    See  Caeoilias. 

Mioipsa,  245 

Military  service,  length  of,  233,  343, 
495 

Milo,  103 

Mines,  Spanish,  179 ;  gold  in  Pied- 
mont, 250,  315;  in  Gaul,  396,  397 

Mintornae,  98,  110,  276 

Minucius  Rufus  M.,  152 

Mithra,  220 

Mithradates  I.,  228 

Mithradates,  king  of  Parthia,  435, 
436 

Mithradates  of  Pergamus,  471 

Mithradates  VI.,  Eupator,  character, 

278,  279,  conquests  and  alliances, 

279,  280,  339 ;  comes  into  contact 
with  Rome,  280,  281;  first  war 
with  Rome,  massacre  of  Italians, 
281-286 ,  terms-  M  peace,  286,  287 ; 
second  war  with  Rome,  298  ;  third 
war  with  Rome,  338-342,  364- 
368;  takes  refuge  with  Tigranes, 
343 ;  entrusted  by  Tigranes  with 
the  command,  345 ;  regains  his 
kingdom,  346  ,  defeated  by  Pom- 
peius, 365,  vevolt  of  his  Bospcran 
subjects,  367  ,  death,  367 

Money,  gold,  517 ,  Celtic,  397 ; 
coinage  in  Gaul,  419,  of  Pom- 
peius, 370  money  dealing,  -320, 
507 

Mons  Sacei,  54,  bC 

Montani,  12 

Motya,  119 

Mucios  Scaevola  P.,  228,  230,  232 

Mucios  Scaevola  Q.,  son  of  the  above, 
263,  295 

Mulvius  pons,  3i 

Municeps,  passive  burgess,  24 

Municipal  constitution,  Latin,  re- 
modelled, 85,  87 

system,  86,  205 ;   developed  in 

Italy,  308-310;  regulated  by 
Cae*ar,  509 ,  extended  to  provinces, 
515 

Muthol,  battle  on  the,  247 

Matiaa,  175 

Mutines,  160, 161 

Mylae,  battle  of,  130 


INDEX. 


535 


Myndus,  189 
Myonnesus,  191 

Nabataean  state,  338,  368 

Nabis,  181,  186, 

Narbo,  243,  251 

Narnia,  97,  169 

Nasioa.    See  Cornelias. 

Naupactus,  191 

Naval  warfare,  130 

Navigation  of  the  Gauls,  396,  400, 
408 

Naxos,  36 

Neapolis,  38;  relations  with  the 
Samnites,  90,  94;  laithful  to 
Rome,  158 

Neetum,  136 

Nemausus  (Nimes),  514 

Nepete,  32,  87 

Nervii,  400,  401,407,  412 

Nicomedes  II.,  king  of  Bithynia,  280 

Nicomedes  III.,  Philopator,  281 ;  be- 
queaths his  kingdom  to  Rome,  339 

Nicopolis,  370,  471 

Nigidius  Figulus  P.,  484 

Nobility,  development  of,  48,  69, 
203 ;  in  possession  of  the  senate 
ami  equestrian  centuries,  203,  204; 
need  of  money  for  office,  207  ;  new 
nobility  of  Caesar,  489 

Nola,  7  ;  under  Etruscans,  34  ;  under 
Samnites  becomes  Greek,  90;  in 
the  Samnite  wars,  94,  95  ;  in  the 
second  Punic  war,  158 ;  in  Social 
war,  269,  seqq.,  289 

Nomentum,  long  independent,  25; 
member  of  Latin  league,  87  ;  bur- 
gess-town, 92 

Norba,  85,  87 

Norbanus  C.,  293,  294,  296 

Noviodunum  (Julia  Equestris),  405, 
514 

Nuceria,  under  Greek  influence,  90 ; 
in  Samnite  wars,  94,  95 

Numana,  Syracusan,  77 

Numantia,  215 

Numidia,  245-249 

Numidians  (or  Berbers),  176,  177 

Ocriculum,  97 

Ootavius  Cn.,  289,  290,  291 

Octavius  L.,  364 


Ootavius  ML,  229 

,  admiral  of  Pompeius,  459, 472, 

473 
Odrysians,  197 
Odysseus  (Ulysses),  38 
Opimius  L.,  239,  240 
Oppius  Q.,  282 
Opsoi,  7 

Optimates  and  Populares,  224 
Orehomenus,  battle  at,  285 
Orestis,  186 
Ostia,    11,     17;     position     towards 

Rome,  28  ;  naval  quaestor  at,  109  ; 

roadstead  silted  up,  319 ;  post  for 

Eastern  imports,  320 
Oxus,  220 

Paelignians,  89;  join  the  Samnites, 
96  ;  269,  seqq. 

Paestum.  108 

Palaeopolis,  94 

Palatine,  11,  12,  23,27 

Pamphylia,  199,  348 

Pandosia,  37 

Panormus,  119,  131,  133 

Panticapaeum,  279,  367 

Paphlagonia,  280,  281 

Papirius  Carbo  C.,  232-234,  252,  253 

Papirius  Carbo  Cn.,  289,  293-296 

Papirius  Cursor  L.,  95,  96 

Papius  Mutilus  C,  270,  seqq. 

Parma,  175 

Paros,  186 

Parthenope,  38 

Parthia,  foundation  of,  220 ;  contact 
with  Romans,  281 ;  encroached  on 
by  Tigranes,  337,  338 ;  agreement 
with  Lucullus,  365  ;  alliance  with 
Pompeius,  365 ;  agreement  with 
Pompeius,  369 ;  war  with  Rome, 
435-439  ;  agreement  with  Bibulus, 
452  ;  mode  of  warfare,  437 

Parthians,  179 

Pastoral  husbandry,  225,  502 

Paternal  authority,  13, 14 

Patres  conscripti,  45 

Patricians,  the  Roman  burgesses,  14, 
16 ;  decrease  of,  22 ;  become  a 
privileged  and  governing  nobility, 
47,  48;  lose  their  privileges,  67} 
new  patriciate  of  Caesar,  489 

Fatronus,  16.    See  Clientship. 


536 


INDEX. 


Paullus.     See  Aemilius. 

Pedarii,  45 

Pedum,  87  ;  becomes  a  municipium, 
92 

Pentri,  155 

Pergamus,  181,  182,  189,  191,  193, 
220,  282,  283,  286 

Perpenna  C,  270 

Perpenaa  M.,  297,  332,  333,  335 

Perseus,  196-199^ 

Persians,  77 

Perusia,  33,  96 

Pessinus,  high  priest  of,  369 

Petreius  M.,  382,  455,  457,  477 

Phanagoria,  279,  367,  369,  466 

Pharisees,  369 

Pharnaces,  sou  of  Mithradates,  367, 
466,  471 

Pharos,  470 

Pharsalus,  battle  at,  464-466 

Phasis,  366 

PhiUnaus  V.,  of  Macedonia,  character 
of,"  182;  ally  of  Hannibal,  154, 
161;  first  war  with  Rome,  161, 
\<>b,  169;  his  power,  179;  invades 
Asia  Minor,  182;  second  war  with 
Rome,  183-185;  results,  185,  186  ; 
attitude  during  war  with  Anti- 
ochus,  190;  dissatisfaction  and 
preparations  for  a  third  war,  194- 
196 

Philippus,  the  Pseudo,  219 

Philopoemen,  183 

Phooaeans,  36,  39 

Phocis,  179 

Phoenice  in  Epirus,  138 

Phoenicians,  home  of,  character,  etc., 
115,  116;  in  Italy.  35;  contest 
with  the  Greeks,  39.  See  Car- 
thage. 

Phraates,  369,  435 

Phrygia,  ISO;  attached  to  province 
of  Asia,  278,  282 

Piceutes,  89  ;  war  with  Rome,  108  ; 
in  the  second  Punic  war,  168 ; 
Campaniau,  155,  172 

Pilumnus  populus,  16 

Piracy,  138, 1 39,  221 ;  used  by  Mithra- 
dates, 282,  348;  unchecked  by 
Romans,  319,  347  ;  in  concert  with 
Sertorius,  332,  334,  348;  their 
organization,  347,  348 ;  expeditions 


of  Servilius,  Antonius,  and  Metel- 
lus,  .548,  349,  364;  Gabinian  law, 
359,  360;  suppressed  by  Pom- 
peius,  363,  3^4 ;  recrudescence 
after  Civil  war,  478 

Pisaurum,  175 

Piso.     See  Calpurnius. 

Pistoria,  382 

Placentia,  140,  148,  149,  168,  175 

Plautius  Hypsaeus  L.,  226 

Plebeians,  origin,  etc.,  22, 23;  eligible 
f>r  military  commands,  24;  ad- 
mitted to  the  curiae  and  senate, 
44-46 ;  acquire  burgess-rights, 
47,  48.  Cf.  Patricii,  and  Tribuni 
plebis. 

Plebiscitum,  55,  57,  67 

Plurality  of  offices,  71,  72 

Poeni.     See  Phoenicians. 

Pompaedius  Silo,  270,  seqq. 

Pompeii,  94  ;  colony  of  Sulla,  302 

Pompeius  Cn..  character,  327,  328, 
355,  370,  371,  440;  Sullan  parti- 
san and  lieutenant  in  Sullan  war, 
294,  299 ;  propraetor  in  Sicily, 
297:  saluted  "Magnus,"  29S  ; 
opposes  Pompeius.  310;  attitude 
to  Lepidus,  329,  330 ;  command 
against  Sertorius,  332-335  ;  coali- 
tion with  democrats  and  Crassus, 
355-361 ;  war  with  pirates,  363, 
364;  with  Mithradates,  364-366; 
peace  with  Tigranes,  366  ;  conquers 
Caucasian  tribes,  366 ;  settlement 
of  Parthia,  369 ;  of  conquered 
territories,  369,  370;  of  Syrian 
affairs,  368  ;  triumph,  370 ;  posi- 
tion on  return  to  Rome,  385-388  ; 
coalition  with  Caesar  and  Crassus, 
388-391 ;  management  at  Rome 
during  Caesar's  absence,  422-434; 
of  corn  supplies,  426  ;  dictatorship, 
432-434;  rupture  with  Caesar, 
439-448  ;  in  the  Civil  war,  449- 
466;  flight  and  death,  466,  468; 
his  wealth,  503 

Pompeius  Cn.,  son  of  above,  469 

Pompeius  Q.,  215 

Pompeius  Rufus  Q.,  275,  277 

Pompeius  Sext.,  469,  477 

Pompeius  Strabo  Cn.,  in  Social  war, 
271  seqq.,  277,  290 


INDEX. 


537 


Pomponius  Atticus,  502 

Pomptine  Marshes,  95,  319 

Pontifex  Maxim  us,  43 

Pontifices,  increase  of,  67 ;  in  muni- 
cipia,  309 

Pontius  of  Telesia,  Samnite  leader, 
296,  297 

Pontus,  180,  220 ;  under  Mithradates 
VI.,  279,  280  ;  occupied  by  Romans, 
341 ;  made  a  Roman  province,  369. 
See  Mithradates. 

Popilius  Laenas  M.,  215 

Population,  of  the  oldest  Roman  terri- 
tory, 11 ;  at  the  time  of  Servius 
Tullius,  24;  decrease  of,  173,  211. 
Cf.  Census. 

Populonia,  33, 38 

Populus,  16 

Porcius  Cato  M.,  character,  etc.,  207, 
208  ;  in  Spanish  war,  178;  in  war 
with  Antiochus,  191 ;  as  governor, 
206  ;  his  reforms,  208,  209  ;  esti- 
mate by  posterity,  210;  commis- 
sioner to  Carthage,  216;  death, 
217;  his  estimate  of  Hamilcar,  142 

Porcius  Cato  Uticensis  M.,  character, 
373,  374,478,  479;  in  Catilinarian 
conspiracy,  381,  382  ;  opposes  Pom- 
peius,  386,  387,  429,  432 ;  mission 
to  Cyprus,  391  :  opposes  the 
regents,  441,  444,  445  ;  in  Civil 
war,  458-460,  464,  467,  472,  476, 
477-479 

Porsena,  76-77 

Port  dues,  17  ;  abolished,  388  ;  re- 
established, 497 

Posidonia,  37,  90 

Postumius  Albinus  A.,  brother  of 
Spurius,  247 

Postumius  Albinus  Sp.,  247 

Postumius  L.,  154 

Potentia,  175 

Praefecti  annonae,  64 ;  urbi,  42 

Praeneste,  war  with  Rome,  86 ;  a 
member  of  the  Latin  league,  87 ; 
cedes  territory,  92  ;  later  position, 
111 ;  siege  of,  295-297 

Praetores,  name  of  consuls,  41 ;  a 
third  consul,  66 ;  governors  of 
provinces,  137 ;  in  Spain,  179 ; 
inadequate,  204;  under  Sulla,  304, 
305,  306  ;  under  Caesar,  491 


Praetor  peregrinus,  204 

Praetoriani,  258 

Precarii,  51 ;  precarium,  53 

Priests,  nominated  by  the  king,  15; 
not  by  the  consuls,  43;  power  in 
politics,  64;  chosen  by  co-optation, 
304 ;  by  the  tribes,  375 

Prineeps  senatus,  46 

Prisci  Latini,  8 

Privernum,  92 

Proletarii,  50 ;  admitted  by  Marius 
to  enlistment,  258 

Proscriptions  of  Sulla,  276,  301,  326, 
357,  375,  483 

Provinciae  originally  the  departments 
of  the  consuls,  71 ;  provincial  con- 
stitution, 137,  138,  205,  206  ; 
Spain,  179 ;  acquisition  of,  221 ; 
fundamental  distinction  of,  515; 
distribution  by  senate,  .105  ;  num- 
ber, in  Sulla's  time,  305;  in 
Caesar's,  509 

Prusias,  182,  193,  194 

Ptolemaeus  Epiphanes,  182 

Ptolemaeus  Philopator,  188 

Ptolemaeus,  son  of  Lagus,  102,  180 

Ptolemaeus  the  Cyprian,  338 

Ptolemaeus  XI.,  Auletes,  338  ;  recog- 
nized by  Romans,  371 ;  expelled 
and  restored,  372 ;  Egypt  after  his 
death,  468 

Publicani,  origin  of,  53 ;  236 

Funic  wars :  first,  127-136 ; — second, 
causes  of,  141-145  ;  march  of  Han- 
nibal from  Spain  to  Italy,  145-147  ; 
battles  of  Ticinus,  Trebia,  Trasi- 
mene,  148-151  ;  events  to  b:ittleof 
Cannae,  151-156;  events  in  Italy, 
157-159  ;  war  in  Sicily,  159-161 ; 
war  in  Macedonia,  161 ;  in  Spain, 
162-164;  in  Italy,  and  fall  of 
Capua,  165-167 ;  Hasdrubal  and 
battle  of  Sena,  168-169 ;  Scipio's 
expedition  to  Africa  and  end  of 
war,  169-173  ;— third,  216-219 

Puteoli,  38  ;  Eastern  trade,  320 

Pydna,  198,  200 

Pyrgi,  38  ;  stormed  by  Dionysius,  77  ; 
burgess-colony,  110 

Pyrrhus,  character,  early  history,  and 
historical  position  of,  102,  103; 
interest   of,    100,   101 ;     lands  at 


INDEX. 


Tarentum,    1^3,    104;    war    with 
Rome,  104,  105 ;   Sicilian  expedi- 
tion, 105-107  ;  battle  of  Beneven- 
tum,  107  ;  death,  108 
Pyxus,  37 

Quaestiones  perpetuae,  repetunda- 
rum,  223  ;  extended  by  Sulla,  307, 
308  ;  under^  Caesar,  492 

Quaestors,  under  the  republic,  43  ; 
two  new  ones  to  manage  the 
military  chest,  60  ;  four  quaestores 
classici,  109;  provincial,  137; 
increased  to  twenty,  303 ;  to 
forty,  490 

Quartering  troops  in  the  provinces, 
avoided  by  Sertorius,  332,  510,  512 

Quinctius  Cineinnatus  L.,  65 

Quinotius  Flamininus  T.,  184-187, 
189 ;  nepotism,  205 

Quinctius  L,  360 

Quinctius  Pennus  Capitolinus  T.,  167 

Quirinal  city,  12,  21 

Quirites,  16 

Eabirius  C,  trial,  375 

Raeti,  31 

Ramncs,  10,  12,  21,  22 

Rasennae,  31 

Baudiue  plain,  254 

Ravenna,  31 

Recruiting,  system  of  Marius,  257, 

258 
Regillus,  lake,  85 
Regulus.     See  Atilius. 
Religion,  Etruscan,  34 ;  Italian  and 

Roman,  4—6 
Remi,  406,  407,  412,  415,  419 
Bepresentative  institutions  unknown 

to  antiquity,  231  ;  approached   to 

at  Rome,  303,  308,  309 
Bex  sacrorum,  41 
Rhegium,  36,  90 ;  occupied  by  Rome, 

102 ;  mutinies  and  repulses  Roman 

attacks,    106 ;    refuses    to    admit 

Pyrrhus,     107 ;    is     stormed     by 

Romans,  108 
Rhine,  boundary  of  Gaul,  394,  401- 

403,  405,  406 ;  crossed  by  Caesar, 

409,  412 
Rhodes,  ally  oe  Rome,  109;  after  the 

6econd  Punic  war,  181 ;  war  with 


Philip,  182, 183;  opposes  Antiochus, 

189-191  ;  reward,  193  ;  humiliated, 

199, 200  ;  resists  Mithradates,  283; 

rewarded,  287 
Rhone,  Hannibal's   passage  of,    145, 

146 ;     Helvetii     prevented     from 

crossing,  404 
Boad.     See  Via. 
Roma  quadrata,  11 
Rome,  site,  character,  rise,  etc.,  10- 

12  ;  amalgamation  of  Palatine  and 

Quirinal,  21  ;  division,  23  ;  Servian 

wall   and   the  seven   hills,  26-28  ; 

burnt  by  the  Gauls,  80 ;  condition 

in  Caesar's  time,  498-501 
Rostra,    27 ;     decorated    with     the 

beaks  of  the  Antiate  galleys,  92 
Rubicon,   boundary   of    Italy,    306 ; 

crossed  by  Caesar,  448 
Rufinus.    See  Cornelius. 
Ruspina,  battle  at,  475 
Rutili,  26 
Rutilius  Lupus  P.,  270,  srqq. 

Sabellians,  7,  10,  93,  94 

Sabines,  8 ;  contact  with  Rome,  26  ; 
conquered,  85,  98 

Saddueees,  368 

Saguntum,  allied  with  Rome,  143 ; 
attacked  and  taken  by  Hannibal, 
144, 145, 154;  recaptured  by  Rome, 
162 

Salassi,  147 

Salii,  12 

Sallentini,  108 

Sallustius  Crispus  C,  376 

Samnites,  a  branch  of  the  Umbrians, 
3,  4  ;  movements,  7,  88,  89 ;  loose 
fedemtion  and  character  of  con- 
quests, 90-93 ;  wars  with  Rome, 
93-98 ;  join  the  Lucanians,  101 ; 
join  Pyrrhus,  104,  107 ;  make 
peace,  108;  league  dissolved,  112; 
in  the  second  Punic  war,  151.  155; 
lose  territory,  173  ;  in  Social  war, 
269,  seqq. ;  courted  by  Sullans  and 
Cinnans,  290;  march  on  Rome, 
battle,  296,  297     punishment,  297 

Samos,  189,  191 

Samothraoe.  198 

Sardinia,  Carthaginian,  34,  76,  119; 
attacked   and   occupied   by  Rome, 


INDEX. 


539 


130,  137 ;  Carthage  attempts  to 
recover,  159;  wars  in.  175;  occu- 
pied by  Lepidus,  330;  by  Q. 
Valerius,  458 

Sassiuates,  108 

Satioula,  95 

Satricum,  86,  87  ;  revolts,  95 

Scaptia,  87 

Scipio.    See  Cornelius. 

Scodra,  138,  139 

Scordisci,  251,  252 

Scotussa,  185 

Scribonius  Curio  C,  bought  by 
Caesar,  445 ;  manages  his  interests 
at  Rome,  445-448  ;  recovers  Sicily, 
458;  killed  in  Africa,  458,  459 ; 
his  debts,  504 

Scribonius  Libo  C,  459 

Scriptura,  17.  52,  53, 317 

Scyros,  186 

Scythia,  279 

Secession.    See  Sacred  Mount. 

Segesta,  138 

Selinus,  119 

Sempronius  Asellio  A.,  274 

8empronius  Gracchus  C,  character, 
234 ;  on  the  land  commission,  230 ; 
232,  233 ,  quaestor,  234 ;  tribune 
and  measures,  death,  234-240; 
improves  Italian  roads,  319;  after 
his  fall,  242,  243,  259,  262 

Sempronius  Gracchus  Ti.,  158,  159, 
165,  166 

— —  (father  of  the  two  Gracchi)  in 
Spain,  178,  228 

,     character,     proposals,     and 
death.  228-232 

Sempronius  Longus  Ti.,  148 

Sena  Gallica,  colony,  102 ;  battle 
near,  168 

Senate,  origin,  powers,  etc.,  in  regal 
times,   18,  19;    increased   power, 

45,  46 ;    plebeians   admitted,   45, 

46,  48;  tribunes  admitted,  72; 
real  power  vested  in  the  senate, 
72-74 ;  contrasted  with  the  judges 
of  Carthage,  123;  conduct  of  the 
first  Punic  war,  132,  134,  136; 
patriotism  in  the  second  War,  155, 
156  :  estimate  of  its  foreign  policy, 
201 ;  becomes  purely  aristocratic, 
203-205 ;  lax  control  of  praetors, 


206 ;  mismanagement  of  land, 
210,211;  senatorial  commissions, 
215;  decline  and  corruption  of, 
221,  222,  224;  attacked  by  C. 
Gracchus,  236, 237  ;  its  subsequent 
rule,  243,  244;  under  Sulla,  303, 
304,  306,  357 ;  dispensing  power 
curtailed,  374 ;  abuses  corrected, 
374 ;  foreign  affair^  after  its  re- 
storation by  Sulla,  337,  seqq. ; 
under  Caesar,  489,  490  ;  opposition 
senate  of  Italians,  269 ;  of  Ser- 
torius,  331  ;  of  the  regents,  427  ; 
in  Macedonia,  459  ;  in  Africa,  473. 
Senatorial  jurymen.  See  Jury 
Courts. 

Senones,  79,  80;  expelled  from  Italy, 
101,412 

Sentinum,  97,  98 

Septimius  L.,  468 

Septimontium,  11 

Sequani,  402,  404,  413 

Sergius  Catilina  L.,  character,  377; 
conspiracies,  377-382  ;  death,  382 

Sertorius  Q.,  character,  330,  331 ; 
iu  Marian  war,  289-291,  295, 297  ; 
in  Mauretania,  331 ;  returns  to 
Spain,  331  ;  struggle  with  the 
Roman  government,  331-335;  or- 
ganization of  Spain,  331-332;  to 
eat  with  Mithradates,  339 

Servian,  wall,  26,  27  ;  constitution, 
23-25 ;  voting  arrangements  re- 
stored, 278 

Servilius  Ahala  C,  64 

Servilius  C,  245 

,269 

Servilius  Caeplo  Q.,  214 

,  243,  253 

,  261,  264 

Servilius  Rullus  P.,  378 

Servilius  Vatia  Isauricus  P.,  348 

Sestus,  191 

Setia,  86,  87 

Sertius  Lateranus  L,  65 

Sibylline  oracles,  426 

Siccius  Dentatus  L.,  60 

Sicily,  position,  2  ;  earlv  immigrants, 
7  ;  Greeks  in,  36,  39,  77 ;  con- 
dition after  the  death  of  Aga- 
thocles,  105,  106 ;  Pyrrhus  in, 
107;    Phoenicians   in,    116;   Car- 


540 


INDEX. 


thaginian  rule  in,  119,  120,  122, 
124;  condition  of,  before  first 
Punic  war,  127,  128  ;  surrendered 
to  Rome,  135-138;  attempts  to 
recover  it  by  Carthage,  145,  155, 
159-161;  slavery  in,  225,  226; 
occupied  sfor  Caesar,  458.  Cf, 
Slaves. 

Sidon,  116,  118 

Signia,  85,  111 

Silver  plate  at  Rome,  322 

Sinnaca,  438 

Sinope,  181,  279,  341,  342;  ex- 
tended, 370,  514 

Sinuessa,  98,  110 

Sins,  37 

Sittius  P.,  381,  475,  477,  478 

Slaves,  14;  work  on  estates,  53,  66, 
225,  226  ;  employed  in  rural  labour, 
51,  52,  211 ;  carry  on  trades,  225 ; 
system  of,  225  ;  insurrections  of,  in 
Italy  and  Sicily,  225,  226,  244,  245; 
increase  of,  320, 321,  498,  499,  501, 
502,  503  ;  checked  by  Caesar,  509  ; 
gladiatorial  war,  349-351  ,  m 
Sicily,  351 

Smyrna,  189,  191 

Solon,  59 

So  Inn  turn,  119 

Sora,  88,  95,  97 

Soracte,  8 

Spain,  Phoenicians  in,  115, 119,  under 
Hamilcar,  142, 143  ;  a  Roman  pro- 
vince, 164;  after  second  Punic 
war,  177  ;  constant  warfare  in, 
178,  179,  213-215,  263;  Sertorius 
in  330  335  ;  Caesar  in,  394,  455- 
457  ;  Caesari.in  lieutenants  in,  473 

Sparta,  181,  186,  219 

Spartacns,  350,  351 

Spina,  34,  88 

Stabiae,  271 

Stoicism  at  Rome,  322,  373 

Subnra,  11,  23 

Suburra,  458 

Suebi,  401,  403 

Snessa  Aurnnca,  95 

Suessa  Pometia,  86 

Snessiones,  399,  406,  407 

Sugambri,  401,  409 

Sulpicius  Galba  P.,  166,  183,  184 

Snlpicius  Galba  Serv.,  214 


Sulpicius  Peticus  C,  80,  81 

Sulpicius  Rufus  P.,  274-27  v 

Surrentum,  34 

Sutrium,  81,  96 

SybariB,  36,  37 

Syphax,  162,  170,  171 

Syracuse,  36  ,  head  of  the  Sicilian 
Greeks,  77,  78,  119,  120;  calls  in 
Pyrrhus,  105-107  ;  in  the  Punic 
wars,  127,  129,  136,  137,  159,  160 

Syria,  200,  220,  221,  282,  338,  343, 
344,  366,  368,  369,  371  ;  Cras>us 
appointed  governor,  427,  435,  436, 
439,  471,  472 

Tactics,  Roman  and  Parthian,  437  , 
Celtic,  399,  400  ;  of  Vercingetorix, 
413-416;  of  Britons,  410 

Tarentum,  36  ;  commerce  of,  37  ;  rise, 
77  ;  attacked  by  Samnites,  90,  91, 
93,  94;  conduct  in  Samnite  wars 
with  Rome,  95,  96 ;  mob  attacks 
Roman  fleet,  102 ;  calls  in  Pyrrhus, 
103-105  ;  held  by  Milo,  106,  107  ; 
surrendered  to  Rome,  108,  128 ;  in 
the  second  Punic  war,  166-167 

Tarpeian  Hill,  27 

Tarquinii,  home  of  the,  32  ;  expelled 
from  Rome,  41 

Tarquinii,  one  of  the  twelve  Etruscan 
towns,  32,  33  ;  war  with  Rome,  81 

Tarracina,  87 

Tarraco,  162 

Task- work,  16 

Taurini,  146,148 

Taurisci,  251-253 

Tanromenium,  127 

Taxation,  direct,  unknown,  17  ;  Ita- 
lian, 315;  Provincial,  315;  496- 
498,  510-512 

Taxiles,  284,  341 

Teanum  Sidicinum,  under  Greek  in- 
fluence, 90;  calls  in  Rome,  91  j 
garrisoned  bv  the  Sammtes,  93 

Tectosages,  180,  193 

Telamon,  38,  140 

Temesa,  37 

Tempe,  pass  of,  185 

Tencteri,  401,. 402,  409 

Tenths,  138,  316 

Terentius  Varro  M.,  152-155 

,  457,  459 


INDEX. 


541 


Terina,  37 

Territory  of  Rome,  original,  10,  11 ; 

increased,  25,  26  ;  lessened,  76,  77  ; 

conquest  of  Veii,  80 ;  south  Etruria 

conquered,    81  ;    extension    south 

and  east,  85,  86  ;  at  end  of  Samnite 

wars,  98 ;  at  end  of  Pyrrhic  war, 

110,  111 ;  extends  to  the  Po,  175 
Teutones,  252,  254 
Thala,  248 

Thapsus,  118;  battle  of,  476-477 
Thasos,  182 
Theatre,  seats  of  the  equites  in,  303, 

358 
Thermae.    See  Himera. 
Thermopylae,  191 
Thessaly,  179,  184,  185,  190,  198 
Theveste,  118 
Thrace,  185,  189,  192,  197;  Thra- 

cians  invade  Macedonia  and  Epirus, 

251 ;  wars  in  282,  337,  421 
Thurii,    90 ;    apply  to   Rome,    101 ; 

captured  by  the  Tarentines,  102  ; 

in  the  second  Punic  war,  166 
Tiber,  8,  10, 11,  26,  27 ;  stone  bridge, 

318;    neglect    of,   319;    Caesar's 

project,  501 
Tibur,  revolts  from  Rome,  86 ;  in  the 

Latin  league,  87 ;  cedes  territory, 

92  ;  position,  111,  501 
Ticinus,  148 
Tifata,  Mount,  166 
Tigranes,  ally  of  Mithradates,  280- 

282 ;  increase  of  his  power,   337, 

338 ;    in    third   Mithradatic  war, 

339;    war  with    Rome,    343-346, 

364-366.  367 
Tigranocerta,  338,  343,  344 
Tingis,  331 
Tities,  10,  12,  21,  22 
Titurius  Sabinus,  408,  411,  412 
Toga,  16 ;  togati,  113 
Tolistobogi,  180,  193 
Tolumnius  Lars,  79 
Torboletes,  144 
Torrhebi,  31 
Trades  at  Rome,  320,  321,  328,  499, 

500 
Transpadani,  306 ;  claim  the  civitas, 

325,  375;    Caesar   governor,  390, 

403,  447,  514,  515 
Trasimene  lake,  150-151 


Trebellius,  360,  361 

Trebia,  149 

Trebonius,  457,  458 

Treviri,  395,  401,  411,  412 

Tribes  of  the  clans,  10,  21,  22; 
Servian  levy-districts,  23  ;  their 
voting,  57  ,  four  added,  81  ;  more 
additions,  92  ;  in  all  thirty-five,  70 

Tribunal,  27 

Tribuni  militum,  elected  by  the 
comitia,  204,  205,  493 

militum  consulari  potestate,  63 

plebis,  origin,  54 ;  powers,  etc., 

55 ;  compared  with  consuls,  56  , 
value,  56,  57  ;  suspended  during 
the  decemvirate,  58-60 ;  restored 
with  new  powers,  60,61;  change 
of  character,  72;  eligible  for  re- 
election, 233  ;  power  restricted  bv 
Sulla,  304,  324,  354;  restored", 
357  ;  under  Caesar,  491 

Tributum,  17 

Trifanum,  92 

Triumph,  meaning  of,  5 ,  becomes 
common,  207 

Trocmi,  180 

Triumvirate,  first,  356  ;  second,  388, 
389 

Tryphon,  in  Sicily,  245 

Tullianum,  27,  249,  381 

Tullius  Cicero  M.,  accuses  Verres,  355, 
supports  Lex  Manilla,  361  ,  consul, 
378 ;  opposes  Lex  Servilia,  378  , 
during  Catilinarian  conspiracy, 
378-383  ;  banished,  391  ;  recalled, 
423-425 ;  threatens  opposition  to 
regents,  427  ;  submits,  429,  431 

Tullius  Cicero  Q.,  412 

Tunes,  131 

Turdetani,  177 

Tuscan  Sea,  33 

Tusculum,  10 ;  revolts,  86 ;  member 
of  Latin  league,  87  ;  treatment  of, 
86,87 

Tutela,  13 

Twelve  tables,  origin,  59 

Tyre,  116,  118 

Ubii,  401,  409 
Ulysses,  38 

Umbrians,  branch  of  the  Italians,  3 ; 
language,    3,    4 ;    migrations,   7 ; 


542 


INDEX. 


evidence  of  movements,  88 ;  in  the 
Samnite  war,  96,  97 ;  in  Social 
war,  269,  seqq. 

Urbs,  9      . 

Usipetes,  401,  402,  409 

Usury,  59,  68,  320,  483,  507,  508 

Utioa,  relations  with  Carthage,  118, 
124;  Scipio's  conflicts  at,  170;  in 
third  Punic  war,  217,  219;  in 
Civil  war,  458,  472,  477,  478 

Uxentum,  155 

Vaocaei,  214 
Vadimonian  Lake,  96 
Vaga,  248 

Valerias  Catullus  Q.,  431 
Valerius  Corvus  L.,  207,  208 

,  284,  285,  286,  299 

Valerius  Corvus  M.,  72 

Valerius  Laevinus  M.,  158,  161 

Valerius  Laevinus  P.,  104,  105 

Valerius  Maximus  M.,  54 

Valerius  Maximus  Messalla  M.,  129 

Valerius  Poplicola  L  ,  60 

Varius  Q.,  270,  273,  274,  291 

Varro.     See  Terentius. 

Vatinius  P.,  390,  431,  472 

Vectigalia,  17 

Veil,   25,   32 ;   assignment  of  terri- 

torv,  65  ;  captured,  80,  82 
Veliai  11,  27 
Velites,  24 

Velitrae,  86,  87;  revolts,  91.  92 
Veneti,  31,  81,  82,  139,  140;  Gallic, 

408 
Venusia,  98  ;  in  Pyrrhic  war,  104 ; 

in  second  Punic  war,  154,  167  ,  in 

Social  war,  271,  273 
Vercellae,  254,  255 
Vercingetorix,  413-418 
Verres  C,  355,  510 
Verona,  79 
Verulae,  97 
Vesta,  27 
Vestini,  94 
Veterans  of  Marius,  lands  allotted  to, 

260 ;  of  Sulla  302,  329,  330  ;  of 

Pompeius,     357,     387,     389;     of 

Caesar,  495,  509 


Vetulonium,  33 
Vetilius  C,  214 
Vettius  T.,  244 

,  informer,  391 

Via  Aemilia,  from  Ariminum  to  Pla» 

centia,  175 
Appia,  to  Capua,  95 ;  to  Venusia, 

98 ;  to  the  Ionian  sea,  108 
Aurelia,  coast  road  from  Rome 

to  Luna,  perhaps  at  the  same  time 

as  the  Aemilian,  175 

Cassia,  175 

Domitia,  from  the  Rhone  to  the 

Pyrenees,  251,  320 
Egnatia,  to  protect  the  Mace- 
donian   frontier,    from    Apollonia 

and  Dyrrhachium  to  the  Hebrus, 

219,319 

Flaminia,  97,  175 

Gabinia,    connecting     Adriatic 

ports  with  interior,  319 
Postumia,  from  Genua  to  Aqui- 

leia,  318 

Valeria,  97 

Vicus  Tuscus,  32 

Vine-culture  in  Italy,  4,  increase  of, 

211 
Viriathus,  214 
Vitruvius  Vaccus,  92 
Volaterrae,  275,  302 
Volci,  33 
Volsci,  wars  with  Rome,  26 :  cltents 

of  the  Etruscans,  34 ;  subdued  by 

Rome,  85,  86  ;  revolt,  91,  94,  97 
Volsinii,   33  ,  its  aristocrats  call  ra 

Rome,  82 
Vote  by  ballot,  223.  224 

War  chariots  In  Britain,  410 
Women,  505 

Xanthippus,  131,  1S2 

Zaoynthus,  194 
Zama  regia,  171 
Zamolxis,  421 
Zanole.    See  Messana. 
Ziela,  472 


b 


